Auswahl der wissenschaftlichen Literatur zum Thema „Post-quantum security“
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Zeitschriftenartikel zum Thema "Post-quantum security"
Li, Silong, Yuxiang Chen, Lin Chen, Jing Liao, Chanchan Kuang, Kuanching Li, Wei Liang und Naixue Xiong. „Post-Quantum Security: Opportunities and Challenges“. Sensors 23, Nr. 21 (26.10.2023): 8744. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/s23218744.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleHosoyamada, Akinori. „On post-quantum security of symmetric cryptosystems“. IEICE ESS Fundamentals Review 17, Nr. 1 (01.07.2023): 59–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1587/essfr.17.1_59.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleSedat Sonko, Kenneth Ifeanyi Ibekwe, Valentine Ikenna Ilojianya, Emmanuel Augustine Etukudoh und Adefunke Fabuyide. „QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY AND U.S. DIGITAL SECURITY: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW: INVESTIGATING THE POTENTIAL OF QUANTUM TECHNOLOGIES IN CREATING UNBREAKABLE ENCRYPTION AND THEIR FUTURE IN NATIONAL SECURITY“. Computer Science & IT Research Journal 5, Nr. 2 (18.02.2024): 390–414. http://dx.doi.org/10.51594/csitrj.v5i2.790.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleDjordjevic, Ivan B. „Physical-Layer Security, Quantum Key Distribution, and Post-Quantum Cryptography“. Entropy 24, Nr. 7 (06.07.2022): 935. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e24070935.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleBene, Fruzsina, und Attila Kiss. „Post-Quantum Security Overview of the Public Key Infrastructure“. SYSTEM THEORY, CONTROL AND COMPUTING JOURNAL 3, Nr. 2 (31.12.2023): 27–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.52846/stccj.2023.3.2.55.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleCultice, Tyler, und Himanshu Thapliyal. „PUF-Based Post-Quantum CAN-FD Framework for Vehicular Security“. Information 13, Nr. 8 (09.08.2022): 382. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/info13080382.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleSong, Gyeongju, Kyoungbae Jang, Hyunjun Kim, Siwoo Eum, Minjoo Sim, Hyunji Kim, Waikong Lee und Hwajeong Seo. „SPEEDY Quantum Circuit for Grover’s Algorithm“. Applied Sciences 12, Nr. 14 (07.07.2022): 6870. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/app12146870.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleB, Sonia Singh, Sravan Karthik T und Shubhaprada KP. „Investigating SHA and Proposing SPHINCS+ as a Post Quantum Algorithm (PQC)“. International Journal for Research in Applied Science and Engineering Technology 11, Nr. 9 (30.09.2023): 1611–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.22214/ijraset.2023.55872.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleAravinda, S., Anindita Banerjee, Anirban Pathak und R. Srikanth. „Orthogonal-state-based cryptography in quantum mechanics and local post-quantum theories“. International Journal of Quantum Information 12, Nr. 07n08 (November 2014): 1560020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219749915600205.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleYevseiev, Serhii, Alla Gavrilova, Bogdan Tomashevsky und Firuz Samadov. „Research of crypto-code designs construction for using in post quantum cryptography“. Development Management 16, Nr. 4 (04.02.2019): 26–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/dm.4(4).2018.03.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleDissertationen zum Thema "Post-quantum security"
Wilson, Freya Louise. „A solution for post quantum security using existing communications infrastructures“. Thesis, University of Leeds, 2017. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/20820/.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleMagnusson, Olof, und Mats Hurtig. „Post-Quantum Public Key Cryptography for the Internet of Things“. Thesis, Högskolan i Halmstad, Akademin för informationsteknologi, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hh:diva-40459.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleDeneuville, Jean-Christophe. „Contributions à la cryptographie post-quantique“. Thesis, Limoges, 2016. http://www.theses.fr/2016LIMO0112/document.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleIn the likely event where a quantum computer sees the light, number theoretic based cryptographic primitives being actually in use might become deciduous. This results in an important need to design schemes that could face off this new threat. Lattices and Error Correcting Codes are mathematical tools allowing to build algebraic problems, for which – up to-date – no quantum algorithm significantly speeding up their resolution is known. In this thesis, we propose four such kind cryptographic primitives: two signatures schemes (among those a traceable one) based on lattices, a signature delegation protocol using fully homomorphic encryption, and a new framework for building very efficient and practical code-based cryptosystems. These contributions are fed with concrete parameters allowing to gauge the concrete costs of security in a post-quantum world
Bonnoron, Guillaume. „A journey towards practical fully homomorphic encryption“. Thesis, Ecole nationale supérieure Mines-Télécom Atlantique Bretagne Pays de la Loire, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018IMTA0073/document.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleCraig Gentry presented in 2009 the first fully homomorphic encryption scheme. Since then, a tremendous effort has been, and still is, dedicated by the cryptographic community to make practical this new kind of cryptography. It is revolutionnary because it enables direct computation on encrypted data (without the need for the computing entity to decrypt them). Several trends have been developed in parallel, exploring on one side fully homomorphic encryption schemes, more versatile for applications but more costly in terms of time and memory. On the other side, the somewhat homomorphic encryption schemes are less flexible but more efficient. This thesis, achieved within the Chair of Naval Cyber Defence, contributes to these trends. We have endorsed different roles. First, an attacker position to assess the hardness of the security assumptions of the proposals. Then, we conducted a state-of-the-art of the most promising schemes in order to identify the best(s) depending on the use-cases and to give precise advice to appropriately set the parameters that drive security level, ciphertext sizes and computation costs. Last, we endorsed a designer role. We proposed a new powerful fully homomorphic encryption scheme together with its open-source implementation, available on github
Bindel, Nina [Verfasser], Johannes [Akademischer Betreuer] Buchmann und Douglas [Akademischer Betreuer] Stebila. „On the Security of Lattice-Based Signature Schemes in a Post-Quantum World / Nina Bindel ; Johannes Buchmann, Douglas Stebila“. Darmstadt : Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Darmstadt, 2018. http://d-nb.info/1169825729/34.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleSchrottenloher, André. „Quantum Algorithms for Cryptanalysis and Quantum-safe Symmetric Cryptography“. Electronic Thesis or Diss., Sorbonne université, 2021. http://www.theses.fr/2021SORUS271.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleModern cryptography relies on the notion of computational security. The level of security given by a cryptosystem is expressed as an amount of computational resources required to break it. The goal of cryptanalysis is to find attacks, that is, algorithms with lower complexities than the conjectural bounds.With the advent of quantum computing devices, these levels of security have to be updated to take a whole new notion of algorithms into account. At the same time, cryptography is becoming widely used in small devices (smart cards, sensors), with new cost constraints.In this thesis, we study the security of secret-key cryptosystems against quantum adversaries.We first build new quantum algorithms for k-list (k-XOR or k-SUM) problems, by composing exhaustive search procedures. Next, we present dedicated cryptanalysis results, starting with a new quantum cryptanalysis tool, the offline Simon's algorithm. We describe new attacks against the lightweight algorithms Spook and Gimli and we perform the first quantum security analysis of the standard cipher AES.Finally, we specify Saturnin, a family of lightweight cryptosystems oriented towards post-quantum security. Thanks to a very similar structure, its security relies largely on the analysis of AES
Zhang, Zheng. „The Singularity Attack on Himq-3: A High-Speed Signature Scheme Based on Multivariate Quadratic Equations“. University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK, 2021. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1623251333085284.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleKaim, Guillaume. „Cryptographie post-quantique pour la protection de la vie privée“. Thesis, Rennes 1, 2020. http://www.theses.fr/2020REN1S077.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleThe past few years have seen the rising of the quantum computers, that are a serious threat to nearly all the actual cryptographic schemes used in practice. In this thesis we propose some new constructions to prevent this obsolescence by building our schemes on the mathematical tool of lattices that is assumed post-quantum resistant. We firstly develop a group signature scheme, allowing each member composing the group to anonymously sign on the behalf of the group. We add a supplementary property, which is the froward secrecy. This property cut the time in periods, such that each secret key is updated when entering a new period. We also propose a blind signature scheme, which is an interactive protocol between an user, who wants to sign a message, with a signer who possesses the signing secret key. We improve the state-of-the art by proposing a constructions without any restart and with a more efficient security. Finally as a use case of the blind signature, we develop an evoting protocol that take as a basis the construction described above
Majumdar, Aalo. „Security of Post-Quantum Multivariate Blind Signature Scheme: Revisited and Improved“. Thesis, 2021. https://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/5573.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleBindel, Nina. „On the Security of Lattice-Based Signature Schemes in a Post-Quantum World“. Phd thesis, 2018. https://tuprints.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/8100/8/Dissertation_NBindel_v1.pdf.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleBücher zum Thema "Post-quantum security"
Kumar, Adarsh, Neelu Jyothi Ahuja, Keshav Kaushik, Deepak Singh Tomar und Surbhi Bhatia Khan, Hrsg. Sustainable Security Practices Using Blockchain, Quantum and Post-Quantum Technologies for Real Time Applications. Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-0088-2.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleDjordjevic, Ivan B., Hrsg. Physical-Layer Security, Quantum Key Distribution and Post-quantum Cryptography. MDPI, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/books978-3-0365-5004-6.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleWireless Quantum Networks, Volume 2 : Quantum vs Post Quantum Security: Algorithms and Design Technology. Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, John, 2023.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenWireless Quantum Networks, Volume 2 : Quantum vs Post Quantum Security: Algorithms and Design Technology. Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, John, 2023.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenWireless Quantum Networks, Volume 2 : Quantum vs Post Quantum Security: Algorithms and Design Technology. Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, John, 2023.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenWireless Quantum Networks, Volume 2 : Quantum vs Post Quantum Security: Algorithms and Design Technology. Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, John, 2023.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenBadhwar, Raj. CISO's Next Frontier: AI, Post-Quantum Cryptography and Advanced Security Paradigms. Springer International Publishing AG, 2022.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenDing, Jintai, und Jean-Pierre Tillich. Post-Quantum Cryptography: 11th International Conference, PQCrypto 2020, Paris, France, April 15–17, 2020, Proceedings. Springer, 2020.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenBadhwar, Raj. The CISOs Next Frontier: AI, Post-Quantum Cryptography and Advanced Security Paradigms. Springer International Publishing AG, 2021.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenDing, Jintai, und Rainer Steinwandt. Post-Quantum Cryptography: 10th International Conference, PQCrypto 2019, Chongqing, China, May 8–10, 2019 Revised Selected Papers. Springer, 2019.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenBuchteile zum Thema "Post-quantum security"
Bernstein, Daniel J. „Post-Quantum Cryptography“. In Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security, 949–50. Boston, MA: Springer US, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5906-5_386.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleBhatia, Amandeep Singh, und Ajay Kumar. „Post-Quantum Cryptography“. In Emerging Security Algorithms and Techniques, 139–58. Boca Raton : Taylor & Francis, a CRC title, part of the Taylor &: Chapman and Hall/CRC, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1201/9781351021708-9.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleArya, Ashish, Arti Ranjan und Amrit Kumar Agrawal. „Post-quantum image security“. In Digital Image Security, 43–75. Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1201/9781003468974-3.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleCovic, Ana, Sreeja Chowdhury, Rabin Yu Acharya, Fatemeh Ganji und Domenic Forte. „Post-Quantum Hardware Security“. In Emerging Topics in Hardware Security, 199–227. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64448-2_8.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleCartor, Ryann, und Daniel Smith-Tone. „An Updated Security Analysis of PFLASH“. In Post-Quantum Cryptography, 241–54. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59879-6_14.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleFehr, Serge, und Yu-Hsuan Huang. „On the Quantum Security of HAWK“. In Post-Quantum Cryptography, 405–16. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40003-2_15.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleYasuda, Takanori, und Kouichi Sakurai. „A Security Analysis of Uniformly-Layered Rainbow“. In Post-Quantum Cryptography, 275–94. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25405-5_18.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleCzajkowski, Jan, Leon Groot Bruinderink, Andreas Hülsing, Christian Schaffner und Dominique Unruh. „Post-quantum Security of the Sponge Construction“. In Post-Quantum Cryptography, 185–204. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-79063-3_9.
Der volle Inhalt der QuellePerlner, Ray, und Daniel Smith-Tone. „Security Analysis and Key Modification for ZHFE“. In Post-Quantum Cryptography, 197–212. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29360-8_13.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleSoukharev, Vladimir, David Jao und Srinath Seshadri. „Post-Quantum Security Models for Authenticated Encryption“. In Post-Quantum Cryptography, 64–78. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29360-8_5.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleKonferenzberichte zum Thema "Post-quantum security"
Hulsing, Andreas, Kai-Chun Ning, Peter Schwabe, Florian Weber und Philip R. Zimmermann. „Post-quantum WireGuard“. In 2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). IEEE, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/sp40001.2021.00030.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleLi, Xiangdong, Lin Leung, Andis Chi-Tung Kwan, Xiaowen Zhang, Dammika Kahanda und Michael Anshel. „Post-quantum key exchange protocols“. In Defense and Security Symposium, herausgegeben von Eric J. Donkor, Andrew R. Pirich und Howard E. Brandt. SPIE, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1117/12.665685.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleAngel, Yawning, Benjamin Dowling, Andreas Hülsing, Peter Schwabe und Florian Weber. „Post Quantum Noise“. In CCS '22: 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3548606.3560577.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleSanon, Sogo Pierre, Ihab Alzalam und Hans D. Schotten. „Quantum and Post-Quantum Security in Future Networks“. In 2023 IEEE Future Networks World Forum (FNWF). IEEE, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/fnwf58287.2023.10520624.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleSharifian, Setareh, Reihaneh Safavi-Naini und Fuchun Lin. „Post-quantum Security using Channel Noise“. In CCS '18: 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3243734.3278517.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleClancy, T. Charles, Robert W. McGwier und Lidong Chen. „Post-quantum cryptography and 5G security“. In WiSec '19: 12th ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3317549.3324882.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleMisra, Manoj Kumar, Rashi Mathur und Rishish Tripathi. „On Post Quantum Wireless Communication Security“. In 2021 5th International Conference on Information Systems and Computer Networks (ISCON). IEEE, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iscon52037.2021.9702489.
Der volle Inhalt der Quelle„Conference Panel 1: Post-Quantum Security“. In 2021 Third IEEE International Conference on Trust, Privacy and Security in Intelligent Systems and Applications (TPS-ISA). IEEE, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/tpsisa52974.2021.00047.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleJoshi, Sandeep, Amit Kumar Bairwa, Anton Pavlovich Pljonkin, Pradumn Garg und Kshitij Agrawal. „From Pre-Quantum to Post-Quantum RSA“. In NISS 2023: The 6th International Conference on Networking, Intelligent Systems & Security. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3607720.3607721.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleFritzmann, Tim, Jonas Vith und Johanna Sepulveda. „Strengthening Post-Quantum Security for Automotive Systems“. In 2020 23rd Euromicro Conference on Digital System Design (DSD). IEEE, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/dsd51259.2020.00094.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleBerichte der Organisationen zum Thema "Post-quantum security"
Perdigão, Rui A. P. Strengthening Multi-Hazard Resilience with Quantum Aerospace Systems Intelligence. Synergistic Manifolds, Januar 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.46337/240301.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleFluhrer, S., P. Kampanakis, D. McGrew und V. Smyslov. Mixing Preshared Keys in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) for Post-quantum Security. RFC Editor, Juni 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/rfc8784.
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