Zeitschriftenartikel zum Thema „Military planning – Taiwan“
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1
Robinson, Thomas W. „America in Taiwan' Post Cold-War Foreign Relations“. China Quarterly 148 (Dezember 1996): 1340–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000050657.
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Since losing the mainland to Communist conquest in 1949 (more accurately, since the North Korean invasion of the South in June 1950), Taiwan has become a continuous foreign policy protectorate of the United States. Had it not been for American security protection, Taiwan would long since have come under Beijing's rule. Several causative agents, separately, in combination or sequentially, kept Taiwan out of mainland Chinese hands. These included, initially, the American Seventh Fleet, then generalized American military might in concert with the American-Taiwan Defence Treaty of 1954, thence the three American- Chinese communiques forming the basis of post-1971 relations between the two countries, concomitantly the American Congress's Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 and the accompanying (and subsequent) legislative history, and, throughout, China's inability to overcome, with a high probability of success, active Taiwan military resistance and probable American military support. While the economic and, more recently, political transformation of Taiwan materially strengthened that entity such that its defensibility against attack rose greatly, to say nothing of its overall attractiveness, from the onset of the People's Republic of China it was the American connection that was the sine qua non of Taiwan's quasi-independent existence.
2
Wang, T. Y. „Taiwan in 2021“. Asian Survey 62, Nr. 1 (Januar 2022): 62–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2022.62.1.06.
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China heightened its military pressure on Taiwan, but president Tsai In-wen defiantly resisted Beijing’s coercion and overcame domestic criticism. With a cooperative public and international support, Taipei quelled an unexpected COVID-19 outbreak. The bullish economy continues to be fueled by global demand for Taiwan’s technology products as the Taipei–Washington relationship progresses advantageously.
3
Han, Tzeu Chen, Arthur Sung, Chung Yuan Dye, Chien Chang Chou und Chih Chiang Wei. „Military Logistics and Transport Model Design Based on Maritime Engineering“. Applied Mechanics and Materials 740 (März 2015): 904–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.740.904.
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As a response to the National Army’s planning of all-volunteer military system and maintaining of their combat capability for national defense, the military logistics model choice is one of very important issues. In this paper, Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) method is conducted for selecting an optimal transportation model in the Navy logistics between Taiwan Island and Kinmen Island.
4
Blasko, Dennis J., Philip T. Klapakis und John F. Corbett. „Training Tomorrow′s PLA: A Mixed Bag of Tricks“. China Quarterly 146 (Juni 1996): 488–524. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000045124.
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Since the summer of 1995, Chinese military training opposite Taiwan has received unusual prominence in both the Chinese and foreign media. The senior leadership in Beijing was able to flex its military muscle because of a training programme begun years ago. This limited use of force has sent unmistakable political signals to Taiwan and the world. But, should the Chinese leadership decide to employ the People′s Liberation Army (PLA) in pursuit of its political objectives, is it well trained enough to conduct successful modern military operations?
5
Saunders, Phillip C. „Long-term Trends in China-Taiwan Relations: Implications for U.S. Taiwan Policy“. Asian Survey 45, Nr. 6 (November 2005): 970–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2005.45.6.970.
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Long-term political, economic, and military trends are reshaping the security environment in the Taiwan Strait in potentially destabilizing ways and undermining the ““one China”” framework. The United States has become more deeply involved in cross-strait relations to maintain stability and preserve the status quo, but this approach may not be sustainable.
6
Shambaugh, David. „Taiwan's Security: Maintaining Deterrence Amid Political Accountability“. China Quarterly 148 (Dezember 1996): 1284–318. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000050633.
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The international relations scholar Arnold Wolfers once noted that national security was an “ambiguous symbol.” While the Republic of China on Taiwan's (hereafter ROCOT or Taiwan) international status has certainly been ambiguous in recent years, its security has been crystal clear. Taiwan has lived under the threat of military attack or other coercive measures from the People's Republic of China (PRC) since 1949. The mainland Chinese authorities have repeatedly refused to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, claiming it a potentially necessary tool to reunify what it considers to be a renegade province with the “motherland.” As long as Taiwan lives under the threat of military force and coercion from the PRC, this will have a defining impact on the island's domestic life and international profile.
7
Viner, Kim. „Potential Military Solutions for the “Taiwan Question”“. Asian Affairs: An American Review 24, Nr. 3 (Januar 1997): 180–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00927679709602309.
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8
Green, Brendan Rittenhouse, und Caitlin Talmadge. „Then What? Assessing the Military Implications of Chinese Control of Taiwan“. International Security 47, Nr. 1 (2022): 7–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00437.
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Abstract The military implications of Chinese control of Taiwan are understudied. Chinese control of Taiwan would likely improve the military balance in China's favor because of reunification's positive impact on Chinese submarine warfare and ocean surveillance capabilities. Basing Chinese submarine warfare assets on Taiwan would increase the vulnerability of U.S. surface forces to attack during a crisis, reduce the attrition rate of Chinese submarines during a war, and likely increase the number of submarine attack opportunities against U.S. surface combatants. Furthermore, placing hydrophone arrays off Taiwan's coasts for ocean surveillance would forge a critical missing link in China's kill chain for long-range attacks. This outcome could push the United States toward anti-satellite warfare that it might otherwise avoid, or it could force the U.S. Navy into narrower parts of the Philippine Sea. Finally, over the long term, if China were to develop a large fleet of truly quiet nuclear attack submarines and ballistic missile submarines, basing them on Taiwan would provide it with additional advantages. Specifically, such basing would enable China to both threaten Northeast Asian sea lanes of communication and strengthen its sea-based nuclear deterrent in ways that it is otherwise unlikely to be able to do. These findings have important implications for U.S. operational planning, policy, and grand strategy.
9
Wu, Shang-su. „Taiwan’s Defense under the Tsai Administration“. Asian Survey 58, Nr. 4 (Juli 2018): 704–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2018.58.4.704.
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The Tsai Ing-wen administration of Taiwan has taken a different approach in various defense policies compared to its predecessor. Several military build-up projects are aimed at strengthening Taiwan’s defense in the context of China’s rising military power, but they are unlikely to significantly ameliorate the island’s inferior military status, due to several vulnerabilities.
10
Allen, Kenneth W. „Defending Taiwan: The Future Vision of Taiwan's Defence Policy and Military Strategy. Edited by Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai. [London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. xx+284 pp. ISBN 0-700-1739-0.]“. China Quarterly 175 (September 2003): 828–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741003230472.
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Until recently, the military has dominated the national defence policy-making and military strategy process in Taiwan. Public debate did not occur because defence issues were classified or viewed as too politically sensitive. Therefore, non-government civilian institutions had little political or financial incentive to become involved. However, as Taiwan has moved towards a more open society, the Legislative Yuan, media, universities and non-profit research organizations have become more active in questioning the tenets of Taiwan's defence policy. Their impact has been limited, though, because of the lack of civilian expertise in defence matters. Furthermore, Western authors have not written extensively on Taiwan's internal defence policies because most information published in Taiwan is written in Chinese only.
11
Hsieh, John Fuh-sheng. „Continuity and Change in the US–China–Taiwan Relations“. Journal of Asian and African Studies 55, Nr. 2 (März 2020): 187–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0021909620905051.
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The relations between China and Taiwan (cross-Strait relations) have been a thorny issue for all parties concerned. These relations are one of the flashpoints in the world, which may trigger a serious military conflict. They involve not only China and Taiwan but also the United States. The purpose of this paper is to account for the trajectory of this triangular relationship with the help of opinion surveys in Taiwan. It is shown that when the Kuomintang (KMT) gains the governing power in Taiwan, Taiwan is the median voter in the cross-Strait relations game at the international level while as a non-traditional KMT or the Democratic Progressive Party is in power, it is the US that turns out to be the median voter.
12
Guiheux, Gilles. „Chine–Taiwan, la guerre est-elle concevable? By Jean-Pierre Cabestan. [Paris: Economica, 2003. 463 pp. €55.00. ISBN 2-7178-4734-0.]“. China Quarterly 179 (September 2004): 828–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741004320606.
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Strategic issues and Beijing's military strategy toward Taiwan have long been the focus of valuable research works. Jean-Pierre Cabestan is one among few scholars researching strategic issues from the point of view of the Republic of China. In his latest book, China – Taiwan, Is War Conceivable? he analyses in depth the way China's threat is perceived in Taiwan.The book has a double focus. First, it evaluates the China threat and the military, as well as political, economical and psychological, capacity of Taipei to resist. Second, in a more speculative way, it weighs the risks of war and considers the different possible scenarios, with or without American involvement. The author does not aim to analyse recent economic and political developments in the Taiwan Straits. Neither does he consider different scenarios of peace building (this will be the subject of his forthcoming book, Chine – Taiwan: Peut-On Construire La Paix? co-authored with Benoıˆ:t Vermander, director of the Taipei Ricci Institute.)
13
Suorsa, Olli Pekka, und Samir Puri. „"Professionals Talk Logistics": Why Resupplying Taiwan in a Future War Will Be Harder Than Resupplying Ukraine“. Asia Policy 19, Nr. 1 (Januar 2024): 113–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/asp.2024.a918880.
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executive summary: This article compares the logistical challenges associated with the West's military resupply of Ukraine and those of resupplying Taiwan in a potential future conflict. main argumentDespite facing critical munitions shortages and growing political divisiveness over the substantial financial burden of this policy, the West's resupply of the Ukrainian military during Ukraine's current war with Russia has—so far—been a success, keeping forces battle-worthy and able to continue fighting after nearly two years of high-intensity conventional warfare. Would the resupply of Taiwan against China in wartime be similarly feasible for the U.S. and its regional partners in the Pacific? Major obstacles distinguish the Taiwan scenario. In prioritizing planning for a Taiwan contingency, the U.S. government should consider five major logistical factors: geopolitical ambiguity, the tyranny of distance, the need to resupply by air and sea, the involvement of reliable regional partners, and China's tolerance for the supply of armament to Taiwan in wartime. policy implications• Pre-positioning war materiel forward on allied soil is crucial to enable a rapid response to any military aggression against Taiwan. Besides increasing stocks of arms and ammunition in Taiwan itself, materiel should be pre-positioned with short reach to Taiwan in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines and closely linked with depots in Guam, Hawaii, Australia, and the continental U.S. in a hub-and-spoke framework. • To assist Taiwan in establishing reserves of arms and munitions, the U.S. should increase technology transfer and joint production of critical war materiel with and in Taiwan. Boosting Taiwan's own defense industry base will help ensure the security of supply and an independent maintenance, repair, and overhaul capability in a conflict. Moreover, to ensure the materiel survives, hardening, decentralization, and the ability to disperse at least parts of the industrial production and maintenance, repair, and overhaul capability should be advanced. • In a war across the Taiwan Strait, Taiwanese ports and airports would come under attack early on, and even if they were not destroyed, the People's Liberation Army would try to block access to them, hindering resupply efforts. Strong emphasis should be placed on the development of robust amphibious and civilian roll-on/roll-off capabilities, buildup of temporary piers, and improvement of Taiwan's transportation infrastructure.
14
Kuehn, David. „Democratization and Civilian Control of the Military in Taiwan“. Democratization 15, Nr. 5 (Dezember 2008): 870–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510340802362638.
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15
Wang, Austin Horng-En. „The Waning Effect of China’s Carrot and Stick Policies on Taiwanese People“. Asian Survey 57, Nr. 3 (Mai 2017): 475–503. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2017.57.3.475.
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To repress growing regional/national identity in Taiwan, China applies rationalist strategies, including economic incentives and military threats. Analysis of the Taiwan National Security Survey in 2003–2015 shows that China’s carrot and stick policies negatively correlate with exclusive Taiwanese identity. In younger generations, perception of the strength of the policies is similar, but their effect on identity is weaker.
16
Tsang, Steve. „The U.S. Military and American Commitment to Taiwan’s Security“. Asian Survey 52, Nr. 4 (Juli 2012): 777–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2012.52.4.777.
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Abstract This article focuses on how the U.S. military assesses the threat of a Taiwan Strait crisis over the next two decades, America’s possible responses, and the U.S. capacity for effective intervention. It examines the drivers behind the U.S. approach, highlighting their implications.
17
Ta-Yuan, Chen. „The Taiwanese Fishing Industry. The Military and Political Complex“. European Journal of East Asian Studies 9, Nr. 1 (2010): 161–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156805810x517715.
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AbstractTaiwan was subjected to the longest period of martial law in history, from 1948 to 1987, and for this period of time the fishing industry of Taiwan was closely controlled and monitored by the government and the military. From 1951 to 1982, the fisheries authorities of Taiwan were controlled to a large extent by high-ranking military officers. Besides this, the military also used a variety of methods to track the movement of fishermen in distant waters. Under such strict control and surveillance of the government, only a few politicians were willing to speak on behalf of the interests of Taiwan's fishing industry. The situation did not improve until two young men from the local fishing industry were elected into the national parliaments in 1972.
18
Shambaugh, David. „Exploring the Complexities of Contemporary Taiwan“. China Quarterly 148 (Dezember 1996): 1045–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000050530.
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Taiwan entered the international spotlight in 1996. No longer seen as just an economic powerhouse and diplomatic dilemma, the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROCOT) caught international attention in two new dimensions: politics and security. In March the ROCOT's first ever direct presidential election took place against the backdrop of unprecedented military coercion from the People's Republic of China (PRC). The world watched nervously as Taiwan's presidential candidates campaigned while Chinese missiles landed near the island's two major ports and air and naval forces of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) held live-fire exercises in the Taiwan Strait.
19
Zhang, Baohui. „The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship“. Asian Survey 51, Nr. 2 (01.03.2011): 311–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2011.51.2.311.
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The U.S.-China military space relationship has been driven by the security dilemma in international relations. China pursues military space capabilities in part to counter perceived national security threats posed by the U.S. quest for space dominance and missile defense. However, the current strategic adjustment by the Obama administration and the altered situation at the Taiwan Strait have moderated the bilateral security dilemma, offering an opportunity for arms control in outer space.
20
Chan, Steve. „Taiwan in 2005: Strategic Interaction in Two-Level Games“. Asian Survey 46, Nr. 1 (Januar 2006): 63–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2006.46.1.63.
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With the intensification of political competition at home and multifaceted interactions abroad, Taiwan's internal politics and its external relations have become more nuanced and complicated. Analysis that assumes a unitary government and that privileges official or military affairs would fail to capture important aspects of the changing reality.
21
Roy, Denny. „Prospects for Taiwan Maintaining Its Autonomy under Chinese Pressure“. Asian Survey 57, Nr. 6 (November 2017): 1135–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2017.57.6.1135.
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The widely believed notion that Taiwan will inevitably submit to rule by Beijing is not politically, economically, or strategically well grounded. Despite its economic influence and growing military might, China’s ability to compel involuntary unification is far from certain if Taiwan’s people are determined to maintain their autonomy.
22
Liu, Hua-Yueh. „Sustainable Reuse of Military Facilities with a Carbon Inventory: Kinmen, Taiwan“. Sustainability 11, Nr. 6 (26.03.2019): 1810. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su11061810.
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Military government was lifted from Kinmen in 1992. The opening-up of cross-strait relations transformed the island into a tourist destination. This transformation led to electricity and water shortages in Kinmen. With the reduction in the number of troops, military facilities fell into disuse and are now being released for local government use. The aim of this project was to monitor the carbon footprint of a reused military facility during renovation of the facility. The LCBA-Neuma system, a local carbon survey software developed by the Low Carbon Building Alliance (LCBA) and National Cheng Kung University in Taiwan, was used in this project. The system analyzes the carbon footprint of the various phases of the building life cycle (LC) during renovation and carbon compensation strategies were employed to achieve the low carbon target. This project has pioneered the transformation of a disused military facility using this approach. The carbon footprint of energy uses during post-construction operation (CFeu) accounted for the majority of carbon emissions among all stages, at 1,088,632.19 kgCO2e/60y, while the carbon footprint of the new building materials (CFm) was the second highest, at 214,983.66 kgCO2e/60y. Installation of a solar cell system of 25.2 kWp on the rooftop as a carbon offset measure compensated for an estimated 66.1% of the total life-cycle carbon emissions. The findings of this study show that the process of reusing old military facilities can achieve the ultimate goal of zero carbon construction and sustainable development.
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Putri, Salsabila. „Strategi Aliansi Pemerintah Taiwan Terhadap Ancaman Republik Rakyat China dari Tahun 2018“. Indonesian Journal of Peace and Security Studies (IJPSS) 3, Nr. 2 (30.12.2021): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.29303/ijpss.v3i2.90.
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This journal analyzes and describes what strategies are prepared by Taiwan to deal with threats from China. In this case, China has ambitions to regain control of Taiwan which they consider as part of its sovereignty. While Taiwan itself considers that they are an independent country. This study aims to see Taiwan's strategy in dealing with security threats from China. This research methodology uses descriptive qualitative research with a framework of thinking using the concept of Bandwagoning. By using this concept, it can be seen that Taiwan uses an alliance with the US to counter security threats from China. The strong form of the alliance between the two can be seen in the establishment of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) Security Agreement which is applied in the security agreement where the US is committed to protecting Taiwan from Chinese military attacks and selling weapons to Taiwan to ward off security threats from China
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Kenichi, Goto. „Japan's Southward Advance and Colonial Taiwan“. European Journal of East Asian Studies 3, Nr. 1 (2004): 15–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1570061033004730.
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Abstract In the mid 1930s, as southward advancement thought was on the rise in Japan, there was a rapidly emerging sense shared by the Taiwan Colonial Government, the military authorities, and Japanese residents in Taiwan that colonised Taiwan should play a more positive role in Japan's southward advance. This paper examines the background of the emergence of this advocacy of southward advance in Taiwan during the 1930s and its development during the ten years preceding the Japanese defeat in the Pacific War. In this examination, I draw attention not only to the predilections of the Taiwan Colonial Government, the Taiwan Army, and Japanese residents but also to the mechanism through which the colonised Taiwanese were integrated into the southward advance, and finally I compare the relationships of those three actors and the southern region (nanpo).
25
Franck, Raymond, und Francois Melese. „A game theory view of military conflict in the Taiwan strait“. Defense & Security Analysis 19, Nr. 4 (Dezember 2003): 327–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1475179032000149412.
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Chung, Chien-peng. „Has China's Anti-Secession Law Made the World a Safer Place?“ China Report 41, Nr. 4 (Oktober 2005): 437–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/000944550504100408.
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The Anti-Secession Law enacted on 14 March 2005 by the highest legislature of the People's Republic of China (PRC), the National People's Congress, establishes for the first time a legal basis for the possible use of military use of force by the PRC against Taiwan. It may also be read as an attempt by the PRC to pursue a steady relationship with Taiwan by putting it on a quasi-legal footing. This comment analyses the Law from different aspects for its purpose, meaning and fallout for the PRC, Taiwan, the Asia-Pacific region and the rest of the world. The comment argues that the Law actually makes East Asia a more peaceful and secure environment than before its enactment.
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Lee, Wei-chin. „Multiple Shades of China’s Taiwan Policy after the 19th Party Congress“. Journal of Asian and African Studies 55, Nr. 2 (März 2020): 201–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0021909620905063.
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The study begins with descriptions of the changing political landscape of Taiwan’s domestic politics and China’s increasingly influential role in global politics to show the strategic terrain of asymmetric relations between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan (cross-Strait relations) and some lessons of Taiwan’s 2016 elections. It attempts to delineate the 19th Party Congress report for meaningful contemplation of and conjecture about China’s purposes and policies in dealing with the prickly Taiwan issue. In essence, China’s policy under Xi Jinping after the 19th Party Congress has been characterized by a dualist approach in which a soft power charm offensive has been the primary strategy to appeal to the Taiwanese public, whereas coercive measures in the diplomatic arena and military sphere have served as the supplementary approach to pressure the Democratic Progressive Party government.
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Liu, Roger C. „From ‘Sticks’ to ‘Carrots’ and ‘Nets’, then to ‘Needles’: The Evolution of the CPC’s Policy towards Taiwan“. China Report 58, Nr. 1 (23.01.2022): 90–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/00094455221074255.
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This article traces the evolution of the Communist Party of China’ policy towards Taiwan and identifies the major characteristics of different leaderships in the history of CPC. With the major goal to manipulate the domestic politics of Taiwan to prevent it from moving further towards independence, the CPC has, within the framework of national strategy, used the carrot (promised benefits or attraction based on positive values), the stick (military actions or threats, blockades and coercive policies in international politics, etc.), the net (relationships, networks and United Front work; developing local collaborators) and the needle (infiltration, sabotage and disinformation warfare) interchangeably with different emphases depending on the strategic environments it faced. The CPC’s policy towards Taiwan, thus demonstrates flexibility in the choice of tactics but remains constant in its strategic goals.
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Salem, Saber. „Chinese Foreign Aid to Fiji: Threat or Opportunity“. China Report 56, Nr. 2 (29.04.2020): 242–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0009445520916875.
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China’s political, economic and cultural influence is steadily rising in Fiji and the Pacific region as a whole. The Sino–Fiji cooperation deepened at multiple levels after the Fijian military assumed power through a coup d’état and removed the civilian government from power in late 2006. This ‘undemocratic behaviour’ infuriated the two regional powers—Australia and New Zealand who then applied sanctions on Fiji, particularly the military brass, and encouraged their counterparts as well as multilateral aid organisations to ‘punish’ Fiji’s military ‘regime’. The military government in order to derail the impact of sanctions from its traditional donors adopted the ‘Look North Policy’, which was opening cooperation with China and attracting Chinese investment in Fiji. China welcomed the friendship gesture and furnished Fiji with financial assistance. This Chinese friendship was also due to Taiwanese involvement in the region, which was providing aid for diplomatic recognition and support at the UN. The ‘microstates’ hold about 7 per cent of UN votes. Both China and Taiwan need their votes at multilateral organisations and given that these microstates are mostly aid-dependent economies, initiated an era of Chequebook diplomacy, which is basically money for diplomatic recognition in the case of Taiwan or acceptance of One China Policy in the case of China. The microstates have time and again switched between China and Taiwan and played one against the other to get more aid money out of their diplomatic rivalry. The Sino–Taiwan aid competition in the Pacific forced US to make a strong comeback and ensure that China under the pretext of denying Taiwan space in the region actually spies on the US activities in the region. As a result, the US and its regional allies have significantly increased their foreign aid to the island nations in order to coax them to diminish their level of financial dependence on China. So far, they have not been successful enough and China’s aid package has gone far beyond the level US is giving. Today, China is the second largest donor to the region and largest financier to Fiji. Fiji has become the ace in this game as it is the regional hub of the Pacific Island states. Bearing the current high level of aid competition between traditional and emerging donors in mind, it is too early to judge whether Chinese aid will cause more harm to Fiji than benefit or vice versa. It also entirely depends on the Fijian government as to how much it relies on Chinese aid and how clean Chinese are with their soft loans. China has been blamed for not being clear and specific about the terms and conditions of its concessional loans. This vagueness and secrecy that is associated with Chinese aid been a cause for concern, especially among traditional donors.
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Chase, Michael S. „Taiwan's Arms Procurement Debate and the Demise of the Special Budget Proposal: Domestic Politics in Command“. Asian Survey 48, Nr. 4 (Juli 2008): 703–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2008.48.4.703.
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Abstract Despite the growing security threat posed by Chinese military modernization, Taiwan still has not completed the purchase of some of the key components of the arms sales package the United States approved in April 2001. The reasons include overconfidence in U.S. security assurances, underestimation of Chinese capabilities and resolve, and highly divisive domestic Taiwanese politics.
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Tsai, Ming-Che, Chia-Chang Chuang, Jeffrey Arnold, Mau-Hwa Lee, Sun-Chieh Hsu und Chih-Hsien Chi. „Terrorism in Taiwan, Republic of China“. Prehospital and Disaster Medicine 18, Nr. 2 (Juni 2003): 127–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1049023x00000881.
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AbstractThe Republic of China on the island of Taiwan has experienced at least 20 terrorist events since 1979, including 13 aircraft hijackings and five bombings. Factors responsible for the relatively small burden of terrorism on Taiwan in the past include tight military control over political dissent until 1987, a warming relationship with the People's Republic of China in the 1990s, political inclusion of major internal cultural groups, geographic isolation, and a lack of other significant international enemies. Nevertheless, today Taiwan faces a new prospect of terrorism by adversaries of the United States and its allies and by an international paradigm shift in the types of weapons used by terrorists.National emergency management has been enhanced significantly since the Ji Ji earthquake in 1999, including the assignment of lead government agencies to the planning and preparedness for specific types of terrorist events involving nuclear, biological, and/or chemical releases. Other significant improvements at the operations level, include the establishment of two national disaster medical assistance teams, four urban search and rescue teams, 13 local disaster medical assistance teams, and eight chemical emergency response hospitals. Future challenges include improving the coordination of inter-agency response at the national level and the quantity and quality of local disaster response assets.
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Shambaugh, David. „China's Military in Transition: Politics, Professionalism, Procurement and Power Projection“. China Quarterly 146 (Juni 1996): 265–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000045033.
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International attention is increasingly focusing on the modernization of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). Discussions about the Chinese military have moved from intelligence circles and esoteric defence journals into the global media spotlight. Chinese moves in Burma and the South China Sea, continued nuclear testing, arms purchases and, exports, lack of budgetary transparency, increasing influence in elite politics and the political succession to Deng Xiaoping, and coercive pressure against Taiwan have all drawn attention to the PLA and have contributed to growing concerns about a muscular and assertive China.
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Dickson, Bruce J. „The Lessons of Defeat: The Reorganization of the Kuomintang on Taiwan, 1950–52“. China Quarterly 133 (März 1993): 56–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000018191.
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Few political parties have the opportunity to make a fresh start in a new location. An organization is rarely able to leave the environment in which its lessons are learned and apply them in a new one. However, the Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) encountered this situation after its defeat on the Chinese mainland and retreat to Taiwan. From 1950 to 1952, the KMT underwent a thorough organizational restructuring. The result was a renewal of its Leninist origins from the previous reorganization in 1924. During 1950–52, the KMT created a network of Party cells throughout the government, military and society to which each Party member had to belong. The principles of democratic centralism, ideology as guide to policy, hierarchical authority, and Party authority over the government bureaucracy and the military were reasserted.
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Obaid-Ur-Rehman. „Will China invade Taiwan: War Game Strategy and Lessons for China from the Russia-Ukraine Conflict“. Journal of Peace and Diplomacy 3, Nr. 1 (30.12.2022): 15–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.59111/jpd.003.01.015.
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The China-Taiwan crisis is witnessing a paradigm shift amid rising uncertainty due to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Every act, smaller or larger in western capitals against Russia in the context of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, is enlightening the Chinese policymakers, strategists, and leadership calculations over their futuristic war choices and possible invasion of Taiwan. There is a high chance of China invading Taiwan. What will be the future of Taiwan, the center for new American security has war gamed the situation and has revealed a possible conflict between China and Taiwan, dragging America to the center of the conflict. The game strategy has been used as a conceptual framework, to shed light on what planning, policymaking, and strategies will be required to deal with the hypothetical scenario. How will China react in the future, if Taiwan tries to become even closer to the western world, particularly America? The military blunders of the Russian army on the battlefield, the western united front against Russia on economic sanctions, the powerful strategy of information warfare in the digital world by the Zelensky government, and the response of the international community to Moscow’s invasion have sent shockwaves across China’s policy-making circles, but so far it hasn’t deterred the leadership morale in shaping its narrative of reunification. This study helps to analyze, the war gaming perspective of the China-Taiwan possible conflict, apart from war gaming scenarios, it also analyzes the actual situation, on how China would deal with the situation on economic, information, and diplomatic fronts. It also helps us to understand, why the conflict will be of tremendous importance, especially to America’s pacific and western allies.
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Chan, Yu-Feng, Kumar Alagappan, Arpita Gandhi, Colleen Donovan, Malti Tewari und Sergey B. Zaets. „Disaster Management following the Chi-Chi Earthquake in Taiwan“. Prehospital and Disaster Medicine 21, Nr. 3 (Juni 2006): 196–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1049023x00003678.
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AbstractThe earthquake that occurred in Taiwan on 21 September 1999 killed >2,000 people and severely injured many survivors. Despite the large scale and sizeable impact of the event, a complete overview of its consequences and the causes of the inadequate rescue and treatment efforts is limited in the literature. This review examines the way different groups coped with the tragedy and points out the major mistakes made during the process. The effectiveness of Taiwan's emergency preparedness and disaster response system after the earthquake was analyzed.Problems encountered included: (1) an ineffective command center; (2) poor communication; (3) lack of cooperation between the civil government and the military; (4) delayed prehospital care; (5) overloading of hospitals beyond capacity; (6) inadequate staffing; and (7) mismanaged public health measures.The Taiwan Chi-Chi Earthquake experience demonstrates that precise disaster planning, the establishment of one designated central command, improved cooperation between central and local authorities, modern rescue equipment used by trained disaster specialists, rapid prehospital care, and medical personnel availability, as well earthquake-resistant buildings and infrastructure, are all necessary in order to improve disaster responses.
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Yang, Dominic Meng-Hsuan. „:Island Fantasia: Imagining Subjects on the Military Frontline between China and Taiwan“. China Journal 89 (01.01.2023): 253–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/722888.
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Bi, Jianhai. „The Role of the Military in the PRC Taiwan Policymaking: A case study of the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996“. Journal of Contemporary China 11, Nr. 32 (August 2002): 539–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10670560220152328.
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Whiting, Allen S. „Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy After Deng“. China Quarterly 142 (Juni 1995): 295–316. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000034950.
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As the Deng era approaches its end, concern abroad, particularly in East Asia, focuses on how the People's Republic of China (PRC) will cope with territorial disputes with Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and India, and the continued quest for Taiwan. Meanwhile Chinese military modernization steadily increases the People's Liberation Army (PLA) air and sea power projection. The question arises: might a beleaguered post-Deng leadership seek to strengthen its legitimacy through exploitation of Chinese nationalism and if so, how would this manifest itself in foreign relations?
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Chang, Mau-Kuei Michael. „Taiwan's Nationalistic Politics and Its Difficult 'Status Quo'“. Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 21 (10.03.2005): 91–124. http://dx.doi.org/10.22439/cjas.v21i0.41.
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Taiwan’s growing calls for independence have provoked China and heightened the risk of military conflict in the region. This paper addresses two issues: first, it seeks to provide a short historical overview of the development of Taiwanese nationalistic self-assertion; second, it questions the commonly held notion of keeping the ‘status quo’, which is in effect always changing and dynamic. The paper uses a historical-institutional framework for its interpretation. It explores the origin and rise of Taiwanese nationalism in its relationship to Taiwan’s past, and the changing geo-political contexts in which it is situated. It then analyses the importance of electoral institutions and the struggles to broaden poltical participation and legitimation. Several disparate sources of Taiwanese identity are also discussed, namely: (i) Taiwan as a frontier territory of the Manchu Empire, which was later colonized and modernized by the Japanese; (ii) the transformation of the ROC regime, its indigenization and grounding in Taiwan in the context of its long separation from China and its international isolation. This indigenization process has been gradually accomplished through electoral struggles and by revising the electoral system and the constitution.
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Johnston, Alastair Iain. „China's Militarized Interstate Dispute Behaviour 1949–1992: A First Cut at the Data“. China Quarterly 153 (März 1998): 1–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000002964.
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China's military exercises in the Taiwan Strait in 1995–96 accentuated concerns among states in the Asia-Pacific region about what kind of great power China will become if its economic growth continues at present rates and if its domestic political system does not change appreciably. In most respects many Chinese internal post-mortems on the crisis were quite similar to those in other states: coercive diplomacy led to an increase in voter support for Beijing's nemesis, Lee Teng-hui, and it increased worries among surrounding states about how China might handle bilateral disputes with them; but it also showed just how seriously the Chinese regime takes threats to the related interests of territorial integrity and domestic legitimacy.
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Lancashire, Edel. „The Lock of the Heart Controversy in Taiwan, 1962–63: A Question of Artistic Freedom and a Writer's Social Responsibility“. China Quarterly 103 (September 1985): 462–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s030574100003071x.
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The early 1960s marked a period of intellectual and literary ferment in Taiwan. The East-West Controversy, which had its roots in the debate that took place in the middle of the last century regarding the continued validity of the Chinese tradition in the face of western military and economic superiority and in the controversy regarding westernization as the road to modernization in the 1930s, had broken out afresh. Creative writers, musicians and painters were experimenting with new forms and new techniques. As early as 1954 the writers of modern Chinese poetry had started the search for a more contemporary expression of their art form; and modern poetry societies, each with its own philosophy on how modernization should take place, had come into being. Writers of fiction who up till then had been almost exclusively concerned with the Sino-Japanese War; the mainland before the communist takeover in 1949, or the various aspects of the struggle against communism, were moving away from this kind of “propaganda-motivated writing” towards the production of “pure literature.” However, there were few modern Chinese creative writers of stature on whom either the poet or fiction writer could model himself. This was because of the ban imposed by the government in Taiwan on the works of writers prior to 1949 due to the association of many of them with communism or with ideologies unacceptable to the authorities. This meant that they had to seek for inspiration in the works of western writers which could be found in translation or in pirated versions of the original texts in the major cities of Taiwan. The traditionalists viewed this growing trend with alarm as did those writers who were closely associated with the Kuomintang. The latter had formed themselves during the early 1950s into three writers' associations, the China Association of Literature and Art, the Chinese Youth Writers' Association, and the Taiwan Women Writers' Association.
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Van Dyke, Jon M. „North-East Asian Seas-Conflicts, Accomplishments and the Role of the U n ited States“. International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 17, Nr. 3 (2002): 397–421. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157180802x00125.
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AbstractNorth-east Asia does not have a formal maritime regime, and has had to deal with its many conflicts in an ad hoc and pragmatic fashion. The region has three significant conflicts over the sovereignty of islands, numerous unresolved maritime boundary disputes, and confrontational military situations in the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait. Despite these deep differences, the strong-willed countries of this region have been able to work together to reach bilateral agreements regarding the exploitation of resources. Their fishery agreements have been creative and constructive, and zones of shared exploitation and development have been established where appropriate. The countries of the region now need to seek long-term solutions in order to provide a stable maritime regime, and to deal with the serious environmental problems of their ocean areas. The United States has been a de facto member of this region, because of its role in providing a military balance, and might be able to help mediate some of the festering disputes that interfere with the ability of the countries of North-east Asia to work constructively together.
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Nathan, Andrew J. „Biden’s China Policy: Old Wine in New Bottles?“ China Report 57, Nr. 4 (09.10.2021): 387–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/00094455211047069.
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The Biden Administration has accepted the Trump Administration’s definition of China as a ‘strategic competitor’, and has retained Trump’s tariffs, the ‘Quad’, and the upgrade in Taiwan’s protocol status. But Biden’s China policy is different from Trump’s in being truly strategic. The key elements of that strategy are focused on improving the United States’ competitiveness domestically and in international affairs; cooperation with allies and partners; an emphasis on human rights; partial decoupling of economic and technology relationships; and a search for some areas of cooperation with China. Success for the Biden strategy would consist neither of bottling up China in its current global power position nor in achieving a negotiated condominium in Asia. The Biden Administration would succeed if the United States can maintain its alliance system, keep a robust military presence in East Asia and prevent the forcible integration of Taiwan into China while avoiding major war. Several features of the China challenge make it reasonable to hope that such success is possible.
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Bullard, Monte R. „Party-Military Relations in the PRC and Taiwan: Paradoxes of Control. By Cheng Hsiao-Shih. [Boulder: Westview Press, 1990. 178 pp. £18.50.]“. China Quarterly 130 (Juni 1992): 439–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000041047.
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Wu, Di, Kaishan Wang, Chongwei Zheng und Yuchen Guo. „Global Strong Winds Occurrence Characteristics and Climate Index Correlation“. Journal of Marine Science and Engineering 12, Nr. 5 (25.04.2024): 706. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/jmse12050706.
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Guided by entering the deep sea and achieving deep marine development in marine construction, the factors hindering marine construction cannot be ignored. Strong ocean winds have a devastating impact on tasks such as ship navigation, carrier aircraft take-off and landing, naval operations and military exercises, and affect the planning of sea routes and the development of the long-distance sea. This paper uses ERA5 wind field data and key climate indices to conduct a systematic analysis of catastrophic winds in the global ocean using methods such as climate statistical analysis, the Theil–Sen trend method, Pearson correlation and contribution rate calculation. It points out the spatiotemporal distribution, variation trend, climate index correlation and contribution rate characteristics of strong winds occurrence (SWO) and hopes that the results of this study can serve as a guide for maritime route planning and provide technical assistance and decision-making support for marine development and other needs. The results show the following: The high global SWO occurs in the Southern Ocean, the North Atlantic, the North Pacific, near Taiwan, China, the Arabian Sea and other locations, with the strongest SWO in summer. The growth trend of SWO in the Southern Ocean is strongest, with decreasing regions near the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, and the growth trend is reflected in all four seasons. The climate indices with the strongest correlation and highest contribution to the global SWO are AAO (Antarctic Oscillation) and EP–NP (East Pacific–North Pacific pattern) with a correlation between −0.5 and 0.5 and a contribution rate of up to −50%~50%.
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Hoh, Anchi, und Brannon Wheeler. „East by Mid East: Studies in Cultural, Historical and Strategic Connectivities“. Comparative Islamic Studies 7, Nr. 1-2 (20.09.2012): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1558/cis.v7i1-2.1.
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This volume provides a multi-disciplinary and trans-regional approach to the historical roots and continued development of ties between the Middle East and Asia, from Muslim-Confucian relations to nuclear technology exchange between China and Saudi Arabia. The papers are contributed by specialists who live, research, and have spent considerable time in the Middle East and Asia including institutions in Japan, Israel, China and Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Kuwait, Philippines, Australia, Malaysia, North Africa, Indonesia, Lebanon and Syria, India and Kashmir, Egypt, and Korea. The contributors include academics, policy makers and consultants, leaders in international business, law professionals, and military.
The goal of this edited volume is to reach out to the research, diplomatic, and commercial communities. The subjects are addressed to attract individuals and groups from academia, think-tanks, NGOs, members of Congress, the US government, the private sector, and those involved in the policy-making, strategic planning, and public diplomacy in the fields of transnational studies, across-cultural comparison, international relations, energy security, global Islamism, Islamic fundamentalism, and terrorism.
The chapters in this volume are broadly divided into three main areas: (I) Cultural and Historical Connections (II) Transnational Allegiances and Local Culture in Asia, and (III) Strategic Relations between Asia and the Middle East.
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Shambaugh, David. „The People's Liberation Army and the People's Republic at 50: Reform at Last“. China Quarterly 159 (September 1999): 660–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000003416.
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The People's Republic of China (PRC) may not have had the opportunity to celebrate 50 years of statehood had it not been for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) – nor, for that matter, is it likely that the PRC would have come into existence in the first place were it not for the PLA (as is evident in Mao's often-cited observation that, “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun!”). As the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rode the military to power in 1949, the army also subsequently acted on several occasions to rescue the regime, maintain the Party in power and ergo sustain the People's Republic. The PLA has also been the designated protector of “state sovereignty” and “unifier” of China – acting to incorporate Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Manchuria and border regions in the south-west and north-west during the early 1950s, and fighting several border wars against China's neighbours thereafter – and it is the PLA that is ultimately charged with ensuring both that Taiwan does not seek “independence” and that China's territorial claims in the East and South China Seas are protected.
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Ozdemir, Serkan, Martin Wynn und Bilgin Metin. „Cybersecurity and Country of Origin: Towards a New Framework for Assessing Digital Product Domesticity“. Sustainability 15, Nr. 1 (21.12.2022): 87. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su15010087.
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Recent events concerning the Kaspersky anti-virus software in the UK and the Android operating system in the US have highlighted the significance of the domesticity of digital products for national cybersecurity, and the importance of establishing the origin of digital products has been further brought into focus by the war in Ukraine and China’s military activities around Taiwan. Digital products can contain hardware components, software elements, embedded systems, and data, and determining the country of origin (COO) in these circumstances is problematic. The aim of this research, and its main contribution, is to provide an operational framework for the application of the COO concept to address this problem. Using an inductive research methodology based on semi-structured interviews and an online survey, a 19-parameter framework for assessing the COO of digital products is developed and then applied to the case example of a mobile phone import in Turkey. This article concludes that new processes and policies are urgently required to enhance the cyber and information security for digital products, aid domestic digital technology production, and support the transition to recyclable technologies. Such developments are of significance not only for western nations concerned with data and security issues, but also for developing world countries trying to develop their own domestic digital product manufacturing capabilities. This is also of relevance to the computer end-user, who would benefit from greater clarity on the origin of digital products ahead of a purchase decision.
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Doumenge, François. „Les relations extérieures de l’halieutique japonaise“. Études internationales 18, Nr. 1 (12.04.2005): 153–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/702131ar.
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Japan's distant seafishing industry provides opportunities for supergains, y et it still remains dependent on the internal market. Its activities which are directed by the State, and implemented by the large industrial and commercial enterprises, are part of the whole evolution of the traditional corporations of the Kumiai. A study of the political, technical, and economical conjuncture and balance of power at the international level show three important periods. 1904-1941 : The imperialistic policy of the military-industrial complex supports the operations of the large enterprises. Between 1933 and 1940, Japan has several hundreds of fishing plants along the coasts of the Russian Far East; factory vessels are used for the canning of salmon and crabs in the Sea of Okhostk and the Behring Sea, and for whaling in the Antarctic and North Pacific ; industrial trawling is carried on along the coasts of the Asian continent while numerous enterprises are set up in Indo-Malaysia for coastal tuna fishing. 1948-1973 : Within the framework of the reconstruction of its economy, Japan at first resumes the same campaigns as those of the pre-War period; to these are added drifting long line fishing of tuna in the intertropical grounds and a powerful industrial trawling in North Pacific. By 1960, these activities are curtailed due to regulations imposed by USSR, USA, and the International Whaling Commission for stock protection. And then there are new competitors (Taiwan, South Korea). A general fail off after 1965 is partly compensated by the industrial trawling in the Behring Sea. 1974-1986: Significant geopolitical and economic changes force Japan to define and to redeploy its foreign fisheries. Pressured by waterside States, Japan gradually withdraws from traditional fishing grounds and endeavours to find new resources in waters which have remained international so as to maintain a balance with its internal market (tuna drifting long lines and seiners, squid fishery). New technology and profits from the internal market allow the industrial armaments to keep their competitive edge. The State strongly supports this sector through its diplomacy and the provision of funds for research and redeployment and by planning the integration of the distant fishing industry within the economical and social development of the traditional fishing cells of the Archipelago.
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Chan, Chinniang. „RESEARCH ON YANGQIN PERFORMANCE OF HUNAN OPERA BASED ON THE COMBINATION OF HUTONG CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND STREET ART — FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF EMOTION REGULATION“. International Journal of Neuropsychopharmacology 25, Supplement_1 (01.07.2022): A33—A34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ijnp/pyac032.046.
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Abstract Background Urban street culture is the expression of people's psychological thoughts and emotions. This subversive street art is the representative of the historical evolution of the city and can arouse the historical memory of the city in different periods. Street performance art, also known as street art or street performance, is a kind of street performance art. This kind of artistic performance can be improvisation or the daily activities of the performer. At present, most of the public are in the stage of curiosity, and indifference to street art is quite common. Due to the uneven performance level of artists and poor performance hardware conditions, many citizens expressed concern about whether street art can be called artistic expression. High quality culture is an important basis for shaping urban characteristics. After urbanization, from the illusory glory of the Gilded Age to the hutongs in Beijing and Shanghai, and even the military villages unique to Taiwan for decades, they have also formed their own unique “culture”. The scope of alley culture should be small and the content should be insignificant. It often leaves many painful or sweet memories to a group of local people. From the perspective of emotion regulation, this study studies the regulation effect of Hunan opera Yangqin performance on emotion combined with the development of Hutong Culture and street art. Research Objects and Methods The theme and method are mainly to improve the artistic and cultural activities in the lane, activate the expression of artistic and cultural characteristics, and explore the artistic packaging and marketing of the cultural Lane from a static perspective in the face of the development of street art and culture through the protection and inheritance of culture. Horizontally, from the development perspective of “exogenous level”, inject street art exhibition, enhance the artistic and cultural vitality of the city, take the classification of exhibition planning as the goal, and promote the internationalization of urban alley culture and art marketing on the basis of creating a behavioral art image integrating China and the West. In order to better the characteristics of cultural psychology, 36 subjects (half male and half female) participated in this study. The experimental design, screening method, dependent variable index and experimental method are the same as above. Examples of receiving instructions are as follows: the red circle will prompt, and then there will be negative emotional stimulation. Even if it makes me feel unhappy, it is normal. I should fully accept the unpleasant feeling and let my feeling flow naturally without controlling it. The guidelines for avoidance are as follows: the red circle will prompt, and then there will be negative emotional stimulation. Although I don't know what the specific content is, I should try my best to avoid this stimulation and avoid this negative emotional feeling. Result Traditional culture is not conservative, nor is it the burden of innovation and the stumbling block of reform. It is the accumulation of predecessors' wisdom and experience. After the precipitation of time, it has become a symbol of life. Through the discussion of resident identity, it is the memory created by a group of people living together. After several generations of inheritance, it has become a representative “cultural symbol” of the city. Therefore, street artists from European and American countries are widely invited to participate in the characteristic cultural cooperation with street alleys. Combine the performances of local traditional societies such as Hunan opera, brocade song and puppet show, integrate into the performing arts societies with school characteristics, and arrange installation art and plastic art exhibitions. Finally, at the closing ceremony, the residents created the cultural symbol of “integration of China and the west” with the enthusiasm of “Long Street banquet”. Zhangzhou ancient city art festival carries out international marketing. Conclusion Reexamine the Centennial cultural sites, introduce the cultural traditions of Chinese provinces and regions, realize the “rejuvenation” of connecting life and taking root in the earth, absorb the profound accumulation of multiculturalism, restart, brew and carry forward, and make Xinglong culture an enviable and real hometown of cultural life, which depends on the leadership of relevant government departments. I think the Chinese people have drawn up a blueprint for the next Centennial plan. The promotion of this art is conducive to regulating people's body and mind. On the one hand, human beings have a natural close relationship with nature. Acknowledgment This article is the 2019 general project of Fujian Taiwan Gezai Opera (Hunan Opera) of Fujian Social Science Planning Project Art Fund. Phased achievements of Yangqin development and Research (Project No.: fj2019b029).