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Le Poidevin, Robin. „The Possibility of Metaphysics“. International Philosophical Quarterly 42, Nr. 4 (2002): 546–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq200242454.
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Kerr, Andrew J. „The Possibility of Metaphysics“. Environmental Ethics 22, Nr. 1 (2000): 85–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/enviroethics200022151.
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Kosykhin, Vitaly G., und Svetlana M. Malkina. „Metaphysics and Realism“. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 58, Nr. 2 (2021): 216–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps202158237.
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The article deals with the problem of the return of metaphysics within the framework of the ontological turn of philosophy and the situation of post-metaphysical thinking. The conditions for the possibility of modern metaphysical discourse in the projects of empirical metaphysics and historical ontology are revealed. Historical ontology as a meta-reflexion of philosophy over its own historical foundations is able to bridge the gap between the epistemological static nature of transcendental subjectivity and the ontological dynamism of the growth of scientific knowledge about reality by comprehending the conditions of interaction between science and metaphysics in conditions of post-metaphysical thinking and realistic reversal of ontology. Philosophical knowledge in the context of the ontological turn and the associated return of metaphysics becomes focused not so much on the sharp demarcation of science and metaphysics and postulating the incommensurability of their ontologies, but on identifying mutually enriching areas of research that could give a new impetus to their development.
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Altaş, Eşref, und Ayaz Asadov. „The Power and Limits of Reason: Al-Razı on the Possibility of General and Particular Metaphysical Knowledge“. Nazariyat İslam Felsefe ve Bilim Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi (Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy and Sciences) 7, Nr. 2 (15.10.2021): 121–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.12658/nazariyat.7.2.m0156en.
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This article examines al-Rāzī’s views on the possibility of metaphysical knowledge. Firstly, after outlining his classification of the metaphysical knowable into essence and existence as well as undetailed (ijmālī) and detailed (tafṣīlī), the article analyzes al-Rāzī’s acceptance of the possibility of general knowledge of metaphysics under a few headings by delving into some major themes. These include the claims that the category of existence is broader than the world of the sensible, that theoretical reasoning leads to metaphysical knowledge, and lastly that the theoretical evidence provides necessary knowledge about the existence of a creator. Al-Rāzī has also been demonstrated in al-Matālib to have inherited the arguments rejecting metaphysical knowledge, which he had attributed in his earlier works to a group with the name muhandisiyyūn, by restricting them to the issue of God’s essence being knowable. For al-Rāzī, theoretical reasoning could provide knowledge about the existence of a particular metaphysical being but not about its quiddity. The article further underlines the metaphysical and epistemic theses for the position on the unknowability of God’s essence and discusses its semantic interpretation. The debate on the potential of theoretical reason to provide uncertain knowledge of detailed metaphysics in the form of the best possible explanations (the metaphysics of the best explanation, or al-awlawiyya), however, is left to another article.
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Arenhart, Jonas R. Becker, und Raoni Wohnrath Arroyo. „The spectrum of metametaphysics“. Veritas (Porto Alegre) 66, Nr. 1 (27.12.2021): e41217. http://dx.doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2021.1.41217.
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Scientific realism is typically associated with metaphysics. One current incarnation of such an association concerns the requirement of a metaphysical characterization of the entities one is being a realist about. This is sometimes called “Chakravartty’s Challenge”, and codifies the claim that without a metaphysical characterization, one does not have a clear picture of the realistic commitments one is engaged with. The required connection between metaphysics and science naturally raises the question of whether such a demand is appropriately fulfilled, and how metaphysics engages with science in order to produce what is called “scientific metaphysics”. Here, we map some of the options available in the literature, generating a conceptual spectrum according to how each view approximates science and metaphysics. This is done with the purpose of enlightening the current debate on the possibility of epistemic warrant that science could grant to such a metaphysics, and how different positions differently address the thorny issue concerning such a warrant.
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Zigouras, Jakob. „Spinoza and the Possibility of Error“. Forum Philosophicum 12, Nr. 1 (01.06.2007): 105–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2007.1201.07.
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If we consider certain features of Spinoza's metaphysics, it can seem very difficult to see how error, or the having of false ideas, is possible. In this paper I want to give the metaphysical background to the problem, before turning to a more detailed consideration of how Spinoza in fact accounts for error, or the having of false ideas. I will show the importance of the notions of adequacy and inadequacy in Spinoza's account. Having done this I will return to the central problem of accounting for the ontological status of false ideas vis a vis both the Infinite Intellect, and finite minds.
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Marciniak, Dominik. „Dwie koncepcje badań metafizycznych rozwijane w XX wieku w filozofii polskiej“. Człowiek i Społeczeństwo 53 (27.06.2022): 223–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/cis.2022.53.13.
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The paper presents two different conceptions of metaphysics – scientistic and neoscholastic – developed in the 20th century by, among others, Polish philosophers: Stanisław Kamiński, Mieczysław Gogacz, Tadeusz Czeżowski and Zygmunt Zawirski. These authors refer to the problem of the possibility of conducting metaphysical research in contemporary philosophy. In this context, they examine issues such as the method, subject, and specificity of research carried out within metaphysics. In the summary, the discussed conceptions are compared with each other. The basic issues determining the similarities and differences between respective positions are the problem of the autonomy of metaphysics in relation to other sciences and the issue of the starting point (source of preliminary data) of metaphysical research. Findings regarding the latter issue turn out to be crucial for resolving the question of the appropriate model for research in metaphysics.
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McDaniel, Kris. „Nicholas Stang’s Kant’s Modal Metaphysics“. Kantian Review 23, Nr. 3 (21.08.2018): 461–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415418000262.
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AbstractIn this critical review, I focus on two things. First, I respond to Stang’s interpretation of Descartes, according to which Descartes’ endorsement of his ontological argument commits him to possibilism, the doctrine that there are, or at least could be, non-existent individuals. My response consists in presenting a version of Descartes’ argument the acceptance of which does not require the acceptance of possibilism. The second thing I focus on is Stang’s claim that Kant distinguishes several kinds of real possibility. I raise worries about Stang’s formulations of various doctrines of real possibility, and I preliminarily explore how real essence and ground are connected with the various kinds of real necessity Stang’s Kant recognizes.
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Kosmulska, Bogna. „Metafizyczne określenia w orzeczeniach soborów starożytnego Kościoła – przyczynek do dyskusji nad duchem i literą dogmatu“. Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Philosophica. Ethica-Aesthetica-Practica, Nr. 26 (01.01.2013): 27–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/0208-6107.26.02.
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In my article I compare two different approaches to a problem of Christian dogma in the shape of classical metaphysical language of ancient Church councils: 1) the proposition of Vladimir Solovyov to rethink metaphysics but to treat it as a still legitimate expression of the very centre of Christianity, and 2) that of Bernhard Welte to rethink Christianity without classical metaphysics. By comparing not only plain theses of both authors but also their historical context I discuss a paradoxical possibility of agreeing with Solovyov (and not with Welte) in our time of «a long farewell to metaphysics» by an attempt to make use of contemporary knowledge of ancient Christianity. This perspective gives a possibility to rethink also present-day Christianity without loosing the continuity of Church tradition which by the letter is always trying – just like nowadays – to find the spirit of dogma.
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Schultz, Walter J. „An Augustinian–Edwardsian Metaphysics of Possibility for the Barcan Formula“. Philosophia Christi 24, Nr. 2 (2022): 191–215. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/pc202224218.
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The Barcan formula is a theorem of quantified modal logic. Its most straightforward interpretation appears to commit one to “possibilism,” the view that merely possible things exist. Alternative systems of logic revise the formal semantics to preclude the theorem and its consequences. The crux, however, is the modal metaphysics presupposed by the formal semantics. This paper presents an alternative metaphysics of possibility that follows Augustine’s suggestion that God’s plan is only one of a range of alternative histories for a creation. The metaphysics is a version of “trace actualism”—neither pure possibilism nor pure actualism.
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Auxier, Randall. „Real Deletion, Time, and Possibility“. Analiza i Egzystencja 62 (2023): 5–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.18276/aie.2023.62-01.
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Abstract: Does anything ever really “go away,” completely? This paper is a search for “real deletion,” and the metaphysics that must accompany real deletion. Why is that important? In artificial intelligence studies, researchers have offered a moving target for when artificial intelligence has been achieved. It began with the Turing test and has evolved through a thousand arguments (e.g., Dreyfuss’ What Computers Can’t Do, through Kurzweil’s “singularity” and into a hundred other criteria and thousands of discussions about what intelligence is and what it would mean to simulate or, as I favor, emulate it). This whole discussion is still just sorting through analogies to human intelligence, not approaching the thing itself, but good analogies must approach much more than analogous function: they must approach real indiscernibility. My arguments here will therefore be largely in the field of metaphysics and ontology, which is how I understand the word “real” in the phrase “real deletion.” I do not think that current researchers have rightly understood time and how it bears upon the criterion or. criteria of artificial intelligence. Hence, I offer “real deletion,” in the sense to be described, as the criterion. The AI argument has implications for all of metaphysics as it relates to the fundamental character of time.
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Di Bella, Stefano. „Possibility, Agency, and Individuality in Leibniz’s Metaphysics“. Leibniz Society Review 18 (2008): 139–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/leibniz2008186.
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Leduc, Christian. „Possibility, Agency, and Individuality in Leibniz's Metaphysics“. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17, Nr. 4 (September 2009): 865–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09608780903135188.
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Engstrom, Stephen. „The Category of Substance“. History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis 21, Nr. 1 (05.04.2018): 235–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/26664275-02101012.
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This paper considers a principal concept of metaphysics – the category of substance – as it figures in Kant’s critical program of establishing metaphysics as a science. Like Leibniz, Kant identifies metaphysical concepts through logical reflection on the form of cognitive activity. He thus begins with general logic’s account of categorical judgment as an act of subordinating predicate to subject. This categorical form is then considered in transcendental logic with reference to the possibility of its real use. Transcendental reflection reveals that the categorical form, in its potential for such use, constitutes the category of substance and accident, representing a first real subject and a determination of its existence. But to qualify for objective, scientific employment, metaphysics’ concepts must admit of real definitions, which show their objects to be possible, and such possibility, pace Leibniz, can be established only in relation to possible experience. Thus, relying on his doctrine of the schematism, Kant shows the category to figure constitutively in experience, as the ground of the first law of nature, that in all change substance persists.
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Saldukaitytė, Jolanta. „ONTOLOGINIS SKIRTUMAS IR METAFIZIKA“. Problemos 77 (01.01.2010): 15–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/problemos.2010.0.1905.
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Straipsnyje svarstoma ontologinio skirtumo ir jo santykio su metafizika problema Heideggerio filosofijoje. Pirmiausia parodoma, kad ontologinis skirtumas yra metafizikos ištaka ir jos galimybė. Taip pat analizuojama, kokiu būdu Vakarų filosofijos tradicijoje buvo skiriama būtis ir esiniai ir kodėl Heideggeris tai vadina skirtumo užmarštimi. Svarstant tiesos, išsišakojančios į ontinę ir ontologinę, sampratą aiškinamasi, kaip tai atveria skirtumo pamatymo galimybę. Taip pat parodoma, kaip ontologinio skirtumo įžvalga ir ontologinės tiesos samprata pagrindo problemą leidžia iškelti iš naujo ir pagrindą pamatyti kaip bepagrindybę.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: ontologinis skirtumas, metafizika, tiesa, pagrindas.Ontological Difference and MetaphysicsJolanta Saldukaitytė SummaryThe problem of the “ontological difference” and its relation to metaphysics in Heidegger’s philosophy is discussed. The ontological difference is presented as the origin of metaphysics and as its very possibility. In addition, the problem of how being and entities have been separated in the metaphysical tradition and why Heidegger calls this separation the “forgetfulness of difference” is analyzed. In contrast, conceiving the truth as arising from a split between the ontic and the ontological presents the possibility to see the ontological difference itself. An insight into the ontological difference and the conception of ontological truth open the possibility of re-wakening the Grundfrage, the question of ground, and to see the ground (reason) as an abyss (Ab-grund).Keywords: ontological difference, metaphysics, truth, ground.
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Dwight, Jim, und Jim Garrison. „A Manifesto for Instructional Technology: Hyperpedagogy“. Teachers College Record: The Voice of Scholarship in Education 105, Nr. 5 (Juni 2003): 699–728. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/016146810310500508.
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We believe hypertext and hypermedia solidify bold and original ideas having the power to open new realms of creative possibility. Unfortunately, we find the new tools encrusted within concepts borrowed from traditional curriculum theory and instructional design. Our goal in this paper is to liberate hypertext; doing so requires challenging Western metaphysics. We rely on the philosophy of John Dewey to disclose this metaphysics and propose an alternative. The paper reviews dominant models of curriculum, especially Ralph Tyler's, revealing their concealed metaphysical assumptions. Our efforts are greatly aided by Herbert M. Kliebard's critique of the Tyler rationale, exposing the fact that, in spite of its inflated claims, all there is to Tyler's rationale is “the philosophical screen.” That is also all we think there is to all the dominant models of curriculum. We show that the philosophical screen is largely comprised of a concealed metaphysics before concluding by showing how hypertext and hypermedia, freed of dogmatic metaphysics, may yield what we call hyperpedagogy, based upon theories of emergent pedagogy and transactional metaphysics.
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Göcke, Benedikt. „The origin of origins a metaphysical argument for the existence of god in the tradition of de ente et essentia“. Belgrade Philosophical Annual, Nr. 35 (2022): 69–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/bpa2235069g.
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In current theology the possibility of conclusive arguments for the existence of God is largely rejected by reference to Hume or Kant. Purportedly post-metaphysical surrogates are put in place of a metaphysically founded theology, where either the existence of God may be believed in only as a rational possibility, or else a radical constructivism about the existence of God is fallen into. Nevertheless, in the following, a conclusive metaphysical argument for the existence of God in the tradition of scholastic metaphysics is formulated. It is shown that theological talk of creatio ex nihilo is only the other side of this metaphysical argument: Whoever accepts creatio ex nihilo cannot consistently deny the soundness of the argument.
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Jones, Rachel. „Irigaray and Lyotard: Birth, Infancy, and Metaphysics“. Hypatia 27, Nr. 1 (2012): 139–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2011.01236.x.
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This paper examines the ways in which Luce Irigaray and Jean‐François Lyotard critique western metaphysics by drawing on notions of birth and infancy. It shows how both thinkers position birth as an event of beginning that can be reaffirmed in every act of initiation and recommencement. Irigaray's reading of Diotima's speech from Plato's Symposium is positioned as a key text for this project alongside a number of essays by Lyotard in which he explores the potency of infancy as the condition of philosophy itself. Despite this potency, however, Lyotard suggests that metaphysics is haunted by a melancholia that is inseparable from the limits of thought. I argue that Irigaray is able both to explain why western metaphysics is constitutively melancholic and to offer a shift in perspective that means we are not inevitably condemned to melancholia. The paper concludes that while Lyotard's account of infancy challenges the terms of western metaphysics from within, Irigaray's reassessment of our beginnings in birth offers the possibility of an alternative metaphysical horizon.
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Heil, John, und E. J. Lowe. „The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time“. Philosophical Review 110, Nr. 1 (Januar 2001): 91. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2693603.
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Heil, J. „THE POSSIBILITY OF METAPHYSICS: SUBSTANCE, IDENTITY, AND TIME“. Philosophical Review 110, Nr. 1 (01.01.2001): 91–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-110-1-91.
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ROSENKRANTZ, GARY. „The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time“. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64, Nr. 3 (Mai 2002): 728–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00178.x.
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Goria, Giulio. „Method and Illusion in Kant's Inaugural Dissertation of 1770“. Estudos Kantianos [EK] 8, Nr. 2 (28.01.2021): 37. http://dx.doi.org/10.36311/2318-0501/2020.v8n2.p37.
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In his Inaugural Dissertation De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis, Kant renders central the function of illusion as an integral part of a method for avoiding metaphysical errors, without therefore doing away with the possibility of a metaphysics at all. In this paper, my aim is to draw attention to three crucial points in the Dissertation that have significant theoretical continuity: 1) the preparatory character of the discipline presented in this work (also called "ontology") with respect to metaphysics, 2) the negative or elenctic function of the real use of the intellect, and 3) the fallacy of metaphysical subreption. Secondly, I want to point out the significant presence of subreption in thetheory of transcendental demonstrations given in the “Doctrine of Method” of the first Critique with the aim of providing a methodical discipline to the proofs of pure principles of the intellect or transcendental propositions.
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Plevrakis, Ermylos. „Realität als vermeintliche Grenze der Erkenntnis: Hegels Metaphysik im Anschluss an und in Abgrenzung zu Kant“. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 74, Nr. 3 (15.08.2020): 392–417. http://dx.doi.org/10.3196/004433020830038769.
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While Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason aims to 'humiliate' reason by declining any possibility of knowledge of things 'in themselves', he does conceive such critique as 'the necessary preparation for a thoroughly scientific system of metaphysics'. In this paper I examine in what sense Hegel's Science of Logic goes beyond that Kantian view without neither relapsing back into dogmatic metaphysics nor turning into a mere pragmatism. I argue that reality in itself is ontologically deficient so that it is already reality itself (and not just the categories of understanding) that makes true knowledge of real things impossible. Nonetheless I contend that there is something in Hegel's Science of Logic that is truly absolute and turns Logic into 'a thoroughly scientific system of metaphysics', namely what Hegel calls the Concept or the Absolute Idea. Furthermore I point out the concrete importance of these metaphysical claims for human theoretical and practical knowledge. This finally provides a new reading of Hegel's Logic as a de-ontologised Aristotelian metaphysics that not just claims to regulate empirical knowledge in a Kantian manner, but to also conceptually constitute reality 'in itself'.
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Katrechko, Sergey L. „Kant’s Transcendentalism as Metaphysics of Possible Experience and its Realistic Interpretation in Analytical Philosophy“. RUDN Journal of Philosophy 27, Nr. 3 (15.09.2023): 659–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2313-2302-2023-27-3-659-676.
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In the “Critique of Pure Reason” and subsequent “Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics...”, “Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science”, “Opus Postumum” Kant develops one of the modes of his transcendentalism, the metaphysics of possible experience, whose task is to study the transcendental conditions for the possibility of our (cognition), which, according to Kant, has a priori character. P. Strawson calls this mode of metaphysics ‘ descriptive metaphysics ’ and connects it with the analyzing the ‘conceptual structure’ of our thinking about the world. The contemporary realistic trend (primarily within the framework of the analytical philosophical tradition) in the interpretation of Kant’s transcendental philosophy is associated with the modern theory of “two aspects” (80s of the 20th century), which replaced the classical theory of “two objects/worlds” (compare also with the opposition “ theory of appearance vs. theory of appearances ”). Within the framework of this theory, the Kantian ‘appearance’ receives an objectified status, it is not our mental representation, but corresponds (as its signs) to really existing things, or Kantian ‘objects of experience’. The article traces the formation of the historical and conceptual background of the ‘ metaphysics of experience ’ (H. Paton's original expression). Historically, the metaphysics of experience inherits the neo-Kantian approach to interpreting Kant's transcendentalism as a ‘theory of experience’ (H. Cohen, E. Cassirer), then it develops in logical positivism/empiricism (H. Reichenbach, R. Carnap; further in post-posivivism: the theory of I. Lakatos and T. Kuhn), analytical philosophy of science (W. Sellars, G. Buchdal, H. Putnam), and at present the metaphysics of experience is developing in a number of contemporary works of an analytical orientation (P. Strawson, K. Ameriks, L. Allais and etc.).
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Compaan, Auke. „The revelation of Christ as an impossible impossibility: a critical reading of Jean-Luc Marion’s contribution to the post-modern debate in phenomenology, philosophy of religion and theology“. STJ | Stellenbosch Theological Journal 1, Nr. 1 (31.07.2015): 57. http://dx.doi.org/10.17570/stj.2015.v1n1.a3.
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This article is an attempt to establish the phenomenological and theological value of the concept of Revelation in the work of the French philosopher Jean-Luc Marion in a post-modern cultural and intellectual context. Is it possible to speak of revelation in a phenomenological sense and more radically, about the Revelation of God, after the critique of metaphysics and phenomenology by Derrida, Caputo and others? Marion argues that by overcoming metaphysics and broadening the limits of traditional phenomenology to include phenomena of Revelation, the Revelation of Christ is a phenomenological impossible impossibility. Using Marion’s reinterpretation of Husserl and Heidegger`s understanding of “givenness”, “the given” and the “gift” and his concept of Revelation as a saturated phenomenon, I want to critically illuminate his contribution to the concept of r/Revelation as a post-metaphysical and theological possibility.
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Falkenburg, Brigitte. „Edgar Wind on Experiment and Metaphysics“. Journal of Transcendental Philosophy 2, Nr. 1 (01.04.2021): 21–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2020-0038.
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Abstract The paper presents a detailed interpretation of Edgar Wind’s Experiment and Metaphysics (1934), a unique work on the philosophy of physics which broke with the Neo-Kantian tradition under the influence of American pragmatism. Taking up Cassirer’s interpretation of physics, Wind develops a holistic theory of the experiment and a constructivist account of empirical facts. Based on the concept of embodiment which plays a key role in Wind’s later writings on art history, he argues, however, that the outcomes of measurements are contingent. He then proposes an anti-Kantian conception of a metaphysics of nature. For him, nature is an unknown totality which manifests itself in discrepancies between theories and experiment, and hence the theory formation of physics can increasingly approximate the structure of nature. It is shown that this view is ambiguous between a transcendental, metaphysical realism in Kant’s sense and an internal realism in Putnam’s sense. Wind’s central claim is that twentieth century physics offers new options for resolving Kant’s cosmological antinomies. In particular, he connected quantum indeterminism with the possibility of human freedom, a connection that Cassirer sharply opposed.
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Golovko, N. V. „Metaphysics as a First Science, Again: How a Textbook on Metaphysics Is Possible. Book Review: Lowe E. J. The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time. Clarendon Press, 1998“. Siberian Journal of Philosophy 19, Nr. 4 (18.05.2022): 155–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.25205/2541-7517-2021-19-4-155-163.
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Jonathan Lowe believes that metaphysics should regain its central place in philosophy. It is an autonomous philosophical discipline, which task is to outline the realm of what is really possible by defining a system of fundamental ontological categories under which everything that exists falls, and relations of ontological dependence in which objects of various ontological categories are related to each other. Metaphysical categories are what gives meaning to our experience, however, unlike I. Kant, they are not the result of a priori constraints – on the contrary, they are subject to revision in the face of experience. The question of why there is something in the world rather than nothing, is solved with a non-Wittgensteinian understanding of what the world is (world is the sum of all existing objects because world as “the totality of facts” lacks determinate identity-conditions), as well as an understanding that universals must be actually instantiated in particulars. Far from being an easy textbook in the proper sense, this book is a brilliant example of the return of Aristotle to modern metaphysics.Reflections on the book: Lowe E. J. The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time. Clarendon Press, 1998.
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Zorzetto, Silvia. „Normative Legal Positivism: from Metaphysics to Politics“. Isonomía - Revista de teoría y filosofía del derecho, Nr. 54 (30.04.2021): 134–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.5347/isonomia.v0i54.463.
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Taking as its starting point María Cristina Redondo’s book Positivismo jurídico “interno”, this article proposes an alternative conception of normativist legal positivism. The article argues that legal theory can be neutral to the extent that it is intersubjective and transparent regarding its own metaphysical premises. On the one hand, thus, the article aims to shed light on the role of metaphysics and common sense in the construction of the concept of law. On the other hand, it seeks to make more transparent the ethical-political choices that constitute legal discourses, including theoretical ones. To pursue these goals the article first analyzes Redondo’s theses on the ontology / epistemology distinction and the possibility of objective knowledge, and advances the idea that inter-subjectivity, and not objectivity, should be the appropriate criterion for normativist legal positivism. Second, the article examines the role of normativity in normativist legal positivism, focusing on the metaphysical nature of the thesis that law belongs to the fields of normativity and practical reason. The following sections then discuss reductionist and anti-reductionist conceptions of legal “entities” (norms, normative statements, propositions, and beliefs) and the theory of legal sources. The final section addresses the question of the axiological neutrality of legal theory and discusses the possibility of describing participants’ internal point of view without committing to existing legal practice(s).
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Bordignon, Michela. „The Notion of Process: Hegel and Contemporary Metaphysics“. Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso, Nr. 18 (02.02.2022): 27–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.22370/rhv2021iss18pp27-44.
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This article is aimed at highlighting some possible contributions of Hegel’s philosophy to the contemporary debate around process metaphysics. In the contemporary metaphysical debate, process metaphysics represent an attempt to highlight the limits of the traditional philosophical paradigm, which is based on the notion of substance, and to work within an alternative paradigm, which is based on the notion of process. What exists, then, are not substances, substrates, fixed and stable objects characterized by certain properties, but processes, events, occurrences. The main idea of process metaphysics is that being is dynamic and that this dynamic nature must be the main focus of any comprehensive philosophical explanation of reality. Looking at this revolution, it is necessary to define the very notion of process. In fact, this work of conceptual clarification of the fundamental notion of this new philosophical paradigm is still ongoing. My idea is that Hegelian philosophy can offer some relevant indications to do the job. In this sense, the article will be divided into two parts: on the basis of the analysis of some definitions of the notion of process in the contemporary debate around process metaphysics, I will show 1) the need to determine the minimal ontological structure of the notion of process; 2) the possibility of determining this structure through some conceptual tools provided by Hegel’s logic and in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy.
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Westphal, Kenneth R. „Noumenal Causality Reconsidered: Affection, Agency, and Meaning in Kant“. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27, Nr. 2 (Juni 1997): 209–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1997.10717478.
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The lead question of Kant's first Critique, indeed his whole Critical Philosophy is ‘How is Metaphysics as a Science Possible?’ Neo-Kantian and recent Anglophone interpretations of Kant's epistemology have concentrated on the ‘Transcendental Analytic’ of the first Critique, and have taken Kant's positive and legitimate sense of metaphysics to concern the necessary conditions of our knowledge of mathematics, natural science, and of course, our common sense knowledge of a spatio-temporal world of objects and events. However, in the ‘Canon of Pure Reason’ in the first Critique Kant indicates quite clearly that, although two of the leading sub-questions of metaphysics — ‘What should I so?’ and ‘What may I hope?’ — cannot be answered on theoretical grounds, they may be answered on practical grounds (A804-05=B832-33). Those practical grounds are elaborated and supplemented (mainly) in the latter two Critiques and the Religion. In each case, however, a definite and positive answer to a metaphysical question involves giving ‘objective reality’ to a concept, e.g., the concepts of freedom or immortality. ‘Objective reality’ involves possible reference to an object, where ‘possible reference’ involves more than merely describing a logical possibility.
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van Peperstraten, Frans. „Heideggers geofilosofie“. Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 112, Nr. 2 (01.07.2020): 177–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.5117/antw2020.2.006.vanp.
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Abstract Heidegger’s geophilosophyIn Heidegger’s ‘Black Notebooks’, his geophilosophy, the fact that he attributes a crucial importance to different places, becomes more evident than in his other works. The effect of this geophilosophy is that ontological difference ‐ the key point of Heidegger’s thinking ‐ is mixed up with, or replaced by, ontic differences. If in Being and Time Dasein’s ‘ground’ is an openness to Being, later this word often refers to Germany as a specific country. In 1939, just before the start of World War II, Hölderlin’s view of the relationship between ‘the own’ and ‘the foreign’ inspires Heidegger to see the possibility of a complementary relationship between the German and the Russian people. During and after World War II, Heidegger’s criticism of ‘Western’ metaphysics is strongly colored by his hostility to England, France and the U.S.A. In response to metaphysical universalism he relates different types of it to specific regions on earth. Remarkably, his criticism of metaphysics brings him to both support and criticize the notion of race.
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Kuravsky, Erik. „Mystical Experiences through the Lens of Heidegger and Mamardashvili: Overcoming the Metaphysical Model of Human Existence“. Religions 14, Nr. 10 (06.10.2023): 1266. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel14101266.
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This essay relates a Heideggerian interpretation of metaphysics, as determined by an interpretation of Being in terms of a priori laws/essences, to a traditionally passive model of experience. The spiritual principles of the Christian and the Buddhist experience of the Nothing are shown as an overcoming of this model and an overcoming of metaphysics. The essay displays the ways in which Heidegger and Mamardashvili stress the illusionary nature of a metaphysical understanding of human existence and the central role of personal transformation beyond one’s psychological subjectivity. This transformation is tied to the possibility of active engagement with the Nothing, requiring efforts of attentive self-detachment from the constant pressure of one’s representational faculties motivated by a hidden flight from anxiety. Buddhist and Christian notions of detachment and letting-be are then interpreted in light of Heidegger’s and Mamardashvili’s ideas, allowing for a phenomenological interpretation of certain passages from the New Testament and the Bodhidharma’s teaching.
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Neog, Bhaskarjit. „Metaphysics of Group Moral Responsibility“. Journal of Human Values 26, Nr. 3 (22.05.2020): 238–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0971685820923943.
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The concept of group moral responsibility is apparently problematic, in that it is unobvious in what sense a group, which is evidently not a conscious rational subject like an individual person, can be held morally accountable. It is unclear how a group can be said to have the ability to form beliefs and intentions needed for genuine group actions of moral assessment. Broadly speaking, there are two separate platforms from which one can investigate this problem: individualism and collectivism. Subscribing to the doctrinal position of methodological individualism, individualists suggest that individual members are the only capable entities, who can meaningfully bear the burden of moral responsibility, either individually or in a shared way. Collectivists, on the other hand look for an alternative position wherein they advocate the genuine possibility of attributing moral responsibility to groups qua groups. The collectivist approach has received substantial philosophical attention in recent years. However, most supporters of collectivism search for such possibility without strongly invoking the idea of group moral agency. In this article, I argue for an irreducible moral agential status of groups in terms of the intentional actions of their constituent individual members and their special conglomeration. I suggest that certain collective or group entities are capable of being identified as proper agents of moral assessment analogous to that of individual agents of similar assessment.
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Effingham, Nikk. „The Close Possibility of Time Travel“. Philosophies 8, Nr. 6 (12.12.2023): 118. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8060118.
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This article discusses the possibility of some outlandish tropes from time travel fiction, such as people reversing in age as they time travel or the universe being destroyed because a time traveler kills their ancestor. First, I discuss what type of possibility we might have in mind, detailing ‘close possibility’ as one such candidate. Secondly, I argue that—with only little exception—these more outlandish tropes fail to be closely possible. Thirdly, I discuss whether these outlandish tropes may nevertheless be more broadly possible (e.g., metaphysically or logically possible), arguing that whether they are or not depends upon your favored metaphysics of the laws of nature.
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Mitchell, Nicholas. „On Metaphysics and Supersessionism“. Journal for Continental Philosophy of Religion 5, Nr. 2 (03.10.2023): 188–208. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/25889613-bja10058.
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Abstract Scholars, theologians and lay people are in the midst of a wave of vital conversations about the nature of Christian supersessionism and the possibility of a post-supersessionist theology. This paper seeks to contribute to these conversations by drawing out the presuppositions about evental relationship that underly supersessionistic habits of thought and their alternatives. This effort will proceed primarily through a critique of Alain Badiou’s supersessionistic reading of the Jewish/Christian evental relationship while attempting to salvage his formal concept of evental recurrence as a potential resource for post-supersessionist theology. The bulk of the paper is dedicated to this critique and salvage project. However, it will close with a series of brief reflections on how a non-teleogical metaphysics of evental recurrence might displace some of the teleological thought patterns that drive the dilemmas of supersessionism
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Messina, James. „The relationship between space and mutual interaction: Kant contra Newton and Leibniz“. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47, Nr. 1 (2017): 43–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2016.1220219.
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AbstractKant claims that we cannot cognize the mutual interaction of substances without their being in space; he also claims that we cannot cognize a ‘spatial community’ among substances without their being in mutual interaction. I situate these theses in their historical context and consider Kant’s reasons for accepting them. I argue that they rest on commitments regarding the metaphysical grounding of, first, the possibility of mutual interaction among substances-as-appearances and, second, the actuality of specific distance-relations among such substances. By illuminating these commitments, I shed light on Kant’s metaphysics of space and its relation to Newton and Leibniz’s views.
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Gabriel, Markus. „Metafísica e Mitologia“. Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy 14, Nr. 27 (2006): 53–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philosophica200614275.
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Since it can reasonably be taken for granted that the Gods of pagan mythology have been products of human cognitive activities, there is an obvious relation between our most general concepts of consciousness and the possibility of an understanding of mythology. In order to hint at the insuffiency of the modern idea of an autonomous subject, which is devoid of any content that cannot be construed as a moment of self-conscious reflection, it is necessary to go back to both ancient greek metaphysics and mythology. Ancient metaphysics does not yet fully articulate the idea of an autonomous subjectivity (even though the latter would not have been possible without the former). Therefore, it is better understood in terms of ontonomy, i.e. metaphysical thought of what there ultimately is. In the paper it is argued that metaphysical ontonomy has its origin in mythological theonomy. The very idea of an emancipation of logos from myth is itself mythological. Hence, self-consciousness may be interpreted as a self-explication of mythology. In the very act of reflecting itself in human consciousness, the “Being” hides its mythological, artistic nature. However, this could not be made intelligible without the help of mythology itself because it is impossible to talk about Ontonomy let alone Theonomy in theoretical propositions.
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Hedrick, Lisa Landoe. „Analytic Philosophy and the Need for Pragmatist Metaphysics“. Contemporary Pragmatism 16, Nr. 1 (22.02.2019): 1–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18758185-0161112.
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This article addresses the problem of intentionality in Analytic philosophy. It begins with an assessment of post-Sellarsian scholarship, with primary attention to the work of Richard Rorty, Donald Davidson, Robert Brandom, and John McDowell. I argue that contemporary Analytic discourse on intentionality not only needs, but internally warrants, a pragmatist metaphysics in order to adequately and accurately communicate its public relevance—particularly in ethics. I suggest the metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead as consonant with the sort of metaphysics needed in order to correct tacit presuppositions currently limiting Analytic treatments of intentionality and, in turn, the possibility of ethical critique without ethnocentrism. The resultant proposal is for a “modest” metaphysics, not unlike that for which Jeffrey Stout has called.
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Reichl, Pavel. „Leaving the Enchanted World Behind: Kant on the Order of Nature, Empirical Space and the Possibility of Miracles“. Kantian Review 24, Nr. 1 (01.02.2019): 103–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415418000547.
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AbstractDespite relative neglect in the literature, Kant’s published and unpublished writings in theoretical philosophy reveal a sustained and at times ambivalent effort to come to terms with the problem of miracles. Because they entail a form of supernatural causation that undermines the law-governedness of the order of nature, miracles pose a significant problem for Kant’s metaphysics. I explore in detail Kant’s account of miracles in conjunction with the relevant aspects of his metaphysics of nature in order to establish in what sense miracles are possible, and how they fit into Kant’s architectonic more generally.
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Werther, David. „Leibniz and the Possibility of God's Existence“. Religious Studies 32, Nr. 1 (März 1996): 37–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500024057.
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Toward the end of 1676 Leibniz met Spinoza a number of times. In one of those meetings Leibniz presented a proof of the possibility of God's existence. In his proof Leibniz presupposed that a proposition is necessarily true only if its truth is either demonstrable or self-evident and that the divine perfections are simple and affirmative qualities. I contend that Leibniz's presuppositions undermine, rather than establish, the necessary existence of ‘a God of the kind in whom the pious believe’. My assessment is based upon a consideration of Leibniz's argument in the context of other early papers, works written before the Discourse on Metaphysics in 1686.
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Savic, Mico. „M. Heidegger: Metaphysical character of technical scientific civilisation“. Filozofija i drustvo 20, Nr. 1 (2009): 107–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid0901107s.
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In this paper, author deals with Heidegger's account of the modern age as the epoch based on Western metaphysics. In the first part of the paper, he shows that, according to Heidegger, modern interpretation of the reality as the world picture, is essentially determined by Descartes' philosophy. Then, author exposes Heidegger's interpretation of the turn which already took place in Plato's metaphysics and which made possible Descartes' metaphysics and modern epoch. In the second part of the paper, author explores Heidegger's interpretation of science and technology as shoots of very metaphysics. Heidegger emphasizes that the essence of technology corresponds to the essence of subjectivity and shows how the metaphysics of subjectivity subsequently finds its end in Nietzsche's metaphysics of the will to power, as the last word of Western philosophy. In the concluding part, author argues that the contemporary processes of globalization can be just understood as processes of completion of metaphysics. They can be identified as a global rule of the essence of technology. On the basis of Heidegger's vision of overcoming metaphysics, author concludes that it opens the possibility of a philosophy of finitude which points to dialogue with the Other as a way of resolving the key practical issues of the contemporary world.
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Bartolini, Elena. „Heidegger on No-thing and the Principle of Non-contradiction“. Heidegger Circle Proceedings 53 (2019): 119–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/heideggercircle20195310.
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Heidegger’s 1929 lecture on Nothing is usually considered as a critique of logic and, more generally, of the sciences that mainly rely on it. However, it can also be interpreted as a strong attempt to overcome Western metaphysics, i.e., the metaphysics of Anwesenheit, as well as a specific interpretation of the principle of non-contradiction on which this metaphysical perspective is grounded. In this new particular philosophical framework proposed by Heidegger, Dasein’s thrownness finds its proper space — the space of Dasein’s freedom. In my paper, I will argue that Heidegger’s proposal, more than just a critique of logic, is a call to re-think some fundamental topics of philosophy and, above all, is a call to be attentive to what is. Surprisingly, this fundamental attention is also the element that discloses Dasein’s thrownness, making possible its freedom. This latter, then, assumes in Heidegger’s thought a very different character from its usual understanding: it is not recognised as a completely absolute possibility of action, i.e., untied from constraints, but rather an attuned response to Being.
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Wetzel, James. „Time After Augustine“. Religious Studies 31, Nr. 3 (September 1995): 341–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500023702.
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The metaphysics of time, though almost always diverting, is rarely discomforting. I can wonder what time is, come up only with conundrums, and yet still feel intimately acquainted with time by way of my mundane experience. Familiarity in this case breeds contempt of metaphysics. If I were to pose the question of time as Augustine posed it, however, I would find no refuge in time's familiarity, for time's familiarity is part of what has come into question. My ordinary experience of time may not be of time after all. Facing such a possibility is discomforting, but it may also be the beginning of wisdom. In Augustine's hands, metaphysical questions turn back upon their owners. What I ask of time I ask of myself. The wisdom comes, if it comes at all, in coming to understand the demand knowledge of the world has made upon my self-knowledge. There is nothing worth knowing that does not in some way transform the knower. Augustine hints at the transformation called for in the knowledge of time. It is disturbingly profound.
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Babu, Roshni, und Pravesh Jung. „The “Incongruous Move”: From Actuality to Possibility of Metaphysics in Kant“. Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 35, Nr. 3 (18.07.2018): 463–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40961-018-0149-7.
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Marieta, Iñaki. „La globalización: el olvido del dolor del mundo“. Theoría. Revista del Colegio de Filosofía, Nr. 33 (01.12.2017): 11–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/ffyl.16656415p.2017.33.419.
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The globalization, economic and socio technological contemporaneous phenomenon has its onthological roots in Parmenides. Roots which make it become destiny of the Western world in its metaphysics and technological form, forgetting the essential grief which hides the triumph of the global connectivity. Only the poets’ word can name the fold of such destiny without being eliminated by the metaphysics: condition for Μνημοσύνη to activate the possibility of a new beginning.
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Pronyakin, Volodymyr. „Transcendental-Anthropological Groundings of Creative Thinking in I. Kant Metaphysics“. Sententiae 3, Nr. 1 (25.06.2001): 39–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.31649/sent03.01.039.
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Author thinks that Kant's critique of metaphysics is motivated by creative need in execution of the possibility of a holistic world-view. By directing thought to the sphere of theoretically appropriate, Kant gives metaphysics anthropological sense which strengthens his motivation. Anthropologist metaphysics gives motivation to creativity of philosophical thinking by opening volition to connect ontological and axiological in philosophical subject: it gives completeness to worldview. But scientific conscience has not overcome non-critical fantasies that scientific intellect can cognize the last truths about the world without any intensional implicatures of anthropological origin yet. Anthropological method of critical thinking makes scientific intellect holistic and reflexive without censoring religious nature of humankind.
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Кузнецова, К. Ю. „СЛАБКА ДУМКА («IL PENSIERO DEBOLE») ТА «СЛАБКА ТЕОЛОГІЯ» ЯК СИМПТОМИ ПОСТМЕТАФІЗИЧНОГО МИСЛЕННЯ“. Humanities journal, Nr. 3 (03.10.2019): 22–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.32620/gch.2019.3.03.
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The growing political influence of religious communities and beliefs, the growing presence of religious discourse in public sphere require a rethinking of the role of religion in modern society. A number of mutual accusations in a metaphysical way of thinking leads to the fact that the whole philosophy of the XX century turns out to be a philosophy thinking in a “post” situation. Formation of the “post“ states is entirely explained in the field of social philosophy, which tries to “keep pace with time”, but the intrigue lies in the fact that in the first place these transformations touched the most fundamental and “eternal” field of philosophy – ontology. After Heidegger's thesis on the ontoteological structure of metaphysics, the discourse at the end of metaphysics and post-metaphysical philosophical thinking not only inevitably affect the problem of theology, but connect the problems of updating philosophy and theology in the XX-XXI centuries as well.Along with the decline of metaphysics as a system philosophy that is able to propose a coherent, unified, well-grounded picture of immutable structures of existence, the very possibility of philosophical refutation of the existence of God is exhausted. It defends the possibility of religious experience. The pluralism of the post-metaphysical era eliminates the possibility of any theoretical distinction between metaphorical and non-metaphorical languages. On the other hand, the famous statement by F. Nietzsche about the death of God, which is inscribed in the context of the critique of metaphysics, symbolically means the final decay of the religious way of thinking and the flowering of secularization, which means the rejection of appeals to other levels of being, except in the focus of today and everyday life. The specificity of hermeneutics, which is practiced by Caputo and Vattimo, is directly related to the key moment in the constructs of both thinkers – the concept of weakening thinking. For Vattimo, a weak thought (pensiero debole) refers to the gradual weakening of being, which turned the modern philosophy from its "obsession" with the metaphysics of truth to the local rationality and awareness of the hermeneutic nature of any truth. There are two aspects of weakening opinion. The first process – the weakening of being – from the objective metaphysical structure to the interpretation (“events” in the Heideggerian sense). It is described in the Nietzschean language of nihilism, which means the historical process, within which objectivistic claims of metaphysics, absolute grounds have become false (or reduced to “nothing”), weakened, and replaced by “prospects” or interpretative schemes. The second process is the weakening of God in the world, described in the language of the apostle Paul in terms of subtlety – kenosis, which is a paradigmatic expression of the Christian doctrine of the incarnation, birth and death of Jesus. Kenosis is not a one-time event that took place in the life and death of Jesus, but the continuing history or tradition initiated by this event. This process is called “secularization” by Vattimo, which doesn’t mean a rejection of God, but a kind of “transcription” of God in time and history (saeculum). Thus, nihilism and kenosis are parallel processes. Nihilism is the devastation of being in an interpretative structure; kenosis is the ascension to nothing of God as transcendental deity. Kenosis is understood as transcription, translation or transfer of God into the world, a means to establish the Kingdom of God on earth. This idea, the political correlation of which is non-authoritarian democracy, and the epistemological correlate, is a Gadamer's understanding of dialogue.On the positive side Vattimo’s “weak thinking” and the ontology, seek to be hermeneutical and nihilistic in the spirit of the Heideggerian ontology. Vattimo's philosophy seeks to save ontological discourse without making it metaphysical in the traditional sense. To speak more specifically, this philosophy recognizes the world of symbolic forms, the world of action, recognizes different practices, perceiving them as different languages of the mind. Describing postmodernity as a “more enlightened Enlightenment”, where there is no longer a dream about pure objectivity, Caputo emphasizes that the modern rebirth of religion returns its original meaning – faith, not less form of knowledge. Therefore, religious truth is characterized as truth without knowledge, and modern religiousness as “religion without religion”.By reducing the ontological and theological thought there is a convergence of theology and philosophy, which now do not contradict each other, but are found in some new space, which we call post-secular philosophy.
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Rohden, Luiz. „HERMENEUTICS, METAPHYSICS, AND THE QUESTION OF BEING“. Síntese: Revista de Filosofia 44, Nr. 139 (13.10.2017): 221. http://dx.doi.org/10.20911/21769389v44n139p221/2017.
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Abstract: Notwithstanding the current common knowledge, which tells us that we live in post-metaphysical times,that metaphysics has come to an end and has been declared dead,the status of metaphysics should be reassessed in light of the contemporary hermeneutical tradition, and the possibility of reconfiguring it on the basis of the hermeneutical tradition should be seriously considered. Metaphysics, as an attempt to understand and articulately explain Being in its totality, has not died: that would mean the end of philosophy itself and, ultimately, the denial of the ability of human beings to understand themselves as Being, that is, as a whole. The hermeneutical tradition developed by Heidegger and Gadamer contributes strong arguments to corroborate this assertion. Finally, because particular views of reality correspond to particular ways of acting, the metaphysics implicit in philosophical hermeneutics may help us to resist political-religious radicalism.Resumo: Partindo do lugar comum hodierno que afirma que a Metafísica chegou ao seu fim – sendo declarada como morta – e que vivemos em tempos pós-metafísicos, nos propusemos reavaliar seu status bem como a possibilidade de reconfigurá-la a partir da tradição Hermenêutica contemporânea. Justificaremos aqui que a Metafísica – enquanto uma proposta de compreensão e de explicitação articulada do Ser em sua totalidade –, não morreu, pois isto significaria decretar o fim da própria Filosofia e, em última instância, seria afirmar a incapacidade de o ser humano compreender-se enquanto Ser, isto é, enquanto um todo. É na tradição hermenêutica desenvolvida por Heidegger e por Gadamer que buscaremos argumentos para corroborar esta nossa hipótese. Dado que a uma visão do real corresponde uma ação determinada, a Metafísica implícita da Hermenêutica Filosófica, enquanto compreensão e explicitação do Ser em sua totalidade, poderá nos ajudar a não sucumbirmos aos radicalismos político-religiosos.
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Cargile, James. „Possibility Versus Possible Worlds“. Logos & Episteme 10, Nr. 2 (2019): 147–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme201910213.
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It is a common idea in philosophy that some false propositions such as (C) that Charlottesville is the largest city in Virginia, have the property of being possibly true. It is not a clear idea but an important one which has inspired considerable effort at clarification. One suggestion is that there exist (really, not just possibly) “possible worlds” in which C or some suitable facsimile is true. One further attempt at clarification on offer is that there exists (again, really) a maximal consistent set of propositions containing C. It is argued here that these attempts at clarification are profoundly erroneous. There exist actual powers of imaginative construction which would yield a scenario sufficiently detailed to be recognized by competent reviewers as one in which C is true. (The depiction might be in film or narrative and would avoid analytic falsehoods.) This is a frail clarification, vulnerable to questions, but is the best possible direction for a clear idea of the possibility of the proposition. The notion of possible worlds is associated with very valuable work in mathematical logic. It can only improve our appreciation of this excellent work to separate it from cloudy metaphysics.
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Macut, Ivan. „Metaphysik in der Lehre des kroatischen Philosophen Stjepan Zimmermann“. Carthaginensia 39, Nr. 76 (25.01.2024): 537–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.62217/carth.402.
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El tema de este artículo es la metafísica en la investigación del neoescolástico croata Stjepan Zimmermann. La introducción y la primera parte resumen los datos biobibliográficos básicos de Zimmermann y su importancia para la filosofía croata del siglo XX. La segunda parte trata de las observaciones de Zimmermann sobre si se puede hablar de metafísica científica. Dado que admite tal posibilidad, la justificación del realismo metafísico se analiza a continuación. Además, la contribución presenta la crítica de Kant a la metafísica y la crítica de Zimmermann a Kant y su filosofía, un tema con el que Zimmermann lidió a lo largo de su vida. La siguiente sección del artículo trata de la cuestión de hasta qué punto las ciencias naturales pueden reemplazar a la metafísica. La respuesta inequívoca de Zimmermann fue que esto no es posible. Sólo la filosofía, y en este contexto la metafísica, puede llevar al hombre a Dios, y según Zimmermann esa es también la meta de la filosofía. Abastract: The subject of this paper is metaphysics in the research of the Croatian neo-scholastic Stjepan Zimmermann. The introduction and the first part summarize the basic bio-bibliographical data of Zimmermann and his importance for the Croatian philosophy of the 20th century. The second part deals with Zimmermann's statements as to whether one can talk about scientific metaphysics at all. Since he allows for such a possibility, the justification of metaphysical realism is discussed below. Furthermore, the contribution presents Kant's critique of metaphysics and Zimmermann's critique of Kant and his philosophy, a topic Zimmermann grappled with throughout his life. The following section of the article deals with the question to what extent the natural sciences can replace metaphysics. Zimmermann's unequivocal answer was that this is not possible. Although great importance was then attached to the natural sciences, as well as to philosophical currents such as positivism, naturalism and materialism, in Zimmermann's opinion metaphysics largely transcends empirical reality and is therefore still possible and very necessary. Only philosophy, and in this context metaphysics, can lead man to God, and according to Zimmermann that is also the goal of philosophy.