Auswahl der wissenschaftlichen Literatur zum Thema „Transhumanist assumption“

The article serves as a continuation of the first part of reflections on future wars and the morale of their participants. The results of a survey will be presented, addressing the most important issues and controversies related to the concept of post-humanism. The study of the awareness of declared transhumanists regarding international security confirmed the heterogeneity of predictions and perceptions of globalization trends. However, even the analysis of the "metrics," i.e., the characteristics of the research group's parameters, allowed for drawing interesting conclusions. The research goal remained complex. Firstly, I wanted to confront the theoretical assumptions of post- and transhumanism; secondly, I aimed to attempt an answer to the question: Who is and what does the contemporary post- and transhumanist think about future wars?

Posthuman Bliss? The Failed Promise of Transhumanism by Susan B. Levin presents a well-informed and structured critique to transhumanism. Not only transhumanist ethical and sociopo-litical applications are challenged: the theoretical assumptions and implications of transhumanism are made explicit and put into discussion, thereby confronting transhumanism as a worldview of its own, from metaphysics, to epistemology, to philosophy of mind, down to ethics and politics. This worldview is then constantly put to the test of Levin’s own Aristotelian essentialist framework, which sees the human being as a holistic whole and our role in the world as the complex process of attaining human flourishing. First, I will spend a few words to frame the general aim of the book and to delineate the main contents of the seven chapters. After that, I will deal critically with four interesting focal points, where further research may be prompted or the standpoint of the author may be challenged: the attribution of (rational) essentialism to transhumanism, the definition of well-being underlying transhumanist positions, the apparent tension between the sociopolitical im-plications of transhumanism and its cultivation of radical personal autonomy, the critical evaluation of Levin’s American-centered adaptation of her Aristotelian virtue-ethics approach.

Abstract This essay examines the narrative conflicts in the cyberpunk novel Altered Carbon and the neo-gothic novella The Body. The theoretical assumption of the analyses is that narrative conflict can serve as an indicator of aspects of a text’s implied worldview: more specifically, narrative conflict is presumed to be indicative of an implied value conflict. Resorting to a spatial conflict model based on Jurij Lotman’s concept of border crossing, the essay argues that both texts differ substantially regarding the values they negotiate despite both deploying the transhumanist concept of body swapping. Whereas Altered Carbon places a socio-economic conflict at its core, The Body negotiates a metaphysical conflict. Accordingly, Altered Carbon discusses the construction of self-worth in view of an economically and socially overpowering opponent, whereas The Body emerges as a search for a value which can fill the void created by the dwindling relevance of religious notions of eternity in a secular world.

Transhumanism is a social, technological, political, and philosophical movement that advocates the transformation of human nature by means of pharmacology, genetic manipulation, cybernetic modification, nanotechnology, and a host of other technologies. The aim of this movement is to increase physical and sensory abilities, augment intelligence and memory, and extend lifespan. After providing some background on transhumanism, its philosophical heritage, and its goals, the author looks at three arguments against transhumanism, arguing that they are unpersuasive and should be rejected. This paper presents two arguments against transhumanism that have merit. The first argument is an argument from justice that addresses the distribution of benefits and burdens for funding, developing, and employing enhancement technology. The second argument examines a significant assumption held by many transhumanists, namely, that there is an essential “human nature” that can be transcended.

Victor Pelevin has established a reputation as one of the most interesting, controversial, and mysterious contemporary Russian writers. He is recognized as one of the leading representatives of Russian postmodernism. Pelevin is also known as an attentive and critical observer of the surrounding reality. He is sometimes described as a deep thinker, a prophet, and a visionary. Pelevin’s literary work entitled Transhumanism Inc. (2021) is the subject of the analysis in this paper. The purpose of the article is to show and discuss Pelevin’s transhumanist vision of the future in which an isolated brain (removed from its host) will be able to survive indefinitely in a specialized container (‘a jar’) and human consciousness will exist within a virtual reality. However, access to this ‘jar dimension’ will be exclusive, limited only to the wealthy, leaders, and world oligarchs. However, it is the vampires, as supernatural creatures, who will be the real architects of the world order. This paper focuses on the analysis of the selected aspects of Pelevin’s literary work − mainly those which can be viewed in connection with the assumptions of the transhumanist project. Special attention is paid to the idea of cyber immortality, the concept of morphological freedom, and mind uploading.

<p>The article deals with analysis of transhumanist prospects for the philosophy of law. Modern transhumanists consider morphological freedom as a concept, revealing the natural right to happiness. The authors take this idea as a starting point and consider the logic of the convergent biotechnology development. They believe that the extension of natural law has the character of a dialectical strategy of assumptions and tactics of the local bans in the sphere of human reproduction. This situation is typical of biomedical technology in general. The legislator authorizes a technology by endorsing forms of reproductive relationships and blocking technologies that support immoral forms. As a result, it gradually enhances understanding of how technology must be applied to ensure the human natural rights. Convergence of technologies makes real a hypothetical design of rights to reproduction, while the conflict of morality and the imperatives of technological development can be resolved from the standpoint of the primacy of natural law.</p>

<p class="Abstract">Nick Bostrom, a transhumanist figure, referred human perfection on three pillars: including super longevity (super long life), super wellbeing (super happy) and super intelligence (super intelligent). This cyborg human model adheres to the epistemology of scientism which he values ​​as anti-traditionalist culture, religious dogmas and metaphysics, but in principle ostrom bases his perfect human model on Nietzsche <i>(Der ubermensch)</i>, whereas scientism in Nietzsche's view is a form of religious ideas in a certain degree. This paper attempts to reveal the epistemological paradox of Bostrom's concept of transhumanism through Nietzsche's genealogical philosophy and its epistemological implications. The method used in this research is an epistemological and genealogical analysis on the three main pillars of Bostrom which are the basic foundations of its transhumanism. In this study, it is found first that the Bostrom paradox occurs not only in the misinterpretation of a perfect man, where Bostrom considers the fulfillment of the three pillars, whereas what Nietzsche means is as an independent human being in the sense of two things, namely: able to govern himself and be united or only rely on himself, and not relying on external reality or dogma. The second, paradoxes occur in the belief system of the pillars of Bostrom's transhumanism where he relies on the absolutism of science and negates all assumptions or arguments that come from metaphysics and religion. Meanwhile, what Nietzsche means is to hold on to the relativity of truth where humans will be weak and flawed if they rely on beliefs outside themselves, including science.&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

<p class="Abstract">Nick Bostrom, a transhumanist figure, referred human perfection on three pillars: including super longevity (super long life), super wellbeing (super happy) and super intelligence (super intelligent). This cyborg human model adheres to the epistemology of scientism which he values ​​as anti-traditionalist culture, religious dogmas and metaphysics, but in principle ostrom bases his perfect human model on Nietzsche <i>(Der ubermensch)</i>, whereas scientism in Nietzsche's view is a form of religious ideas in a certain degree. This paper attempts to reveal the epistemological paradox of Bostrom's concept of transhumanism through Nietzsche's genealogical philosophy and its epistemological implications. The method used in this research is an epistemological and genealogical analysis on the three main pillars of Bostrom which are the basic foundations of its transhumanism. In this study, it is found first that the Bostrom paradox occurs not only in the misinterpretation of a perfect man, where Bostrom considers the fulfillment of the three pillars, whereas what Nietzsche means is as an independent human being in the sense of two things, namely: able to govern himself and be united or only rely on himself, and not relying on external reality or dogma. The second, paradoxes occur in the belief system of the pillars of Bostrom's transhumanism where he relies on the absolutism of science and negates all assumptions or arguments that come from metaphysics and religion. Meanwhile, what Nietzsche means is to hold on to the relativity of truth where humans will be weak and flawed if they rely on beliefs outside themselves, including science.&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>

Resumen: El Transhumanismo es una perspectiva que aboga por la posibilidad de mejorar la condición humana física, emocional y cognitiva utilizando el progreso y la tecnología. Las cuestiones que plantea requieren asumir dos premisas, una normativa y otra empírica: la primera es que la formación para el uso de las tecnologías requiere una educación ética y jurídica, además de científica. La segunda implica que en un futuro próximo habrá robots muy sofisticados y dotados de inteligencia artificial avanzada que podrán tomar decisiones operativas, así que ¿cómo regular estas capacidades? Las aplicaciones en el ámbito sanitario muestran los términos del trilema normativo relativo a la distinción conceptual entre “terapia”, “mejora” y “superación” de la condición humana. Abstract: Transhumanism stands up for the physical, emotional and cognitive human enhancement by progress and technology. The issues in question involve both a normative and an empirical assumption: the first one undertakes that the use of new technologies demands not only a scientific approach but also an ethical and legal one. The second means that in the near future advanced robots with artificial intelligence will make working decisions. So, how shall we have to rule those abilities? Many health implementations show the normative trilemma posed by the conceptual difference between therapy, enhancement and going beyond the human condition.

AbstractWhat justifies the astrobiologist's search for post-biological or machine-intelligence in outer space? Four assumptions borrowed from transhumanism (H+) seem to be at work: (1) it is reasonable to speculate that life on Earth will evolve in the direction of post-biological intelligence; (2) if extraterrestrials have evolved longer than we on Earth, then they will be more scientifically and technologically advanced; (3) superintelligence, computer uploads of brains, and dis-embodied mind belong together; and (4) evolutionary progress is guided by the drive toward increased intelligence. When subjected to critical review, these assumptions prove to be weak. Most importantly, evolutionary biologists do not support the idea that evolution is internally directed toward increased intelligence. Without this assumption, justifying the search for ET more intelligent than earthlings is anaemic. Nevertheless, one can still hope that in the near future we will be communicating with new neighbours in the Milky Way. Can sheer hope inspire science?

La gestion des risques est un enjeu majeur pour le pilotage d’une compagnie d’assurance. Les données toujours plus nombreuses, les modèles toujours plus sophistiqués et la puissance informatique croissante permettent aujourd’hui aux actuaires, risk managers et data scientists d’affiner la connaissance de leurs portefeuilles d’assurés et des risques sous-jacents. C’est dans ce contexte que se situe cette thèse, qui a pour objectif de contribuer à la compréhension et à la modélisation des risques biométriques et comportementaux en assurance vie, par le biais de trois chapitres introduits et contextualisés dans une introduction générale. Le Chapitre 1 s’intéresse aux versements libres sur les contrats d’assurance vie. Nous proposons une méthodologie basée sur l’apprentissage automatique pour les piloter efficacement : le modèle, construit via l’algorithme de Gradient Boosting, s’appuie aussi bien sur des variables liées aux versements passés que sur des variables liées au produit en question et au business plan, et nous montrons qu’il donne de meilleurs résultats qu’une méthodologie plus classique fondée sur l’utilisation de séries temporelles. En outre, l’analyse du modèle via le cadre proposé par SHAP (Shapley Additive Explanations) permet de mettre en évidence certains faits stylisés; enfin, l’étude à une maille plus fine complète les travaux et interroge la relation entre les versements et les rachats et arbitrages. Le Chapitre 2 concerne les transferts en assurance vie, qui offrent la possibilité à un épargnant d’investir de l’argent sur un nouveau contrat tout en conservant une partie des avantages afférents à son contrat d’origine. En particulier, nous nous intéressons aux transferts Fourgous et PACTE que nous présentons et dont nous mettons en exergue les principaux points communs et différences majeures. Nous proposons alors une modélisation de l’amendement Fourgous via une régression logistique dynamique et analysons, au vu des premières observations, dans quelle mesure les enseignements que l’on peut en tirer sont applicables à la loi PACTE. Enfin, nous élargissons la réflexion en discutant du cadre législatif et de ses impacts potentiels en termes de comportements des assurés. Enfin, le Chapitre 3 est consacré au risque de longévité, et s’intéresse en particulier à une hypothèse extrême, peu considérée en actuariat : le transhumanisme. Cette hypothèse envisage une potentielle amélioration gigantesque de la longévité par l’apport de la science et des technologies. Après avoir rappelé l’état de la connaissance sur la longévité et tous les sujets y afférent (espérance de vie, âge biologique maximal en particulier) et les principales hypothèses sur son évolution future, mettant ainsi en évidence l’absence de consensus et la complexité du sujet, nous analysons plus en détail l’hypothèse transhumaniste et discutons de ses tenants et aboutissants
Risk management is a major issue for the piloting of an insurance company. The increasing amount of data, the sophistication of models and the growing computing power now allow actuaries, risk managers and data scientists to refine the knowledge of their policyholder portfolios and the underlying risks. This is the context of this thesis, which aims to contribute to the understanding and modeling of biometric and behavioral risks in life insurance, through three chapters introduced and contextualized in a general introduction. Chapter 1 focuses on free payments on life insurance contracts. We propose a methodology based on machine learning to pilot them efficiently: the model, based on the Gradient Boosting algorithm, relies on variables related to past payments as well as variables related to the product in question and its business plan, and we show that it gives better results than a more classical methodology based on the use of time series. In addition, the analysis of the model via the framework proposed by SHAP (Shapley Additive Explanations) makes it possible to highlight certain stylized facts; finally, the study at a finer scale completes the work and questions the relationship between payments and surrenders or arbitrages. Chapter 2 deals with life insurance transfers, which allow a saver to invest money in a new contract while retaining some of the advantages of the original contract. In particular, we are interested in the Fourgous and PACTE transfers, which we present; we highlight the main common points and major differences of those transfers. We then propose a model of the Fourgous amendment using dynamic logistic regression and analyze, given the initial observations, to what the extent the lessons that can be drawn from it are applicable to the PACTE law. Finally, we broaden the reflection by discussing the legislative framework and its potential impacts in terms of policyholder behavior. Finally, Chapter 3 is devoted to the risk of longevity, and focuses in particular on an extreme assumption, not really considered in actuarial science: transhumanism. This assumption considers a potential gigantic improvement in longevity through the use of science and technology. After discussing the state of the art on longevity and all the related subjects (life expectancy, maximum biological age in particular) and the main hypotheses on its future evolution, thus highlighting the lack of consensus and the complexity of this subject, we analyze the transhumanist assumption in more details and discuss its ins and outs

This chapter is concerned with the contemporary impact of the biomedical sciences on life expectancy and how the so-called life-extension project. A promise of more or less indefinite human survival or the end of aging represents a critical challenge, not just to religious assumptions about life, aging and death but to traditional moral assumptions about the just distribution of resources in society. Medical consumption is simply a subset of general consumption, and the idea of living forever is central to modern secular lifestyles. The tensions between religion and medicine, and therefore the nature of “medical secularization,” can be understood by recognizing that many critical problems for the Christian churches in modernity are raised by questions about the changing status of the human body. As modern societies are driven by technological and scientific advances, the choices that confront humans fall broadly into two camps, namely posthumanism and transhumanism.

Transhumanism is a social, technological, political, and philosophical movement that advocates the transformation of human nature by means of pharmacology, genetic manipulation, cybernetic modification, nanotechnology, and a host of other technologies. The aim of this movement is to increase physical and sensory abilities, augment intelligence and memory, and extend lifespan. After providing some background on transhumanism, its philosophical heritage, and its goals, the author looks at three arguments against transhumanism, arguing that they are unpersuasive and should be rejected. This paper presents two arguments against transhumanism that have merit. The first argument is an argument from justice that addresses the distribution of benefits and burdens for funding, developing, and employing enhancement technology. The second argument examines a significant assumption held by many transhumanists, namely, that there is an essential “human nature” that can be transcended.

Transhumanists want to free us from the constraints imposed by our humanity by means of “uploading”: extracting information from the brain, transferring it to a computer, and using it to create a purely electronic person there. That is supposed to move us from our human bodies to computers. This presupposes that a human being could literally move to a computer by a mere transfer of information. The essay questions this metaphysical assumption, then asks whether the procedure might be just as good, as far as our interests go, even if it could not move us to a computer.

The aim of this chapter is to show some of the assumptions that lie behind transhumanism. The concept of enhancement is analyzed. While, from transhumanism, human welfare depends on the enhancement of human capabilities, here it shall be argued that to begin with, a social debate over what is considered welfare is needed before we can establish what we wish to improve (enhance). This reflection must emphasize the necessity to reflect, ex ante, on what kind of technological development we want, viewing technology as a means to attain the agreed-upon type of welfare, rather than a goal in itself. On the basis of a socially open debate with an anticipatory perspective, society as a whole can establish which risks it is willing to take.

The aim of this chapter is to show some of the assumptions that lie behind transhumanism. The concept of enhancement is analyzed. While, from transhumanism, human welfare depends on the enhancement of human capabilities, here it shall be argued that to begin with, a social debate over what is considered welfare is needed before we can establish what we wish to improve (enhance). This reflection must emphasize the necessity to reflect, ex ante, on what kind of technological development we want, viewing technology as a means to attain the agreed-upon type of welfare, rather than a goal in itself. On the basis of a socially open debate with an anticipatory perspective, society as a whole can establish which risks it is willing to take.

Raising questions about ethics, transhumanism, national security, and the spread of Nazi science internationally following World War II, this qualitative study considers the possibility that the narratives of the biologically based study of the mind known as neuroscience in fiction—conceptualized as a medium of propaganda warfare embedded with socio-political and religious assumptions—have functioned to veil the development and promote the normalization and social acceptance of neuroscience since the dawn of the Scientific Revolution. With a focus on the intertwined relationship between the literary genre and technological innovations in the contest of “killer robots,” “ray guns,” “Skynet,” and now “brain implants,” this chapter examines how the narratives of an internet-connected-and-neural-electrode-dominated future world driven by artificial intelligence has inspired billionaire investors in Silicon Valley to bring to market the neurotechnology that potentially could enslave and wipe out the human race.

Raising questions about ethics, transhumanism, national security, and the spread of Nazi science internationally following World War II, this qualitative study considers the possibility that the narratives of the biologically based study of the mind known as neuroscience in fiction—conceptualized as a medium of propaganda warfare embedded with socio-political and religious assumptions—have functioned to veil the development and promote the normalization and social acceptance of neuroscience since the dawn of the Scientific Revolution. With a focus on the intertwined relationship between the literary genre and technological innovations in the contest of “killer robots,” “ray guns,” “Skynet,” and now “brain implants,” this chapter examines how the narratives of an internet-connected-and-neural-electrode-dominated future world driven by artificial intelligence has inspired billionaire investors in Silicon Valley to bring to market the neurotechnology that potentially could enslave and wipe out the human race.

This article makes no argument against progress but stresses the importance of making it with foresight. The connection between biotechnology, treatment, and enhancement is discussed, stating the need for regulation. Next, the ideas of transhumanism are presented as a framework for an examination of our human condition and it is illustrated that cyborgs will possibly develop other values than Homo sapiens. Thus, the second part of the article discusses what it means to be an ethical being from the perspective of Francis Fukuyama’s ideas of the importance of human nature to our humanity, and further elaborated on by bringing attention to the significance of the vulnerability to moral reasoning. Furthermore, the article suggests a near connection between embodiment and morality. In the light of this assumption, one can ask about ethical values and democratic cohesion in a world with sub-cultures of cyborgs. Thus, John Rawls’ theory of justice is introduced as a framework for reflections about inter-human costs of a posthuman condition. It is concluded that science need democratic regulation, in order to avoid technocratic decision processes, and guidelines for a regulatory body is given.