Thematische Bibliographien / Skepticism

Auswahl der wissenschaftlichen Literatur zum Thema „Skepticism“

Autor: Grafiati

Veröffentlicht am 4. Juni 2021

Zuletzt aktualisiert am 25. Mai 2024

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Zeitschriftenartikel zum Thema "Skepticism":

Johnson, Drew. „Hinge Epistemology, Radical Skepticism, and Domain Specific Skepticism“. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9, Nr. 2 (11.06.2019): 116–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-20191302.

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This paper explores how hinge epistemology (specifically, Duncan Pritchard’s brand of hinge epistemology) might fruitfully be applied not only to the problem of radical skepticism, but also to certain domain specific (or ‘local’) skepticisms, and in particular, moral skepticism. The paper explains the idea of a domain specific skepticism, and how domain specific skepticisms contrast with radical skepticism. I argue that a domain specific skeptical problem can be resolved in just the same way as radical skepticism, if there are hinge commitments within that domain. I then suggest that there are hinge commitments in the moral domain, and use this to address a moral skeptical problem due to our apparent inability to know moral nihilism to be false.

Öztanrıkulu Özel, Nurten. „Is skepticism an epistemological predicament? Skeptisizm epistemolojik bir çıkmaz mıdır?“ Journal of Human Sciences 15, Nr. 2 (29.06.2018): 1291. http://dx.doi.org/10.14687/jhs.v15i2.5183.

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Skeptics, by being skeptical about the certainty, accuracy and truth claims, defend that there are no objective accuracy or certainty; and for this reason, it is not possible to have an epistemological justification. The arguments on skepticism claiming that knowledge is not possible or proofs are inadequate in justifying knowledge have caused that skepticism has been considered as a notorious concept and sometimes it has been considered as a destructive activity. There is the idea that knowledge and certainty are possible behind these considerations. On this basis, skepticism has been conceived as the rejection of knowledge, beliefs and proofs, and therefore, the arguments of skepticism have been presented as an epistemic predicament. In this study, the arguments of whether skepticism has faced an epistemological predicament or not will be dealt with. For this purpose, the etymological investigation of skepticism will be performed, and then it will be claimed that there are two types of skepticisms, which are the excessive one and the moderate one. After skeptical arguments are defined, it will be claimed that excessive skepticism is in an epistemological predicament; however, moderate skepticism has been saved from this predicament by holding tightly to some arguments. In this way, the negative criticisms towards skepticism will have an unfair position in the face of moderate skepticism. In other words, it will appear that that the charge of skepticism with denialism is faulty and incomplete. Extended English summary is in the end of Full Text PDF (TURKISH) file.ÖzetSkeptikler kesinlik, doğruluk ve hakikat iddialarından şüphe duyarak nesnel bir doğruluğun ya da kesinliğin olmadığını; dolayısıyla epistemolojik olarak gerekçelendirmenin de mümkün olmadığını savunmaktadır. Bilginin mümkün olmadığı ya da bilgiyi gerekçelendirmede kanıtların yetersiz olduğu şeklindeki skeptik tezler, skeptisizmin kötü bir unvanla anılmasına hatta yıkıcı bir uğraş gibi değerlendirilmesine neden olmaktadır. Bu değerlendirmelerin arkasında bilginin ve kesinliğin mümkün olduğu fikri yer almaktadır. Bu fikre dayanarak skeptisizm bilginin, inançların ve kanıtların reddi gibi düşünülmekte ve buna bağlı olarak skeptisizmin tezleri epistemik bir çıkmaz gibi sunulmaktadır. Bu çalışmada skeptisizmin epistemolojik bir çıkmaza girip girmediği ele alınacaktır. Bunun için öncelikle skeptisizmin etimolojik araştırması yapılacak ve daha sonra aşırı ve ılımlı olmak üzere iki skeptisizm türü olduğu ileri sürülecektir. Skeptik argümanlar ortaya koyulduktan sonra aşırı skeptisizmin epistemolojik çıkmazda olduğu; ancak ılımlı skeptisizmin bazı varsayımlara tutunarak bu çıkmazdan kurtulabildiği iddia edilecektir. Böylece skeptisizme yönelik olumsuz eleştiriler ılımlı skeptisizmle haksız bir konuma girecektir. Başka bir deyişle skeptisizmi inkarcılıkla suçlamanın hatalı ve eksik olduğu ortaya çıkacaktır.

Vincentnathan, Lynn, S. Georg Vincentnathan und Nicholas Smith. „Catholics and Climate Change Skepticism“. Worldviews 20, Nr. 2 (2016): 125–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685357-02002005.

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Despite Church teachings on climate change and most Catholics accepting the science and being concerned, a large minority of Catholic laity and clergy deny it. This multi-sited, qualitative study, which includes supporting quantitative data, focuses on how skepticism is articulated by Catholic climate change skeptics, and transmitted and transmuted through Catholic networks. While Catholic climate change skeptics echo other skeptics, they also bring Catholic perspectives, often mingled with conservative religious and political views. Some express concern common among other Christian skeptics that believing in climate change leads to neopaganism and promotes anti-human sentiments. The focus is on Catholic climate change skeptics and their ideas, not Catholicism per se, and various cultural, social, and psychological factors, including their understanding of Catholicism, that impact their climate change skepticism. This contributes to the growing scholarship on climate change skepticism.

Schwab, Whitney. „Skepticism, Belief, and the Criterion of Truth“. Apeiron 46, Nr. 3 (Juli 2013): 327–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/apeiron-2012-0026.

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Abstract This paper deals with Pyrrhonian skepticism. It argues that the central argument presented by Jonathan Barnes in favor of the view that skepticism precludes the possession of any belief fails. In brief, Barnes maintains that, because skepticism requires suspending judgment whether criteria of truth exist, no skeptic can, consistently with her skepticism, possess a criterion of truth; this entails, he argues, that no skeptic can make any judgments about anything and, hence, cannot come to possess any beliefs. I evaluate this argument in two ways: first, if we understand criteria of truth along the lines proposed by Sextus’ Hellenistic opponents, the argument fails because such criteria were introduced to guarantee that at least some of our beliefs could count as knowledge, and not to guarantee the very possibility of making judgments in the first place. Second, if we broaden our conception of a criterion of truth, such that a criterion is any standard against which an impression can be evaluated, the argument fails because it equivocates on the notion of ‘possession’. On the one hand, in the sense in which someone must possess such a criterion in order to make judgments, the skeptic’s suspension of judgment concerning their existence does not entail that she does not possess a criterion of truth. On the other hand, in the sense in which the skeptic does not possess such a criterion, possession of a criterion of truth is not a necessary condition for making judgments. Thus, I conclude that the skeptics’ epistemic attitude towards the existence of criteria of truth (i.e. suspension of judgment) does not entail that skeptics cannot possess any beliefs.

Goldberg, Sanford C. „Skepticism and Inquiry“. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10, Nr. 3-4 (17.11.2020): 304–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10019.

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Abstract In this paper, I am interested in skepticism’s downstream effects on further inquiry. To account for these downstream effects, we need to distinguish (i) the (skepticism-supporting) reasons for doubting whether p, (ii) one’s other background beliefs bearing on the prospects that further inquiry would improve one’s epistemic position on p, and (iii) the value one assigns to determining whether p. I advance two claims regarding skepticism’s downstream effects on inquiry. First, it is characteristic of “radical” forms of skepticism that (i) is sufficient to undermine the prospect described in (ii). By contrast (and second), ordinary forms of skepticism, which can be identified in connection with (ii), can actually be a boon to inquiry by enhancing (iii). In such cases, having reasons for skeptical doubt is not merely compatible with inquiring further, but also serves to motivate and to help frame such inquiry.

Vollbrecht, Lucy Alsip. „Skepticism & Feminism“. Southwest Philosophy Review 40, Nr. 1 (2024): 5–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview20244012.

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What is the value of Pyrrhonizing skepticism today? As an epistemologist, I am sympathetic to skepticism, but as a feminist, I am concerned by it. In this short paper, I’ll interrogate the troubled relationship between skepticism and feminism. More specifically, I’ll ask: Can feminists be skeptics? In the first half of the paper, I’ll articulate one feminist objection to skepticism. In the second half, I’ll suggest a pathway forward by which feminists can harness the power of the skeptical method to antiskeptical ends. Part 1 of my analysis engages Brian Ribeiro’s recent book Pyrrhonizers (2021), and Part 2 engages Jennifer Saul’s “Skepticism and Implicit Bias” (2013).

Loveland, Matthew T., Alexander G. Capella und India Maisonet. „Prosocial skeptics: Skepticism and generalized trust“. Critical Research on Religion 5, Nr. 3 (11.05.2017): 251–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2050303217707245.

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We report on a study of the religious correlates of generalized trust. Our critical frame leads us to explore novel questions about how nonreligion may encourage social trust. We find that those who believe the bible to be a book of fables are more trusting than those with other beliefs about the text, and that nontheists report a greater willingness to trust. We discuss the implications of our findings for future research about religious belief and generalized trust.

Maia Neto, José R. „THE SKEPTICAL CARTESIAN BACKGROUND OF HUME'S "OF THE ACADEMICAL OR SCEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY" (FIRST INQUIRY, SECTION 12)“. Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia 56, Nr. 132 (Dezember 2015): 371–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0100-512x2015n13204jrmn.

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ABSTRACT In section XII of the First Inquiry, Hume refers to the two Hellenistic schools of skepticism (Academic and Pyrrhonian) to present his own view of skepticism, which, however, depends on the ancient skeptics mainly indirectly. Hume's view of skepticism depends crucially on Descartes and post-Cartesian philosophers such as Pascal, Huet, Foucher and Bayle, who reacted skeptically to major Cartesian doctrines but followed one version or other of Descartes's methodical doubt. Although all these post-Cartesian philosophers are relevant in section XII, I focus on the topics in which Descartes himself-besides his skeptical followers-seems directly relevant. After an introductory section (I) on Julia Annas' and Richard Popkin's views of Hume's relation to, respectively, ancient and modern skepticism, I turn to section XII and examine what Hume calls (II) "consequent skepticism about the senses," (III) "antecedent skepticism," and (IV) "Academic skepticism."

Rusin, Jill. „Characterizing Skepticism’s Import“. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2, Nr. 2 (2012): 99–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/221057012x627249.

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This paper discusses a common contemporary characterization of skepticism and skeptical arguments—that their real importance is instrumental, that they “drive progress in philosophy.” I explore two possible contrasts to the idea that skepticism’s significance is thus wholly methodological. First, I recall for the reader a range of views that can be understood as ‘truth in skepticism’ views. These concessive views are those most clearly at odds with the idea that skepticism is false, but instrumentally valuable. Considering the contributions of such ‘truth in skepticism’ theorists, I argue, shows that the good of furthering philosophical progress is partly achieved by the work of those who would reject the ‘merely methodological’ view of skepticism’s import. While this shows such a view of skepticism’s import to be partially self-effacing, it is not therefore incoherent. Rather, the characterization is revealed to be wedded to particular diagnoses of skepticism, and not independently innocuous or neutral. Second, I discuss the idea that the ‘merely methodological’ characterization of skepticism’s import draws a contrast with philosophical positions or theses that are supposed to have practical teeth. Here, I think the danger of acquiescing too readily to this view is that the normative import of skeptical arguments is obscured. At a time when discussions of the value of knowledge are in ascendency, this in particular seems a loss—a route from consideration of skeptical arguments to broader normative questions worth keeping open is rather more obscured than opened up. Any radically revisionary outcome of an encounter with skepticism is less likely, led by such an understanding, just when there is opportunity instead to connect up with broad questions of epistemic value. For these reasons I argue the characterization is not one to too readily, unthinkingly, endorse.

Brandom, Robert B. „Fighting Skepticism with Skepticism“. Facta Philosophica 2, Nr. 2 (2000): 163–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/factaphil2000229.

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Dissertationen zum Thema "Skepticism":

Swetly, Walter. „Metaontological skepticism“. Diss., kostenfrei, 2009. http://d-nb.info/1001239997/34.

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Hawley, Patrick 1964. „Skepticism avoided“. Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/17644.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2003.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 121-126).
I evaluate three replies to skepticism, drawing conclusions about the meaning of "justified", the viability of foundationalism, the value of knowledge, and the role of belief in rational action. In the first chapter, I examine the following skeptical argument: Something is justified only if justified by a justified thing; circular and infinite chains of justification are illegitimate; therefore, no belief is justified. A linguistic investigation reveals that this argument contains two ambiguities not yet noticed by epistemologists. The linguistic observations favor foundationalism about justification, showing how the foundationalist can maintain his view, while explaining away the force of the skeptical argument. However, in the second chapter, I argue that foundationalism is unsatisfactory, for non-skeptical reasons. If a foundationalist tries to explain how some things can be basic, then she must endorse a certain kind of circularity. But a foundationalist should not endorse this circularity. Dissecting a single skeptical argument is an interesting although limited endeavour. In the third chapter, I argue that an entire class of skeptical arguments can be avoided. Distinguishing rational action from rational belief change, I claim that certain changes in belief cannot occur during a rational act. In particular, I argue, some skeptical conclusions cannot be accepted while performing an ordinary rational act. The main conclusion of this chapter is: to avoid acting irrationally, it is rational to avoid certain skeptical arguments. Sometimes it is better to concede to skepticism than to flee.
(cont.) In the fourth chapter, I argue that knowledge is no more valuable than stable true belief. This surprising claim supports the conclusion that skepticism about knowledge is harmless. Even if we cannot know anything about the external world-or even if we cannot know anything at all-we may have something just as valuable as knowledge: stable true beliefs.
by Patrick Hawley.
Ph.D.

Thorsrud, Harald Christian. „Cicero's academic skepticism /“. Digital version accessible at:, 1999. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/utexas/main.

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Raskin, David Barry. „Donald Judd's skepticism /“. Digital version accessible at:, 1999. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/utexas/main.

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Fitton, Emily. „Maimon's post-Kantian skepticism“. Thesis, University of Essex, 2017. http://repository.essex.ac.uk/21131/.

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There is little doubt that Salomon Maimon was both highly respected by, and highly influential upon, his contemporaries; indeed, Kant himself referred to Maimon as the best of his critics. The appraisal and reformulation of the Kantian project detailed in Maimon’s Essay on Transcendental Philosophy played a significant role in determining the criteria of success for post-Kantian philosophy, and was thus crucial to the early development of German Idealism. Key aspects of Maimon’s transcendental philosophy remain, however, relatively obscure. In particular, it remains unclear to what degree Maimon’s skepticism is internal to the Kantian framework, and how this skepticism is related to Maimon’s so-called dogmatic rationalism. The central aim of this project is to present Maimon’s as a distinct form of post-Kantian skepticism: one which poses significant problems for Kant’s theoretical project and which motivates a reformulation of the critical framework. In Kant’s eyes, pre-Kantian forms of skepticism are insufficiently critical insofar as they involve a commitment to transcendental realism. By contrast, I argue that Maimon’s skepticism does not involve a commitment to transcendental realism and that it strikes at the heart of Kant’s critical project insofar as it constitutes what I term ‘critical’ as opposed to merely ‘empirical’ skepticism. I further argue that Maimon’s rationalism provides the materials for a response to this form of skepticism. This thesis contributes to contemporary debates in the history of philosophy concerning the nature of Maimon’s coalition system and its relation to German Idealism, but also provides an alternative perspective on contemporary problems in the philosophy of perception concerning, in particular, the possibility of non-conceptual intentional content.

Gutherie, Luanne. „Contextualist Responses to Skepticism“. Digital Archive @ GSU, 2007. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/22.

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External world skeptics argue that we have no knowledge of the external world. Contextualist theories of knowledge attempt to address the skeptical problem by maintaining that arguments for skepticism are effective only in certain contexts in which the standards for knowledge are so high that we cannot reach them. In ordinary contexts, however, the standards for knowledge fall back down to reachable levels and we again are able to have knowledge of the external world. In order to address the objection that contextualists confuse the standards for knowledge with the standards for warranted assertion, Keith DeRose appeals to the knowledge account of warranted assertion to argue that if one is warranted in asserting p, one also knows p. A skeptic, however, can maintain a context-invariant view of the knowledge account of assertion, in which case such an account would not provide my help to contextualism.

Lorentz, Ben. „Nietzsche's Skepticism of Agency“. Digital Archive @ GSU, 2012. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_hontheses/8.

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Nietzsche’s view of the self and will seems to culminate in a naturalistic account of human agency. If we understand Nietzsche as primarily a naturalist who thinks philosophy should more or less be modeled on the sciences whose investigations are restricted to empirical observation and whose explanations, like causal explanation, are natural (rather than supernatural), then ascribing a naturalistic account of human agency to Nietzsche is appropriate. However, I argue that attributing a naturalistic account of agency, or any account of agency to Nietzsche, misunderstands Nietzsche’s skepticism. I attempt to demonstrate the primacy of Nietzsche’s skepticism by showing how “his” naturalistic “account” of agency is best understood as an instrument in the service of his purely critical and deflationary project. To show the instrumental character of his “account,” I show how the account is used to oppose traditional notions of agency without itself becoming Nietzsche’s theory of agency.

Stoutenburg, Gregory Douglas. „Knowledge, infallibility, and skepticism“. Diss., University of Iowa, 2016. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/6505.

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I argue that to know that a proposition is true one must have justification for being certain that the proposition is true. That is, one must have infallible epistemic justification for believing the proposition. It is widely accepted among epistemologists that we rarely, if ever, have such strong justification for our beliefs. It follows that there is precious little that we know. That conclusion is unacceptable to many philosophers. I argue that the positions that lead to the skeptical conclusion are well-motivated and that the skeptical conclusion is implicitly accepted by ordinary speakers. My dissertation has three main components: a metaphilosophical position, an epistemological position, and an error theory. First, the metaphilosophical position. One very important part of philosophy is the analysis of our ordinary concepts. Analysis of our concepts begins with reflecting on what we are inclined to say about various actual and possible cases when considered under specific descriptions. This traditional method has recently come under attack, due in part to the rise of semantic externalism. I agree with externalists that if ‘meaning is reference’ then there is little reason to think reflecting on our concepts from the armchair will provide insight to the nature of the concepts we investigate. I defend a version of semantic internalism which grounds meaning in factors with which subjects are directly acquainted. That view supports the traditional methodology. Furthermore, as the goal of philosophical analysis is to accurately describe concepts of philosophical interest, the only kind of objection that could be decisive against a proposed analysis is that it does not correctly describe our concept. That opens the door to a skeptical analysis of knowledge. Second, the epistemological position. I argue that the unacceptability of sentences of the form “S knows that p but it is possible for S that not-p” is best explained by the hypothesis that our concept of knowledge requires having justification for being certain that what one believes is true. I offer as a criterion of justified certainty the idea that when one knows a proposition is true, one is in a position to decisively answer questions about one’s knowledge of that proposition. I survey a number of competing theories of knowledge and show that they allow for the possibility of knowledge when one fails my criterion of decisive answerability. Those views fail my criterion because according to those views there is nothing the subject is aware of that guarantees for the subject that the allegedly known proposition is true. On that basis, I contend that knowledge is direct awareness of the factors that constitute the truth of the proposition one believes. Third, the error theory. Of course, we rarely have direct awareness of the factors that constitute the truth of the propositions we believe. So, our knowledge attributions are generally false. Yet, they are overwhelmingly natural to make. I argue that competent speakers are often quick to recognize knowledge attributions as a kind of ‘loose talk’ akin to the way we loosely ascribe geometric properties to ordinary objects. We regularly call objects ‘square’ that are not even close to being square, and we are quick to recognize this when challenged. I argue that we do this because we are so accustomed to communicating using strict language to make false claims that we often do not attend to the literal falsity of what we are saying. While we accept very demanding standards for knowledge, the phenomenon of recognizing that our knowledge claims are regularly false is as pervasive as our use of loose speech.

Larsson, Anders, und Josefine Wannehag. „Professionell skepticism : Sambandet mellan personlighetsdrag och professionell skepticism med kön som betingande faktor“. Thesis, Högskolan Kristianstad, Fakulteten för ekonomi, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hkr:diva-19546.

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Att kunna tillämpa professionell skepticism i det dagliga arbetet är en viktig egenskap för dagens revisorer. Vad som påverkar den professionella skepticismen är emellertid inte utrett inom tidigare forskning. Frågan om personlighetsdrag har en påverkan på professionell skepticism med hänsyn till kön som en betingande faktor har vi inte funnit någon forskning om. För att uppfylla syftet har en kvantitativ ansats applicerats och data har samlats in genom en enkätundersökning som ekonomistudenter på Högskolan Kristianstad och Jönköping International Business School har deltagit i. Studien har tillämpat befintliga mätinstrument för att mäta de oberoende variablerna personlighetsdrag och den beroende variabeln professionell skepticism. Enkäten undersökte även ett antal kontrollvariabler hos respondenterna. Resultatet från studien indikerar att två av de i studien undersökta personlighetsdragen (samvetsgrannhet och öppenhet för erfarenhet) har ett positivt samband med professionell skepticism. Vidare konstaterades att en del av personlighetsdraget neuroticism, aspekten stress, har ett negativt samband med professionell skepticism. Studien kunde emellertid inte påvisa om kön har en modererande effekt på sambandet mellan personlighetsdrag och professionell skepticism. Kontrollvariabeln modersmål visade sig ha ett mycket signifikant samband med professionell skepticism. Detta är något som framtida forskning inom området bör undersöka ytterligare.
To be able to apply professional skepticism in day-to-day work is an important attribute for today’s auditors. However, factors that affect the professional skepticism is not investigated in previous research. The question if personality traits affect the professional skepticism in consideration of gender as a moderating factor is an area where we have not found any previous research. To be able to fulfil the purpose a quantitative approach has been applied and the data has been collected through a survey distributed to economy students attending Högskolan Kristianstad and Jönköping International Business School. The study has applied existing measuring instruments to measure the independent variable personality traits and the dependent variable professional skepticism. The survey also explored a few control variables among the respondents. The results from the study indicate that two of the personality traits in the study (conscientiousness and openness) have a positive correlation with professional skepticism. Furthermore, the study found that a part of the personality trait neuroticism, the stress aspect, has a negative correlation with professional skepticism. The study has found no proof that support the belief that gender has a moderating effect on the correlation between personality traits and professional skepticism. The study showed that the control variable mother tongue has a significant correlation with professional skepticism. This is something that future research in the field should examine further.

Wood, John. „Hegel's Critique of Ancient Skepticism“. Digital Archive @ GSU, 2012. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/113.

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Recent work on the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel has emphasized his interest in skeptical concerns. These contemporary scholars argue that, despite common opinions to the contrary, Hegel actually had a very keen interest in skepticism, one that informed and motivated much of his overall project. While I welcome this recent literature, I argue here that contemporary scholars have overemphasized the importance of skepticism for Hegel. By looking closely at Hegel’s arguments against skepticism in the Phenomenology of Spirit, I argue that Hegel’s anti-skeptical arguments are in fact major failures. Hegel’s failure is at odds with the emphasis that contemporary literature places on Hegel’s interests in skepticism. For a philosopher who was supposedly centrally concerned with skeptical issues, Hegel sure does not act like it. I conclude that the tension here is the result of contemporary scholars’ overemphasis of the role that skepticism plays in Hegel’s project.

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Bücher zum Thema "Skepticism":

Ernest, Sosa, und Villanueva Enrique, Hrsg. Skepticism. Boston: Blackwell Publishers, 2000.

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1955-, Sinnott-Armstrong Walter, Hrsg. Pyrrhonian skepticism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.

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Landesman, Charles, und Roblin Meeks, Hrsg. Philosophical Skepticism. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9780470693476.

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Charles, Landesman, und Meeks Roblin, Hrsg. Philosophical skepticism. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2003.

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Kurtz, Paul. Exuberant skepticism. Amherst, N.Y: Prometheus Books 59 John Glenn Drive, 2010.

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Umphrey, Stewart. Zetetic skepticism. Wolfeboro, N.H: Longwood Academic, 1990.

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Tabor, Britton H. Skepticism assailed. New York: S.S. Wood, 1985.

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Brueckner, Anthony. Essays on skepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

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Conant, James, und Andrea Kern, Hrsg. Varieties of Skepticism. Berlin, Boston: DE GRUYTER, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110336795.

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Mitjashin, Alexander. Liberalism and skepticism. Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Pub., 2007.

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Buchteile zum Thema "Skepticism":

Chattopadhyay, Madhumita. „Skepticism“. In Buddhism and Jainism, 1117–18. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-0852-2_344.

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Butler, Keith L. „Skepticism“. In Internal Affairs, 64–82. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1921-6_4.

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Jacobs, Jonathan, Peter Adamson, Christophe Erismann, Pekka Kärkkäinen, Emiliano Fiori, Emily J. Cottrell, Emily J. Cottrell et al. „Skepticism“. In Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy, 1202–6. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9729-4_468.

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Grellard, Christophe. „Skepticism“. In Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy, 1783–89. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1665-7_468.

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Williams, Michael. „Skepticism“. In The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, 33–69. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781405164863.ch1.

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Paganini, Gianni. „Skepticism“. In The Routledge Companion to Seventeenth Century Philosophy, 145–94. 1 [edition]. | New York : Routledge, 2017. | Series: The Routledge companion to feminist philosophy: Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315771960-6.

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Mohr, Beth A. „Skepticism“. In The Art of Investigation Revisited, 157–69. Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003252283-15.

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Yampolskiy, Roman V. „Skepticism*“. In AI, 217–42. Boca Raton: Chapman and Hall/CRC, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1201/9781003440260-13.

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Lim, Daniel. „Skepticism“. In Philosophy through Computer Science, 77–91. New York: Routledge, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003271284-7.

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Cunning, David. „Skepticism“. In Descartes, 108–46. London: Routledge, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781351210522-4.

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Konferenzberichte zum Thema "Skepticism":

Finn, Samantha, Panagiotis Takis Metaxas und Eni Mustafaraj. „Spread and Skepticism“. In WebSci '15: ACM Web Science Conference. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2786451.2786512.

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Siringoringo, Hotniar. „Advertising Skepticism and Media Credibility“. In International Scientific Days 2018. Wolters Kluwer ČR, Prague, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.15414/isd2018.s2-3.11.

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„Discussion on the Practical Value of Skepticism“. In 2021 International Conference on Society Science. Scholar Publishing Group, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.38007/proceedings.0001940.

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Ely, Robert, David Yopp und Anne E. Adams. „Domain appropriateness and skepticism in viable argumentation“. In 42nd Meeting of the North American Chapter of the International Group for the Psychology of Mathematics Education. PMENA, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.51272/pmena.42.2020-156.

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Aaronson, Scott. „Multilinear formulas and skepticism of quantum computing“. In the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1007352.1007378.

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Julian Dini, Fanji, Amy Fontanella und Sukartini Sukartini. „Academic Dishonesty: Lecturer’s Skepticism, Gender, and Experience“. In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Applied Social Sciences, Business, and Humanity, ICo-ASCNITY, 2 November 2019, Padang, West Sumatra, Indonesia. EAI, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4108/eai.1-11-2019.2294011.

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Raziuniene, Daiva. „PROFESSIONAL SKEPTICISM OF THE EXTERNAL AUDITORS: LITERATURE REVIEW“. In 5th SGEM International Multidisciplinary Scientific Conferences on SOCIAL SCIENCES and ARTS SGEM2018. STEF92 Technology, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.5593/sgemsocialf2018/1.6/s03.062.

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Bukoff, Allen. „Inside the Auto Industry: Widespread Skepticism about Electric Vehicles“. In WCX SAE World Congress Experience. 400 Commonwealth Drive, Warrendale, PA, United States: SAE International, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4271/2020-01-0529.

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Blount, PJ, und Jake X. Fussell. „Musical Counter Narratives: Space, Skepticism, and Religion in American Music“. In 52nd Aerospace Sciences Meeting. Reston, Virginia: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.2514/6.2014-0670.

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Handoyo, Sigit, und Widya Wardani. „Do Forensic Expertise, Professional Skepticism and Time Pressure Affect Fraud Detection?“ In Proceedings of The First International Conference on Financial Forensics and Fraud, ICFF, 13-14 August 2019, Bali, Indonesia. EAI, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4108/eai.13-8-2019.2294263.

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Berichte der Organisationen zum Thema "Skepticism":

TOTROVA, Z. H. THE TOPIC OF OBJECTIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE AS A SOCIOCULTURAL PROBLEM. Science and Innovation Center Publishing House, April 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.12731/2077-1770-2021-14-1-3-14-21.

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The actualization of this topic is explained by modern information technologies, which center the question of knowledge, as such, before its practical application. The purpose of the article is to analyze the topic of objectivity of knowledge, as a sociocultural problem, involving consideration of the relationship of various forms of skepticism with the sociocultural context. Research methods are philosophical and general logical. Research results. Pyrrhonian skepticism reflects the personal, socio-political and economic crisis of the Hellenistic era. The complete and consistent development of the views of extreme skeptics in practice turns into an apology for force or chaos. The time of M. Montaigne is characterized by the conjugation of historical optimism with paradigm instability, the struggle of ideas and socio-cultural structures for the right to exist. Hence the appeal to the subject, as to the basis that determines the stability of social and personal existence.

Weddig, Catherine. Climate Change Denial & Skepticism: A Review of the Literature. MediaWell, Social Science Research Council, September 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.35650/mw.3043.d.2022.

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Kahn, Matthew, und Daxuan Zhao. The Impact of Climate Change Skepticism on Adaptation in a Market Economy. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, Februar 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w23155.

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White, Morgan Curtis. Beware of Atoms, They Make Up Everything Or, Encouraging Healthy Skepticism About Computational Tools. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), Februar 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/1345136.

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Ginder, Whitney, und Sang-Eun Byun. Labor-Related CSR Communication: The Impact of Claim Types on Perceived Credibility, Skepticism, and Brand Trust. Ames: Iowa State University, Digital Repository, November 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.31274/itaa_proceedings-180814-168.

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Arnold, Zachary, Ngor Luong und Ben Murphy. Chinese Government Guidance Funds: A Guide for the Perplexed. Center for Security and Emerging Technology, März 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.51593/20210011.

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The Chinese government is pouring money into public-private investment funds, known as guidance funds, to advance China’s strategic and emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence. These funds are mobilizing massive amounts of capital from public and private sources—prompting both concern and skepticism among outside observers. This overview presents essential findings from our full-length report on these funds, analyzing the guidance fund model, its intended benefits and weaknesses, and its long-term prospects for success.

Horgan, John. Deradicalization Programs: Recommendations for Policy and Practice. RESOLVE Network, August 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.37805/pn2021.18.vedr.

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Involvement in violent extremism is not a one-way street. People can, and do, leave violent extremist movements. Understanding how and why they leave (or want to leave) constitutes actionable knowledge that brings immense practical benefits. Such knowledge may help in designing initiatives aimed at persuading people to leave violent extremist groups as well as reducing the risk of re-engagement in violent extremism in the future. Deradicalization programs have much to offer but they are not a magic solution to a highly complex, fluid problem. Not everyone who engages in violent extremism is necessarily going to benefit from such interventions, and no program can ever expect to produce complete success. Yet, they continue to show promise. Deradicalization programs can be effective for some and, if subjected to greater evaluation efforts, may prove far more beneficial than is currently believed. Despite an abundance (and apparent increase) in programming, a continued lack of evaluation work both fuels skepticism and hinders our ability to believe that there is a strong future for these programs.

Pérez Pérez, Jorge Eduardo, und Eduardo Fernández-Arias. Grading Fiscal Policy in Latin America in the Last Decade. Inter-American Development Bank, April 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0008441.

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Fiscal policy in Latin America has been historically imprudent and continues to be viewed with skepticism. At the same time, most countries have remained out of trouble for several years and were able to successfully conduct proactive countercyclical fiscal policy to fight the Great Recession, a historical first. This paper examines the last decade to assess progress, highlight weaknesses, and chart the way forward. The paper looks at structural fiscal balances, filtering out the business cycle and commodity price fluctuations to assess prudent fiscal policy concerning cyclical management and long-run sustainability. Up to the Great Recession countries deserved good grades, in the B range, on both counts. Afterwards, satisfactory cyclical management continued but, critically, extraordinary circumstances led to a regime change in the level of the underlying structural balance. Successful countercyclical fiscal policy was prudently undertaken in the crisis but not decisively unwound in its aftermath, leaving behind an unsatisfactory fiscal stance. With this "Incomplete" grades slipped to the C range and may end up as an F unless there is normalization to pre-crisis levels to regain sustainability. On a constructive note, the paper distills lessons from experience and charts the path of fiscal reform to reach an A grade.

Turmena, Lucas, Flávia Guerra, Altiere Freitas, Alejandra Ramos-Galvez, Simone Sandholz, Michael Roll, Isadora Freire und Millena Oliveira. TUC Urban Lab Profile: Alliance for the Centre of Recife, Brazil. United Nations University - Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS), März 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.53324/hcyv7857.

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After almost two years in operation, the challenges and key achievements of the TUC Urban Lab established in Comunidade do Pilar in Recife, Brazil, provide valuable lessons for sustaining ongoing activities, accelerating broader transformations and guiding similar efforts elsewhere: 1. DEVELOPING A PLACE-BASED APPROACH AND BUILDING MUTUAL TRUST: Meaningful participation is contingent upon establishing and maintaining trust between UL facilitators and participants. In the case of Comunidade do Pilar, overcoming initial distrust and skepticism required tailoring UL activities to residents’ needs and linking those to climate action, while increasing presence in the territory and creating safe spaces for equal participation. The strengthening of a place-based approach has been a key contributor to the UL’s achievements. 2. NAVIGATING PARTICIPATION IN REALITY: Participation is often less smooth than planned. Facilitators must consider fluctuations in the frequency and manner of participation and develop strategies to adapt the UL process accordingly. Open dialogues and clear communication are essential. The UL is not a static organization but a flexible arrangement with the potential to bridge diverse interests and aspirations, linking local needs with the climate change agenda. 3. IMPLEMENTING STRATEGIES TO WIDEN THE IMPACT: The UL in Comunidade do Pilar strives to foster long-term outcomes through small-scale experiments. Incremental changes nurture individual and collective capacities, laying the foundation for broader and deeper transformations. However, scaling up learnings depends on institutionalizing changes and garnering support from decision-makers, which can be challenging.

Glick, Mark. An Economic Defense of Multiple Antitrust Goals: Reversing Income Inequality and Promoting Political Democracy. Institute for New Economic Thinking Working Paper Series, März 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.36687/inetwp181.

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Two recent papers by prominent antitrust scholars argue that a revived antitrust movement can help reverse the dramatic rise in economic inequality and the erosion of political democracy in the United States. Both papers rely on the legislative history of the key antitrust statutes to support their case. Not surprisingly, their recommendations have been met with alarm in some quarters and with skepticism in others. Such proposals by antitrust reformers are often contrasted with the Consumer Welfare Standard that pervades antitrust policy today. The Consumer Welfare Standard suffers from several defects: (1) It employs a narrow, unworkable measure of welfare; (2) It excludes important sources of welfare based on the assumption that antitrust seeks only to maximize wealth; (3) It assumes a constant and equal individual marginal utility of money; and (4) It is often combined with extraneous ideological goals. Even with these defects, however, if applied consistent with its theoretical underpinnings, the consideration of the transfer of labor rents resulting from a merger or dominant firm conduct is supported by the Consumer Welfare Standard. Moreover, even when only consumers (and not producers) are deemed relevant, the welfare of labor still should consistently be considered part of consumer welfare. In contrast, fostering political democracy—a prominent traditional antitrust goal that was jettisoned by the Chicago School—falls outside the Consumer Welfare Standard in any of its constructs. To undergird such important broader goals requires that the Consumer Welfare Standard be replaced with the General Welfare Standard. The General Welfare Standard consists of modern welfare economics modified to accommodate objective analyses of human welfare and purged of inconsistencies.