Zeitschriftenartikel zum Thema „Soviet Union – Politics and government – 1917-1936“

This article will analyze how Ukrainians and Ukrainian-Americans sought diplomatic recognition of Ukraine by the United States between 1917 and 1941. It will explain why the U.S. government, despite its commitments to the principle of self-determination, did not recognize Ukrainian independence and why it extended diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union in 1933 despite protests by Ukrainian- Americans about the terrible famine of 1932- 1933. Drawing on new research in the unu- tilized or underutilized papers of leading Ukrainian-Americans, the article will discuss their tactics and examine their impact on both the press and U.S. government officials.

This article offers an in-depth analysis of Soviet policy and diplomacy in the Far East during the tumultuous period spanning from the 1920s to the 1940s. These policies were profoundly shaped by two key factors: firstly, the ideological considerations rooted in the political framework established in the USSR following the 1917 revolution, and secondly, the geopolitical dynamics reflecting the evolving global and regional political landscape in the Far East. The ruling Bolshevik Party and the Soviet government faced formidable challenges as they sought to safeguard the nascent Soviet Republic amid mounting international tensions, both on a global scale and within the Asia-Pacific region.This study aspires to present a comprehensive and integrated examination of Soviet policy and diplomacy during this era. It delineates four distinct chronological segments, each characterized by its unique features, priorities, and challenges. At the same time, these segments are united by the overarching goal of consolidating the Soviet Union's position in the Far Eastern region and the broader Pacific theater. The four discernible stages in Soviet policy and diplomacy in the Far East encompass:1. The period spanning from 1927 to 1932, marked by an initial deterioration in relations between the Soviet government and the Kuomintang administration following the 1927 split between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China (CPC). This phase also witnessed the 1929 conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway and culminated in the reestablishment of Sino-Soviet relations, all set against the backdrop of escalating Japanese aggression in Northeastern China (Manchuria). This phase demanded adroit diplomacy balancing strength and strategic statecraft.2. The 1930s, especially in the aftermath of Japan's aggressive incursions into China, saw limited interaction and collaboration between the USSR and the Republic of China. This period featured cautious Soviet-Japanese relations and included significant events such as armed clashes at Lake Khasan and the Khalkhin-Gol River, as well as the signing of the USSR-Japan Neutrality Pact.3. The era of the Great Patriotic War from 1941 to 1945, during which the Soviet Union's foremost objective was the defeat of the German Nazi aggressor. During this period, Soviet diplomacy was primarily preoccupied with relations with Anglo-American allies, with particular emphasis on the contentious issue of opening a second front. Consequently, Far Eastern and Pacific policy concerns assumed a somewhat marginalized role within the realm of Soviet diplomacy.4. Finally, the period spanning from the winter to the summer of 1945 emerged as a pivotal juncture. During this time, the Soviet Union intensified its political, diplomatic, and military involvement in the Far East, all against the backdrop of preparations for the impending entry into the war against Japan. Diplomatic endeavors reached their zenith during this critical phase.

Interference of esotericism and politics became apparent especially in the 19th century when the early socialists expected the coming of the Age of Spirit, and narratives about secret wisdom being kept in mysterious sacred places became all the more popular. Thus, the idea of the Age of Enlightenment underwent transformation: the world will be saved not by ordinary knowledge but by some special secret wisdom. In this context, Helena Blavatsky (1831–1891) developed the doctrine of Theosophy the ideas of which were overtaken by the next-generation theosophists including also the Russian painter Nicholas Roerich (1874–1947) and his spouse Helena Roerich (1879–1955) who developed a new form of Theosophy. The aim of this article is to analyse the interference between Theosophy and politics paying special attention to its historical roots, which, in the context of Roerich groups, are to be sought in the political activities of Nicholas Roerich, the founder of the movement. The following materials have been used in the analysis: first, writings of the founders of Agni Yoga or Teaching of Living Ethics; second, the latest studies in the history of Theosophy made in the available archives after the collapse of the soviet regime; third, materials obtained from the interviews of a field research (2006–2008). The author has made use of an interdisciplinary approach combining anthropological methods with the method of systematic analysis. The historical roots of the political activity of contemporary theosophists stretch into the political aspirations of Nicholas Roerich, the founder of Agni Yoga or Teaching of Living Ethics. Opening of the USSR secret archives and publication of several formerly inaccessible diaries and letters of theosophists offer an opportunity to study the “spiritual geopolitics” of the Roerichs. Setting off to his Central Asian expeditions (1925–1928; 1934–1935), Nicholas Roerich strived to implement the Great Plan, i.e. to found a New State that would stretch from Tibet to South Siberia comprising the territories governed by China, Mongolia, Tibet and the USSR. The new state was conceived as the kingdom of Shambhala on the earth, and in order to form this state, Nicholas Roerich aspired to acquire the support of various political systems. During the Tzarist Empire, the political world outlook of Nicholas Roerich was markedly monarchic. After the Bolshevik coup in Russia, the artist accepted the offer to work under the wing of the new power, but after his emigration to the West Roerich published extremely sharp articles against the Bolsheviks. In 1922, the Roerichs started to support Lenin considering him the messenger of Shambhala. Roerich’s efforts to acquire Bolshevik support culminated in 1926 when the Roerichs arrived in Moscow bringing a message by Mahatmas to the soviet government, a small case with earth for the Lenin Mausoleum from Burhan-Bulat and paintings in which Buddha Maitreya bore strong resemblance to Lenin. The plan of founding the Union of Eastern Republics, with Bolshevik support, failed, since about the year 1930 the soviet authorities changed their position concerning the politics of the Far East. Having ascertained that the Bolsheviks would not provide the anticipated support for the Great Plan, the Roerichs started to seek for contacts in the USA which provided funding for his second expedition (1934–1935). The Roerichs succeeded even in making correspondence (1934–1936) with President Roosevelt who paid much larger attention to Eastern states especially China than other presidents did. Their correspondence ceased when the Security Service of the USA grew suspicious about Roerich’s pro-Japanese disposition. Nicholas Roerich has sought for support to his political ambitions by all political regimes. In 1934, the Russian artist tried to ascertain whether German national socialists would support his efforts in Asia. It may seem that the plans of founding the Union of Oriental Republics have passed away along with Roerich; yet in 1991 his son Svyatoslav Roerich (1904–1993) pointed out once again that the Altai is a very important centre of the great future and Zvenigorod is still a great reality and a magnificent dream. Interference between esotericism and politics is observed also among Latvian theosophists: the soviet regime successfully made use of Roerich’s adherents propagating the communist ideology in the independent Republic of Latvia. In the 1920s and 1930s, the embassy of the USSR in Riga maintained close contacts with Roerich’s adherents in Latvia and made a strong pressure on the Latvian government not to ban the Roerich’s Museum Friend Society who actively propagated the success of soviet culture and economy. On 17 June 1940, the soviet army occupied the Republic of Latvia, and Haralds Lūkins, the son of the founder of the Roerich’s Museum Friend Society, was elected to the first government of the soviet Latvia. Nevertheless, involvement of theosophists in politics was unsuccessful, since after the official annexation of Latvia into the USSR, on 5 August 1940, all societies including the Roerich’s Museum Friend Society were closed. Since the members of the movement continued to meet regularly, in 1949, Haralds Lūkins was arrested as leader of an illegal organization. After the Second World War, theosophists were subjected to political repressions. Arrests of Roerich’s followers (1948–1951) badly impaired the movement. After rehabilitation in 1954, the repressed persons gradually returned from exile and kept on their illegal meetings in small groups. To regain their rights to act openly, Roerich’s followers started to praise Nicholas Roerich as a supporter of the soviet power. With the collapse of the soviet regime, Roerich’s followers in Latvia became legal in 1988 when the Latvian Roerich Society was restored which soon split up according to geopolitical orientation; therefore, presently in Latvia, there are the following organisations: Latvian Roerich Society, Latvian Department of the International Centre of the Roerichs, and Aivars Garda group or the Latvian National Front. A. Garda fused nationalistic ideas with Theosophy offering a special social reorganization – repatriation of the soviet-time immigrants and a social structure of Latvia that would be formed by at least 75% ethnic Latvians. Activity of A. Garda group, which is being criticized by other groups of theosophists, is a continuation of the interference between theosophical and political ideas practised by the Roerichs. Generally it is to be admitted that after the crush of the soviet regime, in theosophist groups, unclear political orientation between the rightists and leftists is observed, characterised by fairly radical ideas.

In the last decade, state building and the problems of establishing state authority in the provinces in 1917 have begun to attract historians’ attention. Several works by Russian authors treat state building under the Provisional Government, with emphasis upon organizational activities “at the center.” Daniel T. Orlovsky and Howard J. White (with greater analytical rigor than their Russian counterparts) have studied the work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the provinces. But none of these works has offered a sustained discussion of the revolution in a single city or province. Local studies have concentrated on popular institutions (for example, unions, Red Guards, and the Soviets) and the process of social polarization but have paid litde attention to the state. My aim is to bridge the gap between institutional studies and local studies by looking at local government and the contested nature of state authority in Smolensk from March to June 1917, tracing especially the conflict between class-based politics and state interests.

Dmitry S. Polyansky (1917-2001) is known as one of the CPSU and USSR leaders. He combined his membership in the Politburo of the Communist Party (1960-1976) with the posts of Russian PM, the Deputy and First Deputy Chairman of the all-union Government, the Soviet Minister of Agriculture (1958-1976). Later Polyansky served a SU ambassador in Japan and Norway (1976-1987). As a politic and state activist he was involved to number of odious events: the transfer of the Crimean Oblast (1954), the defeat of the Anti-Party Group (1957), the “Ryazan affair” (1960), the “Novocherkassk massacre” (1962), the Nikita S. Khrushchev’s

AbstractThe Bolsheviks did not alienate citizens from helping find solutions to the problems afflicting children. Many social actions deemed as "useful" by the Soviet authorities were met with support by the regime. These included the "Week of the Homeless Child", school self-taxation, local societies of the "Friend of the Children", and others. Establishing its control over "useful" public ventures, the Government eventually absorbed them. On the surface, the proliferation of public ventures in the area of children's welfare, such as patronage by industrial enterprises, labor unions and other groups and the growth of various advisory boards and children's inspections, appeared to be a result of growing social initiative. In reality the government's support of public work led to de facto state and party control. In order to carry out successful public initiatives, the population had to adapt to the particulars of Bolshevik rule.

AbstractThis article examines the attempts by left-wing Ukrainian nationalists to reconcile the seemingly irreconcilable: Ukrainian nationalism and Soviet socialism. It describes how leftist Ukrainian parties active during the Revolution and Civil War in Ukraine 1917–1921 advocated a soviet form of government. Exiled members of the two major Ukrainian parties, the Social Democrats and the Socialist Revolutionaries, then took this position further, arguing in favor of reconciliation with the Bolsheviks and a return to their homeland. After the Entente recognized Polish sovereignty over Eastern Galicia and Soviet Ukraine introduced a policy of Ukrainization in 1923, many West Ukrainian intellectuals took up this call. The Great Famine of 1932–1933 and the Bolsheviks’ purge of Ukrainian Communists and intellectuals all but ended the position. However, it was more the Soviet rejection of the Sovietophiles that ended Ukrainian Sovietophilism than any rejection of the Soviet Union by leftist Ukrainian nationalists. Thus, an examination of the Ukrainian Sovietophiles calls into question the accounts of the relationship between Ukrainian nationalism and the Soviet Union that have common currency in today’s Ukraine.

After the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, Iurii Filipchenko (in Petrograd) and Nikolai Koltsov (in Moscow) created centers of genetic research where eugenics prospered as a socially relevant part of the new "experimental" biology. The Russian Eugenics Society, established in 1920, was dominated by research-oriented professionals. However, Bolshevik activists in the movement tried to translate eugenics into social policies (among them, sterilization) and in 1929, Marxist geneticist Alexander Serebrovsky was stimulated by the forthcoming Five-Year Plan to urge a massive eugenic program of human artificial insemination. With the advent of Stalinism, such attempts to "biologize" social phenomena became ideologically untenable and the society was abolished in 1930. Three years later, however, a number of eugenicists reassembled in the world's first institute of medical genetics, created by Bolshevik physician Solomon Levit after his return from a postdoctoral year in Texas with H. J. Muller. Muller himself moved to the Soviet Union in 1933, where he agitated for eugenics and wrote Stalin in 1936 to urge an artificial insemination program. Shortly thereafter, Muller left Russia, several of his colleagues were shot, and the Institute of Medical Genetics was disbanded. During the next three decades, Lysenkoists regularly invoked the Soviet eugenic legacy to claim that genetics itself was fascist.Key words: Russia, eugenics, human genetics, medical genetics, Lysenkoism, history, politics.

On 12 February 1930 a near-insolvent English company began arbitration proceedings against a large and hostile foreign State under an ad hoc arbitration clause contained in a written concession agreement signed by both parties. This concession had been granted by the Soviet Union in 1925 in respect of gold mining and other properties previously operated by the English company's Russian subsidiaries until their dispossession by the Soviet Russian government in 1918, following the October 1917 Revolution. In May 1930, after three months, the Soviet Union abruptly withdrew from the arbitration proceedings, abandoning both its defence and counterclaim and instructing its appointed arbitrator to take no further part in the proceedings. Four months later, on 2 September 1930, the English company obtained a massive monetary award in its favour, signed in London by two arbitrators only. Yet the financial result of Lena Gold-fields Limited v. USSR was to benefit David little and cost Goliath less.

The life path, scientific-pedagogical and public activity of Volodymyr Sokurenko – a prominent Ukrainian jurist, doctor of law, professor, talented teacher of the Lviv Law School of Franko University are analyzed. It is found out that after graduating from a seven-year school in Zaporizhia, V. Sokurenko entered the Zaporizhia Aviation Technical School, where he studied two courses until 1937. 1/10/1937 he was enrolled as a cadet of the 2nd school of aircraft technicians named after All-Union Lenin Komsomol. In 1938, this school was renamed the Volga Military Aviation School, which he graduated on September 4, 1939 with the military rank of military technician of the 2nd category. As a junior aircraft technician, V. Sokurenko was sent to the military unit no. 8690 in Baku, and later to Maradnyany for further military service in the USSR Air Force. From September 4, 1939 to March 16, 1940, he was a junior aircraft technician of the 50th Fighter Regiment, 60th Air Brigade of the ZAK VO in Baku. The certificate issued by the Railway District Commissariat of Lviv on January 4, 1954 no. 3132 states that V. Sokurenko actually served in the staff of the Soviet Army from October 1937 to May 1946. The same certificate states that from 10/12/1941 to 20/09/1942 and from 12/07/1943 to 08/03/1945, he took part in the Soviet-German war, in particular in the second fighter aviation corps of the Reserve of the Supreme Command of the Soviet Army. In 1943 he joined the CPSU. He was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War of the 1st degree and the Order of the Red Star (1943) as well as 9 medals «For Merit in Battle» during the Soviet-German war. With the start of the Soviet-German war, the Sokurenko family, like many other families, was evacuated to the town of Kamensk-Uralsky in the Sverdlovsk region, where their father worked at a metallurgical plant. After the war, the Sokurenko family moved to Lviv. In 1946, V. Sokurenko entered the Faculty of Law of the Ivan Franko Lviv State University, graduating with honors in 1950, and entered the graduate school of the Lviv State University at the Department of Theory and History of State and Law. V. Sokurenko successfully passed the candidate examinations and on December 25, 1953 in Moscow at the Institute of Law of the USSR he defended his thesis on the topic: «Socialist legal consciousness and its relationship with Soviet law». The supervisor of V. Sokurenko's candidate's thesis was N. Karieva. The Higher Attestation Commission of the Ministry of Culture of the USSR, by its decision of March 31, 1954, awarded V. Sokurenko the degree of Candidate of Law. In addition, it is necessary to explain the place of defense of the candidate's thesis by V. Sokurenko. As it is known, the Institute of State and Law of the USSR has its history since 1925, when, in accordance with the resolution of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of March 25, 1925, the Institute of Soviet Construction was established at the Communist Academy. In 1936, the Institute became part of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and in 1938 it was reorganized into the Institute of Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In 1941–1943 it was evacuated to Tashkent. In 1960-1991 it was called the Institute of State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In Ukraine, there is the Institute of State and Law named after V. Koretsky of the NAS of Ukraine – a leading research institution in Ukraine of legal profile, founded in 1949. It is noted that, as a graduate student, V. Sokurenko read a course on the history of political doctrines, conducted special seminars on the theory of state and law. After graduating from graduate school and defending his thesis, from October 1, 1953 he was enrolled as a senior lecturer and then associate professor at the Department of Theory and History of State and Law at the Faculty of Law of the Lviv State University named after Ivan Franko. By the decision of the Higher Attestation Commission of the Ministry of Higher Education of the USSR of December 18, 1957, V. Sokurenko was awarded the academic title of associate professor of the «Department of Theory and History of State and Law». V. Sokurenko took an active part in public life. During 1947-1951 he was a member of the party bureau of the party organization of LSU, worked as a chairman of the trade union committee of the university, from 1955 to 1957 he was a secretary of the party committee of the university. He delivered lectures for the population of Lviv region. Particularly, he lectured in Turka, Chervonohrad, and Yavoriv. He made reports to the party leaders, Soviet workers as well as business leaders. He led a philosophical seminar at the Faculty of Law. He was a deputy of the Lviv City Council of People's Deputies in 1955-1957 and 1975-1978. In December 1967, he defended his doctoral thesis on the topic: «Development of progressive political thought in Ukraine (until the early twentieth century)». The defense of the doctoral thesis was approved by the Higher Attestation Commission on June 14, 1968. During 1960-1990 he headed the Department of Theory and History of State and Law; in 1962-68 and 1972-77 he was the dean of the Law Faculty of the Ivan Franko Lviv State University. In connection with the criticism of the published literature, on September 10, 1977, V. Sokurenko wrote a statement requesting his dismissal from the post of Dean of the Faculty of Law due to deteriorating health. During 1955-1965 he was on research trips to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Austria, and Bulgaria. From August 1966 to March 1967, in particular, he spent seven months in the United States, England and Canada as a UN Fellow in the Department of Human Rights. From April to May 1968, he was a member of the government delegation to the International Conference on Human Rights in Iran for one month. He spoke, in addition to Ukrainian, English, Polish and Russian. V. Sokurenko played an important role in initiating the study of an important discipline at the Faculty of Law of the Lviv University – History of Political and Legal Studies, which has been studying the history of the emergence and development of theoretical knowledge about politics, state, law, ie the process of cognition by people of the phenomena of politics, state and law at different stages of history in different nations, from early statehood and modernity. Professor V. Sokurenko actively researched the problems of the theory of state and law, the history of Ukrainian legal and political thought. He was one of the first legal scholars in the USSR to begin research on the basics of legal deontology. V. Sokurenko conducted extensive research on the development of basic requirements for the professional and legal responsibilities of a lawyer, similar to the requirements for a doctor. In further research, the scholar analyzed the legal responsibilities, prospects for the development of the basics of professional deontology. In addition, he considered medical deontology from the standpoint of a lawyer, law and morality, focusing on internal (spiritual) processes, calling them «the spirit of law.» The main direction of V. Sokurenko's research was the problems of the theory of state and law, the history of legal and political studies. The main scientific works of professor V. Sokurenko include: «The main directions in the development of progressive state and legal thought in Ukraine: 16th – 19th centuries» (1958) (Russian), «Democratic doctrines about the state and law in Ukraine in the second half of the 19th century (M. Drahomanov, S. Podolynskyi, A. Terletskyi)» (1966), «Law. Freedom. Equality» (1981, co-authored) (in Russian), «State and legal views of Ivan Franko» (1966), «Socio-political views of Taras Shevchenko (to the 170th anniversary of his birth)» (1984); «Political and legal views of Ivan Franko (to the 130th anniversary of his birth)» (1986) (in Russian) and others. V. Sokurenko died on November 22, 1994 and was buried in Holoskivskyi Cemetery in Lviv. Volodymyr Sokurenko left a bright memory in the hearts of a wide range of scholars, colleagues and grateful students. The 100th anniversary of the Scholar is a splendid opportunity to once again draw attention to the rich scientific heritage of the lawyer, which is an integral part of the golden fund of Ukrainian legal science and education. It needs to be studied, taken into account and further developed.

В статье рассматривается история становления казахстанской государственности в большевистский период и функционирования Советского правительства. Хронологически выделены этапы развития государственности, а так же определена роль партии Алаш в становлении казахской государственности. Рассмотрен большевистский период в истории Казахстана: события национально- освободительного движения 1916 года, буржуазно-демократическая и социалистическая революции 1917 года, события гражданской войны (1918-1920 годов). Сделан акцент на историю большевизации национального кластера менеджеров, этнокультурным особенностям и взаимосвязи процессов большевизации и советизации, власти и этничности. Исследование направлено на формирование более полного и точного понимания формирования советской этнополитической элиты как ключевого фактора государственного строительства в СССР в 1920-1930-е годы. В советское время Казахстан из пяти среднеазиатских республик Казахстан играл самую важную промышленную роль в советской системе из-за богатых месторождений угля и нефти в северном секторе республики, наиболее близком к России КАССР в 1936 году советское правительство провозгласило союзной республикой, тем самым отделив ее от РСФСР, а в 1991 году Республика Казахстан становится независимым и суверенным государством. Мақалада большевиктік кезеңде қазақстандық мемлекеттіліктің қалыптасу тарихы және Кеңес үкіметінің жұмыс істеуі қарастырылады. Хронологиялық тұрғыдан мемлекеттіліктің даму кезеңдері анықталды, сондай-ақ қазақ мемлекеттілігінің қалыптасуындағы Алаш партиясының рөлі анықталды. Қазақстан тарихындағы большевиктік кезең: 1916 жылғы ұлт - азаттық қозғалыс оқиғалары, 1917 жылғы буржуазиялық-демократиялық және социалистік революция, азаматтық соғыс оқиғалары (1918-1920 жылдар) қарастырылды. Менеджерлердің ұлттық кластерін большевизациялау тарихына, этномәдени ерекшеліктеріне және большевизация мен кеңес беру процестерінің, билік пен этниканың өзара байланысына баса назар аударылды. Зерттеу 1920-1930 жылдардағы КСРО-дағы мемлекеттік құрылыстың негізгі факторы ретінде кеңестік этносаяси элитаның қалыптасуы туралы неғұрлым толық және нақты түсінік қалыптастыруға бағытталған. Кеңес заманында Қазақстан Бес Орта Азия республикаларының ішінен Ресейге ең жақын республиканың солтүстік секторындағы көмір мен мұнайдың бай кен орындары себебінен кеңес жүйесінде ең маңызды өнеркәсіптік рөл атқарды. 1936 жылы КСРО Кеңес үкіметі одақтық республика деп жариялап, оны РСФСР-ден бөлді, ал 1991 жылы Қазақстан Республикасы тәуелсіз және егемен мемлекетке айналды. The article examines the history of the formation of the Kazakh statehood in the Bolshevik period and the functioning of the Soviet government. Chronologically, the stages of the development of statehood are highlighted, as well as the role of the Alash party in the formation of the Kazakh statehood is determined. The article considers the Bolshevik period in the history of Kazakhstan: the events of the national liberation movement of 1916, the bourgeois-democratic and socialist revolutions of 1917, the events of the Civil War (1918-1920). The author focuses on the history of the Bolshevization of the national cluster of managers, ethnocultural features and the relationship between the processes of Bolshevization and Sovietization, power and ethnicity. The research is aimed at forming a more complete and accurate understanding of the formation of the Soviet ethno-political elite as a key factor of state-building in the USSR in the 1920s and 1930s. In Soviet times, Kazakhstan of the five Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan played the most important industrial role in the Soviet system due to the rich coal and oil deposits in the northern sector of the republic closest to Russia. In 1936, the Soviet government declared the KASSR a union republic, thus separating it from the RSFSR, and in 1991, the Republic of Kazakhstan became an independent and sovereign state.

In 1917–18, the new republican governments of Russia, Germany, and Austria nationalized their former court property. A monarchic-turned-national heritage of prestigious opera and dramatic theatres weighed heavily on national and regional budgets, prompting first attempts to create centralized forms of theatre governance. In a second wave of theatre reorganization in the mid-1930s, the Soviet government created ‘union theatres’ under a Committee for Arts Affairs; the German and Austrian theatres underwent the Nazi Gleichschaltung (1933–35 and 1938); and France, a ‘democratic outlier’, opted for nationalizing the Opéra and Opéra-Comique under the Réunion des théâtres lyriques nationaux. These conglomerates have so far been little studied as historically specific forms of theatre management, particularly from a comparative, trans-regime perspective. What balance can be struck between economic, political, and ‘artistic’ costs and benefits? How does ‘Baumol’s law’ of decreasing theatre profitability apply to these very different politico-economic systems, as well as to war economies? Dictatorships reveal an economic seduction power, while this essay argues for confirming a long-term ‘great European convergence’ of state-centred theatre management, internal structure, and accountability, both in peace and war. Here, the stated goals and short-term contingencies yielded to trends originating from the logic of theatre production itself, and the compromises that the state, theatre professionals, and the public accepted in exchange for the capital of prestige. Alexander Golovlev (PhD, European University Institute in Florence, 2017) is a senior research fellow at the HSE Institute for Advanced Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies at the University of Moscow. His recent publications include, for New Theatre Quarterly, ‘Theatre Policies of Soviet Stalinism and Italian Fascism Compared, 1920–1940s’ (2019), and ‘Balancing the Books and Staging Operas under Duress: Bolshoi Theatre Management, Wartime Economy, and State Sponsorship in 1941–1945’, Russian History XLVII, No. 4 (2020).

In the middle of the XIX century, the territory of contemporary Kyrgyzstan was conquered by the Tsarist Russia. Later, in 1917, as a result of the October Revolution, the Tsarist regime was replaced by the Soviet rule. In the territory of Kyrgyzstan, it was established firstly in the southern and western regions of the country, such as Suluktu and Kyzyl-Kiya, Osh and Talas, where the largest industrial enterprises, mines, railway junctions and most of the workers and soldiers were concentrated. However, already by the mid 1918, the Soviet government managed to spread its power to the entire region of Kyrgyzstan. In 1924, the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, established on April 30, 1918, was reorganized into a new administrative division. As the part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), on October 24, 1924 the Kara Kyrgyz Autonomous Region was formed. On May 25, 1925 the Kara Kyrgyz Autonomous Region was renamed into the Kyrgyz Autonomous Region. Then on February 01, 1926 it was restructured into the Kyrgyz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. On December 05, 1936 it became a separate constituent republic of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) known as the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic. Along with other 15 Soviet Socialist states, Kyrgyzstan had been the member of the USSR for about 70 years, from 1919 till 1991. The current paper focuses on the processes of social transformation under the Soviet regime, especially the implementation of class struggle policy and its impact on Kyrgyzstan. In comparison with the interventions from the Tsarist Russia, the social transformation process undertaken under the Soviet system was quite different. In the territory of the Kyrgyz traditional society, the Tsarist Russia made only some social reorganization, but the Soviets brought radical changes in to the socio-political organizations of the Kyrgyz people. The paper seeks to understand how the Soviet Union tried to reconstruct the Kyrgyz society during the 1920s and 1930s. In addition, the paper will analyze the methods and mechanisms of the social transformation processes and the measures used by the Soviet government in their socio-political ‘battles’ against the local elites, and the influence of the new system on the existing socio-economic stratification in the context of the Kyrgyz society. During the Soviet period the prevalent scientific vision about the major historical events of the time was based on the Communist ideology. Therefore, the main aim of the paper is to analyze and describe an objective overview of the history of Soviet class struggle policy. The paper is based on the research of local archival documents, published sources and oral materials.

The Comintern represented in the international relations of the inter-war period a transnational global force. It has been rightly described as an organisation with political program ambitions extending beyond national boundaries. Its sections were active in most countries of the globe. The involvement of the Comintern with the Baltic states and the activities of Baltic communists in the transnational framework of the organisation has remained almost unexplored. This article deals with the period from 1918 to 1935 and looks at the Baltic communists’ activities in the Comintern before the Great Purges in the USSR.Estonian and Latvian Communism grew out of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party, Lithuanian Communism out of Polish Social Democracy and the Russian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party. At the time of the Comintern’s I Congress, Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Bolsheviks had congregated into the national sections subject to RKP(b). The Soviet Balticum Project and the founding of the Comintern were reasons for a part of the Baltic bolsheviks belonging to the national sections of RKP(b) to declare that they had formed independent communist parties. The annulment of the Brest peace treaty in November of 1918 and the subsequent emergence of the Estonian Workers’ Commune, Soviet Latvia and Soviet Lithuania-Belarus Republic, or in other words, the soviet project’s duration in the Baltic provinces of the former Russian empire proved to be short-lived. The peace treaties between Soviet Russia and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania signed in 1920 which became the foundation for the emergence of three independent states evoked sharp disagreements and demoralization in the ranks of the Baltic Bolsheviks. One part of them saw the Soviet Russia’s agreement to the peace treaty as treason, while the other justified the act with a comparison to the Brest peace treaty: Considering the existing power relationships and the Comintern-led international revolutionary movement, the peace agreements reached by the Soviet government are temporary and they will certainly encounter the same fate as the Brest peace treaty. The Stalin-led Peoples’ Commissariat of Nationalities played a decisive role in making it possible that bolsheviks of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian extraction were among the founders and afterwards in the leadership of the Comintern as a transnational organization. A similar role played the Zinoviev-led Peoples’ Commissariat of Nationalities of the Union of the Commune of the Nordic Region. In the first of these Commissariats worked Mickevičius-Kapsukas, Alexa-Angaretis, Gailis and Pöögelmamm, in the latter Anvelt and Giedrys. The Latvian bolshevik/communist Stučka was a part of Lenin’s retinue, while his countryman, one of the most transnational Balts in the Comintern and the top level of AUCP(b), Knoriņš, was allied with Stalin. Becoming members of the Comintern, the Baltic communists declared that the leadership of the revolutionary movement in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would belong wholly to the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian communist parties. Ties to the Comintern were justified as follows: the communist party as an independent organization forms a direct tie with the Comintern; having gained the recognition of the Comintern, the communist party joins as an independent member the transnational union of communist parties and starts with the internationalism of the working class, which allows the globalization, together with Soviet Russia/Soviet Union, of the results of the October Revolution. The question of what were the Baltic communists’ relations with the RKP(b) received this declaration as answer: the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian proletariat can proudly point to traditions and cooperation that has connected them to the Russian proletariat. Having joined the Comintern and directing from Soviet Russia / Soviet Union illegal communist activity in their homelands, the Baltic communist leaders remained members of RCP(b)/AUCP(b) and were in their actions subject to the direction of both that organization and of Comintern. They declared that they did not recognize the bourgeois Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and would greet the day when the bourgeois order was ended in these countries and union with Soviet Union took place. A role played here also the rhetoric about the internationalism of the working class and the dictatorship of the proletariat. The latter was to be achieved by taking part in the Comintern’s transnational campaigns. Among such campaigns were the peace movement, the fight against social democracy, the creation of joint and peoples’ fronts etc. The varied ideas and wishful thinking of the Baltic Bolsheviks came to an end with the start of repressions in 1936—1937 or the Great Purge.

The article offers an overview of modern historical data on the origins, causes of World War II, the decisive role of the USSR in its victorious end, and also records the main results and lessons of World War II.Hitler's Germany was the main cause of World War II. Nazism, racial theory, mixed with far-reaching geopolitical designs, became the combustible mixture that ignited the fire of glob­al conflict. The war with the Soviet Union was planned to be waged with particular cruelty.The preconditions for the outbreak of World War II were the humiliating provisions of the Versailles Peace Treaty for the German people, as well as the attitude of the "Western de­mocracies" to Russia after 1917 and the Soviet Union as an outcast of world development. Great Britain, France, the United States chose for themselves a policy of ignoring Moscow's interests, they were more likely to cooperate with Hitler's Germany than with Soviet Russia. It was the "Munich Agreement" that became the point of no return to the beginning of the Second World War. Under these conditions, for the USSR, its own security and the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Germany began to come to the fore, defining the "spheres of interests" of the parties in order to limit the advance of German troops towards the Soviet borders in the event of German aggression against Poland. The non-aggression pact gave the USSR just under two years to rebuild the army and consolidate its defensive potential and pushed the Soviet borders hundreds of kilometers westward. The signing of the Pact was preceded by the failure in August 1939 of the negotiations between the military mis­sions of Britain, France and the USSR, although Moscow took the Anglo-French-Soviet nego­tiations with all seriousness.The huge losses of the USSR in the summer of 1941 are explained by the following circum­stances: before the war, a large-scale modernization of the Red Army was launched, a gradu­ate of a military school did not have sufficient experience in managing an entrusted unit by June 22, 1941; the Red Army was going to bleed the enemy in border battles, stop it with short counterattacks by covering units, carry out defensive operations, and then strike a de­cisive blow into the depths of the enemy's territory, so the importance of a multi-echeloned long-term defense in 1941 was underestimated by the command of the Red Army and it was not ready for it; significant groupings of the Western Special Military District were drawn into potential salients, which was used by the Germans at the initial stage of the war; Stalin's fear of provoking Hitler to start a war led to slowness in making the most urgent and necessary decisions to bring troops to combat readiness.The Allies delayed the opening of the second front for an unreasonably long time. They, of course, achieved outstanding success in the landing operation in France, however, the en­emy's losses in only one Soviet strategic operation in the summer of 1944 ("Bagration") are not inferior, and even exceed, the enemy’s losses on the second front. One of the goals of "Bagration" was to help the Allies.Soviet soldiers liberated Europe at the cost of their lives. At the same time, Moscow could not afford to re-establish a cordon sanitaire around its borders after the war, so that anti- Soviet forces would come to power in the border states. The United States and Great Britain took all measures available to them to quickly remove from the governments of Italy, France and other Western states all the left-wing forces that in 1944-1945 had a serious impact on the politics of their countries.

Despite the attention that has been given to the role of economic sanctions in Japan's decision to launch the Pacific war, Australia's decision to ban iron ore exports to Japan has been given little attention, even though this was one of the earliest economic sanctions imposed onimperial Japan in the 1930s. To a degree this neglect can be traced to a preoccupation with the actions and objectives of the great powers and a failure to consider the opportunities available to small nations to take significant initiatives. The following article traces the origins of the iron ore embargo back to 1934 when Essington Lewis, the Managing Director of the Broken Hill Proprietary Company Ltd (BHP), Australia's iron and steel monopoly, visited Japan and subsequently advocated the development of an Australian armaments industry to counter probable Japanese aggression in the Pacific. In Japan Lewis crossed paths with J. G. Latham, the Minister for External Affairs, who was leading the Australian government's Eastern Mission. Latham returned to Australia with conclusions that differed fundamentally from those of Lewis, who came up with a plan to take advantage of Japan's dependence on imports of iron ore and other iron products to finance investment in Australian armaments manufacturing. In explaining this outcome the article discusses interactions between a number of conflicts: between Latham and Lewis; between the British Treasury and the Foreign Office; and between the Japanese army and navy. In London the Treasury wanted to focus on the European theatre, while also holding down military spending in order to achieve balanced budgets. The Treasury believed that the way to best defend British commercial interests in Asia was to appease Japan. On the other hand, the Foreign Office was committed to the protection of British interests in the Far East by a more forceful diplomacy, although it was only willing to counten-ance behavior short of military action. Consistent with Latham's recommendations to his government, the emerging consensus in London was that while a settlement in China would help to safeguard British interests there, as long as the Japanese were bound up in their war in China they were less likely to attack British colonies in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. In 1936 this orientation was challenged by a shift in the balance of power in Tokyo away from the army and in favor of the navy. Although priority continued to be placed on winning the war in China and guarding against an attack from the Soviet Union, now the navy's plan for southward expansion was given more careful consideration and credibility.

Abstract The article examines the ideas and arrangements referred to as nonterritorial autonomy (NTA) in the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the post-Soviet states. Many scholars regard NTA as a theoretical breakthrough and as a way to drastically rearrange diversity policies. The author seeks to clarify whether NTA had been a groundbreaking innovation and an area of political contestations. Two short periods of NTA-related initiatives after 1917 and in the late 1980s–1990s may look like attempts (albeit ineffective) to replace the earlier forms of diversity governance. The author shows that the ideas of group societal separateness, differential treatment of individuals, group agency, and cohesiveness, as well as a group’s running of its internal affairs, were present in varying degrees in imperial, Soviet, and post-Soviet governments’ thoughts and practices. Academia and civil society were also appropriating and developing these views, and group self-rule on a nonterritorial basis was their logical extension. However, the practical implementation was, in most cases, on a top-down basis, and group agency and self-rule were affirmed mostly rhetorically. The continuity of discourses and practices demonstrates that NTA was an integral part of “normal” and broad ethnopolitical developments across the major historic divides in Northern Eurasia.

Abstract The decriminalisation of homosexuality was a measure originally adopted by the bourgeois revolutions, which was abandoned by the bourgeois parties as the rise of the labour movement led the bourgeoisie to seek a compromise with landlords, clergy and monarchy in different countries. The demand to decriminalise homosexuality was therefore taken over by the Marxist workers’ parties, such as the Social-Democratic Party of Germany before the First World War and the Bolshevik Party in Russia after the Revolution of October 1917. This article outlines the cooperation between the Scientific-Humanitarian Committee led by Magnus Hirschfeld and Social Democracy to decriminalise homosexuality by removing Paragraph 175 of the German Penal Code before the First World War. It also describes the decriminalisation of homosexuality in Russia under Lenin, with the adoption of the first Soviet Penal Code in June 1922, and Magnus Hirschfeld’s relations with prominent figures of the early Soviet government such as N.A. Semashko, the first People’s Commissar of Public Health, and Anatoly Lunacharsky, the first People’s Commissar for Education. Those ties ceased with the Nazis’ rise to power in January 1933, which resulted in the destruction of the institutions created by Hirschfeld, such as the Institute for Sexual Science and the World League for Sexual Reform, while in the Soviet Union itself Stalin recriminalised homosexuality in March 1934, shortly before Hirschfeld’s death, linking homosexuality and fascism.

В начале XX века во всем мире увеличилось количество грамотных и образованных людей, соответственно, вырос спрос на недорогую периодику. Идеологи в разных странах, в том числе в СССР, поняли, что с помощью газет можно сформировать общественное мнение, поэтому начали применять ресурсы крупных изданий в пропагандистских целях. Главным периодическим изданием Советского Союза была газета «Правда». Кроме того, что газета выпускалась большими тиражами и была печатным органом партии, «Правда» имела историко-политическое значение: основана лидером большевиков, тайно перевозилась через границу в Россию, а в июле 1917 г. вовсе была разгромлена. К концу 1920-х годов в СССР увеличилось число людей, владеющих грамотой. Советские пропагандисты увидели возможность продвижения идеологических концепций с помощью периодических изданий. Именно тогда начинается тотальное внедрение в массовое сознание образа Сталина как великого руководителя, полководца, борца с врагами. Статья посвящена актуальной на данный момент теме – советской пропаганде эпохи правления И. В. Сталина. Общественные деятели еще в начале XXI века заметили сходства методов советской пропаганды, разработанных до Великой Отечественной войны, и способов агитации, которые применяют современные политтехнологи и журналисты. Используя методы анализа, сравнения, формализации, автор поставил цель установить роль газеты «Правда» в формировании культа личности И. В. Сталина в 1929–1939 гг. Автором был проведен анализ текстов и иллюстраций газеты «Правда» за период с 1929 по 1939 гг., содержащих информацию о Сталине. Представленный материал раскрывает особенности технологий, которые использовали редакторы газеты. Проблемой исследовательской работы было выяснение достоверности причастности газеты «Правда» в распространении среди своих читателей идеи о культе личности Сталина в 1929–1939 годах. В ходе исследования выявлена причастность газеты «Правда» в формировании культа личности Сталина в 1929–1939 годах. Одним из главных средств массовой информации в 1930-е годы стали периодические издания. Ресурсы ежедневной газеты позволяли доносить информацию до миллионов советских граждан. Советское правительство выбрало газету «Правда» в качестве рупора пропагандистской кампании по установлению культа личности И. В. Сталина в довоенное время. Выбранная тактика подачи новостей способствовала тому, что руководитель СССР был выгодно представлен читателям в качестве борца за права людей, другом всех советских народов и героев эпохи. Кроме перечисления достижений вождя, газета так же часто публиковала фотографии со Сталиным, где он находился рядом со своими товарищами или представителями социальных групп Советского Союза. Количество упоминаний Сталина в каждом номере газеты достигало немыслимых масштабов. Данный способ агитации сыграл одну из главных ролей в установлении культа личности Сталина. Полученные результаты могут быть использованы в написании научной работы по советской пропаганде в 1936–1938 годах. At the beginning of the XX century, the number of literate and educated people around the world increased, and the demand for inexpensive periodicals increased accordingly. Ideologues in various countries, including the USSR, realized that Newspapers can form public opinion, so they began to use the resources of major publications for propaganda purposes. The main periodical of the Soviet Union was the Pravda newspaper. In addition, the newspaper was produced in large print runs and were printed on the party, "Pravda" had historical and political significance: founded by the leader of the Bolsheviks were secretly transported across the border to Russia, and in July 1917 was defeated. By the end of the 1920s, the number of literate people in the USSR had increased. Soviet propagandists saw an opportunity to promote ideological concepts through periodicals. It is then that the total introduction of the image of Stalin as a great leader, commander, and fighter against enemies begins in the mass consciousness. The article is devoted to the current topic – Soviet propaganda during the reign of I. V. Stalin. Public figures at the beginning of the XXI century noticed similarities between the methods of Soviet propaganda developed before the great Patriotic war and the methods of agitation used by modern political strategists and journalists. Using methods of analysis, comparison, and formalization, the author set out to establish the role of the Pravda newspaper in the formation of the personality cult of I. V. Stalin in 1929–1939. The author analyzed the texts and illustrations of the newspaper Pravda for the period from 1929 to 1939, containing information about Stalin. The presented material reveals the features of the technologies used by the newspaper's editors. The problem of the research work was to find out the authenticity of the involvement of the newspaper Pravda in spreading the idea of the cult of Stalin's personality among its readers in 1929–1939. The study revealed the involvement of the newspaper Pravda in the formation of the cult of Stalin's personality in 1929–1939. Periodicals became one of the main media outlets in the 1930s. The resources of the daily newspaper made it possible to convey information to millions of Soviet citizens. The Soviet government chose the newspaper Pravda as the mouthpiece of a propaganda campaign to establish the cult of Stalin's personality in the pre-war period. The chosen tactic of presenting news contributed to the fact that the head of the USSR was favorably presented to readers as a fighter for the rights of people, a friend of all Soviet peoples and heroes of the era. In addition to listing the leader's achievements, the newspaper also often published photos with Stalin, where he was next to his comrades or representatives of social groups of the Soviet Union. The number of references to Stalin in each issue of the newspaper reached unimaginable proportions. This method of agitation played a major role in establishing the cult of Stalin's personality. The results obtained can be used in writing a research paper on Soviet propaganda in 1936–1938.