Dissertationen zum Thema „Multi-sided Market“

The study shows that multi-sided markets pose difficulties when the relevant product market is to be defined. These difficulties pertain to two questions. The first question is whether one or several markets should be defined. In this regard, it is not easy to extract a coherent method from the cases examined. Instead, the methods applied give the impression of ad hoc-solutions, where similar circumstances result in dissimilar outcomes. Indeed, it is hard to reconcile the different market definitions in Visa International MIF and MasterCard MIF. The uncertainties are not limited to these two cases, as the methods applied in Google Shopping too give rise to ambiguities. Why was the market for general search engine platforms separated into two distinct product markets, but the market for comparison shopping services encompassed both sides? Unfortunately, this discussion was not present in the decision. This only serves to reinforce the impression that these questions are solved on an ad hoc-basis. A clear method of approaching multi-sided markets is desirable, not least because the enforcement of competition rules must be characterized by consistency and foreseeability. Hopefully, the judgement in Google Shopping will bring further clarity to this. Nonetheless, the conclusion is that one market should be defined when differences between competitive constraints on the two sides are absent. E contrario, this means that two markets should be defined when such differences are present. This is true regardless of the market in question being a transaction or a non-transaction market. This method seems preferable to strictly adhering to the division of multi-sided markets into transaction or non-transaction markets. If the Commission’s analysis is correct in that there are no differences in competitive constraints on the two sides of comparison shopping services, in combination with crossing network effects, the platform’s multi-sidedness is a necessary trait for both sides. This means that a substitute has to be multi-sided in order for it to be included on the relevant product market, which minimizes the risk for false negatives. Vice versa, the definition of two markets allows for one-sided products to be included on the relevant product market, which minimizes the risk for false positives. This is important not only for the binary finding of dominance or non-dominance, but also the degree of dominance. As concluded above, incorrectly defining one market may artificially inflate the degree of dominance into false super-dominance, and incorrectly defining several markets may artificially dilute the degree of dominance. The second question is how substitutability should be measured. It is obvious from the cases examined that qualitative measures are used and not quantitative measures. The products’ characteristics, intended use, purpose, functionalities, users’ perceptions of the product, etc. were given much attention. The SSNIP test was not applied in any of the cases. The first conclusion to be drawn from the examination above is therefore that the difficulties regarding measuring substitutability on multi-sided markets mainly concern quantitative measures. The arguments against applying a SSNIP test related to the cellophane fallacy (in two different forms, one of which was deceivingly similar to the reverse cellophane fallacy) and differences in price sensitivities between the two sides. Network effects present an additional difficulty, which may lead to exaggerated results when measuring substitutability. The second conclusion to be drawn is that there exists a reluctance to apply a SSNIP test in a way that is tailored for multi-sided markets. One method that has been proposed is to apply the test on the total sum paid by both sides, while allowing the intermediary to adjust the increase in price in accordance with its price structure. The categorical dismissal of applying the test in this way suggests that adapted versions have some time to wait before being introduced into case law and decisional practice. If they, as their proponents argue, are a robust way of broadening the evidence of possible substitutability, this is unfortunate. The risk of defining the market overly narrow or overly broad is of course present in this regard as well. A broader spectrum of evidence therefore minimizes the risk of incorrectly finding both dominance and non-dominance.

The societal problem regarding the housing shortage has made the housing market inaccessible. With the reduced number of rental apartments and longer housing queues, people face more challenges finding a suitable home. Swapping intermediaries have emerged over the years to facilitate the search process to swap apartments. However, tenants are still struggling to find apartments to swap with. Limited research has been conducted about tenants' experiences and perspectives regarding the swapping process. Through an exploratory approach, this study examines what problems tenants encounter during the swapping process. The research findings indicate several opportunity areas for improving and streamlining the swapping process. The made recommendations were regarding the search process, listing information, and apartment viewings. Further, to create an efficient market, the platform needs to consider thickness, overcome congestion, and make participation safe and simple.
Det samhälleliga problemet gällande bostadsbristen har medfört en oåtkomlig bostadsmarknad. Med minskade antalet hyresrätter samt längre bostadsköer står människor inför större utmaningar att hitta ett passande boende. För att underlätta bytesprocessen av hyresrätter har antalet bytesplattformar ökat under åren. Dock kämpar fortfarande många hyresgäster med att hitta en lägenhet att byta med. Begränsat antal studier har genomförts på hyresgäster gällande deras upplevelser samt perspektiv på själva bytesprocessen. Genom användande av en undersökande metod, undersökte denna studie vilka problem hyresgästerna stöter på under bytesprocessen av hyresrätter. Forskningsresultatet indikerade att flera möjligheter finns för att förbättra och effektivisera bytesprocessen. De rekommendationer som gjordes inkluderade sökprocessen, annonssidan, samt lägenhetsvisningar. Vidare, för att skapa en effektiv bytesmarknad, måste plattformen beakta tjocklek, övervinna trängsel, samt göra användandet säkert och enkelt.

The traditional electricity market, holding centralized authority over consumers, is no longer adequate seeing a shift towards a more electrified, decentralized, and digitalized society. Increased energy prices, raising concerns about climate change, and tightening governmental regulations have resulted in that an extensive diffusion of renewable energy sources has evolved. This development is expected to change the structure of the sector, despite that an appropriate market design that can deal with these remains to be identified. The purpose of this study was to investigate how a business model of a digital platform, managing energy trading within a local community could be designed. This study contributes to a new dimension of energy transitions within a Multi-Level Perspective by studying a particular field of the transition in terms of flexibility market platforms. The rising need for flexible solutions, making the consumer a prosumer, and enabling shared energy through a digital platform involves uncertainty and challenges, where a suitable business model linking new technology to the emerging market needs to be defined. Despite the novelty of the research field of local energy markets, the aim of investigating business model designs for a local energy market platform has been reached through an exploratory case study and integration of theories from several fields. This study makes an analytical contribution of investigating five pioneering projects, all developing digital platforms enabling integration of flexibility into the electricity market. This further contributes to the design-implementation gap of theories when developing a local energy market, by suggesting the most vital parameters to take into account. Based on the findings, a suggestion on a suitable business model design and a corresponding market design was developed. The main objective of the proposed market design is to serve as a basis to bring forward flexibility available from prosumers and their controllable demand and supply arrangement, including renewable energy technology generation and storage devices. The intention is to maintain a balanced and transparent distribution network at the lowest possible costs, while, at the same time functioning as reserve storage towards the main grid, reducing the risk of capacity shortage. Additional insights were raised that can be helpful in the evaluation of utilizing flexibility energy assets before making grid investments, following the recently presented recommendation of the EU's Clean Energy package.
Den traditionella elmarknaden, karaktäriserad av en centraliserad styrning, är inte längre hållbar då utvecklingen av marknaden går mot ett allt mer elektrifierat, decentraliserat och digitaliserat samhälle. Ökande energipriser, växande oro för klimatfrågor tillsammans med en allt snävare reglering av energimarknaden har resulterat i en omfattande ökning av förnybara energikällor. Denna utveckling förväntas förändra sektorns struktur, där en lämplig marknadsdesign som kan hantera detta återstår att identifiera. Syftet med denna studie var att undersöka hur en affärsmodell för en digital plattform, anpassad för att hantera lokal energidelning, kan utformas. Denna studie bidrar till en ny dimension av energitransformationen från ett multi-nivå-perspektiv genom att studera ett särskilt område av övergången i form av flexibla marknadsplattformar. Det ökande behovet av flexibla lösningar, där konsumenter blir prosumenter och energi delas lokalt via digitala plattform innebär osäkerheter och utmaningar. En lämplig affärsmodell som kan anknyta de nya tekniska lösningarna som krävs till lokala energimarknader bör därav definieras. Trots att forskningsområdet som berör lokala energimarknader kan anses relativt nytt och delvis outforskat, har målet att undersöka affärsmodellkoncept för en lokal energimarknadsplattform uppnåtts genom en fallstudie och iterationer av teorier inom flertalet områden. Denna studie bidrar med en analytisk undersökning av fem innovativa projekt som alla utvecklar digitala plattformar för att möjliggöra integrering av flexibilitet till elmarknaden. Detta bidrar även till det kunskapsgap som har identifierats mellan design och implementering fas vid utvecklandet av lokala energimarknader, genom föreslagna parameter som anses grundläggande och som bör tas hänsyn till. Baserat på resultatet presenterades ett förslag på en lämplig design för affärsmodell samt en tillhörande marknadsdesign. Huvudsyftet med den föreslagna marknadsdesignen är att utgöra en grund för gynnandet av en mer flexibel elektricitet hantering. Detta möjliggörs genom introduktionen av prosumenter till marknaden, där allt mer elektricitet produceras från förnybara källor och där konsumtion samt produktion regleras med hjälp av integrerade lagringsenheter. Målet är att upprätthålla ett balanserat och transparent distributionsnät till lägsta möjliga kostnad, medan marknaden även fungerar som ett reservlager mot kraftnätet, vilket minskar risken för kapacitetsbrist runt om i Sverige. Ytterligare insikter från denna studie påvisar hur de befintliga energitillgångarna kan utnyttjas på ett mer flexibelt och effektivt sätt, vilka stöds av de nyligen presenterade rekommendationerna från EU:s Clean Energy-paket.

A dilemma that has plagued the rental housing market (RHM) in Sweden is the lack of innovation and companies’ ability to disrupt the market. For start-ups with scarce resources, this becomes further problematic as they become limited in how they can approach disruption. In this study, the possibilities of reaching disruption, or further improving innovation within the Business Model (BM), is studied through the BM Canvas framework. Furthermore, action research was utilized, together with a case study, to create a realistic BM. A qualitative research approach was used with 17 interviews conducted amongst users of already existing platforms in the Rental Housing Swap Market (RHSM), namely the, landlords, politicians and academics within the field. This resulted in two subsequent themes being identified: building incentives for key partners to scale quicker and that a low resource approach requires a highly creative solution. These two themes indicate that if resources are available, innovating the BM through all the BM blocks creates better opportunities for an improved platform. Additionally, while both start-ups and incumbent firms can turn to BM innovation for disruption, the success rate is vastly different for the two. The stage of where a start-up is will determine the difficulty of BM innovation. However, if resources are unavailable, which is the case for some start-ups, it is seemingly better to turn to radical innovation through the use of key infrastructure partnerships – allowing new paradigms to emerge as a result. The results from this study implicate that there are possible gaps within BM innovation that should be studied further. More specifically, how the BM blocks should be prioritized and the differences between the prioritization among different industries.
Ett dilemma som har besvärat den svenska hyresmarknaden är bristen på innovation och förmågan för företag att inträda den redan etablerade marknaden, vilket blir en förhöjd svårighet för nystartade bolag vid ett tidigt skede där det finns väldigt sköra resurser. Denna studie undersöker möjligheterna för en lansering som kan störa marknaden med hjälp av innovation av affärsmodellen där ramverket BM Canvas har använts. Forskningen har bedrivits med hjälp av aktionsforskning och ett tillvägagångssätt av en kvalitativ studie där 17 intervjuer utförts med användare på existerande plattformar i bytesmarknaden, hyresvärdar, politiker och akademiker. Resultatet indikerade framställningen av två teman: att bygga incitament för partnerskap med nyckelaktörer för att skala upp snabbt samt att ett kreativt tillvägagångssätt är nödvändigt om det finns låga resurser i bolaget. Studien illustrerar att en ömsesidig anpassning av alla bropelare i affärsmodellen är nödvändiga för att uppnå bästa möjligheter för en förbättrad plattform. Trots att både nystartade bolag och etablerade företag kan vända sig till BM innovation för disruption så varierar deras framgång mellan de två olika typerna av företag. Om det däremot inte finns tillräckligt med resurser, vilket är en sannolik position för ett nystartat bolag, skapar man bättre möjligheter för radikala innovationer genom användningen av innovation inom infrastrukturen av affärsmodellen som skapar nya paradigm att uppstå som resultat. Resultaten av denna studie visar på att det finns potentiella förbättringsområden inom ämnet av BM innovation som bör studeras vidare i framtiden. Mer specifikt, om hur de olika BM blocken bör prioriteras och hur denna prioritering varierar mellan olika industrier.

Au chapitre 1, je développe un modèle dynamique dans lequel deux plateformes axées sur les données se font concurrence pour l'attention des utilisateurs. La qualité du service sur chaque plateforme s'améliore à mesure que davantage de données utilisateur sont disponibles. À chaque période, les plateformes choisissent entre la monétisation actuelle par la publicité ou l'accumulation de plus d'utilisateurs et donc de plus de données à l'avenir. En conséquence, je relie les résultats du marché à l'équilibre aux parts de marché initiales des plateformes et à la productivité des données. Je montre que la co-participation au marché prévaut lorsque les productivités des données des deux plateformes sont faibles. Le basculement du marché est plus susceptible de se produire lorsque l'une des plateformes a une grande productivité des données et bénéficie d'une grande part de marché initiale. J'explore également les effets du partage obligatoire des données. Le basculement du marché est moins susceptible de se produire avec le partage des données. De plus, le partage des données par les deux plateformes ou par la plateforme ayant un avantage important de productivité des données augmente l'excédent des consommateurs. Au chapitre 2, motivé par plusieurs exemples, notamment la concession de licences de brevets pour l'Internet des objets, nous analysons un modèle dans lequel une ou plusieurs plateformes complémentaires choisissent les prix pour un groupe d'appareils en aval qui présentent des externalités de réseau. Nous montrons comment les prix dépendent de la centralité de Katz-Bonacich (ou du vecteur propre) de chaque appareil dans un réseau défini par les externalités de la demande, et comment le réseau pertinent diffère pour un monopole d'écosystème, un planificateur social ou un groupe de plateformes complémentaires. Dans le dernier cas, nous revisitons l'analyse de Cournot sur les monopoles complémentaires et montrons que, dans notre cadre, il est possible que le prix total d'un appareil particulier diminue lorsque le nombre de plateformes monopolistiques augmente. Enfin, nous analysons une fusion partielle qui laisse des monopoles complémentaires d'un seul côté d'une plateforme, créant un nouveau compromis entre l'intériorisation de la double marginalisation et l'externalisation des effets de réseau. Dans l'ensemble, cette étude offre un modèle exploitable des écosystèmes multi-produits et contribue à la littérature sur les marchés à deux faces en analysant les plateformes complémentaires dans un marché multi-latéral général. Au chapitre 3, j'étudie un jeu stratégique de réseau de recherche dans lequel M détaillants vendent un produit dont la qualité est inconnue sur un marché concurrentiel. Les consommateurs du réseau choisissent entre la recherche et le parasitisme, puis décident d'adopter ou non après la recherche. Les consommateurs équilibrent le coût de la recherche et l'efficacité de l'information. Les chercheurs acquièrent des informations sur la qualité et les prix, tandis que les parasites mettent à jour leurs croyances en observant le comportement d'adoption des voisins. À l'équilibre, la stratégie de recherche des consommateurs présente une propriété de seuil décroissant : les consommateurs ayant plus de voisins sont plus susceptibles d'être des parasites. Je montre qu'il existe plusieurs équilibres, mais lorsque le coût de la recherche est suffisamment faible, il existe un unique NEB intérieur tel que les chercheurs et les parasites coexistent sur le marché, et les prix sont supérieurs au coût marginal. J'étudie également l'impact de la structure du réseau sur les résultats de l'équilibre. Lorsque le réseau est plus connecté, les consommateurs effectuent moins de recherches, les prix sont plus élevés et l'excédent des consommateurs est réduit
In Chapter 1, I develop a dynamic model where two data-driven platforms compete for users' attention. The quality of the service on each platform improves as more user data is available. At each period, platforms choose between current monetization through advertisement, or the accumulation of more user and therefore more data, in the future. Accordingly, I relate the market outcomes in equilibrium to platforms' initial market shares and data productivities. I show that market co-participation prevails when data productivities of both platforms are small. Market tipping is more likely to occur when one of the platforms has a large data productivity and enjoys a large initial market share. I also explore the effects of compulsory data sharing. Market tipping is less likely to occur with data sharing. Besides, data sharing by both platforms, or by the platform with a large advantage of data productivity increases consumers' surplus. In chapter 2, motivated by several examples, including Internet of Things patent licensing, we analyze a model where one or more complementary platforms choose prices for a group of downstream devices that exhibit network externalities. We show how prices depend on each device's Katz-Bonacich (or eigenvector) centrality in a network defined by the demand externalities, and how the relevant network differs for an ecosystem monopolist, a social planner, or a group of complementary platforms. For the latter case, we revisit Cournot's analysis of complementary monopolies and show that in our setting, it is possible for the total price of a particular device to decline when the number of monopoly platforms increases. Finally, we analyze a partial merger that leaves complementary monopolies on just one side of a platform, producing a novel tradeoff between internalizing double marginalization and externalizing network effects. Oevrall, this study offers a tractable model of multi-product ecosystems, and contributes to the two-sided market literature by analyzing complementary platforms in a general multi-sided market. In chapter 3, I study a strategic network game of search, where $M$ retailers sell a product with unknown quality in a competing market. Consumers in the network choose between search and free riding, and choose to adopt or not after search. Consumers trade off between search cost and information efficiency. The searchers acquire information about the quality and prices, while free riders update their believes by observing the adoption behavior of neighbors. In equilibrium, consumers' search strategy exhibits non-increasing threshold property: consumers with more neighbors are more likely to be free riders. I show that although there exist multiple equilibria, when search cost is small enough, there exists a unique interior BNE such that both searchers and free riders coexist in the market, and the prices are larger than marginal cost. I also investigate the impact of network structure on equilibrium outcomes. When the network is more connected, consumers engage in less search, the prices are higher, and the consumers' surplus is reduced

The digital payment industry has become one of the fastest evolving markets in the world, but in the wake of its rapid advancement, an ever increasing gap between academic theory and the actual reality of this market widens - and especially so when it comes to entry theory. It is widely acknowledged that the world is moving towards an ever more homogeneous economy, but despite the fact that payment preferences differ greatly from country to country - research on this subject continues to revolve mainly around localized efforts. But as historical inequalities between poor and rich societies continue to dissipate - learning from nations at the forefront of technological advancement increases the likelihood that the developed strategy becomes applicable to an increased number of countries. By selecting a nation most conducive to technological growth, the purpose of this report is to map the present dynamics in its digital payment industry using both recent and traditional market entry theory. However, studies geared towards globalized strategy formulation cannot be assumed as having guaranteed access to internal company-data at all times. So in order to facilitate such studies, the level of dependency on primary data required for conducting such research needs to be understood first, which is why the work in this report is constrained strictly to data of secondary nature. This, not only to further map the characteristics of this market, but also to see how open the market is to public inspection. Ultimately, the academic contribution becomes that of providing a road-map towards adapting currently available market entry theory to suit the rapidly evolving conditions of the digital payment industry from a global perspective and, when failing to do so, the aim is to also explore avenues for further research towards this end goal.

This dissertation covers the study of assignment problems in a game theoretical framework, focusing on multi-sided assignment games and stability notions. In Chapter 2, we provide some preliminaries on assignment markets and assignment games. We give some needed definitions and crucial results with their proof. In Chapter 3, a generalization of the classical three-sided assignment market is considered, where value is generated by pairs or triplets of agents belonging to different sectors, as well as by individuals. For these markets we represent the situation that arises when some agents leave the market with some payoff by means of a generalization of Owen (1992) derived market. Consistency with respect to the derived market, together with singleness best and individual anti-monotonicity, axiomatically characterize the core for these generalized three-sided assignment markets. When one sector is formed by buyers and the other by two different type of sellers, we show that the core coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoff vectors. In Chapter 4, we consider a multi-sided assignment game with the following characteristics: (a) the agents are organized in m sectors that are connected by a graph that induces a weighted m-partite graph on the set of agents, (b) a basic coalition is formed by agents from different connected sectors, and (c) the worth of a basic coalition is the addition of the weights of all its pairs that belong to connected sectors. We provide a sufficient condition on the weights to guarantee balancedness of the related multi-sided assignment game. Moreover, when the graph on the sectors is cycle-free, we prove the game is strongly balanced and the core is described by means of the cores of the underlying two-sided assignment games associated with the edges of this graph. Moreover, once selected a spanning tree of the cycle-free graph on the sectors, the equivalence between core and competitive equilibria is established. In Chapter 5, we focus on two-sided assignment games. Solymosi and Raghavan (2001) characterizes the stability of the core of the assignment game by means of a property of the valuation matrix. They show that the core of an assignment game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if its valuation matrix has a dominant diagonal. Their proof makes use of some graph-theoretical tools, while the present proof relies on the notion of buyer-seller exact representative in Núñez and Rafels (2002). In Chapter 6, we study von Neumann-Morgenstern stability for three-sided assignment games. Since the core may be empty in this case, we focus on other notions of stability such as the notions of subsolution and von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets. The dominant diagonal property is necessary for the core to be a stable set, and also sufficient in case each sector of the market has only two agents. Furthermore, for any three-sided assignment market, we prove that the union of the extended cores of all mu- compatible subgames, for a given optimal matching mu, is the core with respect to those allocations that are compatible with that matching, and it is always non-empty.

Chapter 1 gives a brief introduction to the dissertation. Chapter 2 describes the functioning of the broadcasting market, with particular emphasis on the platforms involved, in order to prepare the reader for the analysis of platform competition strategies that follows. I discuss so-called “multi sided market theory”, and describe some examples of platforms. In this context I point out that the broadcasting sector involves both vertical integration, horizontal integration and multi-sided market platforms, and the theme of access to platforms is discussed with reference to all three types. In chapter 3 I stress that multi-sided platforms are pervaded by externalities. For this reason I deal with price allocation on the two sides of the market in order to demonstrate that price allocation by the platform is not neutral. Then I discuss the existence of price differences in one-sided and two-sided markets with both single homing and multihoming, and with exclusive and non-exclusive services. In chapter 4 under the leitmotiv of the evolution of pluralism of information, I review the main Italian Constitutional Court judgments on this topic and the ex ante regulation of the broadcasting sector in Italy, verifying whether the existing antitrust limits are still consistent with the current level of technology, considering the DVB-T broadcasting technique and the sale of frequencies on the secondary market. In chapter 5 I describe the various relevant broadcasting markets in accordance with European Commission case decisions. I demonstrate that the activities of multi-sided broadcasting platforms are subject to Article 81 and 82 of the European Treaty, just like any other integrated platform, since in any case they can determine input or customer foreclosure. Furthermore I deal with the relationship between media broadcasting and the social value of sport with reference to the many antitrust cases in the broadcasting sector concerning the sale of sports event rights to media platforms, and I discus Italian Law 9/2008 which establishes the collective trading of such rights. Chapter 6 considers the issue of access to content by focusing on emerging multi-sided platforms. I compare them with the vertically integrated platforms and discuss the potential of multi-sided platforms to remove entry barriers to the sector by means of unbundling, which is made possible by the must-offer and must-carry obligations introduced into Italy by the most recent legislation. Chapter 7 contains my conclusions.

L’objet de cette thèse est d’analyser l’évolution du marché des paiements de détail avec en toile de fond la constitution d’un espace unique pour les paiements en Europe. Notre analyse révèle notamment que ce marché évolue selon la théorie de la Reine Rouge ; en effet, sous le poids de la concurrence, les prestataires de service ne cessent de créer des moyens de paiement de plus en plus innovants afin de maintenir leur part de marché. Paradoxalement, la demande, elle, évolue plus lentement, essentiellement à cause des habitudes difficiles à changer. Pour la dynamiser, régulateur et industrie bancaire ont mis en œuvre de nombreux moyens. Notre étude révèle ainsi que bien que les facteurs sociodémographiques, technologiques et économiques déterminant les comportements de paiement varient et n’ont pas le même impact d’un pays à un autre, certains Etats présentent néanmoins suffisamment d’homogénéité pour appartenir à une même zone de paiement optimale. En outre, nous démontrons que l’harmonisation des pratiques bancaires et des réglementations mise en place pour la réalisation du marché unique a conduit à une convergence des comportements de paiement en Europe. Par ailleurs, en analysant le cas particulier des paiements par carte, nous développons un modèle multi-agents permettant de mettre en évidence l’importance des pratiques tarifaires telles que la commission d’interchange ou la règle de non-discrimination sur la concurrence entre instruments, intermédiaires et systèmes de paiement. L’expérimentation artificielle de ce modèle dévoile les conditions nécessaires à l’efficacité de la réglementation de ces pratiques par l’Etat
The purpose of present thesis is to study the evolution of the retail payment market. This work is set against a backdrop of the creation of a single payment area in Europe. Our analysis reveals that this market is subject to the Red Queen dilemma; indeed, because of intense competition, payment service providers are forced to a constant evolution of technology in order to maintain their market share. Paradoxically, the demand for payment instruments tends to move slowly, basically because habits are difficult to change. To improve the dynamism of the demand response to innovation, regulator and banking industry have implemented new policies and procedures that encourage the development of trans-border payments. Thereby, although the sociodemographic, technological and economic factors which influence payment behaviours vary and don't have the same impact from one country to another, we find some remarkable homogeneity across countries that are eligible to form an optimal payment area. Besides, we show that the harmonization of the banking laws and products led to a convergence of the payment behaviours in Europe. In addition, by analyzing the case of the payment card industry, we develop an agent-based model which highlights the effects of the tariff practices such as the interchange fee or the no-surcharge rule, on competition within and between payment systems. The computational simulation of this model reveals necessary conditions to achieve the desired result of the regulation of these practices

Nous cherchons dans ce travail à détricoter la relation à la fois compétitive et coopérative, indifféremment technique, économique, juridique, sociale, politique et résolument communicationnelle de Google et des éditeurs de presse. Pour cela, après avoir historicisé la rencontre de deux univers singuliers, nous décrivons ce que les éditeurs peuvent faire pour franchir le prisme du moteur de recherche et y optimiser la visibilité de leur production. Nous tâchons ensuite de décrypter ce que la firme Google peut faire faire aux éditeurs en analysant leurs relations de pouvoir, leurs incitations, leurs projets et leurs environnements informationnels respectifs. Enfin, nous rendons compte de ce que les éditeurs français issus de la presse imprimée font effectivement : ce qu’ils communiquent à Google, par quels moyens et à quel prix, pour quels résultats espérés, à l’issue de quelles concessions, quels détours, quelles contestations. Nous expliquons comment les conditions et les modalités de captation du trafic sont susceptibles d’influencer la valorisation du contenu, l’organisation e sa production, la structure du site, les pratiques journalistiques et les lignes éditoriales. Nous montrons qu’un aller-retour performatif se crée entre énoncés et conditions d’énonciation, agissant par et sur les textes, les architextes et les hypertextes. En somme, c’est à la compréhension de ce que deviennent l’actualité et eux qui la mettent en récit, dès lors qu’ils cherchent à ce que l’information qu’ils produisent soit trouvée par les utilisateurs de Google, que notre thèse est consacrée
In this thesis, we aim to disentangle the cooperative but also competitive relationship between Google and news publishers, which is at the same time technical, economic, legal, social, political and certainly communicational. In order to do so, we trace the historical development of two singular universes, describing what publishers can do to overcome the search engine and optimize their ranking. We then analyse how Google can influence publishers’ conduct, by studying power relations, respective incentives, aims, and informational and socio-economic backgrounds. Finally, we report on actual practices of French traditional news publishers: what they communicate to Google, by which means and at what price, for which expected results, after which concessions, detours and controversies. Thus, we explain how search engine optimization is likely to affect the way content is valued, its production organisation, the website’s structure, journalists’ prac tice an editorial policy. We show a back and forth movement between performative utterances and performed circumstances, having an effect on and by texts, architexts and hypertexts. To sum up, this thesis is dedicated to understanding what happens to news and publishers once they strive for their information to be found by Google's users

Cette dissertation concerne l'analyse des problématiques économiques introduites par la numérisation et par la parution des nouveaux réseaux et supports numériques dans l'économie des médias. Le passage du modèle analogique et physique au modèle numérique, en opérant une séparation du concept d'expression signifiante et du support qui permet sa circulation auprès d'un large public, impose un recadrage des procédés de création et production dans plusieurs domaines de l'industrie des médias. En utilisant le cas d'étude de l'industrie de l'édition des magazines, l'introduction de cette dissertation analyse les enjeux économiques plus urgents pour une marque éditoriale face à la numérisation, au niveau d'entreprise et du secteur industriel. Dans le premier chapitre, on va approfondir l'analyse en explorant la littérature existante dans le domaine des effets de la numérisation et de la régulation dans l'économie des médias. Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous analysons les dynamiques d'adoption d'une technologie numérique associée avec un réseau, dans contexte où les contenus media sont des biens complémentaires essentiels et en présence d'externalités positives associées avec le déploiement du réseau. La contribution originale du modèle que nous allons montrer est la possibilité d'évaluer différentes qualités de subsides au déploiement et différentes valeurs de l'innovation technologique. dans le troisième et dernier chapitre, nous développons un modèle pour analyser la tarification des produits soumis au droit d'auteur dans un marché biface avec réseaux de distribution multiples.

碩士
國立臺灣大學
資訊管理學研究所
102
Two-sided market strategy, the strategy that develops an effective way to create a growing user base, is widely used nowadays especially in e-business. For an online company, it is indeed an useful way to keep the two distinct user groups getting larger, but some evidences suggest that once the company dominates the market and even becomes monopoly, it may deprive the rights and interest of the money side; while the clearly stake-separated business model makes the consumers hard to voice their indignation, because the huge user base that grounded on the subsidy side has no stakes connected with the money side. In this research, we take Adobe''s PDF (Portable Document Format) software as our research focal case. The analysis results show that customer loyalty can have significant impact on the degree of monopoly. The results can provide important contributions for multi-sided markets, both for firms and consumers.

碩士
國立中興大學
科技管理研究所
106
As P2P platform has become more and more popular nowadays in various fields, it has changed the form of transaction and made big threats against the traditional banking transaction. According to current literatures, P2P currency exchange is a concept and business model which helps people to transfer money bypass the irrational exchange rate of the traditional financial institutes. It reduced the required transfer fee and information asymmetry. However, P2P currency exchange platform is facing the business lose gradually due to the lack of the users on the platform. According to current study, P2P literatures mainly focus on the technology applied in the system and the new Business Model developing, they rarely discuss extension usage. As distinguished from previous P2P transaction model, it only discusses the two-sided transaction, and mostly focuses on cash flow related topics. This study focuses on the new application of P2P transaction model on cross-nation, multi-sided market, includes the adoption and the related Business Model. This is the new extension usage from the original P2P concept and become much more practical with multiple Products, Services and other kinds of business activities involved in it. As a consequence, this study can build a big transaction platform based on P2P concept which can apply for the cross-nation multi-sided market and constructing a huge ecosystem in a practical way. This extension usage of the P2P platform helps to gather more and more roles and users and make a strong adhesion of all sides. The most important is making a huge benefit to them.

Field Lab in Entrepreneurial Innovative Ventures
The rise in global students mobility is a long-term trend which is set to continue, and has created excellent investment opportunities in key European cities. Currently, 46% of international students study in Europe, and it’s expected that this number will increase in coming years. After becoming a competitive player as a two-sided platform offering quality and verified accommodation to students, UniPlaces decided that internationalization to Madrid was a viable option to increase its sales, revenues, and to improve its awareness in the European market. Although it was recently launched the company has since gain support from several investors, and practical knowledge in this market. This Work Project will study the implementation process of UniPlaces in Madrid. After doing an internal and external analysis it was defined the marketing mix, the mode of entry (creation of a branch in Madrid) and also people, investment, deadlines, and objectives. Finally, a risk assessment was also made, together with some final recommendations aiming to achieve a successful implementation and adaptation of UniPlaces to the Spanish market.
NSBE - UNL

La thèse comporte trois essais en microéconomie appliquée. En utilisant des modèles d’apprentissage (learning) et d’externalité de réseau, elle étudie le comportement des agents économiques dans différentes situations. Le premier essai de la thèse se penche sur la question de l’utilisation des ressources naturelles en situation d’incertitude et d’apprentissage (learning). Plusieurs auteurs ont abordé le sujet, mais ici, nous étudions un modèle d’apprentissage dans lequel les agents qui consomment la ressource ne formulent pas les mêmes croyances a priori. Le deuxième essai aborde le problème générique auquel fait face, par exemple, un fonds de recherche désirant choisir les meilleurs parmi plusieurs chercheurs de différentes générations et de différentes expériences. Le troisième essai étudie un modèle particulier d’organisation d’entreprise dénommé le marketing multiniveau (multi-level marketing). Le premier chapitre est intitulé "Renewable Resource Consumption in a Learning Environment with Heterogeneous beliefs". Nous y avons utilisé un modèle d’apprentissage avec croyances hétérogènes pour étudier l’exploitation d’une ressource naturelle en situation d’incertitude. Il faut distinguer ici deux types d’apprentissage : le adaptive learning et le learning proprement dit. Ces deux termes ont été empruntés à Koulovatianos et al (2009). Nous avons montré que, en comparaison avec le adaptive learning, le learning a un impact négatif sur la consommation totale par tous les exploitants de la ressource. Mais individuellement certains exploitants peuvent consommer plus la ressource en learning qu’en adaptive learning. En effet, en learning, les consommateurs font face à deux types d’incitations à ne pas consommer la ressource (et donc à investir) : l’incitation propre qui a toujours un effet négatif sur la consommation de la ressource et l’incitation hétérogène dont l’effet peut être positif ou négatif. L’effet global du learning sur la consommation individuelle dépend donc du signe et de l’ampleur de l’incitation hétérogène. Par ailleurs, en utilisant les variations absolues et relatives de la consommation suite à un changement des croyances, il ressort que les exploitants ont tendance à converger vers une décision commune. Le second chapitre est intitulé "A Perpetual Search for Talent across Overlapping Generations". Avec un modèle dynamique à générations imbriquées, nous avons étudié iv comment un Fonds de recherche devra procéder pour sélectionner les meilleurs chercheurs à financer. Les chercheurs n’ont pas la même "ancienneté" dans l’activité de recherche. Pour une décision optimale, le Fonds de recherche doit se baser à la fois sur l’ancienneté et les travaux passés des chercheurs ayant soumis une demande de subvention de recherche. Il doit être plus favorable aux jeunes chercheurs quant aux exigences à satisfaire pour être financé. Ce travail est également une contribution à l’analyse des Bandit Problems. Ici, au lieu de tenter de calculer un indice, nous proposons de classer et d’éliminer progressivement les chercheurs en les comparant deux à deux. Le troisième chapitre est intitulé "Paradox about the Multi-Level Marketing (MLM)". Depuis quelques décennies, on rencontre de plus en plus une forme particulière d’entreprises dans lesquelles le produit est commercialisé par le biais de distributeurs. Chaque distributeur peut vendre le produit et/ou recruter d’autres distributeurs pour l’entreprise. Il réalise des profits sur ses propres ventes et reçoit aussi des commissions sur la vente des distributeurs qu’il aura recrutés. Il s’agit du marketing multi-niveau (multi-level marketing, MLM). La structure de ces types d’entreprise est souvent qualifiée par certaines critiques de système pyramidal, d’escroquerie et donc insoutenable. Mais les promoteurs des marketing multi-niveau rejettent ces allégations en avançant que le but des MLMs est de vendre et non de recruter. Les gains et les règles de jeu sont tels que les distributeurs ont plus incitation à vendre le produit qu’à recruter. Toutefois, si cette argumentation des promoteurs de MLMs est valide, un paradoxe apparaît. Pourquoi un distributeur qui désire vraiment vendre le produit et réaliser un gain recruterait-il d’autres individus qui viendront opérer sur le même marché que lui? Comment comprendre le fait qu’un agent puisse recruter des personnes qui pourraient devenir ses concurrents, alors qu’il est déjà établi que tout entrepreneur évite et même combat la concurrence. C’est à ce type de question que s’intéresse ce chapitre. Pour expliquer ce paradoxe, nous avons utilisé la structure intrinsèque des organisations MLM. En réalité, pour être capable de bien vendre, le distributeur devra recruter. Les commissions perçues avec le recrutement donnent un pouvoir de vente en ce sens qu’elles permettent au recruteur d’être capable de proposer un prix compétitif pour le produit qu’il désire vendre. Par ailleurs, les MLMs ont une structure semblable à celle des multi-sided markets au sens de Rochet et Tirole (2003, 2006) et Weyl (2010). Le recrutement a un effet externe sur la vente et la vente a un effet externe sur le recrutement, et tout cela est géré par le promoteur de l’organisation. Ainsi, si le promoteur ne tient pas compte de ces externalités dans la fixation des différentes commissions, les agents peuvent se tourner plus ou moins vers le recrutement.
This thesis includes three essays in applied microeconomics. Using learning and network effects models, we study agents’ behavior in various environments through three chapters. The first chapter examines natural resource exploitation under uncertainty with learning and heterogeneous priors. In the second chapter, we examine the problem of research Foundation concerned with finding good quality researchers for today and the future. The third chapter studies the Multi-level marketing organizations. The first chapter is entitled "Renewable Resource Consumption in a Learning Environment with Heterogeneous beliefs". This work uses a learning model with heterogeneity of beliefs to study natural resources consumption under uncertainty. Following Koulovatianos et al (2009), we distinguish two types of learning process: adaptive learning and learning. I find that learning decreases the total consumption of the resource in comparison with adaptive learning. However, individually and under some conditions, some exploiters could consume more in learning than in adaptive learning. In learning, the exploiter faces two kinds of incentive to invest in the resource: self-incentive which is always positive and heterogeneity incentive which may be negative. The effect of learning on individual consumption depends on the sign and the extent of the heterogeneity incentive. Using absolute change and relative change of consumption due to a change in beliefs, we find that the exploiters tend to converge to a common behaviour. The second chapter is entitled "A perpetual Search for Talent across Overlapping Generations". We use a dynamic discrete time model with overlapping generations to study how a research Fund should optimally rank and select which researchers to give a grant. The optimal decision rule depends on both the perceived quality of researchers based on past success histories and on age. Between two researchers of equal perceived qualities the Fund should select the youngest. This work contributes to the understanding of the bandit problems sometime known to be untractable and pspace-hard. Here, instead of looking for an index characterization, we propose to rank or eliminate progressively the researchers by comparing them two by two. The third chapter is entitled "Paradox about the Multi-Level Marketing". Over the past 50 years, the Multi-level Marketing (MLM) has become an important business strategy. vi MLM is a marketing method in which independent distributors of a product get profits not only from their own sales, but also from recruiting other distributors. According to the promoters of this organization, the purpose of the business and the will of the distributors are to sell the product and not to set up a scam. The question is the following: if the real intention is to sell, why does a distributor recruit other distributors who will become his competitors? It is well known in classical industrial organization that people avoid competition as well as possible. Why is it not the case in the MLM organization? We explain this paradox by the particular economic structure of the MLM. Distributor could not sell enough if he did not recruit. Recruiting provides a price leading power and allows to sell more and make more profit (in some respect). Moreover, the MLM is similar to the multi-sided market structure a la Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006) and Weyl (2010). There is network effect between recruitment and selling activity. Thus, the extent of the paradox can also be explained by the different commissions set by the MLM promoters.

博士
國立中央大學
經濟學研究所
100
This dissertation is a collection of three independent yet related essays which study the topics on the two-sided market literature. The ``two-sided market'' is a new modeling approach that fits certain industries very well. The common features of the two-side market industries are the presence of the intermediate platforms and the cross-side network effects. The platforms facilitate the interactions of the users on the two sides, and are able to charge a fee from each side of the market. The platform users on one side have a higher willingness to pay for entering the platform with larger participation on the other side. A new participant on one side therefore has an effect on the users from the other side. As a consequence, the effect is defined as the cross-side network effect which is usually positive. For enjoying more benefits of the network effect from the other side, the users might have the incentive to enter multiple platforms. Those who do enter multiple platform are defined as the users of multi-homing. Comparing with the existing literature, the models in this dissertation provide more detail discussions about the users'' interactions and multi-homing behaviors. In particular, the interaction of the platform''s pricing strategy and the users'' behaviors. Current dissertation contributes to the two-sided market literature by answering several important questions: Where do the external effects come from, what are the reasons make the users more willing to multi-home, and how is the platform''s pricing strategy interact with the cross-group network effects and the multi-homing behaviors. The first chapter in current dissertation introduces the main issues in the two-sided market literature. The three essays are organized as chapter 2, chapter 3 and chapter 4. I provide the abstract of chapter 2, chapter 3 and chapter 4 as follows. Chapter 2 provides a theoretical model for a specific type of two-sided platform: The buyer-seller transaction platform. In the model, the number of participants and the source of network effects are endogenously determined. The platform is shown to exhibit both positive cross-side and negative within-side network effects. The optimal pricing of the platform depends not only on the cost of providing service and the benefits of the participants, but also on how the marginal entrant (either a buyer or a seller) affects the matching probability. Since the sellers can shift the burden of entry fee to the buyers, the platform never subsidizes the sellers. In chapter 3, a model with two platforms, product heterogeneity and searching engine technology advantage is considered. In the model, the sellers are allowed to multi-home and charge differently on each platform. It has been proved that the buyers always benefit from advanced searching technology, however, whether the sellers benefit from the advanced technology is determined by the degree of product heterogeneity. If the degree of product heterogeneity is large enough, then the sellers benefit from the advanced technology, otherwise, the sellers will suffer from advanced technology, for high competition pressure and low profits. Furthermore, the model proves that the number of multi-homing sellers is at first increasing and then decreasing as the degree of new technology prevalence. In chapter 4, a two-sided market model in which the multi-homing decisions of all users and the platform prices are endogenously determined is considered. The results show that the platforms compete more aggressively when the users on one side switch from single-homing to multi-homing. Furthermore, a homogenized effect which is neglected in existing literature is discovered. Compared with the one-sided multi-homing case, the equilibrium in the two-sided multi-homing case corresponds to a less effective cross-group network effect which causes the platforms reluctance to cross subsidize users. Moreover, an increase of multi-homing choices made by users on one side makes the platforms more substitutable on the other side.

Allocation of objects or resources to competing agents is a ubiquitous problem in the real world. For example, a federal government may wish to allocate different types of spectrum licenses to telecom service providers; a search engine has to assign different sponsored slots to the ads of advertisers; etc. The agents involved in such situations have private preferences over the allocations. The agents, being strategic, may manipulate the allocation procedure to get a favourable allocation. If the objects to be allocated are heterogeneous (rather than homogeneous), the problem becomes quite complex. The allocation problem becomes even more formidable in the presence of a dynamic supply and/or demand. This doctoral work is motivated by such problems involving strategic agents, heterogeneous objects, and dynamic supply and/or demand. In this thesis, we model such problems in a standard game theoretic setting and use mechanism design to propose novel solutions to the problems. We extend the current state-of-the-art in a non-trivial way by solving the following problems: Optimal combinatorial auctions with single minded bidders, generalizing the existing methods to take into account multiple units of heterogeneous objects Multi-armed bandit mechanisms for sponsored search auctions with multiple slots, generalizing the current methods that only consider a single slot. Strategyproof redistribution mechanisms for heterogeneous objects, expanding the scope of the current state of practice beyond homogeneous objects Online allocation mechanisms without money for one-sided and two-sided matching markets, extending the existing methods for static settings.

Allocation of objects or resources to competing agents is a ubiquitous problem in the real world. For example, a federal government may wish to allocate different types of spectrum licenses to telecom service providers; a search engine has to assign different sponsored slots to the ads of advertisers; etc. The agents involved in such situations have private preferences over the allocations. The agents, being strategic, may manipulate the allocation procedure to get a favourable allocation. If the objects to be allocated are heterogeneous (rather than homogeneous), the problem becomes quite complex. The allocation problem becomes even more formidable in the presence of a dynamic supply and/or demand. This doctoral work is motivated by such problems involving strategic agents, heterogeneous objects, and dynamic supply and/or demand. In this thesis, we model such problems in a standard game theoretic setting and use mechanism design to propose novel solutions to the problems. We extend the current state-of-the-art in a non-trivial way by solving the following problems: Optimal combinatorial auctions with single minded bidders, generalizing the existing methods to take into account multiple units of heterogeneous objects Multi-armed bandit mechanisms for sponsored search auctions with multiple slots, generalizing the current methods that only consider a single slot. Strategyproof redistribution mechanisms for heterogeneous objects, expanding the scope of the current state of practice beyond homogeneous objects Online allocation mechanisms without money for one-sided and two-sided matching markets, extending the existing methods for static settings.