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1
Yang, Sung Yoon. „Rethinking Modes of Market Definition for multi-Sided Platforms“. International Journal of Trade, Economics and Finance 9, Nr. 4 (August 2018): 164–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.18178/ijtef.2018.9.4.608.
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Holzweber, Stefan. „Market Definition for Multi-Sided Platforms: A Legal Reappraisal“. World Competition 40, Issue 4 (01.12.2017): 563–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2017036.
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It is frequently assumed that the outcome of today’s most discussed competition law cases hinges on market definition. In the context of multi-sided platforms, delimiting the relevant product market is a particularly delicate and complex task. Thus, this article seeks to analyse, from both an economic and a legal perspective, how relevant product markets for multi-sided platforms are properly defined under European competition law. Multi-sided platforms act as intermediaries which enable distinct groups of customers (also called platform-sides) to interact with each other. Multi-sided platforms have the possibility to set different prices for each group of customers, therefore econometric tools such as the small-but-significant-non-transitory increase-in-price test (SSNIP-test) must be applied with caution. It is argued that multi-sidedness can be considered a question of degree, therefore, for the purpose of market definition, it is necessary to distinguish different types of multi-sided platforms. The stronger the indirect network effects involved, the more the market definition deviates from traditional approaches. Indeed, the established legal framework allows a sound categorization of various forms of multi-sided platforms. In the context of multi-sided platforms, markets are regularly closely interrelated, therefore, the competitive assessment would be incomplete without an intermarket-analysis.
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Hoppner, Thomas. „Defining Markets for Multi-Sided Platforms: The Case of Search Engines“. World Competition 38, Issue 3 (01.09.2015): 349–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2015030.
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Despite the rise of two- or multi-sided platforms in the digital sector, there is not yet an established antitrust policy for defining relevant markets that involve such platforms. Difficulties arise in particular where services are granted for free to some users. This article explains which platform user groups form separate (sub-)markets and with which quantitative and qualitative methods substitution relationships can be assessed for each sub-market. Considering the need to take account of the interactions between all user groups of a multi-sided platform, it is suggested that separate relevant markets should be recognized for each user group with differing demands that individually interacts with the platform in order to procure a service. Such interaction requires direct contact and an exchange between user and platform. It does not, however, pre-suppose any payment stream as users may also ‘pay’ with personal data, their attention or the granting of usage rights. Consequently, search engines, for instance, form a three-sided market consisting of i) a market for online search advertising existing between search providers and advertisers, ii) a market for web search services existing between search providers and Internet users, and iii) a market for indexing content existing between search providers and website operators.
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Rayskin, Victoria. „Dynamics of Two-Sided Markets“. Review of Marketing Science 14, Nr. 1 (01.01.2016): 1–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/roms-2015-0001.
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AbstractThis paper considers a dynamical system, which models a two-sided market. I evaluate the volume of users from each side of the market as a function of time. I formulate and prove theorems describing the long-term behavior and tendency of the market. Even though I consider generic attachment functions, I obtain a concrete result, formulated in terms of properties of attachment functions. This result is followed by examples (defined by the most popular in economics attachment functions), which illustrate behavior of the two-sided markets. I also simulate some two-sided market scenarios, showing how adjustments of attachment functions can influence the users’ dynamics. The dynamical system’s approach to the study of two-sided market problem allows natural generalization to multi-sided market, where one can utilize the same technique and obtain similar results in higher dimensions.
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Holzmann, Thomas, Klaus Sailer und Bernhard R. Katzy. „Matchmaking as multi-sided market for open innovation“. Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 26, Nr. 6 (02.05.2014): 601–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09537325.2014.913786.
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de Matta, Renato, Timothy J. Lowe und Dengfeng Zhang. „Competition in the multi-sided platform market channel“. International Journal of Production Economics 189 (Juli 2017): 40–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2017.03.022.
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7
Weyl, E. Glen. „A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms“. American Economic Review 100, Nr. 4 (01.09.2010): 1642–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.4.1642.
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I develop a general theory of monopoly pricing of networks. Platforms use insulating tariffs to avoid coordination failure, implementing any desired allocation. Profit maximization distorts in the spirit of A. Michael Spence (1975) by internalizing only network externalities to marginal users. Thus the empirical and prescriptive content of the popular Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole (2006) model of two-sided markets turns on the nature of user heterogeneity. I propose a more plausible, yet equally tractable, model of heterogeneity in which users differ in their income or scale. My approach provides a general measure of market power and helps predict the effects of price regulation and mergers. (JEL D42, D85, L14)
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Condorelli, Daniele, und Jorge Padilla. „Harnessing Platform Envelopment in the Digital World“. Journal of Competition Law & Economics 16, Nr. 2 (18.04.2020): 143–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhaa006.
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Abstract We revisit the economics of “platform envelopment strategies,” whereby a dominant platform (the enveloper) operating in a multi-sided market (the origin market) enters a second multi-sided market (the target market) by leveraging the data obtained from its shared user relationships. In particular, we analyze the logic and effects of “privacy policy tying,” a strategy whereby the enveloper requests consumers to grant their consent to combining their data in both origin and target markets. This may allow the enveloper to fund the services offered to all sides of the target market by monetizing data in the origin market, monopolize the target market, and entrench its dominant position in the origin market. We conclude by considering a range of possible policy interventions that may serve to limit such potential anticompetitive effects, while preserving the efficiencies generated by conglomerate platforms.
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FRANCK, Jens-Uwe, und Martin PEITZ. „Market Definition in the Platform Economy“. Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 23 (Dezember 2021): 91–127. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cel.2021.13.
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AbstractThe article addresses the role market definition can play for EU competition practice in the platform economy. The focus is on intermediaries that bring together groups of users whose decisions are interdependent, which therefore are commonly referred to as ‘two-sided platforms’. We address challenges to market definition that accompany these cross-group network effects, assess current practice in a number of competition cases, and provide guidance for adapting practice to properly account for the economic forces shaping markets with two-sided platforms. We ask whether and when a single market can be defined that encompasses both sides. We advocate a multi-markets approach that takes account of cross-market linkages, acknowledges the existence of zero-price markets, and properly accounts for the homing behaviour of market participants.
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Jullien, Bruno. „Competition in Multi-Sided Markets: Divide and Conquer“. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 3, Nr. 4 (01.11.2011): 186–219. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.3.4.186.
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This paper studies Stackelberg price competition in a multi-sided market. The second-mover can engage in divide-and-conquer strategies, which involve cross-subsidies between sides. The paper recovers bounds on profits, and refines the results with a selection criteria whereby consumers resolve coordination failure in favor of a focal platform. It then analyzes perfect price discrimination with network effects, and two-sided market, sheding lights on inefficiencies and strategic choices by platforms. A leading platform may refrain from selling to some side in order to soften competition, it tends to favor excessively balanced market shares and may prefer compatibility to reduce price competition. (JEL D43, D85)
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Aziz, Haris, Péter Biró und Makoto Yokoo. „Matching Market Design with Constraints“. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 36, Nr. 11 (28.06.2022): 12308–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v36i11.21495.
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Two-sided matching is an important research area that has had a major impact on the design of real-world matching markets. One consistent feature in many of the real-world applications is that they impose new feasibility constraints that lead to research challenges. We survey developments in the field of two-sided matching with various constraints, including those based on regions, diversity, multi-dimensional capacities, and matroids.
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Gu, Nina, Hang Min und Meiru Chen. „Multihoming Competition of Delivery Platforms in the Two-sided Market and Its Effects on Social Welfare“. Advances in Economics, Management and Political Sciences 3, Nr. 1 (21.03.2023): 192–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.54254/2754-1169/3/2022783.
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This paper analyzes the platform competition in a differentiated setting (delivery platform) and the effects of social welfare in two-sided markets in the multi-homing platform. Also identifies interdependence between the two sides served by the same platform. Considering the reality of the economy and the diversity of consumer behavior. Single-homing and multihoming in the real economy is relatively small. The vast majority of users in the platforms of two-sided markets belong to partial multi-homing. Through research, it is found that partial multi-homing of delivery platforms is decided by consumer differentiation and platform differentiation. In particular, higher customer loyalty and product differentiation means higher competitiveness in the market.
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Alpa, Guido. „On Contractual Power of Digital Platforms“. European Business Law Review 34, Issue 3 (01.05.2023): 377–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/eulr2023023.
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Digital markets and platforms are increasingly important in commercial life, and the way contracts are formed between users and platforms in multi-sided markets raise many important legal issues. This article interrogates the nature of multi-sided market contracting, and raises questions regarding the binding of users to standard terms, especially extensive limitations of liability. Platforms also govern the terms between supply and demand sides, many of which are standardised and not necessarily bargained for by users on the platform. This gatekeeper role should entail a heightened level of responsibility. Digital markets, platforms, gatekeepers, contractual formation, contractual exclusions, limitations of liability
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Stricker, Lukas, Joël Wagner und Angela Zeier Röschmann. „The Future of Insurance Intermediation in the Age of the Digital Platform Economy“. Journal of Risk and Financial Management 16, Nr. 9 (25.08.2023): 381. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/jrfm16090381.
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Today most insurance is sold by over a million brokers and independent agents acting as intermediaries between the insurance companies and their customers. Digitalization and changing customer behavior have fostered the development of insurtech businesses, and, more recently, multi-sided platforms are emerging as new market forms for insurance intermediation. This paper aims to provide a better understanding of how the emergence of the platform economy, with a market dominated by multi-sided platforms, will potentially impact insurance intermediation in the future. Using inductive content analysis on the results of a systematic literature review of the body of research on insurance intermediation, we identify the key functional roles fulfilled by insurance intermediaries. Applying these roles to a literature review on multi-sided platforms allows us to compare how different market forms and players embody the functional roles of intermediaries. Our findings suggest that multi-sided platforms are better able to perform certain roles in terms of agility, scale and scope, and we discuss the future role of platforms in insurance intermediation.
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Gonen, Rica, und Erel Segal-Halevi. „Strongly Budget Balanced Auctions for Multi-Sided Markets“. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 34, Nr. 02 (03.04.2020): 1998–2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5571.
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In two-sided markets, Myerson and Satterthwaite's impossibility theorem states that one can not maximize the gain-from-trade while also satisfying truthfulness, individual-rationality and no deficit. Attempts have been made to circumvent Myerson and Satterthwaite's result by attaining approximately-maximum gain-from-trade: the double-sided auctions of McAfee (1992) is truthful and has no deficit, and the one by Segal-Halevi et al. (2016) additionally has no surplus — it is strongly-budget-balanced. They consider two categories of agents — buyers and sellers, where each trade set is composed of a single buyer and a single seller.The practical complexity of applications such as supply chain require one to look beyond two-sided markets. Common requirements are for: buyers trading with multiple sellers of different or identical items, buyers trading with sellers through transporters and mediators, and sellers trading with multiple buyers. We attempt to address these settings.We generalize Segal-Halevi et al. (2016)'s strongly-budget-balanced double-sided auction setting to a multilateral market where each trade set is composed of any number of agent categories. Our generalization refines the notion of competition in multi-sided auctions by introducing the concepts of external competition and trade reduction. We also show an obviously-truthful implementation of our auction using multiple ascending prices.Full version, including omitted proofs and simulation experiments, is available at https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.08094.
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Teece, David J., Asta Pundziene, Sohvi Heaton und Maaja Vadi. „Managing Multi-Sided Platforms: Platform Origins and Go-to-Market Strategy“. California Management Review 64, Nr. 4 (August 2022): 5–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/00081256221109961.
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Multi-sided platforms (MSPs) are becoming increasingly important in contemporary economies. This special issue of California Management Review aims to stimulate collective discussion among researchers and practitioners on advancing diverse types of MSPs and on better understanding their future development. This article analyzes five contributions to this special issue and explores the growth trajectories of MSPs. There are three types of platforms: born-platform, platform-born adjacent, and incumbent-born. And they rely respectively on three market entry strategies: market creation, market broadening, and market deepening. This article also spotlights the coopetition dynamics of the platforms.
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Michael, Neubert. „Market Entry Form Choices of Multi-Sided Platforms in the Travel Booking Sector“. International Journal of Business and Management 18, Nr. 6 (29.11.2023): 222. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ijbm.v18n6p222.
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The purpose of this study is to explore how online travel booking firms using multi-sided platform (MSP) business models select their market entry forms using the affecting factors of foreign market entry as a conceptual framework. The utilization of a multiple-case study is employed to conduct a comprehensive analysis and to investigate the patterns and behaviors exhibited among the various cases. Data from five online travel booking companies using MSP business models, including company portfolios, business plans, company websites, and online archives, were gathered and analyzed to ensure cross-validation and triangulation. Through examination of the data from the study, five themes could be identified to answer the research question. The findings suggest that online travel booking firms using MSP business models: 1) Gain access to foreign markets primarily through the utilization of export modes. 2) Employ hierarchical modes for the first internationalization. 3) Use intermediate modes whenever local regulations necessitate their implementation. 4) Adopt hierarchical modes when the target country holds the top position as the most preferred destination from the home market or when the home country ranks as the number one choice for visitors from the target market. The findings of this study will contribute to the expansion of the knowledge of online travel booking firms using MSP business models. Furthermore, it will also provide practical resources to founders, executives, and entrepreneurs to understand how companies with MSP business models select their market entry forms in the online travel booking sector.
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LEVAKOV, P. A. „ESTIMATING THE EFFECTOF EXCLUSIVITY ON MULTI-SIDED MARKETS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF VIDEO GAME MARKET“. Moscow University Economics Bulletin 58, Nr. 3 (07.07.2023): 68–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.55959/msu0130-0105-6-58-3-4.
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At present many markets may be viewed as multisided with platforms where different groups of agents interact. However, many aspects of these markets are still not thoroughly studied, including the competition between platforms with the goal to increase user base. As noted in many theoretical works, due to the phenomenon of zero prices, non-price factors of competition play a leading role on such markets. Among others the importance of exclusive contracts is highlighted in scientific literature, but empirically their effect on the user base has not been fully estimated. In this study we examine video game market since its importance in global economy has increased in the recent decades. The effect of exclusivity on the total video game platforms’ sales and on the sales volumes of individual video games is empirically estimated. As an additional control variable, the age rating of video games is included, which was not considered in prior works. Drawing on the results of estimating econometric model, the author concludes that for platforms on the video game market it is advantageous to increase the share of exclusive contracts, but this relationship is characterized by diminishing returns to scale. On the other hand, for video game developers exclusive distribution on a particular platform results in lower overall sales. Based on these results it can be concluded that platforms can compete for exclusive contracts and in the process of negotiating for exclusivity a compensation from the platform should be provided to video game developers
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Schächtele, Jan, und Jens Uhlenbrock. „How to Regulate a Market-Driven Rollout of Smart Meters? A Multi-Sided Market Perspective“. Competition and Regulation in Network Industries 13, Nr. 3 (September 2012): 273–305. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/178359171201300304.
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Kim, Song-Kyoo (Amang). „Versatile Stochastic Two-Sided Platform Models“. Mathematics 11, Nr. 1 (27.12.2022): 131. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/math11010131.
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This paper deals with the alternative mathematical modeling of the two-side platform. Two-sided platforms are specific multi-sided platforms that bring together two distinct groups of a model. The stochastic modeling by adapting various innovative mathematical methods including the first exceed theory and the stochastic pseudo-game theory has been applied for describing a two-sided platform more properly. A stochastic pseudo-game model is newly introduced to solve the two-sided platform more effectively. Analytically tractable results for operation thresholds for maximizing profits are provided and it also delivers the optimal balance of a two-sided platform. The paper includes how these innovative models are applied into various two-sided market situations. Additionally, users could conduct these multi-sided models to real business developments and the case practices of these unique models shall help the readers who want to find recommendations of their business situations easily even without having any mathematical background.
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Eferin, Yaroslav, Yuri Hohlov und Carlo Rossotto. „Digital platforms in Russia: competition between national and foreign multi-sided platforms stimulates growth and innovation“. Digital Policy, Regulation and Governance 21, Nr. 2 (08.03.2019): 129–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/dprg-11-2018-0065.
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Purpose This paper aims to test the “winner-takes-all” vs the “winner-takes-some” scenarios in digital platform competition dynamics in emerging markets. Design/methodology/approach This paper uses an analytical reference framework to assess the emergence of digital platforms in Russia, including four elements: definition of multi-sided platforms (MSPs), platform enablers, business models and competitive dynamics. Findings This paper concludes that Russia shows that a healthy competition between national and foreign MSPs led to the emergence of a shared equilibrium, where local platforms were able to retain a significant, often majority, share vis-à-vis foreign and global platforms. Research limitations/implications This paper stands as a counterpoint to the widespread conviction that digital platform dynamics will result into a “winner-takes-all” scenario and dominance of global platforms. Practical implications This case study offers practical data and analysis that can be used to create a baseline and evaluate the dynamics of digital platforms in emerging markets. It offers data, trends and evidence on Russia’s digital economy. Social implications This research provides a logical framework to help policymakers take decisions on a policy framework to regulate platforms in emerging markets. The good outcome of competition between local and foreign platforms should emerge as a policy objective to achieve in most emerging markets. Originality/value This case study is the first baseline to assess the dynamics of competition between national and foreign digital platforms in the Russian market. It is one of the first papers to tackle the market of digital platforms in an emerging and developing economy. It tries to address the debate between “winner-takes-all” and “winner-takes some” competition equilibrium through a concrete case study in an important G20 emerging market economy.
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Kira, Beatriz. „Is iFood Starving the Market? Antitrust Enforcement in the Market for Online Food Delivery in Brazil“. World Competition 46, Issue 2 (01.06.2023): 133–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2023009.
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This article examines the decisions taken by the Brazilian Competition Authority, the Administrative Council for Economic Defence (CADE) in two antitrust cases related the dominant food delivery platform iFood, one merger review and one investigation into exclusive dealing agreements. Through an in-depth examination of the case documents, this article uncovers the evolution in CADE’s comprehension of the competition dynamics in multi-sided digital markets, while also revealing gaps and inadequacies in the authority’s substantive and procedural antitrust enforcement. Based on the findings, the article draws lessons that can help strengthen the authority’s approach to digital platform cases in the future. Firstly, CADE must adapt its steps of analysis and develop new theories of harms that are better tailored to the characteristics of multi-sided platforms. Secondly, CADE should conduct more rigorous merger reviews that take into account the wider impact of dominant platforms’ business strategies on the ecosystem of players orbiting them. Thirdly, the article highlights the importance of the authority building its capacities and expertise to detect competition problems from an early stage, design effective remedies, and ensure these remedies are enforced effectively. These recommendations underscore the significance of continuously updating the enforcement framework and enhancing the capabilities of the competition authority to keep pace with the rapidly evolving digital economy. digital markets, competition law, antitrust, exclusivity dealing, merger review, theories of harm, online food delivery, Brazil
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Kang, SeonJun, und Sang-Yong Tom Lee. „Korean Online Game's Platform Competition under Two-Sided Market Characteristic“. Journal of Global Information Management 22, Nr. 4 (Oktober 2014): 21–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/jgim.2014100102.
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While the growth of total game market size slowed down and the arcade game industry started to shrink, the online game market keeps increasing, attaining 26.5% annual growth rate for the early 2010's. Korea's online game business is especially popular, so that the size is about US$ 4 billion, which is 64.2% of Korea's total game industry. In 2013, Game market size and online game market size were estimated to be about US$ 9 billion and US$ 7 billion, respectively. From a standpoint of sales, the game market in Korea (US$ 4.95 billion) accounts for 5.8% of the world game market and almost one third of the world online game market. Its growth rate is higher than that of the world game market. The online game markets in Korea and China have common characteristics that can be distinguished from other countries: two-sided market with very low switching costs. This paper is to study the important factors that affect Korean online game's platform competition. The authors empirically investigate network externalities by using various variables in online game industry in Korea. The authors found the number of games available in a platform positively affects its market share, while the diversity of games and generality of game rating had no significant impacts. The authors also found that multi-homing (or overlap of games) increases an online platform's market share when the platform is relatively new. However, multi-homing decreases market share when it becomes mature. Having done our empirical and academic analyses, the authors draw practical implications that may help decision makers in Korea's online game businesses.
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Vartanov, Sergey. „Modelling Economic Effects of the Media Influence as Methodological Basis for Strategizing the Media System“. Theoretical and Practical Issues of Journalism 10, Nr. 4 (15.12.2021): 711–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.17150/2308-6203.2021.10(4).711-733.
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This research focused on the impact of media industry on other sectors of the economy. Advertising is considered as a basic implementation mechanism of media’s economic impact on the economy. The study used the original classification of the effects of economic impact on the market at all levels, developed by the author. It examined the highest level of advertising associated with the shift in market structure and economic interactions of its members and elements. The effects of this type — tertiary ones — include not only changes in the properties of equilibrium due to advertising, but also the emergence of new types of market participants whose economic activity is determined exclusively by advertising-related goals. To describe such effects, models of marketing channels are used — a special kind of production chains that connect the preceding and subsequent units with the help of contracts for advertising and promotional activities, and models of multi-sided markets, complementing the analysis with the study of the behavior of intermediary firms that place advertisements in the media. and linking producers and consumers. Classical models of two-sided markets, considering media as platforms connecting consumers with producers, do not consider the simultaneous consumption of goods and content by the audience and the nature of the producing firms’ problems. Therefore, in this paper, the focus of the study was on the models of a three-sided market, which includes three types of participants (consumers, media firms and industrial firms). It is proposed to put such models of intersectoral relations as the basis for quantitative methods of strategizing the media system, including at the national level. At the level of strategizing of individual media enterprises or holdings, the proposed model makes it possible to predict the long-term strategies of competitors. At the industrial level of strategy development, the proposed methodology makes it possible to build key indicators that determine the strategic priorities of the industry development based on the properties of the three-sided market equilibrium.
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Zin Ko Ko, ABDUL MUHAIMIN, MUHAMMAD ‘AFIF AKMAL und ABDUL RAHMAN AHMAD DAHLAN. „A CONCEPTUAL ICOOKIES MULTI-SIDED BUSINESS MODEL“. Journal of Information Systems and Digital Technologies 4, Nr. 1 (30.05.2022): 28–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.31436/jisdt.v4i1.297.
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The purpose of this paper is to present a conceptual iCookies business model, with a digital platform and apps, that is aligned with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) in reducing poverty; building-up valuable skills, decent works and entrepreneurship including among the B40s; and in providing consumers with quality & variety cookies worldwide. The B40 community are struggling to find a stable and decent job, especially in this pandemic time. Job opportunity with a digital platform to start a business will benefit the low-income people and B40s. B40s pains include lack of funds and skills to start the business. As for sellers, the online marketplace will help them promote and market their products. The digital platform will help sellers gain more customers and make higher sales. A trusted platform will help donors make the donation and feel at ease without having to worry about scams or implicit donations. Donors will attract to make donations on the platform as it is trusted for the transparency of the donation process. The Customer Segments in this paper are organizations & individuals who want to buy their favourite cookies locally & globally; cookies sellers who want to promote their cookies; low-income people (B40), underemployed, and unemployed who want valuable and employable in baking cookies; and donors who want to build a philanthropic brand on creating employment and companies who want a new generation of employees to learn their cookies. This paper highlights the difficulties faced by various Customer segments along with the conceptual solution to overcome the difficulties. Poverty among B40s (SDG1 - No Poverty), hunger faced by the B40s (SDG2 - Zero Hunger) and unemployment challenges are among the obstacles or significant problems identified (SDG8 - Decent Work and Economic Growth). The key problems were identified, and suitable conceptual solutions were created using the Design Thinking (DT) technique. This process includes completing a literature review, testing, and questionnaires to identify and describe the issue of segments, as well as brainstorming, and testing potential solutions. The methodology adopted for this paper is based on the Design Thinking process using literature review, biz modelling tools namely Business Model Canvas (BMC) and Value Proposition Canvas (VPC), and survey. This paper intends to help the consumer to enjoy a variety of cookies around the world and help cookies sellers by providing an online platform. Moreover, the B40 people will gain skills and get job opportunities to make an income. Last but not least, the donors can make their donations without any worries.
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Huang, Lei, Miltos Ladikas, Guangxi He, Julia Hahn und Jens Schippl. „A multi-sided market of personal data resource allocation: An empirical study of China’s car-hailing platform“. Competition and Regulation in Network Industries 22, Nr. 3-4 (September 2021): 189–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/17835917211051223.
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The current rapid development of online car-hailing services creates a serious challenge to the existing paradigm of market governance and antitrust policy. However, the debate on the market structure of the car-hailing platform requires more empirical evidence to uncover its functions. This research adopts an interdisciplinary methodology based on computer science and economics, and including software reverse engineering tools applied to the interoperability of the terminal application and resource allocation model, to demonstrate the topological market structure of personal data resources allocation in China’s car-hailing industry. Within the discussion of the hybrid nature of technology and economy, the analysis results clearly show that China’s car-hailing platform services present a multi-sided market structure when seen from the perspective of personal data resource allocation. Personal data resource (PDR), that is considered an essential market resource, is applied as an asset transferred unhindered between platforms via the application programming interface, and thus, creating a new market allocation mechanism. The connection between the car-hailing platforms and social media platforms is an essential aspect of the market competition in the domain. As applications of online platforms increase in the global context, this research offers a new perspective in personal data resource allocation with implications for the governance of the platform economy.
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Wolski, Dominik. „Private antitrust enforcement in digital market“. Bratislava Law Review 4, Nr. 2 (31.12.2020): 147–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.46282/blr.2020.4.2.210.
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The increasing popularity of private antitrust enforcement in the EU is reflected by number of antitrust damages claims in the member states, following the transposition of the Damages Directive. Meanwhile, rapid growth of digitization in every aspect of social and economic life, particularly in business like commerce and services, has taken place. Recently, the above phenomenon was intensified by COVID-19. This paper aims at discussing private antitrust enforcement and antitrust damages claims in the context of digital transformation of the market. To this extent, there are several main characteristics of the market (e.g. multi-sided platforms, the role of third-party sellers, etc.), that have to be taken into consideration in the above discussion.
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Ondrus, Jan, Avinash Gannamaneni und Kalle Lyytinen. „The Impact of Openness on the Market Potential of Multi-Sided Platforms: A Case Study of Mobile Payment Platforms“. Journal of Information Technology 30, Nr. 3 (September 2015): 260–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/jit.2015.7.
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A multi-sided platform can only succeed if a critical mass of users can join. This is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a platform's success. However, there is a limited understanding of the factors that contribute to reaching such critical mass. In this study we identify ways to determine the market potential of a platform and to reach critical mass. We particularly enrich past studies by exploring how the openness of a platform influences market potential. We examine openness at three levels – provider, technology, and user level – and ask the question: to what extent can opening (or closing) each level increase or decrease a platform's market potential? The provider level recognizes the strategic involvement of key stakeholders that provide a platform. The technology level is concerned with the interoperability of a platform across different technologies. The user level relates to what extent a platform discriminates different segments of the customer base. On the basis of analytical modeling and theoretical analysis, we formulate four propositions concerning the effects of openness on platforms’ market potential. We illustrate the strength of propositions through a confirmatory case study, which is informed by five theoretically sampled cases. The cases illustrate cogently the effects of opening different levels of a multi-sided platform. In conclusion, we propose a decision model that can assist decision making concerning the opening of a platform to catalyze its growth.
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Ducci, Francesco. „Procedural implications of market definition in platform cases“. Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 7, Nr. 3 (25.06.2019): 419–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnz017.
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Abstract The central and often neglected problem in the evaluation of competitive effects in platform cases is that the boundaries of the relevant market, usually simply a tool for the analysis of market power, can give raise to substantially different procedural routes depending on whether the antitrust market comprises the platform as a whole or just one side. Based on a comparative assessment across jurisdictions, the article argues that the excessive importance of the relevant market creates a potential mismatch between the economic consequences and doctrinal implications stemming from market definition in multi-sided platform cases. The article concludes that a more desirable framework for evaluating competitive effects should remain independent from the way market definition is carried out.
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Zhu, Xiaodong, und Wei Li. „Research on the Pricing Strategy of “Internet +” Recycling Platforms in a Two-Sided Network Environment“. Sustainability 12, Nr. 3 (30.01.2020): 1001. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su12031001.
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“Internet +” platform recycling is an emerging business model with two-sided market characteristics. How to meet the needs of consumers and manufacturers and how to formulate a reasonable two-sided pricing structure have become challenges faced by recycling trading platforms. Based on the theory of a two-sided market, the pricing mechanism of a monopoly platform and a model of competing platforms are studied. Consequently, a sensitivity analysis and comparison analysis are conducted, giving a pricing decision and the optimal profit of closed-loop supply chain systems. Finally, through a numerical simulation analysis, the impacts of the inter-group network externalities, service differentiation, and the matching efficiency on e-waste recycling prices and profits are obtained. The result indicates that the influences of inter-group network externalities on monopoly platforms and competing platforms are different; thus, platforms should choose pricing strategies according to their own market position. The pricing of the two types of platform is inversely proportional to the time-sensitive coefficient of the two platforms, while it is directly proportional to the matching efficiency. The improvement of the differentiation of service will increase the pricing of the platform for single-homing manufacturers without affecting the multi-homing consumers, and profits will increase accordingly.
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Hałaburda, Hanna, und Yaron Yehezkel. „Platform Competition under Asymmetric Information“. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 5, Nr. 3 (01.08.2013): 22–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.5.3.22.
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We consider platform competition in a two-sided market, where the two sides (buyers and sellers) have ex ante uncertainty and ex post asymmetric information concerning the value of a new technology. We find that platform competition may lead to a market failure: competition may result in a lower level of trade and lower welfare than a monopoly, if the difference in the degree of asymmetric information between the two sides is below a certain threshold. Multi-homing solves the market failure resulting from asymmetric information. However, if platforms can impose exclusive dealing, then they will do so, which results in market inefficiency. (JEL D41, D42, D82, D83, L11, L12)
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Mandrescu, Daniel. „Applying (EU) Competition Law to Online Platforms: Reflections on the Definition of the Relevant Market(s)“. World Competition 41, Issue 3 (01.09.2018): 453–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2018024.
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Abuse of dominance cases under Article 102 TFEUconcerning online platforms will require revisiting the process of the market definition in light of the complexities that are likely to arise due to the two- or multi-sided nature of such platforms. This distinctive nature will firstly require determining the number of relevant markets that need to be defined in each case before the scope of such markets can be accurately delineated. Unfortunately, however, the current approaches to this first, new step, of the market definition process are incompatible with business reality. Therefore this article provides an alternative approach to this complexity, which is better suited to guarantee the trueness of the market definition findings. Accordingly, this article indicates that the number of relevant markets in each case should be determined based on the typology of the interactions facilitated by the online platform and the degree of substitutability of such online platform with other non-platform undertakings from the perspective of its customers groups. This approach allows reaching findings of market power in a manner that adequately reflects the business reality of such platforms in the digital economy and the degree of competitive pressure they may experience in practice.
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Viljoen, Salomé, Jake Goldenfein und Lee McGuigan. „Design choices: Mechanism design and platform capitalism“. Big Data & Society 8, Nr. 2 (Juli 2021): 205395172110343. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/20539517211034312.
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Mechanism design is a form of optimization developed in economic theory. It casts economists as institutional engineers, choosing an outcome and then arranging a set of market rules and conditions to achieve it. The toolkit from mechanism design is widely used in economics, policymaking, and now in building and managing online environments. Mechanism design has become one of the most pervasive yet inconspicuous influences on the digital mediation of social life. Its optimizing schemes structure online advertising markets and other multi-sided platform businesses. Whatever normative rationales mechanism design might draw on in its economic origins, as its influence has grown and its applications have become more computational, we suggest those justifications for using mechanism design to orchestrate and optimize human interaction are losing traction. In this article, we ask what ideological work mechanism design is doing in economics, computer science, and its applications to the governance of digital platforms. Observing mechanism design in action in algorithmic environments, we argue it has become a tool for producing information domination, distributing social costs in ways that benefit designers, and controlling and coordinating participants in multi-sided platforms.
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Yuan, Yue. „Two-sided Matching Theory and Its Application in E-commerce Environment“. Advances in Economics, Management and Political Sciences 22, Nr. 1 (13.09.2023): 111–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.54254/2754-1169/22/20230295.
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Since the turn of the 21st century, China's e-commerce has exhibited a rapid development trend of diversification and internationalization. The number of users on e-commerce platforms has increased significantly, the network infrastructure has continued to improve, the number of cross-border e-commerce transactions has risen steadily, and the two-sided matching problem inherent to it has become a topic of increasing interest. Each agent in the e-commerce market may have several attributes, and e-commerce market matches are sophisticated and multi-variant. Thus, the development of a suitable matching mechanism is crucial for the market's effective operation. This paper explores the prior literature on two-sided matching theory and its application in the e-commerce sector, combs its research progress, summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of present matching approaches, and anticipates the growth of application domains in the future.
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Malinauskaite, Jurgita, und Fatih Bugra Erdem. „Digital Antitrust: The Google (Android) Decisions in Russia, Turkey and India“. Business Law Review 42, Issue 4 (01.08.2021): 182–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/bula2021026.
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Digital markets and new business models in multi-sided markets with certain market peculiarities (i.e., network, scale, lock-in effects) have challenged the traditional competition tools. National competition authorities (NCAs), especially younger authorities, across the globe have struggled with the investigations of anticompetitive practices in those markets. Specifically, the paper will use Google (Android) as a case study to explore the approaches taken by three competition authorities, based in Russia, Turkey and India, leading to the prohibition decisions of their national competition laws. Discussions centred on the nationalGoogle Android decisions will be placed in a broader context underpinned by recent ongoing developments of competition laws in Russia, Turkey and India. The Google Android case, digital markets, Turkish competition law, Russian competition law, Indian competition law
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Li, Miao, Yuhan Cao und Dengji Zhao. „Double Auction on Diffusion Network“. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 38, Nr. 9 (24.03.2024): 9848–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v38i9.28845.
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Mechanism design on social networks has attracted extensive attention recently. The goal is to design mechanisms to incentivize participants to invite more participants via their social networks, and the challenge is that the participants are competitors. Various mechanisms have been proposed for single-/multiple-unit auctions, but it has been shown that it is challenging to design such mechanisms for more complex settings. We move this forward to investigate a double auction on a network where each trader (a buyer or a seller) can link to other buyers and sellers. Incentiving invitation is more difficult than in multi-unit one-sided auctions, because there are two different roles and a buyer (seller) seems happy to invite a seller (buyer), but again the invited seller (buyer) may invite another buyer (seller) to compete with the original buyer (seller). To combat this, we propose a solution called dynamic trade reduction (DTR), which also guarantees a non-negative revenue for the market owner. Interestingly, our solution is also applicable to the multi-unit one-sided auction when there is only one seller linking to only buyers on the network. We believe that the principle of our solution has the potential to be extended to design the multi-item one-sided auction.
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Maika, M. Ruslianor. „MODEL EKONOMI BERBAGI “Mobile-SECO” (PLATFORM MULTI-SIDED MARKETS) SEBAGAI EKOSISTEM SOSIO-EKONOMI ISLAMI“. IQTISHODUNA 12, Nr. 2 (10.01.2017): 47–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.18860/iq.v12i2.3946.
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The most disruptive business model innovation of 21st century global market place is sharingeconomy. The value of sharing is indispensable to unlocking ambiguity, paradox and the uncertainty ofeconomy. Sharing economy by definition has to design socio-economic ecosystem between communitieswho share features of production. Sharing economy hold three core features: (1) digital platform, (2) access ofownership and (3) deeper social interaction. Mobile SECO will comes as a platform of multi-sided marketswhich aims to developers capturing value of socio-economic ecosystem. With that value, Mobile-SECO willhelps users and developer campaign the project to be shared with all of social media, that’s what we call Mini-Campaign Platform (MCP). Hopefully, Mobile-SECO will become a platform that can attract developers toimplement of fiqh muamalah as community service obligations.
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Liang, Decui, Xin He und Zeshui Xu. „Multi-attribute dynamic two-sided matching method of talent sharing market in incomplete preference ordinal environment“. Applied Soft Computing 93 (August 2020): 106427. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.asoc.2020.106427.
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Lee, Cynthia Mei Fei, und Tze Chin Ong. „Analysis of Malaysian Competition Law and Policies in the E-Commerce Platforms Market“. Asian Journal of Law and Policy 3, Nr. 3 (25.12.2023): 137–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.33093/ajlp.2023.10.
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The current competition law framework in Malaysia is found in the Competition Act 2010 and Competition Commission Act 2010, supplemented by various Malaysia Competition Commission Guidelines. An analysis of the e-commerce platforms market would demonstrate the creation of complex conglomerate ecosystems surrounding a few incumbent platforms that are resistant to conventional monocentric competition laws and policies focusing on price. Consumer complaints suggest the presence of unfair, exclusionary, and exploitative practices that affect various parties in the multi-sided e-commerce platforms that depend on the platform's infrastructure. This research seeks to identify the e-commerce platforms market ecosystem in Malaysia and analyse the regulatory framework governing market competition and safeguarding consumer protection in the e-commerce platforms market in Malaysia with references to notable competition cases and trending consumer complaints. Crucially, it aims to compare the Malaysian competition laws and policies against the Digital Markets Act and the Digital Services Act of the European Union in the context of the digital market, and employs doctrinal research, wherein the primary data is obtained through systematic content analysis of relevant reports and articles. Malaysian competition laws and policies have potential weaknesses that can be strengthened to safeguard consumer protection in the e-commerce platforms market. Article Details How to Cite
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Díaz, Pablo Solano. „EU Competition Law Needs to Install a Plug-in“. World Competition 40, Issue 3 (01.09.2017): 393–420. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2017026.
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This article vindicates the definition of a new approach to Article 102 enforcement in digital economy based on the concept of multi-sided platform, which in turn revolves around the data flow among groups of users on the various sides of the platform in the form of indirect network effects. The cross-cutting nature of such novel approach, embedded into a broader paradigm of contestable markets and dynamic competition, calls for an analytical framework for market definition and market power appraisal to be devised accordingly. Once such framework is sketched, a section is devoted to exploring recent abuse cases involving e-platforms in light of the approach advocated by this article. In order to provide a full overview, other legal questions are explored as well, with a focus on the relaxation of the notion of ex ante objective justification and the place for an ex post efficiency defence within the proposed analytical framework.
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Guijarro, Luis, Jose Vidal, Vicent Pla und Maurizio Naldi. „Economic Analysis of a Multi-Sided Platform for Sensor-Based Services in the Internet of Things“. Sensors 19, Nr. 2 (17.01.2019): 373. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/s19020373.
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A business model for sensor-based services is proposed where a platform creates a multi-sided market. The business model comprises a platform that serves as an intermediary between human users, app developers, and sensor networks, so that the users use the apps and the apps process the data supplied by the sensor networks. The platform, acting as a monopolist, posts a fee for each of the three sides so as to maximize its profit. This business model intends to mimic the market-creating innovation that main mobile apps platforms have generated in the smartphone sector. We conduct an analysis of the profit maximization problem faced by the platform, show that optimum prices exist for any parameter value, and show that these prices always induce an equilibrium in the number of agents from each side that join the platform. We show that the relative strength of the value that advertisers attach to the users determines the platform price structure. Depending on the value of this relative strength, two alternative subsidizing strategies are feasible: to subsidize either the users’ subscription or the developers’ registration. Finally, all agents benefit from an increase in the population at any of the three sides. This result provides a rationale for incentivizing not only the user participation, but also the entry of developer undertakings and the deployment of wireless sensor network infrastructure.
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Zacher, Lech W. „Society, Market and Technology Nexus as Contexts of ICT Policies and Applications“. International Journal of Information Communication Technologies and Human Development 4, Nr. 3 (Juli 2012): 28–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/jicthd.2012070103.
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Due to the information revolution, societies have been transforming, particularly advanced societies. Contextual analysis of its processes, mechanisms, and effects are needed to understand factors that influence them. Technology – market – society nexus constitutes a context of ICT (Information Communication and Technologies) policies and applications. How could society make ICTs serve social and human goals? Various actors and stakeholders promote ICTs research, applications, and use. They use different means to act and also have different values and interests. Diversity is a typical characteristic of societies. ICTs generation, their multi-sided and multidimensional applications, and their effects depend on cultural abilities of societies to pursue information change. Human development goals, as realized by ICTs, should be analyzed at three levels: global, rational, and individual.
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Bilić, Paško, und Jaka Primorac. „The Digital Advertising Gap and the Online News Industry in Croatia“. Medijske studije 9, Nr. 18 (15.02.2019): 62–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.20901/ms.9.18.4.
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Internet advertising brought about many changes in communication production, distribution, and consumption. By using critical political economy of communication as the mainstay of our approach, we provide supporting evidence of the ambiguous influence of data-driven advertising dynamic on the news industry and audience habits. We look at what we define as the digital advertising gap, or the difference between the size of the internet advertising market and the total income of digital news’ firms. Digital intermediaries such as Google and Facebook are the final destinations for the majority of internet advertising investments in Europe and Croatia. A multi-sided, internet advertising market creates a fertile ground for the production of untrustworthy journalistic content. The digital advertising gap provides an example of a ‘market failure’ in which the market does not efficiently allocate public information goods. We argue that the confidence in the ability of the market to self-regulate the internet should be re-considered in European and national media policies.
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Huang, Lei, Yandong Zhao, Liang Mei, Peiyi Wu, Zhihua Zhao und Yijun Mao. „Structural Holes in the Multi-Sided Market: A Market Allocation Structure Analysis of China’s Car-Hailing Platform in the Context of Open Innovation“. Sustainability 11, Nr. 20 (19.10.2019): 5813. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su11205813.
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Car-hailing platform governance is an emerging topic of research and practice. The governance of the data-driven platform economy is challenging the research paradigm of competition regulation in the context of open innovation. This research is trying to reveal the market allocation structure of China’s online car-hailing industry from the perspective of personal data allocation by the study of Application Programming Interface (API) of sample platforms. On the basis of the networked nature of personal data allocation via APIs, this research constructs a mathematical model of the edge weight of data resource connections between platforms. Furthermore, this research optimises the structural hole analysis of complex networks to discuss the state of personal data resource allocation in China’s car-hailing industry. Results reveal that there are obvious structural holes within the sample network. When compared with related indicators, we found that accessing personal data resources is an essential component of the sample network competition capability and sustainable innovation. Social media platforms and online payment platforms more greatly impact car-hailing platform competition than other types of platforms within the multi-sided market context. This research offers a research perspective of personal data allocation for further study of competition, regulation and sustainable innovation of data-driven platform economies.
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Strothmann, Tom. „Integration of Passive Components into 3D PoP Fan-Out Packages“. Additional Conferences (Device Packaging, HiTEC, HiTEN, and CICMT) 2013, DPC (01.01.2013): 001585–602. http://dx.doi.org/10.4071/2013dpc-wp26.
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Fan-Out Wafer Level Packages provide a flexible assembly platform for single die, multi-chip, and 3D structures in a minimal form factor. As a result, the FO-WLP has gained rapid acceptance as a competitive package in the fast growing market of mobile devices. The eWLB version of FO-WLP has achieved the greatest commercial success, with millions of units already assembled and shipped in mobile phones. Although multi-chip structures have been discussed previously, one capability of the technology that has not received wide attention is the incorporation of passive devices into the packages. There are two common implementations of 3D packaging with the FO-WLP technology. The first is fan-out packages with one sided redistribution layers (RDL) using laser drilled vias to enable the direct mount of top packages. The second is two sided packages with through-mold vias that enable RDL on both the top and the bottom of the package. Using multichip embedding technology, it is possible to embed discrete components such as capacitors, resistors, or inductors into the body of the fan-out package in very close proximity to the active device. This close proximity to the active device combined with Cu RDL routing provides exceptional performance for decoupling capacitors and other passive devices. In a two sided RDL implementation, routing can be provided on the top of the package to enable integrated inductors and pads for direct mounting of additional passive components. This two sided implementation can reduce the combined board footprint of active devices and their required passives through the use of 3D integration. This presentation will discuss the various implementations of embedded passives in the 3D FO-WLP and the form factors that can be achieved with this solution.
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Liebenau, Jonathan, Silvia Elaluf-Calderwood und Patrik Karrberg. „Strategic Challenges for the European Telecom Sector: The Consequences of Imbalances in Internet Traffic“. Journal of Information Policy 2, Nr. 1 (01.01.2012): 248–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.5325/jinfopoli.2.2012.248.
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Abstract The current business model of European telecommunications operators is unsustainable. According to Liebenau, Elaluf-Calderwood, and Karrberg, the old model does not reflect new architectures for the provision of digital services. It is economically unfeasible, they say, to continue to promote the idea of a “dumb pipe” industry alongside a services and content industry. However, network neutrality requirements could stand in the way of application-based charging, significantly hampering market development. To survive, operators need a new multi-sided strategy built around different modular types of traffic in order to link their business models to emerging Internet value chains.
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Winter, Juha, Sandro Battisti, Thommie Burström und Sakari Luukkainen. „Exploring the Success Factors of Mobile Business Ecosystems“. International Journal of Innovation and Technology Management 15, Nr. 03 (14.05.2018): 1850026. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219877018500268.
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Mobile business ecosystems are based on product innovations and complements created on platforms facilitating transactions between groups of users in a multi-sided market. The purpose of this research is to present a model of success factors (SF) of mobile ecosystems. This research establishes an empirical framework based on the Android ecosystem, which has been analyzed in-depth on firm and ecosystem level, identifying 16 success factors. The main theoretical contribution is a model that identifies SF of platforms, which are related to the identification of the role of users and complementors in increasing innovation success. The model advances research in innovation platforms.
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Li, Jing, Shuying Gong und Xing Li. „Co-Opetitive Strategy Optimization for Online Video Platforms with Multi-Homing Subscribers and Advertisers“. Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research 18, Nr. 1 (22.03.2023): 744–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/jtaer18010038.
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In the two-sided market for online streaming content, the platform’s co-opetitive strategy has been wildly discussed, where the platforms cooperate in sharing the broadcasting right of content and meanwhile compete for both subscribers and advertisers. Although platform co-opetition in practice can be easily captured, the impacts of cross-side network effects on pricing strategy are contingent upon the participation decision of both sides, including single-homing and multi-homing. Therefore, we examine the optimal co-opetitive strategy of duopoly platforms using a Hotelling model to capture user behaviors and investigate the equilibriums of pricing decisions and profits in three scenarios: single-single, multi-single, and multi-multi. The main findings are: (1) Advertisers choose multi-homing only when subscribers are also multi-homing, and the broadcasting cost is relatively low. (2) With single-homing advertisers, the primary broadcasting platform earns more profit than the re-broadcasting one. (3) With multi-homing advertisers, the primary broadcasting platform’s profit increases with the broadcasting rights cost. (4) Platforms should focus on building strong cross-side network effects with multi-homing advertisers. Alternatively, they would be better off contracting with single-homing advertisers if the effects are relatively low.
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Anisah, Siti, und Annisa Aulya Putri. „Legal Implications of Post-Merger Notification Policy on Digital Companies in Indonesian Competition Law“. Journal of Law and Legal Reform 4, Nr. 2 (30.04.2023): 285–301. http://dx.doi.org/10.15294/jllr.v4i2.61224.
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In any market structure, potential competition violations arising from merger, consolidation, and acquisition (M&A) activities cannot be completely avoided. This holds true for digital markets that involve multi-sided markets, network effects, and significant consumer data. The intricate nature of the digital market poses a challenge for competition authorities in effectively monitoring M&A transactions between digital companies. A notable example is the GoTo merger, which is set to become the largest digital company in Southeast Asia. To address this issue, this legal research aims to discuss the legal implications of the current notification policy based on Law No. 5 of 1999 by conducting contextual research on digital market operations and studying previous violations committed by foreign digital companies. This research follows a normative legal research approach, employing statutory, conceptual, and case analysis to address the problem formulation. The findings indicate that digital companies possess various possibilities to violate competition law, including monopolistic practices and unfair business competition, if the existing post-merger notification policy remains in place. As many countries are already grappling with complex issues such as data ownership thresholds, Indonesia is taking its initial steps towards implementing changes to its merger policy. By adopting a pre-merger notification policy as a reporting obligation, Indonesia will enable the Commission for the Supervision of Business Competition (KPPU) to assess M&A transactions more effectively and provide legal certainty for businesses regarding the lawfulness of their M&A activities.
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Lähteenmäki, Jarno, und Juuso Töyli. „Platform based Innovation Ecosystems: Value Network Configuration Perspective“. Journal of Innovation Management 11, Nr. 1 (05.05.2023): 68–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.24840/2183-0606_011.001_0004.
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A platform-based innovation ecosystem links multiple markets and their corresponding stakeholders for joint value creation and innovation around a platform, and it is critical for the platform sponsor to manage the configuration efficiently for maximized value and survival. Through a multi-case study, we propose a configurational framework for platform ecosystems to analyze multi-stakeholder business structures, boundary decisions and their relationships. We define the context as for-profit business networks that leverage a digital platform to create multi-sided market circumstances and to engage partners as well as customers in joint innovation and value creation. Empirically we study five small to mid-sized digital information and communication technology platforms and their ecosystems. The discoveries elaborate on the four characteristic configurations and activities involved in the platform ecosystem management, and show configurational differences between open, semi-open, and closed innovation ecosystems. We propose the value-network configurations for the ecosystem, upstream producer, downstream consumer, and partner driven scenarios. Contradicting the existing literature, we argue that complementarities are created by two different producer actors and the consumption is influenced by two different downstream actors. We also argue that an internal production platform can be considered a platform ecosystem for innovation in the case of the extensive use of external knowledge and resource sources. The results extend the understanding of a platform ecosystem as a multi-layered configuration, and show what are the roles of different functions in the multi-layered structure.