Auswahl der wissenschaftlichen Literatur zum Thema „Threats and violence were made aware“

Alfred, Kelly C., Timothy Turner und Aaron Young. „State Medical Board Exposure to Threats of Violence“. Journal of Medical Regulation 99, Nr. 3 (01.09.2013): 11–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.30770/2572-1852-99.3.11.

Tung, Le Thanh, Truong Tuan Anh, Nguyen Thi Minh Chinh und Nguyen Hoang Long. „Public Reactions in Online Newspapers to Workplace Violence Against Nurses“. SAGE Open Nursing 7 (Januar 2021): 237796082110038. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/23779608211003819.

Kaplan, Sebastian G., und Dewey G. Cornell. „Threats of Violence by Students in Special Education“. Behavioral Disorders 31, Nr. 1 (November 2005): 107–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/019874290503100102.

Levin, Carole, und C. J. Kracl. „Violence in Elizabeth’s England: Tudors and Turbervilles“. Explorations in Renaissance Culture 46, Nr. 1 (24.06.2020): 57–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/23526963-04601004.

Davies, Stephen. „Assaults and threats on psychiatrists“. Psychiatric Bulletin 25, Nr. 3 (März 2001): 89–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1192/pb.25.3.89.

Roberts, Lynne, und David Indermaur. „Boys and Road Rage: Driving-Related Violence and Aggression in Western Australia“. Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 38, Nr. 3 (Dezember 2005): 361–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1375/acri.38.3.361.

Zhikharevich, Boris. „Risks and Threats in Russian Regional Strategies“. Regionalnaya ekonomika. Yug Rossii, Nr. 4 (Dezember 2020): 19–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.15688/re.volsu.2020.4.2.

V, MARAGATHAM. „A study on customers purchase decesion making green marketing products in tamil nadu with special reference to coimbatore city“. Journal of Management and Science 1, Nr. 4 (30.12.2015): 316–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.26524/jms.2015.28.

Jassim, Bushra Ahmed, und Amal Kazem Mira. „Violence against wives and the Mental health’s impact on the battered students (wives)“. Al-Adab Journal, Nr. 115 (15.03.2016): 1–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.31973/aj.v0i115.1322.

Thiers, Barbara, Roslyn Rivas und Elizabeth Kiernan. „Using Data From Index Herbariorum to Assess Threats to the World’s Herbaria“. Biodiversity Information Science and Standards 2 (15.06.2018): e26440. http://dx.doi.org/10.3897/biss.2.26440.

Lundquist, Ann-Charlotte. „I skolan medvetandegörs hot och våld : Intervjustudie med personal från gymnasieskolor“. Thesis, Jönköping University, Högskolan för lärande och kommunikation, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-53552.

Kelly, Benjamin. Repression, Resistance and Rebellion. Herausgegeben von Paul J. du Plessis, Clifford Ando und Kaius Tuori. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198728689.013.29.

Ghiselli, Andrea. „Diverse Threats, Diverse Responses“. In Protecting China's Interests Overseas, 170–202. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198867395.003.0007.

Resnick, Phillip J. „Stalking Risk Assessment“. In Stalking. Oxford University Press, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195189841.003.0010.

Susanto, Heru. „Revealing Cyber Threat of Smart Mobile Devices within Digital Ecosystem: User Information Security Awareness“. In Data Integrity and Quality. IntechOpen, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.95752.

Woo, Susie. „GIs and the Kids of Korea“. In Framed by War, 33–56. NYU Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.18574/nyu/9781479889914.003.0002.

Kleinman, Arthur. „Social and cultural anthropology: salience for psychiatry“. In New Oxford Textbook of Psychiatry, 275–79. Oxford University Press, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/med/9780199696758.003.0036.

„psychiatric illness. In refusing to admit the evidence the judge considered Graham and Howe and said that if the word ‘characteristics’ was given the natural wide meaning it would include personal mental characteristics and if these were included the objective test would be undermined completely. Therefore, there must be a limited meaning in this context and it seemed to the judge it would include such things as age, sex, and serious physical disability, but he did not consider it included mental characteristics such as inherent weakness, vulnerability and susceptibility to threats. The history was inadmissible as hearsay and the doctor could not say whether the appellant was in fact threatened nor could he say whether he was affected by any threats which might have been made. The psychiatrist’s opinion that the appellant was by nature pliable or vulnerable could not concern the jury because that would circumvent the objective test. The death of his father a year or more before the offences was something within the ordinary scope of human experience (see Turner (1974) 60 Cr App R 80). In support of his argument that the judge was wrong, counsel relied on a passage from the Law Commission Report (No 83, para 228), which said that the personal characteristics of a defendant were most important. Threats directed against a weak, immature or disabled person might well be much more compelling than against a normal healthy person. However, that recommendation was not enacted by Parliament and did not represent the law. The court was bound by Graham and Howe, and Lord Lane’s judgment in Graham did not comply with the suggestion of the Law Commission. The second limb of the test, which passed an objective test, required the jury to ask themselves whether a person of reasonable firmness, otherwise sharing the characteristics of the defendant, would or might have responded as he did to the threats to which he was subjected. If the standard for comparison was a person of reasonable firmness it must be irrelevant for the jury to consider any characteristics of the defendant which showed that he was not such a person, but was pliant or vulnerable to pressure. It would be a contradiction in terms to ask the jury this question, and then to ask them to take into account, as one of his characteristics, that he was pliant or vulnerable. For the purposes of this appeal, evidence of personal vulnerability or pliancy falling short of psychiatric illness was not relevant. R v Hegarty [1994] Crim LR 353 (CA) Facts: At the appellant’s trial for robbery, and possession of an imitation weapon, his defence was duress. He claimed that some Asian men who accommodated him when he was on the run later attacked him and threatened violence against his family unless he carried out the robberies. The Crown challenged the existence of the Asians or the threats. In support of the plea of duress the appellant sought to put before the court the evidence of two medical witnesses who would testify to his mental instability. He had a conviction for manslaughter of his wife on grounds of diminished responsibility, and the“. In Sourcebook Criminal Law, 567. Routledge-Cavendish, 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781843143093-135.

„reports described him as ‘emotionally unstable’ and in a ‘grossly elevated neurotic state’. The judge refused to admit the evidence, and on appeal following conviction it was contended that he was wrong. The primary contention was that the appellant’s pre-existing mental condition made him vulnerable to threats. Held, dismissing the appeal, the duress relied upon was duress by threats, but in some cases a defendant might be able to rely on ‘duress by circumstances’ (see Conway [1989] QB 290; Martin [1989] 1 All ER 652), and although not argued in this way it was proposed to consider whether the medical evidence could have been introduced on the basis that Hegarty might have been able to set up such a defence. Duress by threats provided a defence to a charge of any offence other than murder (see Howe [1987] AC 417), attempted murder (see Gotts [1982] 2 AC 412) and some forms of treason. It was founded on public policy considerations (see AG v Whelan [1934] IR 518). The fact that the defendant’s mind had been ‘overborne’ by the threats did not mean that he lacked the requisite intent to commit the crime (see DPP for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] AC 653, 703B). It followed that the law might have developed on the lines that, when considering duress, a purely subjective test should be applied, and it might well develop in this way in the future (see Law Com 218, para 29.14, November 1993, Cmnd 2370 and draft Criminal Law Bill, cl 25(2)). As the law stood however the test was not purely subjective but required an objective test to be satisfied (Howe). The jury had to consider the response of a sober person of reasonable firmness ‘sharing the characteristics of the defendant’. They could take account of age, sex and physical health, but it was open to consideration whether the shared characteristics could include a personality disorder of the kind suffered by the appellant. His counsel argued that the expert evidence was relevant to explain the reaction of a man like him to threats of violence to himself and his family, and admissible because the pathological aspects of his personality and the effect of his disorder on his behaviour were matters which lay outside the knowledge and experience of a judge and jury. Counsel referred to a passage in Emery (1993) 14 Cr App R (S) 394, 398 where Lord Taylor CJ said that: ‘... The question for the doctors was whether a woman of reasonable firmness with the characteristics of [the appellant], if abused in the manner which she said, would have had her will crushed so that she could not have protected her child.’ It was accepted that for the purposes of the subjective test medical evidence was admissible if the mental condition or abnormality was relevant and its effects lay outside the knowledge and experience of laymen. In the present case, the reports before the judge did not go that far, and the judge had to decide on the material before him. There were no grounds for disturbing his decision. As the evidence was not admissible to explain the reaction of the appellant himself, it was clearly not admissible on the objective test. The passage cited could not be read in isolation“,. In Sourcebook Criminal Law, 568. Routledge-Cavendish, 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781843143093-136.

„reversing he accidentally drove over one of his own passengers who had failed to get into the car in time. The magistrates’ court convicted him of driving with excess alcohol but the Crown Court allowed his appeal against conviction on the basis of duress. The prosecutor appealed against the Crown Court decision by way of case stated. Held, dismissing the appeal, it was clear that the defence of duress was made out where fear engendered by threats caused a person to lose complete control of his will (see Willer (1986) 83 Cr App R 225; Ortiz (1986) 83 Cr App R 173, 176, per Farquharson J). On the facts found by the Crown Court the appellant was in terror when he drove off and it was a hypothetical question whether he might have driven in the same way if he had not been in fear from the threats. A further important finding of fact was that he drove off only ‘some distance’ down the road and not, for example, all the way home so that the defence of duress/necessity continued to avail him. (DPP v Jones [1990] RTR 33 distinguished.) The prosecution had failed to negative the defence of duress. DPP v Davis; DPP v Pittaway [1994] Crim LR 600 (DC) Facts: The respondents were charged separately with driving with excess alcohol, contrary to s5(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988. Magistrates dismissed the charges finding that, in each case, the defence of duress had been proved. The DPP appealed by way of case stated. Davis: Magistrates found Davis had been suffering stress and anxiety when he had accepted an invitation to go for a meal with a male acquaintance. After the meal he returned to the other man’s flat where he became the subject of an unwelcome homosexual advance. Magistrates found he feared for his life and had run from the flat. After breaking free from the other man’s clutches, he had driven away. Magistrates applied a subjective test in deciding it was more likely than not that events had caused Davis to lose complete control of his will. Pittaway: Pittaway had recently divorced her husband who had been violent towards her. Magistrates found that, as a result of the violence she was frightened of men. She formed a new relationship with the appellant. At a party, she and the appellant had a row, leading to an angry exchange of words outside the party and unspecified threats being made by the appellant. Magistrates found the respondent believed she would suffer immediate violence from the appellant and, although she ran to her house which was about 200 yards from the party, she decided instead to hide in her car. After five minutes or so, she drove 200 yards before being stopped. The appellant was not in the vicinity at the time. Held, allowing both appeals and remitting the cases to the magistrates with a direction to convict, there was not evidence raising the defence of duress. Davis: Although the defence of duress was subjective, it also had objective elements to it, namely whether there was good cause to fear death or serious injury would occur unless the respondent acted as he had done, and whether a sober person of reasonable firmness, sharing the respondent’s characteristics“,. In Sourcebook Criminal Law, 596. Routledge-Cavendish, 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781843143093-141.