Dissertationen zum Thema „Supervisor firms“
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Khayre, Abdimajid, und Jan Niklas Schmänk. „Collaborative Innovation in Family Businesses : Empirical Study on the Influence of Family Involvement in Top Management Teams“. Thesis, Jönköping University, Internationella Handelshögskolan, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-52929.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleSchmidt, Junior Reno. „Existe um trade-off entre supervisão e salário? : evidências para uma firma metal mecânica“. reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/103916.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleThe objective of this dissertation was testing the existence of a trade-off between supervision and wages in a Brazilian metal mechanical industry, called Bruning Tecnometal Ltda. Were examined and analyzed the effects of employees performance and productivity who were facing a changing in the degree of supervision in the production line of aluminum fuel tanks. The experience of Bruning’s case strongly corroborates with the relevance of the theory of efficiency wages (shirking), which indicates that an increase in the degree of supervision reduces the shirking of workers and the behavior of moral hazard. The dissertation concludes that there is a negative relation between wages and supervision, so that, it is the company responsibility to choose between increasing supervision or raising wages, to maintain the same effort level. This case thus is consistent with the predictions generated by the model regarding the shirking efficiencywages.
Toušová, Kateřina. „Problematika uplatňování nástrojů marketingového řízení ve firmě Rodenstock ČR s.r.o“. Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2007. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-3952.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleGrenert, Patrik, und Linus Bäckström. „Damage Assessment of the 2018 Swedish Forest Fires Using Sentinel-2 and Pleiades Data“. Thesis, KTH, Geoinformatik, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-259680.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleHess, Jeffrey Todd. „Reel Deans : The Portrayal of Higher-Education Administrators in American Films“. UNF Digital Commons, 2012. http://digitalcommons.unf.edu/etd/396.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleSvihran, Katrina. „The friction between rationales of national ownership, macroeconomic prudence/supervision and financial restructuring in national banking sectors, how global/regional trade agreements have intensified a competitive rivalry among financial firms operating in the global economy based on the differences between domestic regulatory frameworks“. Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1999. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape7/PQDD_0007/MQ46154.pdf.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleMahdhaoui, Ammar. „Analyse de Signaux Sociaux pour la Modélisation de l'interaction face à face“. Phd thesis, Université Pierre et Marie Curie - Paris VI, 2010. http://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00587051.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleHlavica, Tomáš. „Návrh marketingové strategie“. Master's thesis, Vysoké učení technické v Brně. Fakulta podnikatelská, 2016. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-254272.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleWei, Tsao-Chi, und 魏早啟. „A study of performance and characteristics of board and supervisor of Taiwanese firms listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange“. Thesis, 1997. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/09876888202002029547.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle東吳大學
會計學系
85
Abstract The public company in Taiwan are almost from small business. CEO, general managers, and supervisors in Taiwan are always relatives. This paper is studying if the different characteristics of board of directors affect enterprise''s performance. The American Model Business Corporation Act is different with Taiwan Corporation Act. American company doesn''t have supervisor while has outside directors. American company''s director doesn''t require have stock. American company''s monitor is from outside director, because outside directors are more independent. The public company in Taiwan, chairman of the director and general manager are the same or have relatives perform worse, and family business as well. The company''s supervisors are not independent with directors perform worse. The company have more supervisors perform better.
Kang, Juang, und 康壯. „A Research on Income Conservatism in R.O.C. Listed Firms: Preparation of Financial Reports and Supervisor of Financial Reports View“. Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/58353735995408079242.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle中國文化大學
會計學系
100
This research investigates the extent and nature of income conservatism from a view of preparation of financial reports as related to the factor of industry factor, re-search and development expense, and litigation risk, and a view of supervisor of fi-nancial reports as accounting firm. Due to the lack of a generally accepted method-ology, several proxies, there are, profit margin, accounting rates of return and oper-ating cash flow are applied to value the conservatism of financial statements; meanwhile Basu’s earnings return model (1997) is modified to evaluate the degree of conditional and unconditional conservatism. Also I suppose the financial reports of clients of Big 4 accounting firms should have more conservatism in order to protect their own reputation of Big 4. The result acclaims, relative to other companies, the effects on profit margin and operating cash flow of the technology firms do not follow the same direction as stated in the hypothesis; on the other hand, as predicted, large R&D expense does elevate uncon-ditional conservatism, and the rise of litigation risk increases conditional conserva-tism. The financial reports of clients of Big 4 firms seem to have less conservatism.
Chang, Ting-Hsuan, und 張庭瑄. „A Study on the high and low interactive relationship between Ratio of blockholder shareholding and Ratio of director and supervisor shareholding which impact on firms performance“. Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/15335892660858619893.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle銘傳大學
資訊管理學系碩士在職專班
100
The study analyzes the correlations between the inside and outside of the ownership structure and firm’s performance based on the sample of all listed companies on the TSE (Taiwan stock Exchange) form 2005 to 2009.The primary investigation of research is to examine if there are the significant differences on the firm’s performance under the cross correlation between inside and outside shareholders using descriptive statistics and T test. Furthermore, the investigation discovers that the ownership structure with the higher ratio of blockholder shareholding and the lower ratio of director and supervisor shareholding shows better stock price performance. There are better performance if this ownership structure is under the higher shareholding ratio of institutional director and institutional supervisor, lower ratio of top ten stock holders with president, and higher shareholding ratio of foreign capitals. And the main influence is the supervision effect from the outside shareholding. Poorer performance is shown when the ownership structure is with lower ratio of blockholder shareholding and the ownership structure is lower shareholding ratio of institutional director and institutional supervisor, lower ratio of top ten stock holders with president and lower shareholding of foreign capitals. The main cause of poorer performance may be result from no outside supervision or the endogenous relations of the inside shareholding.
Pinto, Odette M. „Advice and complexity in tax planning judgments“. Phd thesis, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10048/989.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleTitle from pdf file main screen (viewed on February 1, 2010). A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Accounting, School of Business. At head of title: University of Alberta. Spring 2009. Includes bibliographical references.
Chen, Cheng-hung, und 陳政宏. „Board attributes、firm performance、the directors and supervisor's background and market reaction to announcement of independent directors and supervisors“. Thesis, 2005. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/21872118859602462737.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle開南管理學院
財務金融系碩士班
93
Recently, there were quite a number of accounting scandals and financial fraudulence in US and Taiwan. Therefore, the government hope to enhance corporate governance mechanism. They enforce that initial public offerings must set up at least two independent directors and one independent supervisor since February, 2002. The major of this study investigates the independent of director announcement effect that can improve investor's confidence and produce abnormal return which can increase the value of the company and shareholder. The research data were collected by 94 companies which were announced recruiting independent director between 2002 to 2004. Using the event studying get independent director announcement effects, the difference of independent directors and independent supervisor, the effects of industry, the number of independent directors and independent directors' background. As a result, the announcement of director could produce abnormal return, but the technology industry did not significantly positive, the number of independent directors were no more 2 people. Depending on the independent and professional directors are more useful in corporate. Finally, using multiple regression model test the factor of abnormal return from the effects of independent director. Using the character of the board, the performance of corporation, development and the directors get more other jobs. In conclusion, if the company has the higher stock holding ratio of the directors(supervisors), the higher stock holding ratio of the institutional investors have, higher percentage of the shares as collateral by the board of directors, the lower corporate performance in the earlier, the CEO can not be the chair man, the directors get fewer other jobs, it will get positive abnormal return.
MINH, LE THI HONG, und 黎氏紅明. „The Relationship between Ownership Structure, Supervision Mechanism and Firm Performance: An Empirical Study in Vietnamese Listed Firms“. Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/54450944798565508121.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle南台科技大學
企業管理系
98
Nowadays, corporate governance becomes more and more important in managing efficiently firms especially after the Asia crisis in 1997 and the world wide crisis from 2008 until now. Corporate governance has been researched since the early of 20th century by philosophers, and studied deeply and more populated all over the world. Combining with sharply problems in economy, corporate governance is considered like the effective method to establish the basic qualification and improves the economy from inside. At the present, corporate governance is the new issue in Vietnam and has not yet many academic researches about this topic. Moreover, Vietnam economy is in the change stage from State owned to privatization, it requires update regulation to support for this one and get healthier economy. This stage faces a lot of difficulties from both subjective and objective factors. Structures of company, the effective management seem like the priority requirements to reach unshakeable improvement. Cause of these reasons, research about corporate governance play considerately role in the development and integration period of Vietnam nowadays. Corporate governance is studied in many issues, solves a lot of problems in firms to get better performance. In this study examines about the relationship between the ownership structure, board composition and the firm performance in Vietnam. Data are collected from the Vietnam listed firms in stock market from 2006 to 2008. Using software to test the research framework and hypothesis, and analyze the data through t-test, descriptive analysis, correlation coefficients, and regression analysis. The result shows that cause of specific characters in Vietnam, most parts in ownership structure are strongly significant and positive to firm performance cause of specific economy such as state ownership, major shareholders, manager, and institutional ownership. Board composition is less significant and correlated to firm performance than the former part.
Wun, Yu-Li, und 温育儷. „A Study on Taiwan''s Supervisory Laws for Securities Firms“. Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/9gguk7.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle國立中興大學
法律學系碩士在職專班
106
This thesis first examines the separation of banking, securities, and insurance under a system of separate operation within the finance industry which, for the purpose of preventing the spread of financial risks, prohibits banks from concurrently operating securities and insurance businesses. In response to international trends in the highly competitive financial environment, this thesis seeks to analyze regulations on financial firewalls for types of businesses that integrate banks, securities, and insurance as the finance industry enters an era of cross-sector business operations. Following the above analysis is an introduction of the design of Taiwan''s current financial supervisory authorities and detailed descriptions of the establishment of the nation’s securities competent authority, the Securities and Futures Bureau of the Financial Supervisory Commission, and self-regulatory bodies of the securities industry that consist of the Taiwan Stock Exchange, Taipei Exchange, Taiwan Depository & Clearing Corporation, and Taiwan Securities Association as well as their powers of authority in the supervision of securities firms. The key of the study rests upon the supervisory systems for securities firms of non-financial holding and financial holding companies. It analyzes amendments to laws and regulations that govern the establishment criteria, financial regulations, and business regulations of dedicated securities firms, securities firms affiliated with financial holding companies, and banks that concurrently operate securities firms. It also explains the legislative history of related regulations and statutes. Included within the scope of the analysis are the Securities and Exchange Act, Regulations Governing Securities Firms, Standards Governing the Establishment of Securities Firms, Regulations Governing Responsible Persons and Associated Persons of Securities Firms, Regulations Governing the Establishment of Internal Control Systems by Service Enterprises in Securities and Futures Markets, Securities Investor and Futures Trader Protection Act, Operating Rules of the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation, Financial Holding Company Act, Regulations Governing the Consolidated Capital Adequacy of Financial Holding Companies, Company Act, and Banking Act. They are compiled according to date of establishment and financial and business categories. Finally, the thesis analyzes Taiwan''s supervisory regulations for securities firms and compares variations between regulations for dedicated securities firms and non-dedicated securities firms as well as securities firms that are affiliated with financial holding companies and those that are not. Potential deficiencies in the legislation are also explored.
Lin, Mong-Yang, und 林孟陽. „Effects of Independent Director and Supervisor Compositions on Firm Performance“. Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/65030336537637941557.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle國立高雄第一科技大學
財務管理所
95
Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Prowse (1998) found one of the main elements of Asian financial crisis in 1997 was that corporate governance institution had not been well established. Taiwan Securities and Futures Bureau passed a regulation in February 19, 2002 requiring each firm needed to include at least two independent directors and an independent supervisor when initial public offering. This action responded the important role of independent director and supervisor in establishing a functional corporate governance. This research uses at least two independent directors and an independent supervisor, an independent director and an independent supervisor, and an independent director or an independent supervisor, as three compositions to test firm performance separately. ROA and ROE are independent variables responding firm financial performance. Tobin’s Q is the independent variable responding firm marketing performance. 2476 firm yearly data are collected from Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation, but not including banking corporations due to their specific regulations. Effects of independent director and independent supervisor institution on firm’s financial and marketing performance will be tested by Multiple Regression Analysis. Empirical result find that different independent director and independent supervisor compositions have all significant positive effects on firm’s financial and marketing performance.
Ku-Yun, Hung. „Do Independent Directors and Supervisors Help Firm's Financial Performance?“ 2005. http://www.cetd.com.tw/ec/thesisdetail.aspx?etdun=U0001-0906200511135700.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleLin, Ying-Fong, und 林盈夆. „Effects of Stocks Liquidity and Supervisors Monitoring on Firm Value“. Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/50605885484534915293.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle朝陽科技大學
財務金融系碩士班
100
This paper explores the effects of stocks liquidity and supervisors monitoring on firm value. The stock returns of firms world be affected. When the increase in thestock liquidity, the stock returns would be affected, thereby affecting the firm value. In addition, the directors and supervisors enhance the value of the company or its own interests by the supervision and management of the company. Most of the previousreferences have to study for single point of view, but we think, the joint correlation between stocks liquidity and supervisors monitoring exists for the value of firms. Therefore, we add two factors of stocks liquidity and supervisors monitoring at some time to explore the effects on firms value together. Due to time series Analysis and cross sectional analysis can not test alone and to track long-term effects of the causal relationship between the variables, we use panel data to test the correlation between stocks liquidity, supervisors monitoring and the value of firms. the following results are obtained: stocks liquidity the higher, the supervisors monitoring stronger. When market depth the better, the stock return ratios higher. In addition, when increase in number of directors control, the degree of the supervisors monitoring would be improved, Thus making the rise of the stock return ratios. Key words: stocks liquidity, supervisors monitoring, firm value, panel data
Hung, Ku-Yun, und 洪顧紜. „Do Independent Directors and Supervisors Help Firm''s Financial Performance?“ Thesis, 2005. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/95549935624812927493.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle國立臺灣大學
財務金融學研究所
93
Many commentators believe that the higher the percentage of independent directors and supervisors, the better the financial performance of firms. A competent authority in Taiwan requested that newly listed companies should hire independent directors and supervisors after February 22nd, 2002. However, the empirical results in this paper challenge the conventional point of view on this topic in the literature. And in addition, this study finds that the promulgation of the 2002 regulation has brought with it some negative effects. First, the results of this study suggest that the percentage of independent directors and supervisors has a nonlinear relationship with firm performance. Second, the empirical findings of this study show that, affected by the new regulation, some bad companies that didn’t have to follow the new regulation will still voluntarily hire independent directors and supervisors in order to prevent investors from discovering their true quality. Finally, in this paper, we also find that the quality of the independent directors and supervisors is very important for firm performance and should be requested more completely and strictly to make sure that the monitoring mechanism of the firm really works.
Liu, Ker, und 劉科. „A study for estab lishing Taiwanese securities firms' risk management system:from the supervisory angle“. Thesis, 2005. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/97304604620879965557.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleHsieh, Wen-Chi, und 謝雯琪. „Does Supervisory Quality of Board Enhance Corporate Social Performance? -Evidence from Taiwanese Listed Firms“. Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/525js8.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle國立東華大學
會計與財務碩士學位學程
102
Abstract Investors make investment decisions not only based on financial data but also on nonfinancial performance. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is one of the critical indicators. Board responsibilities are to approve management decisions and to supervise corporate operations, including corporate social activities and performance. The effect of the supervisory quality of the board on corporate social performance (CSP) is a topic that has not been explored in the literature. This study uses Taiwanese publicly traded firms as a sample over the period of 2010-2012 to examine their relationships. The present study uses four proxies for supervisory quality of board: board attendance rate at board meetings, number of board meetings, social capital of the board and average training hours of the directors. Corporate social performance data is obtained from an international CSR rating agent. Empirical evidences indicate the followings. For CSR firms, board attendance rate and board meeting frequency positively impact CSP but social capital of the board and average training hours of the directors negatively affect CSP. We then group our samples as CSR firms and match them with double size non-CSR firms. We find that CSR firms exhibit significantly higher board attendance rate, board meeting frequency and board social capital. Overall, results support our expectations that board supervisory quality is important to improve corporate social performance.
Chao, Yin-Cheng, und 趙尹誠. „Firms Capital Structure Decisions from Macroeconomic Conditions and The Structure of Directors and Supervisors“. Thesis, 2008. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/qea7ya.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle國立高雄第一科技大學
財務管理所
96
Differing from previous ones only in terms of variables of corporate governance on the change of debt ratio, this study focuses on the variables of macroeconomic conditions weighed in the model, attempted to integrate them, and research topic for discussion of debt ratio overall. Recently, as a result of a cancer in some corporations and changes of economical condition, and we interested in topic. We suggest three hypotheses:(1) Leverage is negatively related to the board size;(2) Leverage is negatively related to the percentage of supervisors on the board;(3) Leverage is positive related to macroeconomic conditions. We takes 513 Taiwanese listed all kinds of industry’s years data over the period from 1998 to 2007 to evidence analysis with Fixed effect panel data regression. The empirical findings support that hypotheses(1). And, from our data of all firms, the positive relationship between debt ratios and the board size. The result is support to our hypotheses(3) that Leverage is positive related to macroeconomic conditions. In addition, the relationship between leverage and the percentage of supervisors on the board is not obvious
Jhuang, Jyun-Ming, und 莊峻銘. „Association among Independent Directors (Supervisors), Corporate information transparency and Firm value“. Thesis, 2004. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/dx44nh.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle國立彰化師範大學
會計學系
92
After Enron scandal, issues on corporate governance are gradually getting more and more attention. Introducing independent directors (supervisors) and enhancing corporate information transparency have become two imperative topics. In this study, two objectives are raised: (1) to examine the effect of independent directors and independent supervisors on corporate information transparency; (2) to examine the effect of independent directors (supervisors) and corporate information transparency on firm value. The data was gathered from those firms listed on Stock Exchange of Taiwan in 2002. After deleting the omitted data, our final sample consists 553 observations. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), path analysis and t test as well as M-W test are used to analyze our data sets. The results indicate that independent directors and independent supervisors indeed facilitate firms to enhance information transparency. It also shows that both the independent directors and the corporate information transparency are significantly relevant to firm value. The other finding is the proportion of independent directors has the most impact on the firm value. Although independent supervisors don’t have any direct impact on the firm value, they can increase firm value indirectly by their positive impact on their corporate information transparency.
HUANG, WAN-TING, und 黃婉渟. „The Impact of Directors and Supervisors with Industry Specialization on Firm Performance“. Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/21438161104647684976.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle輔仁大學
會計學系碩士班
104
This study used the observisions from Taiwanese listed firm during 2006 to 2013 to investigate the impact of dirsctors and supervisors with industry specialization on firm performance. The study used Tobin’s Q as the proxy for firm performance. Vertical-relatedness coefficient is derived from Input-Output tables published by the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan of Taiwan to measure related expertise in a supply-chain industry. The study uses vertical-relatedness coefficient multiplying industry sales ratio of a firm’s main products as the measurement of specialization of board of directors and supervisors (‘‘DRI scores”, for short),. The results of this study show that the DRI scores are positively associated with the firm performance. In addition, industry specialization of board of directors is not associated with firm performance in high R&D investment firms.
Chang, Ching-Jen, und 張敬人. „The Relationship between the Characteristics of IndependentDirectors and Supervisors and Firm Performance“. Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/70583302442745948077.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle國立臺灣大學
會計與管理決策組
104
This thesis investigates the impacts of the quality and characteristics of independent directors and supervisors on the firm performance. The results show that companies hiring more professional, independent and reputationable independent directors and supervisors can improve operating performance, market value and financial health. This thesis also discovers that companies aiming to enhance operating performance should hire independent directors and supervisors who have been the partners of big 4 audit firms; companies aiming to enhance market value should hire independent directors and supervisors who are accounting or financial experts; companies aiming to improve financial health, innovation, or selling capacity should hire independent directors and supervisors who are professors. Finally, this thesis indicates that the above mentioned results are still significant in the same direction when companies are small and median entities, family firms or duality CEO and Chairman as one role, which are regarded as worse corporate governmance. Our empirical results might provide useful implications for companies to hire appropriate independent directors and supervisors.
HUANG, YU-JING, und 黃鈺晶. „Study on the Impact of Audit Committee and Supervior on Firm Performance“. Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/4c9kem.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle大葉大學
企業管理學系碩士班
106
Theoretically the shareholder meeting is the highest organization of the company, and the board of directors is the main executive organization. Now most companies are the legal separation of ownership and management. The increasing demand on the corporate governance and accountability related to the board of directors made the role of supervisor more important. The supervisor plays a major role in corporate governance regarding the organization’s direction, control, and accountability. The corporate governance structure in taiwan is two-tiered and comprises a board of directors and supervisors which is different from one-tiered of the united states. But now there are supervisor and independent directors in the securities exchange act. If there are 3 independent directors, the corporation can choose to form an audit committee instead of having supervisor. The purpose of this thesis is to to verify whether the supervisor or the audit committee has better firm performance for the company.
Chen, Tsai-hung, und 陳在鴻. „The correlation between compensation of directors and supervisors and performance of the firm“. Thesis, 2007. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/32080721839926879935.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle國立中正大學
財務金融所
95
In this study, we examine the correlation between compensation of directors and supervisors and performance of the firm. We use data of firms listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange. The financial and accounting information between 2000 and 2005 of all these listed companies is gathered to conduct the study. We proxy compensation of directors and supervisors using TOBINS’Q, EPS, and ROA. The results are as follows: 1.We find a significant positive relationship between compensation of directors and supervisors, and TOBINS’Q, EPS and ROA. 2.We also find weak evidence of variations in the relationship between compensation of directors and supervisors and performance of the firm across industries.
Hsueh, Hao-Chien, und 薛皓謙. „The Relationship between Professors in the Board of Directors/Supervisors and Firm Performance“. Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/4deg5s.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle國立臺灣大學
財務金融學研究所
106
As independent director system was introduced to Taiwan in 2002 and expanding its requirement to more firms, there are more and more college teachers (including professors and lecturers) appointed as independent directors, directors and supervisors nowadays. This study not only examines the relationship between college teachers in the board of directors/supervisors and firm performance, but also analyzes such relationship if college teachers have different teaching background. The empirical result shows that college teachers in the board of directors/supervisors have positive influence on firm accounting performance (i.e. ROA) but not on the market one (i.e. Tobin’s Q). As for professors and lecturers, professors in the board of directors/supervisors have significant positive influence on firm accounting performance while lectures don’t. As to general and technical education system, the empirical result shows that teachers from general colleges serving in the board of directors/supervisors help firm accounting performance, but teachers from technical colleges serving in the board of directors/supervisors may lead to worse firm market performance. At last, for teachers from national, private and foreign colleges, the empirical result cannot support that appointing teachers from either national or foreign colleges as directors/supervisors has positive influence on firm performance. In conclusion, with different characteristics, college teachers in the board of directors/supervisors do have different interactive effects on firm performance.
Yang, Shi-Hong, und 楊仕鴻. „Ownership structure, characteristics of directors and supervisors, and firm performance : Evidence from Taiwan“. Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/12694182607345197272.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle東海大學
財務金融學系
102
This study aims to examine the impact of ownership structure and characteristics of directors and supervisors on firm performance. Since prior studies are mainly based on the sample periods before 2005, I employ the firm-year observations of listed firms in Taiwan during the period from 2006 to 2012. My empirical analyses include descriptive statistics, Pearson correlation analysis, OLS regressions and Two-Stage Least Squares regressions. The results indicate a positive linkage between board size and firm performance. CEO duality may weaken firm performance. Board ownership is significantly associated with firm performance. In particular, ownership concentration, institutional and blockholdings are found positively related to firm performance.
HSIAO, PAI-CHIAN, und 蕭百謙. „The moderating effect of supervision mechanism on the relationship between family firms and tax avoidance“. Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/u6ua7c.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle國立中正大學
會計與資訊科技研究所碩士在職專班
104
Using a sample of Taiwanese family firms listed companies over the period 2007 to 2014, this study attempts to examine how board characteristics and controlling shareholders affect corporate tax avoidance. The results of this study show that the higher the ratio of corporate director and the ratio of largest separation of voting rights and cash flow rights, the companies tend to have a tax avoidance behavior. Besides, when the group enterprise is controlled by the family, the board of directors is easily controlled by family members and thereby loses its independence. This phenomenon reveals that the controlling shareholders of family firms do not invest comparable cash to obtain the voting right. Thus, this study also finds that the higher the proportion of share held by controlling shareholders, the company presents less tax avoidance behavior. Specifically, controlling shareholders assume firm risks and financial losses when they hold a sufficient number of shares. Therefore, the interest of benefit of controlling shareholders is aligned with that of non-controlling shareholders if the company can obtain more profits, and the company decreases the tax avoidance behavior. With respect to the impact of corporate governance mechanism, the companies which have a deviation of voting rights from cash flow rights, an increase in the ratio of independent directors lessens corporate tax avoidance. However, this study finds no effect of the supervision mechanism of corporate directors on the company’s tax avoidance. Key Words: Controlling Shareholders, Corporate Directors, Corporate Governance, Family Firms, Tax Avoidance.
Lo, Chi-Ling, und 駱紀伶. „The Relationship between the Oversea Educational Backgrounds of Directors and Supervisors and Firm Performance“. Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/nf8d5t.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle國立臺灣大學
財務金融學研究所
106
Statistics have shown that studying overseas has become a rapidly growing trend among students in Taiwan in recent years. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the influence of the overseas educational qualifications of board members on the performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q) of Taiwan’s non-financial listed firms during the period between 2009 and 2015. The thesis also examines whether important features of overseas educational qualifications of board members, such as the country from which the degree is issued, the major of the degree, and whether the degree is undergraduate or post-graduate, can affect firm performance. To alleviate the concern for reverse causality between the overseas educational qualifications of board members and firm performance, the thesis conducts both the ordinary least square (OLS) and two-stage least square (2SLS) regressions. This thesis finds the following empirical results. First, the percentage of board members who receive overseas degrees is positively related to firm performance. Second, the firms with more directors/supervisors who receive degrees from the U.S. and Canada have better performance. Third, for the firms in the biotechnology industry, firm performance is better if more of their directors/supervisors have overseas biotech/medical degrees. Finally, overseas Ph.D. and master degrees of board members can also improve firm performance. The thesis undertakes several robustness tests, and the main results are unchanged.
I-TingSu und 蘇意婷. „The impact of share pledging behavior of the directors and supervisors on firm performance“. Thesis, 2015. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/22903242521978296994.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleYea-Fon, Shieh Tserng, und 曾雅鳳. „The relationship between the structure of board of supervisory and directors and firm performance:“. Thesis, 2001. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/05653464451547156088.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle義守大學
管理科學研究所
89
This paper empirically examines the relationship between board structure and corporate performance by using a sample of steel corporations listed on Taiwan stock exchange in 1998. The cross-sectional analysis finds a significantly negative association between the percentage of outside directors and corporate performance. In addition, we also find the proportion of outside supervisor is positively related to corporate performance. Moreover, the result indicates that corporate performance has positive relationship with stock share held by board.
Liang, Mei-Chu, und 梁美珠. „The analysis for relationship bewteen breaching regulations by the security firms and promoting supervision by authority“. Thesis, 2007. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/46319341254917610863.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle淡江大學
管理科學研究所企業經營碩士在職專班
95
The irregularities of the Securities Firms emerges in an endless stream in recent years. On one hand, it may cause the securities’ financial risk, and will even influence the market order to make investors to suffer losses on the other hand. Therefore it’s worthy to probe into its intension and influence the relation thoroughly. The main influence factor probed into the internal control mechanism of the Securities Firms and competent authority''s supervision system. Perfecting effective risk management and controlling the system can promote the stability of specific Securities Firms and whole industry, and then increase the confidence of the public, because all Securities Firms have their own economic and commercial motive to build up an effective risk management internal control system. Without the internal control system, the Securities Firms will undoubtedly unable to encounter with all different risks. If the Securities Firms can carry out concrete and effective risk management and control conscientiously, the stability of whole financial system will be substantially promoted .This research analyses the domestic irregularities that appear for more famous Securities Firms through the collection of the huge materials, and finds out the comparatively key points from it, for the competent authority to strengthen their supervisory management. This research focus on the common huge accumulation cases in irregularities of Securities Firms, using the method of classification of the internal control forms, carrying on the statistical analysis of the irregularities. It was found that the enhancement of government’s supervision system really contribute to the reducing of the irregularities. But comparatively obvious cases in irregularities appear, it betrays that the internal control mechanism of the Securities Firms still need to cooperate with the government’s supervision system. To strengthen personnel''s training and carry out the internal control mechanism strictly could reduce the irregularities to the ideal level.
Chuang, Yi Jui, und 莊貽如. „The Study on the Relationship between the Independent Directors and Supervisors and the Firm Performance“. Thesis, 2009. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/dmk4n6.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle長榮大學
經營管理研究所
97
The legalization of the systems of independent directors and supervisors was put into practice in Taiwan on January 1, 2007, but those systems should be set up for the new OTC listed companies in 2002 according to the provisions of the laws. As a matter of fact, the systems of independent directors and supervisors have been implemented in Taiwan for many years. In addition to the introduction the of the accounting and financial professionals in operating a business for better rationalization and specialization, the systems of independent directors and supervisors provide the company more effective management as well as the rights and interests of the investors better protection without any conflict of interests arising, since those systems have no direct stake in the company. First of all, this study analyzed empirically the relationship between the firm performance and the companies with or without the setting of independent directors and supervisors under the selection of the OTC listed companies during 2004 to 2006. On the other hand, the firm performances between the former and the later settings of the independent directors and supervisors of the OTC listed companies during 2003 to 2007 are also analyzed empirically. Finally, this study analyz the relationship of the firm performance of the OTC listed companies among the ownership shares, the pledged shares, and the remuneration of the independent directors and supervisors during 2004 to 2006 respectively. The empirical analysis of this study is based on the methods of the mixed design ANOVA and the Wilcoxon signed ranks test by SPSS. The empirical results of this study are as follows: 1.The ROA, ROE, and EPS of the companies with the setting of independent directors and supervisors are all significantly higher than those without the setting of independent directors and supervisors. This shows that the firm performance of the companies with the setting of independent directors and supervisors is superior to those without the setting of independent directors and supervisors. 2.The ROA, ROE, and EPS of the companies with the later setting of independent directors and supervisors are significantly higher than those with the former setting of independent directors and supervisors. This shows that the firm performance of the companies with the later setting of independent directors and supervisors is superior to those with the former setting of independent directors and supervisors. 3.There is no significant differences in the ROA, ROE and EPS among the companies with the ownership share of the setting of independent directors and supervisors. This shows that the firm performance and the ownership share of the companies with the setting of independent directors and supervisors are irrelevant. 4.The ROA, ROE, and EPS of the companies with high pledged share percentage of the setting of independent directors and supervisors are all significantly higher than those with low pledged share percentage. This shows that the firm performance of the companies with high pledged share percentage is worse than those with low pledged share percentage. 5.The ROA, ROE, and EPS of the companies with high reward of the setting of independent directors and supervisors are all significantly higher than those with low remuneration. This shows that the firm performance of the companies with high remuneration is superior to those with low reward.
Nguyen, Hoang-Dung, und 阮黃勇. „Affiliation of Independent Directors and Independent Supervisors with Current Audit Firm and Financial Reporting Quality“. Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/88066154137988154775.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle國立臺灣大學
會計學研究所
102
This research aims to investigate whether the presence of affiliated independent directors or independent supervisors affects accruals-based earnings management of Taiwanese listed companies. Independent directors/supervisors are “affiliated” if they previously assumed an auditing position at their current company’s audit firm. Independent directors/supervisors are “unaffiliated” if they possess auditing experience, but never worked for their company’s current audit firm. Using a sample of 3,887 firm-years over the period of 2008 – 2012 and four measures of discretionary accruals to estimate earnings quality, this study finds that the presence of unaffiliated independent directors/supervisors is positively associated with earnings quality. Affiliated independent directors/supervisors are also found to have positive impact on earnings quality, after controlling for endogeneity using the difference-on-difference and instrumental variable approach. By classifying unaffiliated and affiliated independent directors/supervisors into seven different “profiles” based on their affiliation relationship with their company’s current audit firm and their highest audit position ever held, this study aims to investigate whether specific “combinations” of affiliation type and audit experience (including staff, manager, and partner) affect earnings quality and whether these effects are significantly different from each other. Results indicate that the profile of independent directors/supervisors affiliated as audit staff and having audit partner experience is positively associated with positive performance-included discretionary accruals, and this impact is significantly different with the other affiliated and unaffiliated independent director/supervisor profiles. On the other hand, even though the three profiles of unaffiliated independent directors/supervisors, including unaffiliated audit staff, unaffiliated audit manager, and unaffiliated audit partner, are all positively linked with earnings quality, this study does not detect any significant difference among these relationships.
Hsu, Jia-Ang, und 許加昂. „The Relationship Between the Pledged Shares Ratio of Directors’ and Supervisors’ Shareholdings and Firms’ Performance, Financial Policies, and Dividend Policies“. Thesis, 2000. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/14796175694322740359.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle國立臺灣大學
會計學研究所
88
The purpose of the study is to investigate the relationship between the percentage of directors’ and supervisors’ shareholdings that are pledged (pledged shares ratio) and firms’ performance, financial policies, and dividend policies. Under the convergence-of-interest hypothesis, the pledged shares ratio is positively related to a firms’ performance, while under the entrenchment hypothesis the above relation is negative. The study also hypothesizes that the pledged shares ratio is positively related to firms’ leverage and dividend payout ratios. The sample includes firms that are listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange for the years 1993-1998. Multivariate regression results indicate that: (1) There is no evidence that the pledged shares ratio is associated with firms’ performance. Neither the convergence-of-interest hypothesis nor the entrenchment hypothesis is supported. (2) There is a significantly positive association between the pledged shares ratio and firms’ financial leverage. The higher the pledged shares ratio, the higher the firm’s total debt to equity. (3) There is no evidence that the pledged shares ratio is positively related to cash dividend payout ratio. Indeed, the above relation is found to be negative. On the other hand, there is a positive relation, although not statistically significant, between the pledged shares ratio and stock dividend payout ratio.
Haung, Wen-Hau, und 黃文豪. „The Effects of Accounting Firms Employee’s Perception of Supervisor’s Leadership Style on Job Performance, Trust as A Mediator“. Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/17348428405953475703.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle淡江大學
會計學系碩士班
100
Accounting firm is a kind of industry offerring assurance service, financial, accounts, tax, and consulting service by application of professional knowledge. Another trait of accounting firm is that frims execute task by team of unit; therefore, leadership style and result become a significant issue. Because of firms performed by teamwork, trust is considered an influential factor. In view of previous literature filled with subordinates’ trust in leader and leaders’ trust in subordinate; nevertheless, based on social psychologists’ view, subordinates’ perception of the trust is the crucial point. Consequently, this article follows social psychologists’ view to do a series of examination to increase literature which concern about leadership, trust, and job performance. The research adopts questionnaire survey to collect data, and examines hypothesises by regression analysis. These findings suggest that consideration factor has a positive impact on task performance and workplace ethics performance; structure factor has a positive impact on task performace, contextual performance, and workplace ethics performance. Trust significantly mediates between leadership style and job performace. Subordinates’s trust in superior significantly mediates between leadership style and workplace ethics performance. Subordinates’ perception of the trusted by superior significantly mediates between leadership style and task performace. Subordinates’ perception of the trusted by superior partially mediates between leadership style and contextual performace. Subordinates’ perception of the trusted by superior significantly mediates between leadership style and workplace ethics performance.
Hsiao, Chung-Chih, und 蕭瓊枝. „The Effect of the Independent Directors / Supervisors System and Their Compensations on Firm Performance in Taiwan“. Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/16874626797929797067.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle輔仁大學
會計學系碩士班
94
Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (Gretai Securities Market) has required all new listed firms to employ at least two independent directors and one independent supervisor since February 22(25), 2002. Although this system is inspired by other countris’ regulations, whether such new system is suitable and brings about positive benefit for Taiwan domestic business culture is subject to testing. Moreover, prior research has focused on the effect of the board structure on firm performance, or the effect of the board compensation on firm performance, none has studied the impact of these two factors on firm performance, so this study is aimed at analyzing the association between firm performance and the independent directors and supervisors system and their compensations. The Sample firms of this study are the TSE and OTC listed firms in Taiwan during the period from 2002 to 2004. This study examines whether the setting of independent directors and supervisors induce the better firm performance, and the board compesation have better effect on firm performance to prompt the strength of supervision function and then induce the positive benefit on firm performance based on agent cost reduction consideration. The empirical results can be summarized as follows: 1.The setting of independent directors and supervisors really induce the better firm performance. 2.The more board compesation, the better firm performance. 3.The empirical finding that the more board compesation, the better firm performance is more profound in firms with independent directors compared to firms without independent directors and supervisors.
李孟倫. „The association among agency problem and dividend policy from the viewpoint of family firms and the compensation of directors and supervisors“. Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/67558363102731233370.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle國立交通大學
管理科學系所
100
In this study, we examine how effectively a firm can mitigate its agency problems by means of dividend policies. Most studies regarding this issue focus mainly on the context in which management abuses power to expropriate shareholders' equity. We have two different perspectives. First, behaviors of expropriation vary with family ownership. Second, for family business, equity expropriation is mostly done by paying high compensation to directors and supervisors. We, in this sense, partition our samples in two ways. First, based on family ownership, firms are divided into three groups with ownership between 10% and 20%, between 20% and 50%, and over 50%. Second, based on compensation to directors and supervisors, firms with different profitability are divided into two groups with high compensation and low compensation. Three results are found. First, firms with family ownership between 10% and 20% are the most effective in reducing agency problems by means of dividend policies. Second, firms should have sustainable profits before paying cash dividends. Third, without abundant profits, excess compensation erodes cash payout. We also examine the severity of agency problems by looking at, in different samples, the impact of internal corporate governance mechanism on firm performance. Three results are found. First, firms with family ownership between 20% and 50% show the highest severity of agency problems and the lowest effectiveness of internal corporate governance mechanism. Second, the phenomenon that more seats of family control lead to poorer firm performance is more obvious in firms with high compensation to directors and supervisors. Third, firms with low compensation show better effectiveness of internal governance mechanism.
Liao, Yujiun, und 廖育駿. „The Influences of Financial Supervision, Firm Characteristics on Bancassurance Business Models and Corporate Performances“. Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/43004430674649247382.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle實踐大學
財務金融與保險研究所
99
Taiwanese bancassurance industry has undergone changes since its debut in 1992. In earlier days, foreign insurance firms sell their simple-structured unforeseen accident insurance policies through their insurance brokers. When a downward trend of interest rates was developed in 2000, the industry introduced investment-oriented insurance products to patch problems caused by changes in interest rate spreads. Later when the economy was experiencing a downturn while overwhelming quantity of cash was deposited into banks, banks started marketing interest sensitive annuity and endowment insurance plans, which had rapidly growing sales figures during the days and enabled banks to seize places of traditional insurance sales forces gradually. Banks then became the largest channel of insurance industry. Meanwhile, insurance policies per se are one of the innovative services which changed traditional business models of banks – making profits mainly through interest spreads. Banks then became the primary income channel of FYP of life-insurance firms. However, by reviewing the development trajectory of Taiwanese bancassurance industry, this thesis discovered that the industry was not only immensely affected by macroeconomic factors, but also financial supervising institutions and systems of the government – due to the delicate “licensed” characteristic of the industry. Under the same regulations, domestic insurance firms and banks have been utilizing their own resources and innovation capabilities to develop new business models and insurance policies so that they can discover their own blue-ocean under keen competition. This thesis utilizes case study methodology to discuss how two factors – governmental supervision and firm characteristics – affect business models of domestic bancassurance industry. The author interviewed managers of financial holding companies and domestic/international insurance firms to understand and develop explanations of bancassurance business models, channels, product strategies and development of the strategies of these firms. Through interviewing three case firms, this thesis discovers: I. Insurance coverage level per capita has been dropping for years, thus the supervising institutions promote bancassurance to boost the sales of traditional insurance products while limiting variable annuity policies, one of the mainstream products of banks. Along with the emergence of full-service investment organizations, life-insurance firms need to develop financial of policies to bridge the gaps between market needs and the supervising policies of pure coverage products. Thus, different firm characteristics, i.e. business conditions and strengths, are making life-insurance firms to react to varied market needs by developing different strategies and products under the same supervising environment and policies. II. By investigating business models of domestic bancassurance practices, this thesis discovered that most of the financial holding companies would only sell the products developed by the life-insurance firm of the group through their “own” banks. This kind of practices can stabilize the income figures from the insurance policies of the life-insurance firm while making it easier to manage the channels and implement selling strategies. As a consequence, better sales performances can be yielded. Additionally, life-insurance firms of the financial holding companies would also cooperate with “outside” banks to enhance its capacities while making the firm strategy more robust. On the other hand, life-insurance firms which are not a subsidiary of financial holding companies have to compete with other life-insurance firms in order to put their products into bancassurance channels. Through interviews, the author determined that product, brand and commission are the three key success factors of the bancassurance channel. To avoid putting all eggs in one basket, life-insurance firms would often cooperate with multiple banks to construct sound sales channels in order to compensate weaknesses of brand and commission and to claim a certain niche market. Their business models yields better performances in profitability figures. Two recommendations according to the analyses of the cases are drawn for supervising institutions and life-insurance firms which have bancassurance channels: I. Domestic and international banks are reporting successes in the realm of bancassurance, which is good news for banks, insurance firms and consumers. The supervising institutions can reference experiences of international banks and accordingly amend regulations and systems which are widely considered archaic or eldritch. In addition, along with the trend of deregulation of domestic markets, financial structures and liquidity of the financial institutions will both affect rights of both the insured and the depositors. Thus, the supervising institutions should focus on financial structures and liquidity of these firms instead of regulating products, where they can invest and how can they manage. II. Banks claimed approximately 70% of the total insurance market in 2010, which is not far from European countries where bancassurance are preponderant. However, different practices can be spotted: domestic banks mainly focus on selling certain types of products. Thus life-insurance firms should proactively develop new products which can fit into selling models of banks so that they can naturally sell these products by planning or designing insurance products which can satisfy the needs of the customers. Modules which fit into the current information systems and data structures of the banks should also be developed so that the processes of reengineering can be thoroughly done. After checking their own value and capabilities, firms should focus on “niche markets” where they can perform the best and apply focus strategies which accommodates their own business models according to the needs of the consumers in order to improve capabilities and competition capacities of the firms.
Long, Chun-Ling, und 龍春伶. „The Effects of Independent Director and Supervisor on Firm Performance and Earnings Quality:The Moderating Effect of Ultimate Controlling Shareholder“. Thesis, 2008. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/18750775603181858575.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle東海大學
會計學系
96
The characteristics of family controlling and business group in domestic corporations influence the function of board of directors. By introducing the independent director and supervisor, the authoritative regulators hope to improve the corporate governance. The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the independent director and supervisor are beneficial to firm performance and earnings quality. Besides, this study also examines the moderating effect of controlling shareholders on the relationship between independent director (supervisor) and firm performance or earnings quality. The empirical results indicate that the independent director and supervisor can improve firm performance but can’t improve earnings quality. Furthermore, the effect of independent director and supervisor on firm performance is reduced when the ultimate controlling shareholders command more controlling or voting right.
Provazníková, Pavlína. „Škola jako úspěšná firma“. Master's thesis, 2012. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-310981.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle„Sales force motivation and supervision: a case study of a local office machine marketing firm“. Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1990. http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5886376.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleThesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1990.
Bibliography: leaves 82-84.
ABSTRACT --- p.ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.v
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS --- p.vii
LIST OF TABLES --- p.viii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS --- p.ix
CHAPTER
Chapter I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1
Background of the Study --- p.1
Problem Identification --- p.3
Research Objective --- p.3
Company Background --- p.4
History and Organization --- p.4
Sales Department --- p.7
Summary --- p.10
Notes --- p.11
References --- p.11
Chapter II. --- LITERATURE REVIEW --- p.12
Introduction --- p.12
Motivation --- p.12
What is Motivation? --- p.12
The Role and Characteristics of Motivation --- p.14
Key Factors in Motivation --- p.15
Theories of Motivation --- p.17
Need Theories --- p.18
Hierarchy of Needs --- p.18
Motivation-Hygiene Theory --- p.21
Achievement-Motivation Theory --- p.22
Expectancy Theory --- p.23
Supervision --- p.24
What is Supervision? --- p.24
The Role of Supervision --- p.25
The Process of Supervision --- p.25
Tools for Supervision --- p.26
Summary --- p.29
References --- p.29
Chapter III. --- METHODOLOGY --- p.31
Introduction --- p.31
Research Design --- p.31
Sources of Data --- p.32
Secondary Data --- p.32
Primary Data --- p.32
Questionnaire --- p.34
References --- p.35
Chapter IV. --- RESEARCH RESULTS --- p.36
Introduction --- p.36
Data Analysis --- p.36
Motivation --- p.37
General Background --- p.37
Motivation System --- p.39
Promotion --- p.45
Compensation --- p.46
Supervision --- p.49
General Background --- p.49
Quota --- p.51
Report System & Others --- p.52
Summary --- p.53
References --- p.54
Chapter V. --- DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS --- p.55
Introduction --- p.55
Discussion --- p.55
Motivation --- p.55
Supervision --- p.62
Recommendations --- p.66
General --- p.66
Motivation System --- p.67
Supervision System --- p.68
Limitations --- p.71
References --- p.73
APPENDICES --- p.74
Chapter 1. --- Questionnaire for Management --- p.75
Chapter 2. --- Questionnaire for Salesmen --- p.78
BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.82
Lin, Kai-Hsun, und 林凱薰. „Earnings Quality in China''s Listed Firms: A Look at Market Supervision, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Auditor Liability“. Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/zwgd9h.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle淡江大學
管理科學學系博士班
102
This paper explores how market supervision, CSR, and auditor liability affect earnings quality in China’s listed firms. Starting with market supervision, we test whether listed firms in China use real activity earnings management (REM) to manipulate earnings, thus meeting the thresholds for issuing new shares as set by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Our analysis shows that REM in China is a de facto means of reaching earnings management goals, but occurrence thereof is mitigated by the level of market development maturity. In other words, a firm in a mature market is less likely to engage in REM than is a firm in an immature market. In terms of earnings management tools, we also discover that after the CSRC issued Article 43 in 2001, once ubiquitous below-the-line items were largely replaced by real activities. To better understand earnings quality, we also study the relationship between non-voluntary CSR and REM, and whether state-owned equity (SOE) structure affects said relationship. Empirical results show that firms in accordance with governmental regulations still score high on CSR, such that manager-level REM is mitigated and a useful mechanism of governance is established. As for SOE structure, it is shown to weaken this relationship. The above conclusions remain consistent when taking the endogeneity of CSR into account. Lastly we research how changes in auditor liabilities affect earnings quality. The results show that, following increased legal responsibilities after 2007, both the earnings quality of listed firms and auditor’s audit quality increased. The results of our research provide a good reference for investors, researchers, and stock market authorities responsible for making supervisory policies.
Tseng, Chu-Hui, und 曾琡惠. „The Determinants of the Directorships Held by Independent Directors and Supervisors and the Impact of Directorships on Firm Performance“. Thesis, 2007. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/68070982639431008857.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle國立交通大學
財務金融研究所
95
In 2006, in order to improve the corporate governance systems and enhance its market competitive capabilities, The Security Exchange Commission (TSEC) decreed that for publicly listed companies, the Board of Directors should have at least two independent directors and can not hold less than 1/3 of the total directorships. To avoid worsening the quality of supervising, TSEC stipulated that the independent directors should not hold more than three independent directorships of other publicly listed companies. The main purpose of this study is to explore the determinants of the directorships held by independent directors and the relation between the firm performance and directorships held by independent directors. In this study, the sample is the electronic industry with at least one independent director and one independent supervisor in the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporate (TSEC) and Over-the-Counter market (OTC) from 2003 to 2005. Our empirical results show: 1. Independent directors with the qualification of experts ,masters or top managers in other companies and average firm size are significantly positively associated with the number of directorships they hold. Average past performance of the firms for which independent directors serve is significantly negatively associated with the number of directorships they hold. 2. The existence of a majority of busy independent directors is significantly negatively associated with firm performance. 3. The existence of a majority of busy independent directors worsens the negative effect of non-independent of supervisor on firm performance. 4. The existence of a majority of busy independent directors worsens the negative effect of powerful managers on firm performance. 5. The existence of a majority of busy independent directors worsens the negative effect of the deviation of controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights from voting rights on firm performance.
WANG, YING-CHU, und 王櫻祝. „The Influence of Directors’ and Supervisors’ stockholding, CEO ownership, and Cross Shareholding on The Firm’s Performance-An Empirical Study on Tranditional Industries“. Thesis, 2017. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/zzp24p.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle長榮大學
經營管理研究所
105
There are many research and studies on corporate performance influence factor with multiple shareholders: shareholding of directors and supervisors and shareholding of managers, but remaining inconclusive. Within this study, we provided additional variant which is called cross shareholding factor, to explore whenever the enterprise has a cross-holder structure and whether this bring different result on corporate performance than shareholder by directors and managers only. According to TEJ database, listed companies from Taiwan Stock Exchange in 2008 to 2015 are object of this study, total 1,526 entrepreneurs, excluded incomplete samples and total samples counts are 10,472. From outcome of this practice shown there is significant influence to company performance when shareholding by directors and managers. Same results applicable to lists of traditional companies with same shareholding sturcture by supervisors and managers. However, in non-traditional industries, the impact is not significant. When traditional industry company has cross-shareholding structure, shareholding by directors and supervisors have significant influence on the company's performance and no significant effect to company performance by manager's shareholding. In traditional industry, there is a significant effect on listed of company performance to shareholding of managers without cross shareholding structure. Shareholding of directors and supervisors has a significant impact on company' ROA performance.
Chen, Yi-Ting, und 陳伊婷. „The Nonlinear Effect of Equity Pledge Ratio of Directors and Supervisors on the Firm Performance-Financial Industry and Non-Financial Industry“. Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/02167755827408473460.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle淡江大學
財務金融學系碩士班
99
The purpose of this study is to examine the nonlinear effect of equity pledge ratio of directors and supervisors on the firm performance by using Panel Smooth Threshold Regression model. Collateralizing shares by board of directors will reinforce the agency problem between controlling shareholders and outside shareholders. Directors’ pledge ratio is regarded as the threshold variable by using the listed companies’ data from 2000 to 2009 in Taiwan to explore the relation. We separate financial firms from entire sample to explore the effect of equity pledge ratio of directors and supervisors on the firm performance because they are special cases. This study divides the non-financial sample into a subsample of conglomerate firms and a subsample of non-conglomerate firms. Further, this study describes and compares the different results. The empirical results show that there exist nonlinear effects between the directors’ shareholding and the firm performance in the conglomerate firms when equity pledge ratio of directors and supervisors is the threshold variable. There is a significant positive relation between the directors’ shareholding and the firm performance in the non-conglomerate firms. The findings imply that the agency problem due to collateralize by board of directors is more serious in the conglomerate firms than in the non-conglomerate firms. Furthermore, when equity pledge ratio of directors and supervisors is more than the threshold value, the higher the directors'' shareholdings, the lower the firm performance in financial industry will be. The agency problem might occur in financial industry more easily when the equity pledge ratio of directors and supervisors is very low.
Chen, Chun-Hsiung, und 陳俊雄. „The Effect of the Stockholding of Directors and Supervisors on the Operating Performance of Firms-An Empirical Study on Electronic Connector Companies Listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange“. Thesis, 2009. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/32306099835903462879.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle淡江大學
國際商學碩士在職專班
97
The purpose of this study is to discuss the effect of director and supervisor’s stockholding on the operating performance of firms. The time period considers extending from 2004 to 2007. The sample comprises 19 Taiwanese electronic connector companies listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange. As pooled cross-section (firms) and time series data are employed for the empirical estimation, random effects and ordinary least square models have been estimated. The operating performance measures include return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and earnings per share (EPS). The empirical evidences show that the following key points: Firstly, the size of firm has nothing to do with the return on assets. However, it has a strongly positive relationship with the ROE and EPS respectively. The age of the firm has a negative relationship with the operating performance of firm. The technology level of the firm has a positive relationship with the operating performance of firm. Secondly, copper price and OECD’s real GDP respectively show no significant effect on variables of ROA、ROE and EPS. Finally, the ratio of stockholding by directors and supervisors exhibits insignificant effect on the operating performance of firm’s ROA、ROE and EPS.
Tsai, Min-Hsiu, und 蔡旻秀. „A Study on the Impact of the Proportion of the Director and Supervisors’ Reward and Employees’ Bonus to Earnings Distributed on Firm’s Performance“. Thesis, 2005. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/93174081946349559141.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle長榮大學
經營管理研究所
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In this research, that whether the reward of directors and supervisors or the allocation for employees’ bonus would impact the industries’ operating performance is discussed. Namely, the discussion is on whether the reward of directors and supervisors as well as the allocation of employees’ bonus will improve the operating performance of enterprises and their connection between each other is also discussed. The purpose of this research is to probe into the influence the allocation for the directors and supervisors’ rewards and that for the employees’ bonus has on the operating performance. Whether the issue of cash dividend and stock dividend would influence the enterprises’ performance is also included in the discussion. The subjects of study are all the listed companies in Taiwan. The financial and accounting information between 1999 and 2003 of all these listed companies were gathered. The statistic analysis, correlation and regression analysis were conducted by using variables, the ratio of directors and supervisors’ awards in the previous year, the ratio of employees’ dividend in terms of book value, market value, and the ratio of the employees’ stock dividend in terms of market value to the total market value. The rates of return is taken as the index of accounting performance; the ratio of the market value to book value of the company is taken as the index of market performance, and the rates of return on stocks is taken as the agent variable of investors’ rewards. The results of the research are as follow. (A)The influence of the rate of directors and supervisors’ awards of the surplus has on the operating performance. The influence of the rate of directors and supervisors’ awards of the divisible surplus has on the rates of return is remarkable and positive; however, the impact on the ratio of the company’s market value to book value and the annual rates of return on stocks is not notable. This result indicates that the higher the rate of directors and supervisors’ awards of the divisible surplus is, the better the operating performance of a company becomes. (B)The influence of the rate of employees’ dividend of the surplus has on the operating performance. The rate of employees’ dividend of book value has positive impact on the company’s operating performance, yet not great. If we convert it into rate of employees’ dividend of market value, the influence will be negative on rates of return and annual rates of return on stocks. The research indicates that the rate of employees’ dividend of market value has tighter connection than that of face value. The higher rate the employees’ dividend of surplus is, the better operating performance the company has. (C)The influence of the issue of cash dividend and stock dividend has on operating performance. In resent years, the enterprises tend to issue cash dividend to share with its employees the achievement of the operation performance. As far as the structure of the issue of employees’ dividend is concerned, the ratio of stock dividend of book value to employees’ dividend of total market value has obvious and positive impact on the market performance; however, it has negative yet not much impact on the investors’ rewards. In other words, the performance of an enterprise surely can be improved by the inspiring stock dividend. However, as the amount of stock divided increases, the investor’s equity also dilutes.