Thematische Bibliographien / Reasoning (Psychology)

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Auswahl der wissenschaftlichen Literatur zum Thema „Reasoning (Psychology)“

Autor: Grafiati

Veröffentlicht am 4. Juni 2021

Zuletzt aktualisiert am 29. Juli 2024

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Zeitschriftenartikel zum Thema "Reasoning (Psychology)"

Wetherick, N. E. „Psychology and Syllogistic Reasoning“. Philosophical Psychology 2, Nr. 1 (Januar 1989): 111–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515088908572966.

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Stenning, Keith, und Michiel van Lambalgen. „Reasoning, logic, and psychology“. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science 2, Nr. 5 (09.12.2010): 555–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/wcs.134.

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Foos, Paul W. „Reasoning About Reasoning“. Contemporary Psychology: A Journal of Reviews 41, Nr. 9 (September 1996): 917–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/003142.

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Over, David E. „New paradigm psychology of reasoning“. Thinking & Reasoning 15, Nr. 4 (November 2009): 431–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13546780903266188.

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Andrews, Jac J. W., und Maisha M. Syeda. „Clinical Reasoning in School Psychology“. Canadian Journal of School Psychology 32, Nr. 1 (27.07.2016): 3–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0829573516659935.

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Bucciarelli, Monica, Sangeet Khemlani und P. N. Johnson-Laird. „The psychology of moral reasoning“. Judgment and Decision Making 3, Nr. 2 (Februar 2008): 121–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500001479.

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AbstractThis article presents a theory of reasoning about moral propositions that is based on four fundamental principles. First, no simple criterion picks out propositions about morality from within the larger set of deontic propositions concerning what is permissible and impermissible in social relations, the law, games, and manners. Second, the mechanisms underlying emotions and deontic evaluations are independent and operate in parallel, and so some scenarios elicit emotions prior to moral evaluations, some elicit moral evaluations prior to emotions, and some elicit them at the same time. Third, deontic evaluations depend on inferences, either unconscious intuitions or conscious reasoning. Fourth, human beliefs about what is, and isn’t, moral are neither complete nor consistent. The article marshals the evidence, which includes new studies, corroborating these principles, and discusses the relations between them and other current theories of moral reasoning.

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Godden, David. „Argumentation, rationality, and psychology of reasoning“. Informal Logic 35, Nr. 2 (29.05.2015): 135. http://dx.doi.org/10.22329/il.v35i2.4124.

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This paper explicates an account of argumentative rationality by articulating the common, basic idea of its nature, and then identifying a collection of assumptions inherent in it. Argumentative rationality is then contrasted with dual-process theories of reasoning and rationality prevalent in the psychology of reasoning. It is argued that argumentative rationality properly corresponds only with system-2 reasoning in dual-process theories. This result challenges the prescriptive force of argumentative norms derives if they derive at all from their descriptive accuracy of our cognitive capacities. In response, I propose an activity-based account of reasoning which retains the assumptions of argumentative rationality while recontextualizing the relationship between reasoning as a justificatory activity and the psychological states and processes underlying that activity.

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Zwaan, L. „The psychology of diagnostic error“. Experimental Psychology (Russia) 8, Nr. 3 (2015): 91–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.17759/exppsy.2015080309.

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Diagnostic errors in medicine occur frequently and the consequences for the patient can be severe. Cognitive errors as well as system related errors contribute to the occurrence of diagnostic error, but it is generally accepted that cognitive errors are the main contributor. The diagnostic reasoning process in medicine, is an understudied area of research. One reason is because of the complexity of the diagnostic process and therefore the difficulty to measure diagnostic errors and the causes of diagnostic error. In this paper, I discuss some of the complexities of the diagnostic process. I describe the dual-process theory, which defines two reasoning modes, 1. a fast, automatic and unconscious reasoning mode called system 1, and a slow and analytic reasoning mode called system 2. Furthermore, the main cognitive causes of diagnostic error are described.

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Oaksford, Mike, und Nick Chater. „New Paradigms in the Psychology of Reasoning“. Annual Review of Psychology 71, Nr. 1 (04.01.2020): 305–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-010419-051132.

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The psychology of verbal reasoning initially compared performance with classical logic. In the last 25 years, a new paradigm has arisen, which focuses on knowledge-rich reasoning for communication and persuasion and is typically modeled using Bayesian probability theory rather than logic. This paradigm provides a new perspective on argumentation, explaining the rational persuasiveness of arguments that are logical fallacies. It also helps explain how and why people stray from logic when given deductive reasoning tasks. What appear to be erroneous responses, when compared against logic, often turn out to be rationally justified when seen in the richer rational framework of the new paradigm. Moreover, the same approach extends naturally to inductive reasoning tasks, in which people extrapolate beyond the data they are given and logic does not readily apply. We outline links between social and individual reasoning and set recent developments in the psychology of reasoning in the wider context of Bayesian cognitive science.

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Roth, Abraham Sesshu. „The Necessity of “Necessity”: Hume’s Psychology of Sophisticated Causal Inference“. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41, Nr. 2 (Juni 2011): 263–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.2011.0012.

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Much of what Hume calls probable reasoning is deliberate and reflective. Since there are aspects to Hume's psychology that tempt some commentators to think, on the contrary, that for Hume all such reasoning is simple and immediate, I will be concerned to emphasize Hume's recognition of the sophisticated sort of probable reasoning (section I). Though some of the details of my case may be new, the overall point of this section should not be news to recent scholarship. But once we recognize that this reflective and deliberate reasoning constitutes a significant portion of all probable reasoning, it becomes legitimate to ask how Hume accommodates this reasoning in his psychology, his ‘science of man.’ I believe that Hume has an answer to this question. I will explain in what way Hume could have thought that probable reasoning can be sophisticated: in short, sophisticated probable reasoning involves the use of the concept of evidence or epistemic support (section II). Hume's psychology, constrained by his empiricism, must therefore explain how we come to have this idea.

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Dissertationen zum Thema "Reasoning (Psychology)"

Lee, John Richard. „Metalogic and the psychology of reasoning“. Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1988. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/6625.

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The central topic of the thesis is the relationship between logic and the cognitive psychology of reasoning. This topic is treated in large part through a detailed examination of the recent work of P. N. Johnson-Laird, who has elaborated a widely-read and influential theory in the field. The thesis is divided into two parts, of which the first is a more general and philosophical coverage of some of the most central issues to be faced in relating psychology to logic, while the second draws upon this as introductory material for a critique of Johnson-Laird's `Mental Model' theory, particularly as it applies to syllogistic reasoning. An approach similar to Johnson-Laird's is taken to cognitive psychology, which centrally involves the notion of computation. On this view, a cognitive model presupposes an algorithm which can be seen as specifying the behaviour of a system in ideal conditions. Such behaviour is closely related to the notion of `competence' in reasoning, and this in turn is often described in terms of logic. Insofar as a logic is taken to specify the competence of reasoners in some domain, it forms a set of conditions on the 'input-output' behaviour of the system, to be accounted for by the algorithm. Cognitive models, however, must also be subjected to empirical test, and indeed are commonly built in a highly empirical manner. A strain can therefore develop between the empirical and the logical pressures on a theory of reasoning. Cognitive theories thus become entangled in a web of recently much-discussed issues concerning the rationality of human reasoners and the justification of a logic as a normative system. There has been an increased interest in the view that logic is subject to revision and development, in which there is a recognised place for the influence of psychological investigation. It is held, in this thesis, that logic and psychology are revealed by these considerations to be interdetermining in interesting ways, under the general a priori requirement that people are in an important and particular sense rational. Johnson-Laird's theory is a paradigm case of the sort of cognitive theory dealt with here. It is especially significant in view of the strong claims he makes about its relation to logic, and the role the latter plays in its justification and in its interpretation. The theory is claimed to be revealing about fundamental issues in semantics, and the nature of rationality. These claims are examined in detail, and several crucial ones refuted. Johnson- Laird's models are found to be wanting in the level of empirical support provided, and in their ability to found the considerable structure of explanation they are required to bear. They fail, most importantly, to be distinguishable from certain other kinds of models, at a level of theory where the putative differences are critical. The conclusion to be drawn is that the difficulties in this field are not yet properly appreciated. Psychological explantion requires a complexity which is hard to reconcile with the clarity and simplicity required for logical insights.

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Morris, M. Frances G. „The psychology of information selection and reasoning“. Thesis, Bangor University, 1997. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.361192.

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Evans, Susan Dorothy. „The psychology of moral versus factual reasoning“. Diss., The University of Arizona, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/185012.

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The theoretical framework for this research contrasting moral and factual reasoning was derived from moral philosophy, research in the Kohlbergian tradition, social psychological research on attitude change, and research in judgment and decision making on biases in reasoning. Based on this work, moral reasoning is characterized as rule-based (top-down) and hence less sensitive to amount of evidence (number of arguments) favoring a given position, compared to factual reasoning which was expected to depend on amount of evidence. Argument processing in moral reasoning was also predicted to be more subject to confirmatory bias. 480 students read arguments, some of which confirmed, while others disconfirmed, their prior opinions. The arguments were either moral or factual in nature, the number of arguments was either high or low, and the target issue was varied (capital punishment versus teaching values in the public schools). Overall opinion, moral opinion, factual opinion, and convincingness of each argument were rated. Moral and factual reasoning were both subject to bias (overweighting of confirmatory arguments), although the former slightly more so. Also as predicted, amount of evidence had a significant effect for factual reasoning, but not for moral reasoning. Arguments exerted cross-category effects on opinion change (e.g. moral arguments on factual opinions), although within-category effects were larger. Path analysis indicated, however, that moral and factual arguments did not exert direct effects on cross-category judgments. In other words, moral arguments did not directly effect factual conclusions, nor vice versa, but were instead mediated through overall opinion. Finally, convincingness ratings exhibited a kind of compensatory equilibrium such that when the majority of arguments was disconfirmatory, the few confirmatory arguments were rated as more convincing in both moral and factual reasoning. Thus, this study indicates that moral and factual reasoning are similar in that they are both subject to opinion bias, but they differ in the kinds of judgments they directly influence, and in their responsiveness to amount of evidence. Therefore these data support a characterization of moral reasoning as rule-based and factual reasoning as evidence-based.

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Witzthum, Harry. „Reasoning across domains : an essay in evolutionary psychology“. Thesis, University of Sheffield, 2004. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.412727.

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Leevers, Hilary Janet. „Children's logical reasoning“. Thesis, University of Oxford, 1997. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.362050.

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Narayanan, N. Hari. „Imagery, diagrams and reasoning /“. The Ohio State University, 1992. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1487779120907533.

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Yule, Peter. „Logic implementation in human reasoning : the psychology of syllogisms“. Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1996. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/26068.

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This thesis presents a novel account of syllogistic reasoning, based on data from a non-standard reasoning task called the Individuals Task. An abstract logical treatment of the system, based on a modalised Euler Circles system (Stenning & Oberlander 1994, 1995) is presented, and it is shown that this can be implemented in a diverse range of notationally distinct ways. The Individual Identification Algorithm, as this method is called, makes use of a logical distinction between the premisses of the syllogism; one has an existential, assertive role, and is called the source premiss, whereas the function of the other is to license inference, and so it is called the conditional premiss. This distinction is central to the way the IIA employs modal information to make the use of Euler Circles tractable. The empirical parts of the thesis are concerned with relating the distinction between source and conditional premisses to the Figural Effect (Johnson-Laird & Steedman 1978). It is argued that the Figural Effect is reducible to a tendency for the terms from the source premiss to occur before the terms from the conditional premiss in Individual Conclusions. Sine these are comprised of all three terms in the syllogism, it is possible to test new hypotheses concerning the role of the middle term in inference, and the results are shown to be incompatible with all existing theories of the Figural Effect. Since the Individuals Task is non-standard, it is necessary to compare performance profiles on this task with those on the Standard Task; one result of this comparison is that a primary cause of error in the Standard Task is selection of an appropriate quantifier for the conclusion, a result which concurs with the conclusions of Ford (1994) and Wetherick & Gilhooly (1990), but contradicts those of Mental Models theory (Johnson-Laird 1983). Certain anomalies in the prediction of term order by the source/conditional distinction lead to the postulation of a second process for conclusion generation, called Minimal Linking. This logically unsound strategy has effects similar to the illicit conversion of A premisses (Chapman & Chapman 1959, Revlis 1975).

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Fenton, William P. „On the Philosophy and Psychology of Reasoning and Rationality“. Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2019. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1574636850795921.

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Blum, Anthony John. „An investigation into the psychology of spatial and temporal reasoning /“. The Ohio State University, 1993. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1487841548269909.

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Sheth, Niyati. „Conditional reasoning in depression /“. View online, 2009. http://repository.eiu.edu/theses/docs/32211131598952.pdf.

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Bücher zum Thema "Reasoning (Psychology)"

Evans, Jonathan St. B. T., 1948-, Hrsg. Thinking & reasoning. Hove: Psychology Press, 1996.

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Walter, Schaeken, Hrsg. Deductive reasoning and strategies. Mahwah, N.J: L. Erlbaum Associates, 2000.

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Smith, Derek J. Applied cognitive psychology. Cardiff: University of Wales Institute, Cardiff, 1998.

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Evans, Jonathan St. B. T., 1948-, Hrsg. The Cognitive psychology of reasoning. Hove: Published for The Experimental Psychology Societyby Lawrence Erlbaum, 1993.

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Wason, P. C. Psychology of reasoning: Structure and content. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1990.

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1917-, Minium Edward W., Hrsg. Statistical reasoning in psychology and education. 4. Aufl. New York: J. Wiley and Sons, 2003.

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Minium, Edward W. Statistical reasoning in psychology and education. 3. Aufl. New York: Wiley, 1993.

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E, Newstead Stephen, und Byrne Ruth M. J, Hrsg. Human reasoning: The psychology of deduction. Hove: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1993.

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M, King Bruce, und Bear Gordon, Hrsg. Statistical reasoning in psychology and education. 3. Aufl. New York: Wiley, 1993.

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Eugenio, Rignano Eugenio. Psychology of Reasoning. Taylor & Francis Group, 2013.

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Buchteile zum Thema "Reasoning (Psychology)"

Xiang, Yao, und Zhang Kan. „Reasoning“. In The ECPH Encyclopedia of Psychology, 1–2. Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6000-2_1007-1.

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Dufour, Valérie. „Reasoning“. In The Routledge International Handbook of Comparative Psychology, 263–73. New York: Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003091868-25.

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Johnson-Laird, Phillip N. „Thinking: Reasoning.“ In Encyclopedia of psychology, Vol. 8., 75–79. Washington: American Psychological Association, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/10523-031.

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Hughes, Brian M. „The Psychology of Evidentiary Reasoning“. In Rethinking Psychology, 69–100. London: Macmillan Education UK, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-30395-0_4.

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Hughes, Brian M. „Reasoning Through Brexit“. In The Psychology of Brexit, 23–63. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29364-2_2.

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Ball, Linden J., Laurie T. Butler, Susan M. Sherman und Helen St Clair-Thompson. „Deductive reasoning“. In Cognitive Psychology in a Changing World, 127–87. London: Routledge, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003145851-4.

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Madsen, Jens Koed. „Subjective Reasoning“. In The Psychology of Micro-Targeted Election Campaigns, 59–102. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22145-4_3.

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McDaniel, Ernest, und Chris Lawrence. „Approaches to Studying Reasoning“. In Recent Research in Psychology, 1–9. New York, NY: Springer New York, 1990. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-3420-3_1.

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von Tetzchner, Stephen. „Conceptual Development and Reasoning“. In Child and Adolescent Psychology, 217–39. 1 Edition. | New York : Routledge, 2019.: Routledge, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315742113-12.

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Cellucci, Carlo. „Logic, Method and Psychology of Discovery“. In Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning, 227–36. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6091-2_13.

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Konferenzberichte zum Thema "Reasoning (Psychology)"

Nova, Vera. „Moral Reasoning of Adolescents Following the Mentorship of Islamic Religion at University X“. In International Conference on Psychology. SCITEPRESS - Science and Technology Publications, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.5220/0009444202230229.

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EVANS, JONATHAN ST B. T. „MODELLING THINKING AND REASONING: THE CHALLENGE AHEAD“. In Proceedings of the Ninth Neural Computation and Psychology Workshop. WORLD SCIENTIFIC, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/9789812701886_0044.

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Jones, Steven, und Haley P. Jeppson. „Students’ reasoning about multivariational structures“. In 42nd Meeting of the North American Chapter of the International Group for the Psychology of Mathematics Education. PMENA, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.51272/pmena.42.2020-180.

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Edwards, Laurie D. „Gesture in proof and logical reasoning“. In 42nd Meeting of the North American Chapter of the International Group for the Psychology of Mathematics Education. PMENA, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.51272/pmena.42.2020-391.

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Jeannotte, Doris, Stéphanie Sampson und Sarah Dufour. „Elementary teachers’ discourse about mathematical reasoning“. In 42nd Meeting of the North American Chapter of the International Group for the Psychology of Mathematics Education. PMENA, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.51272/pmena.42.2020-126.

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Park, Hyejin, und Marta T. Magiera. „Prospective teachers’ interpretations of mathematical reasoning“. In 42nd Meeting of the North American Chapter of the International Group for the Psychology of Mathematics Education. PMENA, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.51272/pmena.42.2020-265.

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Panorkou, Nicole, und Erell Germia. „Examining students’ reasoning about multiple quantities“. In 42nd Meeting of the North American Chapter of the International Group for the Psychology of Mathematics Education. PMENA, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.51272/pmena.42.2020-31.

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Gokhale, Tejas. „Vision beyond Pixels: Visual Reasoning via Blocksworld Abstractions“. In Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-19}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2019/907.

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Deep neural networks trained in an end-to-end fashion have brought about exceptional advances in computer vision, especially in computational perception. We go beyond perception and seek to enable vision modules to reason about perceived visual entities such as scenes, objects and actions. We introduce a challenging visual reasoning task, Image-Based Event Sequencing (IES) and compile the first IES dataset, Blocksworld Image Reasoning Dataset (BIRD). Motivated by the blocksworld concept, we propose a modular approach supported by literature in cognitive psychology and children's development. We decompose the problem into two stages - visual perception and event sequencing, and show that our approach can be extended to natural images without re-training.

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Boyce, Steven, und Steven Boyce. „Pseudo-empirical, internalized, and interiorized covariational reasoning“. In 42nd Meeting of the North American Chapter of the International Group for the Psychology of Mathematics Education. PMENA, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.51272/pmena.42.2020-388.

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Francis, Krista, Stefan Rothschuh, Dana Poscente und Brent Davis. „Enhancing students’ spatial reasoning skills with robotics intervention“. In 42nd Meeting of the North American Chapter of the International Group for the Psychology of Mathematics Education. PMENA, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.51272/pmena.42.2020-376.

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Berichte der Organisationen zum Thema "Reasoning (Psychology)"

Kriegel, Francesco. Learning description logic axioms from discrete probability distributions over description graphs (Extended Version). Technische Universität Dresden, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.25368/2022.247.

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Description logics in their standard setting only allow for representing and reasoning with crisp knowledge without any degree of uncertainty. Of course, this is a serious shortcoming for use cases where it is impossible to perfectly determine the truth of a statement. For resolving this expressivity restriction, probabilistic variants of description logics have been introduced. Their model-theoretic semantics is built upon so-called probabilistic interpretations, that is, families of directed graphs the vertices and edges of which are labeled and for which there exists a probability measure on this graph family. Results of scientific experiments, e.g., in medicine, psychology, or biology, that are repeated several times can induce probabilistic interpretations in a natural way. In this document, we shall develop a suitable axiomatization technique for deducing terminological knowledge from the assertional data given in such probabilistic interpretations. More specifically, we consider a probabilistic variant of the description logic EL⊥, and provide a method for constructing a set of rules, so-called concept inclusions, from probabilistic interpretations in a sound and complete manner.

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