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De, Villiers Tanya. „Mind and language : evolution in contemporary theories of cognition“. Thesis, Link to the online version, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/1092.
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Van, Wagner Tracy P. „An Integrated Account of Social Cognition in ASD: Bringing Together Situated Cognition and Theory Theory“. University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK, 2017. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1505203102196309.
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Walker, Rebecca, und n/a. „The emergence of the representational mind“. University of Otago. Department of Psychology, 2006. http://adt.otago.ac.nz./public/adt-NZDU20061106.161621.
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Theory of mind has been described in philosophical and psychological literature as "folk psychology", and is the tacit understanding that our behaviour is driven by our thoughts, desires and beliefs (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Children are widely considered to have attained theory of mind understanding when they are able to pass the test of false belief understanding devised by Wimmer and Perner (1983), at around 4 years of age. There are many theories as to how a child comes to hold a folk psychology, including innate modularism (Leslie, 1987, 1988, 1994), theory change (Gopnik & Wellman 1992), developing representational understanding (Perner, 1991, 1995, 2000), and experiential understanding developed in a socio-linguisitic context (Nelson, 1996). In addition, theory of mind has been linked to the development of symbolic understanding (Deloache & Smith, 1999; Perner, 1991), pretend play (Leslie, 1987; Taylor & Carlson, 1997; Youngblade & Dunn, 1993), language (Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Nelson, 1996; Olson, 1988) and executive function (e.g. Hughes, 1998a; Kochanska et al., 1996; Reed et al., 1984). The present study sought to bring together these diverse findings and to attempt to provide an integrated account of the emergence of theory of mind understanding during the preschool years. Sixty-four New Zealand children were assessed on their mental state understanding, deceptive abilities, symbolic functioning, language, and executive skills, when they were aged 30, 36, 42 and 48 months of age.
There were a number of key findings in the present study. Language was a powerful predictor of false belief performance both within and across time, and was also related to many of the other variables included in the study. Performance on the scale model test of symbolic functioning was related across time to children�s concurrent and later false belief understanding. Scale model performance was also intertwined in a bidirectional relationship with language, and language appeared to play an increasingly important role in mediating the relationship with false belief understanding across time. False belief understanding and scale model performance were also related within and across time to executive function. There was evidence to suggest that the importance of working memory was due to its role in conflict inhibition. Although deception has sometimes been posited to be a precocious manifestation of theory of mind (Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989), in the present study deceptive ability lagged false belief understanding. Furthermore, false belief understanding was related to children�s subsequent (but not earlier) responses to a protagonist�s intention. This supports the hypothesis that false belief understanding allows a qualitative change in the execution of deception, whereby children can move from simple physical strategies to more sophisticated mentalist strategies. Overall, the present study provides some evidence to suggest that symbolic functioning, language, and later theory of mind may form part of a single developing skill set of symbolic representation. In dynamic interaction with social understanding, and supported by cognitive abilities such as executive function, and the socio-linguistic context, it is argued that understanding of one�s own and other minds emerges. Children�s ability to solve the false belief problem at 4 years of age is presented as a milestone on a developmental continuum of social understanding.
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Stepanenko, Walter Scott. „Passionate Cognition: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion and the Role of the Emotions inCognition“. University of Toledo / OhioLINK, 2014. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=toledo1396533522.
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Fuller, Timothy. „Science and Mind: How theory change illuminates ordinary thought“. The Ohio State University, 2012. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1343840173.
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Japola, Justyna Marta. „Fodor and Aquinas the architecture of the mind and the nature of concept acquisition /“. Connect to Electronic Thesis (CONTENTdm), 2009. http://worldcat.org/oclc/642200251/viewonline.
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Jaworski, Michael Dean. „Thought Without Language: an Interpretationist Approach to the Thinking Mind“. The Ohio State University, 2010. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1276576639.
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SMITH, JOHN-CHRISTIAN. „COMMONSENSE FACULTY PSYCHOLOGY: REIDIAN FOUNDATIONS FOR COMPUTATIONAL COGNITIVE SCIENCE (FUNCTIONALISM, INTENTIONALITY, MODULARITY, MIND, REPRESENTATION)“. Diss., The University of Arizona, 1985. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/188133.
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This work locates the historical and conceptual foundations of cognitive science in the "commonsense" psychology of the philosopher Thomas Reid. I begin with Reid's attack on his rationalist and empiricist competitors of the 17th and 18th centuries. I then present his positive theory as a sophisticated faculty psychology appealing to innateness of mental structure. Reidian psychological faculties are equally trustworthy, causally independent mental powers, and I argue that they share nine distinct properties. This distinguishes Reidian 'intentionalism' from idealist 'representationalism,' which derive cognitive content either from the inherited structure of faculties of from the occurrent structure of sensory activity. Next, I turn to consciousness and reflection for a contemporary Reidian response to traditional phenomenology. Unlike reflection, faculties of reason and remembrance are not causally mediated by consciousness. My interpretation of Reid is that 'Humean causation' of individual faculty structure accounts only for 'natural intentionality,' while 'efficient causation' of faculty interrelations accounts for cognitive 'personal intentionality.' I then proceed by adopting a form of computational description for reconstructing this view as a computational theory of mind. I contrast functional analyses in explanations of some capacities with computational and componential analyses in explanations of other, intentional capacities, in which some processes must be taken to semantically encode and govern the roles of others. This step reconstructs the Reidian notion of intentional operations as requiring an explanation of component faculties and their representation-governed interactions. I argue that properties of faculties delimiting these interactions under Reid's theory parallel those in Fodor's (1983) essay on the "modularity of mind," although the reasons given for individual criteria are often very different. Fodor also proposes a trichotomous mental structure, but I find that a third level of "central systems" is a myth engendered by causal information theory. Such an analysis cannot capture generalizations over the internal representation of semantic roles that determines the character of faculty relations. This requirement for any computational account of cognition is precisely the motivation for the reconstructed Reidian theory. Thus, it comports more favorably with the explanatory program constitutive of a computational cognitive science.
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BLAHNIK, GARY A. „EXPERIMENTALISM: INTEGRATING MIND & BODY, SPIRIT & MATTER, THE ONE & THE MANY“. University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK, 2007. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1185550468.
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Maring, Bayta Louise. „The metaphorical bases of children's developing theories of mind /“. view abstract or download file of text, 2003. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/uoregon/fullcit?p3102179.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2003.Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 186-192). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.
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Vidlund, Elin. „Moral cognition and its neural correlates : Possibilites for enhancement of moral cognition and behavior“. Thesis, Högskolan i Skövde, Institutionen för biovetenskap, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:his:diva-15726.
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This essay aims to provide an overview of some key theories and frameworks regarding moral cognition and its neural correlates, in order to examine the possibilities of enhancement of moral cognition. Moral cognition arises from the functional integration of several distinct brain regions and networks. These neural systems correspond to different socioaffective abilities, such as empathy and compassion, as well as sociocognitive abilities, such as theory of mind. Due to this neural distinction, these moral abilities, behaviors, and emotions can be targeted and trained separately. Recent research suggests that training sociocognitive and socioaffective abilities increases cortical thickness in corresponding brain regions and networks, hence providing support for adult neural plasticity in relation to moral cognition. Increased cortical thickness also corresponds to enhanced performance in socioaffective and sociocognitive abilities. Training compassion and empathy induce enhanced abilities to pick up emotional cues, as well as strengthen the motivation to alleviate others’ distress. Practicing theory of mind allows for a better understanding of the perspective of others, which has been indicated to reduce biases between individuals or societal groups. Thus, enhanced moral cognition can contribute to an increase in consideration for those affected by our choices and behavior, which may yield more compassionate, just, and safe societies.
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Szarkowicz, Diane Louise. „Preschoolers using narrative to evidence an understanding of mind /“. [Campbelltown, N.S.W. : The Author], 1999. http://library.uws.edu.au/adt-NUWS/public/adt-NUWS20030624.135650/index.html.
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Forrest, Peter V. „Can phenomenology determine the content of thought?“ Thesis, University of Oxford, 2015. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:83967922-db20-4f05-bdc9-0ac4b361ba07.
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This thesis is about consciousness and representation. More specifically, the big picture issue in the background throughout is the relationship between consciousness (or "phenomenology") and representation (or "intentionality") in the life of the mind. Phenomenology and intentionality are inarguably the two central topics in philosophy of mind of the last half-century. The question of phenomenology is, "how can there be something it feels like, from a subjective viewpoint, for a physical being to experience the world?" The question of intentionality is, "how can something physical, such as a brain state, be about, or represent, some other thing out in the world?" Not too long ago, the majority opinion was that these two questions addressed two essentially independent domains. However, in recent years the views of many philosophers have swung dramatically in the opposite direction. An important theme of analytic philosophy of mind in the last decade or two has been the exploration of the groundbreaking idea that these two domains might be fundamentally linked in previously unrecognized ways. Perhaps phenomenal properties are reducible to certain kinds of intentional properties. Perhaps the mind's non-derivative intentionality is grounded in phenomenology. Perhaps we should think of phenomenology and intentionality as "intertwined, all the way down to the ground" (Chalmers 2004, 32). This thesis addresses one crucial question within this larger framework: whether, and how, thoughts are phenomenally conscious. Thoughts are an important test case for theories about the relationship between phenomenology and intentionality, because they have long been considered paradigmatic intentional states, in contrast to perceptual and sensory experiences, which are paradigmatic phenomenal states. While there is something it is like, from the inside, for an individual to undergo a perceptual experience such as an olfactory experience of roasted coffee beans, by contrast entertaining a thought might seem to lack such a distinctive qualitative "feel". The thought is clearly intentional: it involves carrying informational content about objects and properties in the world. But is there also something it is like for a subject to experience thinking itself? To answer this question in the affirmative is to accept the existence of a phenomenology of thought, so-called "cognitive phenomenology" (CP). The literature on this topic so far has focused primarily on the question of whether CP exists. Here I will focus on the subtly different, and largely neglected, question of whether a kind of CP exists that is able to determine thought's intentional content. Many proponents of CP seem to be motivated by the hope that it can, since they believe that in the case of other conscious states, the phenomenology accounts for the intentionality. However, in what follows I argue that this ambitious project is doomed to fail, because CP is not suited to determine the intentional content of thought.
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Seakgwa, Kyle Vuyani Tiiso. „Exploring the philosophical mind: An empirical investigation of the process of philosophizing using the protocol analysis methodology“. University of Western Cape, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/11394/7548.
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Masters of ArtMany empirically supported versions of stage and componential models of the cognitive processing underlying the completion of various tasks spanning a wide range of domains have been developed by cognitive scientists of various kinds. These include models of scientific (e.g. Dunbar 1999), mathematical (e.g. Schoenfeld 1985), artistic (e.g. Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi 1976), engineering (e.g. Purzer et al 2018), legal (e.g. Ronkainen 2011), medical (e.g. Vimla et al 2012) and even culinary cognition (e.g. Stierand and Dörfler 2015) (and this list is nowhere near exhaustive). Yet, despite the existence of fields such as experimental and metaphilosophy which take philosophy as their object, often by using methods from the cognitive sciences, a stage or componential model of philosophizing is conspicuously missing from even an exhaustive list of the kind just produced.
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Bradford, Elisabeth E. F. „From self to social cognition : a new paradigm to study differentiations within the Theory of Mind mechanism and their relation to executive functioning“. Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/12005.
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Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and other people. In this thesis, I present a new paradigm, the Self/Other Differentiation task, which was designed to assess ToM abilities – specifically, the ability to attribute belief states to the ‘Self' and ‘Other' – in typically developed, healthy adults. By focussing on fully developed ToM abilities, we aimed to increase understanding of how the ToM mechanism is structured and functions in everyday life, and how individual ToM components may differentially relate to executive functioning (EF) abilities. The Self/Other Differentiation task is a computerized false-belief task utilizing a matched- design to allow direct comparison of self-oriented versus other-oriented belief- attribution processes. Using behavioural (response times/error rates) and electrophysiological (EEG) methods, the work presented in this thesis provides evidence of a clear and distinct differentiation in the processing of ‘Self' versus ‘Other' perspectives in healthy ToM. We established a key role of perspective-shifting in ToM, which we hypothesize plays a crucial role in day-to-day communications; shifting from the Self-to-Other perspective was significantly harder (longer and more error prone) than shifting from the Other-to-Self perspective, suggesting that the ‘Self' forms the stem of understanding the ‘Other'. EEG analysis revealed these effects were present across fronto-lateral and occipital-lateral areas of the brain, particularly across the right hemisphere in parietal regions. We provide evidence of these features as universal, core components of the ToM mechanism, with data collected from both Chinese and Western cultures illustrating similar patterns of results. Results regarding the relationship between ToM and EF were mixed, with one study finding that affective EF positively correlates with ToM task performance, whilst non-affective EF does not, and a further two studies finding no such differential relationship. The Self/Other Differentiation task provides the opportunity to establish the features of ‘typical' ToM processes in healthy adults, to further our understanding of how the mature ToM mechanism functions.
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Peters, Uwe. „Does the mind leak? : on Andy Clark's extended cognition hypothesis and its critics : a thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy /“. Thesis, University of Canterbury. Humanities, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10092/3613.
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A growing controversy at the interface of philosophy and cognitive science concerns the question of where cognition is located. In the paper “The Extended Mind” (1998), the book Supersizing the Mind (2008) and many other publications, Andy Clark contends that cognitive processes do not only occur in the head but also physically extend into the environment. In contrast and critical response to Clark, Adams/Aizawa (2008) and Rupert (forthcoming) hold that cognition is an entirely brain-bound affair. In the present thesis, I will argue that Clark’s extended cognition hypothesis as well as Adams/Aizawa’s and Rupert’s brain-bound accounts should be rejected because they lack plausibility and are cognitive-scientifically gratuitous. However, even though I dismiss Adams/Aizawa’s and Rupert’s specific brain-bound views, I will reach a conclusion similar to theirs: contra Clark, cognition remains an internal phenomenon.
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Krasny, Karen A. „Imagery, affect, and the embodied mind: implications for reading and responding to literature“. Texas A&M University, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/3274.
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Since Plato first banished poets from his Republic, the relationship between the aesthetic and moral value of literature has been subject to philosophical, critical, and pedagogical debate. In this philosophical investigation, I sought to explain how the evocation of the senses during literary transactions shapes the phenomenal experience of the reader. Recent developments in neuroscience (Damasio, 1999, 2003; Edelman, 1992) provide strong evidence in support of embodied theories of cognition in which imagery and affect play a central role. The purposes of this philosophical investigation were to describe the structure and function of imagery and affect in the cognitive act of reading, to provide a detailed account of how we exercise our capacity for imaginative thought in order to achieve literal, inferential, and critical comprehension, and to explore the implications of an embodied mind for reading and responding to literary texts. The investigation yielded a critical review of contemporary theories of reading (Kintsch, 1998; Rumelhart, 1977; Sadoski & Paivio, 2001) to examine their ability to explain the phenomena associated with the literary experience. Dual coding theory (Sadoski & Paivio, 2001) which maintains an empirical and embodied view of the mind was shown to have considerable theoretical advantages over rationalist computational theories of
cognition in explaining phenomena associated with reading and responding to literary texts. A neurobiological account of consciousness provides support for the idea that literature can engage readers imaginatively in the process moral deliberation (Dewey, 1932/1985). In addition, I concluded that considerable evidence exists to suggest that somatic and visceral changes experienced as a result of undergoing the text can potentially incite individual and social change.
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Miller, Jamie M. „Personal Identity and the Extended Mind: A Critique of Parfitian Reductionism“. Ohio University Honors Tutorial College / OhioLINK, 2015. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ouhonors1438280650.
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Wallin-Ruschman, Jennifer. „A Girl Power Study: Looking and Listening to the Role of Emotions and Relationality in Developing Critical Consciousness“. PDXScholar, 2014. https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds/1837.
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The concept of critical consciousness centers on the capacity for involvement in social change efforts. Its development has been the aim of many recent social movements (e.g., the consciousness raising groups of the women's movement). In this work, critical consciousness is defined as the highest level of socio-political-cultural (SPC) consciousness development. SPC consciousness is characterized by the linking of the personal and the political so that structures and discourses of oppression are not only understood but also lead to critical action and transforming relations of domination. Additionally, critical consciousness includes the ability to tolerate ambivalence and conflict as well as the capacity to form group identifications that support critical reflection. While critical consciousness can develop in a variety of settings, it has a historical affinity with liberation education projects, particularly education projects that combine Critical Pedagogy and community engaged learning.
Empirical inquiry on critical consciousness development is extremely limited. This dissertation addresses that gap, focusing specifically on the role of emotion and relationality in critical consciousness development. Further, the study offers a feminist critique of the literature, addressing as well the contribution of Community Psychology to conceptualizing critical consciousness.
This dissertation analyzes data gathered through the Girl Power Senior Capstone, a course routinely taught at an urban Pacific Northwest public university. The six-hour course lasts for one quarter-term and integrates classroom time with community engagement. A central aim of the course is the development of critical consciousness. Specifically, the research was designed to address the following questions: 1) How are emotionally and relationally significant Girl Power experiences related to SPC consciousness development? 2) What tensions arise between the dominant culture and/or significant others' values and the values of the Girl Power capstone and how do these tensions move individuals toward or away from critical consciousness?
The theoretical framework and interview schedule were guided by participant observation of the Girl Power course conducted over an academic term. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with all consenting and available capstone participants (N=10) in the course where participant-observations were carried out. The interviews were transcribed and analyzed based on a modified version of Carol Gilligan's Listening Guide.
Two primary themes emerged from the data analysis-- the processes of awakening and sources of dissonance. The first theme relates to the processes of transformation that participants undergo during and following the course. Participants discuss this process as coming to see the world in a new way though their emotional experiences and relations developed in the course. The second theme, sources of dissonance, addresses sources of conflict that emerge as participants undergo this process of awakening. Areas of tension that were particularly salient centered on relationships and experiences in the course. Participants identified experiences in the course that they perceived as contributing in key respects to SPC consciousness. Yet some aspects of change in the course seemed to reflect limiting capacities, including magical thinking, a limited range of critical action strategies, and lack of critical community post Girl Power. The findings from the dissertation can be used to inform the creation and implementation of future projects of critical consciousness development and social justice work more broadly.
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Skorburg, Joshua. „Extended Virtues“. Thesis, University of Oregon, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/1794/23177.
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The central argument of this dissertation is that virtue ethics is overly individualistic. In response, I develop and defend a more relational, ecological account - what I call extended virtues. First, following Andy Clark, Kim Sterelny, and others, I argue that cognition and emotion can be embedded in, scaffolded by, or even extended to include various environmental resources. These arguments undermine default internalism about cognitive and affective processes. Next, I show how recent work in social and personality psychology similarly undermines individualism about the bearers of these cognitive and affective processes. Taken together, these arguments have significant but heretofore underappreciated implications for virtue ethics. After reviewing the literature which attempts to spell out the ethical implications of embedded, scaffolded, and extended cognition, I conclude that a more substantive engagement with virtue ethics is needed. I then show how plausible, mainstream theories of virtue assume default internalism and individualism, and are thus subject to charges of empirical inadequacy. Finally, I formulate my account of extended virtues in response to these shortcomings. I begin by making three explicit arguments for why an account of extended virtues is needed. I then develop two further arguments - the process argument and the bearer argument - which yield the conclusion that the processes relevant to, and the bearers of, moral and intellectual virtues can be embedded, scaffolded, or extended. After providing examples and filling in details about the hypotheses of embedded, scaffolded, and extended virtue, I propose that virtues are less like dispositions and more like relations. I conclude by suggesting that ecological metaphors such as stewardship are more fitting than traditional views of morality as inner strength.
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Molina, Suely Fernandes. „Ciborgue: a mente estendida de Andy Clark“. Universidade Federal de São Carlos, 2007. https://repositorio.ufscar.br/handle/ufscar/4828.
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Previous issue date: 2007-11-07The cyborg theme, concerning the combination of organisms and machines, has been extensively explored recently. In this text, the theme is once again discussed, first, through a brief historical overview and, then, through a shift in the paradigm, proposed by the philosopher of mind Andy Clark, known as Extended Mind or Activ Externalism: it s not necessary for a man to have implants or chips in his body, to receive a transplant or to use wearable computers to gain the status of cyborg. The human being is naturally a cyborg, because it has always incorporated tools that extend the mind. Therefore, there is a redefinition of the notion of mind, which frees it from the limits of the skull and extends it to the limits of human action, involving body, brain and world. The brain carries the fate of controlling this material mind, upon which its existence depends
O tema do ciborgue, da mistura dos organismos com as máquinas, tem sido bastante explorado nos dias atuais. Neste texto, o tema volta a ser discutido, primeiramente, através de um breve panorama histórico e, em seguida, através de uma quebra de paradigma, proposta pelo filósofo da mente Andy Clark, conhecida como Mente Estendida ou Externalismo Ativo: não é necessário que o humano porte implantes, chips, submeta-se a transplantes ou use computadores vestíveis para que ganhe o estatuto de ciborgue. O ser humano é, naturalmente, ciborgue, pois incorpora, desde sempre, ferramentas que ampliam sua mente. Portanto, há uma redefinição do conceito de mente, que a liberta dos limites da caixa craniana e a estende até os limites da ação humana, abarcando corpo, cérebro e mundo. Ao cérebro é dado o papel de controlador dessa mente material, de cuja existência ela depende
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Rook, Dane. „Doxastic spaces : a new approach to relational beliefs and unstable neglect“. Thesis, University of Oxford, 2015. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:527f1120-ef63-42db-90a7-ceef40397f6c.
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This thesis introduces and explores a novel construct for studying human beliefs in social science: doxastic spaces. These flexible analytical devices are demonstrated as capturing three key properties of beliefs which are difficult to depict through other formats: the relational, relative, and reflexive properties of beliefs. The doxastic-space paradigm developed by this thesis is likewise shown to enable new and insightful theories about belief formation and change. Two such theories cultivated herein are quantized evidence theory (QET) and entropy-based social learning (EBSL). These theories prioritise not only the evidential bases of beliefs, but also the cognitive limitations on memory and attention that people face in constructing and updating beliefs about their worlds. Such bases and limitations underscore not only the role that context has to play in sculpting beliefs, but also the reciprocal function of beliefs in helping to determine and demarcate context. Part of that context is discussed as being other people relevant in social judgment and learning situations. And interplay between beliefs and context is used to aid explanation for unstable tendencies in neglectful cognition. The work mixes theoretical and empirical investigation of the doxastic-space framework, and suggests that it may serve social science by working to not only forge deeper comprehension of belief dynamics but also to operate as a platform for interdisciplinary exchange.
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Tao, Ruoting. „Understanding object-directed intentionality in Capuchin monkeys and humans“. Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/9304.
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Understanding intentionality, i.e. coding the object directedness of agents towards objects, is a fundamental component of Theory of Mind abilities. Yet it is unclear how it is perceived and coded in different species. In this thesis, we present a series of comparative studies to explore human adults' and Capuchin monkeys' ability to infer intentional objects from actions. First we studied whether capuchin monkeys and adult humans infer a potential object from observing an object-directed action. With no direct information about the goal-object, neither species inferred the object from the action. However, when the object was revealed, the monkeys retrospectively encoded the directedness of the object-directed action; unexpectedly, in an adapted version of the task adult humans did not show a similar ability. We then adapted another paradigm, originally designed by Kovács et al (2010), to examine whether the two species implicitly register the intentional relation between an agent and an object. We manipulated an animated agent and the participants' belief about a ball's presence behind a hiding screen. We found no evidence showing that humans or monkeys coded object-directedness or belief. More importantly, we failed to replicate the original results from Kovács et al's study, and through a series of follow up studies, we questioned their conclusions regarding implicit ToM understanding. We suggested that, instead of implicit ToM, results like Kovacs et al's might be interpreted as driven by “sub-mentalizing” processes, as suggested by Heyes (2014). We conclude that so called ‘implicit ToM' may be based upon the computation of intentional relations between perceived agents and objects. But, these computations might present limitations, and some results attributed to implicit ToM may in fact reflect “sub-mentalizing” processes.
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Hornbeck, Ryan. „A pure world : moral cognition and spiritual experiences in Chinese World of Warcraft“. Thesis, University of Oxford, 2012. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:da29fb13-3133-47c3-a0dd-87e41d670e0f.
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This dissertation is about moral cognition and the production of spiritual experiences in the Chinese version of the massively multiplayer online game, World of Warcraft (CWoW). Chapter 1 introduces the game, field sites, data collection methods, and the questions and paradigms that structure the dissertation's narrative. This chapter explains that during fieldwork CWoW players frequently described gameplay as yielding positive moral and spiritual experiences. Chapter 2 outlines the cognitive mechanisms – Haidt and Joseph's 'moral foundations' (2004; 2007) – that are hypothesised to inform the in-game experiences to which players attributed moral significance. Chapter 3 argues that some aspects of the WoW gameworld are high in cognitive 'relevance' (following Sperber & Wilson, 1986) for Haidt and Joseph's moral foundations. This relevance yields the game a capacity for cross-cultural appeal. Chapter 4 argues that social agencies operant in the lives of CWoW players motivated players to utilise these morally relevant aspects of gameplay as a 'religion-like tool for group cohesion' (following Sosis & Alcorta, 2008). These extra-game agencies help explain why these aspects of gameplay were cultivated in lieu of, or as superordinate to, aspects that may be 'relevant' to other cognitive mechanisms. Chapter 5 argues that reports of soul merger experiences obtained in CWoW resemble Durkheim’s 'collective effervescence' (Durkheim, 1995 [1912]) and may be understood at the cognitive level as 'flow' (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990) experiences conjoined with affective outputs from Haidt and Joseph's moral foundations. Chapter 6 summarises the key points made in the preceding chapters and concludes that in the contexts sampled here, high-contingency aspects of CWoW gameplay may be viewed as Durkheimian religious rituals.
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Lanman, Jonathan Andrew. „A secular mind : towards a cognitive anthropology of atheism“. Thesis, University of Oxford, 2010. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:99ae030b-5f3a-4863-abf2-2f63eb8b4150.
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This thesis presents descriptive and explanatory accounts of both non-theism, the lack of belief in the existence of supernatural agents, and strong atheism, the moral opposition to such beliefs on the grounds that they are both harmful and signs of weak character. Based on my fieldwork with non-theist groups and individuals in the United States, United Kingdom, and Denmark, an online survey of over 3,000 non-theists from over 50 countries, and theories from both the social and cognitive sciences, I offer a new account of why nations with low economic and normative threats produce high levels of non-theism. This account is offered in place of the common explanation that religious beliefs provide comfort in threatening circumstances, which I show to be both anthropologically and psychologically problematic. My account centres on the role of threats, both existential and normative, in increasing commitment to ingroup ideologies, many of which are religious, and the important role of witnessing displays of commitment to religious beliefs in producing such beliefs in each new generation. In environments with low levels of personal and normative threat, commitment to religious ideologies decreases, extrinsic reasons for religious participation decrease, and superstitious actions decrease. Given the human tendency to believe the communications of others to the extent that they are backed up by action, such a decrease in displays of commitment to religious beliefs leads to increased non-theism in the span of a generation. In relation to strong atheism, I document a correlation, both geographical and chronological, between strong atheism and the presence of religious beliefs and demands in the public sphere. I then offer an explanation of this correlation based on the effects of threats against a modern normative order characterized by philosopher Charles Taylor as a system of mutual benefit and individual liberty.
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Ogle, Peter, und n/a. „A defence of non-introspective simulationism“. University of Otago. Department of Philosophy, 2006. http://adt.otago.ac.nz./public/adt-NZDU20070117.085634.
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This thesis is a defence of non-introspective simulationism. It seeks to explain how we acquire everyday behavioural and psychological beliefs (henceforth interpretational beliefs) regarding both ourselves and others. The thesis is in three parts; the first states non-introspective simulationism, the second surveys some relevant empirical findings and shows how simulationism explains (or at least accomodates) these, and the third compares simulationism with rival theories.
The two main claims of non-introspecitve simulationism (as defended) are: simulation is central to the acquisition of interpretational beliefs. Introspection has no role whatever.
Further central claims are: beliefs about our own currently intended behaviours are acquired by practical reasoning. Other interpretational beliefs are, in various ways, the product of simulation. Simulation requires little if any machinery not already required for practical reasoning. Knowledge of our own psychological states is acquired after and as a result of knowledge of others�. Knowledge of phenomenal states is unnecessary for mastery of folk psychology and the product of dinkum science.
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Coelho, Bruno Tenório [UNESP]. „A hipótese da mente estendida: um debate acerca dos limites da cognição“. Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP), 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/152252.
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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)
A hipótese da mente estendida afirma não existir um limite identificável para os processos cognitivos, e que por vezes, eles se estendem para o ambiente. Irei neste trabalho inicialmente detalhar os argumentos que sustentam a hipótese, expondo casos onde o uso recorrente de ferramentas e tecnologias acabam se tornando um extensão do corpo. Detalho a cognição incorporada e situada, programa de pesquisa de teor revisionista que dá base para a hipótese, e questiona diretamente os pressupostos da ciência cognitiva tradicional, nomeadamente, de um agente epistêmico passivo que processa e manipula representações. Em seguida, apresento objeções que foram levantadas contra a hipótese, assim como possíveis respostas a estas objeções. Por fim, apresento uma defesa da hipótese a partir de evidências empíricas presentes na pesquisa em psicologia ecológica.
The extended-mind hypothesis states that there is no identifiable limit for cognitive processes, and that sometimes the mind extend into the environment. In this paper I will first detail the arguments that support the hypothesis, exposing cases where the recurrent use of tools and technologies end up becoming an extension of the body. I detail the embodied and situated cognition research program, who has a revisionist content that provides the basis for the hypothesis, and questions directly the presuppositions of traditional cognitive science, namely, a passive epistemic agent that processes and manipulates representations. Then I present objections that have been raised against the hypothesis, as well as possible answers to these objections. Finally, I present a defense of the hypothesis based on empirical evidence in ecological psychology research.
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Born, Ryan. „A Problem Of Access: Autism, Other Minds, And Interpersonal Relations“. Digital Archive @ GSU, 2011. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/103.
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Autism Spectrum Conditions (ASCs) are marked by social-communicative difficulties and unusually fixed or repetitive interests, activities, and behaviors (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). In this thesis, I review empirically and conceptually based philosophic proposals that maintain the social-communicative difficulties exhibited by persons on the autism spectrum result from a lack of capacity to understand other persons as minded. I will argue that the social-communicative difficulties that characterize ASCs may instead result from a lack of ability to access other minds, and that this lack of ability is due to a contingent lack of external resources.
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Ciuca, Diana M. „Reducing Subjectivity: Meditation and Implicit Bias“. Scholarship @ Claremont, 2015. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1213.
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Implicit association of racial stereotypes is brought about by social conditioning (Greenwald & Krieger, 2006). This conditioning can be explained by attractor networks (Sharp, 2011). Reducing implicit bias through meditation can show the effectiveness of reducing the rigidity of attractor networks, thereby reducing subjectivity. Mindfulness meditation has shown to reduce bias from the use of one single guided session conducted before performing an Implicit Association Test (Lueke & Gibson, 2015). Attachment to socially conditioned racial bias should become less prevalent through practicing meditation over time. An experimental model is proposed to test this claim along with a reconceptualization of consciousness based in meditative practice.
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Sloss, Jay. „Meaning : the move from minds to practices“. Thesis, University of Canterbury. Philosophy and Religious Studies, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10092/984.
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For centuries referential theories of language and meaning have dominated Western philosophy. The idea that noises and scratches become meaningful words and writing by virtue of a mental grasp one has on the referents they are talking about has become deeply entrenched. Starting with Plato, and reinvented by Locke, contemporary theorists continue to reproduce this mental fix requirement (MFR) in their philosophies of language and intentionality-Physicalists, such as Paul and Patricia Churchland are typical. Plato, Locke and the Churchlands all share the view that bits of language reach out to extra-linguistic entities by some act of mind (for Plato the mind grasped referents via the Forms, for Locke Ideas bridged the relation, and the Churchland's, brain states). In each case a self-referential mental act gets language up and running, i.e. mental connections (or representations) to referents do the trick. My question also concerns what makes squiggles and noises meaningful. The question is a nested one-ancillary to it are questions of what makes language work? How do words mean or relate to the world? How do speakers mean certain things and not others? I will approach the question from a contextualist perspective where roles in rule-governed activities are the bottom line, not representations in the mind/brain.
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Nakabayashi, Luciana Akemi. „A contribuição da inteligência artificial (IA) na filosofia da mente“. Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, 2009. https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/18236.
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The current research has as central theme investigate the concept of intelligence, and specifically of Artificial Intelligence (AI), derived from the Computer Science and its effect on research of Philosophy of Mind. It tries to consider and to understand such perspective to the light of Technoscience and Cybernetics, in view of the concepts that look for to understanding the human mind by the imitation of its behavior, applying the concepts to the investigation and simulation of dialogues: called Chatterbots. The research stars from a methodological and bibliographic study diverse from the concepts of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the concepts of Philosophy of Mind, focusing on the prominence of the issue in its interdisciplinary aspects. Discusses the prospects consolidated in the community about the issue, especially the approaches of Searle (1984, 1992, 1997), Gardner (1994, 1995) and, in the Brazilian landscape, from Teixeira (1990, 1994, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2004, 2008), focusing on relations between the concepts of intent, brain, mental and cognitive experiment, as well as some trends of criticism and defense of its formal limits. Drawing up of previous searches on the subject and methodology that merges computing elements and philosophy of mind, analyzes the conceptual experiment of the Chinese Room of Searle (in aspects of syntax and semantics). From this experiment and its results, it presents the prospect of Artificial Intelligence (AI) investigation as belonging to the nature of cognition, supported by the theory of cognition, particularly for phenomena such as categorization and identification of objects, problem solving, decision and conscience. The search culminates in the analysis of the concept of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Philosophy of Mind, proposed as a noematic element, being constituted as prerequisite for the production of scientific knowledge, implemented in the areas of Intelligence Technology and Digital Design. Applies the concepts and achievements to the definition and extension of the concept of hypertext, taking it as a computational mechanism capable of structuring hierarchical dialogues, indexed, so as to the formulation of Robot Primo (2001) and Roth Coelho (2001). Finally, the assumptions investigated are shown in results observed in the so-called Chatterbots in the area of Artificial Intelligence (AI), highlighting its characteristics and its importance in the current context of its computer utilization in cyberspace
A presente pesquisa tem como tema central investigar o conceito de Inteligência e, especificamente, de Inteligência Artificial (IA), derivado das Ciências da Computação e sua repercussão nas pesquisas da Filosofia da Mente. Procura conceituar e entender tal perspectiva à luz da Tecnociência e da Cibernética, tendo em vista os conceitos que buscam compreender a mente humana pela imitação de seu comportamento, aplicando os conceitos à investigação e simulação de diálogos: os chamados chatterbots. A pesquisa parte de um estudo metodológico e bibliográfico diversificado dos conceitos de Inteligência Artificial (IA) e das concepções de Filosofia da Mente, enfocando a proeminência do tema em seus aspectos interdisciplinares. Discute as perspectivas consolidadas na comunidade acerca do tema, especialmente as abordagens de Searle (1984, 1992, 1997), Gardner (1994, 1995) e, no panorama brasileiro, de Teixeira (1990, 1994, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2004, 2008), incidindo nas relações entre os conceitos de intencionalidade, cérebro, experimento mental e cognitivismo, bem como algumas tendências críticas e de contestação de seus limites formais. Valendo-se de pesquisas anteriores sobre o tema e de metodologia que mescla elementos computacionais e de filosofia da mente, analisa o experimento conceitual do quarto chinês de Searle (em seus aspectos de sintaxe e semântica). A partir deste experimento e seus resultados, apresenta a perspectiva da investigação da Inteligência Artificial (IA), como pertencente à natureza da cognição, apoiada na teoria da cognição, nomeadamente de fenômenos como categorização e identificação de objetos, resolução de problemas, decisão e consciência. A pesquisa culmina na análise do conceito de Inteligência Artificial (IA), na Filosofia da Mente, proposto como um elemento noemático, constituindo-se como condição para a produção do conhecimento científico, aplicado este nas áreas de Tecnologia da Inteligência e Design Digital. Aplica os conceitos e resultados alcançados à definição e extensão do conceito de hipertexto, tomando-o como um mecanismo computacional capaz de estruturar diálogos hierarquizados, indexados, ao modo da formulação de Robot de Primo (2001) e Roth Coelho (2001). Por fim, os pressupostos investigados são apresentados em resultados observados nos chamados chatterbots na área de Inteligência Artificial (IA), destacando suas características e sua importância no atual contexto de sua utilização computacional no ciberespaço
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DeChant, Ryan C. „Mindreading, Language and Simulation“. Digital Archive @ GSU, 2010. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/74.
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Mindreading is the capacity to attribute psychological states to others and to use those attributions to explain, predict, and understand others’ behaviors. In the past thirty years, mindreading has become the topic of substantial interdisciplinary research and theorizing, with philosophers, psychologists and, more recently, neuroscientists, all contributing to the debate about the nature of the neuropsychological mechanisms that constitute the capacity for mindreading. In this thesis I push this debate forward by using recent results from developmental psychology as the basis for critiques of two prominent views of mindreading. First, I argue that the developmental studies provide evidence of infant mindreading and therefore expose a flaw in José Bermúdez’s view that certain forms of mindreading require language possession. Second, I argue that the evidence of infant mindreading can also be used to undermine Alvin Goldman’s version of Simulation Theory.
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Soll, Jason. „A Theory of Mental Credit“. Scholarship @ Claremont, 2011. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/275.
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Many philosophical subjects attempt to analyze the basis of human welfare. Theories of desert, distribution of property, and happiness tend to dominate philosophical discourse. Mental credit, which is the mental acquisition of credit for one’s accomplishments and the satisfaction one derives from this credit, is absent from this discourse despite its underlying role in the way people think about their lives. Mental credit is an eternal cognitive good that deserves thoughtful attention and pious decisions for implementation. The following theory of mental credit seeks to serve as a unifying theory for the mental calculations that guide life’s most imperative decisions, satisfaction, and impact one has on the world.
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Beitmen, Logan R. „Neuroscience and Hindu Aesthetics: A Critical Analysis of V.S. Ramachandran’s “Science of Art”“. FIU Digital Commons, 2014. http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/1198.
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Neuroaesthetics is the study of the brain’s response to artistic stimuli. The neuroscientist V.S. Ramachandran contends that art is primarily “caricature” or “exaggeration.” Exaggerated forms hyperactivate neurons in viewers’ brains, which in turn produce specific, “universal” responses. Ramachandran identifies a precursor for his theory in the concept of rasa (literally “juice”) from classical Hindu aesthetics, which he associates with “exaggeration.” The canonical Sanskrit texts of Bharata Muni’s Natya Shastra and Abhinavagupta’s Abhinavabharati, however, do not support Ramachandran’s conclusions. They present audiences as dynamic co-creators, not passive recipients. I believe we could more accurately model the neurology of Hindu aesthetic experiences if we took indigenous rasa theory more seriously as qualitative data that could inform future research.
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Ellison, Cassandra J. „Recovery From Design“. VCU Scholars Compass, 2017. http://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/4884.
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Through research, inquiry, and an evaluation of Recovery By Design, a ‘design therapy’ program that serves people with mental illness, substance use disorders, and developmental disabilities, it is my assertion that the practice of design has therapeutic potential and can aid in the process of recovery. To the novice, the practices of conception, shaping form, and praxis have empowering benefit especially when guided by Conditional and Transformation Design methods together with an emphasis on materiality and vernacular form.
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Lynch, Maureen. „The design of journals used for reflection“. 2005. http://arrow.unisa.edu.au:8081/1959.8/28365.
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This thesis examines the development of reflective skills. Reflection has been recognised as a prime mode of creating knowledge for project managers. Reflection literature indicates that reflective skills do not develop naturally; guidance, encouragement and facilitation is usually required for managers to reach their highest learning potential. Among the tools suggested to aid this development are written project journals. While there has been research on some aspects of journals, there was little found on the design of reflective journals relevant to developing project management reflection skills. This study has examined the effect or influence of various designs of reflective journals on different facets of reflective learning. The research question was: ????Are there facets of reflection that can be influenced by journal design????? Evidence for the study was first gathered through literature then from journal content and interviews. Literature on reflective learning revealed the facets relevant to the study: definition of reflection, consequences, emotions, temporal factors and individual and organisational culture. Issues identified in journal literature that needed to be applied to the study of reflection development included the journal audience, assessment and format. Participants in the study were final year undergraduates and Masters students who worked on industry based projects over several months. They were requested to keep journals for the duration of the projects, to submit them for examination and then asked to offer feedback on the various journal designs on completion of the projects. The research was conducted over four years, through seven projects, with thirty students taking part. The journal design went through six modifications. The primary findings from the study were: the majority of participants followed the predicted development hierarchy of reflective development; development of reflective skills is dependent on individual and organisational culture; audience does have an impact on reporting of and reflection on concerns; and journal design can facilitate development of some levels of reflection but has no influence on the development of critical reflection.Masters by research thesis
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(11199060), Stephen A. Setman. „Learning Responsibly: Essays on Responsibility, Norm Psychology, and Personhood“. Thesis, 2021.
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This dissertation argues for a number of theses related to responsibility, norm psychology, and personhood. Although most of the papers argue for “standalone” theses, in the sense that their truth does not depend the truth of the others, the five papers collectively illustrate a broader view of humans as (a) responsible agents who are (b) self-governing and (c) equipped with a capacity for norms, and whose agency (d) centers on dynamic responsiveness to corrective feedback. Drawing on this broader picture, the dissertation sheds light on ethical questions about our social practices and technologies, as well as descriptive questions about the nature of substance use disorder.
Most centrally, the dissertation argues that forward-looking considerations are relevant for responsibility, not merely because the consequences of our responsibility practices are desirable, but primarily because of a connection which I argue exists between relationships, norms, and learning. On the view I defend, an agent is a responsible agent only if she can learn from being held responsible, so as to regulate herself according to norms of which she presently falls short. I argue that, if it were not for the capacity of humans to learn from social corrective feedback, such as normative responses like praise and blame, humans would be unable to participate in norm-governed relationships and communities. It is in virtue of their participation in these relationships and communities that humans are subject to interpersonal norms, such that they can fulfill or violate these norms and be praiseworthy or blameworthy for doing so. So, without the kind of learning that makes participation in these relationships a possibility, humans could never be praiseworthy or blameworthy for anything that they do.
The dissertation also argues that human norm psychology has implications for how we should relate to “social robots”—artificial agents designed to participate in relationships with humans. I argue that, like humans, social robots should be equipped with a capacity to recognize and respond to normative feedback. Lastly, the dissertation resists a common narrative about addiction as being a form of akrasia in which agents act against their own better judgment. While this is certainly a central aspect of many cases of addiction, I argue that it fails to appreciate the ways in which addiction sometimes interacts with a person’s identity and goals, especially in cases where the agent believes that the things she values would not be feasible if she did not continue to engage in addictive behavior.
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Zhitnik, Anatoly. „Explaining the Mind: The Embodied Cognition Challenge“. Thesis, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10012/3682.
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This thesis looks at a relatively new line of research in Cognitive Science – embodied cognition. Its relation to the computational-representational paradigm, primarily symbolicism, is extensively discussed. It is argued that embodied cognition is compatible with the established paradigm but challenges its research focus and traditionally assumed segregation of cognition from bodily and worldly activities Subsequently the impact of embodied cognition on philosophy of Cognitive Science is considered. The second chapter defends the applicability of mechanistic explanation to cases of embodied cognition. Further, it argues that a proposed alternative, dynamic systems theory, is not a substitute to the mechanistic approach. The last chapter critically examines the thesis that mind is extended beyond the bodily boundary and into the world. It is concluded that arguments in favour of the extended mind thesis are inadequate. Considerations in favour of the orthodox view that the does not “leak” out into the world are also presented.
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Tomy, C. A. „Mind and cognition: A study on the philosophical foundations of cognitive science“. Thesis, 1996. http://hdl.handle.net/2009/795.
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„Reality, perceptual experience, and cognition: A study in Charles Sanders Peirce's philosophy of mind“. Tulane University, 1997.
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The present dissertation aims at examining Peirce's approach to realism by way of experience. First, the study sets out Peirce's realism, relative to experience, through a constrastive analysis of a purely perceptual approach to realism (Hume's lack) and an approach wider than perception but including it as crucial. Thus, it goes on to show that Peirce's account of habit (and pragmatism) is anchored in concrete experience but wider because action (activity) is wider than sense perception. Then, scientific method is established as wider than sense perception because it includes inference (deductive, inductive, and abductive) in addition to sense perception and activity. Then, in an effort to establish Peirce as a pioneer in cognitive science, the dissertation goes on to discuss how Peirce's anticipations of cognitive science establish his detailed consideration of sense perception in its relation to cognition. All this points to a realism reached through establishing how sense perception is crucial yet not sufficient for it In fact, recently several views of perception and reality have been advanced that are founded on a new conception of the human mind and a new definition of the concept of cognition. Jerry Fodor, David Marr, and Noam Chomsky are indubitably leading figures in this new philosophical and scientific tradition. What appears new is that cognition is construed to be a process of information-processing. Among those deemed pioneers of these new theories, Peirce has rarely been mentioned, although he may have played a role in the development of present views, and at the very least he anticipated these recent theories. Thus, the purpose throughout the dissertation is to point out Peirce's influence upon and anticipation of present theories of cognition. With focus on computational theories, it is shown that Peirce's views are in total agreement with the claim that the process of cognition consists of a set of interconnected, but independent, stages, each of which forms a module. It is shown that Peirce's contribution to cognitive science may be derived not only from his psychology, logic, espistemology, semiotics, metaphysics, etc., but also, and more importantly, from his conception of science as essentially, and par excellence, a method of inquiry. Such contribution includes having provided the foundation for both the software of computing and the hardware of what later became Turing machines. Furthermore, the dissertation presents Peirce's account of perception as the bridge between theories of direct perception a la Gibson and theories of mental representation a la Fodor In short, the dissertation endeavors to show that, to use C. F. Delaney's words, 'Peirce saw philosophy of science, epistemology, and philosophy of mind not only as intimately related but as inextricably tied to concrete developments in science.'acase@tulane.edu
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Godwyn, Martin. „A defence of extended cognitivism“. Thesis, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/18440.
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This dissertation defends extended cognitivism: a recently emerging view in the
philosophy of mind and cognitive science that claims that an individual's cognitive
processes or states sometimes extend beyond the boundaries of their brain or their skin to
include states and processes in the world. I begin the defence of this thesis through a
background discussion of several foundational issues in cognitive science: the general
character of cognitive behaviour and cognitive processes, as well as the nature and role of
representation as it is standardly taken to figure in cognition. I argue in favour of the
widely held view that cognition is best characterised as involving information processing,
and that carriers of information (i.e., representations) are ineliminable components of the
most distinctively human and powerful forms of cognition. Against this background the
dissertation argues in stages for successively stronger claims regarding the explanatory
role of the external world in cognition. First to be defended is the claim that cognition is
often embedded in one's environment. I develop this claim in terms of what I call 'parainformation':
roughly, information that shapes how we tackle a cognitive task by enabling
the extraction of task-relevant information. Proceeding then to the defence of extended
cognitivism, I draw most significantly on the work of Andy Clark. In outline, and in
general following Clark, it is argued that states and processes occurring beyond the skin of
the cognitive agent sometimes play the same explanatory role as internal processes that
unquestionably count as cognitive. I develop this claim in two versions of differing
strength: firstly, in a general way without commitment to the representational character of
extended cognition, and secondly in a specifically representational version with special
attention to intentional explanation. Against each of these versions of extended
cognitivism are ranged a number of criticisms and objections, many of which stem from
the work of Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa. The dissertation examines these objections and
rejects each of them in turn.Arts, Faculty of
Philosophy, Department of
Graduate
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Bernecker, Sven. „Knowing one's own mind : externalism and privileged self-knowledge /“. 1996. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=016971949&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.
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„The Conceptual Span and Plausibility of Emergence Applied to the Problem of Mental Causation“. Master's thesis, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/2286/R.I.17919.
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abstract: This thesis explores the conceptual span and plausibility of emergence and its applicability to the problem of mental causation. The early parts of the project explicate a distinction between weak and strong emergence as described by Jaegwon Kim. They also consider Kim's objections regarding the conceptual incoherence of strong emergence and the otiose nature of weak emergence. The paper then explores Mark Bedau's in-between conception of emergence and ultimately finds that middle conception to be both coherent and useful. With these three emergence distinctions in hand, the thesis goes on to explore Evan Thompson's recent work - Mind in Life (2010). In that work, Thompson advances a strong emergence approach to mind, whereby he concludes the incipient stages of cognition are found at the most basic levels of life, namely - biologic cells. Along the way, Thompson embraces holism and a nonfundamental/nonhierarchical physics in order to counter Jaegwon Kim's objections to the notion of downward causation needed for strong emergence. The thesis presents arguments against Thompson's holism and nonfundamental physics, while supporting his assertion regarding the incipient stages of cognition. It then combines an important distinction between mental causation and the experience of mental causation with Thompson's notion of incipient cognition to arrive at a dual realms approach to understanding mental causation.Dissertation/Thesis
M.A. Philosophy 2013
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Simms, Mark Roger. „Form and content in mental representation“. 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/2440/37947.
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It is orthodoxy in contemporary philosophy of cognitive science to hold that the human brain processes information, both about the body in which the brain is located and about the world more generally. The internal states of the brain that encode this information are known as mental representations. Two matters concerning mental representation are interwoven here: the role of representational content in cognition and the format of mental representation. Robert Cummins, among others, argues that content is intrinsic to mental representation, rather than involving matters external to a representation, such as the use to which the representation is put. He also holds that resemblance accounts of representation best make sense of this fact. Thus, according to Cummins, the content of a mental representation is determined by its form. This thesis argues that an account of representation requiring that representations possess resembling structure is unlikely to be correct given (a) the minimal requirements that something must meet in order to count as a mental representation, (b) the tasks required of representation in cognition, such as capturing abstract properties, combining with other representations, and tracking change, and (c) the possibility that content stands in a different relation to form and cognition from the one Cummins has in mind. In criticising Cummins, however, this thesis explores possible implementations of resemblance theories in connectionist representation. It also redraws his map of the psychosemantic field to suggest that classical theories of cognition, which posit concatenative schemes of symbolic representation, share some of the benefits of tying content to orm. Finally, in exploring various notions of the role of form in representation, this thesis also advocates a pluralistic approach to the mental representations implicated in human cognition.Thesis (M.A.)--School of Humanities, 2004.
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Thelander, Mary J. „Putting the pieces together : the development of children's interpretive judgment through irony“. 2004. http://link.library.utoronto.ca/eir/EIRdetail.cfm?Resources__ID=94691&T=F.
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Senman, Lili. „Cognitive processes in theory of mind tasks inhibition of attention and symbolic representation in young children /“. 2002. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pMQ71623.
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Thesis (M.A.)--York University, 2002. Graduate Programme in Psychology.Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 71-78). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pMQ71623.
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Souza, Debora Hollanda Echols Catharine H. „"Do you know what I think?" a cross-linguistic investigation of children's understanding of mental state words /“. 2004. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/utexas/fullcit?p3143473.
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Scheepers, Stefan. „Development and preliminary application of an instrument to detect partial dissociation of emotional mental state knowledge and non-emotional mental state knowledge“. Thesis, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10413/5060.
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Theory of mind is the ability to have mental states about mental states. Among theories
concerning the structure and role of theory of mind is the view that theory of mind is the
cognitive component of empathy. It is proposed that there is partial dissociation within theory of
mind between emotional state representation and non-emotional state representation. In trying to
test this hypothesis, an instrument was developed and implemented in a pilot study. Current
theory of mind tests are reviewed and design features discussed in relation to the new hypothesis.
The instrument aims to measure emotional and non-emotional state representation on separate
subscales, as well as coding representations from emotional stories and non-emotional stories
separately. The instrument was administered to 33 third level or higher students from the
University of KwaZulu-Natal. Groups were chosen from science major (n = 9) and humanities
major (n = 24) students. The findings fail to show the group performance patterns reported in
literature, for example that humanities students tend to score higher in ToM tests than science
students. A number of factors might contribute to the finding, but principally, low sample size
and unequal general cognitive ability between groups are proposed as vital. Problems with the
pilot study are identified and improvements suggested for subsequent testing.Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2010.
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Souza, Debora Hollanda. „"Do you know what I think?": a cross-linguistic investigation of children's understanding of mental state words“. Thesis, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/2152/1265.
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Freeguard, Lynn Shirley. „Relationship between visual perceptual skill and mathematic ability“. Diss., 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10500/14118.
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Poor mathematics performance in South African schools is of national concern. An attempt to gain insight into the problem prompted a study into the possibility of a relationship between visual perceptual skill and mathematic ability. A theoretical review revealed that inherent limitations of traditional psychological theories hinder an adequate explanation for the possible existence of such a relationship. The theory of situated cognition seems to be better suited as an explanatory model, and simultaneously clarifies the nature of both visual perception and mathematics. A small exploratory study, with a sample of 70 Grade 6 learners, provided empirical evidence towards the plausibility of the relationship. Specifically, it proved the hypothesis that visual perceptual skill positively correlates with scholastic mathematics achievement. The results of the study, interpreted within the situated cognitive framework, suggest that a conceptual emphasis in mathematics education – as opposed to a factual emphasis – might improve mathematic ability, which may credibly reflect in scholastic performance.Psychology
M. Sc. (Psychology)