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Bhattacharyya, Gopa. „Epistemology of morals: east-west perspective“. Thesis, University of North Bengal, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/2816.
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Samuelsson, Lars. „The moral status of nature : reasons to care for the natural world“. Doctoral thesis, Umeå : Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier, Umeå universitet, 2008. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-1612.
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Pettersson, Jenny. „Ett mediestrategiskt konstverk : En diskursanalytisk studie av den mediala uppmärksamheten kring Okänd, kvinna 2009 – 349701“. Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Konstvetenskapliga institutionen, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-380872.
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This thesis is an analysis of the media attention concerning the artist Anna Odell and her artwork Okänd, kvinna 2009 – 349701. The main materials I have used come from newspapers and articles where critics discuss Odell´s artwork in the period 2009 to 2015. The theoretical and methodological framework is based on Arthur C. Danto, George Dickie and Howard Beckers understanding of the art world and how artwork and artist receive their status. Another theoretical tool I have used is a discourse theory of Mara Lee. Lee helped me to understand the language and the relations between power and institutions. My aim with this thesis has been to understand how Okänd, kvinna 2009 – 349701 achieved its value and its transformation from a bad to a good evaluation. Why did Odell, in the beginning, get blamed for using tax money, tricking people in to believing that she was mentally ill resulting to the attention of the police, but in the end became an appreciated artist for this very same action? Odell was criticized for her behavior and was accused of stepping over a line for using art in a questionable way. A discussion started about the question of what art is. And what the purpose of art in society is. A few years later, in 2015, Odell was called one of the most interesting artists in Sweden by art critics when they wrote about Okänd, kvinna 2009 – 349701. What changed in the eyes of the critics? What is artistic quality and how can we understand the transformation that Odell´s artwork underwent? My analysis shows that esthetic quality depends on the situation and in ethics and morality. At the beginning the critics compared Okänd, kvinna 2009 – 349701 and the profession of psychiatry and in that comparison the psychiatry profession is more important than art. People attributed more confidence to a doctor than to a student of art regarding the truth about what happened at the psychiatric institution of St: Göran´s on the 21th of January 2009.
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Harman, Elizabeth 1975. „Moral Status“. Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/17645.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2003.Includes bibliographical references.
Chapters One through Three present the following view: (i) I explain moral status as follows: something has moral status just in case we have reasons not to cause harms to it simply in virtue of the badness of the harms for it. (ii) Moral status is not a matter of degree. (iii) A living thing has moral status just in case it is ever conscious. (iv) If something has moral status, then the strength of a moral reason not to harm it is proportional to the severity of the harm. In this view, all humans and animals that are ever conscious have moral status. Future consciousness is sufficient for present moral status. An embryo of any species that will actually be conscious in the future, presently has moral status. Living humans who were conscious but are not and never will be again do have moral status. Any being that dies before it is ever conscious lacks moral status, regardless of its potential. Mere potentiality to be a person is not sufficient for moral status. However, a being's potential future affects the severity of certain harms. There are stronger reasons to avoid causing the deaths of humans than to avoid causing the deaths of cats, because humans lose more in death than cats do. Chapters One through Three present the above view. I argue that this view can resolve certain apparent tensions within two different attractive combinations of views, and on this basis I argue that the above view should be adopted.
(cont.) Chapter Four, "Can We Harm and Benefit in Creating?" proposes a solution to the puzzle of actions that appear to be wrong in virtue of harming a particular individual, but where the individual would not have existed if the action had not been performed, so the individual is not made worse off by the action. Chapter Five, "Ethics Without Ethical Theory," defends part of the methodology of Chapters One through Four by defending the view that we can justifiably reach important substantive ethical conclusions without commitment to a particular ethical theory, or to a particular meta-ethical view.
by Elizabeth Harman.
Ph.D.
5
DiSilvestro, Russell Charles. „Capacities and Moral Status“. Bowling Green State University / OhioLINK, 2006. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=bgsu1149604647.
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Clark, Timothy M. „Moral development at the United States Naval Academy : the midshipman's perspective /“. Thesis, Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 2004. http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/hyperion/04Sept%5FClark.pdf.
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Thesis (M.S. in Leadership and Human Resource Development)--Naval Postgraduate School, Sept. 2004.Thesis advisor(s): Albert C. Pierce, Dana P. French, Jr. Includes bibliographical references (p. 79-82). Also available online.
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Thompson, Ryan Mitchell. „Art, Moral Value, and Significance“. Thesis, University of Canterbury. Philosophy, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10092/9479.
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Debate concerning the relationship between ethics and aesthetics has re-emerged in contemporary aesthetic literature. All of the major contemporary positions, I argue, treat this relationship as existing between the "moral value" of art and its aesthetic value. Throughout this thesis I analyse the various "value- based" positions (ethicism, moderate moralism, and contextualism) and examine whether their accounts of this relationship hold. My aim is to explore whether an alternative account - in which the aesthetic value of art can be enhanced or negated through its "moral significance", rather than its "moral value" - is plausible. I argue, that given the failure of these value- based positions we should favour a "significance- based contexutalist" approach that is better equipped to account for the complexity of both our engagement with art, and the moral reflection that it invites.
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Barman, Ranjit Kumar. „Dharma as a moral value“. Thesis, University of North Bengal, 2017. http://ir.nbu.ac.in/handle/123456789/2706.
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Brownlee, Kimberley. „The moral status of civil disobedience“. Thesis, University of Oxford, 2007. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:7cd0f25d-7550-41f6-a902-ab752e7d1026.
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This dissertation examines the moral character of civil disobedience. The discussion begins with a conceptual analysis of civil disobedience which eschews standard definitions in favour of a paradigm case approach, highlighting a parallel between the communicative aspects of civil disobedience and the communicative aspects of lawful punishment by the state. Foundations for a moral evaluation of civil disobedience are then laid down through, first, an examination of the nature of wrongdoing and justification, and second, a critique of contemporary defences of political obligation. The absence of political obligation, it is argued, does not immediately justify civil disobedience even in reprehensible regimes because, in all contexts, adherence to the law and disobedience of the law must be judged on the basis of their character and consequences. Various considerations relevant to the justifiability of civil disobedience are then examined before the discussion turns to the three principal claims defended in this thesis. The first is that people have a moral right to engage in civil disobedience irrespective of both the political regime and the merits of their cause. The second is that the reasons for which people engage in civil disobedience may be understood in terms of a pursuit of ideals. When motivated by a deep commitment to the genuine ideals of their society, disobedients may be said to demonstrate responsible citizenship. The third claim is that the law should treat disobedients differently from other offenders. When civil disobedience is morally justified, and sometimes when it is not, the law has reason to be lenient to its practitioners. In defending these claims, this discussion critiques not only the 'classical' narrow conception of civil disobedience as a public, non-violent, conscientious breach of law for which disobedients are willing to be punished, but also broader conceptions of civil disobedience which take a modest view of its justifiability and accord it limited status as a moral right.
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Farmer, Rhiannon M. „The Moral Status of Nonhuman Animals“. Thesis, Virginia Tech, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/34238.
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Although moral individualism is sufficient for making fair moral decisions, it is itself supported by our implicit moral commitments; Rawls (and consequently Rowlands) uses the original position as a method for making moral decisions that are both fair and consistent without proposing a normative moral code, and DeGrazia adds content to this method by spelling out what interests are and which individuals are capable of having interests - and thus being morally considerable. Rawls does not go far enough in the process of bracketing off undeserved, unearned properties; he fails to see that properties such as rationality and species are undeserved.
Using Rowlands' interpretation of Rawls, I argue that the revised intuitive equality argument provides the justification for the social contract argument - that is, for bracketing off the properties that are arbitrary. I use DeGrazia to make the case for sentience as being essential for moral consideration. Sentience is necessary and sufficient for having interests, and having interests is sufficient for being worthy of moral consideration. From this, I conclude that because there are many sentient nonhuman animals, there are many nonhuman animals that are worthy of moral consideration. Being morally considerable is not equivalent to having substantial moral status.
Rachels' moral individualism allows us to make moral decisions based upon the properties or characteristics of the individual, and this is particularly useful for pinpointing our treatment of humans and our justification for doing so and then simply extending this line of thought to nonhumans. This method allows us to isolate what is indeed relevant to the situation at hand and to consider if both individuals under consideration share it. In the case of moral status, sentience will play an important role because it is a property shared by humans and at least some nonhuman animals. Using Rawls, Rowlands, DeGrazia and Rachels as support, I conclude that at least some animals have significant moral status.
Master of Arts
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Wilcox, Marc Gareth. „The agency account of moral status : defending the equal moral status of humans and non-human animals“. Thesis, University of Leeds, 2017. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/19901/.
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In this thesis, I argue that humans and sentient animals have equal moral status in the sense that they ought to have like interests equally considered. Furthermore, they are owed strong pro tanto duties to be free from having pain inflicted upon them, having their lives ended and having their liberty restricted. I argue for these claims by developing and defending an account of moral status grounded in agency. This account takes agency, understood as the capacity to act on motivating reasons, to be the necessary and sufficient condition for moral status. Further, I argue that agency is sufficient to have interests in liberty, continued existence and freedom from pain. As such we pro tanto wrong agents when we frustrate these interests. I show that sentient beings necessarily possess agency in the relevant sense, because the best account of the nature of sentience, entails that sentient beings have the psychological resources to form and act upon motivating reasons. Thus, I argue that sentient animals must possess interests in liberty, continued existence and freedom from pain, just as autonomous agents do. Therefore we should take all agents, regardless of further facts about their abilities, to possess equal moral status and be owed pro tanto duties to be free from having pain inflicted upon them, having their lives ended and having their liberty restricted.
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Lackamp, Denise. „Aesthetic and moral judgments the moral value of immoral art /“. abstract and full text PDF (free order & download UNR users only), 2007. http://0-gateway.proquest.com.innopac.library.unr.edu/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:1442870.
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Bai, Feng. „A moral virtue theory of status attainment“. Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/58327.
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Recognition has grown that moral behavior (e.g., generosity) plays a role in status attainment, yet it remains unclear how, why, and when demonstrating moral characteristics enhances status. Drawing on philosophy, anthropology, psychology, and organizational behavior, I critically review a third route to attaining status: virtue, and propose a moral virtue theory of status attainment to provide a generalized account of the role of morality in status attainment. The moral virtue theory posits that acts of virtue elicit feelings of warmth and admiration (for virtue), and willing deference, towards the virtuous actor. I further consider how the scope and priority of moralities and virtues endorsed by a moral community are bound by culture to affect which moral characteristics enhance status. In particular, I theorize that virtues pertaining to community (e.g., humility) and divinity (e.g., cleanliness) are more effective to attain status in collectivistic cultures; whereas virtues pertaining to autonomy (e.g., rights) are more effective to attain status in individualistic cultures. Four experimental studies were conducted to examine the proposed theory. Studies 1 to 3 found that demonstrating a variety of virtues, including humility, cleanliness, and (advocating for human) rights, elicited admiration for virtue, which in turn led a virtuous actor to attain status. Expressing humility and cleanliness was more effective in attaining status in a collectivistic culture (India) than in an individualistic culture (the U.S.). Importantly, the positive impact of virtues on status attainment generally did not depend on the virtuous actor’s levels of competence. Study 4 showed that expressing humility led people to see the humble actor as a more desirable leader and to be influenced by the humble actor in a collaborative cognitive task. Humility and cultural self-construals interacted to affect the actor’s status through admiration for virtue. Specifically, individuals with high interdependent self-construals admired humility to a greater degree than those with low interdependent self-construals, which in turn led them to confer higher status to the humble actor. These findings provide initial empirical support for the moral virtue theory of status attainment. Implications for theory, research, and organizational applications are discussed.Business, Sauder School of
Organizational Behaviour and Human Resources, Division of
Graduate
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Mukherjee, Debanjali. „Moral status of animals: debates and dimentions“. Thesis, University of North Bengal, 2018. http://ir.nbu.ac.in/handle/123456789/2828.
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Overton, Jon. „Status Contagion: The Spread of Status Value between People“. Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2018. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1530180135926931.
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Sheehy, Paul Andrew Patrick. „The ontological and moral status of social groups“. Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 2001. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.271170.
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Silva, Renato Cosme Velloso da. „O status ontológico e moral do embrião humano“. Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, 2012. http://www.bdtd.uerj.br/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=4438.
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A presente dissertação é fruto de uma investigação filosófica, inserida na linha de pesquisa de Ética. Esse trabalho aprofunda uma discussão polêmica no contexto da Bioética, a saber: a manipulação de células embrionárias. Contudo, o autor não envereda seus esforços nas conse-quências éticas advindas das novas tecnologias produzidas pela Engenharia Genética, mas adentra na causa do problema, isto é, pretende antes saber se o embrião humano é ser vivo, ser humano e, principalmente, pessoa. Assim, o autor tem como objetivo principal investigar o status ontológico e moral do embrião humano. Nesse contexto, investiga o conceito de identidade pessoal, examinando-o - brevemente - à luz de duas teorias da Filosofia da Mente: internalista, que defende a construção do eu por bases internas; e a externalista, que advoga a construção do eu por bases externas. Elenca e analisa os atributos essenciais que concebe uma pessoa. Também pesquisa o conceito de dignidade humana e sua vinculação ao conceito de pessoa, tendo como base a filosofia moral de Immanuel Kant, através de sua obra Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes. Além desta e da bibliografia utilizada sobre o tema, a fonte principal dessa discussão é a obra Ética Prática, do filósofo Peter Singer. Vale destacar que existem três posições dominantes dentro dessa temática: a) Teoria Concepcionalista, a qual argumenta que o embrião é pessoa desde a concepção e, por isso, desautoriza qualquer manipulação; b) Teoria Genético-Desenvolvimentista, a qual defende a pessoalidade do embrião a partir de diferentes etapas do seu desenvolvimento biológico e, desse modo, defende as pesquisas biomédicas; c) Teoria da Potencialidade da Pessoa, a qual advoga que o embrião ainda não tem a pessoalidade, no entanto, é um potencial ser humano e pessoa, e, por essa razão, sua integridade deve ser preservada. Ao final, o autor enumera as principais implicações éticas, psicológicas, sociais e jurídicas, uma vez determinados os estatutos ontológico e moral do embrião humano.This dissertation is the result of philosophical inquiry, inserted in the line of research ethics. This study further develops a raging debate in the context of bioethics, namely the manipulation of embryonic cells. However, the author doesn`t embarks their efforts on ethical consequences arising from new technologies produced by genetic engineering, but enters into the cause of the problem, ie, does it want to know whether the human embryo is a living being, human being, and especially people. So the author's main objective is to investigate the ontological and moral status of human embryo. In this context, investigates the concept of personal identity, examining it - briefly - in the light of two theories of the Philosophy of Mind: internalist, which advocates the construction of the self by internal bases, and the externalist, defending the construction of the self by external bases. It lists and analyzes the essential attributes that a person is conceived. It also searches the concept of the humans dignity and its relationship to the concept of person, based on Immanuel Kant`s moral philosophy, through his work Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. In this and the vast bibliography on the topic, the main source of the work is Practical Ethics, of the philosopher Peter Singer. It is worth mentioning that there are three dominant positions within this theme: a) Conception Theory, which argues that the embryo is a person from conception and therefore disallows any manipulation, b) Genetic, Developmental Theory, which defends the personhood of the embryo from different stages of their biological development and therefore supports biomedical research, c) Theory of the Potential of People, which advocates that the embryo does not have "personhood," however, is a potential human being and person, and therefore its integrity must be preserved. In the end, the author lists the main ethical, psychological, social and legal, since given the ontological and moral statutories of human embryo.
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Henderson, Robert Samuel. „Moral sense and the ontology of value“. Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1998. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk3/ftp04/nq35182.pdf.
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Rauckhorst, Garrett. „Railton's Reductive Moral Realism“. Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2013. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1366631026.
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Stephens, Christopher. „The moral community and moral consideration : a pragmatic approach“. Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/97136.
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Thesis (MA)--Stellembosch University, 2015.ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The aim of this thesis is to argue for a new metric for determining the moral status of another being. Determining this status is of foundational importance in a number of legal, political, and ethical concerns, including but not limited to animal rights, the treatment of criminals, and the treatment of the psychologically afflicted. This metric will be based upon one’s capacity to morally consider others. In other words, in order to have full moral status, one must be able to have moral concern for others and act upon this concern to even a minimal degree. In doing so, one will be considered to belong to a “moral community”, which affords the member a certain set of rights, privileges, and duties towards other community members. Arguing for the existence of such a community achieves the pragmatic aspect of this thesis. I argue that morality is geared towards group-survival strategies which have been evolutionarily selected for, and thus by organizing societal structures towards the tools which nature has armed us with, we may maximize the powers and capacities of the community members. In order to achieve these aims, I defend a concept of morality as based in emotion, requiring certain neurological structures, which gives the first set of criteria for identifying potential members of the moral community. I then discuss the issue of identifying the capacity for morality in non-human minds, arguing that we may infer moral capacities from behaviourism. In summary, the findings of this paper are that first, morality is essentially emotional in nature and is a product of the nature of our neurological system, although rational processes and enculturation shape particular moral sensitivities and priorities. Second, one can infer the existence of moral capacities in animals from their behaviour, and, at risk of engaging in anthropomorphism, to deny these capacities completely entails solipsism. Thirdly, and most importantly, those who are capable of morally considering others ought to be afforded full moral status themselves and be brought into a “moral community” wherein special rights, freedoms, and privileges allow the members to most efficiently contribute to the community, maximizing the powers and benefits of the community.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die doel van hierdie tesis is om ’n nuwe maatstaf voor te hou waarvolgens die morele status van ’n ander wese bepaal kan word. Die bepaling van hierdie status is van fundamentele belang vir ’n hele aantal regs-, politiese en etiese aangeleenthede. Dit sluit, onder andere, diereregte, die behandeling van misdadigers en die behandeling van diegene met sielkundige probleme in. Hierdie maatstaf sal gebaseer word op die vermoë van die individuele wese om ander moreel in ag te neem. Met ander woorde om volle morele status te hê, moet 'n wese daartoe in staat wees om moreel besorg te wees oor ander en om, ten minste tot ’n minimale mate, na gelang van hierdie besorgheid op te tree. Op grond hiervan kan daar aanvaar word dat daardie wese tot ’n “morele gemeenskap” behoort, wat ook aan hom ’n stel regte, voordele en pligte teenoor ander gemeenskapslede sal besorg. Om ’n argument vir die bestaan van só ’n gemeenskap te maak sal die pragmatiese doelwit van hierdie tesis bereik. Ek argumenteer dat moraliteit ingestel is op groepsoorlewingstrategieë wat evolusionêr geselekteer is. Dit wil sê deur samelewingstrukture op só ’n wyse te organiseer dat dit gebruik maak van die gereedskap waarmee die natuur ons bewapen het, sal ons die bevoegdhede en die vermoëns van gemeenskapslede kan maksimaliseer. Om hierdie doelwitte te bereik, verdedig ek ’n verstaan van moraliteit as gebaseer in emosies wat sekere neurologiese strukture benodig. Dít verskaf die eerste stel kriteria waarvolgens potensiële lede van die morele gemeenskap geïdentifiseer kan word. Ek bespreek vervolgens die moontlikheid om die vermoë tot moraliteit in nie-menslike verstande te identifiseer en argumenteer dat morele vermoëns vanuit gedragsleer afgelei kan word. Ter opsomming is die bevindinge van hierdie tesis, eerstens, dat moraliteit wesenlik emosioneel van aard en ’n produk van ons neurologiese sisteem is, alhoewel rasionele prosesse en verkulturering spesifieke morele sensitiwiteite en prioriteite vorm. Tweedens kan die bestaan van morele vermoëns in diere afgelei word vanuit hulle optrede, en, alhoewel ons hier die risiko van antropomorfisme loop, behels die ontkenning van hierdie vermoëns solipsisme. Derdens, en die belangrikste, diegene wat daartoe in staat is om ander moreel in ag te neem behoort self volledig morele status toegeken te word. Hulle word sodoende in die “morele gemeenskap” betrek waar spesiale regte, vryhede en voordele gemeenskapslede sal toelaat om op die mees effektiewe wyse tot die gemeenskap by te dra om sodoende die bevoegdhede en voordele van die gemeenskap te maksimaliseer.
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Clemans, Craig C. „Does the United States Naval Academy Admissions Board evaluate an applicant's moral values : if so, how? /“. Thesis, Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 2005. http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/hyperion/05Jun%5FClemans.pdf.
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Thesis (M.S. in Leadership and Human Resource Development)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2005.Thesis Advisor(s): Leslie E. Sekerka, Dana P. French, Jr. Includes bibliographical references (p. 91-93). Also available online.
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Tallarita, Diane. „Does a government's regulation of morals, values, and social norms influence behavior“. Instructions for remote access. Click here to access this electronic resource. Access available to Kutztown University faculty, staff, and students only, 1999. http://www.kutztown.edu/library/services/remote_access.asp.
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Thesis (M.P.A.)--Kutztown University of Pennsylvania, 1999.Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 45-06, page: 2963. Typescript. Abstract precedes thesis as preliminary leaves. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 109-113).
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Morse, Donald J. „Dewey's ethics : moral value in the natural world /“. view abstract or download file of text, 2000. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/uoregon/fullcit?p9978592.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2000.Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 229-232). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.
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Leach, Adam. „Nietzsche and moral inquiry : posing the question of the value of our moral values“. Thesis, University of Essex, 2018. http://repository.essex.ac.uk/21801/.
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The continued presence and importance of Christian moral values in our daily lives, coupled with the fact that faith in Christianity is in continual decline, raises the question as to why having lost faith in Christianity, we have also not lost faith in our Christian moral values. This question is also indicative of a more pressing phenomenon: not only have we maintained our faith in Christian values, we fail to see that the widespread collapse of Christianity should affect this faith. To tackle this latter phenomenon, I claim, we have to pose the Nietzschean question of the value of our moral values, so as to see that this value can be a possible object of questioning. In chapter one, I consider different approaches found in the history of moral philosophy that look like potential candidates for this task. I argue that, ultimately, the task requires simultaneously taking our familiarity with Christian moral values as both sui generis and a questionable phenomenon. In chapter two, I articulate in detail the sui generis nature of this familiarity with moral values,in terms of the phenomena of habituation and sedimentation. In chapter three, I consider the possibility of estrangement that is built into our familiarity with moral values, by focusing on the role of cognition. I demonstrate how cognition, in the form of self-consciousness, can disrupt the sedimented, habituated nature of our moral values through a form of ironic disruption. In chapter four, I develop this account by considering the possibility of an appeal to an alternative moral outlook. To do so, I draw upon the structural isomorphism that is present between the process of estrangement and a rite of passage.
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Webber, Anderson Vieira de Lima. „Reconhecimento social e comportamento moral: Estudo em moral naturalizada“. Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos, 2018. http://www.repositorio.jesuita.org.br/handle/UNISINOS/7349.
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CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior
Analisamos como podemos pensar a moralidade no âmbito descritivo do comportamento à luz da hipótese de que o agente da ação moral está sujeito à pressão do reconhecimento de outros agentes, e em que medida isso é de relevância para a tomada de decisão. Ao final do trabalho não apresentamos uma resposta para um guia da ação moral, uma norma que possa auxiliar na tomada de decisão frente à dilemas e problemas morais. Ao final teremos clara a ideia de que uma ação pode ser influenciada por reconhecimento com o peso equivalente ao que atribuímos a valores e razões, a importância do reconhecimento sugirirá que valores e razões não poderiam viger sem o reconhecimento.
The present work is a strictly bibliographic study of moral behavior. In order to research, through the work of other researchers, the hypothesis according to which moral behavior is before influenced by values, influenced by the recognition of other moral agents. How can we think of morality in the descriptive scope of behavior in the light of the hypothesis that the agent of moral action is subject to pressure from the recognition of other agents, and that is relevance for decision-making. At the end of this work we will not be with a definitive answer the description of the behavior, because it requires a holistic work of various areas of knowledge. Nor at the end of the work will we have an answer to a moral action guide, a norm that can assist in the decision-making in the face of dilemmas and moral problems. In the end, we will be in the perspective that, before an action is motivated by reasons and values, it is motivated by recognition.
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Porter, Lindsey. „The moral status of babies and our obligations to them“. Thesis, University of Sheffield, 2012. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/3253/.
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This thesis explores who counts: who is part of the so-called moral community, and why. If personhood is the measure of full moral considerability—as many take it to be—then marginal humans will not count as fully morally considerable. At best, we will have to say that they matter the way that sentient non-human animals do. Most of us will find this unsavoury. To give an account of the moral status of marginal humans just is to give an account of moral status—of what features are morally salient or valuable. To this end, I discuss one of the most puzzling examples of marginal humanity: babies. I look at how we can account (if indeed we can) for the moral status of babies on a personhood-bound account of moral status, and more broadly at how we can account for the moral requirements on us with respect to babies. In part one, I explore the moral status of babies by looking at whether birth can change moral status. I look at the two most plausible accounts of the moral significance of birth, both of which rely on variants of a relational account of moral significance. I argue that neither can successfully motivate the claim that birth is morally significant; but that relationships can change the moral quality of an act by changing the moral context. In part two, I explore other ways of accounting for moral obligations to babies. I discuss how we ought to understand the most central of our special obligations to babies: parental obligations. I argue that a causal account of parental obligation is the best such account, and I discuss important consequences of this view.
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Starks, Shannon. „Moral Values in Moral Psychology? A Textual Analysis“. BYU ScholarsArchive, 2016. https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/etd/6067.
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What values, if any, is moral psychology based on with regard to what humans should be like? While the value-free ideal of science requires at least the bracketing of values in regards to the conducting of research and influence on its results, this investigation takes seriously the concerns of leading social psychologists that biases may influence the subdiscipline. Textual analyses of moral psychology's literature involving content analysis of codes and cultural discourse analysis of value themes illuminate values involving moral problems and moral goods that may inherently influence research at various levels. It is proposed that values are impossible to eliminate from moral psychological research and that a simple epistemic/nonepistemic value distinction is inadequate for deciding which values are appropriate. A norm of value disclosure to replace the norm of the value-free ideal is recommended.
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Tietz, Sarah. „Zwischen Recht und Moral. Eine philosophische Betrachtung des Status von Menschenrechten“. Universität Potsdam, 2005. http://opus.kobv.de/ubp/volltexte/2011/5615/.
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Sparrow, Scott. „Hegelian Recognition and Absolute Dependence: How the Self Achieves Moral Status“. OpenSIUC, 2018. https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/dissertations/1634.
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The problem that this dissertation engages with is how the self achieves moral status or worth. I aim to show that recognition, beginning with Hegel’s dialectical treatment of recognition, is necessary to the modern conception of the value status of the individual, and therefore that the latter must be understood, first, as the value status of the self. That is to say, there is no normative standing of the individual without the self experiencing itself as a being of intrinsic worth. Second, this experience is fully dependent upon others’ acknowledgment of our intrinsic worth. In sum, recognition is constitutive of the value status of the self. To show this requires an exposition of the full significance of the Hegelian conception of recognition that includes a demonstration of the radical meaning of “dependence” in this concept. The basic premise of the dissertation is that there is a problem in how modern subjects have come to interpret their value in accordance with its codification in the reigning legal and political documents of our time, in which the value of the person is stated as a fact, an immediate possession of the self. The supposed validity of this premise is further evidenced in dominant philosophical conceptions of dignity that go back to Kant. The central problem is the commitment to the seemingly factual or given nature of the normative standing of the individual, whatever the vicissitudes in the fate of groups and individuals, which are viewed as secondary phenomena. In arguing against this premise, the dissertation is divided into two broad parts. First, because of the complexity of the ingredients of recognition in a Hegelian viewpoint—where the status of selfhood and the normative standing of the self are entwined, and where both are dependent upon experiences of recognition and misrecognition—the major part of the dissertation is a step-by-step elaboration of what is involved in the constitution of the modern value status of the individual through recognition. Second, this step-by-step elaboration will reveal the ethical meaning of recognition in Hegel. In this, we draw on recent work by J.M. Bernstein in Critical Theory, which emphasizes the ethics in Hegelian thought. The dissertation will then turn to a discussion of a phenomenon today that not only exemplifies the problem of recognition in the modern concept of intrinsic value but also fully reveals the depth and meaning of dependence in the constitution of the self’s value status. This will be a discussion of disability. Our argument is therefore that Hegel’s conception of recognition provides a critical perspective on the apparent assurances and securities of modern subjects by bringing into question and bringing to light: (1) our dependence on others in the “possession” of our individual value status; (2) the normative vulnerability that is central to the possibility of our normative standing; and (3) the need to ground philosophical ethics in experiences of vulnerability. The project will not only argue for these three theses in detailed elaborations of their conceptual components. It will also consider the phenomenon of disability as a contemporary exemplar that reveals their importance.
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Dall'Agnol, Darlei. „Intrinsic value : analysing Moore's ethics“. Thesis, University of Bristol, 2000. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.340312.
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De, Roubaix J. A. M. (John Addey Malcolm). „Value, utility and autonomy : a moral-critical analysis of utilitarian positions on the value of prenatal life“. Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/50542.
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Thesis (PhD)--University of Stellenbosch, 2005.ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Problem statement For utilitarians, human beings have intrinsic moral significance based on only two acquired characteristics: sentience, or the ability to suffer, and psychological personhood. Sentience is the entrance-requirement for moral significance, but does not justify a "right to life" claim; at most a "right" not to suffer. Personhood, described as some sort of self-conscious awareness with a concept of the future, may justify a "right to life" claim. However, since personhood is absent in prenatal beings, and only develops some time after birth, the implication is that such beings have little moral significance and may, for instance, be killed "at will". The moral problem that I address in this dissertation is to investigate, assess and evaluate the utilitarian position on the moral status or value of prenatal life. Methodology and results I firstly, on the basis of an extensive literature study, make a detailed analysis of the utilitarian position with reference to a number of themes that I have identified in their argument. This is followed by a critical philosophical evaluation of the utilitarian position, based on six particular arguments: • Utilitarianism is philosophically incoherent. It over-simplifies the moral argument in claiming that consequences are all that matter morally. Its underlying moral theory is at odds with moral claims contained in contemporary notions of human rights and individual justice. It ignores the moral significance of special obligations to special groups. • Utilitarianism potentially has unacceptable consequences. It IS inherently discriminatory and may lead to legitimate "slippery slope" fears. • Utilitarianism clashes with our fundamental moral intuitions on the value of prenatal life. These intuitions are cherished in most world religions. • Contrary to the utilitarian position, speciesism is inevitable to the human condition, especially argued from a position of existential phenomenology. Self- constitution, simultaneous constitution of the world as we know it, and the very possibility of morality are possible only within a particular notion of speciesism. • The potentiality of pre-persons to develop into persons cannot be as convincingly ignored as is done by the utilitarian. • There is a basic and underlying need and intuition to protect vulnerable human beings, of which pre-persons are exemplars. These notions clash with utilitarian theory. As an alternative, I introduce, set out and evaluate a two-phased position on the moral significance of pre-personal human life, a position of respectfulness of prenatal and pre-personal human life based upon its humanity, potentiality and separation-viability. This leads, firstly, to the conclusion of a graded, sliding scale conception of human prepersonal moral significance in line with the level of development and with the actuation of potentiality. Secondly, it leads to the conclusion that the advent of separationsurvivability (viability) is a morally significant cut-off point beyond which the human fetus may "normally" have a justifiable right to the continuation of its life. In as far as the application of my argument is concerned, I develop a "moderate" position with reference to the abortion debate. Whilst I recognize that all human prenatal beings of which it can be argued that they have a reasonable chance to develop their intrinsic potentiality, i.e., to become full-fledged persons, should have the opportunity to do so, I also recognize that neither this position, nor the complexities of life make it possible to hold "absolute" positions on the justifiability of abortion. I explore this extremely problematic notion in the text. That having been said, the advent of separation-survivability may imply a "moral cut-off point", beyond which termination is only rarely justified. I argue that I find no moral hindrance to wellmotivated research on human pre-embryos and stem cells.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Probleemstelling Utilitariste huldig sterk omlynde standpunte oor die waarde van lewe. Hulle redeneer dat menslike (inderwaarheid, alle lewende) wesens slegs op grond van twee eienskappe intrinsieke morele waarde kan verwerf: sentiëntisme, d.i. die vermoë om lyding te ervaar, en persoonstatus. Sentiëntisme is 'n bepalende vereiste vir morele status, maar regverdig nie 'n "reg op lewe"-aanspraak nie. Persoonsyn, verstaan as 'n vorm van selfbewustheid tesame met 'n bewuste belang by die voortsetting van eie bestaan, mag wel so 'n aanspraak regverdig. Voorgeboortelike (en "voorpersoonlike") wesens is egter nie persone nie; hulle word eers (aansienlik) ná geboorte volwaardige persone. Die implikasie is dat sulke wesens weinig morele status het, en byvoorbeeld, na willekeur gedood mag word. Die morele probleem wat ek in hierdie dissertasie aanspreek is om die utilitaristiese beskouing ten opsigte van die morale status of waarde van voorgeboortelike lewe krities-filosofies te ondersoek en te evalueer. Metodologie en gevolgtrekkings Eerstens maak ek na aanleiding van 'n gedetaileerde literatuurstudie 'n in-diepte analise van van die utilitaristiese posisie aan die hand van 'n aantal temas wat ek in hul argument geïdentifiseer het. Daarna volg 'n krities-filosofiese evaluasie van die utilitaristiese posisie, aan die hand van ses argumente: • Utilitarisme is filosofies onsamehangend. Dit oorvereenvoudig die morele argument deur voor te gee dat gevolge al is wat moreel saakmaak. Die onderliggende utilitaristiese teorie bots met die morele eise vervat in kontemporêre sienings van menseregte en geregtigheid. Dit negeer die morele belangrikheid van spesiale verpligtinge teenoor spesiale belangegroepe. • Utilitarisme het potensieelonaanvaarbare gevolge. Dit IS inherent diskriminerend en kan lei tot onkeerbare glybaan ("slippery slope")-argumente. Utilitarisme bots met ons fundamentele morele intuïsies betreffende die waarde van voorgeboortelike lewe. Hierdie intuïsies word onder meer ondersteun deur die meeste hoofstroom godsdienste. • Spesiësisme is, in kontras met die utilitaristiese beskouing, onafwendbaar vir ons selfverstaan as mense, soos aangetoon kan word met 'n beroep op die eksistensiële fenomenologie. Self-konstituering, gelyktydige konstituering van die wêreld van die mens, en selfs die moontlikheid van moraliteit is slegs moontlik vanuit' n bepaalde spesiësistiese beskouing. • Die potensialiteit van "pre-persone" om tot volwaardige persone te ontwikkel kan nie, soos die utilitaris doen, sonder meer geïgnoreer word nie. • Daar is 'n basiese en onderliggende morele eis om swak en weerlose menslike wesens te beskerm. Hierdie idees bots lynreg met utilitaristiese teorie. As 'n alternatief tot die utilitaristiese beskouing, ontwikkel ek 'n twee-fase posisie betreffende die morele waarde van voorgeboortelike menslike lewe. Ek noem hierdie posisie agting vir voorgeboortelike en voor-persoonlike menslike lewe gebaseer op die menslikheid, potensialiteit en oorleefbaarheid van prenatale mense. Dit lei, eerstens, tot die gevolgtrekking van 'n gegradeerde glyskaal konsepsie van voor-persoonlike menslike morele waarde, min of meer parallel aan die vlak van ontwikkeling en die ontwikkeling van potensialiteit. Tweedens lei dit tot die gevolgtrekking dat die ontwikkeling van lewensvatbaarheid 'n moreel-beduidende afsnypunt is waarna die menslike fetus "normaalweg" aanspraak kan maak op 'n reg dat sy lewe voortgesit moet word. In soverre dit die toepassing van my argument betref, ontwikkel ek 'n "gematigde" posisie vis-á-vis aborsie. Ek redeneer dat alle menslike voorgeboortelike wesens wat 'n redelike kans het dat hul intrinsieke potensialiteit verder sal ontwikkel, die geleentheid daartoe gegun behoort te word. Ek aanvaar ook dat nog hierdie beskouing, nog die kompleksiteit van die menslike bestaan "absolute" posisies moreel regverdig. Die problematiek en inherente spanning tussen hierdie oënskynlik-opponerende posisies word in die teks bespreek. Nogtans beskou ek die ontwikkeling van lewensvatbaarheid as 'n moreel insiggewende afsnypunt waarna terminasie net in buitengewone omstandighede moreel regverdigbaar is.
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Persson, Björn. „Putnam's Moral Realism“. Thesis, Högskolan i Skövde, Institutionen för kommunikation och information, 2013. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:his:diva-8494.
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Moral realism is the view that there are such things as moral facts. Moral realists have attempted to combat the skeptical problem of relativism, which is that the truth of an ethical value judgment is often, or always, subjective, that is, relative to the parties it involves. This essay presents, discusses, and criticizes Hilary Putnam’s attempt at maintaining moral realism while at the same time maintaining a degree of epistemological relativism. Putnam’s positive account originates in moral epistemology, at the heart of which lies truth, as idealized rational acceptability or truth under ideal conditions. The bridge between moral epistemology and normative ethics stems from Putnam’s disintegration of facts and values. His theory is finalized in the construction of a normative moral theory, in which the central notion is incessant self-criticism in order to maintain rationality. After presenting Putnam’s core thesis, the criticism raised by Richard Rorty, is deliberated upon. Rorty is critical of Putnam’s attempt at holding on to objectivity, because he does not understand how objective knowledge can be both relative to a conceptual scheme, and at the same time objective. The conclusion is that Putnam is unable to maintain his notion of truth as idealized rational acceptability and is forced into epistemological relativism. Putnam’s normative ethics has characteristics in common with virtue ethics, and is of much interest regardless of whether it can be grounded epistemologically or not.
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Fea, Courtney J. „Value source, value priming, and social norms as predictors of engaging in minor moral/legal violations“. Diss., Kansas State University, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/2097/38156.
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Doctor of PhilosophyDepartment of Psychological Sciences
Laura A. Brannon
The current dissertation examined the role value sources and social norms play in people’s likelihood to commit minor moral and/or legal violations. First, using the process of value acquisition as a general guideline, five value sources were hypothesized to influence an individual’s tendency for minor moral/legal crimes. Second, based on social norms theory and social norm interventions, it was hypothesized strategically manipulating social norms may alter a person’s willingness to partake in various immoral and/or illegal activities. Two studies were conducted to test these suppositions. Participants randomly assigned to between-subjects design experiments completed questionnaires via the web. In Experiment 1, participants mindset primed with values from multiple value sources (parental, peer, media, religion, personal) indicated how they “personally would act” if provided the opportunity to commit minor moral/legal violations. Participants primed with personal, parental, and religious values were willing to act as the value source suggested in minor moral/legal violation situations. Participants primed with media values did not necessarily follow the value source’s recommendations regarding minor moral/legal violations. In Experiment 2, participants exposed to low, actual, or high social norm (and severity perception) ratings reported how likely they were to commit the same minor moral/legal violations. Participants shown high norm ratings expressed a greater willingness to engage in minor moral/legal violations than those shown low norm ratings. Results suggested value sources and norm ratings differentially impacted participants’ willingness to be involved in minor immoral and/or unlawful behavior.
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Reaves, Mekay L. „Perceived status value regarding elderly individuals : assessing cultural influence /“. Read thesis online, 2009. http://library.uco.edu/UCOthesis/ReavesML2010.pdf.
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Chan, Wai-fun. „Value orientations in senior secondary English language education in Hong Kong“. Hong Kong : University of Hong Kong, 1999. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record.jsp?B21304166.
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Haggerty, Daniel Patrick Stocker Michael. „Moral magnetism: a study in relations of emotion, value and world“. Related Electronic Resource: Current Research at SU : database of SU dissertations, recent titles available full text, 2003. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/syr/main.
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Engelhardt, Craig S. Glanzer Perry L. „Moral and civic education and the public value of religious schools“. Waco, Tex. : Baylor University, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/2104/5340.
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Welsh, Clyde. „On Moral Hedging, the Problem of Intertheoretic Value Comparisons, and Vagueness“. Thesis, Department of Philosophy, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/18824.
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First lines of the Introduction (as abstract not provided): When we are confronted with decisions of moral significance, the ideal course of action, at least according to most moral philosophers, is to look to the moral theory to which we subscribe for guidance, and act in accordance with that guidance as best we can. This process functions well for those who are quite certain that their preferred moral theory is correct, or at least believe that it is sufficient to guide their actions without doubt. There are, however, those of us who are genuinely uncertain as to which moral theory is correct and most accurately tracks morality. Different moral theories make different judgments about the value of each action, the value of each outcome, whether a certain act is permissible or impermissible, or whether a certain act is merely permissible or supererogatory. Depending on which moral theory we subscribe to, the actions we are morally obliged to take may differ substantially, putting agents who are genuinely uncertain as to which moral theory is correct in a difficult situation whenever they are called to make a decision about which the moral theories to which they lend at least some credence disagree. Call this type of uncertainty normative uncertainty.
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Ashley, Martin Reginald. „Value as a reason for action in environmental education“. Thesis, University of the West of England, Bristol, 1998. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.265048.
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Hotte, Alan M. (Alan Mark) Carleton University Dissertation Psychology. „Morality and value-attitude correspondence“. Ottawa, 1992.
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Courtwright, Andrew Hill Thomas E. „Justice, health, and status moral theory and the new epidemiology of health disparities /“. Chapel Hill, N.C. : University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2008. http://dc.lib.unc.edu/u?/etd,1670.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2008.Title from electronic title page (viewed Sep. 16, 2008). "... in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy." Discipline: Philosophy; Department/School: Philosophy.
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Nortje, Nico. „The moral status of embryonic stem cell research in the South African context“. Thesis, Stellenbosch : University of Stellenbosch, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/1372.
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Thesis (DPhil (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2007.Should surplus embryos which are destined to be discarded be protected at all cost, to the extent that they cannot contribute to medical knowledge - knowledge which could benefit society at large? Are embryos people or merely items of property? Different moral theories address these questions in different ways. Deontologists argue that the end never justifies the means and that the right not to be killed is more fundamental than the obligation to save. Utilitarians, on the other hand, argue that certain criteria should be met before moral significance can be contributed to an entity. The question of the moral status of the embryo is, as my discussion will show, one of the most widely discussed issues in the history of bioethics. Extensive literature exists on the topic. This study holds that an Ethics of Responsibility (ER) should by applied when answering the questions posed above as it encourages one to accept responsibility for the choices or decisions made and to defend them accordingly. I have endeavoured to answer the question of the personhood and rights of the embryo within the framework of the Ethics of Responsibility. Although these concepts overlap in many ways they remain central to the debate surrounding the sanctioning or prevention of the use of human embryonic stem cells in research. After identifying the micro-issues surrounding the human embryonic stem cell debate and explaining why both the deontologist and utilitarians fail to provide any adequate answers in this respect, I turn my attention to macro-issues such as safety concerns surrounding the usages and storage of stem cells. Commercialization, power issues, accessibility and the allocation of limited resources are also examined. Living in a society such as South Africa one cannot be blind to the inequalities of our health system. On a macro level I cannot but conclude that stem cell research does not seem to be a viable exercise within the South African context. South Africa faces a health care crisis far greater than the benefits stem cell research currently has to offer. However, the need still exists for a policy to guide future lawmakers who might need to address stem cell research and to guide decisions and actions. This brings me to my final chapter, namely proposing a morally justified policy for South Africa. I propose a policy which respects and values the autonomy of the progenitors’ choices (provided they have not been coerced) and which focuses on the beneficence of the greater society. Furthermore, it is paramount that the goal of any stem cell research should be for therapeutic use ONLY. Before commencing with the extraction of the stem cells, scientists should be obligated first to present convincing evidence that they have tried alternative ways to reach the same result. Once this has been proven, a regulatory body could issue the scientist/team with a license to undertake the specific research with a specific therapy as goal in order to prevent abuse. If they are found guilty of any unethical conduct their licenses should be revoked and an investigation launched.
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Richter, Andrea. „The moral status of animals within the framework of Peter Singer's preference utilitarianism“. Master's thesis, Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10362/7746.
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Dissertação apresentada para cumprimento dos requisitos necessários à obtenção do grau de Mestre em FilosofiaNa história da filosofia, a filosofia animal foi sempre filosofia antropológica em negativo, porque a questão do que é um animal foi substancialmente dependente da noção de humano e vice-versa. Desde o princípio da institucionalização da bioética e a publicação contemporânea do "Animal Liberation" - o elemento fundacional do debate e movimento actual quanto à emancipação animal - por Peter Singer, esta dicotomia tornou-se, particularmente, tanto significante quanto questionável. Na discussão dos denominados casos marginais, i.e. casos marginais de ser humano, como o estatuto do embrião ou pacientes em estado de coma irreversível, esta divisão binária é frequentemente empregue para suportar ou refutar argumentos, o que faz com que meditações quanto à bioética animal, uma questão importante no campo da ética biomédica. Peter Singer, nos seus trabalhos "Animal Liberation" e "Practical Ethics", conseguiu confrontar as fundações do nosso sistema ético e também as nossas definições de animal e de humano, através dum argumento lógico e simples. Desde então, a sua teoria e as suas radicais implicações têm sido ferozmente disputadas. Infelizmente, uma grande parte da crítica consiste em citações fora de contexto, o que distorce a sua argumentação racional. O objectivo deste trabalho assenta na profunda análise e apresentação da fundação teórica da teoria de Singer sob consideração de crítica séria, com uma sintética introdução às teorias utilitaristas mais influentes para Singer e que antecedem a sua elaboração. Seguidamente investiga-se o exemplo prático da vivissecção na medicina humana, à qual a teoria do utilitarismo preferencial de Singer é aplicada, depois dos factos relevantes da pesquisa terem sido apresentados. Os resultados são de que o fundamento da sua teoria é logicamente consistente e de que o nosso tratamento dos animais tem a necessidade urgente de mudança em pensamento e prática, não apenas pelos animais, mas também para benefício humano.
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Silva, Marisane Pereira. „Um estudo sobre o status moral dos animais desde uma perspectiva deontol?gica“. Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte, 2015. http://repositorio.ufrn.br/handle/123456789/21075.
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Este trabalho tem como objetivo analisar a possibilidade de uma abordagem ?tica da rela??o entre homens e animais que, tanto quanto poss?vel, n?o se baseie nem em raz?es utilit?rias nem em raz?es indiretas para explicar a atribui??o de dignidade ou de direitos morais aos animais. Tomamos como pressuposto que alguns deles (se n?o todos) os possuem, e tentamos mostrar que uma ?tica de car?ter deontol?gico, centrada no ser humano como o agente, mas n?o restrita a ele enquanto objeto da a??o moral, pode fornecer um suporte te?rico para a fundamenta??o de tal atribui??o. A partir da an?lise das caracter?sticas principais da ?tica kantiana, e de algumas teorias alternativas, ser? poss?vel mostrar que uma teoria ?tica que n?o pressuponha reciprocidade nem dependa exclusivamente de interesses particulares humanos n?o apenas ? poss?vel como tamb?m se revela a mais sens?vel e adequada ? natureza dos nossos valores e do caso em quest?o.
The main concern of this work is to offer an analysis of the possibility of an ethical approach to the interaction between human beings and animals. As far as possible we seek an approach which rely neither on utilitarian considerations nor on indirect reasons to explain the attribution of dignity or moral rights to animals. We take for granted that some of them (if not all) do possess it. And then we try to show that a deontological ethical theory (one which centers in the human as the agent but is not restricted to humans as the objects of the moral action) can afford us a good theoretical basis for the grounding of the attribution of rights or dignity to animals. Analyzing the main features of Kantian ethics, as well as some of its alternatives, it will be possible to show that an ethical theory which does not presuppose reciprocity nor depends solely upon particular human concerns is not only possible but also reveals itself as the most sensible and adequate to the nature of our values and of the case at hand.
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Beck, Daniel Phillip. „Animals on Lifeboats: a Defense of a Sliding Scale Model of Moral Status“. Miami University Honors Theses / OhioLINK, 2009. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=muhonors1240373673.
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Nortjé, Nico. „The moral status of embryonic stem cell research in the South African context /“. Link to the online version, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/1372.
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Schenck, Natalya. „Impact of Charter Values on Moral Hazard in Banking“. Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2014. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1404827689.
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Cronin, Kieran James. „The value of the language of rights in Christian ethics, with particular reference to reproductive rights“. Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1989. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/19662.
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Artemenko, Oleg. „Inspirations from Potential: Does Human Embryo in vitro Possess Full Moral Status?“ Thesis, Linköpings universitet, Centrum för tillämpad etik, 2010. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-57542.
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The paper deals with the problem of the moral status of human embryos in vitro obtained via somatic cell nuclear transfer, in vitro fertilization and similar biotechnologies. The purpose of research is to investigate whether it is possible to ascribe the position of full moral status to the embryo in vitro relying on its intrinsic properties. In particular, the property of totipotency of a human zygote was taken as presupposition in carrying out further moral assessments. To achieve these goals I have examined the applicability of the potentiality argument for evaluating moral status of the embryo within the frameworks of modal logic. The potential of the human embryo to become a person with full-fledged number of moral rights was interpreted using real, dispositional and counterfactual predicates. It was found that the role of potentiality argument is reduced to a precautionary principle and it failed to provide full moral status to the embryo in vitro. The potential of the embryo proper has a strong relational component that assigns it certain instrumental value. The latter implies that biomedical experimentation with the embryos in vitro cannot be considered as morally unacceptable.
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Igansi, Luca Nogueira. „Normatividade e valor no naturalismo moral“. Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos, 2014. http://www.repositorio.jesuita.org.br/handle/UNISINOS/4380.
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Este trabalho investiga o naturalismo moral contemporâneo a partir das variadas formulações do argumento conhecido como a falácia naturalista, assim como do contraponto de algumas teorias não-naturalistas, em especial a de G. E. Moore. Parto da análise destas formulações do argumento no contexto formal da metaética contemporânea, buscando aferir a validade da falácia naturalista no contexto atual, bem como de seus limites na aplicação contra o naturalismo moral. Apresento então o naturalismo moral numa versão humeana, que sugere uma abordagem descritivista da moralidade, em oposição ao viés prescritivista. Trabalho as origens do naturalismo e apresento algumas posições em metaética a fim de melhor entender a situação contemporânea do debate moral no que tange à naturalização da ética, contrastando teorias da ação e do valor quanto ao tema da motivação e da normatividade morais.
This work addresses contemporary moral naturalism from the investigation of an array of formulations of the argument known as the naturallistic fallacy, as from the contrast of a few non-naturalistic theories, especially G. E. Moore’s. Proceeding from the analysis of such formulations of the argument in the formal context of contemporary metaethics, attempting to assert the validity of the naturallistic fallacy in the current context, as so its limits in its application against moral naturalism. Then I am going to present moral naturalism in a humean version, which suggests a descriptivist naturalism instead of a prescriptivist one. Such origins of naturalism will be worked with and some positions in metaethics to further understand of the contemporary situation of the moral debate concerning the naturalization of ethics will be presented, contrasting theories of action and of value on the matter of moral motivation and normativity.