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1
Bronkhorst, Johannes. „Nāgārjuna and the Naiyāyikas“. Journal of Indian Philosophy 13, Nr. 2 (Juni 1985): 107–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00200261.
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Vaidya, Anand Jayprakash. „Perceptual, Reflective, and Speculative Doubt“. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 45 (2021): 77–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/msp202111517.
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In this paper I present the distinction between perceptual, reflective, and speculative doubt by engaging with the work of (mostly) early naiyāyikas. I argue that the definition of the causes of doubt offered by Gautama Akṣapāda in the Nyāya-Sūtra, and commented upon by later naiyāyikas leads to a distinction between perceptual and reflective doubt, but not to a notion of speculative doubt. I then move on to critically assess J.N. Mohanty’s comparison of Descartes’s method of doubt with the Nyāya theory of doubt through the lens of Janet Broughton’s work on Descartes’s Method of Doubt.
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Kataoka, Kei. „Jayanta on Kumārila’s View of Liberation“. Journal of Hindu Studies 12, Nr. 1 (10.04.2019): 12–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jhs/hiz002.
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Abstract In his Nyāyamañjarī, the Nyāya scholar Bhaṭṭa Jayanta expounds on the issue of liberation when commenting on the Nyāyasūtra. In one of its subsections Jayanta discusses a sceptical view about the very possibility of liberation and the view of the Mīmāṁsāka scholar Kumārila. The present author focuses on this section of the Nyāyamañjarī and elucidates the theoretical criteria presupposed there in order to evaluate Jayanta’s attitude towards Kumārila. Jayanta regards Kumārila as one who internally denies liberation while externally admitting its possibility. The present author also sheds light on Jayanta’s view of the means of liberation in comparison to other Naiyāyika positions. Kumārila’s emphasis on the karmic law can be regarded as a trigger for Jayanta to reconsider the previous views of the Naiyāyikas. How to deal with the accumulated karmas while following the karmic law? The present article clarifies the merits of Jayanta’s solution in terms of theory and exegesis.
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Sudo, Ryushin. „Śrīharṣa’s Critique of the Naiyāyikas’ Argumentation Theory“. Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies (Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyu) 70, Nr. 3 (25.03.2022): 1082–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.4259/ibk.70.3_1082.
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Das, Nilanjan. „Gaṅgeśa on Epistemic Luck“. Journal of Indian Philosophy 49, Nr. 2 (02.03.2021): 153–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10781-021-09461-6.
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AbstractThis essay explores a problem for Nyāya epistemologists. It concerns the notion of pramā. Roughly speaking, a pramā is a conscious mental event of knowledge-acquisition, i.e., a conscious experience or thought in undergoing which an agent learns or comes to know something. Call any event of this sort a knowledge-event. The problem is this. On the one hand, many Naiyāyikas accept what I will call the Nyāya Definition of Knowledge, the view that a conscious experience or thought is a knowledge-event just in case it is true and non-recollective. On the other hand, they are also committed to what I shall call Nyāya Infallibilism, the thesis that every knowledge-event is produced by causes that couldn’t have given rise to an error. These two commitments seem to conflict with each other in cases of epistemic luck, i.e., cases where an agent arrives a true judgement accidentally or as a matter of luck. While the Nyāya Definition of Knowledge seems to predict that these judgements are knowledge-events, Nyāya Infallibilism seems to entail that they aren’t. In this essay, I show that Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, the 14th century Naiyāyika, solves this problem by adopting what I call epistemic localism, the view that upstream causal factors play no epistemically significant role in the production of knowledge.
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Panaïoti, Antoine. „L’élimination des objections de Nāgārjuna“. Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger Tome 149, Nr. 2 (30.04.2024): 163–215. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/rphi.242.0163.
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L’Élimination des objections ( Vigraha-vyāvartanī ) de Nāgārjuna ( ii e - iii e siècles de notre ère) est un texte fondamental de la philosophie indienne classique. La première partie de ce traité donne la parole à un adepte du Nyāya, école brahmanique adhérant à un réalisme métaphysique fondé sur des considérations d’ordre logique et épistémologique et dont les positions philosophiques sont parfaitement antithétiques aux idées d’abord avancées dans les premiers sūtras mahāyānistes, puis défendues par Nāgārjuna dans son œuvre maîtresse, Les Stances du milieu par excellence ( Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā ). L’adversaire naiyāyika s’efforce de démontrer, à travers neuf objections, que la « vacuité de toute chose » ( sarvabhāvānāṃ śūnyatā ) représente une position philosophique contradictoire. Dans la deuxième partie, Nāgārjuna s’emploie à « éliminer » les objections de son opposant. En cours de route, il cherche aussi à démontrer que les principes épistémologiques sur lesquels s’appuient les naiyāyikas pour défendre leur position métaphysique sont infondés : la validité des moyens de connaissance censés nous donner un accès épistémique à un monde d’existants réels est, selon Nāgārjuna, impossible à établir. À la fin du traité, Nāgārjuna insiste sur le fait que tout bouddhiste conséquent doit reconnaître la vacuité de toute chose, puisque « rien n’est [logiquement] possible pour celui qui nie la vacuité » (stance 70). Cette traduction française précisément annotée de L’Élimination des objections est la première à être établie à partir de l’original sanskrit.
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FRAMARIN, CHRISTOPHER G. „Motivation in the Nyāyasūtra and Brahmasiddhi“. Religious Studies 44, Nr. 1 (11.01.2008): 43–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412507009158.
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AbstractOne common interpretation of the orthodox Indian prohibition on desire is that it is a prohibition on phenomenologically salient desires. The Nyāyasūtra and Brahmasiddhi seem to support this view. I argue that this interpretation is mistaken. The Vedāntins draw a distinction between counting some fact as a reason for acting (icchā) and counting one's desire (rāga) as a reason for acting, and prohibit the latter. The Naiyāyikas draw a distinction between desiring to avoid some state of affairs (dveṣa) and believing that some state of affairs is unimportant (vairāgya), and advocate the latter. Both deny that the state to which the English word ‘desire’ refers is a necessary condition of acting.
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Williams, Michael. „Mādhva Vedānta at the Turn of the Early Modern Period: Vyāsatīrtha and the Navya-Naiyāyikas“. International Journal of Hindu Studies 18, Nr. 2 (August 2014): 119–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11407-014-9157-7.
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Saccone, Margherita Serena. „The Vajracchedikā, the Self, and the Path. Kamalaśīla on Logic and Scriptures“. Asiatische Studien - Études Asiatiques 77, Nr. 1 (01.03.2023): 89–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/asia-2023-0001.
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Abstract In the *Vajracchedikāṭīkā, while commenting on a specific passage of the Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā, Kamalaśīla presents a refutation of the Self (ātman). As is well known, the Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā is one of the most important sūtras of the Buddhist Mahāyāna tradition and concerns the correct practice for those who proceed in the path of a Bodhisattva. In this article, I shall analyze a portion of Kamalaśīla’s refutation, based on a new critical edition and English translation of the *Vajracchedikāṭīkā. I will show how he takes the opportunity, while commenting on scriptures, to combine logic/epistemology and soteriology. He does this by including philosophical arguments in his explanation of the cultivation of insight, and accordingly within the spiritual path of a Bodhisattva. In the process, I shall also investigate sources containing disputes between Buddhists and Naiyāyikas (as well as Vaiśeṣikas) regarding the Self. These are evidently the background of Kamalaśīla’s refutation. In particular, he defends the so-called Buddhist non-apprehension argument against Uddyotakara’s doctrine of the perceptibility of the Self.
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Ghosh, Raghunath. „The Concept of Anumāna in Navya-nyāya“. Studia Humana 12, Nr. 1-2 (01.03.2023): 4–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/sh-2023-0002.
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Abstract According to the Navya Naiyāyikas, inference is the knowledge, which is produced out of consideration. But what is to be understood by the term ‘consideration’ or ‘parāmarśa’? According to them, parāmarśa or consideration is the factor through the operation of which the inferential conclusion can be attained. Parāmarśa has been defined as the knowledge of the existence of the hetu or reason in the pakṣa or subject, which reason is characterized by its being concomitant with the sādhya, the knowledge in the form of parāmarśa is actually caused by the knowledge of invariable concomitance of probans (hetu) with the probandum (sādhya) and the knowledge of the existence of the hetu in the subject (pakṣa). It has been said by Viśvanātha that the cognition of the existence of probans or hetu in the subject of inference along with the cognition of the prabans or hetu as pervaded by sādhya is called parāmarśa (pakṣasya vyāpyavṛttitvadhīḥ parāmarśa ucyate). The invariable co-existence in the form ‘where there is smoke, there is fire’ is known as vyāpti or invariable concomitance. Here the invariable coexistence (avyabhicārī sāhacarya) between the probans and probandum (i.e., smoke and fire) is the definition of vyāpti. The term ‘co-existence’ means remaining in the same locus of the probans with the probandum, which is not the counter positive of the absolute negation existing in the locus of the hetu. To Gangeśa, the knowledge of the co-existence of the probans and probandum along with the absence of the knowledge of deviation of the probans is the cause of ascertaining vyāpti. Repeated observations, of course, sometimes act as a promoter (prayojaka) in ascertaining vyāpti by removing the doubt of deviation. The doubt of deviation can be removed sometimes by Tarka or sometimes by the absence of the collocation of causes of doubt, which is called svataḥsiddhaḥ. Gangeśa admits sāmānyalakṣaṇā as a pratyāsatti in ascertaining vyāpti between smoke-in-general and fire-in-general. To him, the super-normal connection through universal (sāmānyalakṣaṇā pratyāsatti) has got a prominent role in ascertaining vyāpti. If somebody challenges about the validity of the syllogistic argument in the form “The mountain is fiery as it possesses smoke” (parvato vahnimān dhūmāt), the philosophers of Nyāya and Navya-nyāya persuasion will justify the same with the help of five constituents (avayava-s). The process is called parāthānumāna (syllogistic argument for making others understand). The constituents of a syllogism are proposition (pratijňā), reason (hetu), example (udāharaṇa), application (upanaya), and conclusion (nigamana).
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Park, Ki Yeal. „A study on the right knowledge(tattvajñāna) in the “Akṣapādadarśana”, the 11th chapter of Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha“. Korean Institute for Buddhist Studies 58 (28.02.2023): 171–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.34275/kibs.2023.58.171.
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Naiyāyikas say that the highest good is achieved through the right knowledge (tattvajñāna) for the sixteen topics (padārtha), beginning the means of knowledge, the object of knowledge, etc. The acquisition of the right knowledge would be the direct cause to remove the wrong knowledge (mithyājñāna), and the mental disturbances (doṣa), the bad activities (pravṛtti) by body-language-mind, birth (janman) one after another would be removed. Finally, the right knowledge leads to reaching liberation (apavarga), being in the complete extinction of suffering. This order to get liberation is backward against the order to generate suffering. Therefore, it could be said that the attainment of the right knowledge is the key to have liberation that is the highest good. The classic Nyāya theory, however, does not concretize the acquisition method of the right knowledge, but in Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha (SDS) Ⅺ, there is a supplement on how to get the right knowledge. That is the role of the Supreme Being (parameśvara) as the direct cause to raise the right knowledge. It is defined as the authority (or proof) of the right means of knowledge (prāmāṇya) that tends not to be emphasized in the classic Nyāya school. Mādhava says in SDS Ⅺ that it is required to attain preveniently dharma on the Supreme Being as the authority of the right means of knowledge through śabda, one of the means of the right knowledge-s (pramāṇa-s) defined as teachings by a trustful teacher (āptopadeśa) according to Nyāya’s theory. Practicing the contemplation (samāhi) repeatedly and continuously, keeping the dharma of the Supreme Being at the same time, Yogi could, at last, come to the right knowledge. It does not mean the Supreme Being is the object of knowledge, but the means of knowledge in the yoga practice. The concept of the dharma is supposed to be influenced by the dharma in VS 1.1.2. The sūtra defines dharma as the means to reach at exaltation (abhyudaya) and the highest goods (niḥśreyasa). The paper considers the above summary of Nyāya’s liberation theory with the right knowledge as the central figure through the examination of the quoted Nyāyabhāṣya and Udayana’s Nyāyakusumāñjali 4.5.-6. in SDS Ⅺ, splitting up the contents on the right knowledge into the definition of, the role of, and the attainment of the right knowledge chapter. The paper would have a chance to introduce Nyāya school’s liberation and the practice. There may have been overemphasized the aspect of the epistemological and logical theory of the Nyāya school as compared to the aspect of the liberation and truth of the Nyāya school. On the other hand, the paper would show the fragmentary aspect that Mādhava tries to consolidate the liberation theories of the traditional philosophy schools (āstika-s) into one theory in SDS Ⅺ based on the thought of Udayana, who had integrated both theories of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika school.
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Park, Ki Yeal. „The controversy surrounding 'inexpressible'(avyapadeśya) in the definition of perception(pratyakṣa) between Naiyāyika and Buddhist“. Korean Institute for Buddhist Studies 54 (28.02.2021): 9–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.34275/kibs.2021.54.009.
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Watson, Alex. „The Self as a Dynamic Constant. Rāmakaṇṭha’s Middle Ground Between a Naiyāyika Eternal Self-Substance and a Buddhist Stream of Consciousness-Moments“. Journal of Indian Philosophy 42, Nr. 1 (14.02.2014): 173–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10781-013-9215-2.
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„Technical Terms of Navya-Nyāya Language and its Methodology“. Regular Issue 4, Nr. 10 (15.06.2020): 98–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.35940/ijmh.j0978.0641020.
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The Navya-Nyāya language1 (Neo-logic) exhibit one of the purest languages of human intellect. It has been assists India’s intellectual academic culture and traditions. From the 10th Century AD Navya-Naiyāyikas emphasized one-step further in intelligentsia and came out with a precise technical language which is a special form of Sanskrit-delimits ultimate mining of each and every word and capture reality as it is, destroy Jalpa and Vitaṇdā kind of dialogues in intellectual countering amid different school of thoughts. Since Navya-Nyāya language is a peculiar language based on logic-thought and reality invented by Great Indian logicians that is why it has been treated an artificial language as well. Due to unique features of Navya-Nyāya language many traditional philosophical problems have been scientifically clarified and resolved. Navya-Nyāya methodology proved to be so multifaceted not just for philosophers, but also in poetics, linguistics, legal theories, and other domains of medieval Indian thought process. Apart from philosophers, Navya-Nyāya style of writing has also been adapted by grammarians, aestheticians and the scholars of rhetoric and poetry. The reason for this could be the ease of putting one’s views methodologically and unambiguously when using Navya-Nyāya language for universal thinking. Navya-Nyāya made the evolution that there was Navya-Vyākaraṇa, Navya-Mīmāṁsā and Navya-Vedānta’s new school of thoughts arose. These terms came into configuration only because of Navya-Nyāya and these other schools followed the footsteps of Navya-Nyāya very systematically. The focus of modern Navya-Nyāya was to define terms in a precise and particular manner and then to formulate or emerge a language which may be called ‘the precise medium of communication’. It was necessary to evolve a new or should we say an artificial language to do away with the possible ambiguity, which is a basic quality of any natural language. Since natural language cannot be totally ambiguity-free, NavyaNyāya can serve the academic needs. To understand our Indian Intellectual Traditions in medieval period or the actual meaning of our Śāstras written after 10 th century AD, this NavyaNyāya language and Methodology is highly efficient device. Without proper knowledge of Navya-Nyāya, intellectual development of aforementioned period cannot be properly known. Hence, this, paper would try to revive the basic features of Navya-Nyāya by analysing its technical terms so that it could serve contemporary academic needs and so on.
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Williams, Michael Thomas. „The Impact of Navya-Nyāya on Mādhva Vedānta: Vyāsatīrtha and the Problem of Empty Terms“. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 17.10.2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10781-020-09453-y.
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Abstract In this article, I explore the encounter of the Mādhva philosopher Vyāsatīrtha with the works of the Navya-Naiyāyika Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya. The article is based on original translations of passages from Vyāsatīrtha’s Nyāyāmr̥ta and Tarkatāṇḍava. Philosophically, the article focuses on the issue of empty-terms/nonexistent entities, particularly in the context of the theory of inference. I begin by outlining the origin of the Mādhva and Nyāya positions about these issues in their respective analyses of perceptual illusion. I then contrast the role of Gaṅgeśa’s thought in the Nyāyāmr̥ta and Tarkatāṇḍava and show how Vyāsatīrtha responds to Gaṅgeśa’s ideas in different ways in those texts. I conclude with a discussion of how Vyāsatīrtha defends the Mādhva theory of “substrate-free” qualities against Gaṅgeśa in order to show that we can think and make valid inferences about nonexistent things.
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Das, Nilanjan. „Uddyotakara on Universals I: Against Resemblance Nominalism“. Journal of Hindu Studies, 18.03.2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jhs/hiac012.
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Abstract Universals are properties that are shared by multiple objects. In classical South Asia, Brahmanical thinkers from Vyākaraṇa, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṃsā text traditions were realists about universals, while most Buddhists were nominalists. In this paper, my aim is to reconstruct the early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of universals, with special emphasis on the arguments of the Nyāya philosopher Uddyotakara (6th century CE) against a Buddhist strand of resemblance nominalism. I show that Uddyotakara's contribution to this debate is twofold. First, he is possibly the first Naiyāyika to adopt a sparse theory of universals, a theory according to which it is necessary to posit only those universals which explain how objects resemble each other in the most fundamental or irreducible respects. On the other hand, he offers a few arguments for realism, which are explicitly motivated by a causal constraint on intentionality.