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Auswahl der wissenschaftlichen Literatur zum Thema „Metaphysical anthropology“
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Zeitschriftenartikel zum Thema "Metaphysical anthropology"
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Misztal, Dawid. „The anthropological consequences of the evolution of empiricism“. Hybris 19, Nr. 4 (30.12.2012): 75–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/1689-4286.19.04.
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The text examines methodological consequences of anti-metaphysical turn of British empiricism in the field of anthropology. I argue that this shift reinforces anthropology in its descriptive and interdisciplinary form, because destruction of metaphysically grounded subjectivity carried out in the course of evolution of empiricism provides epistemological legitimization of the idea of anthropological research as morally neutral and religiously indifferent procedure. In the final part of the article the difficulties caused by application of this new methodology are emphasized.
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Shevtsov, Sergii. „Transcendental anthropology and poetry (metaphysical parallels)“. Sententiae 6, Nr. 2 (30.08.2002): 41–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.31649/sent06.02.041.
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In this article, the author analyses and compares the views of Kant, Heidegger, Husserl, Brodsky and Bakhtin, and examines the problem of time, space, and contemplation. Another subject of consideration is the finitude of being, which combines the three previous aspects.
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Maundrell, Richard. „From Rupert Lodge to Sweat Lodge“. Dialogue 34, Nr. 4 (1995): 747–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300011094.
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This book is presented as “a study in ethno-metaphysics,” an exploration of the worldview of Canada's Native peoples. In offering this as a work of philosophy rather than of cultural anthropology or Native spirituality, authors Rabb and McPherson take as their point of departure anthropologist A. I. Hallowell's claim that a cultural worldview is a “cognitive orientation” from which a set of metaphysical claims might be deduced—even if it is not consciously recognized as such by those who live within it (p. 3). In other words, the guiding premise of this work is that something recognizable and significant as a metaphysical theory can be massaged out of the cultural belief-systems of Canada's Native peoples.
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Friauf, V. A. „Logos and Tao: from Metaphysics to Anthropology“. Izvestiya of Saratov University. Philosophy. Psychology. Pedagogy 12, Nr. 4 (2012): 45–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.18500/1819-7671-2012-12-4-45-49.
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The article compares the primary names in Logos tradition and numeric matrix of antitradition. Tao as a metaphysical and also anthropological metaphor, according to the author's opinion, belongs to primary names’ ladder. How does logocentric «Russian idea» relate to the Chinese tradition of Tao? Hermeneutic clarification of metaphysical and anthropological content of these traditions is the maintenance of the article.
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Faritov, Vyacheslav T. „The will to power in ethnogenesis: Nietzschean motives of Eurasian anthropology“. Izvestiya of Saratov University. Philosophy. Psychology. Pedagogy 24, Nr. 2 (21.06.2024): 180–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.18500/1819-7671-2024-24-2-180-185.
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Introduction.The article carries out a philosophical reconstruction of Eurasian anthropology based on the analysis of the theory of ethnogenesis by L. N. Gumilyov. In the conceptual developments of the classicist of Eurasianism, the motives of Nietzschean anthropology are explicated, which makes it possible to fit the Eurasian concept of man into the context of post-metaphysical philosophy. Theoretical analysis. The application of methodological principles and guidelines of philosophical comparative analysis allows us to reveal parallels between the basic concepts of the theory of ethnogenesis and the basic concepts of Nietzschean anthropology (the will to power, overman, eternal return). Conclusion. A comparative analysis allows us to conclude that the key point of both Nietzschean anthropology and the anthropological teachings of L. N. Gumilev advocates transgression, understood by the author as an ontological horizon opposite to transcendence. The article substantiates the thesis that the constitutive moment of understanding a person in the teachings of F. Nietzsche and the theory of L. N. Gumilev is the rejection of transcendence and the affirmation of the purely transgressive nature of human existence. The rethinking of the nature of the connection between Nietzschean anthropology and the heritage of antiquity is also carried out. It is concluded that Nietzsche’s appeal to antiquity was provoked by the situation of crisis in European metaphysics and Western Christianity. The thesis is substantiated that the crisis of metaphysical philosophy is at the same time the main motive for the Eurasians to turn to the East as a fundamentally non-European horizon of philosophical thought.
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Kristeva, Silviya. „Virtualistic Transcendentalism as a Concept of Systematic Critical Metaphysics. The Pentalogy of Valentin Kanawrow“. Filosofiya-Philosophy 33, Nr. 2 (01.07.2024): 213–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.53656/phil2024-02-08.
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Valentin Kanawrow develops his system of critical metaphysics across five systematically linked monographs. The core of this pentalogy is the original concept of virtualistic transcendentalism. Kanawrow creates a new metaphysical system as a continuation and reorganization of Kant’s transcendental philosophy. The virtual is the domain of the pure a priori form of thought, which, however, must reach and realize experience in its regions. This transition from a priori to a posteriori is mediated by transcendental schematism – an entirely new theory developed by Valentin Kanawrow. In its descent to experience, the transcendental schema devirtualizes itself and deduces the phenomena as formats of the true ontologizations of the given in experience. Transcendental phenomena result in plural regional critical ontologies, such as special metaphysical domains. The large-scale system of critical metaphysics of Valentin Kanawrow ends with a transcendental anthropology demonstratively developed on the conducted Analytics of the transcendental phenomena constituting the lifeworld of human being.
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JANI, ANNA. „SPIRITUAL ACTS IN ANTHROPOLOGY. EDITH STEIN’S PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE“. HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES 10, Nr. 2 (2021): 425–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2021-10-2-425-440.
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The aim of the present contribution is to prove that spiritual acts not only play a significant role in the phenomenological description of the person and in individual and social experiences, but likewise they play a decisive role in the methodological constitution of phenomenology and have a core function in the theoretical structuring of the phenomenological description of the person, regarding, for example, metaphysical and anthropological characteristics. Firstly, in the paper, the implications for anthropology that arise from Edith Stein’s phenomenology are examined. In the second part—from the insight that Stein does not structure anthropology without its metaphysical background—the paper underlines the metaphysical presuppositions of anthropology in Stein’s thinking. In both stages, the investigation engages with Husserlian insights that Stein took on board and creatively introduced from Husserl’s thought into her own work. The inference from this engagement of Stein with Husserl emerges in the way Stein structures anthropology in general, and the origin of this can be seen in the description of the person as a psychophysical individual. At this point, the question arises regarding how the description of the spiritual acts can contribute to the structure of the person and, in this sense, to the foundation of anthropology as a philosophical-theological science.
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Tyson, David. „Should “The Metaphysics of Man” Be a Sixth Branch of Objectivist Philosophy?“ Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 22, Nr. 1 (01.07.2022): 136–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.5325/jaynrandstud.22.1.0136.
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ABSTRACT The author proposes to convert Ayn Rand’s theory of man into a sixth branch of her Objectivist philosophy called the metaphysics of man (more widely referred to by names such as philosophical anthropology). This branch would be distinct from both the metaphysics of reality (more generally called ontology) and epistemology. Along with consolidating all the axioms about the fundamental nature of man (and thus eliminating the various bridge theories, including the bridge theory of man, the anteroom to epistemology, and metaphysical value-judgments about man), this new framework will simplify and clarify the structure of Objectivism.
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Grenberg, Jeanine. „Anthropology From a Metaphysical Point of View“. Journal of the History of Philosophy 37, Nr. 1 (1999): 91–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hph.2008.0961.
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Cohen, Alix A. „Kant's Concept of Freedom and the Human Sciences“. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39, Nr. 1 (März 2009): 113–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.0.0035.
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The aim of this paper is to determine whether Kant's account of freedom fits with his theory of the human sciences. Several Kant scholars have recently acknowledged a tension between Kant's metaphysics and his works on anthropology in particular. Jacobs and Kain write that ‘Kant made his intentions quite clear: he proposed a pragmatic empirical anthropology. The problem is, as commentators have noted, that it is not at all clear how these declared intentions fit with some central claims of his critical philosophy.’ Wood acknowledges the unexpected nature of Kant's anthropological endeavours: ‘The pragmatic approach to anthropology serves to indicate the great distance separating Kantian anthropology from […] what Kant's metaphysical theory of freedom and nature might lead us to expect.’ Louden actually holds that ‘Kant did not satisfactorily address these issues, and in order for [him] to do so it will be necessary to offer conjectures that occasionally go beyond his texts.’
Dissertationen zum Thema "Metaphysical anthropology"
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Dargan, Geoffrey David. „The possible self : an exposition and analysis of metaphysical themes in Kierkegaard's theological anthropology“. Thesis, University of Oxford, 2016. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:939bc331-d3af-4144-8aac-f6fa6be95f0b.
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This thesis proposes that Søren Kierkegaard's thought - in particular, his theological anthropology - is undergirded by an inchoate metaphysics of modality. It focuses on the concept of possibility (Danish: Mulighed), arguing that possibility is a primary ingredient of the Kierkegaardian self and serves as a kind of 'engine' for the development of the individual before God. Accordingly, viewing Kierkegaard's works through the lens of possibility is a fruitful way to gain new insights into his beliefs, and clarifies what he sought to express in his authorship. Kierkegaard, I argue, formulates a multilayered account of possibility that, while not abandoning metaphysics, re-frames possibility existentially, in terms of what the self may actually become, not only in and for itself but also in relation to God. One's selfhood and one's relation to God both require an ontology of possibility. His existential concerns arise from this metaphysical footing. This thesis then considers how possibility is integral to human selfhood. Genuine selfhood is an openness towards God's eternal possibility, rather than the self's attempting to create its own eternal possibilities via some other means of actualization. If the human person, by faith, becomes 'grounded in the absolute', then that person is becoming a self precisely because God is actualizing her possibilities. God is for Kierkegaard the source of all possibility. Theologically, Kierkegaard's conception of possibility presents us with ideas that may be fruitful in further discussion of God's attributes and the ways in which God is understood to relate to the created world. Anthropology, ontology, and theology are thus inextricably linked.
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Milne, Douglas J. W., und res cand@acu edu au. „A Religious, Ethical and Philosophical Study of the Human Person in the Context of Biomedical Practices“. Australian Catholic University. School of Philosophy, 2006. http://dlibrary.acu.edu.au/digitaltheses/public/adt-acuvp148.26072007.
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From the book of Genesis the human person is presented as divine image-bearer, a Godlike status that is further explained in terms of the dual constitution of matter and spirit. Natural Law provides a person-centred ethic that draws on a number of human goods that emanate naturally from the human person and lead in practice to human flourishing. This theory empowers towards making ethical decisions in the interest of human persons. Aristotle explained the human being as a substantially existing entity with rational powers. By means of his form-matter scheme he handed on, by way of Boethius, to Aquinas, a ready model for the Christian belief in the dual nature of the human person as an ensouled body or embodied soul. Applying the new scientific method to the question of the human self David Hume concluded that he could neither prove nor disprove her existence. By so reasoning Hume indirectly pointed to the need for other disciplines than empirical science to explain the human person. Emmanuel Levinas has drawn on the metaphysical tradition to draw attention to the social and ethical nature of the human person as she leaves the trace of her passing through the face of the other person who is encountered with an ethical gravitas of absolute demand. The genesis of the human person most naturally begins at conception at which point and onwards the human embryo grows continuously through an internal, animating principle towards a full-grown adult person. The main conclusion is that biblical anthropology and metaphysical philosophy provide the needed structures and concepts to explain adequately the full meaning of the human person and to establish the moral right of the human person at every stage to respect and protection.
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Lagrut, Blandine. „Le réalisme moral d'Elizabeth Anscombe : une philosophie de l'intégrité“. Electronic Thesis or Diss., Université de Lorraine, 2024. http://www.theses.fr/2024LORR0107.
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Pour Elizabeth Anscombe, tout effort de bonté est indissociablement une quête de vérité. La vigilance morale prend chez elle la forme d’un Daimôn rappelant à chacun la tâche d’examiner sa vie : « Peut-être que d’une manière que je ne vois pas, je me trompe désespérément sur une chose essentielle*. » Cette thèse défend l’idée qu’Anscombe élabore un type original de réalisme moral centré sur la notion d’intégrité et polarisé par une question : comment une personne parvient-elle à saisir, le plus rigoureusement possible, le sens et la gravité de ses actions ? Selon elle, trois conditions sont nécessaires afin d’évaluer correctement le poids de nos actes — elles donnent le plan de notre travail : on a besoin de savoir ce qu’on fait effectivement, on doit avoir une certaine idée des nécessités liées à sa nature d’humain et enfin, on doit reconnaître l’infinie valeur de cette nature.Pour savoir ce qu’elle fait, la personne doit pouvoir identifier les critères de « ce qui compte comme une description pertinente d’une action.» Or c’est précisément ce à quoi s’attèle Anscombe dans son étude de l’intention. Elle montre qu’il est possible d’isoler des types d’actions dont nous savons que, si nous la faisons intentionnellement, nous sommes dans le faux. La catégorie d’« acte intrinsèquement injuste » redevient disponible, offrant ainsi le point de départ d’une épistémologie morale réaliste.Pour être intègre, la personne a, par ailleurs, besoin de justifier ses évaluations en les fondant sur une compréhension approfondie de la forme de vie des humains. Là encore, Anscombe opère un déplacement majeur en donnant une nouvelle consistance au concept de nature humaine. Elle s’appuie sur l’idée que nous apprenons quelque chose sur la sorte d’être que sont les humains en dépliant la forme logique de leurs pratiques linguistiques. Sa méta-éthique gravite autour d’un axe souvent inaperçu, combinant le naturalisme d’Aristote et la grammaire logique de Wittgenstein.Enfin, une action ne sera vraie sur le plan moral qu’à la condition de manifester la valeur « mystique » de la nature humaine. La mise au jour de cet aspect constitue l’apport le plus novateur de cette thèse. L’étude approfondie des textes éthico-religieux permet de dégager le cœur de son anthropologie métaphysique : les humains sont non seulement des animaux rationnels, mais aussi des êtres spirituels, doués d’une dignité que nous pouvons connaître par « connaturalité » ou par « perception mystique ».L’exploration des différentes facettes du réalisme moral anscombéen permet, in fine, de préciser son rôle dans le débat éthique contemporain sur l’absolutisme. Certains actes sont-ils à refuser absolument, quoiqu’il en coûte du bien-être de la personne ou de la situation conséquente ? Pour Anscombe, la réponse est oui. Mais cela ne peut se faire ni au détriment du discernement personnel ni au prix d’une aliénation. Sa manière de concevoir l’humain permet de résoudre la tension en établissant que l’interdit n’a pas besoin d’être décrété par une autorité extérieure pour être absolu. Il peut s’imposer intérieurement à la personne, comme une évidence impérieuse, en raison de sa nature spirituelle.*G.E.M. Anscombe, « La philosophie morale moderne », traduit par G. Ginvert et P. Ducray, Klesis-Revue Philo-sophique. Actualité de la philosophie analytique, 2008, no 9, p. 25.Mots-clés : réalisme moral, intégrité, absolutisme, philosophie de l’action, épistémologie morale, méta-éthique, naturalisme, grammaire logique, perception mystique, connaturalité, anthropologie métaphysique, nature spirituelleFor Elizabeth Anscombe, every effort at goodness is also a quest for truth. Moral vigilance takes the form of a Daimôn reminding each person of the task of examining their life: ‘Perhaps in some way, I can’t see, I may be on a bad path, perhaps I am hopelessly wrong in some essential way*.’ This thesis argues that Anscombe is developing an original type of moral realism centred on the notion of integrity and polarised by one question: how does a person come to grasp, as rigorously as possible, the meaning and gravity of their actions? According to her, three conditions are necessary in order to correctly assess the weight of our actions – they provide the blueprint for our work: we need to know what we are actually doing, we need to have some idea of the necessities of our human nature and, finally, we need to recognise the infinite value of this nature.To know what they are doing, the person must be able to identify the criteria for ‘what counts as a relevant description of an action’. This is precisely what Anscombe sets out to do in her study of intention. She shows that it is possible to isolate types of action which we know that, if we do them intentionally, we are in the wrong. The category of "intrinsically unjust act" becomes available again, providing the starting point for a realist moral epistemology.The person also needs to justify their assessments by basing them on a thorough understanding of the human being. Here again, Anscombe makes a major shift by restoring consistency to the concept of human nature. She relies on the idea that we learn something about the kind of being that humans are by unfolding the logical form of their linguistic practices. Her meta-ethics revolves around an often-unnoticed axis, combining Aristotle’s naturalism and Wittgenstein’s logical grammar.Finally, an action will only be true on a moral level if it manifests the “mystical” value of human nature. Bringing this aspect to light is the most innovative contribution of this thesis. An in-depth study of the ethico-religious texts reveals the core of her metaphysical anthropology: humans are not only rational animals, but also spiritual beings, endowed with a dignity that we can know through “connaturality” or “mystical perception”.By exploring the various facets of Anscombean moral realism, we can ultimately clarify its role in the contemporary ethical debate on absolutism. Are certain acts to be rejected absolutely, whatever the cost to the well-being of the person or the consequent situation? For Anscombe, the answer is yes. But this cannot be done either at the expense of personal discernment or at the cost of alienation. Her way of conceiving the human makes it possible to resolve the tension by establishing that the prohibition does not need to be decreed by an external authority to be absolute. It can be imposed internally on the agent, as compelling evidence, due to their spiritual nature.*G. E. M. Anscombe, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ in Ethics, Religion and Politics, Collected Philosophical Pa-pers III, Oxford, Blackwell, 1981, p. 37.Keywords: moral realism, integrity, absolutism, philosophy of action, moral epistemology, meta-ethics, naturalism, logical grammar, mystical perception, connaturality, metaphysical anthropology, spiritual nature
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Holdsworth, Christopher John. „The revolution in anthropology : a comparative analysis of the metaphysics of E.B.Tylor (1832-1917) and Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942)“. Thesis, University of Oxford, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.240214.
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Cykowski, Elizabeth. „Summoning the courage for philosophising : a new reading of Heidegger's 'The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics'“. Thesis, University of Oxford, 2015. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:8afe3dae-439c-4caa-9046-5e3b94efed61.
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This thesis provides an original reading of Heidegger's 1929-30 lecture course The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. Currently, the notoriety of FCM stems from controversy surrounding its description of human beings as 'world-forming,' and of animals as comparatively 'poor in world.' These propositions are interpreted within the secondary literature as a reinforcement of ontotheological and humanistic metaphysics. However, this standard interpretation misses the more complex and subtle significance of this material in the broader context of the lectures. I argue that Heidegger's 'comparative examination' forms part of a wider metaphysical project of interrogating a contemporary 'delusion,' a metaphysical division drawn between 'life' and 'spirit' engendered by an 'anthropological' worldview which pictures man as a composite of those two elements. Heidegger traces the manifestations of this delusion in Kulturphilosophie and biology, before attempting to recover a more genuinely metaphysical attitude, one founded not on anthropocentric 'worldviews' but on a direct, courageous 'confrontation' with ourselves. Heidegger argues that this confrontation must take its orientation from Greek thought, in which man is interpreted as that part of physis that apprehends physis as a whole. For Heidegger, this notion of the human as a kind of 'meta-physical' being enables us to grasp the coextensive essence of the human and of metaphysics. I argue that Heidegger's position can be extended and enriched if we consider it in conjunction with what he presents in the lecture course as one of its great adversaries; for the German tradition of philosophical anthropology, rather than being a straightforward articulation of the life-spirit divide that Heidegger wishes to eschew, actually harmonises with and deepens Heidegger's reflections in FCM concerning the nature of the human as a meta-physical being.
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Domenech, Théodora. „Phénoménologie et métaphysique dans la pensée de Max Scheler“. Thesis, Montpellier 3, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018MON30069/document.
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Max Scheler développe une phénoménologie de l’affectivité fondée sur l’idée que l’amour est source de toute connaissance. L’amour, défini comme l’acte intentionnel par excellence, est un acte d’essence personnelle. Cette affirmation amène le philosophe à considérer comme une nécessité eidétique l’existence d’une personne infinie divine, un Dieu amour. Cela engendre deux questions : l’essence de la personne divine découle-t-elle de l’expérience intuitive fondée sur l’amour ? Ou bien, au contraire, l’amour ne peut-il être pensé comme fondement de la connaissance que d’après une représentation préalable de Dieu défini comme amour ? Notre recherche propose d’interroger, à partir de la position schelerienne, la possibilité de constituer une phénoménologie absolument neutre de tout présupposé métaphysique. Nous travaillons pour cela avec plusieurs concepts de métaphysique : réalisme ontologique, idéalisme subjectiviste, et Weltanschauung. Nous interrogeons dans un premier temps la pensée schelerienne à travers le prisme du débat généré par le tournant idéaliste de Husserl, en nous demandant si le personnalisme de Scheler peut être qualifié de réalisme et en quel sens. Nous étudions ensuite l’ensemble des axiomes religieux mobilisés par Scheler dans sa phénoménologie afin de mettre en évidence ce que nous appelons une théo-logique de sa conception de la logique phénoménologique. Nous examinons enfin la façon dont Scheler soumet rétrospectivement la phénoménologie à un regard critique, en cherchant à dégager ses présupposés métaphysiques implicites. Cela permet de comprendre pourquoi Scheler, dans la dernière période de ses recherches, abandonne la phénoménologie et considère sa nouvelle pensée comme une métaphysique nouvelleMax Scheler’s phenomenological thinking is based on the idea that love is the source of all knowledge. Defined as the ultimate intentional act, love is an essentially personal act. This claim drives the philosopher to consider the existence of an infinite personal God – a loving God - as an eidetic necessity. This raises the following questions: does the essence of God arise from an intuitive experience grounded in love? Or is love conceived as the source of all knowledge according to an existing representation of God defined as love? Taking Scheler’s position on the matter as the guiding thread of my research, I examine the possibility of a phenomenology free from any metaphysical presupposition. To this end, several definitions of the term metaphysics will be examined: ontological realism, idealist subjectivism, and theological Weltanschauung. I first question Scheler’s thought through the prism of the debate surrounding Husserl’s idealist turn by asking whether his personalist phenomenology can be described as « realist » and if so, in what sense. Then I examine all the religious axioms that Scheler uses in his phenomenology to highlight what I call a « theo-logic », i.e. an implicit theological conception of phenomenological logic. Finally, I look at how Scheler criticizes phenomenology in the hope of revealing its implicit metaphysical presuppositions. My thesis thus sheds light on why Scheler, at the end of his life, decided to put phenomenology aside and to define his thinking in terms of a new metaphysics
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Jullien, Stanislas. „La finitude infinie et ses figures : considérations philosophiques autour de la radicalisation de la finitude originaire chez Derrida“. Thesis, Paris 4, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014PA040146.
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Cette thèse a l’allure d’une géographie de l’historial visant à cartographier le site où la philosophie atteint sa fin. Une telle géographie obéit à, au moins, deux contraintes matricielles. La première contrainte exige de décrire le site en vue de le localiser : notre thèse consistera alors à poser que le site en question ne pourra être occupé que par la finitude infinie car c’est seulement en elle que résiderait son avoir-Lieu matinal ; avoir-Lieu par où la finitude devra pousser son originarité créatrice jusqu’à libérer en elle une infinité affectée en retour d’un sens inédit. La seconde contrainte exige de défricher des territoires textuels permettant d’exhiber le système de coordonnées conceptuelles susceptible de cartographier le site de la FI : notre thèse consistera alors à poser que c’est le territoire élaboré par Derrida qui héberge en lui la cartographie natale de la FI en raison de l’intervention à la fois inaugurale et structurale de la FI sur ce territoire. Dès lors, séjourner dans l’unité articulée de ces deux contraintes exigera d’endurer l’installation spéculative dans la proposition cardinale suivante : la finitude infinie est la déconstruction. Cette endurance se donnera pour tâche de re-Marquer la FI sur le territoire derridien en (re)construisant d’une part le plan d’intelligibilité de la FI à travers l’agencement de ces deux lignes directrices (phénoménologico-Transcendantale et thanatologico-Transcendantale) et d’autre part, en montrant que si la FI confronte le territoire derridien à une charge aporétique opérant comme un pharmakon, cette pharmacologie pourrait libérer des figures inédites de la finitude infinie – figures herméneutiques (Heidegger) et spéculatives (Hegel)We set out to construct a geography of historical aiming to cartograph the site where philosophy reaches its end. In so doing, two main constraints at least have to be taken into account. We first have to describe the site in order to locate it. We argue that the site in question can only be occupied by infinite finitude, for it is our assumption that only infinite finitude holds its inaugural taking-Place, a taking-Place wherein infinite finitude will have to push its creative originarity so far as to release in itself an infinity that will be affected in return by a novel meaning. Secondly, we have to break new ground in textual territories, which will enable us to uncover the system of conceptual coordinates that will make it possible to cartograph the site of infinite finitude. We argue that it is the territory constructed by Derrida that hosts the native cartography of infinite finitude because of the intervention, both inaugural and structural, of infinite finitude on that territory. It follows that, in order to dwell in the articulated unit of these two constraints, we have to maintain a speculative posture in the following cardinal proposition: infinite finitude IS deconstruction. This posture makes it possible to delineate and re-Inscribe infinite finitude on the Derridean territory by (re)constructing a plane of intelligibility through the combination of both the phenomenologico-Transcendental and thanatologico-Trancendental axes on the one hand; by showing, on the other hand, that if infinite finitude confronts the Derridean territory with an aporetic charge operating as a pharmakon, that pharmacology could release novel figures of infinite finitude - hermeneutic (Heidegger), as well as speculative (Hegel), ones
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Blanc-brude, Gilles. „Psychologie et anthropologie dans la philosophie de Kant“. Thesis, Paris 4, 2010. http://www.theses.fr/2010PA040013.
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La philosophie de Kant n’est pas le refus de toute psychologie. Malgré l’incertitude du statut systématique d’une connaissance empirique de l’esprit et l’impossibilité de lui appliquer les mathématiques pour la rendre rigoureusement scientifique, malgré la vacuité d’une déduction a priori des propriétés métaphysiques de l’âme et l’inanité d’une fondation psychologique de la philosophie, de la logique et de la morale, bref, malgré l’antipsychologisme et l’antinaturalisme, les thèmes et les questions psychologiques conservent pour Kant une légitimité et un intérêt. Le chapitre des Paralogismes de la raison pure associé à la Réfutation de l’idéalisme mettent certes fin à la psychologia rationalis issue de la métaphysique de Wolff, mais ils rendent aussi possible une psychologie intégrée à l’anthropologie et suivant le fil directeur de l’expérience. Intimement liée à la philosophie transcendantale, la psychologie selon Kant en sera le complément et l’illustration, par des réflexions sur la genèse de nos connaissances, sur la corrélation de l’intériorité et de l’extériorité, sur l’intensité de la vie consciente et finalement sur le libre usage de nos facultés. La première partie traitera de la difficulté à situer la psychologie par rapport à l’anthropologie et à la philosophie. La seconde, des principales critiques visant la psychologie empirique et la psychologie rationnelle. La dernière, de l’Anthropologie du point du vue pragmatique comme étant la mise en œuvre philosophique d’une théorie inactuelle de l’esprit conforme aux exigences critiquesKant’s philosophy is not a denial of any form of psychology. Despite the uncertainty of the systematic status concerning the mind’s empirical knowledge and the impossibility to use mathematics to bring this knowledge into the scientific field, despite the vacuity of a deduction about the metaphysical properties of the soul made a priori and the pointlessness of a psychological foundation of both philosophy and logic as well as moral, in brief, despite Kant’s antipsychologism and antinaturalism, themes and psychological issues do remain worthwhile and legitimate in his philosophy. The chapter on “Paralogisms” in the Critique of Pure Reason, associated to the “Refutation of Idealism”, does indeed put an end to the psychologia rationalis -which stems from Wolff’s metaphysics- but yet it makes it possible for psychology to be integrated into anthropology while following the leading thread of experience. Kant’s approach of psychology being intimately related to transcendental philosophy will be both its complement and its illustration through a series of considerations on the genesis of our knowledge, on the connection between interiority and exteriority, the various degrees of consciousness and eventually through considerations on the free use of our mental faculties. The first part will deal with the difficulties to set psychology in relation to Kant’s anthropology and philosophy. The second part will set out the main arguments against empirical and rational psychology. The last part will study Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View as being the philosophical fulfilment of an untimely theory of the mind complying with the demands of criticism
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Mercant, Simó Jaume. „La metafísica del conocimiento de Karl Rahner. Análisis de "Espíritu en el mundo"“. Doctoral thesis, Universitat Abat Oliba CEU, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/462803.
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El teòleg jesuïta Karl Rahner, després del Concili Vaticà II, es convertí en el paladí de la nouvelle théologie i en el princeps novorum theologorum mitjançant la proclama del seu gir antropològic. Cal analitzar aquest teòleg de Friburg, per a una comprensió adequada, des dels seus fonaments filosòfics. La metafísica transcendental de Karl Rahner ―expressada en la seva coneguda obra Geist in Welt― està clarament fonamentada en el pensament de l’existencialista Heidegger i en el tomisme transcendental de Maréchal. No obstant això, Rahner es presenta com autèntic intèrpret de sant Tomàs d’Aquino, però, en realitat, tergiversa els texts, contexts i principis de l’Angèlic. El nostre autor, amb la seva Erkenntnismetaphysik, duu fins a les darreres conseqüències el cogito cartesià, identificant en l’home l’ésser, el fet de conèixer i l’objecte conegut, ignorant la distinció que l’Angèlic fa de l’ésser natural i de l’ésser cognoscitiu. Per altra banda, el concepte clau, per entendre la metafísica transcendental del Pare Rahner, és el Vorgriff o anticipació, que és un coneixement apriòric i atemàtic de l’ésser en general. A més a més, Karl Rahner arriba a interpretar la gnoseologia de l’Aquinat identificant ―sic et simpliciter― la conversio ad phantasma, l’abstractio i la reditio in seipsum, sense tenir en compte que sant Tomàs parla d’una unitat dels distints processos cognoscitius, però no els identifica. En conseqüència, Karl Rahner instrumentalitza la metafísica i gnoseologia tomistes pràcticament en la seva totalitat. En definitiva ―seguint Cornelio Fabro―, Rahner “non tam est thomista, quam philosophiae thomisticae depravator”.El teólogo jesuita Karl Rahner, después del Concilio Vaticano II, se convirtió en el paladín de la nouvelle théologie y en el princeps novorum theologorum mediante la proclama de su giro antropológico. Es menester analizar a este teólogo de Friburgo, para comprenderlo adecuadamente, desde sus fundamentos filosóficos. La metafísica trascendental de Karl Rahner ―expresada en su célebre obra Geist in Welt― está claramente fundamentada en el pensamiento del existencialista Heidegger y en el tomismo trascendental de Maréchal. No obstante, Rahner se presenta como auténtico intérprete de santo Tomás de Aquino, mas, en verdad, tergiversa los mismos textos, contextos y principios del Angélico. Nuestro autor, con su Erkenntnismetaphysik, lleva el cogito cartesiano hasta sus últimas consecuencias, identificando en el hombre el ser, el conocer y el objeto conocido, ignorando la distinción que el Angélico hace del ser natural y del ser cognoscitivo. Por otra parte, el concepto clave, para entender la metafísica trascendental del padre Rahner, es el Vorgriff o anticipación, que es un saber apriórico y atemático del ser en general. Además, Karl Rahner llega a mal interpretar la gnoseología del Aquinate identificando ―sic et simpliciter― la conversio ad phantasma, la abstractio y la reditio in seipsum, sin tener en cuenta que santo Tomás habla de una unidad de los distintos procesos cognoscitivos, pero no los identifica. Por consiguiente, Karl Rahner instrumentaliza la metafísica y la gnoseología tomistas prácticamente en su totalidad. En definitiva ―siguiendo a Cornelio Fabro―, Rahner “non tam est thomista, quam philosophiae thomisticae depravator”.
The Jesuit theologian Karl Rahner, after the Second Vatican Council, became the nouvelle théologie's paladin and princeps novorum theologorum by making an anthropological turn. It is necessary to analyze this theologian from Freiburg from his philosophical foundations to properly understand him. Karl Rahner's transcendental metaphysic ―expressed in his famous work Geist in Welt― is clearly based on both Heidegger's existential thought and Maréchal’s transcendental Thomism. Nevertheless, although Rahner acts as an authentic Saint Thomas of Aquinas interpreter, he distorts Angelic's texts, contexts and principles. Our author, with his Erkenntnismetaphysik, takes the Cartesian cogito to the last consequences, identifying in man the being, knowledge and known object, ignoring the distinction that Angelic makes between natural being and cognitive being. Additionally, the key concept to understand Father Rahner's transcendental metaphysics is Vorgriff or anticipation, which is an aprioric and unthematic knowledge of the being in general. Furthermore, Karl Rahner misunderstands Aquinas’ gnoseology, identifying ―sic et simpliciter― the conversio ad phantasma, abstractio and reditio in seipsum, disregarding that Saint Thomas refers to a unity between different cognitive processes without identifying them. Consequently, Karl Rahner instrumentalizes thomistic metaphysics and gnoseology, almost in its entirety. In short ―as Cornelio Fabro indicates― Rahner “non tam est thomista, quam philosophiae thomisticae depravator”.
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Brown, Julius. „Penser le corps, sa puissance et sa destinée chez Spinoza : aux sources de son anthropologie“. Thesis, Strasbourg, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015STRAK012/document.
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Spinoza évaluera la révolution copernicienne et prônera un naturalisme rationaliste et matérialiste contre la tradition onto-théologique, Aristote et Descartes en étant les deux figures clés, sans parler des théologiens et de la Bible. Spinoza interprète l’erreur du géocentrisme comme signalant deux autres erreurs : le dualisme anthropologique classique qui inféodait le corps à l’âme et l’illusion du libre-arbitre. Par la réhabilitation gnoséologique, psychophysique et socio-affective du corps, il prétend conduire l’homme au salut présent, non eschatologique, le réconciliant avec lui-même et avec le Dieu-Nature. La permanence d’une sensibilité anthropologique hébraïque y est prégnante, ce qui n’annule pas des disparités conceptuelles, métaphysiques, sotériologiques et éthiques entre lui et l’Écriture. Ces disparités pourraient rapprocher Spinoza plus d’Aristote que de Descartes. Le projet spinozien tiendra-t-il ses promesses sans retomber dans les travers du mythique et du mystique ?Spinoza assesses the Copernican revolution and advocates a rationalist and materialistic naturalismagainst the onto-theological tradition, Aristotle and Descartes as the two main figures thereof,theologians and the Bible not to mention. Spinoza interprets the error of geocentrism as indicating twoother errors: classical anthropological dualism which subjugated the body to the soul and the illusion offree-will. By gnoseological, psychophysical and socio-emotional rehabilitation of the body, he claims tolead man to present salvation, not eschatological, reconciling him with himself and with God as Nature.The permanence of Hebraic anthropological sensibility is pregnant, which does not cancel metaphysical,soteriological and ethical disparities between him and the Bible. These disparities could bring Spinozacloser to Aristotle than to Descartes. Will the spinozian project keep its promises without relapsing intothe traps of the mythical and the mystical ?
Bücher zum Thema "Metaphysical anthropology"
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Oya, Alberto. The Metaphysical Anthropology of Julián Marías. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-61804-8.
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Todd, Richard. The Sufi doctrine of man: Ṣadr al-Dī̄n al-Qūnawī's metaphysical anthropology. Leiden: Brill, 2014.
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Jean, Grégori. L'humanité à son insu: Phénoménologie, anthropologie, métaphysique. Wuppertal: Association internationale de phénoménologie, 2020.
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Eduardo Batalha Viveiros de Castro. Métaphysiques cannibales: Lignes d'anthropologie post-structurale. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2009.
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Eduardo Batalha Viveiros de Castro. Metafísicas caníbales: Líneas de antropología postestructural. Madrid: Katz, 2010.
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Guz, Tadeusz. Historisch-systematische Beiträge zur Anthropologie. Weilheim-Bierbronnen: Gustav-Siewerth-Akademie, 2000.
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Capelli, Virginia. Essere per avere: Progetto culturale di crescita della persona per l'ordine della convivenza civile nel mondo laico e religioso. Roma: Aracne, 2010.
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Vedder, Ben. Mens en metafysica: Mogelijkheid en grens van een metafysisch mensbeeld. Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 1991.
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Giannini, Gianluca. Condizione umana. Genova: Il melangolo, 2009.
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González, Juan A. García. El ser y la libertad. Málaga: Edinford, 1992.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenBuchteile zum Thema "Metaphysical anthropology"
1
Oya, Alberto. „The Metaphysical Anthropology of Julián Marías“. In Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion, 23–51. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-61804-8_3.
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Meyer, Michel. „Toward an Anthropology of Rhetoric“. In From Metaphysics to Rhetoric, 111–36. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2593-9_9.
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Llewelyn, John. „Lévi-Strauss or Ricoeur: Structural or Hermeneutic Anthropology“. In Beyond Metaphysics?, 153–70. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1985. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-07558-4_8.
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Bello, Angela Ales. „The Sense of Things—Hyletics, Anthropology, Metaphysics“. In The Sense of Things, 57–76. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-15395-7_5.
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Böhr, Christoph. „Anthropologie und Transzendentalphilosophie: ihre Verschränkung in der Bestimmung des ‚Specificum humanum‘. Zu Richard Schaefflers Antwort auf die Frage nach dem Menschen“. In Colloquium Metaphysicum, 97–109. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-42084-0_8.
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Barash, Jeffrey Andrew. „Anthropology, Metaphysics, and the Problem of Historical Meaning in Heidegger’s Interpretation of the Kehre“. In Martin Heidegger and the Problem of Historical Meaning, 231–302. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3579-2_7.
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Galán Díez, Ilia. „Dialogue with Santob: Reflections on Politics, Sociology, Anthropology, Psychology, Ethics Aesthetics, Metaphysics and Theodicy“. In The Birth of Thought in the Spanish Language, 63–72. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50977-8_11.
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Cykowski, Beth. „From Life to Spirit“. In Heidegger's Metaphysical Abyss, 131–58. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198865407.003.0007.
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This chapter embarks upon a critical dialogue with The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, focusing on Heidegger’s use of the concept of ‘spirit’. As it is one half of the crucially important life/spirit divide, one would assume that Heidegger would pay as much attention to spirit as he does to life, and, in this vein, analyse anthropology as thoroughly as he does biology. However, Heidegger restricts his comments concerning anthropology to the few cursory remarks in Part One, in which he denounces the discipline as a problematic form of Darstellung. The chapter argues that with these remarks Heidegger ignores the body of work, spearheaded by Max Scheler during the 1920s, known as ‘philosophical anthropology’. Moreover, despite the fact that Heidegger critiques what he sees as deep delusions implicit in anthropology, this German tradition contains insights that resonate with his own project in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics.
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Voss, Stephen. „Descartes: The End of Anthropology“. In Reason, Will, and Sensation, 273–306. Oxford University PressOxford, 1994. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198240839.003.0015.
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Abstract What is a human being? Any systematic philosophy ought to offer an answer to that question. You would think that Descartes’s philosophy would; it is natural to think that his new vision of souls and bodies provides a new way to do anthropology —a new way to conceive human beings. His first intuition, indeed, is that a human being is a compound of a Cartesian soul and a Cartesian human body. But I believe that, when all is said and done, he concludes that he has no answer at all to this question. In the following pages I will display Descartes’s failure to incorporate human beings into his new universe as the culmination of a historical process discernible in his writings. I will argue that he had good metaphysical reasons to conclude that no Cartesian anthropology is possible. Appreciating the story requires attention to shifting patterns within his writings, and to passages absent from as well as present in the text. The story clearly has large philosophical implications, but we cannot examine them now.
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BANASIAK, DANIEL. „Olga Siedakowa o poezji „głuchych” lat siedemdziesiątych“. In Tradycja i nowoczesność. Z zagadnień języka i literatury Słowian Wschodnich 2, 20–31. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Pedagogicznego w Krakowie, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.24917/9788380845282.2.
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Olga Siedakowa is a representative of contemporary Russian metaphysical poetry. In addition to poems, she writes philosophical and philological essays in which she combines the traditions of the Moscow-Tartu school of anthropology and history of culture with the creative themes of Western philosophy. In the article, I analyze, using the intertextual method, Olga Siedakowa’s essayistic texts on Russian poetry of the 1970s.
Konferenzberichte zum Thema "Metaphysical anthropology"
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Hadzantonis, Michael. „Becoming Spiritual: Documenting Osing Rituals and Ritualistic Languages in Banyuwangi, Indonesia“. In GLOCAL Conference on Asian Linguistic Anthropology 2019. The GLOCAL Unit, SOAS University of London, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.47298/cala2019.17-6.
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Banyuwangi is a highly unique and dyamic locality. Situated in between several ‘giants’ traditionally known as centres of culture and tourism, that is, Bali to the east, larger Java to the west, Borneo to the north, and Alas Purwo forest to the south, Banyuwangi is a hub for culture and metaphysical attention, but has, over the past few decades, become a focus of poltical disourse, in Indonesia. Its cultural and spiritual practices are renowned throughout both Indonesia and Southeast Asia, yet Banyuwangi seems quite content to conceal many of its cosmological practices, its spirituality and connected cultural and language dynamics. Here, a binary constructed by the national government between institutionalized religions (Hinduism, Islam and at times Chritianity) and the liminalized Animism, Kejawen, Ruwatan and the occult, supposedly leading to ‘witch hunts,’ have increased the cultural significance of Banyuwangi. Yet, the construction of this binary has intensifed the Osing community’s affiliation to religious spiritualistic heritage, ultimately encouraging the Osing community to stylize its religious and cultural symbolisms as an extensive set of sequenced annual rituals. The Osing community has spawned a culture of spirituality and religion, which in Geertz’s terms, is highly syncretic, thus reflexively complexifying the symbolisms of the community, and which continue to propagate their religion and heritage, be in internally. These practices materialize through a complex sequence of (approximately) twelve annual festivals, comprising performance and language in the form of dance, food, mantra, prayer, and song. The study employs a theory of frames (see work by Bateson, Goffman) to locate language and visual symbolisms, and to determine how these symbolisms function in context. This study and presentation draw on a several yaer ethnography of Banyuwangi, to provide an insight into the cultural and lingusitic symbolisms of the Osing people in Banyuwangi. The study first documets these sequenced rituals, to develop a map of the symbolic underpinnings of these annually sequenced highly performative rituals. Employing a symbolic interpretive framework, and including discourse analysis of both language and performance, the study utlimately presents that the Osing community continuously, that is, annually, reinvigorates its comples clustering of religious andn cultural symbols, which are layered and are in flux with overlapping narratives, such as heritage, the national poltical and the transnational.
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Svoboda, David. „WHY SHOULD METAPHYSICS BE IMPOSSIBLE?“ In SGEM 2014 Scientific SubConference on ANTHROPOLOGY, ARCHAEOLOGY, HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY. Stef92 Technology, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.5593/sgemsocial2014/b31/s11.118.
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