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Zeitschriftenartikel zum Thema „Social epistemology“

Autor: Grafiati

Veröffentlicht am 4. Juni 2021

Zuletzt aktualisiert am 1. August 2024

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1

Broncano, Fernando. „Sinopsis de "Conocimiento expropiado"“. Quaderns de Filosofia 9, Nr. 2 (29.11.2022): 11. http://dx.doi.org/10.7203/qfia.9.2.22951.

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Summary of Conocimiento expropiado Resumen: El libro Conocimiento expropiado trata varios de los temas nucleares de la epistemología política. Parte de la hipótesis de que en la interacción entre posiciones epistémicas y posiciones sociales se producen daños epistémicos que producen daños sociales. El marco teórico del libro es la epistemología de virtudes extendida a los aspectos sociales. Desde estos dos puntos de vista examino temas como la injusticia epistémica, las ignorancias estructurales, la opresión epistémica y las relaciones entre epistemología y orden social democrático. Abstract: The book Conocimiento expropiado deals with several of core issues of political epistemology. It starts from the hypothesis that in the interaction between epistemic positions and social positions epistemic certain harms are produced that amount to social harms. The theoretical framework of the book is virtue epistemology extended to social aspects. From these two points of view, I examine issues such as epistemic injustice, structural ignorances, epistemic oppression and, finally, the relations between epistemology and democratic social order. Palabras clave: Epistemología política, injusticia epistémica, epistemología y democracia. Keywords: Political epistemology, epistemic injustice, epistemology and democracy.

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Grasswick, Heidi E., und Mark Owen Webb. „Feminist epistemology as social epistemology“. Social Epistemology 16, Nr. 3 (Juli 2002): 185–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0269172022000025570.

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3

Schmitter, Amy M. „Cartesian Social Epistemology? Contemporary Social Epistemology and Early Modern Philosophy“. Roczniki Filozoficzne 68, Nr. 2 (30.06.2020): 155–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.18290/rf20682-8.

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Kartezjańska epistemologia społeczna? Współczesna epistemologia społeczna a wczesna filozofia nowożytna Wielu współczesnych epistemologów społecznych uważa, że tocząc batalię z indywidualistycznym podejściem do wiedzy, walczy tym samym z podejściem do wiedzy opisanym przez Kartezjusza. Choć wypada się zgodzić, że Kartezjusz przedstawia indywidualistyczny obraz wiedzy naukowej, niemniej trzeba dodać, że wskazuje on na istotne praktyczne funkcje odnoszenia się do świadectw i przekonań innych osób. Jednakże zrozumienie racji Kartezjusza za zaangażowaniem się w indywidualizm pozwala nam na identyfikację kluczowych wyzwań, z jakimi spotka się epistemologia społeczna, m.in., że poleganie na świadectwach innych może propagować uprzedzenia oraz hamować autentyczne zrozumienie. Implikacje zawarte u Kartezjusza zostały opracowywane i rozwinięte przez niektórych z jego bezpośrednich spadkobierców. W prezentowanym tekście zostanie przedstawione, jak np. François Poulain de la Barre oraz w pewnym skrócie przez Mary Astell analizują uwarunkowania społeczne kształtujące podmiot epistemiczny rozumiany w duchu Kartezjusza.

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Goldman, Alvin I. „Social Epistemology“. Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 31, Nr. 93 (13.12.1999): 3–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.1999.819.

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5

Harre, Rom, und S. Fuller. „Social Epistemology.“ Noûs 25, Nr. 5 (Dezember 1991): 732. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2215645.

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6

Jacobson, Nora. „Social Epistemology“. Science Communication 29, Nr. 1 (September 2007): 116–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1075547007305166.

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7

Hjørland, Birger. „Social Epistemology“. KNOWLEDGE ORGANIZATION 51, Nr. 3 (2024): 187–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/0943-7444-2024-3-187.

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The term “social epistemology” (SE) was first used by the library and information scientist Jesse Shera in 1951, but soon the term became muddled, and it did not become influential at that time. Later, it became known as the name for two different traditions outside library and information science, one led by Alvin Goldman and based on analytic philosophy, and the other led by Steve Fuller and related to science policy. It seems, however, problematic just to associate the term with these two schools, which, in different ways, are found not to represent genuine approaches to SE. SE is an alternative to individualist epistemologies and, as such, has roots back to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Karl Marx, and Charles Peirce, among others. In the twentieth century, the concept became influential in the wake of Thomas Kuhn’s historicist view and in pragmatic, hermeneutic, critical, and feminist views (but mostly not by using the term SE). In these contexts, it represents an alternative to “positivism.”[1] Shera’s 1951 use of the term SE is found to represent the best vision for SE, although it could not be properly concretized before alternatives to positivism were developed in 1962.

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Shevchenko, A. A. „«Social» in Social Epistemology“. Siberian Journal of Philosophy 20, Nr. 2 (15.11.2022): 10–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.25205/2541-7517-2022-20-2-10-18.

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The paper analyzes the main social contexts constituting social epistemology. It describes external socio-political contexts which define the framework and required procedures for open research, scientific consensus and epistemic justice. However, the article argues for special importance of internal social contexts – those of knowledge production in research groups. The treatment of knowledge as a collective enterprise requires, in turn, discussion of a new set of problems: the ways and mechanisms of creating the collective subject of knowledge, ways of overcoming disagreements between individual researchers and research teams, explanation of scientific change and others. The «social turn» in epistemology calls for a careful study of these two types of interacting contexts – external and internal ones.

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Lynch, William T. „Social Epistemology Transformed“. Symposion 3, Nr. 2 (2016): 191–205. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/symposion20163215.

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10

Gorman, Michael, und Robert Rosenwein. „Simulating social epistemology“. Social Epistemology 9, Nr. 1 (Januar 1995): 71–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02691729508578775.

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11

McNulty, Lisa. „Lockean Social Epistemology“. Journal of Philosophy of Education 47, Nr. 4 (30.07.2013): 524–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.12035.

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12

Buchanan, Allen. „SOCIAL MORAL EPISTEMOLOGY“. Social Philosophy and Policy 19, Nr. 2 (Juli 2002): 126–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052502192065.

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The distinctive aim of applied ethics is to provide guidance as to how we ought to act, as individuals and as shapers of social policies. In this essay, I argue that applied ethics as currently practiced is inadequate and ought to be transformed to incorporate what I shall call social moral epistemology. This is a branch of social epistemology, the study of the social practices and institutions that promote (or impede) the formation, preservation, and transmission of true beliefs. For example, social epistemologists critically evaluate the comparative advantages of adversarial versus inquisitorial criminal proceedings as mechanisms for the discovery of truth.

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Kotzee, Ben. „Introduction: Education, Social Epistemology and Virtue Epistemology“. Journal of Philosophy of Education 47, Nr. 2 (Mai 2013): 157–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.12033.

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14

González, Alberto Matías, und Orlando Fernández Aquino. „DESAFÍOS EPISTEMOLÓGICOS DE LA EDUCACIÓN SUPERIOR EN EL SIGLO XXI“. Cadernos de Pesquisa 25, Nr. 1 (24.04.2018): 11. http://dx.doi.org/10.18764/2178-2229.v25n1p11-22.

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Acudir a la epistemología es una práctica necesaria para el desempeño de la Educación Superior, más si se trata de la universidad en una sociedad cambiante, con interrogantes que echan por tierra lascreencias con las que se han diseñado los sistemas educativos. El objetivo ha sido analizar la mudanza paradigmática que está ocurriendo en la actualidad en las ciencias, y en particular en la concepción del papel social de la Universidad, marcada por el surgimiento de epistemologías emergentes como el Pensamiento Complejo, el Movimiento Ciencia, Tecnología y Sociedad, la Epistemología del Sur y la Epistemología de Segundo Orden. El método ha sido el análisis hermenéutico de las fuentes consultadas. El resultado ha sido una visión sintética de la trasformación epistemológica en curso contenida en tendencias de pensamento que, a pesar de sus diferencias, presentan coincidencias que muestran una ruptura con la epistemologia positivista tradicional, la cual ha sido el sostén de formas de educación que han quedado obsoletas.EPISTEMOLOGICAL CHALLENGES OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE 21ST CENTURYAbstractReturn to the epistemology is a necessary practice for the performance of Higher Education, still more so in the case of the university in the mutant society with question that play by land the beliefs considered in the design of the educative systems. The objective of this study was to analyze the paradigmatic change that is happening currently in the sciences, and in particular in the conception of the social role of the University, marked by the emergence of emerging epistemologies such as Complex Thought, the Movement Science, Technology and Society, the Epistemology of the South and the Epistemology of the Second Order. The method was the hermeneutic analysis of the consulted sources. The result was a synthetic vision of the still in progress epistemological transformation expressed in trend of thought tendencies that, despite their differences, present coincidences that show a rupture with the traditional positivist epistemology, which has been the support of forms of education that are obsolete.Keywords: Positivism. Higher education. Epistemology.DESAFIOS EPISTEMOLÓGICOS DA EDUCAÇÃO SUPERIOR NO SÉCULO XXIResumoRetomar a epistemologia é uma prática necessária para o desempenho da Educação Superior, mais ainda em se tratando da universidade numa sociedade mutante com interrogações que jogam por terra as crenças consideradas no desenho dos sistemas educativos. O objetivo deste estudo foi analisar a mudança paradigmática que está acontecendo na atualidade nas ciências e, particularmente, na concepção do papel social da universidade, marcada pelo aparecimento de epistemologias emergentes como o Pensamento Complexo, o Movimento Ciência, Tecnologia e Sociedade, a Epistemologia do Sul e a Epistemologia de Segunda Ordem. O método foi a análise hermenêutica das fontes consultadas. O resultado foi uma visão sintética da transformação epistemológica em curso expressa em tendências de pensamento que, apesar de suas diferenças, apresentam coincidências que mostram uma ruptura com a epistemologia positivista tradicional, a qual tem sido a base de formas de educação que estão obsoletas.Palavras-chaves: Positivismo. Educaçao Superior. Epistemologia.

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Cserne, Péter. „Epistemology, social theory, social research“. Review of Sociology 7, Nr. 1 (01.07.2001): 143–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1556/revsoc.7.2001.1.12.

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16

Longino, Helen E. „What's Social about Social Epistemology?“ Journal of Philosophy 119, Nr. 4 (2022): 169–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil2022119413.

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A thin conception of the social pervades much philosophical writing in social epistemology. A thicker form of sociality is to be found in scientific practice, as represented in much recent history and philosophy of science. Typical social epistemology problems, such as disagreement and testimony, take on a different aspect when viewed from the perspective of scientific practice. Here interaction among researchers is central to their knowledge making activities and disagreement and testimony are resources, not problems. Whereas much of the disagreement and testimony literature assumes some conception of evidence, or that it is obvious what evidence is, a focus on scientific practice reveals that determining what counts as evidence and for what is determined through the discursive interactions among researchers. This paper concludes with questions about the assumptions about knowledge, cognitive agents, and the right starting point for epistemological reflection that shape the mainstream social epistemological approaches.

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Corlett, J. Angelo. „Social epistemology and social cognition“. Social Epistemology 5, Nr. 2 (April 1991): 135–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02691729108578609.

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18

Corlett, Angelo. „The foundations of social epistemology“. Theoria, Beograd 56, Nr. 1 (2013): 5–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1301005c.

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There is no more prolific analytical philosopher than Alvin I. Goldman when it comes to social epistemology. During the past two decades, he has done more than any other analytical philosopher to set the tone for how social epistemology ought to be conceptualized. However, while Goldman has provided numerous contributions to our understanding of how applied epistemology can assist not only philosophy, but other fields of learning such as the sciences, law, and communication theory, there are concerns with the way he conceptualizes the foundations of social epistemology. One is that he somewhat problematically partitions off social epistemology from traditional analytic epistemology in ways that make the latter, but not the former, naturalistic and reliabilist (on his construal of naturalism and reliabilism). Another difficulty is that he seems not to recognize that social epistemology poses a rather embarrassingly potential problem for traditional epistemology, namely, it exposes traditional epistemology?s excessive individualism. That Goldman seems not to recognize this is evidenced by the fact that in his conceptualization of the foundations of epistemology he retains traditional epistemology as an area of philosophical inquiry on its own terms, without arguing that elements of the social might well have to be taken into account by traditional analyses of human knowledge. Thus, to put it in the terms of another social epistemologist, Steve Fuller, Goldman?s social epistemology is not revisionistic, though Goldman himself insists that it is normative. This leads to a third problem for Goldman?s social epistemology, namely, that it contains no justified true belief analysis of the nature of social knowledge.

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Grandy, Richard E. „Information-based epistemology, ecological epistemology and epistemology naturalized“. Synthese 70, Nr. 2 (Februar 1987): 191–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00413935.

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20

Uzoigwe, Elias Ifeanyi E. „An Appraisal of Alvin Goldman’s Social Epistemology“. PREDESTINASI 13, Nr. 1 (08.06.2020): 15. http://dx.doi.org/10.26858/predestinasi.v13i1.19211.

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This work is aimed at giving an insight into the issues raised by Goldman in his argument that social epistemology is ‘real epistemology’. Goldman wants to convince the mainstream epistemologists and the philosophical world in general that social epistemology is real epistemology by distinguishing between three forms of social epistemology: revisionist, preservationist, and expansionist. These three forms of social epistemology construed and proposed by Goldman differ in how they relate to the basic assumptions of traditional/classical epistemology. While acknowledging the various authors for their divergent views and contributions to social epistemic discourse, this work holds that though Goldman, more than any other social epistemologist, raised a fresh perspective in social epistemology, yet, there is a missing link in his submission. Goldman’s preservationist social epistemology, which he argued is “real epistemology”, fails to give at least, a spotlight on what this work calls historical social epistemology. This does not in any way downplay Goldman’s giant stride in awakening epistemologists from their slumber which led some scholars to include issues like analytic social epistemology, diagnostic social epistemology, naturalistic social epistemology, and political social epistemology in the epistemic lexicon; and by so doing, expanding the frontiers of the epistemic domain of philosophical enterprise. It is the position of this research that Goldman’s social epistemology elicited a renewed interest in epistemologists and scholars alike in the social dimension of knowledge. This work employs historical, conceptual, contextual, and textual methods of analyses.

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Kukla, André, und Joel Walmsley. „Mysticism and Social Epistemology“. Episteme 1, Nr. 2 (Oktober 2004): 139–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/epi.2004.1.2.139.

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This article deals with the grounds for accepting or rejecting the insights of mystics. We examine the social-epistemological question of what the non-mystic should make of the mystic's claim, and what she might be able to make of it, given various possible states of the evidence available to her.For clarity, let's reserve the term “mystic” for one who claims to have had an ineffable insight. As such, there are two parts to the mystic's claim: first, a substantive insight into the way the world works; second, a (perfectly effable) meta-insight that the substantive insight is ineffable. The two parts to the claim are independent: it is possible to accept that the mystic has been struck by an ineffable idea, but refuse to lend credence to the idea itself. Similarly, it is possible to accept the mystic's claim that she has had a veridical insight, whilst denying her claim that it is ineffable, or that she can know that it's ineffable. Thus, we could inquire into the grounds for accepting either part of the mystic's conjunctive claim. In this article, we deal only with the grounds for rejecting or accepting the substantive insight of a mystic, granting the meta-insight that the insight is ineffable.

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Goldman, Alvin I. „Argumentation and Social Epistemology“. Journal of Philosophy 91, Nr. 1 (1994): 27–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2940949.

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23

Christiano, Thomas. „Democracy and Social Epistemology“. Philosophical Topics 29, Nr. 1 (2001): 67–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics2001291/28.

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Моркина, Ю. С. „Social Epistemology: обзор дискуссий“. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 25, Nr. 3 (2010): 95–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps201025358.

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de Laet, Marianne. „Anthropology as Social Epistemology?“ Social Epistemology 26, Nr. 3-4 (Oktober 2012): 419–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2012.727196.

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26

Renzi, Barbara G. „Kuhn's Evolutionary Social Epistemology“. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27, Nr. 1 (März 2013): 101–4. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2013.783978.

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27

Bycroft, Michael. „Kuhn’s evolutionary social epistemology“. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43, Nr. 3 (September 2012): 425–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2012.05.001.

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Nickles, Thomas. „Social Epistemology. Steve Fuller“. Isis 81, Nr. 4 (Dezember 1990): 806–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/355624.

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Schmitt, Frederick. „Social epistemology and social cognitive psychology“. Social Epistemology 5, Nr. 2 (April 1991): 111–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02691729108578606.

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Martínez-Ávila, Daniel, und Tarcísio Zandonade. „Social epistemology in information studies“. Brazilian Journal of Information Science 14, Nr. 1 Jan.-Mar (27.03.2020): 7–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.36311/1981-1640.2020.v14n1.02.p7.

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The present paper aims to provide new details and information on the intellectual context in which social epistemology was born, including aspects such as its theoretical influences, intellectual contexts, and main characteristics. As methodology it presents an analysis of the writings on social epistemology by Jesse Shera and Margaret Egan selected from different and sometimes rare sources and collection. After an the analysis, the paper addresses the relationship between the historical social epistemology proposed by Margaret Egan and Jesse Shera as a discipline to investigate the foundations of librarianship and the contemporary social epistemology proposed by Steve Fuller as a program of a “naturalistic approach to the normative questions surrounding the organization of knowledge processes and products.” Both these proposals are outlined as an interdisciplinary project that is based on both philosophical epistemology and the scientific sociology of knowledge.

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Decothé Junior, Joel. „Epistemologia religiosa e formas de discursividades sobrepostas: uma análise desde a política da secularização de Charles Taylor [Religious epistemology and shapes of overlaping discourses: an analysis from the politics of secularization of Charles Taylor]“. Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN) 24, Nr. 44 (21.08.2017): 151. http://dx.doi.org/10.21680/1983-2109.2017v24n44id9860.

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Neste artigo temos como objetivo tratar do significado político da secularização. Iniciamos abordando a tensão existente entre a epistemologia religiosa e a epistemologia do humanismo exclusivo. Damos continuidade problematizando a questão referente à era dos reordenamentos e da transmutação para uma nova ordem moral secularizada, na qual o agente humano se autointerpreta. Assim, destacamos a relevância da presença da epistemologia religiosa na construção de uma nova mentalidade no imaginário social moderno. Surge a implicação do exercício do self se avaliar fortemente a partir da epistemologia imanente do humanismo exclusivo. Outra abordagem empreendida deste problema é a da elaboração de uma ética da autenticidade, que interferiu na construção da identidade moral expressivista, cada vez mais desarraigada dos pressupostos da epistemologia religiosa. Então, abordamos a postura do agente humano viver o conflito de busca por autorrealização e sentido normativo-ontológico para o seu self ao articular a sua forma de vida e identidade moral numa era secular. [In this article we aim to address the political significance of secularization. We begin by addressing the tension between religious epistemology and the epistemology of exclusive humanism. We proceed to the question of the age of reordering and transmutation into a new secularized moral order, where the human agent is self-interpreting. Thus, we highlight the relevance of the presence of religious epistemology in the construction of a new mentality in the modern social imaginary. The implication of the exercise of the self arises strongly from the immanent epistemology of exclusive humanism. Another approach taken to this problem is the elaboration of an Ethics of authenticity, which interfered in the construction of expressivist moral identity, increasingly uprooted from the presuppositions of religious epistemology. So we approach the posture of the human agent to live the search conflict for self-realization and normative-ontological sense for his self by articulating his way of life and moral identity in a secular age.]

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Grantham, Todd A. „Evolutionary Epistemology, Social Epistemology, and the Demic Structure of Science“. Biology & Philosophy 15, Nr. 3 (Juni 2000): 443–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/a:1006718131883.

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Oliveira, Daniel José Silva. „Gestão Social: Epistemologia para Além de Paradigmas“. Organizações & Sociedade 28, Nr. 98 (Juli 2021): 582–606. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/1984-92302021v28n9805pt.

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Abstract The objective of this theoretical essay is to propose a new path for the epistemological debate in the field of social management that goes beyond the paradigmatic boundaries. Based on studies that deal with social management from different perspectives, a comparison was made between models based on the thesis of incommensurability by Thomas Kuhn – such as the Gibson Burrell and Gareth Morgan diagram of sociological paradigms – and an alternative to break away from the paradigmatic mentality: the circle of epistemic matrices. The study demonstrated that the logic of incommensurable paradigms is not adequate to guide social management studies due to its complexity and plurality. This was proven by the identification of multiple sociological approaches adopted in field studies, including hybrid approaches. In this sense, the circle of epistemic matrices proved to be more appropriate, because instead of impenetrable boundaries, it allows transit between the matrices and enables a dialogue between different sociological approaches.

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Shaffer, Michael J. „Bayesianism, Convergence and Social Epistemology“. Episteme 5, Nr. 2 (Juni 2008): 203–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/e1742360008000324.

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ABSTRACTFollowing the standard practice in sociology, cultural anthropology and history, sociologists, historians of science and some philosophers of science define scientific communities as groups with shared beliefs, values and practices. In this paper it is argued that in real cases the beliefs of the members of such communities often vary significantly in important ways. This has rather dire implications for the convergence defense against the charge of the excessive subjectivity of subjective Bayesianism because that defense requires that communities of Bayesian inquirers share a significant set of modal beliefs. The important implication is then that given the actual variation in modal beliefs across individuals, either Bayesians cannot claim that actual theories have been objectively confirmed or they must accept that such theories have been confirmed relative only to epistemically insignificant communities.

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Quinton, Anthony. „Two Kinds of Social Epistemology“. Episteme 1, Nr. 1 (Juni 2004): 7–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/epi.2004.1.1.7.

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Social Epistemology arose from the recognition that nearly all that we believe or claim to know is second hand and derived from the speech or writing of others. The “we” of “our knowledge” here is, of course, “educated members of advanced industrial societies”. Our remoter, but still identifiably, human ancestors, without speech or writing, picked up such knowledge or belief as they had on their own, apart from what they may have leant from the reactions of others to the presence of quarry or danger. Palaeolithic man, having mastered speech, had access to plenty of second hand knowledge. But it was only of what the people he directly met could tell him. With writing a vast new range of informants is brought into play. Clay tablets and papyrus rolls give way to codices – in other words, books – and another gigantic step forward is made with the invention of printing. We would appear to be going through a comparable information revolution at the present day. We, as defined above, either posses or have ready access to a vast assemblage of common knowledge, actual or claimed. How are we to rationally to decide how much of this we are to accept? It is obviously not all worthy, or equally worthy of acceptance.

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36

Bishop, Michael A. „The Autonomy of Social Epistemology“. Episteme 2, Nr. 1 (Juni 2005): 65–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/epi.2005.2.1.65.

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Social epistemology is autonomous: When applied to the same evidential situations, the principles of social rationality and the principles of individual rationality sometimes recommend inconsistent beliefs. If we stipulate that reasoning rationally from justified beliefs to a true belief is normally sufficient for knowledge, the autonomy thesis implies that some knowledge is essentially social. When the principles of social and individual rationality are applied to justified evidence and recommend inconsistent beliefs and the belief endorsed by social rationality is true, then that true belief would be an instance of social knowledge but not individual knowledge.

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37

Maslov, D. K. „Epistemic Disagreement in Social Epistemology“. Siberian Journal of Philosophy 17, Nr. 1 (2019): 30–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.25205/2541-7517-2019-17-1-30-41.

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The article presents the problem of epistemic disagreement as part of social epistemology, particularly considering the conditions of rational disagreement (equal weight view). Against this background some versions of epistemic “bootstrapping” are addressed that serve to give advantage to one of the disputing parties. As a result, a conclusion is drawn that the kinds of bootstrapping portrayed are epistemically irrelevant, which also casts doubt on Bayesian epistemology, for it mixes two different types of rational decision making – practical and epistemic.

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38

Duran, Jane. „Social Epistemology and Goffmanian Theory“. Journal of Philosophical Research 19 (1994): 185–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jpr_1994_21.

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39

Kasavin, Ilya, Tom Rockmore und Evgeny Blinov. „Social Epistemology, Interdisciplinarity and Context“. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 37, Nr. 3 (2013): 57–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps201337329.

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40

Oliveira, Daniel José Silva. „Social Management: Epistemology Beyond Paradigms“. Organizações & Sociedade 28, Nr. 98 (Juli 2021): 582–606. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/1984-92302021v28n9805en.

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Abstract The objective of this theoretical essay is to propose a new path for the epistemological debate in the field of social management that goes beyond the paradigmatic boundaries. Based on studies that deal with social management from different perspectives, a comparison was made between models based on the thesis of incommensurability by Thomas Kuhn – such as the Gibson Burrell and Gareth Morgan diagram of sociological paradigms – and an alternative to break away from the paradigmatic mentality: the circle of epistemic matrices. The study demonstrated that the logic of incommensurable paradigms is not adequate to guide social management studies due to its complexity and plurality. This was proven by the identification of multiple sociological approaches adopted in field studies, including hybrid approaches. In this sense, the circle of epistemic matrices proved to be more appropriate, because instead of impenetrable boundaries, it allows transit between the matrices and enables a dialogue between different sociological approaches.

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41

Goldman, Alvin I. „Social Epistemology, Interests, and Truth“. Philosophical Topics 23, Nr. 1 (1995): 171–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics199523117.

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42

Duran, Jane. „Feminist Epistemology and Social Epistemics“. Social Epistemology 17, Nr. 1 (Januar 2003): 45–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0269112032000114822.

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43

Origgi, Gloria. „A Social Epistemology of Reputation“. Social Epistemology 26, Nr. 3-4 (Oktober 2012): 399–418. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2012.727193.

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44

Fernández Pinto, Manuela. „Economics Imperialism in Social Epistemology“. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 46, Nr. 5 (02.08.2016): 443–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0048393115625325.

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45

Buchanan, Allen. „Political Liberalism and Social Epistemology“. Philosophy Public Affairs 32, Nr. 2 (April 2004): 95–130. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2004.00008.x.

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46

Resnik, D. „Methodological conservatism and social epistemology“. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 8, Nr. 3 (Januar 1994): 247–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02698599408573499.

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47

Zolo, Danilo. „Reflexive Epistemology and Social Complexity“. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 20, Nr. 2 (Juni 1990): 149–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/004839319002000201.

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48

Goldman, Alvin I. „Social Epistemology: Theory and Applications“. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 64 (27.05.2009): 1–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246109000022.

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49

Fallis, Don. „Social epistemology and information science“. Annual Review of Information Science and Technology 40, Nr. 1 (28.09.2007): 475–519. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/aris.1440400119.

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50

OREKHOV, Andrey. „TO THE QUESTION ON THE SUBJECT AND CONTENT OF INSTITUTIONAL EPISTEMOLOGY“. Economy Governance and Lave Basis, Nr. 1(40) (30.03.2024): 9–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.51608/23058641_2024_1_9.

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The paper is devoted to the problem of institutional epistemology as a new interdisciplinary direction in contemporary science. The concept “institutional epistemology” should be connected with the concept “social epistemology”, but it is necessary to remind social epistemology is theory of knowledge of social reality, where in focus of research are society and social interaction. A term “institutional epistemology” is a scientific metaphor, — while, for instance, a term “social epistemology” used in its directed significance. It is not realized parallels between concepts “institutional epistemology” and “institutional ontology”, because they used in different contexts. Institutional epistemology is research of formal and informal aspects of production of social knowledge; a study of a social; epistemologist as a “cognitive manager of knowledge” in contemporary society; research of different ways of constituting social-epistemological knowledge through social institutions elaborating this knowledge

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