Auswahl der wissenschaftlichen Literatur zum Thema „Practical Cognitivism“

AbstractIntention Cognitivism – the doctrine that intending to V entails, or even consists in, believing that one will V – is an important position with potentially wide-ranging implications, such as a revisionary understanding of practical reason, and a vindicating explanation of ‘Practical Knowledge.’ In this paper, I critically examine the standard arguments adduced in support of IC, including arguments from the parity of expression of intention and belief; from the ability to plan around one’s intention; and from the explanation provided by the thesis for our knowledge of our intentional acts. I conclude that none of these arguments are compelling, and therefore that no good reason has been given to accept IC.

Abstract This paper examines the empirical and armchair evidence concerning the practical profiles of normative judgments. It then argues that the theory of normative judgment that best explains these practical profiles is a version of cognitivism: subjectivism. The preferred version says, roughly, i) each normative predicate is conventionally associated with a certain conative attitude, and ii) for S to judge that x has normative status N is for S to judge that x has a property picked out by the conative attitude associated with N. In short, having a normative judgment about x semantically necessitates having a conative attitude toward x's properties, to be contrasted with conceptual necessitation, metaphysical necessitation, rational necessitation, etiological necessitation, and other flavors of necessitation.

AbstractKant famously claims that the table of the categories of freedom does not require explanation, ‘since it is intelligible enough of itself’ (Critique of Practical Reason 5: 67). Kant interpreters have been baffled by this claim, and the disagreement among the increasing number of studies in more recent years suggests that the table is not as straightforward as Kant took it to be. In this article I want to show that a coherent interpretation of the table depends essentially on a clarification of what have been taken to be three fundamental ambiguities in Kant’s presentation of the table. This assumption about ambiguities in Kant’s text is, I argue, rooted in a hybrid conception of practical rationality assumed by his interpreters. I believe the task of disambiguating the table in all three cases can be completed. But it will require spelling out Kant’s moral cognitivism in such a way that he emerges as holding what I will call a unitary account of practical rationality.

ABSTRACTThis article offers a critical analysis of John Broome's conception of practical reasoning. I first introduce his main claims and then point out some of the difficulties raised by the notion of “double expression” and by some aspects of the cognitivism which he explicitly endorses. I then emphasize two consequences of these criticisms: one concerning the link he sees between belief and intention, and the other concerning the idea that our practical reasonings are inextricably linked to our theoretical reasonings. Finally, I argue that the problem Broome seems to be facing has its source in the difficulty of distinguishing clearly between reasoning (a relation between mental states) and the description of its content (a relation between propositions).

Internalism – here the view that moral judgments entail motivation – is often taken to support non-cognitivism about morality. However, Michael Smith has defended a variety of it in combination with a cognitivist account of morality. Despite the eminence of Smith’s contribution, his case in favour of internalism is flawed. I distinguish several internalist positions and argue that Smith’s version, unlike standard ones, expresses a view about, not the nature of the state one is in when one makes a moral judgment, but the norms of practical rationality. I then defend the externalist appeal to the possibility of amoralism. Such an appeal need not beg the question against internalism and can in any case be backed up by independent considerations. Moreover, neither of Smith’s two main arguments in favour of internalism – the reliable connection argument and the appeal to rationalism about moral requirements – are sound. Having shored up the case for externalism and dismissed Smith’s case against it, I end the essay with a suggestion as to why many philosophers have been attracted to internalism even though the theory turns out to be ill-founded.

The main purpose of this article is to point out Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s metaethical idea, that is moral realism, based on the principle of moral philosophy which found in his theory of I’tibāriyat, a theory of perception dealing with various kinds of perception related to practical action of human being whether individual or social. Departing from many problems related to ontological and epistemological statuses of morality that have not been solved yet by several modern metaethical theories, cognitivism and non-cognitivism, this Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s metaethical idea is considered enable to give alternative solutions by proposing two points as the results of reflection on it that morality in the case of metaethical study is imaginative-cognitive-relative and existent in threefold components (action, pupose, and nature of an actor). The elaboration of this reflection in the same time constitutes a response to those modern metaethical theories especially Naturalism, Emotivism, and Anti-Realism. The method by which the writer presents this article is analytical-critical-comparative method, that is, to analyze every idea or theory of metaethics mentioned and, then, by comparative-critical approach, the writer attempts to provide a response to some claims from Naturalism, Emotivism, and Anti-Realism.

O artigo discute a reabilitação do intuicionismo ético utilizado, principalmente, na discussão atual sobre os fundamentos da Bioética a partir da teoria normativa predominante. Além de reconstruir brevemente o surgimento e o desenvolvimento do intuicionismo na primeira parte, o trabalho analisa criticamente uma proposta de reformulação dessa corrente ética feita a partir do pensamento filosófico wittgensteiniano. Mostrando que há poucas razões para considerar Wittgenstein um intuicionista no sentido clássico, o artigo apresenta, na terceira parte, uma alternativa chamada “cognitivismo prático” como forma de resolver tanto os problemas metaéticos quanto normativos inerentes ao intuicionismo. Para avaliar a plausibilidade desse projeto são discutidos os princípios fundamentais da Bioética.Abstract: This article examines the rehabilitation of ethical intuitionism mainly concerning the present discussion about the foundations of bioethics according to the normative theory. In addition to a brief review of the emergence and development of intuitionism, the first part of the work provides a critical analysis of a proposal to reformulate this ethical line on the basis of Wittgenstein’s philosophical thought. In order to show that there is little reason to believe Wittgenstein was an intuitionist in the classical sense, the article presents, in the third part, an alternative called “practical cognitivism” which enables to solve both meta-ethical problems and those inherent to normative intuitionism. The plausibility of this project will be evaluated discussing the fundamental principles of bioethics.

Enligt ett argument mot nonkognitivismen som många kritiker hänvisat till, så är denna teori oförenlig med förekomsten av så kallade ‘tjocka moraliska begrepp’. Argumentet har dock aldrig artikulerats och preciserats ordentligt, vilket lett till att det ofta misstolkats av både anhängare och kritiker av nonkognitivismen. I uppsatsen rekonstrueras och utvärderas argumentet såsom det formulerats av John McDowell. Enligt argumentet är nonkognitivismen bristfällig eftersom den inte både kan ge en tillfredsställande analys av tjocka moraliska begrepp och framställa moralisk argumentation och debatt som rationell. Uppsatsen visar dock att nonkognitivister kan undvika denna slutsats på flera sätt. Uppsatsen innehåller även en översikt över olika nonkognitivistiska perspektiv på tjocka moraliska begrepp.

Many critics of non-cognitivism have argued that the existence of ‘thick moral concepts’ constitutes a serious challenge to non-cognitivist views of moral language. While this argument is frequently invoked, it has never been clearly articulated. Hence, the argument is often misinterpreted by both friends and foes of non-cognitivism. In this thesis, John McDowell’s forceful rendering of the argument is reconstructed and evaluated. According to the argument, non-cognitivism is not an adequate metaethical view because it cannot both provide an adequate analysis of thick moral concepts and construe moral discourse as rational. It is argued in this thesis that there are several ways in which non-cognitivists can avoid this conclusion. The thesis also contains a survey of various non-cognitivist views on thick moral concepts.

INTRODUÇÃO: Alterações cognitivas em pacientes idosos não são freqüentemente detectadas pelo médico generalista, de acordo com a literatura médica. No Brasil, assim como em outros países, o indivíduo idoso é atendido rotineiramente pelo clínico geral. Neste estudo, verificou-se se alterações da cognição em idosos diagnosticadas por especialistas haviam sido detectadas anteriormente pelos médicos generalistas que acompanham estes indivíduos. Verificou-se também se os instrumentos utilizados na detecção de alterações cognitivas tiveram boa eficácia e foi proposto o uso de alguns deles na prática clínica de rotina do médico generalista. MÉTODOS: Neste estudo de corte transversal, de uma lista de indivíduos idosos atendidos por médicos generalistas em dois serviços de clínica médica geral do Hospital das Clínicas da Faculdade de Medicina da Universidade de São Paulo, foi selecionada uma amostra de forma aleatória. Foi realizada convocação por telefone para que os idosos participassem de pesquisa clínica na qual teriam uma avaliação cognitiva e funcional realizada por um médico geriatra. Constavam dessa avaliação: Mini Exame do Estado Mental (MEEM), Short Informant Questionnaire on Cognitive Decline in the Elderly (Short-IQCODE), Bateria Cognitiva Breve (BCB), Questionário de Avaliação Funcional de Pfeffer (QAF-Pfeffer) e Escala de Depressão Geriátrica de 15 itens (GDS). Os indivíduos foram classificados inicialmente como suspeitos de alteração cognitiva ou não, de acordo com os escores do MEEM e/ou Short-IQCODE. Os suspeitos foram submetidos à análise laboratorial de sangue e realizaram tomografia de crânio, além de terem sido encaminhados à avaliação neuropsicológica. Os indivíduos suspeitos (N=52) e uma subamostra de não-suspeitos (N=53) tiveram diagnósticos nosológicos realizados por meio de discussão entre o pesquisador e dois neurologistas com experiência em demências. Todos os prontuários dos serviços de clínica geral dos suspeitos e da subamostra de não-suspeitos foram analisados procurando-se encontrar anotações a respeito de declínio da cognição. Calculou-se a sensibilidade e a especificidade dos instrumentos utilizados no diagnóstico de demência e de Comprometimento Cognitivo Leve. Calculou-se também a sensibilidade e a especificidade do uso conjunto de alguns instrumentos considerados de fácil aplicação e interpretação. RESULTADOS: 248 pacientes, com mediana de idade de 70 anos e, de escolaridade, de 4 anos, foram submetidos à análise inicial. Cinqüenta e dois indivíduos foram classificados como suspeitos e, desses, 21 tiveram diagnóstico de demência, e 22 de Comprometimento Cognitivo Leve. Em sete (16,27%) prontuários dos serviços de clínica geral dos indivíduos que tiveram diagnóstico de demência e de comprometimento cognitivo havia anotações a respeito de alterações cognitivas. Não houve anotações a respeito de alterações cognitivas nos prontuários dos não-suspeitos. O instrumento utilizado que demonstrou maior eficácia no diagnóstico de declínio cognitivo (demência e Comprometimento Cognitivo Leve) foi o QAF-Pfeffer, com sensibilidade de 84% e especificidade de 94%. Para o diagnóstico de declínio cognitivo, houve aumento da sensibilidade do QAF-Pfeffer quando se analisou a aplicação conjunta desse instrumento com, respectivamente, os testes do desenho do relógio, da fluência verbal (que são instrumentos de fácil aplicação) e o item memória tardia da BCB. As sensibilidades e xv especificidades para o diagnóstico de declínio cognitivo com o uso conjugado do QAF-Pfeffer foram, respectivamente, de 88,4% e 93,5% com o teste de fluência verbal, 93% e 92,5% com o desenho do relógio e de 86,4% e 89,6 % com o item memória tardia da BCB. CONCLUSÕES: O presente estudo conclui que o declínio cognitivo de pacientes idosos é pouco detectado por médicos generalistas em nosso meio. Esse achado é semelhante ao observado em estudos realizados em outros países. Alguns instrumentos apresentaram boa eficácia no diagnóstico das alterações cognitivas, e o uso combinado desses instrumentos aumentou a sensibilidade observada ao utilizá-los isoladamente. Os testes que tiveram melhor desempenho possuem características que os fazem bons instrumentos para o uso de médico generalista, já que são de fácil e rápida aplicação e simples interpretação, características fundamentais em ambientes com altas demandas de pacientes e limitações de tempo para as consultas. Destes, o teste de fluência verbal tem as vantagens da rapidez e de prescindir de quaisquer instrumentos para sua aplicação
INTRODUCTION: Elderlys cognitive impairment is often overlooked by the general practitioner, according to medical literature. In Brazil, as in several other countries, older adults are routinely followed by the general practitioner. This study verified if elderly patients cognitive impairment diagnosed by specialized physicians had such impairment recognized by their general practitioners. Also, it was verified if the cognitive tests and functional scales used in the diagnosing process of cognitive impairment had good efficacy. Some of the instruments used in this diagnosing process were suggested to be used by general practitioners in their working sets. METHODS: In this transversal cut study, a list of elderly outpatients followed by general practitioners at Hospital das Clínicas (Faculty of Medicine, University of São Paulo) was acquired randomly. These subjects were invited by telephone to participate in a clinical study and then submitted to cognitive and functional evaluation by a geriatrician. This evaluation consisted of: Mini Mental State Exam (MMSE), Short Informant Questionnaire on Cognitive Decline in the Elderly (Short-IQCODE), Brief Cognitive Battery, Pfeffer Functional Activities Questionnaire (Pfeffer-FAQ) and Geriatric Depression Scale (GDS) with 15 items. MMSE and/or Short-IQCODE scores were chosen to classify these individuals into suspected cognitive impairment cases or otherwise. The suspects underwent blood analysis and brain computed tomography scan. They also had neuropsychological evaluation (Dementia Rating Scale) performed by a neuropsychologist. The suspects (N=52) and a sample of non-suspects (N=53) were given different diagnosis regarding cognitive impairment through consensus between the researcher and two neurologists with experience in dementia. The general practitioners files of all the suspects and of a sample of non-suspects were checked in order to find notes on cognitive decline. Sensitivity and specificity of the instruments used in the diagnosing process of cognitive impairment (dementia and mild cognitive impairment) were calculated. Easily applicable screening methods were performed in combination and tested for their combined sensitivity and specificity. RESULTS: Two hundred and forty-eight patients, with age and schooling median of 70 years and four years were initially submitted to screening. Fifty two patients were classified as suspects. Of these 52 suspects, 21 had dementia and 22 were classified as having mild cognitive impairment. In seven (16.27%) of these patients (dementia and mild cognitive impairment) records of the general practitioner there were notes on cognitive decline. There were no notes on cognitive decline in general practitioners records of those non-suspects that were given some type of diagnosis. Pfeffer-FAQ had the best sensitivity and specificity considering cognitive impairment (dementia and mild cognitive impairment) diagnosis. For diagnosis of cognitive impairment, Pfeffer-FAQ sensitivity was 84% and specificity, 94%. Pfeffer-FAQ combined with verbal fluency came out with a sensitivity of 88.4% and a specificity of 93.5%; with clock drawing test, 93% and 92.5% and with delayed recall item of Brief Cognitive Battery, 86.4% and 89.6%. CONCLUSION: This study concludes that cognitive decline of elderly patients is not often detected by general practitioners. This finding is similar to that observed in research carried out in other countries. Some instruments used for the diagnosis of cognitive impairment showed good efficacy and some combinations of these instruments increased their sensitivity. The tests with better performance in the diagnosing process of cognitive impairment are easy and fast to apply besides being easy to be interpreted, which make them good tools in working sets with high demand of patients and little time to attend them. Of the tests with best performances, verbal fluency seems to be the most interesting since patients do not even need a pencil to get it done nor appliers need a great amount of time to give back the result of the test

The guiding question for this essay is: who is the learner? The aim is to examine and criticize one answer to this question, sometimes referred to as the theory of the learning brain, which suggests that the explanation of human learning can be reduced to the transmitting and storing of information in the brain’s formal and representational architecture, i.e., that the brain is the learner. This essay will argue that this answer is misleading, because it cannot account for the way people strive to learn in an attempt to lead a good life as it misrepresents the intentional life of the mind, which results in its counting ourselves out of the picture when it attempts to provide a scientific theory of the learning process. To criticize the theory of the learning brain, this essay will investigate its philosophical foundation, a theory of mind called cognitivism, which is the basis for the cognitive sciences. Cognitivism is itself built on three main tenets: mentalism, the mind-brain identity theory and the computer analogy. Each of these tenets will be criticized in turn, before the essay turns to criticize the theory of the learning brain itself. The focus of this essay is, in other words, mainly negative. The hope is that this criticism will lay the groundwork for an alternative view of mind, one that is better equipped to give meaningful answers to the important questions we have about what it means to learn, i.e., what we learn, how we do it and why. This alternative will emphasize the holistic and intentional character of the human mind, and consider the learning process as an intentional activity performed, not by isolated brains, but by people with minds that are extended, embodied, enacted and embedded in a sociocultural and physical context.

Le modèle computo-fonctionnel de la vision de haut niveau de Kosslyn et Koenig (1992) repose sur la dissociation entre la reconnaissance et le traitement spatial de la scène visuelle. En 1987, Kosslyn postula l’existence de deux processus pour le traitement des relations spatiales : un processus catégoriel qui calcule les positions relatives des objets et un processus coordonné qui calcule la distance entre les objets. Des études utilisant le paradigme de présentation en champ visuel divisé ont mis en évidence que l’hémisphère gauche sous-tendrait un traitement catégoriel ; l’hémisphère droit sous-tendrait un traitement coordonné. Cette interaction semblerait valider la dichotomie des deux types de processus.Une revue de la littérature pluridisciplinaire a été menée afin de savoir si ce fait est suffisant pour rejeter l’hypothèse d’un processus unique pour les traitements catégoriels et coordonnés. Entre autres, plusieurs études ont observé un effet de pratique au cours de la réalisation de jugements coordonnés : une diminution de l’intervention de l’hémisphère droit au profit d’une prise en charge progressive de l’hémisphère gauche. De plus, l’avantage de l’hémisphère gauche pour le traitement catégoriel a été rarement observé.Une série de cinq expériences comportementales ont été conduites pour vérifier certains biais expérimentaux qui pourraient expliquer les différences hémisphériques et l’effet de pratique observés. Nos résultats nous ont permis d’avancer des hypothèses axées sur la communication entre les hémisphères et sur un lien entre les processus catégoriels et coordonnés. Une critique du paradigme de présentation en champ visuel divisé et différents modèles d’interaction hémisphérique ont été présentés. Trois expériences ont été menées, afin d’évaluer l’impact des communications hémisphériques dans le traitement des relations spatiales. A la lumière de nos résultats, la dichotomie des processus catégoriels et coordonnés a été discutée
The computational-functional conception of high-level processing of vision in Kosslyn and Koenig (1992) relies on dissociation between object recognition and spatial processing. In 1987, Kosslyn postulated that two different processes compute spatial-relations: categorical process computes relative position of objects and coordinate process computes the distance between objects. Some studies indicate a left-hemisphere advantage for processing categorical spatial relations and a right-hemisphere advantage for processing coordinate spatial relations. This hemispheric difference is interpreted as an evidence of a dichotomy between these two processes. A pluridisciplinary review was conducted to assure that single process hypothesis is dismissed out. Some studies showed, in a coordinate task, that practice resulted in a decreased right-hemisphere involvement and a concurrent increase in left-hemisphere involvement (i.e., practice effect). Furthermore, the left-hemisphere advantage in categorical was seldom observed. The theoretical aim of the thesis was based on two questions: (1) Are there single or several processes encoding visual spatial relations? (2) How can we interpret this practice effect ?Five experiments were run to verify possible bias which might explain observed hemispheric differences and practice effect. Our results suggested that hemispheric communication might be an important factor in spatial-relation processing.An theoretical investigation of divided visual field paradigm was led and several interhemispheric models were described. Three experiments were conducted to estimate hemispheric communication in spatial-relation process. In the light of our results, separate categorical-coordinate processes hypothesis were discussed

Esta tese se compõe de três ensaios que conjuntamente pretendem explorar o papel da família no desenvolvimento humano, destacando especialmente sua função de cuidado na primeira infância e sua influência na formação das habilidades cognitivas e socioemocionais. A hipótese geral parte da premissa que a família é o espaço social com maior influência no desenvolvimento infantil e que determina inclusive os efeitos que outros espaços de educação e cuidado como a creche podem ter nos resultados das crianças. A família representa uma rede de cuidados e afetos, mas também pode constituir um lugar de privações para o bem-estar humano. As características das famílias tanto estruturais como de dinâmicas internas definem os fatores de proteção e os fatores de risco para o desenvolvimento infantil. Nesse sentido, no primeiro ensaio realiza-se uma discussão teórica a partir de abordagens da psicologia e da neurociência sobre como as experiências na família e nos períodos sensíveis da infância determinam resultados das crianças, definindo, por exemplo, o desenvolvimento do cérebro e da personalidade. Nessa linha, apresentam-se as práticas parentais positivas e os estilos parentais participativos como referências para ambientes adequados e de estímulo. O ensaio também analisa o conceito de resiliência e que permite identificar fatores que explicam por que algumas crianças que ainda expostas a ambientes adversos podem atingir boas competências e desempenho. De igual forma, o ensaio discute sobre as habilidades cognitivas e não cognitivas e o papel central das emoções no desenvolvimento humano. No segundo ensaio, avalia-se o desenvolvimento infantil do Chile contemplando diferentes dimensões das crianças, como a cognitiva, socioemocional e motricidade. Considera-se também, ao mesmo tempo, a influência de fatores familiares sobre o nível de desenvolvimento atingido pelas crianças. Para esse objetivo aplica-se o modelo “Multiple Indicator Multiple Causes – MIMIC” que faz parte dos Modelos de Equações Estruturais (SEM). Neste artigo, também se operacionaliza parte da concepção da Abordagem das Capacitações fundamentada por Amartya Sen e Martha Nussbaum ao considerar as oportunidades das crianças atingirem seu desenvolvimento de acordo às condições impostas por suas famílias, seja por suas características estruturais ou socioeconômicas como a renda ou por dinâmicas interna da família associadas ao grau de sensibilidade, práticas de envolvimento parental e exercício de práticas de disciplina. Por fim, no terceiro ensaio avaliam-se os efeitos da creche no desenvolvimento cognitivo e socioemocional das crianças chilenas de 4 a 5 anos, condicionado às características da família, como o status socioeconômico, o grau de sensibilidade materna e as práticas de envolvimento parental. Os resultados mostram que a maior exposição à creche tem maiores benefícios nas habilidades cognitivas de crianças de baixo status socioeconômico do que nas crianças de famílias de maior status. No entanto, há evidências de efeitos negativos da creche sobre os resultados das crianças quando o grau de sensibilidade e envolvimento parental é baixo. Desta forma, este ensaio contribui ao entendimento da importância do engajamento parental para que programas de cuidado à infância como a creche tenham maior sucesso e possam cooperar no desenvolvimento infantil.
This thesis consists of three essays that together aim to explore the role of family in human development, focusing on its care function during the early childhood and its influence on the formation of cognitive and socio-emotional skills. The general hypothesis consists that family is the social space with most influence on child development and it even could determine the effects that other social spaces like the daycare may have on child outcomes. Family is a network of care and affection, but it can also be a place of deprivation for human well-being. The structural characteristics of family as well as internal dynamics define protective and risk factors on child development. In the first essay, a theoretical discussion is done from the approach of psychology and neuroscience, and it explains how experiences in families during sensitive periods in childhood determine child outcomes, defining, for example, brain development and personality. In that sense, positive parenting practices and authoritative parenting style are indicated as references of suitable environments that encourage child development. The essay examines the concept of resilience and through this is possible to identify factors to explain why some children exposed to adverse environments can achieve good performance and skills. Also, the essay discusses about cognitive and non-cognitive skills and the central role of emotions in human development. In the second essay is evaluated the child development in Chile. This analysis includes different dimensions of children, such as cognitive, social-emotional and motor skills and considering at the same time, the influence of family factors on the level of development achieved by the children. For this objective, it is applied the model "Multiple Indicator Multiple Causes - MIMIC" which is part of the Structural Equation Modeling (SEM). In this paper also is used the Capability Approach founded by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum considering the real opportunities of children to achievement their development according the conditions imposed by their families, either by their structural or socioeconomic characteristics such as income or by family internal dynamics associated with the degree of sensitivity, parenting practices and practices of discipline. Finally, the third essay evaluates the effects of daycare on cognitive and socio-emotional development of Chilean children of 4-5 years conditioning to family characteristics, such as socioeconomic status, degree of maternal sensitivity and parental involvement practices. The results showed that more exposure to daycare has more benefits in cognitive skills of children of low socioeconomic status than in children from families of higher status. However, there are evidences of negative effects of daycare on children's outcomes when the degree of sensitivity and parental involvement is low. Thus, this paper contributes understanding the importance of parental involvement for that child care programs like daycare have greater success and these can cooperate in the child development.

L'expérience perceptive directe se vit lors d'un moment juste qui donne accès, dans l'instant présent, à des données de la connaissance de soi et de la connaissance objective. Ce processus à caractère flou et insaisissable est étudié en première personne à partir de mes expériences en arts martiaux, en méditation et en accompagnement à autrui, en deuxième personne à travers les entretiens d'explicitation de pratiquants d'arts martiaux, et en troisième personne avec l'étude bibliographique de travaux scientifiques et artistiques. Cette thèse a suivi le cheminement parallèle d'un travail de recherche et d'une transformation intérieure. Cette double évolution trace une voie qui relie l'approfondissement du ressenti corporel et énergétique, les échanges nourrissants guidés par des connexions synchronistiques et l'harmonisation avec le contexte environnant, pour aboutir au passage d'une réflexion de la tête à un espace du cœur. Elle élargit la conscience perceptive qui voyage du regard sensoriel à une vision plus intuitive. La véracité des informations immatérielles perçues et non démontrables s'auto-valide par la création de son propre outil de vérification. Cet outil est porté par les valeurs d'intégrité qui responsabilisent le chercheur comme le lecteur à travers une relation d'équilibre interactif qui repose sur la notion d'utilité vitale et sur le positionnement éthique de chacune des parties. Ce ne sont plus les parties qui sont à la recherche scientifique du tout, mais l'universel qui vient guider le cœur de ces infimes parcelles de l'univers incarnée par chacun de nous
Direct perceptual experience can be lived as a true moment providing access, in the present moment, to self-knowledge and objective knowledge. The details of this elusive process is apprehended through my experiences in martial arts, meditation, energetic healing and coaching (first-person point of view), through elicitation interviews with martial artists (second-person method), and the review of scientific and artistic literature (third-person approach). This dissertation has followed the parallel journey of research work and inner transformation. This twofold development follows a path that puts together the deepening of body energy and feeling, nourishing exchanges guided by synchronistic connections, and by harmonization with the surrounding context. This association leads to the passage of reflexion in the head to a space of the heart. It brings an expansion of perceptual awareness from sensory seeing to intuitive vision. The veracity of immaterial information that occurs through this perceptual enlargement, is self-validated by creating a holographic personal verification tool. This tool is supported by the values of integrity that empower the research as well as the reader, through an interactive equilibrium relationship based on the concept of vital utility and ethical stance of each party. No longer does scientific research use parts to provide a theory of everything: instead the universal comes to guide the heart of these tiny patches of the universe embodied in each of us

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A tese da Atuação do Corpo Cognitivo, baseada no trânsito metafórico da cognição individual para coletiva, desenvolve-se numa pesquisa qualitativa interdisciplinar que toma como referentes teóricos da cognição humana os estudos da mente incorporada de Varela, Thompson, Rosch, Lakoff, Johnson e outros, e da mente consciente de Damásio. Propondo para a compreensão da cognição individual a ideia da atuação do corpo cognitivo, que procura explicar, de que se constitui, como se configura e atua. Então, arrisca a metáfora da atuação do corpo cognitivo como abordagem epistêmica das formas de construção e difusão de conhecimento numa comunidade de prática, seguindo os estudos de Wenger e tendo como lócus de atuação e observação a comunidade de prática que trabalha na manutenção do ambiente Moodle na Universidade Federal da Bahia. A atuação do corpo cognitivo dá rota a esta navegação que tem como rumo a criação coletiva do conhecimento e justifica-se socialmente pela importância de desenvolver o conhecimento do conhecer.
ABSTRACT The thesis Cognitive Body Enaction, based on the metaphorical transit between individual and collective cognition, is developed in an interdisciplinary qualitative research that takes human cognition theoretical references from Varela, Thompson, Rosch, Lakoff, Johnson and others embodied mind studies and Damásio's conscious mind. Proposing the individual cognition understanding by means of cognitive body enaction idea, explains his constitution, how stands up and actuates. Then, taking some risk, proposes the cognitive body enaction metaphor as an epistemic approach to forms of knowledge construction and dissemination in a community of practice, following Wenger's studies and using the community of practice that maintains the Moodle environment at Federal University of Bahia as locus for action and observation. The cognitive body enaction gives route to this navigation, whose direction is the collective knowledge creation which is socially justified by the knowledge of knowing development.

The topic of the thesis are moral judgments which are articulated in language by claims or speech-acts like, for example, “One ought to keep one’s promises” or “It is good to respect the beauty of nature”. According to the philosophical literature on moral judgments, they have two distinctive features. They are objective and practical: They purport to be correct in an objective sense and they tend to motivate us to act in certain ways. In light of these two features, I discuss the two most prominent accounts in the philosophical literature on moral judgments: cognitivism and noncognitivism. Cognitivism takes moral judgments to be acts of theoretical knowledge with a special normative content. Noncognitivism takes moral judgments to be desire-like acts of the mind. In part I., I argue that cognitivism is not able to make sense of moral judgments as the unity of objectivity and practicality since it spoils the practical character of such judgments. In part II., I argue that noncognitivism is not able to make sense of moral judgments as the unity of objectivity and practicality because it makes the objectivity of moral claims mysterious. In part III. of the thesis, I then aim at developing an alternative to cognitivism and noncognitivism that overcomes their shortcomings but also saves their insights. I call this alternative account 'practical cognitivism'. The core claim of practical cognitivism is that moral judgments are acts of a sui generis power for practical knowledge or cognition. The bulk of part III. is about developing this claim and showing that it allows us to make sense of moral judgments as the unity of objectivity and practicality. I end the thesis by responding to some objections that might be raised against practical cognitivism.:1. Approaching my topic: moral judgments 1 1.1. The objectivity of moral judgments ................... 5 1.2. The practicality of moral judgments................... 9 1.3. The task, the problem .......................... 11 1.4. Outlook .................................. 16 I. Cognitivism 21 2. Introduction 21 3. Cognitivism: the basics 22 3.1. Ordinary descriptive beliefs ....................... 22 3.2. Moral beliefs................................ 28 3.3. Scanlon’s and Smith’s cognitivism.................... 31 4. Cognitivism and the objectivity of moral judgments 35 5. Cognitivism and the practicality of moral judgments 38 5.1. Attempt#1:Externalism ........................ 40 5.2. Attempt #2: The rationality-based account of practicality . . . . . . 44 5.3. Attempt#3: Volitionalism........................ 55 6. Conclusion 63 II. Noncognitivism 67 7. Introduction 67 8. Noncognitivism: the basics 69 8.1. Nondescriptivism ............................. 69 8.2. Intrinsic practicality ........................... 71 8.3. The desire-like account of intrinsic practicality . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 8.4. A standard of internal consistency.................... 79 8.5. Expressing vs. reporting ......................... 85 9. Noncognitivism and the practicality of moral judgments 88 10.Noncognitivism and the objectivity of moral judgments 90 10.1. Noncognitivism vs. speakersubjectivism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 10.2. Attempt #1: Horgan and Timmons................... 96 10.3. Attempt #2: Blackburn ......................... 99 10.4. Attempt #3: Gibbard ..........................103 11. Conclusion 112 III. Practical Cognitivism 115 12. Introduction 115 12.1. Diagnosis .................................115 12.2. Practical cognitivism ...........................125 13. The generic concept of form 130 13.1. Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 13.2. Applying the generic concept of form to moral judgments . . . . . . . 136 14.The practical character of practical knowledge 138 15.The cognitive character of practical knowledge 145 15.1. Universal validity as a feature of theoretical knowledge . . . . . . . . 146 15.2. Universal validity as a feature of practical knowledge . . . . . . . . . 148 16. The self-conscious character of practical knowledge 153 17. Moral judgments as acts of practical knowledge 160 17.1. Self-conscious practicality ........................161 17.2. Self-conscious validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164 1 7.3. Self-conscious practical validity .....................167 18. Excursus: Thompson’s (Neo)Aristotelian practical cognitivism 172 19.The objectivity and intrinsic practicality of moral judgments 179 19.1. The objectivity of moral judgments ...................180 19.2.The intrinsic practicality of moral judgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 19.3. Shared willing, public reasons and practical knowledge of the good . . 191 20.Conclusion 196 21.Objections 198 21.1. Moral error and practical irrationality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .200 21.2. The formalism objection .........................208 22. Acknowledgement 219 References 220

Constructivism is a relatively recent theory of learning which focuses on using learner-centred strategies in learning. Reform efforts in education in Zimbabwe have been aimed at incorporating constructivist-inspired strategies in the classroom, with mixed results. Some teachers continue to prefer traditional approaches to learning in their classrooms, despite these being teacher-centred and generally looked down upon. The study examined the perceptions of primary school student teachers regarding the practical application of constructivism in the classroom. A qualitative research design was adopted, and the study was grounded in a constructivist and interpretivist paradigm aimed at understanding perceptions emanating from the lived experiences of the student teachers. In all, eight student teachers were sampled for the study by means of purposive, convenience and stratified random sampling. Data was collected through a literature review, lesson observations and semi-structured individual interviews. The rigour of the study was maintained by ensuring trustworthiness and the credibility of the findings. Ethical issues were adhered to. Data was analysed using Tesch’s method of data analysis, through which the researcher identified categories and themes, and reported on in narrative format. The study findings indicate that student teachers have a positive perception of the practical application of constructivism in learning. Participants expressed the view that the practical application of constructivism leads to deeper learning and greater understanding by learners. Participants nevertheless stated that in their efforts to implement constructivism in learning and teaching during their practicums they experienced a lack of support from mentor teachers and shortages of resources. Considering these findings, the researcher made several recommendations to various stakeholders with the aim of helping student teachers to be more effective constructivist teachers. The recommendations include the need to carry out more research on the constructivist learning theory and its practical application in the classroom as well as encouraging teachers to apply constructivist learner-centred strategies in their classrooms. The researcher also made recommendations for further research.
Psychology of Education

Partindo do pressuposto que, atualmente, existe uma maior consciencialização por parte das instituições bancárias de que a ética ou a falta dela pode afetar positiva ou negativamente a sua reputação, é possível afirmar que a preocupação do setor bancário em se reger por normas, condutas e práticas éticas tem vindo a aumentar exponencialmente. Contudo, o alinhamento de tais práticas com as operações diárias de um banco exige o tratamento cuidado de um vasto leque de variáveis, tangíveis ou intangíveis, o que constitui um processo notoriamente difícil. Por conseguinte, o objetivo principal da presente dissertação centra-se no desenvolvimento de um modelo conceptual, através de ferramentas de mapeamento cognitivo difuso (i.e. fuzzy cognitive mapping), que visa o reconhecimento e a perceção das relações de causalidade entre os elementos que influenciam as práticas éticas no setor bancário. Os resultados obtidos indicam que os mapas cognitivos detêm um elevado potencial de aplicabilidade no que diz respeito à estruturação de problemas dinâmicos e reais, oferecendo assim a possibilidade de minimizar os erros aquando do processo de tomada de decisão. Em particular, foi possível apurar que a gestão ética dos colaboradores, as práticas e comportamentos dos colaboradores, as práticas de governance e as práticas de responsabilidade social são, efetivamente, os elementos de maior representatividade na análise das práticas de ética bancária. As pressuposições práticas do modelo criado, as respetivas vantagens e limitações são também objeto de discussão. Palavras-Chave: Apoio à Tomada de Decisão; Práticas Éticas; Setor Bancário; Dinâmicas de Causa-Efeito; Mapas Cognitivos Fuzzy.
because the perceived ethics of a banking institution can affect its reputation, concern over ethical practices in the banking sector is rapidly increasing. The alignment of such practices with daily operations, however, requires dealing with a wide range of variables, tangible or intangible, and constitutes a notoriously difficult endeavor. Still, due to the rapidly changing economic environment and current sharp competition in the banking industry, a better understanding of this alignment can help bank managers and other key players enhance value creation through more informed decisions, contributing to stronger integration of ethical practices in the banks’ daily activities. This paper proposes the use of fuzzy cognitive maps (FCMs) to analyze the dynamics behind ethical banking practices. Grounded on intensive group meetings with a panel of senior executives from the banking industry, the result is a well-informed processoriented framework that sheds light on the manner in which ethical practices interrelate with each other. Implications, advantages and shortcomings of our proposal are also discussed.

Cognitivists about practical reason hold that we can explain why certain wide-scope requirements of practical rationality are true by appealing to certain epistemic requirements. Extant discussions of cognitivism focus solely on two claims. The first is the claim that intentions involve beliefs. The second is that whenever your intentions are incoherent in certain ways, you will be epistemically irrational (given that intentions involve beliefs). Even if the cognitivist successfully defends these claims, she still has to show that the epistemic requirements explain the practical requirements. This chapter argues that it is not plausible that the epistemic requirements explain the practical requirements. This shows that the cognitivists’ project will fail even if their controversial views about the relationship between the practical and epistemic are granted.

This essay argues against an approach—one I call cognitivism—that tries to understand synchronic plan rationality as, at bottom a matter of theoretical rationality of belief. This approach is taken by, among others, Gilbert Harman, J. David Velleman, and R. Jay Wallace. I explain several problems for such cognitivism: there are problems posed by the possibility of false beliefs about what one intends; and there are problems posed by the need to distinguish intended means from expected side effects. In response to a challenge from Velleman, I sketch an alternative approach, one that sees these planning norms as fundamentally practical norms and that notes a parallel with Peter Strawson’s treatment of the framework of reactive attitudes.

This essay continues my critique of the cognitivist view that the norms on intention of instrumental rationality and consistency are, at bottom, norms of theoretical rationality on one’s beliefs. It critically examines the cognitivist views of Gilbert Harman, J. David Velleman, Kieran Setiya, and John Broome. The essay sketches a proposed alternative to such cognitivism: the practical commitment view of instrumental rationality. The essay explores the challenge posed for cognitivism by the possibility of false beliefs about one’s own intentions; and the essay also explores the idea that, while belief aims at truth, intention aims at coordinated, effective control of action.

Planning agency involves characteristic norms of practical rationality—in particular, norms of consistency and of means-end coherence of intentions. This essay defends the idea that there is normally a normative reason of self-governance in favor of conformity to these norms in the particular case. I contrast this self-governance-based view of these norms of plan rationality with the myth theories of Joseph Raz and Niko Kolodny, and with the cognitivism of Kieran Setiya. I explain how this view responds to concerns (including an argument from Setiya that focuses on nonmodifiable intentions) about the inappropriate bootstrapping of normative reasons. And I explore relations between this view and related work of John Broome, and between this view and Harry Frankfurt’s work on volitional necessity.

The three main ethical theories in Western philosophy can be used as a framework from which to bring out the features of Buddhist ethics; hermeneutical questions regarding the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of comparison; a consideration of Buddhist ethics as virtue ethics, centring around the notions of practices, narratives, and traditions, as proposed by MacIntyre, including a discussion of relativism in the context of naturalism, the fact/value gap, and cognitivism/non-cognitivism; a critique of consequentialism including a discussion of Goodman and Singer on altruism and compassion, agent-neutrality, and personhood, especially the bodhisattva-ideal; a critique of deontology that argues that there are no moral absolutes, and that only the wise can establish in a particular situation what is right, that is, what leads to a more awakened state. Conclusion: a discussion of why it is fruitful to see Buddhist ethics as a member of the family of (neo-Aristotelian) virtue ethical theories.

Like aesthetic hedonism, the network theory assumes aesthetic value realism. The chapter argues for aesthetic naturalism without appeal to aesthetic non-cognitivism or aesthetic nihilism. First, aesthetic normativity reduces to achievement normativity. Second, aesthetic value facts are grounded in non-aesthetic facts. Grounding, by contrast with supervenience, provides for metaphysical explanations of the very kind that we seek in order to understand and to manipulate aesthetic value in the world. Many philosophers fret about whether or not aesthetic value facts are subjective (response-constituted). A distinction between what grounds aesthetic value facts and what anchors aesthetic practices makes clear how aesthetic values are anthropocentric, but not response-constituted.

Cognitivists about practical rationality argue that some requirements of practical rationality can be explained by the requirements of theoretical rationality, given the way in which intentions involve beliefs. This chapter considers several possible ways a cognitivist could explain means–ends coherence. It first considers accounts that use the Strong Belief Thesis, according to which intending to X involves believing one will X. It considers and reject several important arguments David Velleman has proposed in defense of the thesis. Additionally, the chapter argues that the thesis is vulnerable to counterexamples, and the standard moves made in response to such counterexamples are unhelpful to the cognitivist. It then considers accounts that use a weaker thesis about the intention–belief connection, but even the best available cognitivist account along these lines has trouble showing that the theoretical requirements explain the practical ones.

Constructivism attempts to straddle the divide between two extremes: on the one hand that the practical good exists independent of human thought and choice, or on the other that ethical claims are not truth-evaluable, because they have a non-cognitivist basis or even represent outright error. Aristotle’s position is compared to the forms of constructivism that see normativity as constitutive of agency, and his strategy is located within the current philosophical landscape. Although Aristotle’s position may not be as sophisticated or as carefully articulated as modern versions, it is argued that it is no accident that some modern constructivist accounts have drawn on Aristotelian resources.

The communicative practices that comprise religions have their roots in human niche construction. But this is not a cognitivist argument that locates religion in particular regions of the brain, or a naturalist, biological reductionism that maintains the hegemony of the genes; rather, it contends that forms of communicative practice that are constitutive of religions, while being rooted in human biology, function at a cultural level that has autonomy from the cellular. Religions are niche constructions that create worlds of meaning through imagination within which people can live complete and competent lives and that function eschatologically to facilitate self-repair; their roots are in the pro-social emotions, language development, and ritual behaviour.

This study aims to analyze the strategic implications that the organizational culture has on organizational knowledge, learning, and innovation. It begins from the assumption that there is a direct and positive relationship between the organizational culture and knowledge, learning, and innovation in organizations. It also is assumed that organizational culture, knowledge, learning, and innovation play a receptive to sustainable organizational practices. The method used is the appreciative inquiry as a collaborative dialogue based on the question of what is the best of and what might be that aims to design and implement innovations in sustainable organizational arrangements and processes. The theoretical framework is based on organizational cultural cognitivism theory and the theory of socio-ecological intergradation. It is concluded that sustainable organizations practices require the creation and development of an organizational culture supportive of knowledge, learning, and innovation practices.

DESCRIPCIÓN DEL CASO: Varón de 30 años sin antecedentes personales en salud mental. Consumidor de múltiples tóxicos (cannabis, heroína, cocaína, alcohol). Varios ingresos en Psiquiatría. Niega clínica psicótica anterior por consumo de tóxicos. Inicio de clínica hace varios meses sin consumo. EXPLORACIÓN PSICOPATOLÓGICA: Consciente, orientado, colaborador y abordable. Discurso coherente y fluido sin alteraciones en curso o forma. No alteraciones mayores del estado de ánimo. Autorreferencialidad. Ideación delirante de perjuicio con importante repercusión afectiva/ conductual. Alucinaciones auditivas (voces comentadoras). Nula conciencia de enfermedad. JUICIO CLÍNICO: Primer episodio psicótico con síntomas de esquizofrenia F23.2 según CIE-10 EVOLUCIÓN CLÍNICA: La evolución del paciente en un primer momento ha sido desfavorable debido a la escasa conciencia de enfermedad, falta de adherencia terapéutica y consumos puntuales de tóxicos con descompensaciones psicopatológicas posteriores. Se han realizado varios ajustes de tratamiento psicofarmacológicos declarando secundarismos (risperidona, olanzapina, paliperidona). En el último ingreso se inicia tratamiento con formulación inyectable de liberación prolongada mensual (Abilify Maintena 400 mg). Tras esto permanece estable psicopatológicamente, sin evidenciarse clínica psicótica productiva. Persiste el consumo puntual de cannabis con finalidad evasiva. CONCLUSIONES: La psicosis exotóxica se produce directamente por el consumo de un tóxico, aunque los síntomas psicóticos podrían persistir una vez eliminada el tóxico. Se asocian también a cambios bruscos en la conducta con irritabilidad, agresividad, alteraciones anímicas, fallos cognitivos, alteraciones del patrón del sueño, trastornos perceptivos (visuales, somáticos) y trastornos de la conciencia. Si bien en este caso habría que valorar evolución para realizar diagnosticar de Esquizofrenia. REFERENCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFRICAS: -APA Clinical Guidelines. American Psychiatric Association. Practice guidelines for the treatment of patients with schizophrenia. 2004Angermeyer et al. Schizophr Bull 1990; 16: 293–300. -NICE. Psychosis and schizophrenia in adults. Treatment and management. National Clinical Practice Guideline Number 178