Thematische Bibliographien / Naturalised Epistemology

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Auswahl der wissenschaftlichen Literatur zum Thema „Naturalised Epistemology“

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Veröffentlicht am 18. Mai 2024

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Zeitschriftenartikel zum Thema "Naturalised Epistemology"

Beed, C. „Naturalised epistemology and economics“. Cambridge Journal of Economics 29, Nr. 1 (01.01.2005): 99–117. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cje/bei013.

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Moraes de Assis, Saulo. „Por um naturalismo moderado?; For a moderate naturalism?“ Sofia 11, Nr. 2 (01.08.2022): e11231861. http://dx.doi.org/10.47456/sofia.v11i2.31861.

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Neste artigo, discutiremos o naturalismo de Alvin Goldman em relação à questão da normatividade da epistemologia. Para isso, revisamos a apresentação que este autor faz do conhecimento e da justificação entendidas sob um enfoque naturalista. Pretende-se entender como Goldman incorpora elementos da epistemologia especulativa tradicional ao seu ponto de vista naturalista. Apresentamos algumas distinções, feitas pelo próprio Goldman, a fim de esclarecer as diferentes abordagens que uma postura naturalista na epistemologia pode ter e discutir sua formulação de um naturalismo moderado. No final, procuramos apresentar algumas fragilidades dessa pretensão para pensar sobre a questão de se um naturalismo moderado é necessário. Abstract In this paper, we will discuss Alvin Goldman's naturalism in relation to the question of the normativity of epistemology. For this, we review the presentation that this author makes of knowledge and justification understood under a naturalistic approach. It is intended to understand how Goldman incorporates elements of traditional speculative epistemology to his naturalistic point of view. We present some distinctions, made by Goldman himself, in order to clarify the different approaches that a naturalist stance in epistemology can take and to discuss his formulation of a moderate naturalism. In the end, we try to present some weaknesses of this pretension to think about the question of whether a moderate naturalism is necessary.

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H, Jales Ribeiro. „The Roots of the Concept of Naturalised Epistemology: Russell and Quine“. Philosophy International Journal 5, Nr. 4 (10.10.2022): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.23880/phij-16000272.

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In this article, contrary to the traditional and still very current interpretations, it is shown how Russell’s philosophy, from the 1920s onwards, was on the path to Quine’s concept of naturalised epistemology, and why Russell, if he had been confronted with such a concept, could not have subscribed to it. With this objective, a re-reading of this philosophy, from the abovementioned era, is proposed, which makes evident his involvement with the problems of naturalism and behaviourism and, especially, with the respective limitations.

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Omoge, Michael. „Naturalised modal epistemology and quasi-realism“. South African Journal of Philosophy 40, Nr. 3 (03.07.2021): 229–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2021.1949556.

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Haack, Susan. „Il buono, il brutto e il cattivo. Disambiguare il naturalismo di Quine“. RIVISTA DI STORIA DELLA FILOSOFIA, Nr. 1 (März 2009): 75–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/sf2009-001006.

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- Quine's ‘epistemology naturalised' has been profoundly influential, but it is also highly ambiguous. Quine seems at times to claim only that epistemology is not a purely a priori enterprise but an empirical study, continuous with the sciences of cognition; at others, that epistemological questions can be turned over to the sciences to resolve; and on other occasions, that epistemological questions are misconceived and should be replaced by scientific investigation into cognition. What is argued here is that the first and most modest version of Quine's epistemological naturalism is potentially fruitful, the second and more ambitious indefensible, and the third and most ambitious not only false but disastrous.

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Zanet, Giancarlo. „Naturalizzazione, mente e conoscenza“. RIVISTA DI STORIA DELLA FILOSOFIA, Nr. 1 (März 2009): 151–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/sf2009-001009.

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- A controversial issue regarding Quine's naturalised epistemology is that it may involve some form of reductionism. This article focuses on one of these forms, analysing the interplay of his philosophy of mind and epistemology. It aims to show that if we take into proper consideration the way in which the version of anomalous monism embraced affects his conception of mental states like sensations and propositional attitudes, Quine's philosophy of mind should be regarded as anti-reductionist. Through a discussion of his theory of perception, I try to argue that what is entailed by it is, in a sense only partially accepted by Quine himself, that neither perception nor observational language can be strictly reduced to their stimulatory conditions. By pointing out the relevance that Quine attributes to the mechanism of empathy as a means for ascribing propositional attitudes, a further interesting argument is provided to underline that, within a naturalized epistemology, there is room for a non-reductive description of mind in some ways close to the results of the hermeneutic tradition.

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KARUVELIL, Benny. „Naturalised Epistemology and the Quinean-Chomskyan Debate Revisited“. Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 71, Nr. 4 (31.12.2009): 751–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/tvf.71.4.2045822.

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Campbell, Jennifer. „Irreducible Freedom in Nature“. Philosophy 89, Nr. 2 (25.10.2013): 301–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819113000752.

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AbstractI provide a novel response to scepticism concerning freedom and moral responsibility. This involves my extension to freedom of John McDowell's liberal natural approach to ethics and epistemology. I trace the source of the sceptical problem to an overly restrictive, brute conception of nature, where reality is equated with what figures, directly or indirectly, in natural scientific explanation. I challenge the all encompassing explanatory pretensions of restrictive naturalism, advocating a re-conception of nature such that it already incorporates reasons. This allows for an explanation of free actions which is not ultimately brute, but irreducibly normative. Against the backdrop of liberal naturalism I conceive freedom as an emergent capacity to respond to reasons which arises from the acquisition of language. I claim that freedom is a rational causal power to originate actions based within a naturalised ontology, which has sufficient depth to justify moral responsibility without begging ontological or epistemological questions.

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Lemos, John. „A Defense of Naturalistic Naturalized Epistemology“. Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 35, Nr. 105 (08.01.2003): 49–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2003.1052.

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Naturalistic naturalized epistemology combines ontological naturalism with naturalized epistemology. Ontological naturalism is the view that nothing exists other than spatio-temporal beings embedded within a space-time framework. Naturalized epistemology is a view about the nature of knowledge characterized by its commitment to externalism and the idea that knowledge consists in beliefs reliably generated by cognitive mechanisms operating in a suitable environment. Alvin Plantinga has provided a much discussed evolutionary biological argument against naturalistic naturalized epistemology. In this article I defend naturalistic naturalized epistemology by refuting Plantinga's replies to two important criticisms of his argument.

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Sans Pinillos, Alger, und Anna Estany. „Concerning the Epistemology of Design: The Role of the Eco-Cognitive Model of Abduction in Pragmatism“. Philosophies 8, Nr. 2 (29.03.2023): 33. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8020033.

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Design has usually been linked to art and applied in scenarios related to everyday life. Even when design has, on occasion, made its way into the world of academia, it has always been closely linked to art and scenarios related everyday life. At last, however, the idea of design has reached the field of epistemology: an area within the very heart of philosophy that has always focused, in theory, on the foundations of knowledge. Consequently, design is being studied from different approaches interested in the foundation of knowledge, theoretical and practical. This is one of the reasons why abduction and pragmatism have been considered relevant from a design perspective. This paper first shows the main features of abduction and pragmatism, describes their evolution and considers their mutual implications. Second, the epistemology of design is analysed considering its most relevant characteristics. Third, the connection between abduction and, on the one hand, pragmatism and, on the other, design epistemology is addressed. Finally, the role of abductive inference in grounding a real epistemology for design theory from the naturalised cognitive perspective of abduction is outlined. The central proposition is that this approach is essential as a methodological innovation, as it allows us to analyse both the inquiry process and the design process as interdependent when dealing with practical problems of a social and cultural nature. This approach allows us to analyse how human actions determine changes in the theoretical framework from which we make our inquiry. In short, the world is an open-ended project that humans design through our daily inquiry.

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Dissertationen zum Thema "Naturalised Epistemology"

Inglis, S. „The form and scope of naturalised epistemology“. Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1998. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.604930.

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This thesis is about the methodology of philosophy. In particular, it represents an attempt to answer the question 'What is it to do naturalised epistemology?' Naturalised epistemology has become a popular movement in the last thirty years, but there is no consensus as to what exactly it is to subscribe to this movement. In my thesis I locate what I call a "core idea" which is common to all conceptions of naturalised epistemology, portraying it as a philosophical movement with an inclusive attitude to empirical science. I then attempt to work out the way in which this "core idea" can best be developed into a defensible and broad programme of philosophical inquiry. Naturalism is also usually seen as a reaction against a prior philosophical orthodoxy; and I argue that the key respect in which naturalism should be seen as differing from earlier philosophical movements is in its rejection of the view that philosophical inquiry can be conducted a priori. I explore the consequences of this move for philosophical methodology, with particular reference to the problem of Cartesian scepticism.

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Krieger, Gordon S. F. „Connectionism, naturalized epistemology, and eliminative materialism“. Thesis, McGill University, 1993. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=68112.

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The aim of this essay is to explore the potential for an epistemology consistent with eliminative materialism based on work in connectionist modeling.
I present a review of the connectionist approach to psychological models that contrasts it with the classical symbolic approach, focusing on the nature of their respective representations. While defending the legitimacy of the connectionist approach, I find that its most useful application is as a basis for neuroscientific investigation.
Discussing connectionist psychology, I find it inconsistent with folk psychology and therefore consistent with eliminative materialism. I argue also for the naturalization of epistemology and thus for the relevance of psychology for epistemology. The conclusion of the essay is an outline of connectionist epistemology, which centres around two mathematical analyses of the global activity of connectionist networks; I argue that connectionist psychology leads to a version of epistemic pragmatism.

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Freedman, Karyn L. „Naturalized epistemology and the construction of normativity“. Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2001. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk3/ftp04/NQ59045.pdf.

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Christiansen, Jesse G. „Apriority in naturalized epistemology investigation into a modern defense /“. unrestricted, 2007. http://etd.gsu.edu/theses/available/etd-11272007-193136/.

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Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2007.
Title from file title page. George W. Rainbolt, committee chair; Jessica Berry, Steve Jacobson, committee members. Electronic text (43 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed Jan 18, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 43).

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Christiansen, Jesse Giles. „Apriority in Naturalized Epistemology: Investigation into a Modern Defense“. Digital Archive @ GSU, 2007. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/31.

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Versions of naturalized epistemology that overlook or reject apriority ignore innate belief-forming processes that provide much of the grounding for epistemic warrant. A rigorous analysis reveals that non-experiential ways of viewing apriority, such as innateness, establish the domain for a plausible naturalistic theory of a priori warrant. A moderate version of naturalistic epistemology that embraces the non-experiential feature of apriority and motivates future cognitive scientific research is the preferred account.

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Hundleby, Catherine. „Feminist standpoint theory as a form of naturalist epistemology“. Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2001. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk3/ftp04/NQ58217.pdf.

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Roberts, Brenda. „Connectionism and the integration of error, applications in naturalized epistemology and minimal rationality“. Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp03/MQ47880.pdf.

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Penna-Forte, Marcelo do Amaral. „Iconografia cientifica : um estudo sobre as representações visuais na ciencia“. [s.n.], 2006. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/280453.

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Orientador: Jose Carlos Pinto de Oliveira
Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas
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Resumo: A presente tese elabora um quadro geral para o estudo das representações visuais, tal como são utilizadas na atividade científica, na perspectiva de uma filosofia naturalista da ciência. Para tanto, é encaminhado um questionamento acerca das funções das representações visuais que passa pela consideração, orientada para este fim, da pertinência das análises funcionais, de uma noção adequada de representação e da caracterização da ciência como um sistema de representações. Conclui-se, finalmente, que as funções das representações visuais concernem à elaboração, ao desenvolvimento e, por vezes, à modificação da rede de similaridades que constitui a ciência
Abstract: This dissertation is concerned with the exposition of a naturalistic general framework for the study of visual representations as they are used in the scientific activity. It raises the question ci the role played by the visual representations in science. In order to do so, it argues for a functional analysis as a philosophical approach, suggests a suitable notion of representation, and describes science as a representational system. Finally, it concludes that visual representations can contribUte to the establishment, to the improvement, and to the revision of the network of similarities that constitutes science
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Doutor em Filosofia

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Guzman, Dahlia. „The Strategic Naturalism of Sandra Harding's Feminist Standpoint Epistemology: A Path Toward Epistemic Progress“. Scholar Commons, 2018. https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/7626.

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This dissertation considers the “strategic naturalism” of Sandra Harding’s standpoint theory in the philosophy of science, and it should be applied to epistemology. Strategic naturalism stipulates that all elements of inquiry are historically and culturally situated, and thereby subject to critical reflection, analysis, and revision. Allegiance to naturalism is de rigueur, yet there is no clear agreement on the term’s meaning. Harding’s standpoint theory reads the lack of definition as indicative of its generative possibilities for epistemic progress. The driving question is why Harding’s approach has not been considered a viable candidate for determining progress in epistemology. Beyond the fact that epistemic labor, in its scientific and non-scientific forms, is a social activity, Harding’s approach recognizes that it is situated in and reinforced by a broader network of social institutions, beliefs, and practices. Harding’s strategic naturalism would invigorate epistemology by increasing the awareness, acceptance, and respect for epistemic difference and drive epistemic progress that not only acknowledges pluralistic ways of knowing but also gives a more accurate account of the knowing subject. Chapter one is a discussion of non-naturalized epistemology and Quinean Naturalized Epistemology (QNE), framed by Harding’s historical account of the related projects of modern epistemology and science. This chapter highlights two important issues. The first issue is that epistemology is more complex than the story Quine offers. The second, and decisive issue is that the shared history of modern epistemology and science demonstrates the influence of social and cultural values on that history, and the long shadows they cast on naturalism debates in epistemology, science, and philosophy of science. Chapter two is an exegetical account of the origins of and motivations for critical feminist responses to both the received epistemological theory and QNE discussed in chapter one. The justifications for the feminist critiques and the problematic issues that motivate these critiques provide the backdrop for the initial, positive response to QNE, as well as their disenchantment with Quine’s influential proposal. Ultimately, feminist epistemologists and philosophers of science assess QNE as not naturalized enough to address their concerns. Chapter three considers several feminist standpoint theories to show that they are more naturalistic and better at providing a multi-faceted theory that is based on actual scientific practice, and re-introduces social values and interests as having a positive influence on epistemology and philosophies of science. This chapter shows that given the closely shared histories and assumptions of modern epistemology and science, FSE would be a viable resource for a more naturalistic epistemology. The final chapter argues that the project of naturalizing epistemology could incorporate FSE insights and the positive role FSE’s controversiality would play in naturalizing epistemology and philosophies of science. If we are to take seriously the concept of situatedness and what that entails, then naturalism must also be situated, and revisited with a critical and reflective eye. The implications on both our epistemic theories and our accounts of what kinds of knowing subject we are would foster epistemic progress.

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Lopes, Arthur Viana. „Três defesas do externalismo epistêmico“. Universidade Federal da Paraíba, 2010. http://tede.biblioteca.ufpb.br:8080/handle/tede/5689.

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The purpose of this dissertation is to defend the position known in epistemic literature as epistemic externalism. This position essentially consists in the thesis that some of the features which determine when a belief is a case of knowledge or a case of justified belief are external to the epistemic agent, i.e., they are not internal states of the agent, nor need to be consciously accessed by him. We neither criticize any particular internalist theory, nor advocate a particular externalist theory. Instead, we discuss three different topics that work as a general motivation for adopting externalism. The option for these topics is guided by an interest in naturalistic epistemology and in recent discussions of epistemology. First, we discuss the use of cases the description of imaginary cases with the intent to emphasize the intuition of a particular proposition or to show the counterintuitive consequence of a theory in the debate between internalists and externalists. We try to provide a sort of psychological diagnosis of the use of this intuitive tool and argue that the literature on concepts psychology suggests an advantage for externalist theories. Second, we discuss the contextualist approach about the skeptical paradox and its relation to conceptual analysis. We argue that a semantic approach fails to solve the paradox and that the proper understanding of its origin, and also an invariantist rejection of the contextualist approach, provide a motivation to accept the externalist solution of the problem. At last, we deal with John Pollock s criticism against externalism the idea that a proper naturalistic theory of justification has to be internalist. We analyze whether his refutation really affects all form of externalism, particularly, process reliabilism. We present Pollock s procedural theory of epistemic norms, and discuss if the reasons he presents can actually refute process reliabilism. We claim that the reasons presented do not really put Pollock s project in an advantage.
A proposta deste trabalho é defender a posição conhecida na literatura epistemológica como externalismo epistêmico. O externalismo epistêmico consiste essencialmente na tese de que alguns dos fatores que determinam quando uma crença constitui um caso de conhecimento ou um caso de crença justificada são externos ao agente epistêmico, i.e., não são estados internos ao sujeito, nem precisam ser acessados conscientemente por ele. Nós não atacamos nenhuma teoria particular do internalismo, ou mesmo defendemos uma teoria externalista particular. Em lugar disto, discutimos três tópicos distintos que servem de motivação geral para a adoção do externalismo. A escolha destes tópicos é guiada pelo interesse em uma epistemologia naturalizada e em discussões recentes da epistemologia. Primeiro, nós discutimos a utilização da análise de casos a descrição de casos imaginários com a intenção de salientar a intuição de uma proposição particular ou mostrar a consequência antiintuitiva de uma teoria no debate entre internalistas e externalistas. Nós tentamos fornecer uma espécie de diagnóstico psicológico sobre o uso desta ferramenta intuitiva e argumentamos que a literatura em psicologia de conceitos sugere um favorecimento a teorias externalistas. Segundo, nós discutimos a abordagem contextualista sobre o paradoxo cético e sua relação com a análise conceitual. Nós argumentamos que uma abordagem semântica falha em resolver o paradoxo e que a compreensão adequada de sua origem, assim como uma rejeição invariantista da posição contextualista, fornece uma motivação para aceitarmos a solução externalista do problema. Por último, nós tratamos da crítica de John Pollock ao externalismo, que consiste justamente na ideia de que uma teoria de justificação naturalista adequada deve ser internalista. Nós analisamos se sua refutação realmente atinge toda forma de externalismo e, em particular, o confiabilismo de processo. Nós apresentamos a teoria procedimental de normas epistêmicas de Pollock e discutimos se as razões que ele apresenta podem realmente refutar o confiabilismo de processo. Nós defendemos que as razões que são apresentadas não colocam realmente o projeto de Pollock em vantagem.

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Bücher zum Thema "Naturalised Epistemology"

Moral epistemology naturalized. Calgary, Alta: University of Calgary Press, 2000.

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Fairweather, Abrol, Hrsg. Virtue Epistemology Naturalized. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04672-3.

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Richmond, Campbell, und Hunter Bruce 1949-, Hrsg. Moral epistemology naturalized. Calgary, Alta: University of Calgary Press, 2000.

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Knowles, Jonathan. Norms, Naturalism and Epistemology. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230511262.

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Hilary, Kornblith, Hrsg. Naturalizing epistemology. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1985.

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1962-, Mi Chienkuo, und Chen Ruey-lin, Hrsg. Naturalized epistemology and philosophy of science. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2007.

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Hilary, Kornblith, Hrsg. Naturalizing epistemology. 2. Aufl. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1994.

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Illusions of paradox: A feminist epistemology naturalized. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998.

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Jane, Duran. Knowledge in context: Naturalized epistemology and sociolinguistics. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994.

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Meeker, Kevin. Hume’s Radical Scepticism and the Fate of Naturalized Epistemology. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137025555.

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Buchteile zum Thema "Naturalised Epistemology"

Knowles, Jonathan. „Naturalised Epistemology“. In Norms, Naturalism and Epistemology, 34–47. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230511262_3.

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Nolan, Daniel. „Naturalised Modal Epistemology“. In Modal Epistemology After Rationalism, 7–27. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44309-6_2.

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Knowles, Jonathan. „Psychologistic Naturalised Epistemology“. In Norms, Naturalism and Epistemology, 114–42. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230511262_6.

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Gjelsvik, Olav. „The Epistemology of Decision-Making “Naturalised”“. In Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine, 109–29. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3933-5_9.

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Sinclair, Robert. „Quine's Epistemology Naturalized“. In Just the Arguments, 183–87. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781444344431.ch47.

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Kvandal, Halvor. „A Virtue Epistemology for the“. In God Naturalized, 145–62. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83178-3_6.

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Fairweather, Abrol. „Bridges Between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science“. In Virtue Epistemology Naturalized, 1–9. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04672-3_1.

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Fallis, Don. „Epistemic Values and Disinformation“. In Virtue Epistemology Naturalized, 159–79. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04672-3_10.

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Comesaña, Juan. „Defeasibility Without Inductivism“. In Virtue Epistemology Naturalized, 181–92. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04672-3_11.

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Morton, Adam. „Acting to Know: A Virtue of Experimentation“. In Virtue Epistemology Naturalized, 195–205. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04672-3_12.

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