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Delpierre, Maxime. „Philosophie / Philosophy“. Studia Islamica 115, Nr. 2-3 (21.12.2020): 272–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/19585705-12341429.
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Muttaqin, Ali. „Implikasi Aliran Filsafat Pendidikan dalam Pengembangan Kurikulum Pendidikan Islam“. DINAMIKA : Jurnal Kajian Pendidikan dan Keislaman 1, Nr. 1 (03.02.2017): 67–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.32764/dinamika.v1i1.105.
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Islamic education phenomenon with its kinds and shapes has good philosophic evidence. Philosophy of education is application of philosophyc ideas in education which has essential values to aim the purpose and the performance of Islamic education. Generally, the tendencies in philosophy had created the typology of Islamic education philosophy. Its tendencies influenced the development Islamic education curriculum. This paper tries to explain the tendency of education philosophy which influenced Islamic education curriculum.Keyword : Philosophy , Islamic education curriculum
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Bryan, Jenny. „Philosophy“. Greece and Rome 67, Nr. 2 (Oktober 2020): 280–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0017383520000133.
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Many introductory courses on ancient, or indeed modern, philosophy begin from the observation that the word ‘philosophy’ itself describes a ‘love of wisdom’. Christopher Moore's wide-ranging, original, and fascinating new book sets out to examine the value of that etymology. He argues persuasively that philosophos does not, in fact, originate as a label applied respectfully to pick out a ‘lover of wisdom’ for emulation. Rather, the term is appropriated and developed from its origins as a pejorative name applied to those perceived to be striving too hard and in the wrong way to achieve the status of sophos, a ‘sage-wannabe’ as Moore has it. As he is careful to emphasize, his history of the origins of philosophos and philosophia does not and need not coincide with the origin story of ‘philosophy’ as a certain kind of discipline involving a certain way of talking about specific questions. Nevertheless, by scrutinizing the origins of these terms and their application in the sixth and fifth centuries bce, Moore sets himself up to offer some further enlightening discussion of the fifth- and fourth-century development of the discipline of ‘philosophy’.
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Samuji, Samuji. „Understanding, Basics and Characteristics of Philosophy“. Jurnal Paradigma 14, Nr. 1 (28.04.2022): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.53961/paradigma.v14i1.95.
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Understanding philosophy can be reviewed etymologically and terminology. The word philosophy comes from the Greek which is a compound word Philosophia or Philosophos. The word consists of two words namely philos (philein) and Sophia. The word Philos means love (love), while Sophia or sophos means knowledge, truth, wisdom or wisdom (wisdom). So etymologically philosophy means love of knowledge, truth or wisdom. There are 3 (three) foundations in philosophy, namely the ontology basis, the epistemological basis and the axiological basis. Meanwhile, according to Suprapto Wirodiningrat in Surajiyo (2012: 13), there are 3 (three) characteristics of philosophy, namely; Thorough, basic and speculative.
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Fortino, Mirella. „Philosophie, connaissance et nouvelle histoire des sciences“. Revue des questions scientifiques 190, Nr. 1-2 (01.01.2019): 83–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.14428/qs.v190i1-2.69453.
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Expression de l’esprit positiviste, la pensée du philosophe et historien des sciences Abel Rey est caractérisée par « l’affirmation philosophique de l’histoire des sciences ». L’histoire des sciences, selon Rey, n’est pas érudition, ni histoire événementielle, mais philosophie. Bien loin de réduire toutefois la philosophie à la science, il s’agit, selon la nouvelle perspective critique de Rey, de considérer que « la théorie de la connaissance ne peut sortir que de son histoire ». Dans cet article, nous aimerions souligner que la liaison étroite, que Rey a défendu, entre la philosophie et l’histoire des sciences comme histoire de la raison humaine et fait de civilisation promeut une valeur pédagogique et se traduit, donc, en humanisme.
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As an expression of the positivist spirit, the thinking of the philosopher and science historian, Abel Rey, is characterized by “the philosophical affirmation of the history of science”. The history of science, according to Rey, does not stem from erudition, nor event-driven history, but from philosophy. Far from reducing philosophy to science, however, according to Rey’s new critical perspective, it is a matter of considering that “the theory of knowledge can only emerge from its history”. In this article, we would like to draw attention to the fact that the strong connection, which Rey upheld, between philosophy and the history of science as the history of human reason and a result of civilization, promotes pedagogical value and thus translates into humanism.
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Gunnarsson, Logi. „Transforming philosophy“. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 70, Nr. 5 (01.10.2022): 823–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2022-0056.
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Abstract The aim of the paper is to defend the project of transforming philosophy carried out in my book Vernunft und Temperament. Eine Philosophie der Philosophie. In section 1, I distinguish between five philosophical genres in which transformation plays a role: 1. academic texts in which transformation is simply a topic; 2. texts meant to adequately articulate through their form the transformative experiences of their authors; 3. texts aiming to enable the reader to transform herself; 4. texts on other texts; 5. manifestos defending the project of transforming philosophy. Section 2 is such a manifesto. Its main thesis is: “What makes somebody – anybody – a good philosopher is that she is a real human being.” Many of the remaining 16 theses of the manifesto are elaborations on this main thesis. One example is the thesis that the philosophical activity is essentially a becoming – the development of an individual human being.
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Von Eggers, Nicolai. „Lived Ontologies“. Symposium 24, Nr. 2 (2020): 100–123. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/symposium202024214.
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In this article, I analyze the relation between ontology and practical philosophy in Cicero’s work and the role Hellenistic philosophy plays within the work of Giorgio Agamben. I discuss the relation between life and ontology, between philosophy as a guide to living and philosophy as the study of being. Unlike philosophers who treat Hellenistic philosophy as a form of therapy (Nussbaum, Foucault, Hadot), I show how Agamben interprets Hellenistic philosophy as oppressive by turning the theory of being into an injunction of having-to-be. For Agamben, every philosophy implies a certain form of life, and it is thus impossible to distinguish between ontology and living. The aim of philosophy, therefore, is not to be therapeutic but rather to develop an ontology that will allow for humanity to live without oppression. Through a detailed reading of Cicero’s concept of “nature,” I develop the reading and critique of Cicero suggested by Agamben.Cet article analyse la relation entre l’ontologie et la philosophie pratique dans l’oeuvre de Cicéron et le rôle joué par la philosophie hellénistique dans l’oeuvre de Giorgio Agamben. Il discute la relation entre la vie et l’ontologie, entre la philosophie comme guide de savoir-vivre et la philosophie comme étude de l’être. Contrairement aux philosophes qui traitent la philosophie hellénistique comme une forme de thérapie (Nussbaum, Foucault, Hadot), je montre que Agamben interprète la philosophie hellénistique comme essentielle-ment oppressive en transformant la théorie de l'être en une injonction normative de devoir-être. Pour Agamben, toute philosophie implique une certaine forme de vie, rendant alors la distinction entre l’ontologie et la vie impossible. Ainsi, le but de la philosophie n'est pas d’être thérapeutique mais plutôt de développer une ontologie qui permettra à l’humanité de vivre sans oppression. Par une lecture du concept de la « nature » de Cicéron, je développe l’interprétation et la critique de Cicéron proposé par Agamben.
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Maluleka, P., und T. Mathebula. „Trends in African philosophy and their implications for the Africanisation of the South Africa history caps curriculum: a case study of Odera Oruka philosophy“. Yesterday and Today 27 (2022): 65–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/2223-0386/2022/n27a3.
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A Kenyan philosopher, Henry Odera Oruka (1944-1995), conceptualised and articulated the six trends in African philosophy. These are ethno-philosophy, nationalistic-ideological philosophy, artistic (or literary philosophy), professional philosophy, philosophic sagacity and hermeneutic philosophy. In this article, we maintain that the last three of these trends, namely professional philosophy, philosophic sagacity, and hermeneutic philosophy, are useful in our attempt to contribute to Africanising the school history curriculum (SHC) in the Curriculum Assessment Policy Statement (CAPS) in post-apartheid South Africa. Against this background, we make use of Maton's (2014) Epistemic-Pedagogic Device (EPD), building on from Bernstein's (1975) Pedagogic Device as a theoretical framework to view African philosophy and its implications for the Africanisation of the SHC in CAPS in post-apartheid South Africa. Through the lens of Maton's EPD, we show how the CAPS' philosophy of education is questionable; untenable since it promotes 'differences of content'; and is at the crossroads, i.e., it is stretched and pulled in different directions in schools. Ultimately, we argue that Oruka's three trends form a three-piece suit advertising one's academic discipline (professional philosophy); showing South Africa's rich history told in the words ofAfrican elders (sage philosophy); and imploring school history learners to embark on a restless, unfinished quest for knowledge in the classrooms in post-apartheid South Africa.
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SIVAK, Jozef. „Le philosophe et la philosophie dans le 'Dictionnaire des philosophes'“. Revue Philosophique de Louvain 86, Nr. 4 (01.11.1988): 574–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/rpl.86.4.2013483.
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Hacker, P. M. S. „A PHILOSOPHER OF PHILOSOPHY“. Philosophical Quarterly 59, Nr. 235 (April 2009): 337–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.587.x.
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Wylie, Alison. „Between Philosophy and Archaeology“. American Antiquity 50, Nr. 2 (April 1985): 478–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/280505.
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The journal of the Philosophy of Science Association,Philosophy of Science, celebrates its fiftieth anniversary this year, and in honor of this has reprinted the Table of Contents from its first issue as well as the lead article, “On the Character of Philosophic Problems” by Rudolf Carnap (1984). Carnap's object in this article is to determine just whatphilosophicalproblems in science are. He took this to be a question about what distinguishes the “standpoint” of a philosopher from that of the empirical investigator (1984:6). He begins with the observation that “philosophers have ever declared that their problems lie at a different level from the problems of the empirical sciences . . . the question is, however, where one should seek this level” (1984:5).
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Blokhuis, Peter. „THE CAPE HORN OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS: IN MEMORY OF ANDREE TROOST (1916-2008)“. Philosophia Reformata 75, Nr. 1 (17.11.2010): 75–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22116117-90000483.
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When asked how he would characterize himself, Andree Troost said: “I am a philosopher of theology” (Geelhoed and De Boer 2002). Troost studied theology, but he read more philosophical than theological books. He learned from the reformational philosophy of Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven how to be a critical theologian, and critical he was: in the many articles he wrote for Philosophia Reformata, Troost joined issue with theologians who do not realize that philosophy comes first, attempting to lay bare the presuppositions of theology. The same he did in the two books he published in 2004 and 2005. Troost stopped writing for Philosophia Reformata in 2001. He passed away on 18 March 2008.
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Edwards, Mark. „Michael Psellus on Philosophy and Theology“. Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Theologia Orthodoxa 66, Nr. 1 (30.06.2021): 81–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.24193/subbto.2021.1.03.
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"This paper explores the use of the terms theologia and philosophia in the philosophic opuscula of Michael Psellus, especially those which are dedicated to the Chaldaean Oracles. It begins with a review of previous pagan and Christian usage, the conclusion of which is that Christians rejected the pagan distinction between theologoi, as inspired conduits of divine truth, from philosophers who interpreted such revelations under the rubric of theologia. For Christians Greek theologoi were mere purveyors of myth; theologia was not a branch of philosophy but the exposition of truths revealed in scripture. Since the revealers were already theologians, and the interpreters were theologoi in their own right, the terms became synonymous when applied to Christian practice. Psellus is on the whole faithful to this tradition, reserving the term theologia for Christian teaching in contrast to philosophy, except in one passage that speaks of the ""philosophy and theology"" of the Chaldaeans. The purpose of this phrase, in which the latter term seems to be epexegetic to the former, is to intimate that even the best theology of the pagans, being ignorant of the biblical revelation, can rise no higher than philosophy. Keywords: Chaldaean Oracles, Opuscula, philosophy, theology, revelation. "
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Tsouna-McKirahan, Voula. „Philosophy and the Philosophic Life“. Ancient Philosophy 15, Nr. 2 (1995): 626–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil199515221.
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Xiao-ming, Wu. „Philosophy, Philosophia, and Zhe-xue“. Philosophy East and West 48, Nr. 3 (Juli 1998): 406. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1400334.
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Marks, Joel. „Teaching Philosophy, Being a Philosopher“. Teaching Philosophy 16, Nr. 2 (1993): 99–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/teachphil199316220.
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Marcotte-Chenard, Sophie. „What Can We Learn from Political History? Leo Strauss and Raymond Aron, Readers of Thucydides“. Review of Politics 80, Nr. 1 (2018): 57–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670517000778.
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AbstractThrough a comparison of Leo Strauss's and Raymond Aron's interpretations of Thucydides's history, this paper sheds light on the relationship between political history and political philosophy. In continuing the dialogue between the two thinkers, I demonstrate that in spite of their opposed views on modern historical consciousness, they converge in a defense of the object and method of classical political history. However, there is a deeper disagreement regarding the relationship between philosophy and politics. While Strauss makes the case for the compatibility of classical political history and classical political philosophy on the grounds that Thucydides is a “philosophic historian,” Aron argues that it is precisely because Thucydides is not a philosopher that he succeeds in understanding an essential feature of political things, namely, contingency in history.
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Čížek, Jan. „The “Christian Natural Philosophy” of Otto Casmann (1562–1607): A Case Study of Early Modern Mosaic Physics“. Folia Philosophica 49 (29.06.2023): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.31261/fp.15474.
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This article aims to present a detailed analysis of the “Christian natural philosophy” elaborated by the German humanist philosopher and theologian Otto Casmann (1562–1607) in his various works. To this end, Casmann’s general idea of philosophia Christiana is discussed and critically evaluated. Regarding natural philosophy, or physics, attention is paid mainly to topics such as cosmogony and cosmology, which Casmann promised to have developed biblically and independently of the pagan (namely Aristotelian) tradition. However, when Casmann’s natural philosophy is analyzed in detail, his resolute emphasis on the literal reading of the Bible, the cornerstone of his entire concept, turns out to be problematic. Similarly, despite his resolutions, his natural-philosophical views are, to a considerable extent, still dependent on Aristotelian terms and concepts.
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Kern, Andrea. „Ästhetisches Selbstbewusstsein und Urteilsvermögen in Kants Analytik des Schönen“. Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und Allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft Band 64. Heft 1 64, Nr. 1 (2019): 41–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.28937/1000108293.
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Gemäß der üblichen Auslegung besteht Kants maßgeblicher Beitrag zur Philosophie darin, eine Position entwickelt zu haben, die das Dilemma zwischen zwei gleichermaßen unbefriedigenden Konzeptionen unseres Urteilsvermögens überwindet: der empiristischen Konzeption, der zufolge der letzte Grund des Urteilens in Akten der Empfindung zu finden ist, und der rationalistischen Konzeption, der zufolge der letzte Grund in Erkenntnissen besteht. In meinem Text konzentriere ich mich auf Kants Analyse der Schönheitsurteile und argumentiere, dass Kant in seiner Analytik des Schönen nicht einfach ein anderes Verständnis vom Begriff der Schönheit entwickelt, sondern dass er eine andere Vorstellung davon hat, was es bedeutet, ein solches Verständnis zu haben. Kants sogenannter Mittelweg stellt die Annahme infrage, dass der Philosoph oder die Philosophin den Begriff der Schönheit von außerhalb desjenigen Selbstbewusstseins untersuchen kann, das derjenige hat, der kompetent über Schönheit urteilt. Nach dieser Lesart ist Kants Darstellung der Schönheitsurteile deswegen von besonderem Interesse für die Philosophie, weil Schönheitsurteile eine Form besitzen, die die Form jener philosophischen Urteile widerspiegelt, die diese Form artikulieren. According to the standard interpretation, Kant’s major contribution to philosophy consists in his position that overcomes a dilemma between two equally dissatisfying positions on how we understand our capacity for judgments: the so-called empiricist position, according to which the ultimate ground for judgment is to be found in acts of sensibility, and the so-called rationalist position, according to which its ultimate ground is to be found in cognitions. In my paper I focus on Kant’s analysis of the judgment of beauty and argue that in his analysis of beauty Kant does not simply develop another understanding of the concept of beauty, but that his understanding of beauty manifests a different conception of ›what it means to have such an understanding‹ in the first place. Kant’s so-called middle course calls into question the assumption that the philosopher can investigate the concept of beauty from outside the self-consciousness that constitutes the capacity of his competent judgment of beauty. According to this reading, Kant’s account of judgments of beauty is of special interest to philosophy because they turn out to have a form that, in a certain respect, mirrors the form of philosophical judgments which attempt to articulate this form
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Berger, Chris. „Plato’s Case Against the Philosopher King“. Agora: Political Science Undergraduate Journal 2, Nr. 2 (13.05.2012): 180–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.29173/agora17243.
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Liberal democracies afford their citizens the opportunity to reflect seriously upon the perennial questions of politics and the fundamental alternatives. However, an unfortunate trend, indeed observable in both practical politics and the social sciences, has seen political philosophy largely supplanted by ideology, the co-opting of philosophic thought for partisan ends. Political philosophy is the serious reflection upon and inquiry into the core theme of political thought and practice: the best way to live and the regime that conduces to it. This paper seeks to demonstrate by example the possibility of preserving the serious study of political questions by challenging the dominant scholarly interpretation of Plato’s political philosophy as presenting the philosopher king as the solution to the political problem. By offering some cursory remarks on Plato’s Apology and Republic in order to suggest that philosophic rule is not a serious prescription for political action, this paper argues that Plato’s aim is not to propose a doctrine but to compel us to reflect on the nature of politics, the permanent political questions, and the fundamental alternatives available to the human condition.
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Konoplyanik, Alexandra A., und Taisiya R. Kondratyeva. „Philosophical Practice in the Contemporary World“. Ethical Thought 21, Nr. 1 (2021): 148–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2021-21-1-148-162.
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In traditional academic sense practical philosophy is the combination of those philosophical disciplines which study the practical manifestations of human life, such as ethics and political philosophy. So “practice” in this context is not so much the way of doing philosophy, but rather its object of interest. Thus different subject-specific and applied philosophies are frequently referenced as areas of practical philosophy, though might as well develop in purely academic context. However, there exists another increasingly visible interpretation of practical philosophy, often also referred to as philosophical practice, which involves the use of philosophical tools and insights for philosophical work outside of academia. The best established forms of philosophical practice are individual philosophical counselling/consultancy, philosophy for children, community philosophy/philosophical cafe, philosophy for business. The core (but not strict) common denominator for all these formats is the joint philosophical work of a professional philosopher with non-philosophers. This work may be perceived of intrinsic value or goal-oriented, including making sense of oneself and the world, personal development, developing thinking and metacognitive skills, solving particular conceptually rich problems, including ethical dilemmas. These formats have been developed and formalised to differing extent in different countries and regions. The goal of the present paper is to introduce the Russian-speaking reader to philosophical practice as a contemporary manifestation of practical philosophy and give a short analytical overview of its key formats in the contemporary world, incl. in Russia.
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Strenski, Ivan. „Philosophy of (Lived) Religion“. Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 41, Nr. 1 (März 2012): 5–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0008429811430052.
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The cohabitation of philosophy with the study of religion has such a long history that we have not been motivated to consider the terms of that relationship. This paper proposes that this relationship needs to be examined radically. That is to say it proposes to query the nature, or possible natures, of the relationship of philosophy to the study of religion by posing such questions as the following: What kind of philosophy belongs in the study of religion? Constructive? Critical? Does philosophy have an independent role in the study of religion or does it, rather, best play the role of ‘handmaiden’? To the extent that philosophy plays an integral part in the study of religion, how should philosophy reflect the global and cross-cultural nature of the study of religion? To what extent does a philosophy that is integral to the study of religion need to change in order to reflect the philosophical agendas integral to other religions than Christianity? La cohabitation de la philosophie avec l’étude de la religion a une si longue histoire que nous ne nous sommes pas penchés sur les termes de cette relation. Cet article montre le besoin d’un examen radical de cette relation. C’est-à-dire qu’il propose d’interroger la nature, ou les natures possibles, de la relation que la philosophie entretient avec l’étude de la religion à partir de plusieurs questions: Quels types de philosophie font partie de l’étude de la religion? Constructive? Critique? La philosophie a-t-elle un rôle indépendant dans l’étude de la religion ou est-elle plutôt dans le rôle de « servir » ? Dans la mesure où la philosophie est une partie intégrante de l’étude de la religion, comment la philosophie devrait-elle refléter la nature mondiale et culturellement croisée de l’étude de la religion ? Dans quelle mesure, une philosophie faisant partie intégrante de l’étude de la religion doit-elle être transformée de façon à rendre compte des programmes des religions autres que la Chrétienté?
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Radney, El-Ra. „Why African American Philosophy Matters: A Case for Not Centering White Philosophers and White Philosophy“. Philosophia Africana 20, Nr. 1 (Juni 2021): 44–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.5325/philafri.20.1.0044.
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ABSTRACT This article asks why African American Philosophy matters. The notion of the “Black philosopher” continues to be an enigma. African descendants are not generally associated with the revered location and status of “the philosopher” and with doing philosophy. In a celebration of the sustained work of the Black philosopher-practitioner, who continues to suffer a fate of deliberate academic “invisibility” and historical erasure, this article supports the expansion of philosophical categories, philosophical conversation, and philosophical inclusivity. This work contends that the marginalization of African American philosophy can be understood from a synthesis of Foucault’s thesis of “subjugated knowledge” (how certain discourses are routinely disqualified by dominant ones) and Black philosopher Lewis Gordon’s explanation of “subverted realization,” which is built in to “white” modern thought. Both key philosophers help locate the problem questioned here. The overriding current of the “white (main) stream” of philosophy, by its deliberate exclusion of African American philosophy, disqualifies it.
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Kardelis, Naglis. „Graikiškosios filosofijos sampratos aktualumas: ko galėtume pasimokyti iš senovės graikų“. Athena: filosofijos studijos 18 (30.12.2023): 17–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.53631/athena.2023.18.2.
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The article is dedicated to the problem of relevance of the Classical Greek understanding of philosophy to contemporary philosophy. A distinction is made between the relevance of the Greek philosophy that has already been realized, or made actual, in the sphere of contemporary philosophy and culture, and the relevance of the Greek philosophy which is yet in need of realization, that is, which has a potential of being realized in the future. The author, mainly focusing on this latter kind of relevance, for it is more interesting from the philosophical point of view and suggests new ways to reinvigorate the contemporary field of philosophical thought, discusses the original Greek understanding of philosophy that can be discerned from the ancient Greek philosophical texts and the original Greek term for philosophy, philosophia. The author presents an analysis of the Greek word philosophia from the etymological and conceptual points of view, disclosing its several layers of meaning. It is argued that the Greek philosophical thinking employs a productive combination of pre-methodical and methodical thought, deriving from this combination a specific synergy that might also be useful to contemporary philosophy. A point is made that the original Greek notion of philosophy, understood as the love of divine wisdom, presupposes both modesty, stemming from the acknowledgment of one’s absolute ignorance of the most important philosophical answers, and intellectual passion. The author makes a claim that the original close and deep relation between the Greek philosophy and astronomy was instrumental in the original Greek understanding of the philosopher as a theōros of a special kind, that is, as a theoretic viewer of the entire cosmos who focuses on the whole of the cosmos (or reality in general), not on its individual constituents and details. What was expected of the Greek philosopher was the ability to deeply appreciate the beauty, unity, and underlying divine order of the cosmos, not the capacity to acquire the knowledge of concrete information related to it. The attention is drawn to the circumstance that the Greek philosopher’s aesthetic appreciation of the cosmos that took place at the moments of its theoretical contemplation had also a specific ethical aspect to it – an aspect that cannot be simply explained in terms of the Classical Greek virtue ethics and can be rather viewed in terms of the modern approaches to ethics. The relation between the ability to acknowledge one’s ignorance of the most important matters and the capacity to theoretically contemplate and aesthetically appreciate the cosmos in holistic terms is viewed by the author as potentially relevant to those contemporary thinkers who seek to reassert the unique status of philosophy, its special place among other disciplines, and to rethink the radical difference between philosophy and science. After discussing some other aspects of potential relevance of the Greek understanding of philosophy to contemporary philosophy, the author makes a conclusion that the Classical Greek understanding of the nature of philosophy should be viewed not as having to replace, but as being able to complement the current understanding of the nature and mission of philosophy.
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Schalow, Frank. „Heidegger and Jaspers, and: Karl Jaspers: Philosopher among Philosophers/Philosoph unter Philosophen (review)“. Journal of the History of Philosophy 33, Nr. 4 (Oktober 1995): 700–702. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hph.1995.a225902.
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Polka, Brayton. „Philosophy without God? God without Philosophy?: Critical Reflections on Antony Flew'sGod and Philosophy1“. European Legacy 11, Nr. 1 (Februar 2006): 35–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10848770500489037.
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Amir, Lydia. „Transformative Philosophy“. Interdisciplinary Research in Counseling, Ethics and Philosophy - IRCEP 3, Nr. 8 (01.09.2023): 43–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.59209/ircep.v3i8.54.
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The contemporary relevance of unraveling the transformative power of philosophy lies in helping to secure its place in the academe and in enabling personal change for the benefit of the individual and the society in which we live. Yet formulating the transformative power of various philosophies, of different philosophic notions, and of philosophy itself as a rational discipline which addresses the mind leads to laying the ground for a new field. This is what I attempt to do on my own, yet briefly, in this article, and at length, with the help of others, in the Handbook for Transformative Philosophy. In the current article, I explain why only Eastern philosophies are usually considered transformative, I argue that Western philosophy is deeply transformative and I formulate that which performs in it the required transformation of the self. I further identify religious readings of philosophy as one impediment to experiencing philosophy’s transformative power, and I point to the ideal of personal philosophic redemption as a promising avenue for modern transformative philosophies.
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Schneider, Henrique. „Chinese philosophy: The philosopher as activist“. Human Affairs 31, Nr. 4 (01.10.2021): 488–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2021-0043.
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Abstract In contemporary academic philosophy, Chinese Philosophy remains a niche. This has a lot to do with its presentation, which often creates an impression of alienness and allegory, making its contribution, especially to analytical questions, not obvious. This paper examines how a change in presentation eases the inclusion of Chinese Philosophy into the mainstream. On the assumption that there has been an “activist turn” in the discipline in general, philosophical interest in a tradition that ranges from conceptual analysis, to ethics and politics, but that is ultimately focused on motivating actions, becomes more relevant and pressing. Since, in much of Chinese Philosophy, the philosopher is an activist, if the wider discipline is indeed undergoing an “activist turn”, then there is a connection here that should be made. In this paper, the connection is explained using two examples, Mozi and Xu Fuguan.
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서선정. „Philosopher’ and ‘Philosophy’ in Old Russia“. 러시아연구 17, Nr. 2 (Dezember 2007): 67–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.22414/rusins.2007.17.2.67.
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NEWSOME, GEORGE L. „EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHER“. Educational Theory 9, Nr. 2 (02.04.2007): 97–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5446.1959.tb01254.x.
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Boundas, Constantin V., Daniel W. Smith und Ada S. Jaarsma. „Encounters with Deleuze“. Symposium 24, Nr. 1 (2020): 139–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/symposium20202417.
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This interview, conducted over the span of several months, tracks the respective journeys of Constantin V. Boundas and Daniel W. Smith with the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. Rather than “becoming Deleuzian,” which is neither desirable nor possible, these exchanges reflect an array of encounters with Deleuze. These include the initial discoveries of Deleuze’s writings by Boundas and Smith, in-person meetings between Boundas and Deleuze, and the wide-ranging and influential philosophical work on Deleuze’s concepts produced by both Boundas and Smith. At stake in this discussion are key contributions by Deleuze to continental philosophy, including the distinction between the virtual and the actual and the very nature of a “concept.” Also at stake is the formative or pedagogical impact of a philosopher, like Deleuze, on those who find and fully engage with his texts, concepts, and project. Cette interview, menée sur plusieurs mois, suit les parcours respectifs de Constantin V. Boundas et Daniel W. Smith avec la philosophie de Gilles Deleuze. Au lieu de « devenir Deleuzien, » ce qui n’est ni souhaitable ni possible, ces échanges reflètent un éventail de rencontres avec Deleuze. Il s’agit notamment des premières découvertes des écrits de Deleuze par Boundas et Smith, des rencontres en personne entre Boundas et Deleuze, et du travail philosophique vaste et inluent sur les concepts de Deleuze produit par Boundas et Smith. L’enjeu ici étant les contributions clés de Deleuze à la philosophie continentale, y compris la distinction entre le virtuel et l’actuel, et la nature même d’un « concept. » Mais il y a aussi l’impact formateur ou pédagogique d’un philosophe, comme Deleuze, sur ceux qui trouvent et s’engagent pleinement dans ses textes, ses concepts et ses projets.
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Olasov, Ian. „Philosophy for Characters“. Precollege Philosophy and Public Practice 2 (2020): 62–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/p420204113.
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Public philosophers have tended to think of their audience as the public, or perhaps a public or counterpublic. In my work on the Ask a Philosopher booth, however, it’s been helpful to think of our audience as made up of a handful of characters—types defined by the way in which they engage (or decline to engage) with the booth. I describe the characters I’ve encountered at the booth: orbiters, appreciaters, readers, monologuists, freethinkers, scholars, and peers. By reflecting on these characters and their needs, we can both imagine other forms of public philosophy that might better serve them, and better articulate the values that inhere in public philosophy projects like the Ask a Philosopher booth. I conclude with a brief case for the philosophy of public philosophy.
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Rowett, Catherine. „Analytic Philosophy, the Ancient Philosopher Poets and the Poetics of Analytic Philosophy“. Rhizomata 8, Nr. 2 (01.12.2020): 158–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2020-0008.
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Abstract The paper starts with reflections on Plato’s critique of the poets and the preference many express for Aristotle’s view of poetry. The second part of the paper takes a case study of analytic treatments of ancient philosophy, including the ancient philosopher poets, to examine the poetics of analytic philosophy, diagnosing a preference in Analytic philosophy for a clean non-poetic style of presentation, and then develops this in considering how well historians of philosophy in the Analytic tradition can accommodate the contributions of philosophers who wrote in verse. The final part of the paper reviews the current enthusiasm for decoding Empedocles’ vague and poetic descriptions of the cosmic cycle into a precise scientific periodicity on the basis of the recently discovered Byzantine scholia on Aristotle. I argue that this enthusiasm speaks to a desire for definite and clear numerical values in place of poetic motifs of give and take, and that this mathematical and scientific poetic is comparable to the preferred poetic of analytic philosophy.
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Alvis, John. „The Philosopher's Literary Critic“. Review of Politics 78, Nr. 4 (2016): 681–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670516000620.
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Leon Craig's five books are interrelated by a common approach: Craig writes of philosophic matters juxtaposing them with literary works, or one may reverse the order—whichever way, the exegesis proceeds in tandem. Moreover, he has intertwined the books in a sequential development. One can perceive Craig discovered his fountainhead in Plato. His first book, in 1993, The War Lover: A Study of Plato's “Republic,” has left its genetic pattern upon the next four, Of Philosophers and Kings: Political Philosophy in Shakespeare's “Macbeth” and “King Lear” (2001), The Platonian Leviathan (2010), Philosophy and the Puzzles of “Hamlet” (2014), and his latest, The Philosopher's English King: Shakespeare's “Henriad” as Political Philosophy (2015). In this latest effort, Shakespeare is the philosopher and Henry V the best of Shakespeare's English kings. But you will not appreciate the extent and intricacy of Craig's web unless you recognize that Plato's thought, especially as that thought has been conveyed in The Republic, runs through every filament. To be precise, taking such themes of that dialogue as Socrates's notion of a tripartite human soul, his taxonomy of defective regimes, his all but best regime of “Guardians,” and Socrates's ultimately best constitution, rule by a philosopher become king or king become philosopher, or only somewhat less improbably, a king become an understanding student of a counselor philosopher. Then, best self-government within the individual soul is likewise worked out in The Republic as Craig reads it. To my mind he has read Plato aright.
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Drees, Martin. „Evolution and Emanation of Spirit in Hegel's Philosophy of Nature“. Hegel Bulletin 13, Nr. 02 (1992): 52–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s026352320000286x.
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Having studied Hegel's philosophy, as it is epitomized in the Encyclopaedia, many scholars would be in agreement with David G Ritchie who, in his book on Darwin and Hegel (1893), remarked: “Everywhere in Hegel we read about Entwickelung; but of Evolution he does not speak in so friendly a manner.” Bearing in mind the distinction between “Entwicklung” (“development”) and “evolution” and recalling Hegel's criticism of conceptions of natural evolution in the initial section of the Philosophy of Nature, it is certainly not immediately evident why a serious scholar like John N Findlay should maintain that “if any philosopher is a philosopher of evolution, that philosopher is Hegel.” It can hardly be denied, however, that more recent studies in Hegel's philosophy can be used to support Findlay's statement to a certain extent. Not only has the relevance of Hegel's philosophy for an adequate understanding of organic life and its evolution been strongly emphasized; it has even been asserted that Hegel had at his disposal a concept of evolution essentially determining the methodic approach of his philosophy of nature. Now I would not venture to ascertain whether or not Hegel's concept of evolution is of present relevance for our understanding of nature and even less would I dare to decide on the hypothetical question whether or not Hegel, if he “had lived a little later, … would have given us an evolutionary, teleological theory of Nature as he did of mind in history.” In my paper, I would like to deal with a subject matter of more limited scope. Discussions concerning the systematic importance and present relevance of Hegel's concept of evolution tend to be somewhat vague and abstract as long as the meaning of “evolution” in Hegel's philosophy is anything but unequivocal. Therefore, I am going to attempt to outline a systematic reconstruction of the function of Hegel's concept of evolution within the conceptual framework of Hegel's encyclopaedic Philosophy of Nature. More precisely, I will try to elucidate: 1) the question whether or not Hegel's criticism of philosophic and scientific concepts of evolution led him to his own positive concept of evolution; 2) the question in what sense a specific Hegelian concept of evolution is relevant for the understanding of the notional development taking place between the logical “absolute Idea” and “subjective spirit”.
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Pirc, Tadej. „What is African Philosophy?“ Ars & Humanitas 12, Nr. 1 (20.07.2018): 189–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.4312/ah.12.1.189-203.
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The article focuses on the concept of African philosophy. I enter the discussion with some of the earliest texts that we can classify both as philosophical and of African origin. I proceed with an overview of four approaches to philosophising in Africa, as identified by Henry Oruka (ethno-philosophy, philosophic sagacity, nationalist-ideological philosophy, and professional philosophy) and, in reference to other categorisations, emphasise the critique by Peter Bodunrin, who attributes the status of true philosophy exclusively to professional or academic philosophy. The explication makes it evident that the question of African Philosophy is in essence the question of Philosophy itself.
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Pirc, Tadej. „What is African Philosophy?“ Ars & Humanitas 12, Nr. 1 (20.07.2018): 189–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.4312/ars.12.1.189-203.
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The article focuses on the concept of African philosophy. I enter the discussion with some of the earliest texts that we can classify both as philosophical and of African origin. I proceed with an overview of four approaches to philosophising in Africa, as identified by Henry Oruka (ethno-philosophy, philosophic sagacity, nationalist-ideological philosophy, and professional philosophy) and, in reference to other categorisations, emphasise the critique by Peter Bodunrin, who attributes the status of true philosophy exclusively to professional or academic philosophy. The explication makes it evident that the question of African Philosophy is in essence the question of Philosophy itself.
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Bryson, Anthony, und David Alexander. „The View from the Armchair“. Essays in Philosophy 13, Nr. 1 (2012): 162–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eip201213110.
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In the last two decades, the greatest threat to armchair philosophy has been the natural kinds approach. On this view, philosophic theorizing should not be obsessed with the ideas of justice, goodness, and truth but should look outward to the world of objects to find these things. And if these things happen to be natural kinds, like kinds of rock or fish for instance, then clearly we should reject the armchair for the lab. The philosopher should leave the office and join the scientist out in the field. Philosophy should become a species of science. We attempt to defend traditional/armchair philosophy by examining Hilary Kornblith’s naturalistic methodological approach to epistemology. Among other things, we argue that Kornblith’s approach leads to some surprising, undesirable results (at least undesirable to the naturalist), one of which is that Kornblith cannot discount epistemic internalism as a viable contender in the search for the nature of knowledge. His methodology actually requires that we take epistemic internalism seriously.
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Campagnolo, Gilles. „Du «spectateur impartial» au «travailleur impartial», un commentaire sur la relation entre philosophie morale et économie politique chez Adam Smith selon Jean Mathiot“. Dialogue 50, Nr. 3 (September 2011): 469–509. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217311000515.
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ABSTRACT: As Smith freed moral philosophy from former control bodies (the Church, the state), the Scottish philosopher opened the field for a scientific political economy. In hisAdam Smith. Philosophie et économie(Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1990, p. 45), Jean Mathiot asked :«Should then one wonder that his [Smith’s] audacious stand became the historical grounding stone for political economy, then bringing recognition as an objectively-grounded field of knowledge?»Mathiot’s text and thought have been little debated to this day; this essay is meant to fill that gap, in particular with regard to the history of Smith’s reception in France. Mathiot sought to understand better the “impartial spectator” using a new character whom he claimed Smith was implicitly sketching, and whom he called “the impartial laborer”. To Mathiot’s mind, from theTheory of moral sentiments(1759) to theWealth of Nations(1776), the link is nothing else than Smith’s own philosophy.
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Rodowick, David N. „Of which we cannot speak … Philosophy and the humanities“. ZMK Zeitschrift für Medien- und Kulturforschung 2/2/2011: Medien des Rechts 2, Nr. 2 (2011): 9–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.28937/1000106337.
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Philosophie und Geisteswissenschaften finden in Bezug auf Theorie kaum eine gemeinsame Gesprächsgrundlage. Der Beitrag zeigt, dass der späte Wittgenstein ebenfalls »Theorie« hinterfragt, dies aber als eine Weise begreift, den Dialog zwischen Philosophie und Geisteswissenschaft wiederherzustellen. Wittgenstein zielt in seinen Philosophischen Untersuchungen nicht – wie in der Analytischen Philosophie üblich – auf Gewissheit, sondern sucht Wege, die Philosophie zu Fragen des menschlichen Verstehens und Interpretierens zurückzuführen. </br></br>Philosophy and the humanities have not found much common ground for conversation in theory. I argue that the late Wittgenstein also questions »theory« but as a way of restoring a dialogue between philosophy and the humanities. Wittgenstein aimed his not at the quest for certainty, so characteristic of the history of analytic philosophy, but rather at ways for returning philosophy to questions of human understanding and interpretation through ethical questioning.
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Bogatov, M. A. „About Rhetoric of Crisis in Philosophy“. Izvestiya of Saratov University. Philosophy. Psychology. Pedagogy 11, Nr. 2 (2011): 46–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.18500/1819-7671-2011-11-2-46-52.
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The article discusses the topic of the crisis of modern philosophy. This theme is presented as special crisis rhetoric not interested in philosophy. Rhetoric contrasts to theme of philosophy as a way of escaping from the externally imposed rhetorical tricks. As a result, attempt to define a specific mode of existence of philosophy and the philosopher is given.
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Tarigan, Mardinal, Masita Hamidiyah, Masriyanti Nasution und Rahmi Rahmita Tanjung. „Filsafat Ilmu, Perkembangannya dan Pandangan Filsafat“. Mahaguru: Jurnal Pendidikan Guru Sekolah Dasar 3, Nr. 1 (04.03.2022): 140–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.33487/mgr.v3i1.3954.
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Historically, philosophy has always been the mother of science. In its development, science is increasingly independent and concrete. However, in the face of many life problems that science cannot answer, philosophy became the basis for answering the problem. Before the 17th century, science was synonymous with philosophy. Philosophy itself is a broad science, meaningz that it is closelyz relatedz to our daily lives. Therefore, the philosophyz of sciencez can be seen as an attemptz to bridgez thez gapz betweenz philosophyz andz science. The urgency of the philosophyzof sciencez can be seen from its role asz a keyz dialogue partner in the development of science. The philosophy of science is also a philosophicalz reflectionz of the naturez ofz science, and does notz recognizez the end of the achievement of goals. Understandingz thez philosophyz ofz sciencez meansz understandingz thez complexity ofzscience, so thatz its mostz basicz aspectsz are also understood from the perspectivezofzscience, the development of science, and thez interrelationshipszbetween brancheszofzscience, which cannot be separated from a philosophical paradigm. Thez researchzmethod thatz researchersz usez when writingz scientificz papersz isz az typez of literature research. Itz can bezconcludedzthat philosophy is a sciencez thatz studiesz thez naturez of allz things. Sciencezis an objective way of thinkingzabout the real world and giving it meaning.
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Das, Rolla. „Sundar Sarukkai on Indian Higher Education: Quality, Excellence in Neoliberal Times“. Tattva - Journal of Philosophy 10, Nr. 1 (01.01.2018): 89–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.12726/tjp.19.6.
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Sundar Sarukkai is a philosopher and is currently associated with the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore as a Professor of Philosophy. His research interests range from philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, postmodernism, phenomenology to philosophy of art. A critical philosopher whocan, with élan, and a certain sense of analytical rigour, transverse the philosophical terrains between the Western and Indian traditions. He has authored several books, such as Translating the World: Science and Language (2002), Philosophy of Symmetry (2004) and Indian Philosophy and Philosophy of Science (2005). Hehas earned his doctoral degree from Purdue University, USA following which he has been associated with several institutes such as Indian Institute of Advanced Studies, Manipal University and National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore. He has been the Founder-Director, Manipal Centre for Philosophy and Humanities, Manipal University, Manipal. He can be reached at sarukkai@nias.iisc.ernet.in
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Stepanyants, Marietta. „Intercultural Philosophy“. Philosophical anthropology 7, Nr. 1 (2021): 168–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2414-3715-2021-7-1-168-184.
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Intercultural philosophy emerged in the 1980s and 1990s in Germany and Austria. It has become widespread throughout the world. Geopolitical changes, which defined the nature of modernity as an era of post-colonialism and globalization, played a decisive role in its emergence. The new philosophic trend has grown from a comparative philosophy that has gone through three stages of evolution: from proving the universal "truth" of Western philosophy, to attempts to create a "synthetic philosophy" and, finally, to the recognition of autonomy and significance of non-Western philosophies. Intercultural philosophy offers a new method of thinking, which involves the rejection of claims to the ultimate truth of the philosophical tradition of its own culture, respect for the heritage of other cultures, the deployment of large-scale discourse so that to find alternative approaches to solving both purely philosophical and global problems.
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Treloar,, John L. „Kant on Philosophy and Being a Philosopher“. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 75, Nr. 2 (2001): 297–316. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/acpq200175237.
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Liparotti, Renan Marques. „Alexander philosopher-king: from Philosophy to action“. Ploutarchos 14 (30.10.2017): 47–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.14195/0258-655x_14_3.
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Plutarch, in his Life of Alexander and his speeches On the Fortune or Virtue of Alexander the Great, draws a portrait of a philosopher-king, inspired by Plato, Aristotle and Diogenes’ philosophies. This paper aims to analyse the dialogues between these philosophers and Alexander and to scrutinise the Macedonian’s political path whereby philosophical ideals were put in action. This study, therefore, may suggest that whilst in the encomiastic speeches Plutarch draws a king, enlightened by Philosophy, who made happier «all the inhabited earth», in the biography, contradictions of imposing a ‘blessed life’ are unveiled.
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McWhorter, Ladelle. „Can a Postmodern Philosopher Teach Modern Philosophy?“ Teaching Philosophy 23, Nr. 1 (2000): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/teachphil20002313.
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Marlen Esser, Andrea. „Philosophie aktuell: Public Philosophy – brauchen wir das?“ Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 71, Nr. 1 (01.03.2023): 119–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2023-0008.
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Abstract In recent years, calls for philosophy to interact more with the public have grown louder in the German-speaking world as well as elsewhere. Public philosophy, as it were, has a long-standing tradition, reaching back to Enlightenment-era German “Popularphilosophie” and of course to Socrates and the Sophists. This section presents four short articles on some current aspects of the public-philosophy debate: on the overall conditions for transferring content from academic philosophy to the public in Germany; on the relations between philosophers’ mediatic presence and their disciplinary expertise; on 18th-century guidelines for accessible philosophical writing; and on public philosophy as a social practice that is more than mere unidirectional knowledge transfer.
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Wood, William. „Leo Strauss on Religion as the Fundamental Alternative to Philosophy“. Roczniki Filozoficzne 71, Nr. 2 (28.06.2023): 289–311. http://dx.doi.org/10.18290/rf237102.15.
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Leo Strauss is well known for his thesis that there is an irreconcilable conflict between philosophy and “revelation,” i.e. monotheistic revealed religion, which cannot be harmonized. The philosopher qua philosopher cannot be a believer, while the believer qua believer cannot be a philosopher. However, it is less widely recognized that Strauss’ thought about religion as the fundamental alternative to philosophy follows two divergent trajectories. The first emphasizes the unique importance of revealed religion, while the other emphasizes the conflict between philosophy and what he calls “religion in general.” Sometimes, Strauss suggests that revelation poses a unique “challenge” to philosophy, such that the philosopher must refute the mere possibility of revelation in order to justify the legitimacy of philosophy itself. Sometimes, however, he suggests rather that revelation is a religion like any other, not essentially different from e.g. ancient polytheism, which would seem therefore to pose no unique “challenge.” I argue that Strauss ultimately fails to reconcile these two strands of this thought and that this failure is related both to tensions internal to his positive conception of philosophy itself as a middle path between dogmatism and skepticism and to the fact that he begs the question by assuming, rather than proving, that it follows necessarily from “the very idea of revelation” that it cannot be harmonized with philosophy.
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Rashkovsky, Eugene B. „Philosophical Fragments: from Diaries of Recent Years“. Voprosy Filosofii, Nr. 6 (2021): 207–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/0042-8744-2021-6-207-219.
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The paper presents few extracts from the philosophical diaries of Russian historian, philosopher and poet Eugene Rashkovsky during 2017‒2020. The pivotal problems of his diary are connected with three branches of philosophical knowledge: Philosophy of human person, Philosophy of poetry, Philosophy of history. An idea of human spontaneous creative activity (ποιησις) as well as interconnected with it idea of freedom – these both ideas seem to be central theoretical interest of the diaries’ author. Human ποιησις (in the broad approach to this notion) seems to be important field where our feelings, intuitions, reason and praxis interconnected and finding themselves in the main streams and trends of history. “A Study of Poetry” with poetry’s special, non-linear connections of semantic chains, images and rhythms is presented by author as one of hermeneutic keys to philosophical understanding of history. Philosophy of Vladimir Solovyev as well as Pushkin’s and Pasternak’s poetical heritage are the subjects of author’s special interest. A philosophical diary that does not require a scientific apparatus or detailed argumentation is a unique genre. Self-interview genre. Or, as I tried to show in one of my books, the genre of “raising the interlocutor” in oneself. Sure, it also happens that a natural, non-fictional interlocutor can sometimes continue in a casual (or not casual) diary reader. The interview with oneself continues in the reader…