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Benson, Bruce L., und David W. Rasmussen. „The Context of Drug Policy: An Economic Interpretation“. Journal of Drug Issues 28, Nr. 3 (Juli 1998): 681–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002204269802800307.
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Economics can be used to analyze public sector decision making because individuals make these decisions within a framework of incentives and constraints that are a product of individual preferences and institutional structure. Considering the emphasis on law enforcement in U.S. drug policy in this context, this paper presents an analysis of the incentives and constraints affecting drug policy that explains a reluctance to change the policy even in the face of considerable evidence that some reforms could be cost effective. Two specific incentives for an emphasis on enforcement are presented. First, police agencies have an incentive to allocate more resources to drug enforcement due to the factors that determine police budgets. Second, asset forfeiture laws give police agencies a direct monetary reward for making drug arrests. We conclude that understanding drug policy requires an examination of the incentives and constraints that affect the behavior of those who are responsible for policy development.
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Abidin, Mohammad Zainul, Haula Rosdiana und Roy Valiant Salomo. „Tax Incentive Policy for Geothermal Development: A Comparative Analysis in ASEAN“. International Journal of Renewable Energy Development 9, Nr. 1 (23.01.2020): 53–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.14710/ijred.9.1.53-62.
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This paper examines tax incentive policies in geothermal industries in ASEAN to better understand the development of geothermal industry investment in the ASEAN Member States (AMS) using a qualitative method. The results indicate that tax incentive policies have supported the investment climate and the development of geothermal industries in the AMS. Geothermal investments and production capacities in AMS have increased significantly. AMS that provide geothermal tax incentives include Indonesia, Lao PDR, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. The performance of geothermal tax incentive policies is reflected in the level of utilization of geothermal potential, which is higher in states that provide greater tax incentives. The results also indicate that geothermal power plants in AMS use dry steam, flash and binary cycle technologies with flash plants being the most common. Results suggest that the future development of geothermal energy in AMS will be related to the tax incentive policy and investment climate in those states. Furthermore, the granting of various types of tax incentives should be focused on the initial investment in geothermal development. ©2020. CBIORE-IJRED. All rights reserved
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Voigt, Kristin. „Incentives, health promotion and equality“. Health Economics, Policy and Law 7, Nr. 3 (21.09.2010): 263–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744133110000277.
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AbstractThe use of incentives to encourage individuals to adopt ‘healthier’ behaviours is an increasingly popular instrument in health policy. Much of the literature has been critical of ‘negative’ incentives, often due to concerns about equality; ‘positive’ incentives, however, have largely been welcomed as an instrument for the improvement of population health and possibly the reduction of health inequalities. The aim of this paper is to provide a more systematic assessment of the use of incentives from the perspective of equality. The paper begins with an overview of existing and proposed incentive schemes. I then suggest that the distinction between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ incentives – or ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ – is of limited use in distinguishing those incentive schemes that raise concerns of equality from those that do not. The paper assesses incentive schemes with respect to two important considerations of equality: equality of access and equality of outcomes. While our assessment of incentive schemes will, ultimately, depend on various empirical facts, the paper aims to advance the debate by identifying some of the empirical questions we need to ask. The paper concludes by considering a number of trade-offs and caveats relevant to the assessment of incentive schemes.
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Scott, Anthony, und Luke B. Connelly. „Financial incentives and the health workforce“. Australian Health Review 35, Nr. 3 (2011): 273. http://dx.doi.org/10.1071/ah10904.
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Changes to the remuneration of medical practitioners are currently being considered in Australia. In this paper, we provide a discussion of financial incentives in healthcare markets and their effects on health professionals’ behaviour. After defining incentives, the paper focuses on the design of incentive schemes for the health workforce. It discusses several issues that should be considered when designing incentives, illustrated with some Australian examples. What are the objectives of the incentive scheme? What types of incentives can be used and under what circumstances? What is the empirical evidence around the effects of incentive schemes? What unintended consequences might exist? The paper concludes with a set of principles around which incentives can be designed. These principles might be used to inform the current debate about revisions to the incentives that are faced by medical practitioners in Australia.
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Quoc Trung, Trinh, und Nguyen Van Tan. „Tax incentive policy and firm performance: evidence from Vietnam“. Investment Management and Financial Innovations 17, Nr. 2 (01.07.2020): 277–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/imfi.17(2).2020.22.
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This paper aims to assess the impact of the tax incentive policy on firm performance after privatization in Vietnam. Using research data of 260 privatized enterprises in Vietnam, this study sheds light on whether tax incentive policies can help improve firm performance after privatization. The paper utilizes a pre-post comparison approach proposed by Megginson, Nash, and Van Randenborgh (1994). The research results reveal that privatized enterprises with tax incentives have improved profitability (ROA, ROE, ROS) and operating efficiency (NIEFF) and reduced leverage after privatization. A statistical reduction in the number of employed and an improvement in output (real income) after privatization are not observed. Besides, there is no statistical evidence proving that privatized enterprises have experienced significant changes in standard deviations of firm performance measures after privatization in Vietnam. Given significant improvements in the profitability of post-privatized enterprises with tax incentives, the authors propose some managerial implications for the Vietnamese government, investors and non-privatized state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
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Alayande, Folarin, und Dr Wumi Olayiwola. „Trade Policy Incentives, Market Structure and Productivity“. Journal of Social Sciences Research, Nr. 57 (10.07.2019): 1106–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.32861/jssr.57.1106.1122.
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Trade policy incentives are drivers of within-sector productivity growth and rapid industrial transformation in many developing countries. In many African countries, the use of tariffs, trade prohibitions and a package of fiscal policy incentives are therefore components of industrialisation and backward integration programmes to accelerate the performance of priority sectors. However, the effectiveness of these policy instruments within specific industries, and the transmission mechanism of policy incentives to productivity has not been adequately explored in the literature. By focusing on oligopolistic market structure of the cement industry in Nigeria, this paper analysed the relative impact of trade policy incentives and market structure on the within-sector productivity. Using the autoregressive distributed lag model with structural breaks, the study finds that producer concentration ratio is the most significant driver of productivity. While the trade policy incentive indexed by effective rate of protection (ERP), and financing subsidies also impact productivity improvements, the magnitudes are significantly lower. The overwhelming significance of market structure nuance earlier research studies and provide new insights into the nexus between trade incentives and productivity in an oligopolistic industry.
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Zhang, Shen Sheng, Wei Zhang, Xing Xing Ji und Wen Fang Zhang. „Research of Existing Building Energy Saving Economic Incentives Policy in Liao Ning Province“. Applied Mechanics and Materials 409-410 (September 2013): 570–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.409-410.570.
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Analyzed the status of Liaoning Province Existing Building Energy Saving, and elaborate the role of economic incentives in the Existing Building Energy Saving. Proposed the establish principles and design ideas of Existing Building Energy Saving economic incentive policies in Liao Ning Province on the basis of learning from the developed countries economic incentives successful experience. Developed economic incentives on taxation, loans, and subsidies and so on.
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Jansa, Joshua M. „Chasing Disparity: Economic Development Incentives and Income Inequality in the U.S. States“. State Politics & Policy Quarterly 20, Nr. 4 (21.01.2020): 462–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532440019900259.
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Political scientists and policy scholars have traditionally looked at the role of welfare and tax policies in shaping income inequality. Less attention has been paid to the key policy area of economic development. But states spend billions on economic development incentives each year to encourage firms to locate in their state. The few studies that have examined the impact of economic development policy on inequality have found mixed results, and have not considered who shapes and benefits from economic development policy when identifying possible causal mechanisms. I argue that increased incentive spending leads to increased inequality through either a market conditioning effect (incentives disproportionately boost the incomes of top earners prior to taxes) or a redistributive effect (incentives allow wealthy firms, investors, and employees to keep income that would otherwise be taxed and transferred). These mechanisms are tested using data on incentive spending and inequality across the 50 states from 1999 to 2014. The findings demonstrate that incentives increase income inequality via a redistributive effect only. This effect, though, is relatively large, long-lasting, and robust to different measures of incentive spending. Despite using economic development incentives to try to generate greater prosperity, state governments may be inadvertently exacerbating inequality.
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Hodge, Emily M. „School Desegregation and Federal Inducement: Lessons From the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972“. Educational Policy 32, Nr. 1 (18.03.2016): 86–116. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0895904816632608.
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This study uses the example of the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972, a federal desegregation incentive program, to discuss the benefits and challenges of equity-oriented incentives. This study applies theories of policy instruments and the social construction of target populations to congressional records, archival program materials, and other historical sources to trace the origin and evolution of the incentives and mandates built into the Emergency School Aid Act. The study ultimately concludes that the program’s combination of a financial incentive with rigorous oversight offers lessons for how to incorporate equity-oriented incentives into current education policy.
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Cheng, Hua, Zhiying Zhang, Zhongju Liao, Yong Wei und Joseph Martial Nkongo Mvondo. „Different policy instruments and the threshold effects on collaboration efficiency in China“. Science and Public Policy 47, Nr. 3 (16.03.2020): 348–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/scipol/scaa016.
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Abstract University–industry R&D collaboration is an important means to improve innovation efficiency; many governments have issued policies to promote it. The most frequent policy instruments implemented by policy-makers to foster firms’ innovation are subsidies and tax incentives. The article elaborated on how subsidies and tax incentives influence the R&D collaboration efficiency through a panel dataset from 2009 to 2015 in China. The result showed that subsidies and tax incentives have a positive effect on collaboration efficiency, and the effect of subsidies on output is bigger than that of tax incentives. Taking the intensity of subsidy as a threshold variable, there is a significant single threshold effect on collaboration efficiency. However, there is no threshold effect when the intensity of the tax incentive used as the threshold variable.
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Rosenthal, Meredith B., Andrea B. Troxel, Kevin G. Volpp, Walter F. Stewart, Thomas D. Sequist, James B. Jones, AnneMarie G. Hirsch et al. „Moderating Effects of Patient Characteristics on the Impact of Financial Incentives“. Medical Care Research and Review 76, Nr. 1 (08.05.2017): 56–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1077558717707313.
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While financial incentives to providers or patients are increasingly common as a quality improvement strategy, their impact on patient subgroups and health care disparities is unclear. To examine these patterns, we analyzed data from a randomized clinical trial of financial incentives to lower low-density lipoprotein (LDL) cholesterol levels in patients at risk for cardiovascular disease. Patients with higher baseline LDL experienced greater cholesterol reductions in the shared incentive arm (0.23 mg/dL per unit change in baseline LDL, 95% CI [−0.46, −0.00]) but were also less likely to have medication potency increases in the physician incentive arm ( OR = 0.98, 95% CI [0.97, 0.996]). Uninsured patients and those of race other than Black or White were less likely to have potency increases in the shared incentive arm ( OR = 0.15, 95% CI [0.03, 0.70] and OR = 0.09, 95% CI [0.01, 0.93], respectively). These findings suggest some differential response to incentives, particularly in the form of targeted medication changes.
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Noel, HarmoniJoie, und Alison R. Huang. „The Effect of Varying Incentive Amounts on Physician Survey Response“. Evaluation & the Health Professions 42, Nr. 1 (01.11.2018): 71–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0163278718809844.
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A major challenge with surveying physicians is low response. In this article, we present results of an experiment conducted to determine the optimal monetary incentive amount for gaining response from physicians to a short screener survey. Sampled physicians were randomly assigned to three prepaid cash incentive conditions (US$2, US$5, US$10) compared to a control (US$0). This study found using any incentive increased response versus no incentive. The US$10 incentive produced the highest response and was significantly greater than the US$2 incentive group. However, we did not find a statistical difference between the $5 and US$10 incentives or between the US$2 and US$5 incentives. In addition, any incentive amount increased the likelihood of early response compared to no incentive. This study builds on previously mixed results about the effects of various incentive amounts and effect on early survey response. These findings provide practical advice for researchers surveying physicians.
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Wasilah, Galuh Ayu, und Maria R. U. D. Tambunan. „Tax Incentive Policy Evaluation on Donation for Disaster Charity in Indonesia“. MIMBAR : Jurnal Sosial dan Pembangunan 35, Nr. 2 (31.12.2019): 371–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.29313/mimbar.v35i2.5020.
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This research is conducted to evaluate tax incentives for donation activities of disaster management based on policy evaluation criteria by William Dunn which consists of effectiveness, efficiency, adequacy, equity, responsiveness, and accuracy. The research method used is qualitative approach and qualitative data analysis techniques. In qualitative research, the researcher occupied theory as a tool to guide the research by collecting data through interviews and literature study until reaching the conclusion. The data used in this research is qualitative data, gathered through literature review, documentation study, and in-depth interviews with experts (policymakers, policy implementers, academicians, civil society). The result of this study indicates that the tax incentive policy on donations for disaster management has not met William Dunn's policy evaluation criteria. The research shows that quite limited benefit granted and less clear of technical guidance of tax incentives implementation for disaster donations lead the taxpayer which has been undertaking the role as donators to not utilize the incentives. In order to occupy tax incentives to contribute to disaster management effectively, the government needs to socialize the implementation with clear guidance.
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Hopkins, Vincent. „Institutions, Incentives, and Policy Entrepreneurship“. Policy Studies Journal 44, Nr. 3 (30.09.2015): 332–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/psj.12132.
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Lenten, Liam J. A., Jan Libich und Petr Stehlík. „Policy Timing and Footballers' Incentives“. Journal of Sports Economics 14, Nr. 6 (19.01.2012): 629–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1527002511432786.
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Thom, Michael. „Do State Corporate Tax Incentives Create Jobs? Quasi-experimental Evidence from the Entertainment Industry“. State and Local Government Review 51, Nr. 2 (Juni 2019): 92–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0160323x19877232.
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Policy makers allocate billions of dollars each year to tax incentives that increasingly favor creative industries. This study scrutinizes that approach by examining motion picture incentive programs used in over thirty states to encourage film and television production. It uses a quasi-experimental strategy to determine whether those programs have contributed to employment growth. Results mostly show no statistically significant effects. Results also indicate that domestic employment is unaffected by competing incentives offered outside the United States. These findings are robust to several alternative models and should lead policy makers to question the wisdom of targeted incentives conferred on creative industries.
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Митрофанова, Александра, und Aleksandra Mitrofanova. „Incentive System as an Instrument of Personnel Motivation“. Management of the Personnel and Intellectual Resources in Russia 7, Nr. 6 (26.12.2018): 24–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.12737/article_5c1764453df656.31079412.
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Modern development of management theory and practice pays special attention to staff incentives, which, often, takes the main place in a personnel management system of the organizations in various branches. In modern conditions inefficient incentive system is the widespread phenomenon on what directly and indirectly specify data on supply balance and demand in labor market, personnel fluidity in the organizations, unsatisfactory professional level of personnel and others. In this regard, researches in the field of staff incentive acquire special relevance. The author proves a work incentives role in the system of the social and labor relations in the organization, shows change of relationship between the employer and the hired worker on the basis of the effective system of work incentives. Also the author defines policy and represents structure of incentive system. Requirements, the principles and the purposes of staff incentives are submitted. The algorithm of incentives system formation in the organization is described.
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Mallah, Farah. „A Theoretical Framework for Teacher Incentives: Monetary, Social and Vision-Based“. Journal of Education and Learning 8, Nr. 1 (30.12.2018): 29. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/jel.v8n1p29.
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Teachers are at the heart of the education process; in attempts to improve teacher quality there has been a trend in the US and elsewhere to incentivize teachers to put in more effort. This paper presents a theoretical framework for analyzing and designing different incentive schemes informed by the structure and quality of tasks constituting the k-12 teaching profession. It focuses on the question of how policy makers and education leaders can improve teacher effort towards the outcome of interest, specifically improving student achievement. It draws on literature on incentives, goal setting theory, norms and work significance to identify three main types of incentives: (1) monetary incentives, (2) social incentives and (3) vision-based incentive. Each of the types of incentives in this paper are analyzed in light of Vroom’s (1964) expectancy theory—its expectancy, valence and instrumentality—to build a theoretical framework for analyzing the potential mediating factors of each of the incentive schemes and their impact.
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Morgan, Heather, Pat Hoddinott, Gill Thomson, Nicola Crossland, Shelley Farrar, Deokhee Yi, Jenni Hislop et al. „Benefits of Incentives for Breastfeeding and Smoking cessation in pregnancy (BIBS): a mixed-methods study to inform trial design“. Health Technology Assessment 19, Nr. 30 (April 2015): 1–522. http://dx.doi.org/10.3310/hta19300.
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BackgroundSmoking in pregnancy and/or not breastfeeding have considerable negative health outcomes for mother and baby.AimTo understand incentive mechanisms of action for smoking cessation in pregnancy and breastfeeding, develop a taxonomy and identify promising, acceptable and feasible interventions to inform trial design.DesignEvidence syntheses, primary qualitative survey, and discrete choice experiment (DCE) research using multidisciplinary, mixed methods. Two mother-and-baby groups in disadvantaged areas collaborated throughout.SettingUK.ParticipantsThe qualitative study included 88 pregnant women/recent mothers/partners, 53 service providers, 24 experts/decision-makers and 63 conference attendees. The surveys included 1144 members of the general public and 497 health professionals. The DCE study included 320 women with a history of smoking.Methods(1) Evidence syntheses: incentive effectiveness (including meta-analysis and effect size estimates), delivery processes, barriers to and facilitators of smoking cessation in pregnancy and/or breastfeeding, scoping review of incentives for lifestyle behaviours; (2) qualitative research: grounded theory to understand incentive mechanisms of action and a framework approach for trial design; (3) survey: multivariable ordered logit models; (4) DCE: conditional logit regression and the log-likelihood ratio test.ResultsOut of 1469 smoking cessation and 5408 breastfeeding multicomponent studies identified, 23 smoking cessation and 19 breastfeeding studies were included in the review. Vouchers contingent on biochemically proven smoking cessation in pregnancy were effective, with a relative risk of 2.58 (95% confidence interval 1.63 to 4.07) compared with non-contingent incentives for participation (four studies, 344 participants). Effects continued until 3 months post partum. Inconclusive effects were found for breastfeeding incentives compared with no/smaller incentives (13 studies) but provider commitment contracts for breastfeeding show promise. Intervention intensity is a possible confounder. The acceptability of seven promising incentives was mixed. Women (for vouchers) and those with a lower level of education (except for breastfeeding incentives) were more likely to disagree. Those aged ≤ 44 years and ethnic minority groups were more likely to agree. Agreement was greatest for a free breast pump and least for vouchers for breastfeeding. Universal incentives were preferred to those targeting low-income women. Initial daily text/telephone support, a quitting pal, vouchers for > £20.00 per month and values up to £80.00 increase the likelihood of smoking cessation. Doctors disagreed with provider incentives. A ‘ladder’ logic model emerged through data synthesis and had face validity with service users. It combined an incentive typology and behaviour change taxonomy. Autonomy and well-being matter. Personal difficulties, emotions, socialising and attitudes of others are challenges to climbing a metaphorical ‘ladder’ towards smoking cessation and breastfeeding. Incentive interventions provide opportunity ‘rungs’ to help, including regular skilled flexible support, a pal, setting goals, monitoring and outcome verification. Individually tailored and non-judgemental continuity of care can bolster women’s capabilities to succeed. Rigid, prescriptive interventions placing the onus on women to behave ‘healthily’ risk them feeling pressurised and failing. To avoid ‘losing face’, women may disengage.LimitationsIncluded studies were heterogeneous and of variable quality, limiting the assessment of incentive effectiveness. No cost-effectiveness data were reported. In surveys, selection bias and confounding are possible. The validity and utility of the ladder logic model requires evaluation with more diverse samples of the target population.ConclusionsIncentives provided with other tailored components show promise but reach is a concern. Formal evaluation is recommended. Collaborative service-user involvement is important.Study registrationThis study is registered as PROSPERO CRD42012001980.FundingThe National Institute for Health Research Health Technology Assessment programme.
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Adams, Jean, Belinda Bateman, Frauke Becker, Tricia Cresswell, Darren Flynn, Rebekah McNaughton, Yemi Oluboyede et al. „Effectiveness and acceptability of parental financial incentives and quasi-mandatory schemes for increasing uptake of vaccinations in preschool children: systematic review, qualitative study and discrete choice experiment“. Health Technology Assessment 19, Nr. 94 (November 2015): 1–176. http://dx.doi.org/10.3310/hta19940.
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BackgroundUptake of preschool vaccinations is less than optimal. Financial incentives and quasi-mandatory policies (restricting access to child care or educational settings to fully vaccinated children) have been used to increase uptake internationally, but not in the UK.ObjectiveTo provide evidence on the effectiveness, acceptability and economic costs and consequences of parental financial incentives and quasi-mandatory schemes for increasing the uptake of preschool vaccinations.DesignSystematic review, qualitative study and discrete choice experiment (DCE) with questionnaire.SettingCommunity, health and education settings in England.ParticipantsQualitative study – parents and carers of preschool children, health and educational professionals. DCE – parents and carers of preschool children identified as ‘at high risk’ and ‘not at high risk’ of incompletely vaccinating their children.Data sourcesQualitative study – focus groups and individual interviews. DCE – online questionnaire.Review methodsThe review included studies exploring the effectiveness, acceptability or economic costs and consequences of interventions that offered contingent rewards or penalties with real material value for preschool vaccinations, or quasi-mandatory schemes that restricted access to ‘universal’ services, compared with usual care or no intervention. Electronic database, reference and citation searches were conducted.ResultsSystematic review – there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the interventions considered are effective. There was some evidence that the quasi-mandatory interventions were acceptable. There was insufficient evidence to draw conclusions on economic costs and consequences. Qualitative study – there was little appetite for parental financial incentives. Quasi-mandatory schemes were more acceptable. Optimising current services was consistently preferred to the interventions proposed. DCE and questionnaire – universal parental financial incentives were preferred to quasi-mandatory interventions, which were preferred to targeted incentives. Those reporting that they would need an incentive to vaccinate their children completely required around £110. Those who did not felt that the maximum acceptable incentive was around £70.LimitationsSystematic review – a number of relevant studies were excluded as they did not meet the study design inclusion criteria. Qualitative study – few partially and non-vaccinating parents were recruited. DCE and questionnaire – data were from a convenience sample.ConclusionsThere is little current evidence on the effectiveness or economic costs and consequences of parental financial incentives and quasi-mandatory interventions for preschool vaccinations. Universal incentives are likely to be more acceptable than targeted ones. Preferences concerning incentives versus quasi-mandatory interventions may depend on the context in which these are elicited.Future workFurther evidence is required on (i) the effectiveness and optimal configuration of parental financial incentive and quasi-mandatory interventions for preschool vaccinations – if effectiveness is confirmed, further evidence is required on how to communicate this to stakeholders and the impact on acceptability; and (ii) the acceptability of parental financial incentive and quasi-mandatory interventions for preschool vaccinations to members of the population who are not parents of preschool children or relevant health professionals. Further consideration should be given to (i) incorporating reasons for non-vaccination into new interventions for promoting vaccination uptake; and (ii) how existing services can be optimised.Study registrationThis study is registered as PROSPERO CRD42012003192.FundingThe National Institute for Health Research Health Technology Assessment programme.
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Brink, Alisa G., Jessen L. Hobson und Douglas E. Stevens. „The Effect of High Power Financial Incentives on Excessive Risk-Taking Behavior: An Experimental Examination“. Journal of Management Accounting Research 29, Nr. 1 (01.07.2016): 13–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jmar-51533.
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ABSTRACT Recent attempts by policy makers to rein in high power financial incentives are predicated on the belief that such incentives cause managers to engage in excessive risk taking that is not in the best interest of the firm. This potential agency cost, however, has received little attention in the management accounting literature. We examine the effect of incentive power on excessive risk-taking behavior in a controlled experimental setting where managers make incentivized risk choices that affect the pay of the manager and another participant representing the firm. Our main results are, first, that the high power incentive generates more excessive risk taking than the low power incentive, despite both incentives being equivalent in expected value at the optimal level of risk for the firm. Second, changing from the low power to the high power incentive significantly increases excessive risk taking, but changing from the high power to the low power incentive does not significantly decrease excessive risk taking, indicating a stickiness effect that may hinder attempts to decrease this behavior. These results provide useful insights for agency theory and public policy. JEL Classifications: C91; C92; D80; G30; J30; M40.
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Amundson, Gail. „Quality Incentives“. Health Affairs 23, Nr. 4 (Juli 2004): 284–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.23.4.284-a.
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Alper, Philip R. „Performance Incentives“. Health Affairs 24, Nr. 3 (Mai 2005): 886. http://dx.doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.24.3.886.
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Marmilava, Katsiaryna. „Reshaping R&D Tax Incentive Policy in Terms of International Tax Competition“. Európai Tükör 23, Nr. 4 (25.06.2021): 43–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.32559/et.2020.4.4.
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Policies to stimulate research and development are significant in the government’s agenda and affect businesses growing internationally. The article highlights the role of tax incentives in the policy mix to promote private research and development (R&D). It discusses evolution and recent trends in R&D tax incentive schemes in European countries. The impact of international tax competition on their adoption and generosity is investigated. Moreover, a decision-making model on implementation and generosity of R&D tax incentives is introduced.
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Rogerson, William P. „Economic Incentives and the Defense Procurement Process“. Journal of Economic Perspectives 8, Nr. 4 (01.11.1994): 65–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.8.4.65.
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This paper describes some of the insights that the economic theory of incentives can contribute to defense procurement policy analysis. It describes the underlying incentive problems that shape the defense procurement problem, the nature of current institutions and how they affect actors’ behavior, and possible directions for improving the procurement process suggested by viewing it as a solution to a complex set of incentive problems. Incentive problems between government and defense firms and incentive problems within government are both considered.
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Thom, Michael, und Brian An. „Fade to Black? Exploring Policy Enactment and Termination Through the Rise and Fall of State Tax Incentives for the Motion Picture Industry“. American Politics Research 45, Nr. 1 (11.08.2016): 85–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532673x16661819.
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Policy termination has received less scholarly attention than policy diffusion, and empirical state-level studies that examine the rise and fall of the same policy are mostly absent from the literature. This study assesses the factors that led more than 45 states to enact and some to later repeal Motion Picture Incentive programs, a collection of tax incentives aimed at facilitating job creation and economic diversification. We find program enactments were driven by rising unemployment and national but not bordering state imitation. Falling unemployment and national trends drove subsequent terminations, but in many states, their impact was overwhelmed by the influence of incentive spending, which greatly reduced termination likelihood. These results not only shed light on policy enactments and terminations in general, but also inform scholarship on state tax incentives and the role of competitive factors in their creation and repeal—or lack thereof.
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Wang, Jia, Weici Yuan und Cynthia Rogers. „Economic Development Incentives: What Can We Learn From Policy Regime Changes?“ Economic Development Quarterly 34, Nr. 2 (20.03.2020): 116–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0891242420909899.
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The authors investigate state-level economic incentive policies in the United States using the Panel Database on Incentives and Taxes for economic development (PDIT). Although interest in evaluating the efficacy of tax and incentive programs is growing, data limitations are formidable: Tax policies and expenditures are difficult to track and administrators are not equipped to gather the data needed for rigorous evaluation. The PDIT covers 45 industries in 32 U.S. states, including the main cities in the 30 largest metropolitan areas. The PDIT simulates the value of an incentive in terms of value added of a hypothetical firm in a particular industry, state, and year from 1990 to 2015. The authors identify and exploit large, discrete changes in incentive policies (e.g., regime changes). Applying the difference-in-differences method, they investigate potential causal links between regime changes and medium-run economic outcomes, including employment, establishment counts, wages, and poverty rates.
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Webb, Kernaghan. „Thumbs, Fingers, and Pushing on String: Legal Accountability in the Use of Federal Financial Incentives“. Alberta Law Review 31, Nr. 3 (01.08.1993): 501. http://dx.doi.org/10.29173/alr1202.
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The federal government makes extensive use of its spending powers to establish programs intended to influence private behaviour in furtherance of public policy objectives. Incentives are frequently used where more conventional policy instruments would not be appropriate or available. However, in many situations, such programs lack adequate legal structure. The author concludes that the minimal legal structure allows for tremendous administrative flexibility, but detracts from effective accountability, and can negatively affect operational fairness. Taking a functional approach to analysis, the author argues that since incentives are public policy instruments intended to alter behaviour, they are akin (though not identical) to conventional regulatory approaches, and so should be subject to many of the same legal principles and structures as apply to conventional policy instruments. The effect would be more open and accountable frameworks for the creation and operation of incentives, which should result in better designed and more fair and efficiently functioning incentive regimes.
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Shan, Wei, und Ran An. „Motives of Stock Option Incentive Design, Ownership, and Inefficient Investment“. Sustainability 10, Nr. 10 (29.09.2018): 3484. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su10103484.
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This paper analyzes the effects of stock option incentives on inefficient investment. Specifically, based on the motive of design, we divide stock option incentives into incentive-driven and welfare-driven incentives. Our research is based on the panel data of 511 Chinese listed companies that declared stock option incentives from 2010 to 2014, including both incentive-driven and welfare-driven incentives. Our research shows that different types of stock option incentives have different effects on inefficient investment. Generally, incentive-driven stock option incentives reduce inefficient investment, whereas welfare-driven stock option incentives do not reduce inefficient investment, but increase it. However, there is a weakening effect in state-owned enterprises due to two opposite factors, numerous restrictions and more self-interested managers. Additionally, the paper provides implications that some stock options are manipulated by managers in the designing stage in order to pursue self-interests, and therefore monitoring abnormal share price movement and performance hurdles is important to safeguard the wealth of shareholders and promote effective motivation for managers.
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Yamin, Dan, und Arieh Gavious. „Incentives' Effect in Influenza Vaccination Policy“. Management Science 59, Nr. 12 (Dezember 2013): 2667–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2013.1725.
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Zhang, Xinzhu. „Incentives in allocation of policy loans“. European Economic Review 44, Nr. 4-6 (Mai 2000): 785–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0014-2921(99)00042-2.
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Avanesova, A. Е., О. N. Bugaev, G. E. Koncevich und N. A. Sarkisyan. „Policy Incentives for Staff: Theoretical Aspect“. Social’naya politika i sociologiya 15, Nr. 3 (24.06.2016): 8–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.17922/2071-3665-2016-15-3-8-15.
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Korlén, Sara, Anna Essén, Peter Lindgren, Isis Amer-Wahlin und Ulrica von Thiele Schwarz. „Managerial strategies to make incentives meaningful and motivating“. Journal of Health Organization and Management 31, Nr. 2 (10.04.2017): 126–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jhom-06-2016-0122.
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Purpose Policy makers are applying market-inspired competition and financial incentives to drive efficiency in healthcare. However, a lack of knowledge exists about the process whereby incentives are filtered through organizations to influence staff motivation, and the key role of managers is often overlooked. The purpose of this paper is to explore the strategies managers use as intermediaries between financial incentives and the individual motivation of staff. The authors use empirical data from a local case in Swedish specialized care. Design/methodology/approach The authors conducted an exploratory qualitative case study of a patient-choice reform, including financial incentives, in specialized orthopedics in Sweden. In total, 17 interviews were conducted with professionals in managerial positions, representing six healthcare providers. A hypo-deductive, thematic approach was used to analyze the data. Findings The results show that managers applied alignment strategies to make the incentive model motivating for staff. The managers’ strategies are characterized by attempts to align external rewards with professional values based on their contextual and practical knowledge. Managers occasionally overruled the financial logic of the model to safeguard patient needs and expressed an interest in having a closer dialogue with policy makers about improvements. Originality/value Externally imposed incentives do not automatically motivate healthcare staff. Managers in healthcare play key roles as intermediaries by aligning external rewards with professional values. Managers’ multiple perspectives on healthcare practices and professional culture can also be utilized to improve policy and as a source of knowledge in partnership with policy makers.
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Williamson, Stephen D. „Low Real Interest Rates, Collateral Misrepresentation, and Monetary Policy“. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 10, Nr. 4 (01.10.2018): 202–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mac.20150035.
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A model is constructed in which households and banks have incentives to fake the quality of collateral. These incentive problems matter when collateral is scarce in the aggregate—when real interest rates are low. Conventional monetary easing can exacerbate these problems, in that the misrepresentation of collateral becomes more profitable, thus increasing haircuts and interest rate differentials. Central bank purchases of private mortgages may not be feasible, due to the misrepresentation of asset quality. If feasible, central bank asset purchase programs work by circumventing suboptimal fiscal policy, not by mitigating incentive problems in asset markets. (JEL E43, E52, E58, E62, G21)
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Zuo, Cai (Vera). „Promoting City Leaders: The Structure of Political Incentives in China“. China Quarterly 224 (01.03.2015): 955–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741015001289.
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AbstractThe shift in Beijing's priorities to more balanced and people-oriented development has led some localities to make more efforts in developing social policy areas. By investigating the personnel institution, a political incentive mechanism, this article aims to shed light on the structure of political incentives in China and why local political leaders improve public welfare in a non-democratic setting. A content analysis of 69 regulations that cover one-third of all municipal leaders shows that the formal evaluation rules for leaders in some localities have become more welfare-oriented to reflect Beijing's new focus on social policy areas. A statistical analysis further reveals that different political incentives operate for municipal Party leaders and mayors, and that political incentives to develop social policy vary across geographic regions. The statistical analysis exploits an original dataset I compiled from an online archive and statistical yearbooks, and contains biographic and career history data on municipal leaders between 2003 and 2010.
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Milstein, Arnold, und Debra Ness. „U.K. Quality Incentives“. Health Affairs 23, Nr. 4 (Juli 2004): 282. http://dx.doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.23.4.282.
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Bloom, Jonathan Z., und Frederik J. Mostert. „Incentive Guidelines for South African Tourism: Implications and Challenges in the Context of Developing Socio-Political Trends“. Tourism Economics 1, Nr. 1 (März 1995): 17–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/135481669500100103.
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The need for some form of support from governmental sources to advance the tourism industry by means of financial and fiscal incentives has become a significant issue. This article provides a comparison of incentives found internationally with those available in South Africa. Various shortcomings pertaining to the types of incentives provided are discussed. The main aim of the paper is to analyse three incentive options in the context of tourism policy together with a decision matrix which could be used by the government to make a choice between alternative options. A conceptual framework is provided which could form the basis for the government in its choice of incentives. The implications and challenges of providing incentives for the tourism industry are discussed in the context of developing socio-political trends within the South African environment
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Martinelli, César, Susan W. Parker, Ana Cristina Pérez-Gea und Rodimiro Rodrigo. „Cheating and Incentives: Learning from a Policy Experiment“. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 10, Nr. 1 (01.02.2018): 298–325. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.20150066.
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We use a database generated by a policy intervention that incentivized learning as measured by standardized exams to investigate empirically the relationship between cheating by students and cash incentives to students and teachers. We adapt methods from the education measurement literature to calculate the extent of cheating and show that cheating is more prevalent under treatments that provide monetary incentives to students (versus no incentives or incentives only to teachers). We provide evidence suggesting that students may have learned to cheat, with the number of cheating students per classroom increasing over time under treatments that provide monetary incentives to students. (JEL D83, I21, I28, O15)
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Mo, Jongryn, und Jeong Yeon Lee. „Think Tanks and Good Governance: The Case of the Korea Development Institute (KDI)“. International Studies Review 15, Nr. 2 (15.10.2014): 93–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2667078x-01502004.
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This paper introduces a set of analytical frameworks for explaining the configuration and performance of different policy research systems. Building upon these frameworks, we identify three major contributing factors to the creation of an efficient policy research system in Korea while paying particular attention to the Korea Development Institute (KDI). Those factors include: (i) a favorable policy environment; (ii) an optimal organizational arrangement; and (iii) effective incentive and discipline mechanisms. Among possible lessons from the KDI model that can have important bearings on other countries, we emphasize the importance of institutional and individual incentives. But incentive systems would not have worked without the KDI’s open and “liberal” organizational culture. Non-economic factors such as the recognition as a center of excellence have also been as important to KDI success as financial rewards. It is also important to recognize that these success factors, strong incentives, organizational culture and non-financial recognitions, do not work independently; rather, they reinforce one another.
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Leiser, Stephanie. „The Diffusion of State Film Incentives: A Mixed-Methods Case Study“. Economic Development Quarterly 31, Nr. 3 (01.06.2017): 255–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0891242417710715.
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In 2000, only six states had tax incentives for film and video production, and by 2010, all but six states had film incentives. What accounts for this growth in popularity? This study combines quantitative event history analysis and qualitative interview methods to try to understand why states adopted film incentive programs and how they were influenced by the adoption of incentives in other states. The analysis suggests that the diffusion processes in state adoptions of film incentives can be largely explained by two factors: (a) the size and sophistication of the existing film industry in the state and (b) a competitive “bandwagon” effect based on the total number of states that had already adopted film incentives. The results emphasize the need to broaden the ways that competitive influences can be conceptualized and modeled in policy diffusion research, especially in economic development.
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LAWLOR, ANDREA. „Getting Citizens to Save: Media Influence on Incentive-Based Policies“. Journal of Social Policy 45, Nr. 2 (17.11.2015): 201–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0047279415000641.
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AbstractGovernments often introduce financial incentives to citizens in order to encourage ‘personally responsible’ behaviour. Examples of these types of incentives include tax-deferral or tax-free incentives around retirement savings. These types of incentives are shown to matter to investment strategies in the aggregate, but we still lack a full explanation as to how individuals respond to these types of incentives, and what role media play in advertising these incentives. This paper illustrates the potentially vital role that media play in enhancing contributions to one incentive-based policy, the Registered Retirement Savings Plan (RRSP) in Canada (2000–2013), using aggregate contribution data, media data, as well as individual-level survey data from the Canadian Financial Capability Survey. Results show that media advertising of the programme influences contribution outcomes and, while media may not outweigh lifecycle effects such as proximity to retirement, it is nonetheless an essential – and overlooked – motivator for contributions to late-life savings.
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Belfo, Fernando. „A Framework to Enhance Business and Information Technology Alignment Through Incentive Policy“. International Journal of Information Systems in the Service Sector 5, Nr. 2 (April 2013): 1–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/jisss.2013040101.
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The alignment of Business and IT is still an important concern of IT managers. Alignment, as most others organization challenges, is essentially promoted by people. So, adequate people´s incentives should be accordingly designed with that purpose in mind. A framework that enhances alignment through an incentive policy is proposed, relating incentive initiatives with alignment criteria. Framework uses Luftman instrument, where its dimensions represents alignment opportunities that should be explored. The used incentive instrument is based on the WorldatWork model. An incentive policy should consider five areas; compensation, benefits, work-life, performance/recognition and development/career opportunities. Strategic alignment dimension is composed by six areas; communications, competency/value measurements, governance, partnership, technological scope and skills. The framework supports the definition of an incentive policy enhancing general and specific alignment dimensions. Theorization about some possible direct relations between the dimensions of an incentive policy and alignment is made, helping the incentive policy definition.
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Lange, Samantha J., Latetia V. Moore und Deborah A. Galuska. „Local government retail incentives for healthier food retailers in the USA, 2014“. Public Health Nutrition 22, Nr. 13 (21.05.2019): 2521–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1368980019000983.
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AbstractObjective:National public health organizations recommend that local governments improve access to healthy foods. One way is by offering incentives for food retailer development and operation, but little is known about incentive use nationwide. We aimed to describe the national prevalence of local government reported incentives to increase access to healthy food options in three major food retail settings (farmers’ markets, supermarkets, and convenience or corner (smaller) stores) overall and by municipality characteristics.Design:Cross-sectional study using data from the 2014 National Survey of Community-Based Policy and Environmental Supports for Healthy Eating and Active Living.Setting:USA, nationally representative survey of 2029 municipalities.Participants:Municipal officials (e.g. city/town managers or planners; n 1853).Results:Overall, 67 % of municipalities reported incentives to support farmers’ markets, 34 % reported incentives to encourage opening new supermarkets, and 14 % reported incentives to help existing convenience or corner stores. Municipality characteristics significantly associated with incentive use were larger population size (all settings), location in Midwest v. West (supermarkets, smaller stores), higher poverty level (farmers’ markets) and ≤50 % of the population non-Hispanic White (supermarkets, smaller stores). The most commonly reported individual incentives were permission of sales on city property for farmers’ markets, tax credits for supermarkets and linkage to revitalization projects for smaller stores.Conclusions:Most municipalities offered food retail incentives for farmers’ markets, but fewer used incentives to open new supermarkets or assist existing smaller stores. National data can set benchmarks, provide relative comparisons for communities and identify areas for improvement.
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Sungur, Onur. „Spatial Distribution of Investment Incentives and the Impact of New Incentive System for Less Developed Regions in Turkey“. Review of Economic Perspectives 19, Nr. 1 (01.03.2019): 25–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/revecp-2019-0002.
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Abstract Regional policy has been on the agenda of Turkey since the First Five-Year Development Plan (1963–1967), and so far, Turkey has put into practice to overcome regional disparities, one of the most important is regional-sectoral incentives. Thus, the incentive system, which has undergone many changes until today, has been revised and updated in 2012. Although this incentive system has been put into practice for increasing the investment in eastern provinces/regions, development gap between eastern and western regions still stands. The main purpose of this study is to investigate the success of the new incentive system and to determine whether the new investment incentive system is effective in shifting investments from developed regions to backward regions in Turkey. In the study, the regional distribution of investment incentives during 2001–2016 and the effect of new investment incentive system to change the distribution of investments in favor of less developed provinces/regions will be examined. By using investment incentives data, regional distribution of investments will be revealed with the help of map-graph technique. The study found that both the share of incentive certificates and the share of the investment amount have increased during the period of 2001–2016 in the less developed provinces. From this point of view, it is possible to say that the new investment incentive system has a positive impact on increasing the share of incentives in these provinces.
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Leiser, Stephanie. „The Diffusion of State Tax Incentives for Business“. Public Finance Review 45, Nr. 3 (26.10.2015): 334–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1091142115611741.
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Tax competition scholars are increasingly recognizing that states compete with each other not only by manipulating tax rates but also by adopting tax incentives. However, there is a comparative lack of empirical literature exploring why states adopt different types of tax incentives. This article draws on the literatures on tax competition and policy diffusion to develop hypotheses about what factors motivate states to adopt business tax incentives, paying particular attention to the influence of other adopting states. It uses event history analysis methods to test hypotheses regarding the adoption of four state tax incentive policies: investment tax credits, apportionment formula changes, research and development tax credits, and job creation tax credits. Regression results show that factors that influence adoption decisions are largely inconsistent across the four incentive types. However, analyses of duration dependence find evidence consistent with the idea that states are “racing to the bottom.”
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PRONINA, L. I. „OPTIMIZATION OF TAX POLICY IN THE PERIOD 2019-2024: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ASPECTS“. EKONOMIKA I UPRAVLENIE: PROBLEMY, RESHENIYA 6, Nr. 12 (2020): 88–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.36871/ek.up.p.r.2020.12.06.011.
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The article examines the prospects for budget planning for 2021-2023, analyzes the state and development of tax legislation in 2019-2020, and the modification of tax policy in the period 2021-2023, including on the basis of protection and promotion of capital investments. An assessment of the effectiveness of tax incentives and other incentive mechanisms is proposed.
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Botz, Charles K. „Principles for Funding on a Case Mix Basis: Construction of Case Weights (RIWs)“. Healthcare Management Forum 4, Nr. 4 (Dezember 1991): 22–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0840-4704(10)61307-5.
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The construct of Resource Intensity Weights (RIWs) contains implicit financial incentives if they are used for hospital funding purposes. This paper compares the RIW (funding) credit to the expected average per diem cost for each of the new subcategories (typicals, deaths, transfers, signouts and outliers) of Case Mix Groups (CMGs). RIW construction, and inherent incentives for a hospital to reduce costs or length of stay(LOS), differ significantly for each subcategory. At some point or points in a patient's LOS, when RIW credit equals case cost, RIWs are incentive neutral. However, it can also be demonstrated that RIW credit is not generally congruent with average costs on each day of a patient's stay. Financial incentives (both positive and negative) arise when RIW credit and costs differ. Only by being fully aware of these differences can hospitals determine how to respond to the introduction of case mix funding to maintain financial viability. Funding agencies, too, need to appreciate the sometimes subtle policy implications that come with the adoption of RIWs for funding purposes.
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Starkova, E. Y. „FORMATION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE ORGANIZATION“. Vestnik of Khabarovsk State University of Economics and Law, Nr. 1-2 (20.10.2020): 61–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.38161/2618-9526-2020-1-2-29.
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The income policy is shown as an effective tool for stimulating the economic growth of the organization with the interests of the main social groups of employees and employers. It carries the content of incentives, providing employees with an additional old-age pension, and also plays a significant incentive role for employees. In modern conditions, an organization, that wants to be a market leader in terms of the quality of its products and services, must take a very serious approach to developing a social policy for its employees.
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Anesi, Vincent, und Giovanni Facchini. „Coercive Trade Policy“. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 11, Nr. 3 (01.08.2019): 225–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20170085.
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Coercion is used by one government (the “sender”) to influence the trade practices of another (the “target”). We build a two-country trade model in which coercion can be exercised unilaterally or channeled through a “weak” international organization without enforcement powers. We show that unilateral coercion may be ineffective because signaling incentives lead the sender to demand a concession so substantial to make it unacceptable to the target. If the sender can instead commit to the international organization’s dispute settlement mechanism, then compliance is more likely because the latter places a cap on the sender’s incentives to signal its resolve. (JEL D74, D82, F12, F53)
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Enright, Sharon Murphy. „Productivity and incentives“. American Journal of Health-System Pharmacy 46, Nr. 6 (01.06.1989): 1218–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ajhp/46.6.1218.
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