Dissertationen zum Thema „Undercover operations – Great Britain“
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1
Cassidy, Robert M. „The uptonian paradox and the Cardwellian conundrum : a comparison of U.S. and British military-strategic cultures and peace operations doctrine, 1990-1995“. Thesis, Connect to Dissertations & Theses @ Tufts University, 2000.
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Thesis (Ph.D) -- Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 2000.Typescript. Vita. Adviser: Dick Shultz. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 403-422). Access restricted to members of the Tufts University community. Also available via the World Wide Web;
2
Delaporta, Eleftheria. „The role of Britain in Greek politics and military operations 1947-1952“. Thesis, University of Glasgow, 2003. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/1138/.
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This thesis examines Anglo-Greek relations during 1947-1952; the era of the Greek civil war from the British announcement to withdraw aid from Greece until the end of the civil war and Greece's entry into NATO. A comprehensive treatment of the crisis of the civil of the civil war focuses on British imperial defence, the politics and society of Greece and bilateral relations as formulated by Cold War needs. During the rift between the Right and the Left in Greece, the main issue addressed by this work is the continuation of British influence in Greek affairs and the extension of British interest in bolstering the anti-Communist fight of the Greek government. In 1947 Britain, being itself on the verge of economic collapse, opted to discontinue financial support to the Greek right-wing government, which boosted the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947. In the wake of American interference in Greece, Anglo-Greek relations remained close and intense, as the Greek governments maintained their trust in the British. For the British, Greece remained a destitute country, in need for assistance to defeat the communists. This study emphasises the diplomatic and military co-operation between the British, the American and the Greek governments in trying to defeat the communist forces, while attention is given to the policy and aims of the Greek Communist Party. The communist attempts to take over power along with the policies of the Greek governments and their allies are examined, with particular emphasis on the counterinsurgency operations of the Greek government developed from 1947 until the final defeat of the communist forces in 1949. The British role in these operations is considered to be important and influential in training and equipping the Greek armed forces. In the first post-civil war period of 1950-1953, the main issues examined are the attempts made by the Greek governments and the allies to establish a strong democratic cabinet and to strengthen the security of Greece within the context of international Cold War policies. Due to anti-Communist perceptions, precipitated by the Korean War, Greece became a quasi NATO member in 1950 and full member in 1952, which brought the withdrawal of the British Military Mission from Greece.
3
Bines, Jeffrey. „The Polish country section of the Special Operations Executive 1940-1946 : a British perspective“. Thesis, University of Stirling, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1893/929.
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This thesis is a history of the Polish Country Section of the Special Operations Executive (SOE), a British organisation whose purpose was to infiltrate agents behind enemy lines during World War II. The thesis covers the period 1940 – 1946, the entire period that SOE existed, and its close connection with the Polish special department, formally known as the Sixth Bureau of the Polish Government in Exile. Chapters contained herein each cover a full year of operations from 1941 -1943, followed by two chapters for 1944, and one chapter for 1945-1946. Covered are details of agent training, information on the first flight to Poland to drop agents and couriers and the problems encountered. The German invasion of the Soviet Union and SOE’s thoughts on the predicted outcome is covered, as are also Polish operations in France and indications of support for Polish operations in other parts of the world. Throughout, is evidence of the difficulties in obtaining sufficient air support for flights to Poland which, although inadequate for Polish requirements, were more abundant than many realised at the time. This is especially true with reference to supplies dropped to Warsaw during the rising of 1944. Brief accounts of the meetings between the ‘Big Three’, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, at Teheran and Yalta in as much as they affected SOE/Polish relations. The thesis finishes with appendices detailing agent/courier parachute drops, lists of personnel involved, a bibliography and glossary.
4
McLay, Keith Andrew John. „Combined operations : British naval and military co-operation in the wars of 1688-1713“. Thesis, University of Glasgow, 2003. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/1269/.
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This thesis assesses British naval and military co-operation in the form of combined operations during the Nine Years War, 1688-1697, and the War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-1713. The operational history of the joint actions is related and used to drive forward the determination of two inter-related themes. These are, how combined operations might be defined as an instrument of warfare during this period; and secondly, the place of such operations within the military component of Britain's wartime Grand Strategy. With respect to the former, previous definitions embodying the benchmarks of objectives and composition of force are set against the history and built upon to incorporate three further categories of definition: theatre of war, bureaucratic control and command structure. As a result, it is argued that no blanket definition for combined operations can be arrived at, but that any one of the five categories can provide insights into combined operations as an instrument of warfare. The second theme places the strategic objectives of these operations within the context of British war policy and explores their relationship to the 'Maritime' and 'Continental' strategic traditions. While it becomes clear that combined operations were thought to possess neither an independent nor a war-winning strategic capability, they do appear to have consistently filled a role in Grand Strategy which acted either simultaneously or separately in support of the naval and military strategic interests. With the categories for definition and a strategic role established for such joint army-navy ventures, the thesis concludes by considering whether during these wars there were any factors common to the more successful, and conversely to the failing, combined operations. Although a pattern or mould for a successful combined operation cannot be established, it is shown that the origins of the developed historical practice of this type of warfare - demonstrated to such effect later in the eighteenth century - can be traced in the two wars considered in this study.
5
Ellis, John Edward Kirkham. „Military intelligence operations during the first English Civil War 1642-1646“. Thesis, University of Southampton, 2010. https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/361576/.
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6
Luce, Alexandra Isabella. „British intelligence in the Portuguese world, 1939-1945 : operations against German Intelligence and relations with the Polícia de Vigilância e Defesa do Estado (PVDE)“. Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.608984.
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7
Jakub, Joseph F. „Spies and saboteurs : Anglo-American collaboration and rivalry in human intelligence collection and special operations, 1940-1945“. Thesis, University of Oxford, 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.670255.
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8
Lawrence, Keith Michael. „Cautious steps : the development and use of tactical air power by the RAF during the Second World War“. Thesis, McGill University, 2001. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=31116.
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This thesis examines the doctrinal and practical development of tactical air forces by the Royal Air Force until the end of the Second World War. It focuses on the fundamental disagreements over the uses of air power, the preference for a strategic vision and the pressing need for tactical air forces in the face of the exigencies of war. This paper will trace the gradual provision of air support to the land forces and the formidable and fundamental changes that occurred during operations in various theatres in the Second World War.
9
Drolet, Marc 1968. „The North American squadron of the Royal Navy, 1807-1815 /“. Thesis, McGill University, 2002. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=82857.
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This study explores the role of the Royal Navy's North American squadron in protecting Britain's colonies and trade in North America from 1847 to 1815. The squadron had its origins in the war of 1739--48, when it became clear that a fleet based on the eastern Atlantic or the West Indies could not adequately support operations in the North American theatre. The British naval establishment, however, even when North America was the principle theatre of war, never developed as strong an attachment to the North American squadron as it did to its fleets in the West Indies or other theatres. It was, with a few notable exceptions, generally treated as one of the lesser commands of the Royal Navy, and rarely received more than secondary consideration from the Admiralty. This was especially true during the Napoleonic Wars, in which the North American station was viewed a one of the 'quiet' stations, especially when compared to the more active stations in the West Indies.England's main priority was in defeating France, and she was willing to achieve this at the expense of antagonizing the United States, leading to an unnecessary war with them in 1812. Yet even when faced with a new war in North America, the needs of the squadron were considered of secondary importance to the war in Europe, and several months passed before sizable reinforcements were sent to the North American theatre. Even when the war in Europe ended in 1814, the British leaders continued to treat North America as a secondary theatre. Their efforts to gain victory were at best half-hearted, and the government was more interested in demobilizing the navy to cut costs than in defeating the United States.
The War of 1812 brought little glory to England or the Royal Navy, and there was much criticism in the way the conflict was fought after the war. The inability of England's leaders to correctly read the situation in the United States or to understand the American threat led them to send forces inadequate to wage more than a limited war in North America. Despite this, the performance of the North American Squadron in this period was far more commendable than has generally been acknowledged, especially in light of the handicaps set upon it. This work will give a detailed description of the operations of the squadron, to give a better understanding of its role in this period.
10
Drolet, Marc. „[The] North American squadron of the Royal Navy, 1807-1815“. Thesis, McGill University, 2003. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=107545.
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Note:This study explores the role of the Royal Na'vy's North American Squadron in protecting Britain' s colonies and trade in North America from 1807 to 1815. The squadron had its origins in the war of 1739-48, when it became clear that a fleet based on the eastem Atlantic or the West Indies could not adequately support operations in the North American theatre. The British naval establishment, however, even when North America was the principle theatre of war, never developed as strong an attachment to the North American Squadron as it did to its fleets in the West Indies or other theatres. It was, with a few notable exceptions, generally treated as one of the lesser commands of the Royal Navy, and rarely received more than secondary consideration from the Admiralty. This was especially true during the Napoleonic Wars, in which the North American station was viewed a one of the 'quiet' stations, especially when compared to the more active stations in the West Indies.
Notre étude trace le role de la marine britannique en Amérique du Nord entre 1807 et 1815. L'origine de la flotte remonte à la guerre de 1739-48, quand c'était devenu évident que les flottes dans le secteur de l'est Atlantique ou dans les Antilles n'étaient pas capables de supporter des opérations en Amérique du Nord. Mais cette flotte était rarement considérée comme une des flottes importantes dans la marine britannique. Ceci était le cas durant la guerre contre Napoléon, quand la flotte américaine protégeait un secteur perçu comme tranquille comparativement à la flotte antillaise, elle plus active.
11
Cobden, Lynsey Shaw. „Neuropsychiatry and the management of aerial warfare : the Royal Air Force Neuropsychiatric Division in the Second World War“. Thesis, University of Oxford, 2015. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:2dd79d33-bf1f-4351-b3f4-cebcac9b7fad.
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This work is a critical assessment of the role of neuropsychiatry in the management of aerial warfare. Focussing almost exclusively on the Second World War (1939-45), the thesis demonstrates how the Royal Air Force (RAF) mobilised specialist medical knowledge to improve wastage and combat efficiency in flying personnel. Neurological and psychiatric expertise was enlisted to improve service performance and reduce the burden of neuropsychiatric disorders. To meet these key objectives, the RAF neuropsychiatric division undertook important administrative and therapeutic duties in the areas of personnel selection, service discipline, neuropsychiatric research, and the treatment of mental disorders. The work therefore assesses how the division responded to these challenges and contributed to the management of aerial warfare. The thesis assesses the factors that shaped the practice of neuropsychiatry in the service. Historically, the training and personal interests of specialists and the context of therapeutic practice guided the development of mental health specialties. To gain a fuller appreciation of the administrative and therapeutic duties of the division, this work explores the medical, social, military, and professional factors that shaped neuropsychiatric thought and practice. Secondly, the work engages with the 'human element' of aerial combat. The physical and mental health of aircrew was fundamental to the conduct of the air war and underpinned the administrative decisions of the air force. It was the primary objective of the neuropsychiatric division to preserve and develop these vital human resources. Neuropsychiatric disorders represented a challenge to efficiency, for they could affect the performance and motivation of a flyer. The thesis will examine how the neuropsychiatric division attempted to sustain aircrew by preventing and treating the disorders that compromised their efficiency.
12
Hughes, Jackson. „The monstrous anger of the guns : the development of British artillery tactics, 1914-1918 /“. Title page, contents and abstract only, 1992. http://web4.library.adelaide.edu.au/theses/09PH/09phh893.pdf.
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13
Furlet, Brooke (Brooke Gardiner). „The Influence of Naval Strategy on Churchill's Foreign Policy: May - September 1940“. Thesis, University of North Texas, 1993. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc501254/.
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This study examines Churchill's struggle during the summer of 1940 to preserve Britain's naval superiority worldwide, through the neutralization of the French fleet and by securing the active participation of the United States. Sources consulted included autobiographies of the participants, especially those by Churchill, Reynaud, Baudouin, and Weygand, document collections, and British and American official histories. This study is organized to give a chronological analysis of Churchill's efforts from 10 May to 2 September 1940, ending with the United States' acceptance of the destroyers-for-bases agreement. This act committed them to shared strategical responsibilities with Great Britain. The thesis concludes that Churchill's efforts in this period laid the foundation for later Allied victory.
14
Baker, William C. „Capital Ships, Commerce, and Coalition: British Strategy in the Mediterranean Theater, 1793“. Thesis, University of North Texas, 2014. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc699881/.
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In 1793, Great Britain embarked on a war against Revolutionary France to reestablish a balance of power in Europe. Traditional assessments among historians consider British war planning at the ministerial level during the First Coalition to be incompetent and haphazard. This work reassesses decision making of the leading strategists in the British Cabinet in the development of a theater in the Mediterranean by examining political, diplomatic, and military influences. William Pitt the Younger and his controlling ministers pursued a conservative strategy in the Mediterranean, reliant on Allies in the region to contain French armies and ideas inside the Alps and the Pyrenees. Dependent on British naval power, the Cabinet sought to weaken the French war effort by targeting trade in the region. Throughout the first half of 1793, the British government remained fixed on this conservative, traditional approach to France. However, with the fall of Toulon in August of 1793, decisions made by Admiral Samuel Hood in command of forces in the Mediterranean radicalized British policy towards the Revolution while undermining the construct of the Coalition. The inconsistencies in strategic thought political decisions created stagnation, wasting the opportunities gained by the Counter-revolutionary movements in southern France. As a result, reinvigorated French forces defeated Allied forces in detail in the fall of 1793.
15
Macfarlane, J. Allan C. „A naval travesty : the dismissal of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, 1917“. Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/5022.
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This dissertation relates to the dismissal of Admiral Jellicoe, First Sea Lord from November 1916 to December 1917, by Sir Eric Geddes, First Lord of the Admiralty, at the behest of the Prime Minister, David Lloyd George. The dismissal was peremptory and effected without rational explanation, despite Jellicoe having largely fulfilled his primary mission of combating the German U-boat threat to British merchant shipping. The outcome of the war may well have been affected if the level of shipping losses sustained through U-boat attack in April 1917 had continued unabated. The central argument of the dissertation is that the dismissal was unjustified. As an adjunct, it argues that the received view of certain historians that Jellicoe was not successful as First Sea Lord is unwarranted and originates from severe post war critism of Jellicoe by those with a vested interest in justifying the dismissal, notably Lloyd George. Supporting these arguments, the following assertions are made. Firstly, given the legacy Jellicoe inherited when joining the Admiralty, through the strategies adopted, organisational changes made and initiatives undertaken in anti-submarine weapons development, the progress made in countering the U-boat threat was notable. Secondly, the universal criticism directed at the Admiralty over the perceived delay in introducing a general convoy system for merchant shipping is not sustainable having regard to primary source documentation. Thirdly, incidents that occurred during the latter part of 1917, and suggested as being factors which contributed to the dismissal, can be discounted. Fourthly, Lloyd George conspired to involve General Haig, Commander of the British Forces France, and the press baron, Lord Northcliffe, in his efforts to mitigate any potential controversy that might result from Jellicoe's removal from office. Finally, the arguments made by a number of commentators that the Admiralty performed better under Jellicoe's successor, Admiral Wemyss, is misconceived.
16
„An analysis of credit card organizations' operations in two selected markets: a cross-cultural approach“. Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1993. http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5887556.
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by Cheung Mo Man, Mandy, Lau Yiu Kwong, Clive.Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1993.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves [31]-[34] (2nd group)).
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY --- p.i
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS --- p.iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.iv
LIST OF TABLES --- p.vi
LIST OF FIGURES --- p.vii
Chapter
Chapter I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1
Chapter II. --- OBJECTIVES --- p.5
Chapter 2.1 --- Decision-Making Objective --- p.7
Chapter 2.2 --- Research Objectives --- p.7
Chapter III. --- LITERATURE REVIEW --- p.9
Chapter 3.1 --- Standardization Versus Adaptation --- p.9
Chapter 3.1.1 --- International Marketing Standardization --- p.11
Chapter 3.1.2 --- International Marketing Adaptation --- p.13
Chapter 3.1.3 --- Standardization or Adaptation? --- p.14
Chapter 3.2 --- Studies on Credit Card Market --- p.16
Chapter 3.2.1 --- Cross-Cultural Studies of Credit Cardholders --- p.16
Chapter 3.2.2 --- Studies of the Credit Card Market in Hong Kong --- p.20
Chapter 3.2.3 --- Studies of the Credit Card Market in the United Kingdom --- p.23
Chapter 3.3 --- Overview of the Credit Card Market --- p.25
Chapter 3.3.1 --- Global Market --- p.25
Chapter 3.3.2 --- Hong Kong Market --- p.36
Chapter 3.3.3 --- United Kingdom Market --- p.39
Chapter IV. --- METHODOLOGY --- p.43
Chapter 4.1 --- Research Design --- p.43
Chapter 4.2 --- Data Collection --- p.47
Chapter 4.2.1 --- Secondary Data Collection --- p.47
Chapter 4.2.2 --- Primary Data Collection --- p.48
Chapter 4.3 --- Sampling --- p.50
Chapter 4.3.1 --- Sampling Method --- p.50
Chapter 4.3.2 --- Sample Size --- p.51
Chapter 4.4 --- Construction of Questionnaire --- p.52
Chapter 4.5 --- Field Work --- p.55
Chapter 4.6 --- Data Analysis --- p.56
Chapter 4.6.1 --- Editing --- p.56
Chapter 4.6.2 --- Coding --- p.57
Chapter 4.6.3 --- Methods of Analysis --- p.58
Chapter V. --- LIMITATIONS --- p.61
Chapter 5.1 --- Sampling Control --- p.61
Chapter 5.2 --- Information Control --- p.62
Chapter 5.3 --- Administrative Control --- p.63
Chapter VI. --- FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS --- p.65
Chapter 6 .1 --- Usage Patterns --- p.65
Chapter 6.2 --- Card Selection Criteria --- p.72
Chapter 6.3 --- Attitudes Toward Credit Cards --- p.76
Chapter 6.4 --- Demographic Characteristics of Heavy Users --- p.81
Chapter VII. --- RECOMMENDATIONS --- p.85
Chapter 7.1 --- Standardization Versus Adaptation --- p.85
Chapter 7.2 --- Recommended Marketing Strategies --- p.89
Chapter 7.2.1 --- Marketing Strategies for the HK Market --- p.89
Chapter 7.2.2 --- Marketing Strategies for the UK Market --- p.93
APPENDIX
BIBLIOGRAPHY