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1
Cussins, A. „A representational theory of mind“. Thesis, University of Oxford, 1986. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.375861.
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2
O'Connell, Sanjida. „Theory of mind in chimpanzees“. Thesis, University of Liverpool, 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.321147.
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3
Nicolls, Small Lucinda. „Descartes’ Developmental Theory of Mind“. Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2022. https://hdl.handle.net/2123/29781.
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Descartes is famous for his claim that the essence of soul is thought, and that there is nothing in the mind of which we are in no way conscious. This has the controversial implication that we are always thinking and in some respect conscious of our thoughts, from our earliest moments in the womb to our final moments in life. Nonetheless, Descartes acknowledges a substantive difference between infant and adult cognitive experience. While Cartesian infants are always thinking, they cannot ‘meditate upon metaphysics’ and cannot entertain ‘pure intellections’. But if infants and adults are on a par in possessing minds and therefore thought, what explains this difference? This question is my overarching focus in this thesis. Through a close examination of Descartes’ discussions of infant and adult thought, I seek to establish the main source of the cognitive differences between infants and adults. I maintain that Descartes’ account is surprisingly nuanced given the elliptical nature of these discussions. The difference between infant and adult cognitive experience rests primarily on a difference in attentional capacity. Cartesian infants experience a generalised attentional deficit that prevents their engaging in certain forms of higher-order thinking—for instance, that required to ‘meditate on metaphysics’. This attentional deficit arises both in the undeveloped nature of the infant body, which exerts a distracting influence on the infant mind, and the inexperienced infant mind, which is less accustomed to responding to the body and performing its various intellectual operations.
My examination of the difference between infant and adult cognitive experience supports two overarching theses. First, that Descartes presents us with a rudimentary implicit theory of attention. This encompasses both a descriptive account of how attention operates and a normative account of how attention should ideally be directed in order to successfully engage in the ‘search for truth’. Second, that Descartes presents an implicit developmental theory of mind through his account of infant and adult cognitive experience. This developmental theory of mind has two main aspects: the transition from infancy to adulthood, and the cultivation of reason and reflective attention in adulthood. Through exercising our minds in accordance with his method, Descartes maintains that we can develop our powers of reasoning and, moreover, cultivate a ‘clear and attentive mind’ (mens pura et attenta). This requires that we direct the mind’s attention to the proper objects, in the proper order, in accordance with the proper method. With concerted intellectual practice over time, we can cultivate an attentive mind capable of discerning the truth.
4
Knoll, Meredith Sharyn. „Rethinking the #theory' in theory of mind development“. Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2001. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.272550.
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5
Walters, Daniel Dewi. „Understanding other minds : an interrogation of the theory of mind debate“. Thesis, University of Hull, 2014. http://hydra.hull.ac.uk/resources/hull:11523.
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6
Vestberg, Marcus Erik. „A compatibilist computational theory of mind“. Thesis, Oxford Brookes University, 2017. https://radar.brookes.ac.uk/radar/items/bf378e8f-abc3-47cd-9004-4efab56970c1/1/.
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This thesis defends the idea that the mind is essentially computational, a position that has in recent decades come under attack by theories that focus on bodily action and that view the mind as a product of interaction with the world and not as a set of secluded processes in the brain. The most prominent of these is the contemporary criticism coming from enactivism, a theory that argues that cognition is born not from internal processes but from dynamic interactions between brain, body and world. The radical version of enactivism in particular seeks to reject the idea of representational content, a key part in the computational theory of mind. To this end I propose a Compatibilist Computational Theory of Mind. This compatibilist theory incorporates embodied and embedded elements of cognition and also supports a predictive theory of perception, while maintaining the core beliefs pertaining to brain-centric computationalism: That our cognition takes place in our brain, not in bonds between brain and world, and that cognition involves manipulation of mental representational content. While maintaining the position that a computational theory of mind is the best model we have for understanding how the mind works, this thesis also reviews the various flaws and problems that the position has had since its inception. Seeking to overcome these problems, as well as showing that computationalism is still perfectly compatible with contemporary action and prediction-based research in cognitive science, the thesis argues that by revising the theory in such a way that it can incorporate these new elements of cognition we arrive at a theory that is much stronger and more versatile than contemporary non-computational alternatives.
7
Meyer, Joseph Francis. „Theory of Mind Impairment and Schizotypy“. W&M ScholarWorks, 2005. https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd/1539626502.
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8
Sharp, Carla. „Biased minds : theory of mind in emotional behaviour disorders of middle childhood“. Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2000. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.621991.
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9
Hwang, Yoon Suk. „Mind and autism spectrum disorders: A Theory-of-Mind continuum model and typology developed from Theory-of Mind as subjectively experienced and objectively understood“. Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/5984.
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This study defines Theory-of-Mind as the ability to experience one’s own mind and understand the minds of others to the extent necessary to make sense of human behaviour and the world. Since the concept of Theory-of-Mind was first applied to people with ASD (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985), lack of Theory-of-Mind has been used to explain their cognitive difficulties (National Research Council, 2003), along with social, communicative and imaginative impairments (Frith, Happé & Siddons, 1994). Previous studies have tended to think of Theory-of-Mind in terms of a simple binary of deficit or credit; to exclude the voices of people with ASD; to emphasise the cognitive aspects of Theory-of-Mind over its affective aspects; and to emphasise understanding the minds of others over experiencing one’s own mind. This study aims to address these issues by investigating Theory-of-Mind as subjectively experienced by students with ASD and objectively understood by their teachers. It is the first attempt in the study of Theory-of-Mind to include the voices of individuals with ASD along with the professional views of their teachers. This study takes an interdisciplinary approach, supported by philosophy of mind and special education. A grounded theory approach and a mixed methods research design combine to build and strengthen a theory of Theory-of-Mind. For Theory-of-Mind as subjectively experienced, 20 senior secondary and post secondary school students with ASD from Republic of Korea were interviewed and student-produced documents were reviewed to draw out their inner experiences. The Korean Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale and the Korean Vineland Social Maturity Scale were employed to assess IQ and social competence. For Theory-of-Mind as objectively understood, their teachers’ beliefs regarding their students with ASD were sought through in-depth interviews, a review of teacher-produced documents and administration of a newly developed Teacher Questionnaire. This study reports differences between Theory-of-Mind as subjectively experienced and objectively observed, and variations within the components of Theory-of-Mind. The role of imagination in Theory-of-Mind and the relationships between Theory-of-Mind components, IQ and social competence are discussed. As a result, a Theory-of-Mind continuum model and Theory-of-Mind Typology is proposed.
10
Hwang, Yoon Suk. „Mind and autism spectrum disorders: A Theory-of-Mind continuum model and typology developed from Theory-of Mind as subjectively experienced and objectively understood“. University of Sydney, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/5984.
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Doctor of PhilosophyThis study defines Theory-of-Mind as the ability to experience one’s own mind and understand the minds of others to the extent necessary to make sense of human behaviour and the world. Since the concept of Theory-of-Mind was first applied to people with ASD (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985), lack of Theory-of-Mind has been used to explain their cognitive difficulties (National Research Council, 2003), along with social, communicative and imaginative impairments (Frith, Happé & Siddons, 1994). Previous studies have tended to think of Theory-of-Mind in terms of a simple binary of deficit or credit; to exclude the voices of people with ASD; to emphasise the cognitive aspects of Theory-of-Mind over its affective aspects; and to emphasise understanding the minds of others over experiencing one’s own mind. This study aims to address these issues by investigating Theory-of-Mind as subjectively experienced by students with ASD and objectively understood by their teachers. It is the first attempt in the study of Theory-of-Mind to include the voices of individuals with ASD along with the professional views of their teachers. This study takes an interdisciplinary approach, supported by philosophy of mind and special education. A grounded theory approach and a mixed methods research design combine to build and strengthen a theory of Theory-of-Mind. For Theory-of-Mind as subjectively experienced, 20 senior secondary and post secondary school students with ASD from Republic of Korea were interviewed and student-produced documents were reviewed to draw out their inner experiences. The Korean Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale and the Korean Vineland Social Maturity Scale were employed to assess IQ and social competence. For Theory-of-Mind as objectively understood, their teachers’ beliefs regarding their students with ASD were sought through in-depth interviews, a review of teacher-produced documents and administration of a newly developed Teacher Questionnaire. This study reports differences between Theory-of-Mind as subjectively experienced and objectively observed, and variations within the components of Theory-of-Mind. The role of imagination in Theory-of-Mind and the relationships between Theory-of-Mind components, IQ and social competence are discussed. As a result, a Theory-of-Mind continuum model and Theory-of-Mind Typology is proposed.
11
Lowther, Juliet. „Theory of mind development in deaf children“. Thesis, University of Southampton, 2003. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.398720.
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12
Cummins, O. C. A. „Theory of mind, context processing and schizotypy“. Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2007. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1445405/.
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C. Frith (1992) proposed that the clinical heterogeneity of schizophrenia could be explained by varying degrees of impairment in theory of mind (ToM). The development of this model is briefly traced with reference to the literature on autism and the empirical evidence discussed. Context processing deficits and their relationship to impaired ToM in autism are then introduced. Parallels with schizophrenia are explored with regards to the primacy and modularity of impaired ToM in schizophrenia. It is tentatively concluded that ToM is a social-cognitive form of context processing and that ToM impairments in schizophrenia reflect more general impairments in the co-ordination of contextually related information (Phillips & Silverstein, 2003). Difficulties with clinical populations are noted and the need for further research exploring relations between context processing and ToM using the schizotypy paradigm recommended.
13
Gomes, Kathline C. „Verbal Scaffolding in Children's Theory of Mind“. Scholarship @ Claremont, 2012. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/48.
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For nearly 30 years, researchers have been proposing and testing theories of the cognitive mechanisms that underlie children’s abilities to comprehend the mental states of others and to predict behavior on the basis of those abilities. One such theory, the “theory theory,” contends that children evaluate their own understanding of others’ minds, developing a theory and expanding it when they encounter situations incongruent with their predictions. Wellman and Liu (2004) present a scale of the changes that children’s understanding of mental state representations commonly undergo as children develop a mature theory of mind. The present study aims to clarify how children pass from one stage of understanding to the next, employing a training study paradigm to examine the possible role of verbal scaffolding on children’s progression in this sequence. Specifically, the present study hypothesizes that verbally emphasizing the connection between one’s knowledge and thoughts will advance children’s performance on false belief tasks. This hypothesis was not supported. Even though children may appear to be at the same developmental level on Wellman and Liu’s (2004) scale, the variation in their performances after training may indicate more nuanced underlying processes than are currently expressed by Wellman and Liu’s (2004) scale.
14
Happe, Francesca Gabrielle Elizabeth. „Theory of mind and communication in autism“. Thesis, University College London (University of London), 1991. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1317758/.
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Recent work investigating the biological and cognitive nature of autism is reviewed. The hypothesis that autistic individuals suffer from a specific impairment in theory of mind, and the relevance of this notion to the diagnosis of Asperger's syndrome, is discussed. Theory of mind explanations of autism must account for the minority of autistic subjects who pass false belief tasks. Two possible accounts are considered; delay versus 'hacking'. A battery of theory of mind tasks was given to able autistic subjects, and to mentally handicapped and young normal controls. The results suggested the existence of subgroups: while some autistic subjects performed inconsistently (perhaps using task-specific strategies), others performed consistently well at first-order theory of mind tasks, and some passed an array of second-order tasks. Relevance theory suggests that understanding mental states is vital in communication. Communication tasks were therefore given, to explore the theory of mind abilities of the autistic subjects. Relevance theory predicted that subjects unable to attribute mental states would show literal understanding, subjects with first-order theory of mind would comprehend metaphor, but second-order theory of mind would be necessary to understand irony. These predictions were tested and confirmed with autistic subjects and normal children. The theory of mind hypothesis cannot explain the persistent real-life handicaps of autistics who understand mental states, nor account for the nonsocial peculiarities seen in autism. A deficit in central coherence is suggested as the source of these features. Results from a preliminary test of this hypothesis suggested that even autistic subjects who develop theory of mind ability are impaired at extracting context-dependent meaning. The implications of these findings for the diagnosis of Asperger's syndrome, the relations between the social and nonsocial impairments, and suggestions for further research are discussed.
15
Flynn, Emma. „Theory of mind, representation and executive control“. Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2001. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.364662.
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16
Amin, Yazdi Seyed Amir. „Theory of mind reasoning in Iranian children“. Thesis, University of Sheffield, 2003. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.289636.
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17
Doherty, Martin John. „Children's theory of mind and metalinguistic awareness“. Thesis, University of Sussex, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.241689.
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This thesis advances the hypothesis that the child's theory of mind and metalinguistic awareness are both based on a general understanding of representation. A priori considerations lead to a definition of metalinguistic awareness as representation of language as a representational medium. Since no existing tasks tap this competence reliably and validly, three novel tasks based on the understanding of synonymy in naming situations were developed. Experiments 1 and 2 examined preschoolers' ability to produce synonyms. This associated highly with their false belief understanding (r = .73, p<.OOI and r = .64, p<.OOl, respectively) and persisted beyond a common association with verbal mental age and general production difficulties. The danger remained, however, of success through some associative strategy or failure through word finding difficulties. To avoid these possibilities, in Experiments 3 and 4 children judged the synonym production of a puppet. With these sources of error removed, association was even higher (r =.76, p<.OOI, r = .84, p<.OOl, respectively) beyond a common association with age or verbal mental age. Experiment 9 examined the ability of autistic children on a version of the judgement task to see whether their understanding of mental arid. non-mental representation was also related. Results were suggestive of a relationship, but inconclusive. The possibility remains that normal children may represent form in a nonrepresentational way. Experiment 5 and 6 showed that although even very young children could recall synonyms verbatim, most preschool children deny that one of the synonyms applies. I argued that children assume that categories, not words, are mutually exclusive. Experiment 7 showed a similar rejection effect for hierarchical terms. In Experiment 8, more metalinguistic terminology aided only younger children to accept both words, consistent with the assumption that the use of two "is a" phrases prompts children to employ their category mutual exclusivity assumption. Finally, the synonym judgement task was modified for use with autistic children to test the theory that autistic children have general difficulties understanding representation. Results were inconclusive, although they suggest that autistic children have similar difficulties with the false belief and synonym tasks. The overall conclusions are-that metalinguistic awareness and theory of mind have a common basis in representational understanding, but that prior to this children can employ the form of language to make judgements about category membership.
18
Figel, Jared T. „Contemporary Functionalism and Aristotle's Theory of Mind“. Ohio University / OhioLINK, 2016. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ohiou1460400969.
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19
Stewart, Elizabeth Margaret. „Theory of Mind in Children with Epilepsy“. Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/20234.
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Epilepsy is a common neurological condition in childhood that is associated with significant social morbidity. Despite a high prevalence of social impairment in children with epilepsy, the factors underpinning social difficulties remain poorly understood and as a result, effective treatments are lacking. Two recent theoretical models of social competence proposed for children with epilepsy, central nervous system conditions, neurodevelopmental and acquired brain disorders have proposed that impairments in social cognition (i.e. Theory of Mind [ToM]) may be related to social impairments in this group. The aims of the thesis were to: (1) study ToM and its relationship to social competence in children and adolescents with genetic generalised epilepsy (GGE) and temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE), and (2) determine whether social impairments could be remediated by targeting ToM. First, we conducted a systematic review and meta-analysis, which revealed significant ToM impairments in adults with epilepsy and a dearth of research in children with epilepsy (Chapter 2). Second, we conducted two empirical studies assessing ToM and social competence in children (8-16 years old) with GGE (Chapter 3) and TLE (Chapter 4); we found evidence of significant ToM impairments that were related to social problems in both epilepsy groups. Third, we developed a novel cognitive behavioural intervention with ToM training for children with epilepsy (Chapter 5), published a study protocol (Chapter 6) and evaluated the intervention in pilot study (Chapter 7); results from the pilot study provided preliminary evidence that the intervention was feasible, acceptable, safe, and a potentially effective way of remediating social problems in our target group. In conclusion, these studies have shown that: (1) children with GGE and TLE have significant impairments in ToM, and associated social problems, and (2) social difficulties can be potentially remediated by targeting ToM impairments in this group.
20
Thornburg, M. Hayden. „Possibilities of mind and body an exploration and critique of mind-body identity theory /“. Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 2006. http://www.tren.com/search.cfm?p006-1549.
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21
Martin, Christopher. „Investigating the neuropsychology of theory of mind and designing a new test of theory of mind in acquired brain injury“. Thesis, University of Hull, 2008. http://hydra.hull.ac.uk/resources/hull:1363.
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In Part 1 the Literature on the Neuropsychology of Theory of Mind (ToM) was investigated in a Systematic Literature Review of scanning and Acquired Brain Injury (ABI) lesion studies. The quality of study methodologies and the tests used to assess ToM were evaluated, and findings about the brain regions implicated in ToM were summarised. The quality of some tests of ToM used in the literature was critiqued due to their failure to tap into all three components of a recent definition of ToM (Stone et al, 2003). The quality of the methodology of studies was also examined. Brain regions implicated in ToM according to the review included the frontal cortices, the temporal poles and the posterior cingulate.In Part 2 an Empirical Paper is presented. Many social problems are often evident after ABI and deficits in ToM have recently been discovered in ABI populations (Milders et al, 2006). ToM deficits may contribute to and help explain social difficulties such as finding social interactions hard. Few tests of ToM are widely used with individuals with ABI. A new video test of ToM was designed and piloted on non-brain injured participants and participants with ABI. There was a correlation with performance on the new test and an existing measure of ToM and participants with ABI scored significantly less highly on both tests of ToM. The new test shows promise and further research with the measure is recommended. The results also highlight the utility of routinely assessing social cognition after ABI.
22
Mauer, Maria Christine. „Das Konstrukt der Theory of Mind bei Erwachsenen“. Diss., Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, 2012. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-157578.
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Theory of Mind is a mental process which can be critical to the understanding of the maintenance of psychic disorders and can have implications for their treatment. The idea of a conceptual organisation of the Theory of Mind is supported by current research from Developmental Psychology (see Perner, Mauer & Hildenbrand, 2011). We could show that Theory of Mind seems to develop with the understanding of identity and is based on a common conceptual basis: the understanding of the relationship between reference and representation.
Theory of Mind means the ability to ascribe and reflect own mental states and mental states of others. The concept "Theory of Mind" is used very heterogeneousl and is defined very broadly in the research with adults.
The aim of this work is to describe the theoretical and conceptual basis of the Theory of Mind and to show its importance for the Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Chronic Depression with regards to aetiology concept as well as for its implications in the specific therapy methods [Dialectic Trauma Therapy of (Butollo and Karl, 2012) and the Cognitive Behavioral Analysis System for Psychotherapy (McCullough, 2000, 2006)]. I will take into account the attachment theory, the ability of perspective-taking and the integration of paradoxical information as well as the meaning of trauma as a determining factor in the organisation of the Theory of Mind. The differentiation between reference and representation forms the basis of the ability of perspective-taking as well as understanding identity.
This work shows related concepts as well as established assumptions about the organisation of the Theory of Mind and Mentalizing and introduces a meta-representational concept to distinguish between reference and representation. The environment is seen as an external source of supply to the formation of mental representation.
This work intends a systematic processing of the conceptual fundament of the Theory of Mind as a basis for the use in the clinical-therapeutic area.
23
Scott, Suzanne. „Theory of mind in individuals with paranoid schizophrenia“. Thesis, University of Glasgow, 2013. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/4686/.
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Individuals with schizophrenia show deficits in theory of mind (ToM), however the nature of these deficits in individuals with paranoid symptoms is unclear. This study examined whether ToM ability in individuals with paranoid schizophrenia varied according to the emotional valence of items within ToM tasks. Eight participants with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia (patient group) and eight healthy controls completed two ToM tasks, the revised Eyes Test and a newly developed mental state reasoning task (New ToM Measure). Controls were significantly more accurate than the patient group on both tasks (revised Eyes Test: t (14) = 4.48, p = .001, d = 2.24, New ToM Measure: t (14) = 3.63, p = .003, d = 1.82). There was evidence of a trend for a mediating role of emotional valence in the patient group on the revised Eyes Test, although contrary to the study’s hypothesis, patients were more accurate on positive items than threat items (t (7) = 2.19, p = .07, d = 1.01). There was no evidence of a mediating role of emotional valence on the New ToM Measure. This study provides further evidence of ToM deficits in individuals with schizophrenia. The mixed evidence for the mediating role of emotional valence is discussed in relation to existing literature and the study’s limitations.
24
Deptula, Andrew. „Autobiographical Memory and Theory of Mind in Schizotypy“. Master's thesis, University of Central Florida, 2013. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETD/id/5623.
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Individuals with schizophrenia exhibit marked impairments on tasks assessing theory of mind (ToM) and autobiographical memory (AM) qualities, and preliminary research has indicated a positive link between these abilities. This study is the first to systematically explore this relationship in the related personality trait of schizotypy. In a study of 47 undergraduate students (23 males) reporting a wide continuous range of schizotypy, we found that females, but not males, exhibited a negative correlation between ToM and schizotypy, and an unexpected positive correlation between AM qualities and schizotypy. Factor score analysis within females indicated that disorganized schizotypy was the strongest correlate of both ToM (i.e., affective ToM; ability to infer emotions), and AM qualities (i.e., mental imagery vividness). Finally, independent of schizotypy and sex, ToM was negatively correlated with AM qualities. This negative association between ToM and AM as well as the positive relationship between schizotypy and AM (in females) distinguish findings in schizotypy from those in schizophrenia. Although, the qualities of AM in schizotypy are relatively unexplored in schizotypy, overlapping and AM-related constructs (e.g., mental image vividness, creativity) are enhanced in schizotypy. This phenomenon is theorized to occur due to a reduced latent inhibition process, which also reveals distinct patterns of sexual dimorphism in schizotypy. In sum, the current study found sex to be a critical variable in each hypothesis, demonstrating a unique pattern in females, but not males. It could be that distinct underlying mechanisms account for sex differences on ToM and AM tasks in schizophrenia-related disorders.M.S.
Masters
Psychology
Sciences
Psychology Clinical
25
Corcoran, G. P. „An analysis of the computational theory of mind“. Thesis, University of Bradford, 1986. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.372172.
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26
Gallagher, Helen Louise. „Investigating the neural correlates of 'theory of mind'“. Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2003. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.401204.
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27
Akande, Isaac Oluwamayowa. „Assessment of theory of mind in stroke populations“. Thesis, Canterbury Christ Church University, 2017. http://create.canterbury.ac.uk/16436/.
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Over the last twenty years there have been several investigations exploring theory of mind (ToM) abilities within populations with acquired brain injury, including stroke survivors. Most neuropsychology studies involving people with acquired brain injury have assessed the cognitively-demanding, social-cognitive component of ToM, whereas the literature concerned with exploring social-perceptual ToM is limited by its reliance on measures that are not representative of ToM processes within real-world situations. The current study aimed to examine the use and utility of an ecologically-valid (verisimilitudinous) social-perceptual ToM task within stroke survivors, known as the Cambridge Mindreading Face-Voice Battery (CAM; Golan, Baron-Cohen, & Hill, 2006). Group comparisons of CAM performance between 22 stroke survivors and 20 age- and education-matched healthy control participants showed no significant differences. In addition, the CAM was unable to accurately distinguish between the groups. An exploratory cluster analysis revealed differential patterns of ToM impairment and preservation within the sample of stroke survivors. These findings suggest studies that have attempted to tap social-perceptual ToM through artificial tasks and/or static stimuli may be overestimating the deficits observed within stroke samples, and tentatively points towards functional fractionation of social-perceptual ToM abilities dependent on modality. Some recommendations for future research combining neuropsychology and neuroimaging methodology are discussed.
28
Schjelderup, Vanessa. „Social anxiety : a question of theory of mind?“ Thesis, City University London, 2011. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.544444.
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Fyfe, S. „Theory of mind and its relation to schizotypy“. Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2006. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1444687/.
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Literature Review: Is Atypical Mentalizing a Risk Factor for Psychosis. The literature review summarises models and rationale underpinning investigation of atypical mentalizing as a risk factor for psychosis, and reviews longitudinal and cross-sectional studies relating to this. It concludes that, although differences in social cognition can be demonstrated to be associated with risk for psychosis, findings to date are mixed, and a focus on the presence or absence of mentalizing skills has limited exploration of the nature of these putative differences. Empirical Paper: Theory of Mind and its Relation to Schizotypy. This section reports an experimental comparison of the performance of high and low schizotypes on verbal and non-verbal measures of theory of mind. In the non-verbal domain, high schizotypes were significantly more likely than low schizotypes to read meaning in randomness and to impute agency or mental states where none were obviously implied. These tendencies were associated with positive schizotypy in particular. The findings are discussed in relation to Frith's (1992) cognitive model of schizophrenia and existing studies of theory of mind and schizotypy and schizophrenia. Critical Appraisal: A critical review of the process of the above study is presented. Observations made during the planning, data collection, data analysis and interpretation stages of the project are described, and suggestions are made for future research.
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Pacer, Michael D. „Mind as Theory Engine| Causation, Explanation and Time“. Thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 2017. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=10194103.
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Humans build theories out of the data we observe, and out of those theories arise wonders. The most powerful theories are causal theories, which organise data into actionable structures. Causal theories make explicit claims about the structure of the world: what entities and processes exist in it, which of these relate to one another and in what form those relations consist. We can use causal theories to induce new generalisations about the world (in the form of particular models or other causal theories) and to explain particular occurrences. This allows rapidly disseminating causal information throughout our cognitive communities. Causal theories and the explanations derived from them guide decisions we make, including where and when to look for more data, completing the cycle.
Causal theories play a ubiquitous and potent role in everyday life, in formal pursuit of them in the sciences, and through their applications in medicine, technology and industry. Given this, the rarity of analyses that attempt to characterise causal theories and their uses in general, computational terms is surprising. Only in recent years has there been a substantial refinement of our models of causal induction due to work by computational cognitive scientists — the interdisciplinary tradition out of which which this dissertation originates. And even so, many issues related to causal theories have been left unattended; three features in particular merit much greater attention from a computational perspective: generating and evaluating explanation, the role of simplicity in explanation choice, and continuous-time causal induction. I aim to redress this situation with this dissertation.
In Chapter 0, I introduce the primary paradigms from computational cognitive science – computational level analysis and rational analysis – that govern my research. In Chapter 1, I study formal theories of causal explanation in Bayesian networks by comparing the explanations the generate and evaluate to human judgements about the same systems. No one model of causal explanation captures the pattern of human judgements, though the intuitive hypothesis, that the most probable a posteriori explanation is the best performs worst of the models evaluated. I conclude that the premise of finding model for all of human causal explanation (even in this limited domain) is flawed; the research programme should be refined to consider the features of formal models and how well they capture our explanatory practices as they vary between individuals and circumstances. One feature not expressed in these models explicitly but that has been shown to matter for human explanation is simplicity. Chapter 2 considers the problem of simplicity in human causal explanation choice in a series of four experiments. I study what makes an explanation simple (whether it is the number of causes invoked in or the number of assumptions made by an explanation), how simplicity concerns are traded off against data-fit, which cognitive consequences arise from choosing simpler explanations when the data does not fit, and why people prefer simpler explanations.
In Chapter 3, I change the focus from studying causal explanation to causal induction — in particular, I develop a framework for continuous time causal theories (
CTCTS
). ACTCT
defines a generative probabilistic framework for other generative probabilistic models of causal systems, where the data in those systems expressed in terms of continuous time. Chapter 3 is the most interdisciplinary piece of my dissertation, accordingly it begins by reviewing a number of topics: the history of theories of causal induction within philosophy, statistics and medicine; empirical work on causal induction in cognitive science, focusing on issues related to causal induction with temporal data; conceptual issues surrounding the formal definition of time, data, and causal models; and probabilistic graphical models, causal theories, and stochastic processes. I then introduce the desiderata for theCTCT
framework and how those criteria are met. I then demonstrate the power ofCTCTS
by using them to analyse five sets of experiments (some new and some derived from the literature) on human causal induction with temporal data. Bookending each experiment and the model applied to it is are case from medical history that illustrate a real-world instance of the variety of problem being solved in the section; the opening discussion describes the case and why it fits the problem structure of the model used to analyse the experimental results and the closing discussion illustrates aspects of the case omitted from the initial discussion that complicate the model and fit better with the model introduced in the next section. Then, I discuss ways to incorporate other advances in probabilistic programming, generative theories and stochastic processes into theCTCT
framework, identify potential applications with specific focus on mechanisms and feedback loops, and conclude by analysing the centrality of temporal information in the study of the mind more generally.Excepting the supporting appendices and bibliography that end the dissertation, I conclude in two parts. First, in Chapter 4, I analyse issues at the intersection of three of the main themes of my work: namely, (causal) explanation, (causal) induction and time. This proceeds by examining these topics first in pairs and then as a whole. Following that, is Chapter 5, an epilogue that clarifies the interpretations and intended meanings of the “Mind as Theory Engine” metaphor as it applies to human cognition.
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Linares, Pava Leslie. „The role of culture in Theory of Mind“. Thesis, Edith Cowan University, Research Online, Perth, Western Australia, 2019. https://ro.ecu.edu.au/theses/2173.
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Theory of Mind (ToM) is defined as the ability to understand our own and otherpeople’s mental representations, characterised by individual perspectives and motives,with potential for directing human behaviour (Kuntoro, Saraswati, Peterson & Slaughter,2013). Over the past 30 years this concept has captured the attention of cognitive anddevelopmental psychologists and it has been established that typically developed childrenfrom individualistic, mainly from Anglo (English-speaking) countries are most likely toacquire this ability at the age of four.
In the past decade, a growing interest in differences between children fromindividualistic and collestivistic cultural orientations led researchers to question the extentto which ToM is influenced by culture. Many cross-cultural studies that examined theToM performance have mainly focused on reporting on children from individualisticdominant cultures (mostly from English speaking countries) and countries frompredominantly collectivistic dominant cultures, and have found that children from theformer are more likely to develop advanced and earlier ToM, fuelling deeperinvestigation into sociocultural mechanisms influencing ToM performance incollectivistic children.
In the present study, a narrative literature review was conducted to identify theevidence for differences and similarities in ToM performance of children from differentcultures; the potential sociocultural factors influencing ToM; and gaps in the currentliterature that will benefit from future research. The review comprised 131 studies andrevealed two main findings. Firstly, little is known about the mechanisms underlyingcultural variations in ToM. Secondly, parenting might be an important culturaltransmission mechanism that has only been partially investigated in past cross-culturalToM research.
These gaps in the literature sparked my interest in advancing our understanding ofthe sociocultural influences on ToM performance, and ultimately led to this investigation.The main aim of my study was to explore the impact of sociocultural factors on ToMperformance in children from Australia and Colombia. To address the main aim of thisresearch, I explored the influence of sociocultural factors (i.e., parent-child relationshipsand child self-concept dimensions) in ToM in a sample of four- to six-year-oldColombian (N = 70) and Anglo-Australian children (N = 87).
My results revealed that culture influences ToM performance. Mediation analysesconfirmed that children’s tendency towards following rules and parents’ participation inthe child’s everyday activities and knowledge about their child are potential influencingmechanisms that can explain ToM variability, although this was confined to the six-yearoldsonly. Moreover, important cultural differences and similarities in ToM performanceemerged from my findings. Similarly to that reported in previous studies, Anglo-Australian children presented more advanced ToM abilities than Colombian children andachieved significantly higher total scores on the ToM scale, as well as above-chancelevels on higher-order ToM tasks. However, a novel finding was that the order in theGuttman scalogram for ToM progression was similar between the cultural groups. Thelatter finding demonstrates there is still more to discover in the field of ToM to shed lighton new directions of ToM development in children across cultures.
To sum up, this investigation contributed to the growing evidence of the influenceof collectivistic and individualistic orientations in parenting involvement styles andchildren’s norm awareness as potential cultural transmission mechanisms in ToM.Therefore, future investigations might be interested in broadening their scope ofinvestigation to socialization agents like parents and teachers and their influence inchildren’s ToM to consolidate our knowledge about the cultural transmission mechanismsin ToM. This, will to not only advance the field of ToM, but also enrich research in other disciplines, such as education.
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Trabucco-Miguel, Sandra. „La "theory of mind" dans l'accident vasculaire cérébral“. Grenoble 1, 2008. http://www.theses.fr/2008GRE10059.
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L'étude des troubles de l'intelligence sociale et plus spécifiquement de la théorie de l'esprit (ToM) pourrait révéler des difficultés méconnues au niveau de l'adaptation sociale après un AVe. Ees difficultés peuvent générer des troubles de la réinsertion socioprofessionnelle, lourdes de conséquences pour les patients jeunes sans autre handicap majeur. L'objectif de ce travail était d'évaluer les difficultés de réinsertion socio-professionnelle et relationnelle du point du patient, de les confronter à la reprise professionnelle (RP) effective, et d'en expliciter les causes. Nous avons mené une étude cas-témoins, chez 74 patients consécutifs non déments âgés de 16 à 65 ans ayant un A ve de plus de 3 mois sans séquelle ou handicap sévères (score de Rankin <3), appariés en âge à 74 témoins. Nous avons évalué les difficultés subjectives socioprofessionnelle et relationnelles par la WSAS, la RP à 1 an, par un bilan neuropsychologique extensif, et des tests et questionnaires évaluant la théorie de l'esprit. La WSAS était perturbée chez 70,3'Yo des patients et la RP s'élevait à 54. 4'Yo. WSAS et RP étaient prédites par la dépression, l'atteinte de la mémoire de travail spatiale et le test des faux-pas évaluant l'analyse de scènes sociales. Sur le plan anatomo-clinique, l'ensemble des tests évaluant différentes composantes de la ToM était perturbé en cas d'AVe sylvien superficiel droit ou d'atteinte du réseau de la ToM comprenant le STS et le cortex préfrontal droits. Seul le test des fP était perturbé indépendamment de la topographie, en faveur d'un traitement métareprésentationnel dans cette tâche. L'anxiété et la dépression majoraient les dysfonctionnements observés. L'évaluation des troubles cognitifs et de la ToM est importante dans la prise en charge des AVe peu sévères du sujet jeune car elle permet de prédire la reprise professionnelle et la réinsertion sociale et relationnelle du patient au niveau individuel. En outre, l'étude de la théorie de l'esprit dans des lésions focales telles que l'Ave contribue à la compréhension des modèles de l'intelligence socialeSocial intelligence and theory of mind (ToM) may reveal difficulties in social adaptation after stroke. Such difficulties may result in social and professional difficulties, leading to disturb young patients' way of life. Objective: To assess social and professional difficulties, return to work at one year, and analyze the causes. Methods: A case-control study was carried out in 74 non demented patients age-matched to 74 controls, age from 16 to 65 years, who suffered a mild to moderate stroke more than 3 months (Rankin <3). Social professional and relational difficulties were assessed using the WSAS, return to work at one year, extensive neuropsychological evaluation, and tests, questionnaries and scales to evaluate theory of mind. Results: WSAS was increased in 70,3'Yo patients and return to work was observed in 54,4'Yo. Both were predicted by depression, spatial working memoryand "faux-Pas" test to reasoning about mental states by integrating contextual and historical information about a pers on Anatomoclinical analysis showed that every theory of mind tasks were impaired in superficial middle cerebral artery strokes or in patients with lesion located in the theory of mind neuronal network, including either right superior temporal sulcus or right prefrontal cortex. The only one to be impaired, whatever stroke location, was the "faux-Pas" test, suggesting a metarepresentational process. Anxietv and depression increased theorv of mind impairment
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Doostdar, Sanaje Ladan [Verfasser], und Stephanie [Akademischer Betreuer] Mehl. „Theory of Mind - Zusammenhänge von affektiven und kognitiven Theory of Mind Fähigkeiten bei Patienten mit Schizophrenie / Ladan Doostdar Sanaje ; Betreuer: Stephanie Mehl“. Marburg : Philipps-Universität Marburg, 2020. http://d-nb.info/1218685808/34.
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Kallerstrup, Jesper. „On having meaning in mind“. Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/12911.
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There have traditionally been two views as to what makes it the case that a singular term has the prepositional content that it does. According to Descriptivism, the content of a term is descriptive since it is given by a cluster of descriptive properties commonly associated with it. According to Referentialism, the content of a term is singular since it is determined by the object it picks out. It follows that empty terms can have descriptive, but not singular, content. If narrow content is what intrinsic duplicates have in common, then descriptive content is arguably narrow. Singular content, however, is wide since intrinsic duplicates who inhabit different environments express different singular contents by the same terms. On the face of it, the arguments against Descriptivism and Semantic Internalism - the view that content is narrow - seem convincing, but a worry persists, namely how to reconcile Semantic Externalism - the view that content is wide - with the kind of Privileged Access speakers enjoy with respect to the contents of their occurrent attitudes. By thorough examination of those arguments I find space for an intermediate position. What we learn is not that reference cannot go by properties, but rather which properties mediate reference. Kripke's Modal Argument proves that we need rigidified descriptive properties, Putnam's Twin Earth Argument shows that we better include causal properties, and Burge's Arthritis Argument highlights that we frequently invoke properties involving reference to other speakers. What is more, considerations about the behaviour of singular terms in intentional contexts strongly suggest that their propositional contents cannot be exhausted by their referents. By deploying so-called Two-Dimensionalism, as developed by Stalnaker, Kaplan, Evans, Davies, and others, I argue that singular content is knowable only after relevant empirical information about the actual world is in, and so is not subject to Privileged Access. Descriptive content, however, is a priori knowable since it is independent of which possible world is actual. But if that is so, then descriptive content constrained by rigidity, causality and other-dependence must also be a priori. All it takes is knowledge of how to describe various thought experiments. Although the latter kind of content is not object-dependent, as is singular content, it is wide in that it fails to be shared by duplicates who are embedded in distinct physical or social environments. So, we should expect compatibility between Semantic Externalism and Privileged Access only if Rigidified Causal Descriptivism is adopted.
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Baimel, Adam Sean. „From keeping together in time, to keeping together in mind : behavioral synchrony and theory of mind“. Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/54339.
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Human cultural practices are, and have always been, profoundly ritualistic. Yet, only recently has the study of ritual practices gained favor in the psychological sciences. Specifically, there is great intrigue in exploring why certain ritual forms consistently emerge across cultural and historical boundaries as they often exert potent effects on human sociality, cooperation, and cohesion. For instance, culturally evolved collective rituals often involve some form of synchronized behavior. However, little is known about specific social cognitive effects of synchrony – the act of keeping together in time with others. Here, I hypothesized that synchronizing with others engages, and fosters, our everyday cognitive processes for reasoning about other minds – our theory of mind. To test this hypothesis, I first demonstrated that participation in a synchronous ritualized task in the lab produced increases on a measure of theory of mind. In a second study, I replicated this effect and demonstrated that it could not be accounted for by general increases in sociality. In a third experiment, I tested the hypothesis that synchrony would foster ability as well as tendencies towards mental state reasoning. The results of which suggest that synchronizing with others produces a willingness to take on others’ perspectives, but not necessarily greater ability to actually do so. Results are discussed in terms of how turning to culturally evolved practices, such as ritual, can greatly contribute to our understanding of human psychological processes.Arts, Faculty of
Psychology, Department of
Graduate
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Fuchs, Christina. „Theory of Mind bei akut- und postpsychotischer paranoider Schizophrenie -“. Diss., lmu, 2011. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-134520.
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Barnaby, B. „Schizotypy, theory of mind and the understanding of irony“. Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2006. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1445309/.
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Frith's (1992) cognitive neuropsychological model of schizophrenia proposed that the symptoms characteristic of that disorder can be accounted for in terms of differing degrees of theory of mind impairment. There is a large body of evidence indicating that individuals with schizophrenia perform poorly on tasks that are hypothesised to require a functioning theory of mind, and this review aims to introduce the main findings from these studies. Following consideration of thirty-four relevant papers, this review finds that the only unequivocal finding is that individuals with schizophrenia do show impaired theory of mind. How this impairment relates to schizophrenic symptomatology as predicted by Frith's model is far less certain, and several methodological limitations are discussed that could account for this uncertainty, before a new development in the field is introduced: the use of the schizotypy paradigm to test the predictions of Frith's theory in non-clinical samples. The schizotypy paradigm has been employed in three studies investigating ToM performance in healthy individuals to date (Langdon and Coltheart, 1999 Langdon and Coltheart, 2004 Pickup, 2006), and the findings from these studies show that schizotypal traits do influence ToM performance. These studies are reviewed, and future directions for research are recommended.
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Asghar, Adam. „Theory of mind, empathy and androgyny in psychopathic disorder“. Thesis, University of Warwick, 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.487651.
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The following thesis mainly focuses on the conceptualisation that the symptoms of psychopathic disorder are a function of selectively impaired empathy abilities. Those with apsychopathic disorder are considered to be manipulative and predatory, callous towards others and substantially lacking in empathy or guilt for the harm they do to others. Recent initiatives have attempted to devised interventions for psychopathy, yet the outcomes are not encouraging. A failure to understand its aetiology may explain poor treatment outcomes. The literature review summarises studies that have examined the Theory of Mind (ToM) abilities of those with a psychopathic disorder. The literature is critically evaluated in terms of methodologies: it is reasoned that the conclusions ofthe reviewed studies are likely to be a consequence oftheir methodologies rather a representation of a psychopathic disorder. Although the authors of these studies concluded that cognitive empathy is intact within psychopathy and thereby explains their tendencies, this extrapolation and its subsequent generalisation across different populations is reasoned to be untenable. The empirical Pllper addresses the methodological critiques raised in the literature review and aims to construct a more robust methodology. In doing so, this paper investigated the relationship between cognitive empathy, emotional empathy, ToM and androgyny within psychopathy. In contrast to the published literature, this study identified that cognitive empathy is not a determinant of psychopathic tendencies and that ToM is impaired in this disorder. As expected, emotional empathy was also found to be impaired. Gender, however, mediates the relationship between these measures and thereby identifies that there is not a simple linear relationship between them. The reflective review discusses personal, professional and research reflections relating to this thesis. Discussion is focused on the political and professional implications to psychopathy and its treatment, and exploring the evidence that informs on its conceptualisation and how this impacts on our understanding of treatment outcomes.
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Dodge, Stephanie Renea. „Social dominance and theory of mind in early childhood“. Thesis, Wichita State University, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10057/6811.
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This research examines whether or not there is a relationship between social dominance and theory of mind skills in three to five year old children. Twenty-seven three to five year old children were both rated and ranked by their lead teacher on social dominance. Each child was given the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, 4th Edition, to measure their receptive language skills, and then two common theory of mind false belief tasks. The first hypothesis, that there would be a positive correlation between social dominance and theory of mind skills was not supported. The second hypothesis, that there would be a positive relationship between theory of mind and language was only supported after outliers were removed. The third hypothesis, that when controlling for language, the relationship between social dominance and theory of mind would remain intact was not supported.
The results of this study were surprising due to many similarities between social dominance and theory of mind as well as extensive research supporting a positive relationship between theory of mind and language. Some possible explanations for these results include a very small sample size of children participating as a whole and within each classroom, the age of the children, and possible effects of teacher experience.Thesis (M.Ed.)--Wichita State University, College of Education, Dept. of Counseling, Educational Leadership, Educational and School Psychology
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Glenn, Sylvia. „The development of theory of mind in deaf people“. Thesis, University of Sheffield, 2007. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/3085/.
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Several authors claim that deaf children with hearing parents do not' develop theory of mind (ToM) until adolescence, but this is largely based on false-belief studies. Peterson & Siegal's (2000) review of false-belief studies is updated and the section also reviews research using a wider range of methodologies with deaf children and adults. Deaf children have difficulties in false-belief, perspective-taking and emotional responses/reactions, but these skills may develop later. In contrast, deaf children do not appear to have deficits in mental-state attribution or emotional recognition. More research with deaf adults is needed. Section II: Research Report This study explores whether Deaf adults have impairments in ToM and empathy compared to hearing adults, and if Deaf forensic patients have further impairments. Tests were adapted and translated for the purpose of the study. The Deaf community scored lower than the hearing community on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test and produced fewer mental states. The Deaf forensic group was too small for reliable statistical analysis. Deafpeople may continue to have ToM impairments into adulthood, but the results could be due to methodological, linguistic and social factors. Assessments must be developed specifically for use with Deaf populations rather than relying on interpreted measures. Section III: Critical Appraisal This section gives a commentary, and personal reflections, on the project. The challenges faced during the progression through the thesis and of researching within the Deaf culture are explored. Methodological problems, clinical implications and areas for further research are discussed and key learning points are identified.
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Andriopoulos, Constantine A. „Mind stretching : a grounded theory for enhancing organisational creativity“. Thesis, University of Strathclyde, 2000. http://oleg.lib.strath.ac.uk:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=21175.
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This doctoral thesis establishes an initial understanding, by providing an insight, on the way employees' creativity can be enhanced. Specifically, the primary focus of this study is to explain the different ways through which creative organisations mobilise creativity within the workplace environment. The findings of this research revealed the emergent substantive process of mind stretching. The process of mind stretching is about developing the conditions where creative individuals can extend their creative potential within project based environments. This substantive theory has emerged through the study of organisational behaviour of creative professionals within three organisations, namely a corporate identity consultancy, a multidisciplinary design consultancy and an architectural firm. Mind stretching has two sub-core variables, "perpetual challenging" and "confidence building". Perpetual challenging encompasses the processes that creative organisations use in order to enhance employees' internal drive to perceive every project as a new creative challenge. Confidence building refers to the ways through which creative organisations assist their employees to build a belief in themselves. Each of the aforementioned sub-core variables has categories which explain the way the theory works within its context. The emergence of the theory of "Mind Stretching" was made possible by using the orthodox grounded theory method. The researcher followed specific stages of analysis and synthesis of data. After having identified the basic social process of mind stretching, it was then compared with the existing bodies of literature. The mind stretching theory provides an original perspective into the behaviour of the people under investigation. It provides an integrated conceptual explanation of the different ways adopted by creative organisations to mobilise creativity within their workplace environment. Furthermore, as with all grounded theory studies conducted in organisational settings,the mind stretching theory can be considered as methodologically original since it provides a holistic and in-depth insight into current business practices. Keywords: Creativity, Innovation, Grounded theory, Employees, Organisational culture.
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Park, Sam-Yel. „A study of the mind-body theory in Spinoza“. Thesis, University of Glasgow, 1999. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/2040/.
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This thesis investigates Spinoza's mind-body theory starting with the discussion of the diverse interpretations of his mind-body theory such as hylomorphism, idealism, epiphenomenalism, and materialism. From the critical comments on inadequacies of these interpretations, it turns out that Spinoza's argument of the relationship between the mind and the body should be understood as holding that there is a non-causal relationship between the mind and the body and that they have equal weight. Although the parallelistic interpretation is compatible with the above understandings, we cannot ascribe traditional parallelism to Spinoza. His parallelism is derived from his argument of identity between the mind and the body, which is based on his substance monism and attribute dualism. We should therefore understand Spinoza's mind-body theory as an identity theory which leads to a parallel relationship between the mind and the body. Since the double aspect theory argues both identity and parallelism between the mind and the body, the doctrine we should ascribe to Spinoza is the double aspect theory. Furthermore, owing to the fact that Spinoza maintains substance monism and attribute dualism (assuming an objective view of the attributes of thought and extension, which are distinct), there is, in Spinoza's theory, an identity between mental and physical events while there is no identity between mental and physical properties: the mental and the physical events are one and the same event described under mental and physical properties, respectively. From the fact Spinoza finds identity in individuals or events, but not in properties, it follows that his theory should also be understood as a kind of token identity theory.
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Williams, Claire. „Persecutory delusions, schizotypy and disruptions to theory of mind“. Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2006. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1446421/.
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Frith (1992) proposed that disruptions to 'theory of mind' (Premack and Woodruff, 1978) or 'mentalising' could explain the signs and symptoms of schizophrenia. For Frith, persecutory delusions represent a disorder in monitoring the thoughts and intentions of others. Following Frith's (1992) model, disruptions to theory of mind have been included in the main cognitive models of persecutory delusions. This review will first outline Frith's neuropsychological model of schizophrenia. It will then summarise the role theory of mind disruptions are given by the main cognitive models of persecutory delusions (Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, Blackwell and Kinderman, 2001 Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler and Bebbington, 2002) and the cognitive model of positive symptoms (Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Freeman and Bebbington, 2001). The empirical evidence for such a disruption is then reviewed from studies with a patient population and studies with a non-patient population who vary of the dimension of schizotypy. It is concluded that empirical studies to date have mostly employed traditional theory of mind tests that are designed to assess simple theory of mind deficits such as those seen in autism or the behavioural signs of schizophrenia (Frith, 1992). It is suggested that traditional tests are not able to detect the subtle disruptions to theory of mind related to persecutory delusions. The concepts of 'hyper-ToM' (Abu-Akel and Bailey, 2000) and 'over-mentalising' are discussed and it is suggested that future research should focus on the development of tests which are able to detect 'hyper-ToM' or 'over-mentalising' in patients with persecutory delusions or non-clinical populations who are high on delusional ideation and paranoia.
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Misailidi, Plousia. „Social behaviour and theory of mind deficits in autism“. Thesis, University College London (University of London), 1996. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/10020269/.
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Fuller, Timothy. „Science and Mind: How theory change illuminates ordinary thought“. The Ohio State University, 2012. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1343840173.
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Curry, Ryan H. „CHILDREN’S THEORY OF MIND, JOINT ATTENTION, AND VIDEO CHAT“. Case Western Reserve University School of Graduate Studies / OhioLINK, 2021. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=case1616663322967054.
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Hirao, Kazuyuki. „Theory of mind and frontal lobe pathology in schizophrenia“. Kyoto University, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/2433/124245.
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Hastie, Natalie. „A computational theory of world: Mind in Leibnizian metaphysics“. Thesis, Hastie, Natalie (2014) A computational theory of world: Mind in Leibnizian metaphysics. Honours thesis, Murdoch University, 2014. https://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/id/eprint/25125/.
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Computational theory of mind (CTM) is a dominant model found in much of the cognitive sciences and neuroscience, with the working assumption that most or all of mental phenomena can be reduced to computation. While this has demonstrated to be an effective working model within such disciplines, there are fundamental philosophical issues with this standard theory. By using a hybrid approach of Leibnizian Metaphysics as the ground on which to develop the emerging field of a computational Metaphysics, we can begin to reconcile this disciplinary gap and grant those fields the epistemic purchase that their assumptions are currently lacking. I will present first the primary concepts of CTM, and the problems which arise from this standard model in terms of understanding the nature of consciousness itself. By then backtracking into Leibniz’s Monadology, I will explore the rational foundation of his peculiar computational metaphysics that form his conception of the nature of ‘substance’. This will serve as a useful platform to explore the emerging fields of Computational Metaphysics, in which a number of recent theorists are proposing a paradigm shift away from the “myth of matter” to an informational model which seeks to account for physical structures of matter and motion in terms of computation. By combining these theories with Leibnizian metaphysics, in which perception and consciousness are not just explained but are intrinsic to his system, I propose a new, hybrid approach to computational theory of mind which is neither reductive to physical brain states and which accounts for the lived experience of consciousness.
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Yoon, Jeung Eun. „Theory of mind in middle childhood : assessment and prediction“. Diss., University of Iowa, 2015. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/1941.
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Theory of Mind (ToM), a social cognitive skill defined as one's ability to attribute mental states to self and others, is considered key for a successful navigation of one's social world. Extensive research has elucidated the early developmental trajectory, predictors, correlates, and outcomes of ToM in the first five years of a child's life. By contrast, although ToM continues to develop beyond age five, and children increasingly begin to function in more complex and interconnected social ecologies, very little is known about ToM in middle childhood. The present study examines ToM development in middle childhood, using a new measure that is age appropriate, innovative, and embedded in the flow of a naturalistic social interaction. Drawing from rich behavioral and report data collected from children, parents, and teachers in a longitudinal study from toddlerhood to middle childhood, interpersonal factors (the child's relationships with the mother, father, and peers), and intrapersonal factors (temperament characteristic of effortful control) are systematically examined to predict individual differences in children's performance in the new ToM measure at age 10. Associations between children's ToM and their broadly ranging, concurrently assessed clinical symptoms are also examined. As a preliminary venture, using a small sample of children with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and their caregivers, the present study also seeks to establish preliminary criterion validity for the new measure of ToM.
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Grape, Amelie, und Sara Sandstig. „Theory of mind, språkliga förmågor och ickeverbal intelligens hos barn mellan tre och fyra års ålder : Översättning och validering av Theory of Mind Scale“. Thesis, Linköpings universitet, Logopedi, 2012. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-79309.
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Theory of mind är att kunna tillskriva andra människor mentala tillstånd som förklarar deras beteenden. Dessa mentala tillstånd kan röra sig om uppfattningar, intentioner eller känslor. Theory of Mind Scale är en bedömningsskala utformad av Wellman och Liu (2004), som undersöker olika nivåer av theory of mind. Theory of Mind Scale är uppbyggd i skalsteg med stigande svårighetsgrad. Syftet med föreliggande studie var att översätta Theory of Mind Scale från engelska till svenska samt validera bedömningsskalan för barn mellan 3 och 4 år. Studien syftade även till att se om det fanns ett samband mellan dessa barns förmåga till theory of mind, impressiva grammatiska förmåga och impressiva ordförråd. Valideringen i föreliggande studie visade att skalstegen i den amerikanska originalversionen av Theory of Mind Scale var applicerbara på barnen i föreliggande studie, med undantag för den sista uppgiften. Istället för att exkludera den sista uppgiften skulle ett alternativ till en bedömningsskala kunna vara att jämföra barns resultat mot ett medelvärde med en normalvariation. I föreliggande studie kunde ett barn mellan 3;0 och 3;11 års ålder förväntas klara 2,83 ± 2,50 uppgifter och ett barn mellan 4;0 och 4;11 års ålder förväntas klara 3,71 ± 1,50 uppgifter. Resultaten visade att sambandet var starkare mellan ickeverbal intelligens och theory of mind än mellan impressivt ordförråd och theory of mind. Inget signifikant samband fanns mellan impressiv grammatisk förmåga och theory of mind. Översättningen och valideringen som gjorts i samband med föreliggande uppsats gör det möjligt att kvalitativt använda bedömningsskalan i det kliniska arbetet med barn som misstänks ha svårigheter med theory of mind.Theory of mind is an ability to ascribe other people mental states to explain their behaviors. These mental states may regard beliefs, intentions or feelings. Theory of Mind Scale is an evaluation scale designed by Wellman and Liu (2004). The scale consists of different scale steps of theory of mind, with an increasing difficulty. The purpose of this study was to translate Theory of Mind Scale from English to Swedish and validate the scale for children from the age of 3 to 4 years. The study also aims to examine if there is any relationship between children’s theory of mind, grammatical understanding, receptive vocabulary and non-verbal intelligence. The validation of the present study showed that the order of the scale steps in the American original version of the Theory of Mind Scale was applicable to the children in the present study, with an exeption of the last task (real-apparent emotion). An alternative to the scale would be to compare the children’s performance against a normal variation. According to the present study a child between the age of 3;0 and 3;11 years could be expected to complete 2,83 ± 2,50 tasks and a child between the age of 4;0 and 4;11 years could be expected to complete 3,71 ± 1,50 tasks. The results indicated a stronger correlation between theory of mind and non-verbal inteligence than between theory of mind and receptive vocabulary in children between the age of 3;0 and 4;11 years. No significant correlation existed between receptive grammar and theory of mind. The translation and validation of Theory of Mind Scale enables qualitative clinical investigations of theory of mind deficits in children.