Bücher: „Status of Moral value“

1

Bao, Limin. Different paradigms of value formation: China and America. Hangzhou, P.R. China: Hangzhou University Press, 1996.

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2

Basic values and ethical decisions: An examination of individualism and community in American society. Malabar, Fla: R.E. Krieger Pub. Co., 1990.

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3

Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Standing Committee on Human Rights and the Status of Disabled Persons. Privacy, where do we draw the line?: Report of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Human Rights and the Status of Persons with Disabilities. [Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada], 1997.

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4

Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Standing Committee on Human Rights and the Status of Disabled Persons. Privacy, where do we draw the line?: Report of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Human Rights and the Status of Persons with Disabilities. Ottawa: Public Works and Govt. Services Canada, 1997.

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5

Character education: Transforming values into virtue. Lanham: University Press of America, 2007.

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6

Commitment, value, and moral realism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

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7

Friendship: A central moral value. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2012.

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8

Growing moral relations: Critique of moral status ascription. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

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9

Wiener, Harvey S. American values reader. Boston, Mass: Allyn and Bacon, 1999.

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10

DiSilvestro, Russell. Human Capacities and Moral Status. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-8537-5.

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11

Human capacities and moral status. Dordrecht: Springer, 2010.

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12

1969-, Haugen David M., Hrsg. American values. Detroit, MI: Greenhaven Press, 2009.

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13

Chakrabarti, Mohit. Value education: Changing perspectives. New Delhi: Kanishka Publishers, Distributors, 1997.

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14

1945-, Harris David E., Hrsg. Reasoning with democratic values: Ethical problems in United States history. New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1985.

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15

F, Carbone Peter, Hrsg. Value theory and education. Malabar, Fla: R.E. Krieger Pub. Co., 1987.

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16

Symposia: Plato, the erotic, and moral value. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999.

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17

Cordella, Tito. Bank bailouts: Moral hazard vs. value effect. [Washington, D.C.]: International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department, 1999.

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18

Holmes, Rolston. Conserving natural value. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.

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19

Unternehmensvereinigungen und Shareholder Value. Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang, 2003.

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20

Kroes, Peter, und Peter-Paul Verbeek, Hrsg. The Moral Status of Technical Artefacts. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7914-3.

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21

Value in ethics and economics. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993.

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22

Equality and tradition: Questions of moral value in moral and political theory. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

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23

B, Stockdale James, Hrsg. Purpose!: The forgotten principle. North Manchester, Ind: DeWitt Books, 2000.

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24

Traditional values for today's new woman. Grand Rapids, Mich: Zondervan, 1992.

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25

Animals and the moral community: Mental life, moral status, and kinship. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.

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26

Dean, Richard. The value of humanity in Kant's moral theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006.

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27

Steinbock, Bonnie. Moral Status, Moral Value, and Human Embryos: Implications for Stem Cell Research. Oxford University Press, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199562411.003.0019.

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28

Shepherd, Joshua. Consciousness and Moral Status. Taylor & Francis Group, 2018.

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29

Shepherd, Joshua. Consciousness and Moral Status. Taylor & Francis Group, 2018.

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30

Shepherd, Joshua. Consciousness and Moral Status. Taylor & Francis Group, 2018.

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31

Olsaretti, Serena. Liberal Equality and the Moral Status of Parent-Child Relationships. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198801221.003.0004.

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The justification of the parent-child relationship that lies at the core of the family raises two main challenges for liberal egalitarianism: the challenge of authority and the challenge of partiality. These point, respectively, to the burdens of justifying to children their parents’ having rights over them, and to third parties parents’ favoring of their children in ways that negatively affects others. This paper examines some recent attempts at justifying the family and meeting these two challenges by appealing to the non-instrumental value of the parent-child relationship. It argues that these accounts do not capture some important convictions about the moral status of the parent-child relationship and thereby do not fully meet the two stated challenges. The paper also offers an alternative basis for justifying the parent-child relationship on which parents, by virtue of being morally responsible for their children’s existence, have an obligation to enter a relationship with them.

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32

Christensen, Anne-Marie Søndergaard. Moral Philosophy and Moral Life. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198866695.001.0001.

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This is a work in moral philosophy and its ambition is to contribute to a renewed understanding of moral philosophy, the role of moral theory, and the relation between moral philosophy and moral life. It is motivated by the belief that the lack of a coherent answer to the question of the role and status of moral philosophy and the theories it develops, is one of the most important obstacles for doing work in moral philosophy today. The first part of the book untangles various criticisms of the dominant view of moral theories that challenges the explanatory, foundational, authoritative, and action-guiding role of these theories. It also offers an alternative understanding of moral theory as descriptions of moral grammar. The second part investigates the nature of the particularities relevant for an understanding of moral life, both particularities tied to the moral subject, her character, commitments, and moral position, and particularities tied to the context of the subject, her moral community and language. The final part marks a return to moral philosophy and addresses the wider question of what the revised conception of moral theories and the affirmation of the value of the particular mean for moral philosophy by developing a descriptive, pluralistic, and elucidatory conception of moral philosophy. The scope of the book is wide, but its pretensions are more moderate, to present an understanding of descriptive moral philosophy which may spur a debate about the status and role of moral philosophy in relation to our moral lives.

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33

Streeter, Ryan, und Don Eberly. Soul of Civil Society: Voluntary Associations and the Public Value of Moral Habits. Lexington Books/Fortress Academic, 2002.

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34

The Soul of Civil Society: Voluntary Associations and the Public Value of Moral Habits. Lexington Books, 2002.

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35

Eberly, Don. The Soul of Civil Society: Voluntary Associations and the Public Value of Moral Habits. Lexington Books, 2002.

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36

Leiter, Brian. Moral Psychology with Nietzsche. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199696505.001.0001.

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This book offers both a reading and defense of Nietzsche’s moral psychology, drawing on both empirical psychological results and contemporary philosophical positions and arguments. Among the views explained and defended are: anti-realism about all value, including epistemic value; a kind of sentimentalism about evaluative judgment; epiphenomenalism about certain conscious mental states, including those involved in the conscious experience of willing; and radical skepticism about free will and moral responsibility. Psychological research, from Daniel Wegner’s work on the experience of willing to the famed Minnesota Twin studies, is marshalled in support of the Nietzschean picture of moral psychology. Nietzschean views are brought into dialogue with contemporary philosophical views defended by, among many others, Harry Frankfurt, T.M. Scanlon, Gary Watson, and Derk Pereboom. Nietzsche emerges not simply as a museum piece from the history of ideas, but as a philosopher and psychologist who exceeds David Hume for insight into human nature and the human mind, one who repeatedly anticipates later developments in empirical psychology, and continues to offer sophisticated and unsettling challenges to much conventional wisdom in philosophy.

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37

Sher, George. What Is Moral Standing? Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190660413.003.0004.

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People employ the concept of moral standing when they try to explain why (or, less frequently, deny that) all humans are of equal moral importance. They also do so when they ask whether animals, fetuses, or seriously and permanently impaired humans are of lesser status than normal humans. But what do claims about moral standing come to, and how are they related to other moral categories such as obligation, value, and rights? This chapter develops a conception of moral standing that is neutral among the competing moral theories and their competing vocabularies and concepts. The main thesis defended is that a being’s moral standing relative to a given theory depends not on how the theory’s principles say it should be treated but rather on whether claims about its interests are among the inputs to the arguments by which the theory defends its principles.

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38

Ing, Michael D. K. Irresolvable Value Conflicts in a Conflictual World. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190679118.003.0006.

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This chapter reveals that early Confucians saw irresolvable value conflicts as real possibilities. It starts with an overview of the ways in which contemporary scholars have described Confucianism in terms of harmony and the lack of tragedy. It then challenges these narratives by looking at several vignettes that depict moral agents confronting irresolvable value conflicts. This chapter also analyzes the notion of tragedy in an early Confucian worldview to show that early Confucians did not see values as necessarily conflicting with each other, although they accepted the possibility of tragic conflict. This means that early Confucians recognized the complexities of life such that even the highly skilled moral agent (i.e., a sage) could encounter a situation where the values at stake were incapable of being harmonized, but, at the same time, the Confucian moral agent did not see the world as necessitating conflict. The Confucian conflictual world is one of possible incongruity, where minor value conflicts may even be inevitable given the complexities of life, but values in the abstract sense are not thought to be in conflict in and of themselves. In this light, deep value conflicts such as those discussed in this chapter may rarely occur, but the fact that they can occur, and that they can occur for even the most profound people, is significant in forecasting the sentiments people have about the world they live in.

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39

Owning the Genome: A Moral Analysis of DNA Patenting. State University of New York Press, 2004.

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40

Resnik, David B. Owning the Genome: A Moral Analysis of DNA Patenting. State University of New York Press, 2004.

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41

Salls, Holly Shepard. Character Education: Transforming Values into Virtue. University Press of America, 2006.

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42

Carter, Jimmy. Our Endangered Values: America's Moral Crisis. Simon & Schuster, 2005.

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43

Our Endangered Values: America's Moral Crisis. Simon & Schuster, 2006.

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44

Savulescu, Julian, Steve Clarke und Hazem Zohny. Rethinking Moral Status. Oxford University Press, 2021.

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45

Clarke, Steve, Hazem Zohny und Julian Savulescu, Hrsg. Rethinking Moral Status. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192894076.001.0001.

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Common-sense morality implicitly assumes that reasonably clear distinctions can be drawn between the ‘full’ moral status usually attributed to ordinary adult humans, the partial moral status attributed to non-human animals, and the absence of moral status, usually ascribed to machines and other artefacts. These assumptions were always subject to challenge; but they now come under renewed pressure because there are beings we are now able to create, and beings we may soon be able to create, which blur traditional distinctions between humans, non-human animals, and non-biological beings. Examples are human non-human chimeras, cyborgs, human brain organoids, post-humans, human minds that have been uploaded into computers and onto the internet, and artificial intelligence. It is far from clear what moral status we should attribute to any of these beings. While commonsensical views of moral status have always been questioned, the latest technological developments recast many of the questions and raise additional objections. There are a number of ways we could respond, such as revising our ordinary suppositions about the prerequisites for full moral status. We might also reject the assumption that there is a sharp distinction between full and partial moral status. The present volume provides a forum for philosophical reflection about the usual presuppositions and intuitions about moral status, especially in light of the aforementioned recent and emerging technological advances.

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46

Kristjánsson, Kristján. Emotions and Moral Value. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198809678.003.0002.

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Chapter 2 explores questions about the relationship between emotion and moral value. For an emotion to be virtuous, it must be getting moral value right, but what exactly does ‘getting moral value right’ mean? The debate about the moral epistemology of emotions is waged between moral rationalism and moral sentimentalism. Rationalists believe that moral facts exist independently of our emotions, and that those facts can be tracked by human reason. Sentimentalists believe either that no moral facts exist at all or, alternatively, that moral facts are created by our emotions and exist in our minds. It is helpful to distinguish between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ forms of both moral rationalism and sentimentalism. This chapter argues that Aristotelianism is best understood as a form of ‘soft rationalism’—and that it can offer it as an antidote to currently fashionable forms of ‘hard sentimentalism’.

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47

Figdor, Carrie. Literalism and Moral Status. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198809524.003.0009.

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Chapter 9 presents the idea that Literalism undermines current social and moral boundaries for moral status. Possession of psychological capacities, moral standing, and respectful treatment are a standard package deal. So either many more beings enjoy moral status than we now think, or the relative superiority of human moral status over other beings is diminished. It introduces the role of psychological ascriptions in drawing social and moral boundaries by examining dehumanization and anthropomorphism. It argues that in the short term Literalism does not motivate us to do more than make minor adjustments to current moral boundaries. We can distinguish the kinds of psychological capacities that matter for moral status from the kinds that best divide nature at its joints. In the long run, however, Literalism prompts us to reconsider the anthropocentric standards that govern current moral boundaries.

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48

Shepherd, J. Consciousness and Moral Status. Taylor & Francis Group, 2020.

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49

Hicks, Amelia. Moral Uncertainty and Value Comparison. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198823841.003.0008.

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Several philosophers have recently argued that decision-theoretic frameworks for rational choice under risk fail to provide prescriptions for choice in cases of moral uncertainty. They conclude that there are no rational norms that are “sensitive” to a decision maker’s moral uncertainty. But this chapter argues that one sometimes has a rational obligation to take one’s moral uncertainty into account in the course of moral deliberation. It first provides positive motivation for the view that one’s moral beliefs can affect what it is rational for one to choose. It then addresses the problem of value comparison, according to which one cannot determine the expected moral value of one’s actions. The chapter argues that we should not infer from the problem of value comparison that there are no rational norms governing choice under moral uncertainty.

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50

Moral Value and Human Diversity. Oxford University Press, USA, 2007.

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