Dissertationen zum Thema „Naturalised Epistemology“

This thesis is about the methodology of philosophy. In particular, it represents an attempt to answer the question 'What is it to do naturalised epistemology?' Naturalised epistemology has become a popular movement in the last thirty years, but there is no consensus as to what exactly it is to subscribe to this movement. In my thesis I locate what I call a "core idea" which is common to all conceptions of naturalised epistemology, portraying it as a philosophical movement with an inclusive attitude to empirical science. I then attempt to work out the way in which this "core idea" can best be developed into a defensible and broad programme of philosophical inquiry. Naturalism is also usually seen as a reaction against a prior philosophical orthodoxy; and I argue that the key respect in which naturalism should be seen as differing from earlier philosophical movements is in its rejection of the view that philosophical inquiry can be conducted a priori. I explore the consequences of this move for philosophical methodology, with particular reference to the problem of Cartesian scepticism.

The aim of this essay is to explore the potential for an epistemology consistent with eliminative materialism based on work in connectionist modeling.
I present a review of the connectionist approach to psychological models that contrasts it with the classical symbolic approach, focusing on the nature of their respective representations. While defending the legitimacy of the connectionist approach, I find that its most useful application is as a basis for neuroscientific investigation.
Discussing connectionist psychology, I find it inconsistent with folk psychology and therefore consistent with eliminative materialism. I argue also for the naturalization of epistemology and thus for the relevance of psychology for epistemology. The conclusion of the essay is an outline of connectionist epistemology, which centres around two mathematical analyses of the global activity of connectionist networks; I argue that connectionist psychology leads to a version of epistemic pragmatism.

Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2007.
Title from file title page. George W. Rainbolt, committee chair; Jessica Berry, Steve Jacobson, committee members. Electronic text (43 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed Jan 18, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 43).

Versions of naturalized epistemology that overlook or reject apriority ignore innate belief-forming processes that provide much of the grounding for epistemic warrant. A rigorous analysis reveals that non-experiential ways of viewing apriority, such as innateness, establish the domain for a plausible naturalistic theory of a priori warrant. A moderate version of naturalistic epistemology that embraces the non-experiential feature of apriority and motivates future cognitive scientific research is the preferred account.

Orientador: Jose Carlos Pinto de Oliveira
Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas
Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-07T02:48:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Penna-Forte_MarcelodoAmaral_D.pdf: 33078007 bytes, checksum: d5814e0c2de9c5cefde73b485db17b1e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006
Resumo: A presente tese elabora um quadro geral para o estudo das representações visuais, tal como são utilizadas na atividade científica, na perspectiva de uma filosofia naturalista da ciência. Para tanto, é encaminhado um questionamento acerca das funções das representações visuais que passa pela consideração, orientada para este fim, da pertinência das análises funcionais, de uma noção adequada de representação e da caracterização da ciência como um sistema de representações. Conclui-se, finalmente, que as funções das representações visuais concernem à elaboração, ao desenvolvimento e, por vezes, à modificação da rede de similaridades que constitui a ciência
Abstract: This dissertation is concerned with the exposition of a naturalistic general framework for the study of visual representations as they are used in the scientific activity. It raises the question ci the role played by the visual representations in science. In order to do so, it argues for a functional analysis as a philosophical approach, suggests a suitable notion of representation, and describes science as a representational system. Finally, it concludes that visual representations can contribUte to the establishment, to the improvement, and to the revision of the network of similarities that constitutes science
Doutorado
Doutor em Filosofia

This dissertation considers the “strategic naturalism” of Sandra Harding’s standpoint theory in the philosophy of science, and it should be applied to epistemology. Strategic naturalism stipulates that all elements of inquiry are historically and culturally situated, and thereby subject to critical reflection, analysis, and revision. Allegiance to naturalism is de rigueur, yet there is no clear agreement on the term’s meaning. Harding’s standpoint theory reads the lack of definition as indicative of its generative possibilities for epistemic progress. The driving question is why Harding’s approach has not been considered a viable candidate for determining progress in epistemology. Beyond the fact that epistemic labor, in its scientific and non-scientific forms, is a social activity, Harding’s approach recognizes that it is situated in and reinforced by a broader network of social institutions, beliefs, and practices. Harding’s strategic naturalism would invigorate epistemology by increasing the awareness, acceptance, and respect for epistemic difference and drive epistemic progress that not only acknowledges pluralistic ways of knowing but also gives a more accurate account of the knowing subject. Chapter one is a discussion of non-naturalized epistemology and Quinean Naturalized Epistemology (QNE), framed by Harding’s historical account of the related projects of modern epistemology and science. This chapter highlights two important issues. The first issue is that epistemology is more complex than the story Quine offers. The second, and decisive issue is that the shared history of modern epistemology and science demonstrates the influence of social and cultural values on that history, and the long shadows they cast on naturalism debates in epistemology, science, and philosophy of science. Chapter two is an exegetical account of the origins of and motivations for critical feminist responses to both the received epistemological theory and QNE discussed in chapter one. The justifications for the feminist critiques and the problematic issues that motivate these critiques provide the backdrop for the initial, positive response to QNE, as well as their disenchantment with Quine’s influential proposal. Ultimately, feminist epistemologists and philosophers of science assess QNE as not naturalized enough to address their concerns. Chapter three considers several feminist standpoint theories to show that they are more naturalistic and better at providing a multi-faceted theory that is based on actual scientific practice, and re-introduces social values and interests as having a positive influence on epistemology and philosophies of science. This chapter shows that given the closely shared histories and assumptions of modern epistemology and science, FSE would be a viable resource for a more naturalistic epistemology. The final chapter argues that the project of naturalizing epistemology could incorporate FSE insights and the positive role FSE’s controversiality would play in naturalizing epistemology and philosophies of science. If we are to take seriously the concept of situatedness and what that entails, then naturalism must also be situated, and revisited with a critical and reflective eye. The implications on both our epistemic theories and our accounts of what kinds of knowing subject we are would foster epistemic progress.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-14T12:12:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.PDF: 592160 bytes, checksum: 1e3e2e63a1177515b3803954795fa703 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-09-29
Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES
The purpose of this dissertation is to defend the position known in epistemic literature as epistemic externalism. This position essentially consists in the thesis that some of the features which determine when a belief is a case of knowledge or a case of justified belief are external to the epistemic agent, i.e., they are not internal states of the agent, nor need to be consciously accessed by him. We neither criticize any particular internalist theory, nor advocate a particular externalist theory. Instead, we discuss three different topics that work as a general motivation for adopting externalism. The option for these topics is guided by an interest in naturalistic epistemology and in recent discussions of epistemology. First, we discuss the use of cases the description of imaginary cases with the intent to emphasize the intuition of a particular proposition or to show the counterintuitive consequence of a theory in the debate between internalists and externalists. We try to provide a sort of psychological diagnosis of the use of this intuitive tool and argue that the literature on concepts psychology suggests an advantage for externalist theories. Second, we discuss the contextualist approach about the skeptical paradox and its relation to conceptual analysis. We argue that a semantic approach fails to solve the paradox and that the proper understanding of its origin, and also an invariantist rejection of the contextualist approach, provide a motivation to accept the externalist solution of the problem. At last, we deal with John Pollock s criticism against externalism the idea that a proper naturalistic theory of justification has to be internalist. We analyze whether his refutation really affects all form of externalism, particularly, process reliabilism. We present Pollock s procedural theory of epistemic norms, and discuss if the reasons he presents can actually refute process reliabilism. We claim that the reasons presented do not really put Pollock s project in an advantage.
A proposta deste trabalho é defender a posição conhecida na literatura epistemológica como externalismo epistêmico. O externalismo epistêmico consiste essencialmente na tese de que alguns dos fatores que determinam quando uma crença constitui um caso de conhecimento ou um caso de crença justificada são externos ao agente epistêmico, i.e., não são estados internos ao sujeito, nem precisam ser acessados conscientemente por ele. Nós não atacamos nenhuma teoria particular do internalismo, ou mesmo defendemos uma teoria externalista particular. Em lugar disto, discutimos três tópicos distintos que servem de motivação geral para a adoção do externalismo. A escolha destes tópicos é guiada pelo interesse em uma epistemologia naturalizada e em discussões recentes da epistemologia. Primeiro, nós discutimos a utilização da análise de casos a descrição de casos imaginários com a intenção de salientar a intuição de uma proposição particular ou mostrar a consequência antiintuitiva de uma teoria no debate entre internalistas e externalistas. Nós tentamos fornecer uma espécie de diagnóstico psicológico sobre o uso desta ferramenta intuitiva e argumentamos que a literatura em psicologia de conceitos sugere um favorecimento a teorias externalistas. Segundo, nós discutimos a abordagem contextualista sobre o paradoxo cético e sua relação com a análise conceitual. Nós argumentamos que uma abordagem semântica falha em resolver o paradoxo e que a compreensão adequada de sua origem, assim como uma rejeição invariantista da posição contextualista, fornece uma motivação para aceitarmos a solução externalista do problema. Por último, nós tratamos da crítica de John Pollock ao externalismo, que consiste justamente na ideia de que uma teoria de justificação naturalista adequada deve ser internalista. Nós analisamos se sua refutação realmente atinge toda forma de externalismo e, em particular, o confiabilismo de processo. Nós apresentamos a teoria procedimental de normas epistêmicas de Pollock e discutimos se as razões que ele apresenta podem realmente refutar o confiabilismo de processo. Nós defendemos que as razões que são apresentadas não colocam realmente o projeto de Pollock em vantagem.

Orientador: Silvio Seno Chibeni
Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-19T18:05:36Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Sousa_ClaudineyJosede_D.pdf: 2248193 bytes, checksum: 2086e31340227c88d3d49873a49aee2f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012
Resumo: A adoção do modelo da ciência da natureza física, por parte de Hume, para a elaboração de seu projeto de uma ciência da natureza humana, permite ao autor construir um novo sistema de conhecimento, erigido sobre um fundamento inteiramente novo e seguro, mas exige, por outro lado, uma quase completa redefinição de velhos conceitos epistemológicos e uma revisão de teorias e concepções tradicionalmente aceitas em filosofia. Neste trabalho procuraremos avaliar esse audacioso empreendimento a partir do estudo da teoria humeana das crenças (mais particularmente, das crenças causais e da crença na existência dos corpos), destacando duas grandes concepções sobre a atitude do autor, a cética e a naturalista, quase sempre vistas como radicalmente diferentes e incompatíveis: i) por um lado os que tendem a enfatizar o lado negativo de sua filosofia, por entender que ele teria restringido o espaço tradicionalmente conferido à razão, como conceito normativo em filosofia, e exaltado conceitos desautorizados dessa tarefa, como hábito e imaginação (nesse grupo de autores estão, por exemplo, Thomas Reid, Thomas Hill Green e Bertrand Russell); ii) e por outro, os que realçam aspectos positivos e a subordinação da razão aos sentimentos para destacar o caráter irresistível e inevitável de nossas crenças naturais como critério para distinção e escolha entre crenças (a figura central deste segundo grupo de autores é Norman Kemp Smith). Veremos que no século XX o debate sobre a epistemologia humeana continua estimulador: John Wright, Galen Strawson e Edward Craig, são exemplos de uma tendência a conciliar as duas interpretações para uma melhor compreensão de sua epistemologia, mostrando que as duas posturas podem ser complementares ao invés de excludentes. Tendo examinado algumas das principais contribuições desse debate, posicionamos-nos em defesa da concepção segundo a qual o projeto de Hume pode ser visto como um trabalho precursor daquilo que hoje conhecemos como naturalismo epistemológico, embora, de uma forma geral, alguns autores que exploram essa perspectiva contemporânea, notadamente Quine, não reconheçam as contribuições de Hume. Acreditamos, porém, que o filósofo moderno teria fornecido, de forma pioneira, os parâmetros para uma visão científica e experimental sobre os processos e produtos cognitivos, de um modo inteiramente diferente daquele elaborado pela especulação filosófica apriorista. Sem ter que restringir a filosofia à mera extensão do fazer científico, defendemos que Hume se preocupa em preservar o caráter normativo desse empreendimento, como propuseram Kemp Smith, Louis Loeb, Michael Costa, entre outros. A base para a defesa dessa concepção estaria em sua reavaliação do estatuto epistemológico do conceito de crença que, embora seja um complemento essencial do conhecimento, contrapõe-se diretamente a este (conforme sugere Locke em seu Essay). Sendo assim, o tema central de nosso trabalho será a maneira como Hume procede a essa difícil tarefa de conciliar naturalismo e normatividade em sua teoria da crença, antecipando propostas muito conhecidas no século XX como o confiabilismo de Alvin Goldman, que analisaremos com o intuito de estabelecer pontos de contato entre o naturalismo pioneiro de Hume e a epistemologia contemporânea
Abstract: The adoption of natural science as a model for the project for a science of human nature led Hume to build a new system of knowledge, built, as he hoped, on an entirely new and secure foundation. But the implementation of this project would require an almost complete redefinition of old philosophical concepts, and a reappraisal of traditionally accepted philosophical theories. In the present work we attempt to evaluate this bold intellectual enterprise, taking as focal point Hume's theory of belief (and, more particularly, causal beliefs and belief in the existence of bodies), analyzing two major interpretative trends, the naturalistic and the skeptical, often seen as radically different and incompatible: i) To the latter belong those authors who tend to emphasize the negative side of Hume's philosophy by holding that he would have restricted the space traditionally accorded to reason as normative concept in philosophy, and that his theory of belief does not in fact have epistemological import, to the extent in which it is based on concepts such as habit and imagination (to this group belong, for instance, Thomas Reid, Thomas Hill Green and Bertrand Russell); ii) In the other, more recent interpretative trend, are those who seek to bring out the positive aspects of his theory, taking Hume's proposed subordination of reason to the sentiments as a way to highlight the inevitable and irresistible character of our natural beliefs, an not their epistemic devaluation. Norman Kemp Smith is the leading proponent of this position, taken up more recently by authors such as John Wright, Galen Strawson and Edward Craig. In fact, these authors seek to reconcile the two interpretations, by showing that the two positions can be complementary rather than exclusive. Having examined some of the major contributions of this debate, we argue that Hume's project can be seen as a pioneering work containing some central elements of the position now know as epistemological naturalism, although many of the philosophers who explore this contemporary perspective do not to acknowledge Hume's contributions. We believe, however, that in Hume we find guidelines for a scientific and experimental study of the cognitive processes and products which still retain much interest nowadays. Without reducing philosophy to a mere brach of natural science (as Quine famously proposed), Hume was, we argue, concerned to preserve the normative character of epistemology. The basis for the defense of this position is the reassessment of the epistemological status of the concept of belief. Thus, we try to show that the way in which Hume seeks to combine naturalism and normativity in his theory of belief bears resemblance to proposals such Alvin Goldman's reliabilism
Doutorado
Filosofia
Doutor em Filosofia

Philosophers such as Clark and Leiter propose that Nietzsche’s position on the concept of truth, while controversial in his early and middle periods, developed into something far less radical in his later works. They claim that Nietzsche should be understood as a naturalist who contends that we can attain truth, and that his falsification thesis, along with skeptical interpretations of it, is incoherent due to self-contradiction. I challenge these thinkers and what I call the naturalist interpretations because if Nietzsche’s middle period is incoherent then little or nothing can be seen as valuable in GS, Z, or BGE. In order to defend Nietzsche from his alleged self-contradiction I examine positions offered by Clark & Dudrick and Berry who attempt to offer a coherent interpretation of his middle period. While neither provides a convincing position, they help me reveal that what Nietzsche calls “strong skepticism” is integral towards his project. Strong skepticism is the notion that we should continuously perpetuate inquiry, while also creating new values. Nietzsche’s project is to get beyond good and evil, which can be achieved by recognizing untruth as a strong skeptic. To get beyond good and evil, Nietzsche asserts that the thing-in-itself must be properly rejected along with any other metaphysical faith. In so doing philosophers of the future can create new values by being honest about their personal judgements as well as recognizing that falsification is necessary for getting around in the world. Ultimately, I conclude that Nietzsche is neither a skeptic nor a naturalist, and instead utilizes elements from both without committing to either.

Recent literature concerning laws of nature highlight the close relationship between general metaphysics and philosophy of science. In particular, a person's theoretical commitments in either have direct implications for her stance on laws. In this dissertation, I argue that an ontic structural realist should be a realist about laws, but only within a non-Whiteheadean process framework. Without the adoption of a process framework, any account of laws the ontic structural realist offers will require metaphysical commitments that are at odds with ontic structural realism. In arguing towards this aim, I adopt an attenuated methodological naturalistic stance to show that traditional substance metaphysics, of the sort neo-Aristotelians endorse, is problematic and that we have naturalistic reasons for further developing process metaphysics. I then apply this framework to develop a processual account of mereological structures and show how we can understand structures as being stable processes. In the final section, I argue that these are the kind of structures with which the ontic structural realist concerns herself. By adopting a realist account of laws the ontic structural realist can explain how these structures enter into modal and causal relations.

Values are inherent within cultures, relationships, and many other systems, however, little study has been done on the extent to which individuals may explicitly agree with the metaphysical assumptions that much of psychological science relies upon. Psychological science, which uses scientific methodology, is a trusted source of knowledge for many students. Scientific methodology is conceptually linked to assumptions of naturalism, which makes claims about the truth of reality. These naturalistic assumptions pertain to ideas of disenchantment, which describe the world as free from any transcendent quality. These same ideas have become popular among people of the Western world and are foundational to the worldview of secularism. Accessing whether, and to what extent, individuals explicitly agree or disagree with ideas of disenchantment inherent within secularism may help to better understand relationships between cultural, educational, and spiritual beliefs, and the underlying presumptions of psychological science. A measure of 30 items in length was created in order to evaluate the extent to which individuals agree with statements about some of the foundational assumptions of secularism as it relates to naturalism. A random sample of online participants (N=395) completed the items through an online survey platform. A 1-factor model provided sufficient statistical fit for the data, suggesting that items appeared to support the idea that this measure addresses attitudes of secularism, however no claims on the validity of the measure in the current study can be made. Suggestions for future study are provided.

La « critique de la langue » chez Fritz Mauthner (1849-1923), qui se décline comme critique de la presse et de la culture, critique littéraire, critique de la philosophie et des sciences, est une critique, par son style et son écriture, des modes intellectuelles et des idéologies codées par les usages de langue de son époque. Notre travail replace l’ensemble des écrits de Mauthner dans leur contexte d’apparition, le Berlin de la fin du XIXe siècle, et documente l’implication de Mauthner dans le mouvement de la modernité littéraire, autour de la Freie Bühne de Berlin. Ces écrits invitent à interroger les paradoxes constitutifs de la Modernité, et l’articulation entre les notions de crise et de critique qui traversent le champ littéraire, scientifique et philosophique. Il s’agit donc de mettre en évidence une stratégie d’écriture qui, dans le contexte de la spécialisation et de la vulgarisation des savoirs modernes et de leurs terminologies, revêt une dimension polémique et politique. Cette stratégie sert une critique immanente à la langue, qui procède par imitation et détournement des mots-clef, des effets de discours et des formes d’expression de la pensée dominante. Nous montrons enfin de quelle manière cette écriture, avec son recours à des figures ou quasi-figures du discours impropre, exemplifie et alimente une conception métaphorique, contextuelle et dialogique de la langue, approche sémantique visant à exclure les notions d’identité et de propriété et les jugements de valeurs d’une réflexion historique sur la langue et la culture
This dissertation shows that Fritz Mauthner’s (1849-1923) famous “critique of language” should be understood as a unique mode and style of attack on the literary cultures and ideological codes of his time, characterized by the development of print media. His work was unique because, through his critiques of literary, journalistic, and scholarly writings, Mauthner developed a powerful form of immanent critique of language that engaged typical forms of thought in that period as it was embedded within the topoi of late nineteenth century Berlin practices of writing. By adopting and repeating the period’s chauvinistic and anti-Semitic clichés he exposed – through modes of irony and parody – their failures and anti-modernistic images. By contextualising all of Mauthner’s late nineteenth century writings, in particular his critical approaches to modern literature, this work reconstructs Mauthner’s unmasking of modernity’s constitutive paradoxes through the links that he revealed between literary, scholarly, and philosophical modernity

This thesis considers Kant's departure from moral naturalism. In doing so, it explores the relationship between ethics, naturalism, normativity and freedom. Throughout this exploration, I build the case that Kant's ethics of autonomy allows us to make better sense of ethics than Hume's moral naturalism. Hume believes that morality is ultimately grounded in human nature. Kant finds this understanding of ethics limiting. He insists that we are free - we can critically reflect upon our nature and (to an extent) alter it accordingly. This freedom, I contend, renders the moral naturalist's appeal to nature lacking. Of course, a Kantian conception of freedom - some form of independence from the causal order - is fairly unpopular in contemporary circles. In particular, a commitment to naturalism casts doubt on such a notion of freedom. I argue with Kant that such a conception of freedom is essential to the conception of ourselves as rational agents. The critical turn, unlike naturalism, warrants this conception of freedom, accommodating the point of view of our rational agency. It thus allows Kant's ethics of autonomy to better grasp certain key elements of morality - normativity and our agency - than Hume's moral naturalism.

The error statistical account provides a basic account of evidence and inference. Formally, the approach is a re-interpretation of standard frequentist (Fisherian, Neyman-Pearson) statistics. Informally, it gives an account of inductive inference based on arguing from error, an analog of frequentist statistics, which keeps the concept of error probabilities central to the evaluation of inferences and evidence. Error statistical work at present tends to remain distinct from other approaches of naturalism and social epistemology in philosophy of science and, more generally, Science and Technology Studies (STS). My goal is to employ the error statistical program in order to address a number of problems to approaches in philosophy of science, which fall under two broad headings: (1) naturalistic philosophy of science and (2) social epistemology. The naturalistic approaches that I am interested in looking at seek to provide us with an account of scientific and meta-scientific methodologies that will avoid extreme skepticism, relativism and subjectivity and claim to teach us something about scientific inferences and evidence produced by experiments (broadly construed). I argue that these accounts fail to identify a satisfactory program for achieving those goals and; moreover, to the extent that they succeed it is by latching on to the more general principles and arguments from error statistics. In sum, I will apply the basic ideas from error statistics and use them to examine (and improve upon) an area to which they have not yet been applied, namely in assessing and pushing forward these interdisciplinary pursuits involving naturalistic philosophies of science that appeal to cognitive science, psychology, the scientific record and a variety of social epistemologies.
Ph. D.

La matérialité biologique du corps humain est devenue l'objet d'interventions inédites au moyen de nouvelles technologies biomédicales, comme la procréation médicalement assistée, les tests génétiques, la contraception hormonale. Cette thèse part des difficultés inhérentes à une approche antinaturaliste pour aborder la dimension biologique des corps sexués. “On ne naît pas femme, on le devient” : mais qu'en est-il des corps ? Les technologies biomédicales investissent la chair selon des modalités qui échappent aux grilles d'analyses matérialiste et butlérienne. Faut-il y voir une réfutation du constructivisme, la revanche d'un socle biologique – hormonal, génétique, moléculaire – primant sur les effets anatomiques de la socialisation, comme le suggèrent les partisan·e·s d'un material turn féministe ? À partir d'une analyse de l'évolution de la notion de nature, définie comme "vie elle-même" depuis la révolution moléculaire de la biologie, cette thèse propose une autre interprétation, en définissant les technologies biomédicales comme des technologies de pouvoir relevant d’une biopolitique moléculaire de genre. Sans infirmer la perspective constructiviste, ces médiations sociales originales (adossées au nouveau paradigme épistémique) permettent de comprendre comment les frontières et limites du genre sont déplacées, tout en produisant des identités, des expériences et des subjectivités genrées inédites. En dégageant les coordonnées d'un véritable dispositif biomédical, notre étude comparative entre techniques disciplinaires et biopolitique moléculaire de genre plaide pour une critique antinaturaliste renouvelée, s’articulant à une critique de la technique qui permette d'inventer collectivement des moyens pour se réapproprier démocratiquement les technologies biomédicales
The biological materiality of the human body has become an object of unprecedented interventions through “new biomedical technologies” as medically assisted procreation, genetic tests, or hormonal contraception. This thesis interrogates the difficulties inherent to anti-naturalist approaches in order to address the biological dimension of sexed bodies. “One is not born a woman, one becomes one”, but is this also true for the body? The analytical frames of materialist or deconstructivist feminism cannot cease the modalities through which biomedical technologies invest the flesh. Do biomedical technologies make constructivist approaches obsolete through the revenge of a biological – hormonal, genetic, molecular – ground that tops the anatomical effects of socialization? Partisans of a feminist “material turn” seem to think so. After analyzing how the molecular biology revolution changes the very concept of nature in defining it as “life itself”, I offer an alternative interpretation by defining biomedical technologies as technologies of power that stem from a molecular biopolitics of gender. Instead of overturning constructivist perspectives, these new social mediations (residing on a new epistemic paradigm) help understanding a shift in what has been seen as the limits of gender. This shift creates unprecedented identities, experiences and subjectivities of gender. In exposing the coordinates of the biomedical apparatus, this comparative study between disciplinary techniques and molecular biopolitics of gender pleads for a renewed anti-naturalist critique that takes the form of a critique of technology in order to allow for a collective appropriation of biomedical technologies

Submitted by Cleide Dantas (cleidedantas@ufpa.br) on 2014-10-10T11:49:21Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 23898 bytes, checksum: e363e809996cf46ada20da1accfcd9c7 (MD5) Dissertacao_FundamentacaoCienciaNatureza.pdf: 1029893 bytes, checksum: fd37a796dbd85478ad6cbecd5914945c (MD5)
Approved for entry into archive by Ana Rosa Silva (arosa@ufpa.br) on 2014-10-10T12:34:53Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 23898 bytes, checksum: e363e809996cf46ada20da1accfcd9c7 (MD5) Dissertacao_FundamentacaoCienciaNatureza.pdf: 1029893 bytes, checksum: fd37a796dbd85478ad6cbecd5914945c (MD5)
Made available in DSpace on 2014-10-10T12:34:53Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 23898 bytes, checksum: e363e809996cf46ada20da1accfcd9c7 (MD5) Dissertacao_FundamentacaoCienciaNatureza.pdf: 1029893 bytes, checksum: fd37a796dbd85478ad6cbecd5914945c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013
CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior
A ciência da natureza humana é o projeto de Hume que concerne à toda sua filosofia –estética, ética, política, teoria do conhecimento, história, economia, filosofia da religião, etc. – coisa de que jamais poderíamos dar conta, dado a natureza do trabalho de mestrado. Por isso, contentamo-nos em falar apenas da fundamentação da ciência da natureza humana, referente à investigação acerca da origem das ideias e operações do entendimento, ou da investigação sobre as causas e os poderes ocultos do entendimento humano, com base no método experimental. A questão a que o nosso trabalho visa a lançar luz é precisamente esta: o que é uma ciência da natureza humana baseada no método experimental? Essa será, pois, a nossa tarefa adiante. Julgamos que, a partir de uma abordagem holística e científica da mente humana, Hume tenta explicar a natureza dos poderes ou faculdades intelectuais, sobretudo suas limitações e sua fragilidade. Sendo, pois, a base da ciência do homem o método experimental, o qual, por sua vez, tem o seu fundamento sólido na experiência e na observação, então é preciso perguntar: como e em que medida o uso de tal método tornou-se imprescindível à filosofia moral – isto é, às questões filosóficas de modo geral – e que tangem à ciência da natureza humana? Compreender isso é compreender a etapa inicial do projeto filosófico humiano, ou seja, o estudo do entendimento humano que, por sua vez, subdivide-se em dois momentos, a saber: (1) A ciência da mente, pela qual Hume mostra as limitações de nossas faculdades e poderes intelectuais e (2) o ceticismo que é, pois, as consequências desse estudo, a constatação da fragilidade e das limitações do entendimento humano. Nesse sentido, sentimo-nos livres para falar de algumas reflexões tanto do Tratado quanto da primeira Investigação, muitas vezes de maneira indistinta, tentando ressaltar que tais obras, quando comparadas, podem revelar o amadurecimento de um mesmo projeto filosófico que é a ciência da natureza humana. E este é exatamente o fio condutor de nossa pesquisa: como uma ciência da natureza humana é projetada por Hume e em que medida é possível falar do amadurecimento de seus propósitos? Com este exame inicial, poderemos responder alguns problemas acerca da visão pela qual Hume foi falsamente apontado como um cético radical. Apresentaremos por que a crítica sobre a sua “teoria das ideias” elaborada pelos filósofos do senso comum não considera importantes pontos de sua ciência da mente, gerando muitos mal-entendidos na posteridade. Em suma, no Capítulo 1 deste trabalho, examinaremos o que seria o projeto filosófico de Hume e, por meio desse exame, tentaremos apresentar, no Capítulo 2, as bases em que essa ciência da mente construída por Hume está sustentada. No capítulo 3, mostraremos que a interpretação cético-destrutiva da posteridade está equivocada, na medida em que desconsidera os meios que Hume encontrou à sua fundamentação da ciência da natureza humana.
The science of human nature is the Hume’s project concerning to all his philosophy – aesthesis, ethic, politic, theory of knowledge, history, economy, philosophy of religion etc. -; matter that we never could to account, because of the nature of a work of master’s degree. Hence, we just content ourselves to talk about to the foundation of science of human nature, concerning to the research about the origin of ideas and operations of understanding, or about the research regarding the causes and occult powers of human understanding, based on experimental method. The question that ours work seek to explain is closely this: What is a science of human nature based on experimental method? This one will, therefore, ours task from now on. We regard, from a holistic and scientific approach of human mind, Hume tries to explain the nature of powers or intellectual faculties, mainly its boundaries and weakness. Being, hence, the base of the science of man the experimental method that, in turn, has its solid foundation on the experience and observation; we must, then, to ask: how and to what extend the use of a such method became indispensable to the moral philosophy – that is, to the philosophical questions altogether – and that it touch on science of human nature? To know it is to know the initial step of philosophical Humean project, that is, the study of human understanding that, on the other hand, it is subdivided in two moments, viz, (1) the science of man, by which Hume shows the boundaries of ours faculties and intellectual powers and (2) the skepticism that is, then, the outcome this study, the finding of weakness and boundaries of human understand. In this sense, we feel free to talk about some account both of Treatise as first Enquiry, many times indistinctly, trying to emphasize that such works, when compared, can to reveal the maturation of a same philosophical project that is the science of human nature. And this is exactly this tread of ours research: how a science of human nature is projected by Hume and to what extend is possible to talk to maturation of its purposes? With this initial exam, we will be able to answer some problems concerning to the view by which Hume was appointed like radical skeptical. We will show why the critique regarding his “theory of ideas” taken by philosophers of common sense does not regard important points of his science of mind, generating many misunderstanding for posterity.In short, in the Chapter 1 of this work, we will examine what it was the Hume’s philosophical project and, by means of this exam, we will try to show, in the Chapter 2, the bases in which this science of mind constructed by Hume is sustained. In the Chapter 3, we will show that the interpretation skeptical-destructive of the posterity is misguided, in that it disregard the means found by Hume to his foundation of the science of human nature.

Cette thèse vise à fournir un élément de réponse à un problème politicoanthropologique classique, celui de l'origine de l'inégalité parmi les hommes. Plus précisément, elle vise à déterminer deux choses:

1) pourquoi des hommes, capables de culture, ont vécu pendant des centaines de milliers d'années dans des petits groupes de chasseurs-cueilleurs nomades et égalitaires

2) pourquoi l'apparition de sociétés de grande taille au cours du Néolithique s'est systématiquement accompagnée d'une différenciation sociale accrue, de l'apparition de hiérarchies de statuts et, éventuellement, de la centralisation du pouvoir politique.

La réponse proposée est que la taille des sociétés humaines est sensible à un effet de plafonnement. Ceci s'explique par le caractère conditionnel de la coopération humaine et par la mémoire limitée des humains en contexte social. Ce plafonnement de la taille des groupes ne peut être surmonté que si les humains créent des institutions qui permettent une division sociale du travail de sanction, ce qui à son tour dépend de l'émergence chez l'homme d'un langage et d'une théorie de l'esprit complexes. L'argument proposé est de type fonctionnaliste et vise à appuyer les théories en sciences sociales qui s'intéressent à l'évolution de la culture et des formes politiques.
Doctorat en philosophie et lettres, Orientation philosophie
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Friedrich Nietzsche’s 1874 essay "On the Use and Disadvantage of History for Life" (HL) presents ideas on how the past ought to be appropriated and how history ought to be written. His 1887 book "On the Genealogy of Morality" (GM) presents an account of the historical development of European morality. Given that Nietzsche appropriates the past through writing in GM, the question arises: does GM put into practice Nietzsche’s earlier ideas from HL concerning how the past ought to be appropriated through the writing of history? I argue that GM does indeed apply some of Nietzsche’s key ideas from HL. In particular, GM remains consistent with HL insofar as it appropriates the past unhistorically, makes use of the monumental and critical modes of history, and appropriates the past in a way that encourages the flourishing of an elite kind of human being. However, Nietzsche’s manner of appropriating the past in GM also diverges from what he espouses in HL. Whereas in HL he emphasizes the usefulness and desirability of forgetting and distorting the past, in GM he exhibits a more notable concern with knowing the truth about the past. I show that this difference in approach is due to the significant change that Nietzsche’s epistemology underwent between the writing of HL and the writing of GM. This difference in approach notwithstanding, the great virtue of illuminating GM through the lens of HL is that it allows us to see more clearly how a lack of concern with truth and knowledge plays a positive role in Nietzsche’s writing of the past in GM. It also helps us to understand why he appropriates the past the way that he does in GM. Just as in HL Nietzsche thought that the past ought to be appropriated in a way that encourages the activity of genius, his writing of the history of European morality in GM is undertaken with the intent to encourage the occurrence and activity of a select kind of human being, a kind of human being that Nietzsche values above all else.

碩士
國立臺灣大學
哲學系
86
The aim of this thesis is to examine Quine's naturalized epistemology,investi-gating whether its adoption would repudiate the normative element in epistemo-logy. In his well-known essay "Epistemology Naturalized" of 1969, Quine arguesthat epistemology should be reconstructed as a branch of natural science, an empirical study of the relation between sensory stimulations and scientific theory formulations. There are three major objections that have been raised against Quine's argument and his approach to epistemology: (i)Quine's charact- erization of traditional epistemology is misconceived. (ii) Quine's recommedat-ion of naturalizing epistemology neglects the notion of epistemic justificati-on, and hence the evaluative strain in epistemology. (iii)Quine's naturalized epistemology, understood as a scientific study, does not and cannot response to the skeptical challenge to the very possibility of our knowledge of the ex-ternal world,and hence fails to be a normative study of knowledge. In this th-esis, I reconstruct Quine's argument for naturalizing epistemology within his systemic philosophy, and focus on Quine's holism and its application: Qui-ne relies on it in arguing against traditional epistemology (especially Carna-pian reductionist program), in supporting his thesis of underdetermination of physical theory and indeterminacy of translation, and in responding to radicalskepticism. It offers the key to an understanding of the normativity and scopeof Quine's naturalized epistemology. After analyzing three criticisms on Quin-e's naturalized epistemology, especially proposed by Harvey Siegel, Jaegwon Kim, Alvin Goldman, and Barry Stroud, I try to show that those critics miss the point because they do not appreciate the close connection between Quine's naturalistic approach and holistic approach to epistemology.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 68-11, Section: A, page: 4727. Adviser: Jonathan Waskan. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 256-269) Available on microfilm from Pro Quest Information and Learning.

碩士
國立臺灣大學
哲學研究所
89
Critics of Quine often regard his proposal of naturalizing philosophy as simply dismissing the normative dimension of epistemology, along with it the notion of justification. It is thus questionable whether the alleged successor program constitutes a suitable substitute. Quine, however, stresses that his naturalism does not repudiate the normative. He offers a means-ends approach to the explication of normativity. This account, as I shall try to show, does not really compete with other justificatory theories, but offers a background thesis in which we could deploy the investigation of the notion of justification. Within Quine’s own doctrine, we do perceive both a foundationalist as well as a coherentist perspective as to the question of evidential support. Foundationalism lies in his persistence on observation sentences--being conditioned outright to some ranges of stimulation--as the checkpoint of science, while coherentism manifests in his holistic consideration. It is nonetheless a tremendous hard work to offer a streamlined account conjoining these two parts. The problem occurs when we consider how the purported empirical basis, i.e. stimulation, lends support to our overall theory of the world. The evidential relation, as Davidson rightly criticizes, remains obscure. Quine’s overall conception has a relish of pragmatism, owing primarily to his naturalistic orientation. It remains to be discussed whether pragmatic consideration could play any role in reconciling, or in cutting through, the tension and debate between foundationalism and coherentism.

Naturalism faces problems caused by a lack of agreement about whether there is or can be a meaningful and useful conception of naturalism as a general research position. Without a widely agreed upon account of what naturalism in general amounts to there is no clear and definitive way to adjudicate disputes as to what is consistent with naturalism; the absence of such an account also makes it impossible for specific projects in naturalistic inquiry to take guidance from naturalism in general. In the following, I develop a determinate account of naturalism in general, which I think could find acceptance among naturalists because it accounts for many of the features commonly associated with naturalism. To do this, I first lay out the problem to be solved, express its importance, and explain what a solution to the problem would involve. I then make appeal to an account of naturalism developed by Penelope Maddy and use this account to show that the published and unpublished work of Charles Sanders Peirce offers, prima facie, a more determinate account of naturalism than is commonly recognized and that goes beyond the account given by Maddy. With this Peircean account developed, I then measure it against the criteria I develop and conclude that a Pericean account of naturalism does promise to adjudicate various disputes in the naturalism literature and to offer guidance to the development and application of specific projects in naturalistic inquiry.

Dissertation

Alvin Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism (EAAN) begins with the following simple idea: the evolutionary process of natural selection selects organisms due to adaptive behaviors, but not necessarily due to true beliefs. If this notion is even possibly true, then it is also possible that some (or many) of our own beliefs are not veridical and that our reasoning processes may not successfully point to truths (but are merely evolutionarily advantageous). Once the deliverances and processes of our cognitive faculties have been thus called into question, it seems improper to provide an argument that one can trust one’s cognitive faculties and processes (because such an argument requires the presupposition of what one is trying to prove). The reflective metaphysical naturalist, upon seeing this, realizes that she has a defeater for her belief in the reliability of her cognitive faculties, and this eventuates into a defeater for all of her beliefs (including the belief in naturalism). So, a belief in naturalism, when conjoined with a belief in current evolutionary theory, puts the reflective naturalist in an epistemically undesirable (i.e., irrational) position. It is better, Plantinga says, to discard one’s belief in metaphysical naturalism. Plantinga’s argument is not a globally skeptical one. His ultimate goal is to persuade people to give up naturalism as a metaphysical explanation, and to adopt theism instead. EAAN is an argument against naturalism that is intended to open a door for some later argument for theism; EAAN in itself is not an argument for theism. In this paper, I attempt to: (1) explain EAAN via its historical development and refinement; (2) examine what I feel to be some of the most important critiques of EAAN (along with some of Plantinga’s responses); (3) put the argument in an Extended Summary in Logical Form; (4) comment upon the Extended Summary and, in the process of discussing the premises, settle upon what I feel to be the two main contested premises of EAAN; and, (5) conclude that Plantinga’s argument has thus far survived attack, and explain why I expect it to continue to do so in the future.

Traditional epistemology has it that the pursuit of knowledge is predicated on two inter-connected goals: the generation of meaningful truths and the avoidance of error. This is neatly summarized in the conventional definition of knowledge as justified true belief In the following thesis I trace the evolution of an alternative account of knowledge which is predicated not on the avoidance of error but on the capacity to learn from error. I contend that the connectionist model of artificial intelligence provides the necessary framework for an understanding of cognition in which knowledge emerges as a dynamic product of learning. Epistemic content in this alternative is not comprised of fixed representations. Instead, content is encoded within shifting patterns of activation among large numbers of processing units. However, a connectionist approach does not give rise to a new epistemology. Rather, when integrated with Quinean naturalism, it fulfills the project of naturalized epistemology in ways that psychology could not. The convergence of connectionism and naturalized epistemology then embodies the normative principle that we should be fallibilistic about beliefs and realistic about believers.

Die Arbeit fragt zunächst nach der Existenz von Wissenschaftsphilosophie in Hegels System, da sie traditionellerweise von denjenigen geleugnet wird, die fest an den naturalistischen Wissenschaftsbegriff glauben. Es wird zwischen zwei Konzeptionen von epistemologischen Untersuchungen unterschieden, nämlich einer positivistischen-objektorientierten und einer selbstreflexiven. Hegels Wissenschaftslehre entspricht der letzteren, d.h. einer Art noesis noeseos, denn Wissenschaft ist für ihn das Selbstwissen des kollektiv verstandenen Geistes. In diesem Sinne kann Hegel als Mitbegründer der modernen Wissenschaftsphilosophie avant la lettre angesehen werden. Die Kernbestimmung von Hegels Metawissenschaft wird dann im Lichte der vor kurzem entfachten Debatte um seinen angeblichen Naturalismus des Geistes untersucht, weil auch diejenigen neueren angelsächsischen Hegelinterpretatoren, die einen epistemologischen Diskurs in Hegels System durchaus anerkennen, irreführend behaupten, dass Hegel die Geistaktivitäten und Geistentäußerungen naturalistisch auffasst. Es folgt die kritische Analyse von vier exemplarischen naturalistischen Hegellektüren und die Rekonstruktion von Hegels Argumentation für einen nichtnaturalistischen Geistbegriff sowie Naturbegriff. Im Gegensatz zu diesen Auslegungen, welche vom Menschen als bloßem Bedürfniswesen ausgehen, macht die Analyse der Hegelschen Texte deutlich, dass für Hegel der Geist nicht durch irgendein biologisches Interesse oder Organ allein bedingt ist, sondern vielmehr durch eine sozialkulturelle Seinsweise und dabei besonders durch sprachlich vermittelte generische Formen eines Wir-Subjekts. Hegel nimmt die Aufgabe auf sich, der Philosophie zu einer selbstbewussten Wissenschaft zu verhelfen, da er die gravierenden Probleme von rein empirischen, rein rationalistischen sowie romantischen „unmittelbaren“ Wissenskonzepten identifiziert und beheben will. Es wird gezeigt, dass trotz massiver Kritik der posthegelianischen Philosophie, sowohl der analytischen als auch der kontinentalen, Hegels Idee von Philosophie als Wissen des Wissens keinesfalls blinde Orientierung an der Methodologie gegebener Sach-Wissenschaften bedeutet. Vielmehr entwickelt Hegel eine allgemeine, begriffsorientierte und nichtformalistische Logik, die als innovative Theorie der Geisteswissenschaften verstanden werden soll.

In this dissertation, I reconcile our knowledge of our own minds with philosophical naturalism. Philosophers traditionally hold that our knowledge of our own minds is especially direct and authoritative in comparison with other domains of knowledge. I introduce the subject in the first chapter. In the second and third chapters, I address the idea that we know our own minds directly. If self-knowledge is direct, it must not be grounded on anything more epistemically basic. This creates a puzzle for all epistemologists. For the naturalist, the puzzle is especially tricky. To say that self-knowledge has no epistemic ground threatens the naturalist’s ability to understand it as psychologically real. I argue that the idea that self-knowledge is direct is not well motivated and that models of direct self-knowledge have fundamental problems. In the fourth and fifth chapters, I examine first-person authority. I distinguish between epistemic authority, or being in a better position than others to know, and nonepistemic authority, or being immune to challenge according to some conventional norm. I argue that we have only limited epistemic authority over our own minds. I then consider whether there may be an interesting non-epistemic authority attached to the first-person perspective. This would locate first-person authority in connection with our responsibility for our own minds. I argue that this sort of authority may exist, but is unlikely to threaten naturalism without further anti-naturalist commitments in the philosophy of mind. In the final two chapters, I explore the possibility that the underlying disagreements between naturalists and anti-naturalists are about the nature of belief. I consider what failures of self-knowledge might demonstrate about the nature of belief. I show how, with the proper understanding of belief, a theory of self-knowledge can assuage some of these worries. Having adopted a conception of belief that makes sense for philosophy and empirical psychology, I outline a positive theory of self-knowledge and suggest directions for future research.

The purpose of this thesis is to critically examine how W.V. Quine, Michael A. Bishop and J.D. Trout confront the normativity objection against naturalized epistemology. In Chapter One, normativity in epistemology is introduced, followed by a brief look over Quine’s grievances against the traditional approach to epistemology. Quine rejects traditional epistemology and assimilates epistemology with science. The second chapter assesses how Quine naturalizes epistemology, and the third chapter evaluates his engineering response against the normativity objection. Bishop and Trout’s theory, founded upon the Aristotelian Principle, concentrates on reasoning and epistemic excellence instead of belief justification. Strategic Reliabilism’s attempt to dissolve the naturalistic challenge and resolve the normativity objection is inspected in Chapter Four. The final chapter, succinctly, summarizes its preceding chapters and ends by suggesting a closer exploration of the link between epistemology and cognitive sciences, to better understand the underlying mechanics of the objections that face naturalized epistemology.
Graduate
0422
0621
soushi@gmail.com