Zeitschriftenartikel: „Objectivism“

1

Parrish, Stephen E. „God and Objectivism: A Critique of Objectivist Philosophy of Religion“. Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 8, Nr. 2 (2007): 169–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/41551399.

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Abstract Objectivism is committed to atheism. However, Objectivists have done little work in Philosophy of Religion. This article argues that much of the work that they have done is fallacious. In particular, the critique of God that Peikoff gives in Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand is deeply flawed. If they want to justify their atheism, Objectivists need to rework and revise their arguments; in the final analysis, however, it is doubtful that their efforts will succeed.

2

Parrish, Stephen E. „God and Objectivism: A Critique of Objectivist Philosophy of Religion“. Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 8, Nr. 2 (2007): 169–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.5325/jaynrandstud.8.2.0169.

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Abstract Objectivism is committed to atheism. However, Objectivists have done little work in Philosophy of Religion. This article argues that much of the work that they have done is fallacious. In particular, the critique of God that Peikoff gives in Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand is deeply flawed. If they want to justify their atheism, Objectivists need to rework and revise their arguments; in the final analysis, however, it is doubtful that their efforts will succeed.

3

Dent, Eric B. „Objectivism and Christianity“. Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 11, Nr. 2 (01.12.2011): 189–213. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/41560411.

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Abstract The two primary philosophies upholding reason today are Objectivism and Christianity. They may seem like strange bedfellows, but many of the large perceived gaps between them disappear upon close inspection. This paper analyzes five areas (creation; tabula rasa; life as the ultimate standard; romantic love, sex and marriage; and altruism and the trader principle) in which Objectivist philosophy can be enhanced by assuming Christian philosophical axioms. The argument focuses on Christianity as a philosophy and intentionally does not assume a transcendent God. In each case, the Christian philosophical axioms are more realistic and better supported empirically than the Objectivist axioms.

4

Dent, Eric B. „Objectivism and Christianity“. Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 11, Nr. 2 (01.12.2011): 189–213. http://dx.doi.org/10.5325/jaynrandstud.11.2.0189.

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Abstract The two primary philosophies upholding reason today are Objectivism and Christianity. They may seem like strange bedfellows, but many of the large perceived gaps between them disappear upon close inspection. This paper analyzes five areas (creation; tabula rasa; life as the ultimate standard; romantic love, sex and marriage; and altruism and the trader principle) in which Objectivist philosophy can be enhanced by assuming Christian philosophical axioms. The argument focuses on Christianity as a philosophy and intentionally does not assume a transcendent God. In each case, the Christian philosophical axioms are more realistic and better supported empirically than the Objectivist axioms.

5

Goldman, Michael. „Capitalism, Socialism, Objectivism“. Philosophy Research Archives 12 (1986): 143–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/pra1986/19871221.

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6

Venturinha, Nuno. „Context-Sensitive Objectivism“. Logos & Episteme 11, Nr. 4 (2020): 481–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202011436.

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This paper outlines the major topics addressed in my book Description of Situations: An Essay in Contextualist Epistemology (Springer, 2018), anticipates some possible misunderstandings and discusses issues that warrant further investigation.

7

PENDLEBURY, MICHAEL. „OBJECTIVISM VERSUS REALISM“. Philosophical Forum 42, Nr. 1 (07.02.2011): 79–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9191.2010.00379.x.

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8

Harrington, Austin. „Objectivism in Hermeneutics?“ Philosophy of the Social Sciences 30, Nr. 4 (Dezember 2000): 491–507. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/004839310003000401.

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9

Edelman, Christopher. „Montaigne's Moral Objectivism“. Philosophy and Literature 35, Nr. 1 (2011): 32–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/phl.2011.0001.

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10

Yarusso, Lowell. „Constructivism vs. objectivism“. Performance + Instruction 31, Nr. 4 (April 1992): 7–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/pfi.4170310404.

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11

Björnsson, Gunnar. „Do ‘Objectivist’ Features of Moral Discourse and Thinking Support Moral Objectivism?“ Journal of Ethics 16, Nr. 4 (12.06.2012): 367–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10892-012-9131-9.

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12

Ommen, Thomas B. „Relativism, Objectivism, and Theology“. Horizons 13, Nr. 2 (1986): 291–305. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0360966900036343.

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AbstractRelativism is a central issue in anthropology, philosophy of science, and a number of other disciplines. It is usually contrasted with objectivism or foundationalism, the quest for universal and absolute norms. Richard Bernstein has recently written an illuminating overview of the relativist-objectivist tension and has sketched out a notion of rationality “beyond objectivism and relativism.” This paper is an effort to follow Bernstein's lead and consider the theological implications of objectivism and relativism and the attempt to move beyond them. The first two parts of the paper take up objectivism and relativism in their philosophical and theological forms. The third section briefly explores some aspects of a non-relativist and non-objectivist model of rationality.

13

Warren C. Gibson. „Modern Physics versus Objectivism“. Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 13, Nr. 2 (2013): 140. http://dx.doi.org/10.5325/jaynrandstud.13.2.0140.

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14

Kang, In ae. „Objectivism' Challenges to Constructivism“. Journal of Educational Technology 13, Nr. 1 (30.10.1997): 3–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.17232/kset.13.1.3.

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15

Gowans, Christopher W. „Beyond Objectivism and Relativism“. International Philosophical Quarterly 25, Nr. 2 (1985): 207–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq19852528.

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16

Lambek, Michael. „Introduction: Treading Beyond Objectivism“. Culture 11, Nr. 1-2 (15.12.2021): 3–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1084470ar.

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17

Laurier, Daniel. „Between Phenomenalism and Objectivism“. Journal of Philosophical Research 30 (2005): 189–214. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jpr20053034.

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18

McLaughlin, Andrew. „Beyond Objectivism and Relativism“. Philosophical Inquiry 7, Nr. 1 (1985): 60–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philinquiry19857117.

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19

McKinney, Ronald H. „Beyond Objectivism and Relativism“. Modern Schoolman 64, Nr. 2 (1987): 97–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/schoolman198764218.

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20

Margolis, Joseph. „X—Objectivism and Relativism“. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 85, Nr. 1 (01.06.1985): 171–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/85.1.171.

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21

Fuller, Steve. „Towards objectivism and relativism∗“. Social Epistemology 1, Nr. 4 (Oktober 1987): 351–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02691728708578452.

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22

Stige, Brynjulf. „Beyond Objectivism and Relativism?“ Nordic Journal of Music Therapy 10, Nr. 1 (Januar 2001): 2. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08098130109478011.

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23

WEINTRAUB, RUTH. „Objectivism without objective probabilities“. Theoria 56, Nr. 1-2 (11.02.2008): 23–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.1990.tb00216.x.

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24

Dallmayr, Fred R. „Beyond Objectivism and Relativism“. New Vico Studies 3 (1985): 215–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/newvico1985339.

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25

Cairns, Dorion, Lester Embree, Fred Kersten und Richard M. Zaner. „Husserlian Phenomenology and Objectivism“. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 38, Nr. 2 (Januar 2007): 116–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2007.11006607.

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26

Rosati, Connie S. „OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIONAL GOOD“. Social Philosophy and Policy 25, Nr. 1 (20.12.2007): 314–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052508080126.

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In his critique of egoism as a doctrine of ends, G. E. Moore famously challenges the idea that something can be “good for” someone. Donald Regan has recently revived and developed the Moorean challenge, making explicit its implications for the very idea of individual welfare. If the Moorean is right, there is no distinct, normative property good for, and so no plausible objectivism about ethics could be welfarist. In this essay, I undertake to address the Moorean challenge, clarifying our theoretical alternatives so that we may better decide what to admit into our moral ontology and better assess what may be at stake in whether objectivists treat good or good for (or neither) as fundamental. I compare the Moorean and welfarist pictures of value, providing an account of the form and function of good for. According to this account “good for” expresses a distinct relational value that has its source in the value of persons. Good for value is thus a form of extrinsic value that provides agent-neutral reasons for action, and it plays a pervasive normative role in regulating child rearing, guiding individual life choices, and shaping social policy formation.

27

Averill, Edward Wilson. „A limited objectivism defended“. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15, Nr. 1 (März 1992): 27–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x00067261.

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28

HAMATI-ATAYA, INANNA. „Transcending objectivism, subjectivism, and the knowledge in-between: the subject in/of ‘strong reflexivity’“. Review of International Studies 40, Nr. 1 (23.04.2013): 153–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210513000041.

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AbstractThis article addresses theproblématiqueof the subject and the subject-object dichotomy from a post-objectivist, reflexivist perspective informed by a ‘strong’ version of reflexivity. It clarifies the rationale and epistemic-ontological requirements of strong reflexivity comparatively, through a discussion of autoethnography and autobiography, taken as representatives of other variants of reflexive scholarship. By deconstructing the ontological, epistemic, and reflexive statuses of the subject in the auto-ethnographic and auto-biographical variants, the article shows that the move from objectivism to post-objectivism can entail different reconfigurations of the subject-object relation, some of which can lead to subjectivism or an implicit positivist view of the subject. Strong reflexivity provides a coherent and empowering critique of objectivism because it consistently turns the ontological fact of the social situatedness of knowledge into an epistemic principle of social-scientific research, thereby providing reflexivist scholars with a critique of objectivism from within that allows them to reclaim the philosophical, social, and ethical dimensions of objectivity rather than surrender them to the dominant neopositivist tradition.

29

Vrhovski, Jan. „Shadowlands of Objectivism and Comprehensiveness“. Asian Studies 9, Nr. 1 (08.01.2021): 227–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.4312/as.2021.9.1.227-262.

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The article aims at presenting an overview of the main concepts in the philosophical thought of Zhang Shenfu, one of the leading intellectuals from Republican China (1912–1949). The study sets out from a brief summary of Zhang’s intellectual achievements, and proceeds by offering a more concise picture of the main influences, developmental stages and finally also central ideas of Zhang’s thought. By offering a general view on the concrete confluences and dissonances between the keystones of Zhang’s philosophy on one side, and its alleged sources in Western and Chinese philosophy on the other, this study further aims at presenting a new insight into the unique characteristics of Zhang’s philosophy. At the same time, by setting the discussion on Zhang’s philosophy in a broader context of contemporary intellectual discourse, the article also endeavours to establish a tentative basis for the future critical analyses and potential revaluations of Zhang Shenfu’s role in intellectual history of modern China.

30

Vrhovski, Jan. „Shadowlands of Objectivism and Comprehensiveness“. Asian Studies 9, Nr. 1 (08.01.2021): 227–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.4312/as.2021.9.1.227-262.

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The article aims at presenting an overview of the main concepts in the philosophical thought of Zhang Shenfu, one of the leading intellectuals from Republican China (1912–1949). The study sets out from a brief summary of Zhang’s intellectual achievements, and proceeds by offering a more concise picture of the main influences, developmental stages and finally also central ideas of Zhang’s thought. By offering a general view on the concrete confluences and dissonances between the keystones of Zhang’s philosophy on one side, and its alleged sources in Western and Chinese philosophy on the other, this study further aims at presenting a new insight into the unique characteristics of Zhang’s philosophy. At the same time, by setting the discussion on Zhang’s philosophy in a broader context of contemporary intellectual discourse, the article also endeavours to establish a tentative basis for the future critical analyses and potential revaluations of Zhang Shenfu’s role in intellectual history of modern China.

31

Margolis, Joseph. „Relativism vs. Pluralism and Objectivism“. Journal of Philosophical Research 21 (1996): 95–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jpr_1996_18.

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32

Eggerman, Richard. „TWO KINDS OF VALUATIONAL OBJECTIVISM“. Southwest Philosophy Review 10, Nr. 2 (1994): 167–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview199410234.

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33

Mason, Elinor. „Objectivism and Prospectivism About Rightness“. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7, Nr. 2 (05.06.2017): 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v7i2.72.

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In this paper I present a new argument for prospectivism: the view that, for a consequentialist, rightness depends on what is prospectively best rather than what would actually be best. Prospective bestness depends on the agent’s epistemic position, though exactly how that works is not straightforward. I clarify various possible versions of prospectivism, which differ in how far they go in relativizing to the agent’s limitations. My argument for prospectivism is an argument for moderately objective prospectivism, according to which the right thing to do is what would make sense given reasonable beliefs, reasonable probability estimates and a reasonable understanding of value. My argument is an argument for this form of prospectivism over objectivism. Arguments about prospectivism and objectivism usually use an example with the following form: an agent has a choice between options – one she knows would be acceptable, while the other could either be catastrophic or very good. Objectivists argue that the right thing to do is what would in fact be best (though the agent cannot know which option that is) while prospectivists argue that the agent’s ignorance is relevant, and the right thing to do is to compromise. The question is how we should understand the underlying argument. It is not about action guidance. Moderately objective prospectivism is not action guiding, because an actual agent may not have access to reasonable beliefs, probability estimates and so on. Another common argument is that the objective notion is the primary one. I show that there are no good grounds for this claim. My argument uses the distinction between rightness and goodness to show that a consequentialist theory, that bases rightness on goodness, should take into account how much goodness is at stake. Crucially, potential losses as well as gains are relevant. So long as goodness, rather than rightness, is in the driving seat, we should not be “bestness fetishists.” As the name suggest, this would be an irrational privileging of the best option. This argument does not apply to pure deontology: a pure deontology does not use the notion of goodness at all, and so there is nothing to compromise with. If the agent does not know what is right, there is nothing further to say. I end by arguing against a recent strategy that aims to show that although objectivism is true (the right option is the best one), we should sometimes do what is wrong (i.e. what is prospectively best). I argue that insofar as this is correct, it is simply prospectivism with awkward terminology.

34

Mizrahi, Vivian. „Color Objectivism and Color Pluralism“. dialectica 60, Nr. 3 (September 2006): 283–306. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2006.01070.x.

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35

Nees, Dan, Valerie E. Green und Kim Treadway. „Activism, Objectivism, and Environmental Politics“. Environmental Ethics 25, Nr. 3 (2003): 295–312. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/enviroethics200325320.

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36

Elkind, David. „Response to Objectivism and Education“. Educational Forum 69, Nr. 4 (31.12.2005): 328–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00131720508984706.

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37

Dorfman, Eran. „Naturalism, Objectivism and Everyday Life“. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 72 (03.04.2013): 117–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246113000088.

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AbstractIn this paper I analyse the role of naturalism and objectivism in everyday life according to Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Whereas Husserl attributes the naturalistic attitude mainly to science, he defines the objectivist attitude as a naiveté which equally applies to the natural attitude of everyday life. I analyse the relationship between the natural attitude and lived experience and show Husserl's hesitation regarding the task of phenomenology in describing the lived experience of everyday life, since he considers this experience to be too objectivistic. I use Merleau-Ponty's work to argue that objectivism is an essential characteristic of lived experience and that phenomenology should therefore find ways to integrate it into its descriptions while simultaneously suggesting ways to overcome its rigidity in order to renew perception. I finally propose that the project of the naturalisation of phenomenology could be one of the ways to connect lived experience to the objectivism of everyday life.

38

Levine, Joseph. „Objectivism-subjectivim: A false dilemma?“ Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15, Nr. 1 (März 1992): 42–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x00067431.

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39

Averill, Edward Wilson, und Allan Hazlett. „Color objectivism and color projectivism“. Philosophical Psychology 24, Nr. 6 (06.06.2011): 751–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2011.562645.

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40

Beebe, James R., und David Sackris. „Moral objectivism across the lifespan“. Philosophical Psychology 29, Nr. 6 (22.04.2016): 912–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2016.1174843.

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41

Majka, Wojciech. „A critique of scientific objectivism“. International Journal of Academic Research 5, Nr. 3 (23.05.2013): 167–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.7813/2075-4124.2013/5-3/b.26.

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42

Dedrick, Don. „Objectivism and the Evolutionary Value of Colour Vision“. Dialogue 34, Nr. 1 (1995): 35–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300049283.

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In Color for Philosophers, C. L. Hardin argues that chromatic objectivism—a view that identifies colour with some or other property of objects—must be false. The upshot of Hardin's argument is this: there is, in fact, no principled correlation between physical properties and perceived colours. Since that correlation is a minimal condition for objectivism, objectivism is false. Mohan Matthen, who accepts Hardin's conclusion for what can be called “simple objectivism,” takes it that an adaptationist theory of biological function applied to colour is able to surmount the problems Hardin describes. It is Matthen's view that I am primarily concerned with in this paper. I will argue that it entails an overly simple view of adaptive value—as, perhaps, do all objectivist views.

43

Hedden, Brian. „A defense of objectivism about evidential support“. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45, Nr. 5-6 (Dezember 2015): 716–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2015.1123038.

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Objectivism about evidential support is the thesis that facts about the degree to which a body of evidence supports a hypothesis are objective rather than depending on subjective factors like one’s own language or epistemic values. Objectivism about evidential support is key to defending a synchronic, time-slice-centric conception of epistemic rationality, on which what you ought to believe at a time depends only on what evidence you have at that time, and not on how you were at previous times. Here, I defend a version of objectivism about evidential support on which facts about evidential support are grounded in facts about explanatoriness.

44

Smith, Holly M. „The Zimmerman-Graham Debate on Objectivism versus Prospectivism“. Journal of Moral Philosophy 15, Nr. 4 (11.08.2018): 401–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20180006.

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In Living with Uncertainty Michael Zimmerman argues against the Objective view and for the Prospective view of morality. He claims that the conscientious agent would always choose the act that maximizes projected value, and that this is incompatible with Objectivism. Peter Graham defends Objectivism against Zimmerman’s attack. He argues that a conscientious agent must balance fulfilling obligations against avoiding the worst wrong-doings, and that this stance is consistent with Objectivism and with the agent’s choosing an act she believes to be Objectively wrong. In Ignorance and Moral Obligation Zimmerman argues that Graham’s “Objectivism” is only terminologically distinct from his Prospectivism. I argue that Graham faces a dilemma: if his theory delivers different prescriptions from Zimmerman’s, those prescriptions are implausible. On the other hand, if his theory avoids such implausible recommendations, it now generates exactly the same recommendations as Zimmerman’s theory, and so does not constitute a serious challenge to it.

45

Raskin, Jonathan D. „Objecting, subjecting, and epistemic diversity“. Theory & Psychology 30, Nr. 3 (Juni 2020): 394–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0959354320914392.

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Held (2020) portrays critical and Indigenous psychologists as subscribing to an epistemological “anti-objectivism” that inhibits their ability to combat oppression. She believes that their anti-objectivism yields a troublesome relativism in which truth is overly context-dependent; what counts as true knowledge for one Indigenous group may not count for another. This commentary explores whether critical and Indigenous psychologists are strict “anti-objectivists,” as Held contends. It also challenges the need for epistemological consistency, while encouraging a shift from “objectivism” and “subjectivism” as essentialized states to “objecting” and “subjecting” as complementary ways to explore and study the world.

46

Dent, Parnell und Carraher. „Developing an Instrument to Measure Objectivism“. Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 18, Nr. 1 (2018): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.5325/jaynrandstud.18.1.0001.

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47

Zhang, Long, John A. Parnell und Eric B. Dent. „Objectivism In China: A Management Perspective“. Academy of Management Proceedings 2016, Nr. 1 (Januar 2016): 10313. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2016.10313abstract.

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48

Pueyo-Ibáñez. „Moral Inquiry Beyond Objectivism and Subjectivism“. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 35, Nr. 2 (2021): 165. http://dx.doi.org/10.5325/jspecphil.35.2.0165.

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49

Potaga, Anna. „The "Logical Objectivism" of Gottlob Frege“. Philosophical Inquiry 24, Nr. 3 (2002): 77–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philinquiry2002243/423.

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50

Meltzer, Edmund S. „A Constructivism and Objectivism: Additional Questions“. Educational Forum 70, Nr. 3 (30.09.2006): 200–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00131720608984896.

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Zeitschriftenartikel zum Thema „Objectivism“

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