Thematische Bibliographien / Policy incentives

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Auswahl der wissenschaftlichen Literatur zum Thema „Policy incentives“

Autor: Grafiati

Veröffentlicht am 24. Juni 2021

Zuletzt aktualisiert am 15. Februar 2022

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Zeitschriftenartikel zum Thema "Policy incentives"

Benson, Bruce L., und David W. Rasmussen. „The Context of Drug Policy: An Economic Interpretation“. Journal of Drug Issues 28, Nr. 3 (Juli 1998): 681–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002204269802800307.

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Economics can be used to analyze public sector decision making because individuals make these decisions within a framework of incentives and constraints that are a product of individual preferences and institutional structure. Considering the emphasis on law enforcement in U.S. drug policy in this context, this paper presents an analysis of the incentives and constraints affecting drug policy that explains a reluctance to change the policy even in the face of considerable evidence that some reforms could be cost effective. Two specific incentives for an emphasis on enforcement are presented. First, police agencies have an incentive to allocate more resources to drug enforcement due to the factors that determine police budgets. Second, asset forfeiture laws give police agencies a direct monetary reward for making drug arrests. We conclude that understanding drug policy requires an examination of the incentives and constraints that affect the behavior of those who are responsible for policy development.

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Abidin, Mohammad Zainul, Haula Rosdiana und Roy Valiant Salomo. „Tax Incentive Policy for Geothermal Development: A Comparative Analysis in ASEAN“. International Journal of Renewable Energy Development 9, Nr. 1 (23.01.2020): 53–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.14710/ijred.9.1.53-62.

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This paper examines tax incentive policies in geothermal industries in ASEAN to better understand the development of geothermal industry investment in the ASEAN Member States (AMS) using a qualitative method. The results indicate that tax incentive policies have supported the investment climate and the development of geothermal industries in the AMS. Geothermal investments and production capacities in AMS have increased significantly. AMS that provide geothermal tax incentives include Indonesia, Lao PDR, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. The performance of geothermal tax incentive policies is reflected in the level of utilization of geothermal potential, which is higher in states that provide greater tax incentives. The results also indicate that geothermal power plants in AMS use dry steam, flash and binary cycle technologies with flash plants being the most common. Results suggest that the future development of geothermal energy in AMS will be related to the tax incentive policy and investment climate in those states. Furthermore, the granting of various types of tax incentives should be focused on the initial investment in geothermal development. ©2020. CBIORE-IJRED. All rights reserved

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Voigt, Kristin. „Incentives, health promotion and equality“. Health Economics, Policy and Law 7, Nr. 3 (21.09.2010): 263–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744133110000277.

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AbstractThe use of incentives to encourage individuals to adopt ‘healthier’ behaviours is an increasingly popular instrument in health policy. Much of the literature has been critical of ‘negative’ incentives, often due to concerns about equality; ‘positive’ incentives, however, have largely been welcomed as an instrument for the improvement of population health and possibly the reduction of health inequalities. The aim of this paper is to provide a more systematic assessment of the use of incentives from the perspective of equality. The paper begins with an overview of existing and proposed incentive schemes. I then suggest that the distinction between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ incentives – or ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ – is of limited use in distinguishing those incentive schemes that raise concerns of equality from those that do not. The paper assesses incentive schemes with respect to two important considerations of equality: equality of access and equality of outcomes. While our assessment of incentive schemes will, ultimately, depend on various empirical facts, the paper aims to advance the debate by identifying some of the empirical questions we need to ask. The paper concludes by considering a number of trade-offs and caveats relevant to the assessment of incentive schemes.

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Scott, Anthony, und Luke B. Connelly. „Financial incentives and the health workforce“. Australian Health Review 35, Nr. 3 (2011): 273. http://dx.doi.org/10.1071/ah10904.

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Changes to the remuneration of medical practitioners are currently being considered in Australia. In this paper, we provide a discussion of financial incentives in healthcare markets and their effects on health professionals’ behaviour. After defining incentives, the paper focuses on the design of incentive schemes for the health workforce. It discusses several issues that should be considered when designing incentives, illustrated with some Australian examples. What are the objectives of the incentive scheme? What types of incentives can be used and under what circumstances? What is the empirical evidence around the effects of incentive schemes? What unintended consequences might exist? The paper concludes with a set of principles around which incentives can be designed. These principles might be used to inform the current debate about revisions to the incentives that are faced by medical practitioners in Australia.

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Quoc Trung, Trinh, und Nguyen Van Tan. „Tax incentive policy and firm performance: evidence from Vietnam“. Investment Management and Financial Innovations 17, Nr. 2 (01.07.2020): 277–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/imfi.17(2).2020.22.

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This paper aims to assess the impact of the tax incentive policy on firm performance after privatization in Vietnam. Using research data of 260 privatized enterprises in Vietnam, this study sheds light on whether tax incentive policies can help improve firm performance after privatization. The paper utilizes a pre-post comparison approach proposed by Megginson, Nash, and Van Randenborgh (1994). The research results reveal that privatized enterprises with tax incentives have improved profitability (ROA, ROE, ROS) and operating efficiency (NIEFF) and reduced leverage after privatization. A statistical reduction in the number of employed and an improvement in output (real income) after privatization are not observed. Besides, there is no statistical evidence proving that privatized enterprises have experienced significant changes in standard deviations of firm performance measures after privatization in Vietnam. Given significant improvements in the profitability of post-privatized enterprises with tax incentives, the authors propose some managerial implications for the Vietnamese government, investors and non-privatized state-owned enterprises (SOEs).

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Alayande, Folarin, und Dr Wumi Olayiwola. „Trade Policy Incentives, Market Structure and Productivity“. Journal of Social Sciences Research, Nr. 57 (10.07.2019): 1106–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.32861/jssr.57.1106.1122.

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Trade policy incentives are drivers of within-sector productivity growth and rapid industrial transformation in many developing countries. In many African countries, the use of tariffs, trade prohibitions and a package of fiscal policy incentives are therefore components of industrialisation and backward integration programmes to accelerate the performance of priority sectors. However, the effectiveness of these policy instruments within specific industries, and the transmission mechanism of policy incentives to productivity has not been adequately explored in the literature. By focusing on oligopolistic market structure of the cement industry in Nigeria, this paper analysed the relative impact of trade policy incentives and market structure on the within-sector productivity. Using the autoregressive distributed lag model with structural breaks, the study finds that producer concentration ratio is the most significant driver of productivity. While the trade policy incentive indexed by effective rate of protection (ERP), and financing subsidies also impact productivity improvements, the magnitudes are significantly lower. The overwhelming significance of market structure nuance earlier research studies and provide new insights into the nexus between trade incentives and productivity in an oligopolistic industry.

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Zhang, Shen Sheng, Wei Zhang, Xing Xing Ji und Wen Fang Zhang. „Research of Existing Building Energy Saving Economic Incentives Policy in Liao Ning Province“. Applied Mechanics and Materials 409-410 (September 2013): 570–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.409-410.570.

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Analyzed the status of Liaoning Province Existing Building Energy Saving, and elaborate the role of economic incentives in the Existing Building Energy Saving. Proposed the establish principles and design ideas of Existing Building Energy Saving economic incentive policies in Liao Ning Province on the basis of learning from the developed countries economic incentives successful experience. Developed economic incentives on taxation, loans, and subsidies and so on.

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Jansa, Joshua M. „Chasing Disparity: Economic Development Incentives and Income Inequality in the U.S. States“. State Politics & Policy Quarterly 20, Nr. 4 (21.01.2020): 462–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532440019900259.

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Political scientists and policy scholars have traditionally looked at the role of welfare and tax policies in shaping income inequality. Less attention has been paid to the key policy area of economic development. But states spend billions on economic development incentives each year to encourage firms to locate in their state. The few studies that have examined the impact of economic development policy on inequality have found mixed results, and have not considered who shapes and benefits from economic development policy when identifying possible causal mechanisms. I argue that increased incentive spending leads to increased inequality through either a market conditioning effect (incentives disproportionately boost the incomes of top earners prior to taxes) or a redistributive effect (incentives allow wealthy firms, investors, and employees to keep income that would otherwise be taxed and transferred). These mechanisms are tested using data on incentive spending and inequality across the 50 states from 1999 to 2014. The findings demonstrate that incentives increase income inequality via a redistributive effect only. This effect, though, is relatively large, long-lasting, and robust to different measures of incentive spending. Despite using economic development incentives to try to generate greater prosperity, state governments may be inadvertently exacerbating inequality.

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Hodge, Emily M. „School Desegregation and Federal Inducement: Lessons From the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972“. Educational Policy 32, Nr. 1 (18.03.2016): 86–116. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0895904816632608.

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This study uses the example of the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972, a federal desegregation incentive program, to discuss the benefits and challenges of equity-oriented incentives. This study applies theories of policy instruments and the social construction of target populations to congressional records, archival program materials, and other historical sources to trace the origin and evolution of the incentives and mandates built into the Emergency School Aid Act. The study ultimately concludes that the program’s combination of a financial incentive with rigorous oversight offers lessons for how to incorporate equity-oriented incentives into current education policy.

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Cheng, Hua, Zhiying Zhang, Zhongju Liao, Yong Wei und Joseph Martial Nkongo Mvondo. „Different policy instruments and the threshold effects on collaboration efficiency in China“. Science and Public Policy 47, Nr. 3 (16.03.2020): 348–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/scipol/scaa016.

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Abstract University–industry R&D collaboration is an important means to improve innovation efficiency; many governments have issued policies to promote it. The most frequent policy instruments implemented by policy-makers to foster firms’ innovation are subsidies and tax incentives. The article elaborated on how subsidies and tax incentives influence the R&D collaboration efficiency through a panel dataset from 2009 to 2015 in China. The result showed that subsidies and tax incentives have a positive effect on collaboration efficiency, and the effect of subsidies on output is bigger than that of tax incentives. Taking the intensity of subsidy as a threshold variable, there is a significant single threshold effect on collaboration efficiency. However, there is no threshold effect when the intensity of the tax incentive used as the threshold variable.

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Dissertationen zum Thema "Policy incentives"

Maier, Norbert Zsombor. „Incentives and public policy“. Thesis, London Business School (University of London), 2006. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.436324.

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Yazaki, Yukihiro. „Essays on policy-making incentives of government“. Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2013. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/613/.

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This thesis is a collection of three independent essays on policy-making incentives of government. The ﬁrst essay examines whether citizens can indirectly control bureaucrats. If voters and bureaucrats prefer diﬀerent types of politicians, i.e., they have a conﬂict of interest, incumbents need to increase the budget to prevent bureaucrats from information manipulation, which leads to an oversized government. If, instead, voters and bureaucrats prefer the same type of politicians, i.e., they have an alignment of interests, bureaucrats can send to voters a credible signal about the type of incumbents, which enhances the selection eﬀect of election. Although political appointees enable politicians to implement the ﬁrst-best policy in the case of the conﬂict of interests, they lead to the persistence of ineﬃcient government in the case of the alignment of interests. The second and third essays study how autocrats commit not to conﬁscate private property. The second essay argues that the potential of economic growth would help the ruler to make a credible commitment. Since a predatory policy reduces the citizens’ income, it would reduce capital accumulation because of the income eﬀect. Then, the ruler faces a trade-oﬀ between the current consumption with the predatory policy and the larger future consumption with the moderate policy, which would lead to economic growth. The third essay models endogenous judicial independence (JI) as a commitment device in the political commitment game. If information on JI is transmitted to citizens with positive probability, the ruler creates JI and does not renege on an announcement. Even if not, the ruler still can guarantee property rights by granting human rights as a signal on JI if the cost of the signal is low.

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Kleer, Robin. „Three Essays on Competition Policy and Innovation Incentives“. kostenfrei, 2008. http://www.opus-bayern.de/uni-wuerzburg/volltexte/2009/3476/.

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Licht, Amanda Abigail. „Private incentives, public outcomes: the role of target political incentives in the success of foreign policy“. Diss., University of Iowa, 2010. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/700.

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When do foreign influence attempts succeed in obtaining concessions from targeted states, and why do they so often fail? Powerful states employ a broad range of foreign policy tools in their dealings with other countries, but their ability to successfully exert power varies. This project seeks an explanation for the patchy record of foreign aid and economic sanctions in the political incentives of targeted leaders. Understanding the process of foreign policy success and failure requires considering both the effect of intervention on leader survival and the domestic cost of providing concessions. In both respects, the type of sanction interacts with targets' domestic context. Dynamic trends in leadership experience and political support, strength of political opposition, and regime type condition both the probability of sanctions' effectively tapping into target incentives and the difficulty of providing concessions. My framework and analyses push beyond standard conceptualizations of leader incentives and foreign policy in several ways. The theory unites positive and negative strategies rather than treating them as divergent phenomena. I also break the traditional dichotomy of democratic and autocratic regimes, modeling dynamic political processes and explicitly incorporating the political opposition. I pursue a multi-stage modeling technique which more faithfully represents the strategic encounters between sending and targeted states and furthers our understanding of the interplay between external demands and domestic political incentives. The findings suggest many strategies utilized for targeting aid and economic sanctions may be faulty. Sending states' best bet for achieving concession may be to target leaders whose place in office is very secure, yet empirically they pursue the opposite strategy. Contrary to much theory in the literature, I also find that even ineffective negative sanctions can achieve success provided the target faces few domestic challenges. The probability of concession also increases when states demand concessions of a diffuse and symbolic nature, rather than changes to the status quo which would hurt a private domestic interest. A strong political opposition magnifies the relative ease of public-costs concessions, suggesting that challenging parties compete for the favor of elites rather than championing the public interest.

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Reed, Samuel Thomas. „The nuclear terrorism disconnect : electoral incentives and U.S. policy responses“. Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/44465.

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This thesis investigates the range of U.S. threat assessments of—and policy responses to—nuclear terrorism in the United States. It finds that a series of disconnects characterizes political elites’ and the American public’s views and relationships to the politics of nuclear terror. The salience of issues related to nuclear terrorism is not closely linked to the severity of the threat. In turn, the perceived severity of the threat is not strongly correlated with the counter nuclear terror policy response. This thesis assesses the degree of citizen competence in nuclear politics and the degree of elite responsiveness to mass opinion. It also evaluates the full range of elite threat assessments and identifies a number of contemporary trends in public opinion on nuclear terrorism. The thesis advances both domestic and international case studies of American policy responses to the threat of nuclear terrorism.

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Valenzuela, Joseph John. „Non-nuclear deterrence in U.S. strategic policy incentives and limitations /“. Thesis, Monterey, Calif. : Naval Postgraduate School, 1992. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA256700.

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Bayham, Jude. „Characterizing incentives| An investigation of wildfire response and environmental entry policy“. Thesis, Washington State University, 2013. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3587051.

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Policy makers face complex situations involving the analysis and weighting of multiple incentives that complicate the design of natural resource and environmental policy. The objective of this dissertation is to characterize policy makers' incentives, and to investigate the consequences of those incentives on environmental and economic outcomes in the context of wildfire management and environmental policy.

Wildfire management occurs in a dynamic uncertain environment and requires the coordination of multiple management levels throughout the course of a fire season. Over the course of a wildfire, management teams allocate response resources between suppression of fire growth and protection of valuable assets to mitigate damage with minimal regard for cost. I develop a model of wildfire resource allocation to show that 1) wildfire managers face the incentive to protect residential structures at the expense of larger and more costly fires, and 2) response resources are transferred to fires with more threatened structures constraining the set of resources available to manage other fires in the region. I find empirical evidence to support the predictions of this model with theoretically consistent regression models of wildfire duration, size, and cost using data from U.S. wildfires that occurred between 2001 and 2010. These results imply that continued housing development of wildland prone to wildfire will 1) further distort management incentives, 2) lead to larger and more expensive fires, and 3) provide support for fees on rural homeowners.

Governments facing political opposition to renewable energy subsidies may resort to augmenting the fixed cost of entry in order to induce environmental outcomes. In global markets, one government's entry policy creates either positive or negative pecuniary externalities in other regions. I develop a two-region model to investigate the behavior of rival governments setting strategic entry policy, and the subsequent impacts on welfare. The results indicate that competition between the rival governments prevents the social optimal level of entry and suggests a role for international environmental agreements.

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Fregene, Ebitari O. „Policy and program incentives and the adoption of agroforestry in Missouri“. Diss., Columbia, Mo. : University of Missouri-Columbia, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10355/5011.

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Thesis (M.S.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2007.
The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file. Title from title screen of research.pdf file (viewed on March 26, 2008) Includes bibliographical references.

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Propp, Joshua M. „Incentives for Distributed Generation in California: The Rise of Third-Party Solar Development“. Scholarship @ Claremont, 2013. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/pomona_theses/82.

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There are a series of state and federal incentives in California to encourage the installation of distributed generation (DG) renewable energy, largely photovoltaic (PV). This thesis explores the policies behind the incentives, namely the Federal Investment Tax Credit, California Solar Initiative, and Net Energy Metering requirements. Discussion is informed by environmental policy tools, as well as business models that have acted to increase accessibility to these investment-intensive projects. Underlying this analysis is the theme of a shifting energy paradigm, with distributed generation spreading political, economic, and electric power.

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Cech, Paula-Ann. „Information, auditing, and incentives in regulation“. Diss., The University of Arizona, 1989. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/184798.

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This dissertation uses laboratory economic experiments to test the incentive effects of regulatory policies and practices under asymmetric information conditions. Significant results and policy implications are obtained on the traditional use of rate-of-return regulation (RORR) to regulate natural monopolies, and on the practice of restricting such firms from entering ancillary markets. The objective of the first several chapters is to test the incentive effects of RORR on market performance. Results confirm long-standing theories of incentive malfunctions of RORR. One result shows that under voluntary compliance, RORR is completely ineffective for regulating single sellers when cost information is private to firms, allowing them to misrepresent costs and earn monopoly profits. When firm's do not know market demand, they capture less surplus, but still earn above RORR expected returns. When stochastic auditing is added varying penalty rates and audit probabilities, significant cost overestimates remain common. Theoretical analysis explains the potential source of this anomaly as being the use of historical cost information in rate setting when excess profits are used as the audit benchmark. Other results show that in perfect repeated static implementations of RORR, wasteful input use will occur manifested as rate base padding or Averch-Johnson type selection of inefficient input combinations. Another chapter addresses the consequences of deregulating RORR franchise firms allowing them to enter ancillary markets. A stylized model of the telecommunications industry is created and experimentally tested to determine if anti-competitive firm behavior results when entry restrictions are lifted. Results offer no support for the arguments that regulated firms will use monopoly market earnings to underwrite ancillary market operations ("deep pocket"), engage in predatory pricing, or unfair competition. Economic arguments for removing entry barriers to improve market performance (increased output and lower prices) are substantiated.

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Bücher zum Thema "Policy incentives"

Bhutan. Department of Revenue & Customs. Fiscal incentives, 2010. Thimphu: Department of Revenue & Customs, Ministry of Finance, [Government of Bhutan], 2010.

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Incentives for industry. New Delhi: Economic & Scientific Research Foundation, 1985.

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Berlinski, Julio. Argentina, industrial development and incentives. Buenos Aires: Instituto Torcuato Di Tella, Centro de Investigaciones Económicas, 1996.

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Development, United Nations Conference on Trade and. Incentives. New York: United Nations, 2004.

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Incentives and political economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

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Persson, Torsten. Double-edged incentives: Institutions and policy coordination. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 1995.

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Persson, Torsten. Double-edged incentives: Institutions and policy coordination. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 1995.

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Berthélemy, Jean-Claude. HIPC debt relief and policy reform incentives. Helsinki: United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research, 2001.

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Toma, Eugenia Froedge, und Mark Toma, Hrsg. Central Bankers, Bureaucratic Incentives, and Monetary Policy. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1986. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4432-9.

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Belisario, Liam. Federal incentives for renewable energy. Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 2011.

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Buchteile zum Thema "Policy incentives"

Baldwin, Robert E. „Rent-Seeking and Trade Policy: An Industry Approach“. In Economic Incentives, 429–53. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1986. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-18204-6_16.

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Verbruggen, Harmen. „Environmental Policy Failures and Environmental Policy Levels“. In Economic Incentives and Environmental Policies, 41–54. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1994. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0856-0_2.

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Kararach, George. „Institutions, Incentives, Adaptability and Development“. In Development Policy in Africa, 250–76. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137360595_11.

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Hurter, Arthur P., und Joseph S. Martinich. „Policy Evaluation: Incentives and Regulation“. In Facility Location and the Theory of Production, 211–27. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2518-2_8.

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Perrings, Charles. „Economic Policy and Economic Incentives“. In Sustainable Development and Poverty Alleviation in Sub-Saharan Africa, 70–90. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-24352-5_5.

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Hartmann-Wendels, Thomas. „Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information“. In Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives, 229–53. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-75060-1_13.

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Thomas, Kenneth P. „Policy Studies“. In Investment Incentives and the Global Competition for Capital, 39–48. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230302396_3.

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Monke, Eric, Daniel Sellen, Alex Winter-Nelson, Mulinge Mukumbu und Francisco Avillez. „4. Policies Affecting Current Agricultural Incentives“. In Agricultural Policy in Kenya, 49–84. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.7591/9781501737442-008.

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Kemp, René, Xander Olsthoorn, Frans Oosterhuis und Harmen Verbruggen. „Policy Instruments to Stimulate Cleaner Technologies“. In Economic Incentives and Environmental Policies, 275–300. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1994. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0856-0_13.

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Karpodini-Dimitriadi, Effie. „Traditional Policy Tools and New Incentives“. In Privatization and Culture, 111–19. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5099-0_10.

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Konferenzberichte zum Thema "Policy incentives"

Zhang, Jian, Alta Knizley und Heejin Cho. „An Evaluation of Financial Incentive Policies for Solar Photovoltaic Systems in the U.S.“ In ASME 2017 11th International Conference on Energy Sustainability collocated with the ASME 2017 Power Conference Joint With ICOPE-17, the ASME 2017 15th International Conference on Fuel Cell Science, Engineering and Technology, and the ASME 2017 Nuclear Forum. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/es2017-3693.

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This paper analyzes some of the existing incentives for solar photovoltaic (PV) energy generation in the U.S. to investigate how effectively those existing incentive policies can promote PV adaptions in the U.S. market. Two common building types (i.e., hospitals and large hotels) located in five different U.S. states, each having their own incentives, are selected and analyzed for the PV incentive policies. The payback period of the PV system is chosen as an indicator to analyze and critique the effectiveness of each incentive by comparing the payback periods before and after taking the incentive into consideration. In this way, the existing incentive policies implemented by utility companies in each state are analyzed and critiqued. Finally, a parametric analysis is conducted to determine the influence of the variation in key parameters, such as PV system capacity and PV capital cost, on the performance of PV system. The results show how the existing incentives can be effectively used to promote the PV systems in the U.S. and how variations of the parameters can impact the payback period of the PV systems. Through the evaluation of the existing incentive policies and the parametric study, this paper demonstrates that the type and level of incentives should be carefully determined in policy-making processes to effectively promote the PV systems.

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Cuellar, Amanda D., und Michael E. Webber. „Policy Incentives, Barriers and Recommendations for Biogas Production“. In ASME 2009 3rd International Conference on Energy Sustainability collocated with the Heat Transfer and InterPACK09 Conferences. ASMEDC, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/es2009-90272.

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Biogas is a mixture of predominantly carbon dioxide and methane that is formed from the anaerobic decomposition of organic materials. It is also a high-quality fuel that can be used in most natural gas applications such as home heating or electricity generation or scrubbed and sold into the gas grid. In the United States the production of biogas from animal manure alone represents an enormous potential energy resource, on the order of 0.9 quadrillion BTU (quad) annually, or nearly 1% of total US energy consumption. Biogas from the wastewater treatment sector in the US could provide another 1.5 billion kWh (or 5 trillion BTU). Despite the promise of this resource as a renewable, low-carbon source of energy, as of 2007 only 125 functioning biogas operations using manure exist in the US. These facilities produced 290 GWh (0.001 quad) of energy in 2007, which accounts for 0.001% of annual energy consumption in the United States and one thousandth of the nation’s biogas potential. In addition, only 15% of the wastewater treatment flow in the US produces biogas that is used as a source of energy; the rest of the wastewater flows either do not produce biogas at all, or produce biogas that is wastefully flared instead of captured for heat or power. In contrast, Sweden currently produces 0.3% of their annual energy usage from biogas, primarily from the wastewater treatment sector. This report analyzes the policy incentives and barriers that exist for the production and utilization of biogas as well as the policy and institutional factors that have contributed to Sweden’s relative biogas success. Based on this analysis, the authors make recommendations for policy measures that would increase biogas production in the United States. These recommendations include R&D to promote technological advancement with digesters, state and national environmental objectives, state and national renewable energy quotas, financial support for biogas operations, state biogas education and support programs, and infrastructure improvements that facilitate biogas use. Such policy incentives would promote both biogas production and use, and thereby help increase the market penetration of a domestically-produced, renewable, low-carbon fuel.

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Fitria, Rizka, Adang Hendrawan und Milla Sepliana Setyowati. „Income Tax Incentives Policy in Special Economic Zones“. In International Conference on Anti-Corruption and Integrity. SCITEPRESS - Science and Technology Publications, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.5220/0009402502390245.

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Sukumar, Sreenivas R., Mallikarjun Shankar, Mohammed Olama, Stanton Hadley, Vladimir Protopopescu, Sergey Malinchik und Barry Ives. „Quantifying state-policy incentives for the renewable energy investor“. In 2010 IEEE Energy Conversion Congress and Exposition (ECCE). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ecce.2010.5618006.

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Gerni, Cevat, Selahattin Sarı, Haktan Sevinç und Ömer Selçuk Emsen. „Role of Investment Incentives in Removal of Regional Imbalances and Convergence Analysis as Success Criteria: The Turkish Case“. In International Conference on Eurasian Economies. Eurasian Economists Association, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.36880/c06.01234.

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Together with starting to observe the situations like the development differences seen between the countries after industrial revolution between the cities and regions of the countries. This situation leads some of the cities to emigrate and some other cities to become more crowded. The negative externalities emerging in migration-receiving cities make the life in those cities intolerable, whilst the decreasing population of emigrant cities triggers the decrease in both of demand and supply that is a production factor. The reflection of this situation shows itself as the cycle of “migration-revenue decrease-migration”. Through the investment incentives given to underdeveloped regions in order to prevent the migration that is a reflection of regional imbalances, it is aimed to decrease the imbalances by increasing the employment and revenue. The incentives applied in the year after statistical region classification in Turkey consist of incentives in periods of 2004-2008 and 2009-2012. In this study, it has been examined if there is any convergence between the income per capita in city and region axes, and if the incentives have any influence on this convergence. The investment incentives prepared in accordance with the realities of the cities eliminate the development differences by creating more efficient results. As a policy argument, it can be asserted that the incentive implementations considering the comparative superiorities of the cities will play more important roles in both of ensuring the efficient use of the resources and closing the development differences.

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Simons, George, Kurt Scheuermann, Myles O’Kelly und Pierre Landry. „Moving to Market-Based Photovoltaics: The Impact of PV Costs and Performance on PV Incentives“. In ASME 2007 Power Conference. ASMEDC, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/power2007-22108.

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This paper presents the results of a study conducted by Itron for the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) to examine the relationships between solar photovoltaic (PV) performance, costs, and PV incentive structures. The intent is twofold. The first intent is to create a baseline of PV performance and costs using actual performance data and reported costs from a large number of PV systems installed and operating in California. The second intent is to examine how PV performance and projected PV cost reductions can influence PV incentive payments. This study should help provide policy makers responsible for developing PV incentive programs with information that will result in incentive structures that fairly and transparently reward improved PV cost and performance while simultaneously providing a reasonable pathway to move PV towards an incentive-free market environment. PV performance monitoring data for over one hundred operating commercial, industrial, and institutional solar PV systems are combined with projected electricity retail rates and future PV costs within a breakeven levelized cost model to produce associated PV incentive levels. Preliminary results for 39 prototype PV market scenarios provide insights into how PV incentive levels can be set to take advantage of utility-specific electricity retail rates, PV configuration and location, and projected PV cost reductions while facilitating the development of PV systems that can compete without incentives. Potential implications of these performance and cost-effectiveness results are discussed with respect to PV incentive programs and PV markets.

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Morkovkin, Dmitry E. „General Economic Incentives and Industrial Policy: Balance of Socio-Economic Interests“. In 4th International Conference on Culture, Education and Economic Development of Modern Society (ICCESE 2020). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.200316.295.

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Frischknecht, Bart D., und Kate Whitefoot. „Defining Technology-Adoption Indifference Curves for Residential Solar Electricity Generation Using Stated Preference Experiments“. In ASME 2011 International Design Engineering Technical Conferences and Computers and Information in Engineering Conference. ASMEDC, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/detc2011-48007.

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Success in achieving environmental goals is intrinsically dependent on policy decisions, firm decisions, and consumer decisions. Understanding how consumer product adoption jointly depends on policy incentives and firm design decisions is necessary for both firms and governments to make optimal decisions. This paper demonstrates a methodology for assessing the linkage between policy incentives and firm decisions on the level of consumer adoption of a particular technology. A policy optimization is formulated and technology-adoption indifference curves are constructed to allow firms to identify the most profitable direction for product development given the policy environment, and similarly to allow government organizations to set policies that maximize technology adoption given firm decisions. As an example we use the residential solar electricity industry in New South Wales, Australia. Consumer choice is modeled using a mixed logit choice model estimated with hierarchical Bayes techniques from stated preference experiment data.

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Yu, Dayong, und Jianwen Luo. „Determining Optimal Ordering Policy for Deteriorating Products Under the Trade Credit Incentives“. In 2008 4th International Conference on Wireless Communications, Networking and Mobile Computing (WiCOM). IEEE, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/wicom.2008.1632.

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Bussell, Jennifer. „Political incentives and policy outcomes: Who benefits from technology-enabled service centers?“ In 2009 International Conference on Information and Communication Technologies and Development (ICTD). IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ictd.2009.5426711.

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Berichte der Organisationen zum Thema "Policy incentives"

Wu, Jing, Yongheng Deng, Jun Huang, Randall Morck und Bernard Yeung. Incentives and Outcomes: China's Environmental Policy. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, Februar 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w18754.

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Chang, Roberto, und Andrés Velasco. Economic Policy Incentives to Preserve Lives and Livelihoods. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w27020.

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Chang, Roberto, Humberto Martínez und Andrés Velasco. Pandemics, Incentives, and Economic Policy: A Dynamic Model. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w28636.

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Arnold, Scot A., David L. McNicol und Kenton G. Fasana. Can Profit Policy and Contract Incentives Improve Defense Contract Outcomes? Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, Februar 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada494490.

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Arnold, Scot A., David L. McNicol und Kenton G. Fasana. Can Profit Policy and Contract Incentives Improve Defense Contract Outcomes? Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, Oktober 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada491740.

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Cox, Sadie. Financial Incentives to Enable Clean Energy Deployment: Policy Overview and Good Practices. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), Februar 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/1239887.

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Dynarski, Susan. Tax Policy and Education Policy: Collision or Coordination? A Case Study of the 529 and Coverdell Saving Incentives. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, März 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w10357.

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Tian, Tian. City and County PV Training Program, Module 4: Project Financing, Policy, and Incentives. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), September 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/1471554.

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Bartik, Timothy J. Distributional Effects of Early Childhood Programs and Business Incentives and Their Implications for Policy. W.E. Upjohn Institute, Juli 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.17848/wp09-151.

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Brown, Jeffrey, Nellie Liang und Scott Weisbenner. Executive Financial Incentives and Payout Policy: Firm Responses to the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, Dezember 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w11002.

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