Zeitschriftenartikel: „Reasoning (Psychology)“

1

Wetherick, N. E. „Psychology and Syllogistic Reasoning“. Philosophical Psychology 2, Nr. 1 (Januar 1989): 111–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515088908572966.

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2

Stenning, Keith, und Michiel van Lambalgen. „Reasoning, logic, and psychology“. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science 2, Nr. 5 (09.12.2010): 555–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/wcs.134.

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3

Foos, Paul W. „Reasoning About Reasoning“. Contemporary Psychology: A Journal of Reviews 41, Nr. 9 (September 1996): 917–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/003142.

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4

Over, David E. „New paradigm psychology of reasoning“. Thinking & Reasoning 15, Nr. 4 (November 2009): 431–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13546780903266188.

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5

Andrews, Jac J. W., und Maisha M. Syeda. „Clinical Reasoning in School Psychology“. Canadian Journal of School Psychology 32, Nr. 1 (27.07.2016): 3–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0829573516659935.

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6

Bucciarelli, Monica, Sangeet Khemlani und P. N. Johnson-Laird. „The psychology of moral reasoning“. Judgment and Decision Making 3, Nr. 2 (Februar 2008): 121–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500001479.

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AbstractThis article presents a theory of reasoning about moral propositions that is based on four fundamental principles. First, no simple criterion picks out propositions about morality from within the larger set of deontic propositions concerning what is permissible and impermissible in social relations, the law, games, and manners. Second, the mechanisms underlying emotions and deontic evaluations are independent and operate in parallel, and so some scenarios elicit emotions prior to moral evaluations, some elicit moral evaluations prior to emotions, and some elicit them at the same time. Third, deontic evaluations depend on inferences, either unconscious intuitions or conscious reasoning. Fourth, human beliefs about what is, and isn’t, moral are neither complete nor consistent. The article marshals the evidence, which includes new studies, corroborating these principles, and discusses the relations between them and other current theories of moral reasoning.

7

Godden, David. „Argumentation, rationality, and psychology of reasoning“. Informal Logic 35, Nr. 2 (29.05.2015): 135. http://dx.doi.org/10.22329/il.v35i2.4124.

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This paper explicates an account of argumentative rationality by articulating the common, basic idea of its nature, and then identifying a collection of assumptions inherent in it. Argumentative rationality is then contrasted with dual-process theories of reasoning and rationality prevalent in the psychology of reasoning. It is argued that argumentative rationality properly corresponds only with system-2 reasoning in dual-process theories. This result challenges the prescriptive force of argumentative norms derives if they derive at all from their descriptive accuracy of our cognitive capacities. In response, I propose an activity-based account of reasoning which retains the assumptions of argumentative rationality while recontextualizing the relationship between reasoning as a justificatory activity and the psychological states and processes underlying that activity.

8

Zwaan, L. „The psychology of diagnostic error“. Experimental Psychology (Russia) 8, Nr. 3 (2015): 91–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.17759/exppsy.2015080309.

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Diagnostic errors in medicine occur frequently and the consequences for the patient can be severe. Cognitive errors as well as system related errors contribute to the occurrence of diagnostic error, but it is generally accepted that cognitive errors are the main contributor. The diagnostic reasoning process in medicine, is an understudied area of research. One reason is because of the complexity of the diagnostic process and therefore the difficulty to measure diagnostic errors and the causes of diagnostic error. In this paper, I discuss some of the complexities of the diagnostic process. I describe the dual-process theory, which defines two reasoning modes, 1. a fast, automatic and unconscious reasoning mode called system 1, and a slow and analytic reasoning mode called system 2. Furthermore, the main cognitive causes of diagnostic error are described.

9

Sarasvathy, Saras D. „Founding Moral Reasoning on Evolutionary Psychology“. Ruffin Series of the Society for Business Ethics 4 (2004): 135–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ruffinx2004410.

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In this paper I develop a critique of the strong adaptationist view inherent in the work of Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, as presentedat the Ruffin Lectures series in 2002. My critique proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, I advance arguments as to why I find the particular adaptation story that the authors advance for their experimental results unpersuasive even when I fully accept the value of their experimental results. In the second stage, I grant them their adaptation story and critique the implications of such stories forbusiness ethics and for future research. In sum, I argue against recasting key problems in the social sciences to fit the use of toolsdeveloped in the so-called “hard” sciences. Instead, I urge that we deal with these problems on their own terms, i.e. through their basisin and dependence on deliberate social action.

10

Pennisi, E. „PSYCHOLOGY: Nonhuman Primates Demonstrate Humanlike Reasoning“. Science 317, Nr. 5843 (07.09.2007): 1308. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.317.5843.1308.

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11

Krueger, Joachim I. „The flight from reasoning in psychology“. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30, Nr. 1 (Februar 2007): 32–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x07000751.

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Psychological science can benefit from a theoretical unification with other social sciences. Social psychology in particular has gone through cycles of repression, denying itself the opportunity to see the calculating element in human interaction. A closer alignment with theories of evolution and theories of interpersonal (and intergroup) games would bring strategic reasoning back into the focus of research.

12

Wetherick, Norman E. „Psychology and syllogistic reasoning: Further considerations“. Philosophical Psychology 6, Nr. 4 (Januar 1993): 423–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089308573102.

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13

Oaksford, Mike, und Nick Chater. „New Paradigms in the Psychology of Reasoning“. Annual Review of Psychology 71, Nr. 1 (04.01.2020): 305–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-010419-051132.

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The psychology of verbal reasoning initially compared performance with classical logic. In the last 25 years, a new paradigm has arisen, which focuses on knowledge-rich reasoning for communication and persuasion and is typically modeled using Bayesian probability theory rather than logic. This paradigm provides a new perspective on argumentation, explaining the rational persuasiveness of arguments that are logical fallacies. It also helps explain how and why people stray from logic when given deductive reasoning tasks. What appear to be erroneous responses, when compared against logic, often turn out to be rationally justified when seen in the richer rational framework of the new paradigm. Moreover, the same approach extends naturally to inductive reasoning tasks, in which people extrapolate beyond the data they are given and logic does not readily apply. We outline links between social and individual reasoning and set recent developments in the psychology of reasoning in the wider context of Bayesian cognitive science.

14

Shin, Hyoung Seok. „Reasoning processes in clinical reasoning: from the perspective of cognitive psychology“. Korean Journal of Medical Education 31, Nr. 4 (01.12.2019): 299–308. http://dx.doi.org/10.3946/kjme.2019.140.

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15

Roth, Abraham Sesshu. „The Necessity of “Necessity”: Hume’s Psychology of Sophisticated Causal Inference“. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41, Nr. 2 (Juni 2011): 263–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.2011.0012.

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Much of what Hume calls probable reasoning is deliberate and reflective. Since there are aspects to Hume's psychology that tempt some commentators to think, on the contrary, that for Hume all such reasoning is simple and immediate, I will be concerned to emphasize Hume's recognition of the sophisticated sort of probable reasoning (section I). Though some of the details of my case may be new, the overall point of this section should not be news to recent scholarship. But once we recognize that this reflective and deliberate reasoning constitutes a significant portion of all probable reasoning, it becomes legitimate to ask how Hume accommodates this reasoning in his psychology, his ‘science of man.’ I believe that Hume has an answer to this question. I will explain in what way Hume could have thought that probable reasoning can be sophisticated: in short, sophisticated probable reasoning involves the use of the concept of evidence or epistemic support (section II). Hume's psychology, constrained by his empiricism, must therefore explain how we come to have this idea.

16

Bremner, Andrew J., und Denis Mareschal. „Reasoning . . . what reasoning?“ Developmental Science 7, Nr. 4 (September 2004): 419–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2004.00360.x.

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17

Gampa, Anup, Sean P. Wojcik, Matt Motyl, Brian A. Nosek und Peter H. Ditto. „(Ideo)Logical Reasoning: Ideology Impairs Sound Reasoning“. Social Psychological and Personality Science 10, Nr. 8 (05.03.2019): 1075–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1948550619829059.

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Beliefs shape how people interpret information and may impair how people engage in logical reasoning. In three studies, we show how ideological beliefs impair people’s ability to (1) recognize logical validity in arguments that oppose their political beliefs and (2) recognize the lack of logical validity in arguments that support their political beliefs. We observed belief bias effects among liberals and conservatives who evaluated the logical soundness of classically structured logical syllogisms supporting liberal or conservative beliefs. Both liberals and conservatives frequently evaluated the logical structure of entire arguments based on the believability of arguments’ conclusions, leading to predictable patterns of logical errors. As a result, liberals were better at identifying flawed arguments supporting conservative beliefs and conservatives were better at identifying flawed arguments supporting liberal beliefs. These findings illuminate one key mechanism for how political beliefs distort people’s abilities to reason about political topics soundly.

18

Galotti, Kathleen M. „Reasoning about Reasoning: A Course Project“. Teaching of Psychology 22, Nr. 1 (Februar 1995): 66–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15328023top2201_20.

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19

Leighton, Jacqueline P. „Reasoning Strategies and the Fundamental Reasoning Mechanism“. Contemporary Psychology 46, Nr. 4 (August 2001): 407–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/002466.

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20

Bonnefon, Jean-François. „Formal Models of Reasoning in Cognitive Psychology“. Argument & Computation 4, Nr. 1 (März 2013): 1–3. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19462166.2013.767559.

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21

Ricou, Miguel, und Sílvia Marina. „Decision Making and Ethical Reasoning in Psychology“. Psychology in Russia: State of the Art 13, Nr. 1 (2020): 2–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.11621/pir.2020.0101.

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22

St.B. T. Evans, Jonathan. „The Cognitive Psychology of Reasoning: An Introduction“. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A 46, Nr. 4 (November 1993): 561–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14640749308401027.

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23

Achourioti, Theodora, Andrew Fugard und Keith Stenning. „Throwing the normative baby out with the prescriptivist bathwater“. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34, Nr. 5 (Oktober 2011): 249. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x1100046x.

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AbstractIt is neither desirable nor possible to eliminate normative concerns from the psychology of reasoning. Norms define the most fundamental psychological questions: What are people trying to do, and how? Even if no one system of reasoning can be the norm, pure descriptivism is as undesirable and unobtainable in the psychology of reasoning as elsewhere in science.

24

VanderStoep, Scott W., und John J. Shaughnessy. „Taking a Course in Research Methods Improves Reasoning about Real-Life Events“. Teaching of Psychology 24, Nr. 2 (April 1997): 122–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15328023top2402_8.

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We examined the extent to which students who take a course in research methods improve their reasoning about real-life events. Because social science majors improve their methodological and statistical reasoning during 4 years of college (Lehman & Nisbett, 1990), a logical source of this improvement in psychology would be the Research Methods course. We tested students in Research Methods and in Developmental Psychology on methodological and statistical reasoning at the beginning and the end of the term. As expected, reasoning scores of Research Methods students improved more than did scores of Developmental Psychology students. These results have implications for teaching because they support our intuitive notions that what we are teaching has real-life value.

25

Smith, Edward E. „Natural Reasoning“. Contemporary Psychology: A Journal of Reviews 30, Nr. 3 (März 1985): 181–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/023617.

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26

Johnson-Laird, P. N. „DEDUCTIVE REASONING“. Annual Review of Psychology 50, Nr. 1 (Februar 1999): 109–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.50.1.109.

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27

Wilcox, Gabrielle, Meadow Schroeder und Michelle A. Drefs. „Clinical Reasoning: A Missing Piece for Improving Evidence-Based Assessment in Psychology“. Journal of Intelligence 11, Nr. 2 (26.01.2023): 26. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/jintelligence11020026.

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Clinical reasoning is a foundational component of conducting evidence-based psychological assessments. In spite of its importance, limited attention has been paid to the teaching or measurement of clinical reasoning skills relative to psychological assessment, as well as how clinical reasoning develops or how its efficacy can be measured. Improving clinical reasoning throughout the assessment process, from initial case conceptualization to hypotheses testing, to recommendation writing, has the potential to address commonly noted concerns regarding diagnostic accuracy, as well as the accessibility and utility of psychological reports and recommendations, and will, ultimately, lead to improved outcomes for clients. Consequently, we provide a definition of clinical reasoning in relation to psychological assessment, followed by a critique of graduate training assessment and the current challenges of measuring clinical reasoning in psychology. Lastly, this paper provides suggestions for how to incorporate clinical reasoning throughout the assessment process as a way to answer client questions more effectively and provide meaningful recommendations to improve outcomes.

28

Eflin, Juli T., und Mary E. Kite. „Teaching Scientific Reasoning through Attribution Theory“. Teaching of Psychology 23, Nr. 2 (April 1996): 87–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15328023top2302_3.

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A teaching activity improves students' scientific reasoning by focusing attention on the causal, explanatory nature of psychological theories, The instructor's initial lecture emphasizes the argument form called Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). Students construct IBE arguments by sorting a series of premises and conclusions based on correspondent inference theory (Jones & Davis, 1965), Discussion of argument strength follows, using the concepts presented in the lecture. Fifty-two introductory social psychology students evaluated the activity favorably, and results of a nonequivalent control group experiment showed that participation improved their reasoning ability. Suggestions for modifying the activity for other psychology courses are provided.

29

Resnick, Lauren, Merrilee Salmon, Colleen Zeitz, Sheila Haley Wathen und Mark Holowchak. „Reasoning in Conversation“. Ethics & Behavior 11, Nr. 3 (01.11.1993): 347–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s1532690xci1103&4_11.

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30

Evans, Jonathan St B. T. „Reflections on reasoning and reasoning about reflection“. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11, Nr. 10 (Oktober 2007): 412. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2007.07.004.

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31

Rascher, Candice Lee, und Nicky Israel. „LINKING INFORMATION PROCESSING STYLE PREFERENCE, STATISTICAL REASONING, AND STATISTICAL PERFORMANCE IN PSYCHOLOGY“. New Voices in Psychology 11, Nr. 1 (25.10.2016): 112–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.25159/1812-6371/1808.

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This study sought to examine the nature of the relationships between information processing style preference, statistical reasoning ability (statistical skills and misconceptions), and performance on a psychology-based statistics course (RDA IIA). A non-experimental, correlational research design was used. The sample consisted of 133 University of the Witwatersrand students who had completed the RDA IIA module. Participants completed a brief demographic questionnaire as well as the Rational-Experiential Inventory (Pacini & Epstein, 1999), assessing processing style preference, and the Statistical Reasoning Assessment (Garfield, 2003), assessing statistical reasoning ability. Results indicated statistically significant, positive relationships between preference for a rational information processing style and statistical reasoning ability; as well as between performance on RDA IIA and statistical reasoning ability. There were, however, no significant relationships between performance on RDA IIA Â and processing style preference. These findings yielded useful implications for the teaching of statistical courses and thus contribute to limited knowledge available regarding the links between processing style preference and statistical reasoning and performance, particularly in the South African context.

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Müller, Ulrich, Bryan Sokol und Willis F. Overton. „Developmental Sequences in Class Reasoning and Propositional Reasoning“. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 74, Nr. 2 (Oktober 1999): 69–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jecp.1999.2510.

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33

Mueller, Jon F., Helen K. Taylor, Karen Brakke, Mike Drysdale, Kiesa Kelly, Gary M. Levine und Jaclyn Ronquillo-Adachi. „Assessment of Scientific Inquiry and Critical Thinking: Measuring APA Goal 2 Student Learning Outcomes“. Teaching of Psychology 47, Nr. 4 (11.09.2020): 274–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0098628320945114.

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Goal 2 of the APA Goals for Undergraduate Major in Psychology, Scientific Inquiry and Critical Thinking, addresses the development of scientific reasoning and problem-solving, including effective research methods, in undergraduate psychology students. These skills serve as the foundation of not only introductory courses but also the entire psychology curriculum. In this article, we address why these skills are critical to help students interpret information and assess claims and review the current practice of measuring student reasoning in this domain. The reach of Goal 2 is broad, including the application of scientific reasoning to interpret psychological phenomena, the demonstration of psychology information literacy, the interpretation and execution of basic psychological research, and an understanding of sociocultural influences in scientific inquiry. We discuss the value of both formative and summative assessments in this area, offer examples of assessment tools currently in use, and provide a list of nationally normed assessments in critical thinking and scientific reasoning. We conclude with a discussion of limitations in current assessment practices and suggest possible future directions.

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Santibáñez Yáñez, Cristián. „Mercier and Sperber’s Argumentative Theory of Reasoning: From Psychology of Reasoning to Argumentation Studies“. Informal Logic 32, Nr. 1 (08.03.2012): 132. http://dx.doi.org/10.22329/il.v32i1.3536.

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Mercier and Sperber (2011a, 2011b; Mercier, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, and 2011d) have presented a stimulating and provocative new theory of reasoning: the argumentative theory of reasoning. They maintain that argumentation is a meta-representational module. In their evolutionary view of argumentation, the function of this module would be to regulate the flow of information between interlocutors through persuasiveness on the side of the communicator and epistemic vigilance on the side of the audience. The aim of this paper is to discuss the perspective of the authors in which they conceive this competence as the natural scenario of reflective reasoning.

35

Bonnefon, Jean-François, und Stéphane Vautier. „Modern Psychometrics for the Experimental Psychology of Reasoning“. Acta Psychologica Sinica 42, Nr. 1 (03.02.2010): 99–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.3724/sp.j.1041.2010.00099.

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36

Fricker, Ronald D. „Cognition and Chance: The Psychology of Probabilistic Reasoning“. Technometrics 47, Nr. 3 (August 2005): 376. http://dx.doi.org/10.1198/tech.2005.s295.

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37

Sauer, Hanno. „Social Intuitionism and the Psychology of Moral Reasoning“. Philosophy Compass 6, Nr. 10 (Oktober 2011): 708–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00437.x.

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38

John, Carolyn. „Delusions—Investigations into the psychology of delusional reasoning“. Behaviour Research and Therapy 34, Nr. 1 (Januar 1996): 97–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0005-7967(96)90065-0.

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39

Garety, Philippa, Daniel Freeman, Suzanne Jolley, Kerry Ross, Helen Waller und Graham Dunn. „Jumping to conclusions: the psychology of delusional reasoning“. Advances in Psychiatric Treatment 17, Nr. 5 (September 2011): 332–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1192/apt.bp.109.007104.

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SummaryDelusions are a key symptom of psychosis and they are frequently distressing and disabling. Existing treatments, both pharmacological and psychological, are only partially effective. It is important to develop new treatment approaches based on theoretically derived and empirically tested processes. Delusions are associated with a reasoning bias: the jumping to conclusions (JTC) bias involves gathering limited information to reach decisions. It is proposed that this bias influences appraisals of psychotic experiences leading to the formation and persistence of delusions. Existing treatments do not influence JTC. A new intensive treatment approach – ‘reasoning training’ – is described. It aims to encourage participants to gather information, consider alternative explanations for events and review the evidence before reaching a decision. Preliminary data suggest that it is possible to change the JTC bias and that this improves belief flexibility and may reduce delusional conviction. The concepts and methods of this new approach have implications for clinical practice.

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Mortensen, Uwe. „Cognition and Chance-The Psychology of Probabilistic Reasoning“. Biometrics 62, Nr. 3 (September 2006): 947–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0420.2006.00588_10.x.

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41

Rafetseder, Eva, und Josef Perner. „Is reasoning from counterfactual antecedents evidence for counterfactual reasoning?“ Thinking & Reasoning 16, Nr. 2 (Mai 2010): 131–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2010.488074.

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42

Hörnig, Robin, Klaus Oberauer und Andrea Weidenfeld. „Between Reasoning“. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 59, Nr. 10 (Oktober 2006): 1805–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470210500416151.

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43

Sudić, Mislav, Pavle Valerjev und Josip Ćirić. „Deontic Moral Reasoning Task“. Psihologijske teme 28, Nr. 3 (2019): 483–506. http://dx.doi.org/10.31820/pt.28.3.2.

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Domain theory suggests that moral rules and conventions are perceived differently and elicit a different response. A special procedure was designed to test this hypothesis in a laboratory setting using a deontic reasoning task. The goal was to gain insight into the cognitive and metacognitive processes of deontic reasoning from simple deontic premises. In the 3x2x2 within-subjects design, we varied rule-content (moral, conventional, abstract), rule-type (obligation, permission) and the induced dilemma (punishment dilemma, reward dilemma). Participants (N = 78) were presented with 12 laws. After memorizing a law, eight cases were presented to participants so that they make a quick judgment. Participants were tasked with punishing rule-violators, ignoring rule-conformists, and rewarding rule-supererogation. Response times (RT) and accuracy were measured for each judgment, and final confidence was measured after a set of judgments. No differences were expected between rule-types, except for superior performance for moral content and punishment dilemmas. RT correlated negatively with confidence levels, while accuracy correlated positively. Moral reasoning was more accurate than conventional and abstract reasoning, and produced higher confidence levels. Better performance was found for punishment dilemmas than reward dilemmas, likely due to the presence of a cheater-detection module; but the differences were not found in moral reasoning. Moral reasoning was also independent of rule-type, while conventional and abstract reasoning produced superior performance in obligation-type than in permission-type rules. A large drop-off in accuracy was detected for rules that allowed undesirable behaviour, a phenomenon we termed the "deontic blind spot". However, this blind spot was not present in moral reasoning. Three lines of evidence indicate a qualitative difference between the moral and other deontic domains: (1) performance for moral content was independent of rule-type, (2) moral content produced an equal activation of violator- and altruist-detection modules, and (3) moral content produces higher levels of confidence.

44

Newstead, Stephen E. „Reasoning Made Readable“. Contemporary Psychology 46, Nr. 3 (Juni 2001): 290–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/002498.

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45

Ahn, Woo-kyoung, und Loranel M. Graham. „Analogizing Analogical Reasoning“. Contemporary Psychology: A Journal of Reviews 41, Nr. 7 (Juli 1996): 652–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/004603.

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46

Rips, Lance J. „Reasoning and conversation.“ Psychological Review 105, Nr. 3 (1998): 411–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-295x.105.3.411.

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47

Goodwin, Geoffrey P., und P. N. Johnson-Laird. „Reasoning about relations.“ Psychological Review 112, Nr. 2 (April 2005): 468–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-295x.112.2.468.

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48

Evans, Jonathan St B. T., und Shira Elqayam. „Towards a descriptivist psychology of reasoning and decision making“. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34, Nr. 5 (Oktober 2011): 275–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x11001440.

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AbstractOur target article identifiednormativismas the view that rationality should be evaluated against unconditional normative standards. We believe this to be entrenched in the psychological study of reasoning and decision making and argued that it is damaging to this empirical area of study, calling instead for a descriptivist psychology of reasoning and decision making. The views of 29 commentators (from philosophy and cognitive science as well as psychology) were mixed, including some staunch defences of normativism, but also a number that were broadly supportive of our position, although critical of various details. In particular, many defended a position that we call “soft normativism,” which sees a role for normative evaluation within boundaries alongside more descriptive research goals. In this response, we clarify our use of the term “instrumental rationality” and add discussion of “epistemic rationality,” defining both as descriptive and non-normative concepts. We consider the debate with reference to dual-process theory, the “new paradigm” psychology of reasoning, and empirical research strategy in these fields. We also discuss cognitive variation by age, intelligence, and culture, and the issue of relative versus absolute definitions of norms. In conclusion, we hope at least to have raised consciousness about the important boundaries between norm and description in the psychology of thinking.

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Klauer, Karl Christoph, Thorsten Meiser und Birgit Naumer. „Training Propositional Reasoning“. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A 53, Nr. 3 (August 2000): 868–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/713755911.

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Two experiments compared the effects of four training conditions on propositional reasoning. A syntactic training demonstrated formal derivations, in an abstract semantic training the standard truth-table definitions of logical connectives were explained, and a domain-specific semantic training provided thematic contexts for the premises of the reasoning task. In a control training, an inductive reasoning task was practised. In line with the account by mental models, both kinds of semantic training were significantly more effective than the control and the syntactic training, whereas there were no significant differences between the control and the syntactic training, nor between the two kinds of semantic training. Experiment 2 replicated this pattern of effects using a different set of syntactic and domain-specific training conditions.

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Byrne, Ruth M. J., Simon J. Handley und Philip N. Johnson-Laird. „Reasoning from Suppositions“. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A 48, Nr. 4 (November 1995): 915–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14640749508401423.

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Two experiments investigated inferences based on suppositions. In Experiment 1, the subjects decided whether suppositions about individuals’ veracity were consistent with their assertions—for example, whether the supposition “Ann is telling the truth and Beth is telling a lie”, is consistent with the premises: “Ann asserts: I am telling the truth and Beth is telling the truth. Beth asserts: Ann is telling the truth”. It showed that these inferences are more difficult than ones based on factual premises: “Ann asserts: I live in Dublin and Beth lives in Dublin”. There was no difference between problems about truthtellers and liars, who always told the truth or always lied, and normals, who sometimes told the truth and sometimes lied. In Experiment 2, the subjects made inferences about factual matters set in three contexts: a truth-inducing context in which friends confided their personality characteristics, a lie-inducing context in which business rivals advertised their products, and a neutral context in which computers printed their program characteristics. Given the supposition that the individuals were lying, it was more difficult to make inferences in a truth-inducing context than in the other two contexts. We discuss the implications of our results for everyday reasoning from suppositions, and for theories of reasoning based on models or inference rules.

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