Thematische Bibliographien / Perfect information / Zeitschriftenartikel
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Zeitschriftenartikel zum Thema „Perfect information“

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Veröffentlicht am 11. Januar 2025

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1

King, Stephen P. „Is perfect information perfectly useless?“ Economics Letters 39, Nr. 4 (August 1992): 415–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(92)90178-2.

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2

Dowden, John S. „Product information past perfect“. Medical Journal of Australia 186, Nr. 2 (Januar 2007): 51–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.5694/j.1326-5377.2007.tb00797.x.

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3

Dubey, Pradeep, und Ori Haimanko. „Learning with perfect information“. Games and Economic Behavior 46, Nr. 2 (Februar 2004): 304–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00127-1.

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4

Lapidoth, A., und S. Shamai. „Fading channels: how perfect need "perfect side information" be?“ IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 48, Nr. 5 (Mai 2002): 1118–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/18.995552.

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5

Bondar, Vladimir. „The present perfect in past time contexts : a diachronic study of English“. Brno studies in English, Nr. 2 (2023): 5–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.5817/bse2023-2-1.

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Throughout the history, English has developed a category of the present perfect that can be considered prototypical when compared to the same categories in other typologically similar languages. Although the present perfect in Standard British English has not reached the final stage of acquiring preterit semantics, data from diachronic corpora provides evidence that the English present perfect had the potential to follow a similar path of grammaticalization like the German Perfekt, for instance. This paper presents an investigation of data collected from several diachronic English corpora and employs a usage-based approach to elicit the mechanisms underlying the incipient semantic shift of the present perfect. It is argued that a functional overlap with verbs in the simple past at an early stage of its evolution and later movement towards perfective past tense, though not attested on a large scale, reflect developments in certain pragmatic contexts, in particular with topicalized temporal adverbials. It is claimed that in passages where new information becomes crucial, alongside the completion of the action, temporal properties of the 'hot news' perfects tend to be foregrounded.
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6

Kukushkin, Nikolai S. „Perfect Information and Potential Games“. Games and Economic Behavior 38, Nr. 2 (Februar 2002): 306–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0859.

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7

Flesch, János, und Arkadi Predtetchinski. „Parameterized games of perfect information“. Annals of Operations Research 287, Nr. 2 (28.10.2018): 683–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10479-018-3087-5.

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8

He, Wei, und Yeneng Sun. „Dynamic games with (almost) perfect information“. Theoretical Economics 15, Nr. 2 (2020): 811–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/te2927.

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This paper aims to solve two fundamental problems on finite‐ or infinite‐horizon dynamic games with complete information. Under some mild conditions, we prove the existence of subgame‐perfect equilibria and the upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium payoffs in general dynamic games with simultaneous moves (i.e., almost perfect information), which go beyond previous works in the sense that stagewise public randomization and the continuity requirement on the state variables are not needed. For alternating move (i.e., perfect‐information) dynamic games with uncertainty, we show the existence of pure‐strategy subgame‐perfect equilibria as well as the upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium payoffs, extending the earlier results on perfect‐information deterministic dynamic games.
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9

Datta, Pratim, Mark Whitmore und Joseph K. Nwankpa. „A Perfect Storm“. Digital Threats: Research and Practice 2, Nr. 2 (April 2021): 1–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3428157.

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In an age where news information is created by millions and consumed by billions over social media ( SM ) every day, issues of information biases, fake news, and echo-chambers have dominated the corridors of technology firms, news corporations, policy makers, and society. While multiple disciplines have tried to tackle the issue using their disciplinary lenses, there has, hitherto, been no integrative model that surface the intricate, albeit “dark” explainable AI confluence of both technology and psychology. Investigating information bias anchoring as the overarching phenomenon, this research proposes a theoretical framework that brings together traditionally fragmented domains of AI technology, and human psychology. The proposed Information Bias Anchoring Model reveals how SM news information creates an information deluge leading to uncertainty, and how technological rationality and individual biases intersect to mitigate the uncertainty, often leading to news information biases. The research ends with a discussion of contributions and offering to reduce information bias anchoring.
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10

Harris, Christopher. „Existence and Characterization of Perfect Equilibrium in Games of Perfect Information“. Econometrica 53, Nr. 3 (Mai 1985): 613. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1911658.

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11

Mariotti, Thomas. „Subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes in continuous games of almost perfect information“. Journal of Mathematical Economics 34, Nr. 1 (August 2000): 99–128. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(99)00039-7.

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12

Desmedt, Yvo, und Fred Piper. „Perfect Anonymity“. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 65, Nr. 6 (Juni 2019): 3990–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/tit.2019.2893334.

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13

Nitinawarat, Sirin, und Prakash Narayan. „Perfect Omniscience, Perfect Secrecy, and Steiner Tree Packing“. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 56, Nr. 12 (Dezember 2010): 6490–500. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/tit.2010.2081450.

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14

Cabrera García, S., J. E. Imbert Tamayo, J. Carbonell-Olivares und Y. Pacheco Cabrera. „Application of the Game Theory with Perfect Information to an agricultural company“. Agricultural Economics (Zemědělská ekonomika) 59, No. 1 (19.02.2013): 1–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.17221/1/2012-agricecon.

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This paper deals with the application of Game Theory with Perfect Information to an agricultural economics problem. The goal of this analysis is demonstrating the possibility of obtaining an equilibrium point, as proposed by Nash, in the case of an agricultural company that is considered together with its three sub-units in developing a game with perfect information. Production results in terms of several crops will be considered in this game, together with the necessary parameters to implement different linear programming problems. In the game with perfect information with the hierarchical structure established between the four considered players (a management center and three production units), a Nash equilibrium point is reached, since once the strategies of the rest of the players are known, if any of them would use a strategy different to the one proposed, their earnings would be less than the ones obtained by using the proposed strategies. When the four linear programming problems are solved, a particular case of equilibrium point is reached.
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15

Petrosyan, L. A., und A. A. Sedakov. „Multistage network games with perfect information“. Automation and Remote Control 75, Nr. 8 (August 2014): 1532–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1134/s0005117914080165.

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16

Aghion, Philippe, Drew Fudenberg, Richard Holden, Takashi Kunimoto und Olivier Tercieux. „Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations*“. Quarterly Journal of Economics 127, Nr. 4 (01.11.2012): 1843–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjs026.

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Abstract We consider the robustness of extensive form mechanisms to deviations from common knowledge about the state of nature, which we refer to as information perturbations . First, we show that even under arbitrarily small information perturbations the Moore-Repullo mechanism does not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation and that in addition the mechanism has sequential equilibria with undesirable outcomes. More generally, we prove that any extensive form mechanism is fragile in the sense that if a non-Maskin monotonic social objective can be implemented with this mechanism, then there are arbitrarily small information perturbations under which an undesirable sequential equilibrium also exists. Finally, we argue that outside options can help improve efficiency in asymmetric information environments, and that these options can be thought of as reflecting ownership of an asset.
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17

Sarch, Yvonne. „Future Perfect“. Serials: The Journal for the Serials Community 7, Nr. 1 (01.03.1994): 89–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1629/070189.

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18

Bremer, Peter. „Picture perfect“. Reference Librarian 59, Nr. 3 (26.03.2018): 146–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02763877.2018.1454875.

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19

Larson, Per-Ake, und M. V. Ramakrishna. „External perfect hashing“. ACM SIGMOD Record 14, Nr. 4 (Mai 1985): 190–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/971699.318916.

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20

Schmidt, Karen. „Past perfect, future tense“. Library Collections, Acquisitions, & Technical Services 28, Nr. 4 (Dezember 2004): 360–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14649055.2004.10766010.

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21

Kennedy, Marie R. „Dreams of perfect programs“. Library Collections, Acquisitions, & Technical Services 28, Nr. 4 (Dezember 2004): 449–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14649055.2004.10766016.

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22

Zhang, Tao, und Gennian Ge. „Perfect and Quasi-Perfect Codes Under the $l_{p}$ Metric“. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 63, Nr. 7 (Juli 2017): 4325–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/tit.2017.2685424.

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23

Harrington, Linda. „Health Information Technology Safety: The Perfect Storms“. AACN Advanced Critical Care 25, Nr. 2 (01.04.2014): 91–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.4037/nci.0000000000000022.

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24

Apt, Krzysztof R., und Sunil Simon. „Well-Founded Extensive Games with Perfect Information“. Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 335 (22.06.2021): 7–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.4204/eptcs.335.2.

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25

Rosha, Media. „Value of perfect information in stock picking“. Journal of Physics: Conference Series 1317 (Oktober 2019): 012010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1742-6596/1317/1/012010.

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26

Berry, Donald A., und Robert P. Kertz. „Worth of perfect information in bernoulli bandits“. Advances in Applied Probability 23, Nr. 1 (März 1991): 1–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1427509.

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For k-armed Bernoulli bandits with discounting, sharp comparisons are given between average optimal rewards for a gambler and for a ‘perfectly informed' gambler, over natural collections of prior distributions. Some of these comparisons are proved under general discounting, and others under non-increasing discount sequences. Connections are made between these comparisons and the concept of ‘regret' in the minimax approach to bandit processes. Identification of extremal cases in the sharp comparisons is emphasized.
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27

Johnson, J. David, Donald O. Case, James E. Andrews und Suzanne L. Allard. „Genomics—the perfect information–seeking research problem“. Journal of Health Communication 10, Nr. 4 (Juni 2005): 323–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10810730590950048.

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28

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques, und Arkadi Predtetchinski. „Best-Response Cycles in Perfect Information Games“. Mathematics of Operations Research 42, Nr. 2 (Mai 2017): 427–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.2016.0808.

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29

Boppana, Ravi B., und Babu O. Narayanan. „Perfect-Information Leader Election with Optimal Resilience“. SIAM Journal on Computing 29, Nr. 4 (Januar 2000): 1304–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1137/s0097539796307182.

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30

Clausing, Thorsten. „BELIEF REVISION IN GAMES OF PERFECT INFORMATION“. Economics and Philosophy 20, Nr. 1 (April 2004): 89–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0266267104001269.

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A syntactic formalism for the modeling of belief revision in perfect information games is presented that allows to define the rationality of a player's choice of moves relative to the beliefs he holds as his respective decision nodes have been reached. In this setting, true common belief in the structure of the game and rationality held before the start of the game does not imply that backward induction will be played. To derive backward induction, a “forward belief” condition is formulated in terms of revised rather than initial beliefs. Alternative notions of rationality as well as the use of knowledge instead of belief are also studied within this framework.
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31

Berry, Donald A., und Robert P. Kertz. „Worth of perfect information in bernoulli bandits“. Advances in Applied Probability 23, Nr. 01 (März 1991): 1–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0001867800023314.

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For k-armed Bernoulli bandits with discounting, sharp comparisons are given between average optimal rewards for a gambler and for a ‘perfectly informed' gambler, over natural collections of prior distributions. Some of these comparisons are proved under general discounting, and others under non-increasing discount sequences. Connections are made between these comparisons and the concept of ‘regret' in the minimax approach to bandit processes. Identification of extremal cases in the sharp comparisons is emphasized.
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32

Alpern, Steve. „Cycles in extensive form perfect information games“. Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications 159, Nr. 1 (Juli 1991): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-247x(91)90217-n.

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33

Pak, Maxwell, und Bing Xu. „Generalized reinforcement learning in perfect-information games“. International Journal of Game Theory 45, Nr. 4 (29.09.2015): 985–1011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0499-1.

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34

Thuijsman, Frank, und Thirukkannamangai E. S. Raghavan. „Perfect Information Stochastic Games and Related Classes“. International Journal of Game Theory 26, Nr. 3 (01.08.1997): 403–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001820050042.

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35

Maniquet, Fran�ois. „Implementation of allocation rules under perfect information“. Social Choice and Welfare 21, Nr. 2 (01.10.2003): 323–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0262-6.

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36

Ichiishi, T. „Stable extensive game forms with perfect information“. International Journal of Game Theory 15, Nr. 3 (September 1986): 163–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01769256.

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37

Alós-Ferrer, Carlos, und Klaus Ritzberger. „Equilibrium existence for large perfect information games“. Journal of Mathematical Economics 62 (Januar 2016): 5–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.10.005.

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38

Reny, Philip J. „Common Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information“. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988, Nr. 2 (Januar 1988): 363–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1988.2.192897.

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39

Demichelis, Stefano, Klaus Ritzberger und Jeroen M. Swinkels. „The simple geometry of perfect information games“. International Journal of Game Theory 32, Nr. 3 (01.06.2004): 315–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001820400169.

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40

Flesch, János, Jeroen Kuipers, Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi, Gijs Schoenmakers, Eilon Solan und Koos Vrieze. „Perfect-Information Games with Lower-Semicontinuous Payoffs“. Mathematics of Operations Research 35, Nr. 4 (November 2010): 742–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.1100.0469.

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41

Purves, Roger A., und William D. Sudderth. „Perfect Information Games with Upper Semicontinuous Payoffs“. Mathematics of Operations Research 36, Nr. 3 (August 2011): 468–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.1110.0504.

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42

Thompson, David R. M., und Kevin Leyton-Brown. „Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions“. Games and Economic Behavior 102 (März 2017): 583–623. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.009.

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43

Shitovitz, Benyamin. „Optimistic stability in games of perfect information“. Mathematical Social Sciences 28, Nr. 3 (Dezember 1994): 199–214. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(94)90003-5.

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44

Kůrka, P. „Darwinian evolution in games with perfect information“. Biological Cybernetics 55, Nr. 5 (Februar 1987): 281–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02281974.

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45

K?rka, P. „Darwinian evolution in games with perfect information“. Biological Cybernetics 55, Nr. 5 (Februar 1987): 281–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00320540.

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46

Thuijsman, Frank, und Thirukkannamangai E. S. Raghavan. „Perfect information stochastic games and related classes“. International Journal of Game Theory 26, Nr. 3 (Oktober 1997): 403–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01263280.

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47

Samet, Dov. „Hypothetical Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information“. Games and Economic Behavior 17, Nr. 2 (Dezember 1996): 230–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0104.

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48

Tranæs, Torben. „Tie-Breaking in Games of Perfect Information“. Games and Economic Behavior 22, Nr. 1 (Januar 1998): 148–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0564.

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49

Delsol , Idris, Olivier Rioul , Julien Béguinot, Victor Rabiet  und Antoine Souloumiac . „An Information Theoretic Condition for Perfect Reconstruction“. Entropy 26, Nr. 1 (19.01.2024): 86. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e26010086.

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A new information theoretic condition is presented for reconstructing a discrete random variable X based on the knowledge of a set of discrete functions of X. The reconstruction condition is derived from Shannon’s 1953 lattice theory with two entropic metrics of Shannon and Rajski. Because such a theoretical material is relatively unknown and appears quite dispersed in different references, we first provide a synthetic description (with complete proofs) of its concepts, such as total, common, and complementary information. The definitions and properties of the two entropic metrics are also fully detailed and shown to be compatible with the lattice structure. A new geometric interpretation of such a lattice structure is then investigated, which leads to a necessary (and sometimes sufficient) condition for reconstructing the discrete random variable X given a set {X1,…,Xn} of elements in the lattice generated by X. Intuitively, the components X1,…,Xn of the original source of information X should not be globally “too far away” from X in the entropic distance in order that X is reconstructable. In other words, these components should not overall have too low of a dependence on X; otherwise, reconstruction is impossible. These geometric considerations constitute a starting point for a possible novel “perfect reconstruction theory”, which needs to be further investigated and improved along these lines. Finally, this condition is illustrated in five specific examples of perfect reconstruction problems: the reconstruction of a symmetric random variable from the knowledge of its sign and absolute value, the reconstruction of a word from a set of linear combinations, the reconstruction of an integer from its prime signature (fundamental theorem of arithmetic) and from its remainders modulo a set of coprime integers (Chinese remainder theorem), and the reconstruction of the sorting permutation of a list from a minimal set of pairwise comparisons.
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50

Barelli, Paulo, und John Duggan. „Subgame‐perfect equilibrium in games with almost perfect information: Dispensing with public randomization“. Theoretical Economics 16, Nr. 4 (2021): 1221–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/te3243.

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Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) added a public randomization device to dynamic games with almost perfect information to ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when Nature's moves are atomless in the original game, public randomization does not enlarge the set of SPE payoffs: any SPE obtained using public randomization can be “decorrelated” to produce a payoff‐equivalent SPE of the original game. As a corollary, we provide an alternative route to a result of He and Sun (2020) on existence of SPE without public randomization, which in turn yields equilibrium existence for stochastic games with weakly continuous state transitions.
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