Zeitschriftenartikel zum Thema „Logiese positivisme“

Die standpunt word gehuldig dat die sielkunde, na 'n onafhanklike bestaan van meer as 100 jaar, as wetenskaplike projek misluk het. Dit word toegeskryf daaraan dat die sielkunde nie, in dialoog met sy menslike ‘materiaal’, 'n eie metodiek ontwikkel het nie maar voorrang verleen het aan die reedsontwikkelde natuurwetenskaplike metodiek waardeur die basiese aannames van die natuurwetenskap ook sonder voldoende besinning oorgeneem is. Die onderhawige bydrae pleit vir nuwe antropologiese en teoretiese grondslae gebaseer op eksistensieël-fenomenologiese denke eerder as op Cartesiaanse dualisme, idealisme, en logiese positivisme. Die nuwe grondslae moet steeds in kritiese dialoog met en gebruikmaking van ons primêre belewing van die wêreld opgebou word. Hoe die benadering bevrugtend kan inwerk op verskillende velde van die sielkunde, van waarneming tot psigopatologie en van bedryfs tot kritiese psigologie, word kortliks geïllustreer.

Abstract: Ernst Mach stands as a representative figure of the positivist philosophy of science at the turn of the twentieth century, yet he is by far the most misunderstood scientist-philosopher. The misunderstanding is largely caused by his epistemological rejection of the use of hypothetical entities that are ordinarily posited by scientists. He also argued against the mechanistic worldview which dominated scientific investigations in the nineteenth century. This essay will demonstrate that Mach’s positivism differs from the earlier positivism of August Comte. His anti metaphysical stance is deeply-rooted in his physical phenomenology, guided by the economy of thought in pursuit of the unity of science. In Mach’s view, scientific theories are merely biological tools for organizing experience by means of the fewest possible concepts, and all metaphysical elements are to be eliminated from science as methodologically and epistemologically superfluous. But Mach’s thesis of the unification of science does not share the common concern of the logical positivists to reduce various scientific statements to physical language. While Mach’s philosophy of science clearly exhibits a miscalculation of the strength of scientific conceptual tools, his physical phenomenology serves as a bridge between theory and experiment which has proved to be fruitful. Keywords: The economy of thought, evolution, element, physical phenomenology, the unity of science, instrumentalism, emphirical realism. Abstrak: Ernst Mach tampil sebagai tokoh representatif dari Filsafat Ilmu Pengetahuan positivis pada peralihan menuju abad ke-20, sekaligus sebagai ilmuwan-filsuf yang paling disalahpahami. Kesalahpahaman tersebut sebagian besar disebabkan oleh penolakan epitemologisnya terhadap penggunaan wujud-wujud hipotetis yang kerap diajukan oleh para ilmuwan. Ia juga melawan cara pandang mekanistis yang mendominasi penyelidikan ilmiah pada abad ke-19. Artikel ini memperlihatkan bahwa positivisme Mach berbeda dengan positivisme August Comte yang mendahuluinya. Pandangan anti-metafisis Mach berakar sangat dalam pada fisika fenomenologi yang dipandu oleh ekonomi pikiran untuk mencapai sains terpadu. Dalam pandangan Mach, teori-teori ilmiah semata-mata sarana biologis untuk menata pengalaman dengan memanfaatkan sesedikit mungkin konsep, dan semua elemen metafisika perlu disingkirkan dari sains karena secara metodologis dan epistemologis tidak bermanfaat. Namun, tesis Mach tentang sains terpadu tidak sejalan dengan gagasan para positivis logis yang mereduksi berbagai macam pernyataan ilmiah ke dalam bahasa fisika. Sementara Filsafat Ilmu Pengetahuan Mach jelas-jelas keliru dalam memperhitungkan kekuatan piranti-piranti konseptual sains, fisika fenomenologi yang menjembatani teori dan eksperimen telah terbukti sangat bermanfaat. Kata-kata kunci: Ekonomi pikiran, evolusi, elemen, fisika fenomenologi, sains terpadu, instrumentalisme, realisme empiris.

O presente trabalho tem como objetivo analisar o modo em que a bibliografia especializada busca explicar o constante emprego das Forças Armadas – instrumento de política externa – em missões de segurança pública na América do Sul. São identificados três níveis de explicação: internacional, regional e nacional. Defende-se que as análises podem ser agrupadas em duas lógicas explicativas – positivismo e o pós-positivismo –, as quais distinguem-se não apenas em termos teóricos, mas também, sob a ótica da teoria crítica, em relação às suas consequências políticas. Considera-se que a compreensão positivista do fenômeno em questão leva a uma subordinação da política à técnica, enquanto as análises pós-positivistas evidenciam o caráter político da escolha de envolver o instrumento militar em segurança pública. Palavras-chave: Forças Armadas; Segurança Pública; América do Sul. Abstract: The current paper aims to evaluate the way in which specialized scholars seek to clarify the constant employment of South Americans Armed Forces – foreign policy instrument – in public security. Three explanatory levels are identified: international, regional and domestic. It is argued that analyses can be classified in two logics of explanation – positivism and post positivism – that are distinguished by both its theoretical specificity and its politics implications. We sustain that rationalist explanation submits politics to technique, while post positivism analyses emphasize the political nature of the decision to involve the military in public security. Key-Word: Armed Forces; Public Security; South America. Recebido em: fevereiro/2017. Aprovado em: agosto/2017.

RESUMENEl arte popular, concebido como lenguaje, posibilita el descentramiento de los relatos modernos y pone en evidencia los vicios de la civilización a través de un posicionamiento ético-crítico que busca un horizonte de sentido humanizante para desterrar los excesos de la instrumentalidad positivista y cientifizante. Es mediante la incidencia del arte popular y su valoración simbólica que se pueden generar procesos de revisión histórica, para que junto al eclecticismo crítico, el nihilismo y la deconstrucción, se pueda arribar a una autonomía social e individual capaz de conformar una “utopía estética” que apunte a un “sentido orgánico de la vida”, a la interrelación armónica entre pensamiento, naturaleza y ser humano. Todo en beneficio de una subjetividad epistémica que dignifique al sujeto como centro, ante la arremetida de los excesos de la modernidad.PALABRAS CLAVESubjetividad epistémica, deconstrucción, eclecticismo, revisión histórica, positivismo lógico, utopía estética, metarrelato, diseminación.RURANKUNA RIGSISKA RIMAKUNA KUNAURAMANDASUGLLAPIKaipi nenakume imasami ñugpamanda kaugsaikuna kasaka mailla mailla tukurespa rinaku kai sutiname ailla kaugsajirú rima, maskaspa sugsinama allilla llullarispa tukuikunamanda mana allilla kaskata anchuchispa, churaspa sug allí llullakuna chasallata kawachiku ñugpa kausai sapallamanda mana llachachispa suma ima ruraikuna “ nukakin ruraspa kawachispa” minakume allilla “ kawachichu iuiaichi kausangapaallilla” atun llagtata munaspa chasallata pai nukachiwa kaipi ninakume parlaichi allila kaskata kunauramandakunata.IMA SUTI RIMAI SIMI:Rurai tukuikunamanda wallichii, kawaspa ñugpamanda iallilla llullai nukakin rurai.FOLK ART AND CRITIQUE OF MODERNITYABSTRACTFolk art, conceived as a language, enables the shift of our focus from modern narratives to the vices of civilization, through a critical and ethical stance that seeks a humanizing horizon of meaning in order to banish the excesses of positivist instrumentality. It is through the impact of popular art and its symbolic value that processes of historical revision can be produced, so that we can reach, along with critical eclecticism, nihilism and deconstruction, an individual autonomy capable of an “aesthetic utopia” that points to an “organic meaning of life”, to the harmonic interplay between thought, nature and human beings. All this will favor an epistemic subjectivity that dignifies the individual as center in face of the onslaught of modernity.KEYWORDSSubjectivity, deconstruction, eclecticism, historical revision, logical positivism, aesthetic utopia, metanarrative.ART POPULAIRE ET CRITIQUE DE LA MODERNITÉRÉSUMÉL’art populaire, conçu comme un langage, permet le déplacement de notre attention dès les récits modernes aux vices de la civilisation, à travers une position critique et éthique qui cherche un horizon humanisant de sens afin de bannir les excès de l’instrumentalité positiviste. C’est par l’impact de l’art populaire et sa valeur symbolique que le procès de la révision historique peut être produit, de sorte que nous puissions atteindre, avec l’éclectisme critique, le nihilisme et la déconstruction, une autonomie individuelle capable d’une « utopie esthétique » qui pointe vers un « sens organique de la vie », à l’interaction harmonieuse entre la pensée, la nature et les êtres humains. Tout cela favorisera une subjectivité épistémique qui ennoblit l’individu comme centre, face à l’assaut de la modernité.MOTS-CLEFSSubjectivité, déconstruction, éclectisme, révision historique, positivisme logique, utopie esthétique, méta-narration.ARTE POPULAR E CRÍTICA À MODERNIDADERESUMOA arte popular, concebido como linguagem, possibilita o descentra mento dos relatos modernos e põe em evidência os vícios da civilização a traves de um posicionamento éticocrítico que procura um horizonte de sentido humanizante para desenterrar os excessos da instrumentalidade positiva e “cientifizante”. É mediante a incidência da arte popular e sua valoração simbólica que se podem gerar processos de revisão histórica, para que junto ao ecletismo crítico, o niilismo e a desconstrução, se possa arribar a uma autonomia social e individual capaz de conformar uma “utopia estética” que aponte a um sentido orgânico da vida, à inter-relação harmônicas entre pensamento, natureza e ser humano. Todo em beneficio de uma subjetividade epistêmica que dignifique ao sujeito como centro, ante a arremetida dos excessos da modernidade.PALAVRAS CHAVESSubjetividade epistêmica, desconstrução, ecletismo, revisão histórica, positivismo lógico, utopia estética, metanarrativa, disseminação. Recibido el 10 de agosto de 2015Aceptado el 22 de septiembre de 2015

The planning and building of sustainable cities and communities yields operational theories on urban space. The novelty of this paper is that it discusses and explores the challenges for space syntax theory building within two key research traditions: positivism and hermeneutics. Applying a theory of science perspective, we first discuss the explanatory power of space syntax and its applications. Next, we distinguish between theories that attempt to explain a phenomenon and theories that seek to understand it, based on Von Wright’s modal logics and Bhaskar’s critical realism models. We demonstrate that space syntax research that focuses on spatial configurative changes in built environments, movement and economic activities can explain changes in a built environment in terms of cause and effect (positivism), whereas historical research or research focusing on social rationality, space and crime or cognition seeks to develop an understanding of the inherent cultural meaning of the space under investigation (hermeneutics). Evidently, the effect of human intentions and behaviour on spatial structures depends on the type of rationality underlying these intentions, which is the focus of this study. Positivist explanatory models are appropriate for examining market rationality in cases that entail unambiguous intentionality and that are associated with a high degree of predictability. By contrast, other kinds of reasoning require a hermeneutic understanding.

Dalam perkembangannya postivisme terdiri dari, positivisme sosial, positivisme evolusioner, positivisme kritis. Ketiga positivisme diatas dibahas dalam positivisme Auguste Comte dilihat dari analisa epistimologis dan nilai etisnya terhadap sains. Menghadapi filsafat positivisme Auguste Comte, disatu fihak orang mengatakan bahawa filsafat tersebut tidak lebih dari sebuah metode atau pendirian saja. Sedangkan dilain pihak orang mengatakan bahwa filsafat positivisme itu merupakan “sistem afirmai” sebuah konsep tentang dunia dan manusia. Aguste Comte telah menunjukkan bahwa didalam perkembangan jiwa manusia, baik secara individual maupun secara keseluruhan, terdapat suatu kemajuan. Kemajuan itu akan dicapai, pada saat perkembangan datang, pada saat yang disebut positif. Positivisme berakar pada empirisme. Positivisme adalah: bahwa ilmu adalah satu-satunya pengetahuan yang valid, dan fakta-fakta sejarah yang mungkin dapat menjadi obyek pengetahuan. Dengan demikian positivisme menolak keberadaan segala kekuatan atau subyek dibelakang fakta, menolak segala penggunaan metode diluar yang digunakan untuk menelaah fakta. Aguste Comte adalah tokoh aliran positivisme, pendapat aliran ini adalah indera amatlah penting dalam memperoleh pengetahuan, tetapi harus dipertajam dengan alat bantu dan diperkuat dengan eksperimen. Bila dilihat dari nilai etisnya terhadap sains maka dapat dinyatakan bahwa apabila pradigma positivisme maka objeknya empiris macam pengetahuannya menunjukkan sains dan dapat diukur dengan logis dan bukti empiris.

Qu'il s'agisse de la politique ou du droit, l'explication par la « Loi islamique», la sharî'a, paraît incontournable, dès lors qu'on entreprend d'étudier un fait qui s'inscrit dans le contexte de sociétés dites « arabomusulmanes ». Ceci est pourtant à la fois tautologique et prochronique. Tautologique, en ce sens que le fait même de caractériser une société par l'ethnicité ou la religion confère à ce critère une place centrale dans la logique explicative de tout fait social qui s'y produit : si une société ne peut être identifiée que par son islamite, il est inévitable que le droit qualifié d'islamique soit son système régulateur. Mais ce critère d'islamité apparaît rapidement problématique.

<p>The purpose of this paper is to compare and evaluate the thoughts of Hans Kelsen with Satjipto Raharjo. Both offer their respective theories, namely Hans Kelsen's pure legal theory and Satjipto Rahardjo's progressive law. In this theory, both of them base their philosophical approach. After reviewing, the theories of these two figures are relevant for interpreting the law. This paper uses a critical paradigm with a combination of normative or doctrinal and sociological or non-doctrinal approaches. The results showed that Hans Kelsen directed his mind that legal positivism considers moral speech, values are finished and final when it comes to the formation of positive law. Pure Legal Theory is not a perfect copy of transcendental ideas, but it does not try to see the law as a posterity of justice. While Rahardjo's progressive law rests on the aspects of rules and behavior. Regulations will build a positive and rational legal system. While the behavioral or human aspects will drive the rules and systems that are built.</p><p> </p><p>Tujuan penulisan ini adalah untuk membandingkan dan mengevaluasi pemikiran Hans Kelsen dengan Satjipto Raharjo. Keduanya menawarkan teori masing-masing, yaitu teori hukum murni Hans Kelsen dan hukum progresif Satjipto Rahardjo. Dalam teori ini, keduanya sama-sama mendasarkan pendekatan secara filosif. Setelah dikaji, teori dari kedua tokoh ini relevan untuk memaknai hukum. Tulisan ini menggunakan paradigima kritis dengan pendekatan kombinasi normatif atau doktrinal dan sosiologis atau non doktrinal. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa Hans Kelsen lebih mengarahkan pikirannya bahwa positivisme hukum yang menganggap pembicaraan moral, nilai-nilai telah selesai dan final manakala sampai pada pembentukan hukum positif. Teori Hukum Murni bukanlah salinan ide transendental yang sempurna, namun tidak berusaha memandang hukum sebagai anak cucu keadilan. Sementara hukum progresifnya Rahardjo bertumpu pada aspek peraturan dan perilaku (rules and behavior). Peraturan akan membangun suatu sistem hukum positif yang logis dan rasional. Sedangkan aspek perilaku atau manusia akan menggerakkan peraturan dan sistem yang dibangun. </p>

<p>The purpose of this paper is to compare and evaluate the thoughts of Hans Kelsen with Satjipto Raharjo. Both offer their respective theories, namely Hans Kelsen's pure legal theory and Satjipto Rahardjo's progressive law. In this theory, both of them base their philosophical approach. After reviewing, the theories of these two figures are relevant for interpreting the law. This paper uses a critical paradigm with a combination of normative or doctrinal and sociological or non-doctrinal approaches. The results showed that Hans Kelsen directed his mind that legal positivism considers moral speech, values are finished and final when it comes to the formation of positive law. Pure Legal Theory is not a perfect copy of transcendental ideas, but it does not try to see the law as a posterity of justice. While Rahardjo's progressive law rests on the aspects of rules and behavior. Regulations will build a positive and rational legal system. While the behavioral or human aspects will drive the rules and systems that are built.</p><p> </p><p>Tujuan penulisan ini adalah untuk membandingkan dan mengevaluasi pemikiran Hans Kelsen dengan Satjipto Raharjo. Keduanya menawarkan teori masing-masing, yaitu teori hukum murni Hans Kelsen dan hukum progresif Satjipto Rahardjo. Dalam teori ini, keduanya sama-sama mendasarkan pendekatan secara filosif. Setelah dikaji, teori dari kedua tokoh ini relevan untuk memaknai hukum. Tulisan ini menggunakan paradigima kritis dengan pendekatan kombinasi normatif atau doktrinal dan sosiologis atau non doktrinal. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa Hans Kelsen lebih mengarahkan pikirannya bahwa positivisme hukum yang menganggap pembicaraan moral, nilai-nilai telah selesai dan final manakala sampai pada pembentukan hukum positif. Teori Hukum Murni bukanlah salinan ide transendental yang sempurna, namun tidak berusaha memandang hukum sebagai anak cucu keadilan. Sementara hukum progresifnya Rahardjo bertumpu pada aspek peraturan dan perilaku (rules and behavior). Peraturan akan membangun suatu sistem hukum positif yang logis dan rasional. Sedangkan aspek perilaku atau manusia akan menggerakkan peraturan dan sistem yang dibangun. </p>

Et af den analytiske filosofis yndlingseksempler, når det gælder begrebsforplumring, er Heidegger. Ikke kun for logiske positivister som Carnap, men også for senere analytiske filosoffer med et mere nuanceret syn på sproget står Heidegger som skræmmebilledet på, hvor galt det kan gå, hvis man hengiver sig til etymologi og sprogmagi i stedet for begrebsanalyse. Hvis det sker, at angelsaksiske filosoffer tager Heidegger til sig, kan man være temmelig sikker på, at de samme filosoffer tager afsked med analytisk filosofi. Et repræsentativt eksempel kunne være Richard Rorty.

Pozityvizmas padarė reikšmingą įtaką daugeliui XIX ir XX amžių filosofijos srovių. Bet jo įtaka skleidėsi plačiau – jis darė poveikį gamtos ir ypač socialiniams mokslams bei įvairioms kitoms viešosios ir privačios žmogaus veiklos sritims: teisei, politikai, kasdieniam gyvenimui. Nemenka jo įtaka ir menui ar menams. Šią įtaką straipsnyje ir mėginama patyrinėti.Įtakos pobūdis priklausė nuo epochos ir joje dominavusios pozityvizmo formos ir buvo ganėtinai skirtingas. Klasikinis, arba socialinis, XIX amžiaus pozityvizmas labiausiai paveikė literatūrą. XIX a. pozityvizmas traukė rašytojus tiek savo dėmesiu faktams ir dėsningai visuomenės raidai, tiek kolektyvistiniais bei altruistiniais idealais, tiek progresyvistine orientacija. Labiausiai jo įtaka jaučiama natūralistiniuose Émilio Zola kūriniuose. Ernsto Macho empiriokriticizmo idėjų poveikis buvo kitoks. Nepalyginti daugiau dėmesio nei Auguste’as Comte’as skyręs ne išoriniams, o vidiniams faktams, o tiksliau, patį jų supriešinimą laikęs ydingu, Machas padarė poveikį vadinamiesiems modernistams: Jamesui Joyce’ui, Franzui Kafkai, Robertui Musiliui. Subjekto desubstancializacija, sąmonės srautas, sapno ir tikrovės suliejimas – tai Macho įtakos ženklai. Jų nestinga ir modernistinėje dailėje, ypač abstrakcionistinėje, nes dailininkus labai paveikė XX amžiaus pradžioje itin populiarios Macho mintys apie percepciją ir ypač erdvės vizualinį suvokimą. Na, o loginio pozityvizmo įtaka ryškiausiai skleidėsi architektūroje, kurią Vienos ratelio nariai laikė svarbiausiu iš menų. Daug bendravę su garsiosios Bauhauso architektūros mokyklos atstovais, jie nemažai prisidėjo prie loginių pozityvistų griežtas logines konstrukcijas atliepiančių funkcionalizmo ir konstruktyvizmo idėjų, „naujojo daiktiškumo“ sklaidos.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: pozityvizmas, menas, natūralizmas, modernizmas, funkcionalizmas.Impact of Positivism on Literature, Visual Arts and ArchitectureEvaldas Nekrašas SummaryPositivism has made a significant influence on many schools of philosophy of the 19th and 20th centuries. But its influence spans even further – positivism also made an impact on natural and especially on social sciences, as well as on various fields of public and private life, such as law, politics and everyday life. A significant influence has been also made on arts. The latter is being analyzed in the article.The nature of influence depended on the historical epoch and the prevailing form of positivism and was quite diverse. Classical or sociological positivism made the biggest impact on literature. Positivism of the 20th century was attractive to writers because of its attention to facts and the steady development of society, collectivistic and altruistic ideals and progressive orientation. The influence of positivism can be seen in naturalistic writings of Émile Zola. The empirio-criticism of Ernst Mach made quite a different impact. Contrary to Auguste Comte, he emphasized not external but internal facts or, to be precise, considered such contraposition to be faulty, and made an impact on writers, such as James Joyce, Franz Kafka, Robert Musil, who are usually called modernists. De-substantialisation of subject, stream of consciousness, fusion of dream and reality are signs Mach’s influence. They are also apparent in abstract art where Mach’s ideas of visual space perception were exceptionally popular at the beginning of the 20th century. In turn, the influence of logical positivism is most visible in architecture which by members of the Vienna Circle was considered to be the most important of arts. Having been in close contact with representatives of the Bauhaus school, they made a significant contribution to the spread of constructivism and functionalism which correspond to the strict logical structures of logical positivism.Keywords: positivism, arts, naturalism, modernism, functionalism.

Design theory and practice are increasingly prevalent in legal and justice systems, at times reframing the relationship between the law and the world it seeks to make just. This article presents my professional experiences introducing design theory, methods, and mindsets into legal and government contexts, highlighting challenges and tensions across various legal design projects. Challenges include the justice sector's struggles dealing with complexity, the unfamiliar logics of design and abductive reasoning, and the legacy of positivist and instrumentalist philosophies. As a response, I propose a legal design that incorporates phronesis and re-orients around anticipation, rather than prediction.

Résumé Jules Vuillemin était un philosophe érudit et savant ; il entretenait avec la philosophie analytique de son temps une relation étroite, mais rendue énigmatique par sa fidélité au principe de l’inséparabilité entre la philosophie et l’histoire de la philosophie hérité de l’historien de la philosophie, Martial Gueroult. La question principale que je me pose ici est de savoir quelle était l’attitude exacte de Vuillemin à l’égard de la triple controverse entre Quine et Carnap provoquée par les critiques dirigées par Quine contre la tripartition de Carnap entre les propositions analytiques (de la logique et des mathématiques), les propositions synthétiques (des sciences expérimentales) et les choix ontologiques purement pragmatiques. Tout en souscrivant à la tripartition carnapienne, Vuillemin réprouvait l’idée positiviste de l’irrésolubilité des controverses ontologiques et défendait, au nom de la liberté de la raison spéculative, l’idée de la pluralité des solutions.

In the late 19th century a reversal of the values linked to the sacred and the profane can be observed. As Religion retreats, Positivism and faith in Progress fill the gap left by the abandoned spiritual belief. A nostalgia for transcendence arises amongst writers. Naturalism turns out to be sterile, but, sill, a belief in God seems to have become impossible. It is in this context that Huysmans writes his novels. The Durtal tetralogy in particular focuses on this theme: desperate, the main character wanders around Catholicism, seeking a sense of the Sacred. He first explores the world of Satanism before the conversion. But even when faith is regained, problems are not solved. In the religious domain itself, Durtal condemns the sacralization of the profane. Henceforth, the Durtal tetralogy manifests itself as a novel of the in-between: from brothel to church, between up-above and down-below, between almighty materialism and bourgeois Catholicism, this misanthropic writer prays for a renewed and primitive form of religious practice in which the individual can access the Sacred again. The quest for the supernatural, through a questioning of contemporary society, becomes a quest for Identity.

Hakim sebagai garda utama bagi pencari keadilan harus mampu melampaui batasan positivisme hukum dan dapat membuka diri terhadap akal budi (natural reason) yang selama ini menjadi ruang kosong dalam proses penetapan hukum di pengadilan. Fokus artikel ini membahas bagaimana putusan pengadilan seharusnya dibuat dengan mempertimbangkan aspek-aspek yang logis sesuai dengan akal budi, berdasarkan prinsip equity sebagai dasar pertimbangan putusan dalam menyelesaikan perkara pidana perempuan. Kajian ini berkesimpulan bahwa penerapan prinsip equity dalam peradilan pidana merupakan salah satu upaya untuk mencari keadilan di saat tidak ada aturan perundang-undangan yang dapat menjamin hak-hak perempuan sebagai korban tindak pidana. Penerapan prinsip equity dalam hukum pidana ini dapat disamakan dengan prinsip ex aequo et bono dalam hukum perdata, yaitu “menurut keadilan” sehingga majelis hakim dapat berpendapat lain dari ketentuan yang telah ada dan menjatuhkan putusan yang seadil-adilnya bagi perempuan korban tindak pidana/kekerasan seksual.

O artigo mostra a trajetória do pensamento de Marx sob a perspectiva do método na sua determinação dupla, investigação e exposição, enquanto processo de apropriação e explicitação crítico-racional da imanência do próprio objeto pelo sujeito. O método dialético de Marx enquanto método de investigação e de exposição distingue, sem separar, esses dois momentos, pressupondo que o objeto só pode ser exposto depois de ser investigado, analisado, criticamente em suas determinações essenciais. Por isso, tal método constitui uma oposição ao positivismo acrítico, próprio da economia clássica moderna, que toma o objeto como uma imediatidade factual, dada, sem a mediação do pensamento, assumindo e ratificando a positividade do fato, e ao idealismo acrítico, típico da especulação e da dialética hegeliana, que tem o objeto como resultado de uma construção abstrata do pensamento que sintetiza tudo em si e se movimenta a partir de si mesmo, sendo, por isso, incapazes de realizar uma investigação sistemática da “lógica”, da “racionalidade”, imanente ao próprio real e uma exposição crítica desse real, reconstruindo, no plano ideal, a totalidade do movimento istemático do próprio real.Abstract: The article presents the trajectory of Marx’s thought under the perspective of the method in its double determination, i.e. research and exposition, seen as a process of appropriation and of critical rational explanation of the object’s immanence by the subject. Marx’s dialectical method, in its investigative and expositional nature, distinguishes these two moments without separating them, presupposing that the object can only be presented after being critically investigated, according to its essential determinations. Therefore, such a method is, on the one hand, opposed to acritical positivism, which is so characteristic of modern classical economics and takes the object as a factual immediate entity devoid of mediating thought, assuming and confirming the positivity of the fact, and, on the other hand, to acritical idealism, which is typical of Hegel’s speculation and dialectic which takes the object as a result of an abstract construction of thought that synthethizes everything in itself and moves by its own means. These two kinds of explanation are therefore incapable of performing both a systematic investigation of the “logics” and “rationality”, immanent to reality itself, and a critical exposition of this reality, reconstructing in the ideal plan the totality of the systematic movement of reality itself.

Tulisan ini mengkaji pemikiran Ludwig Wittgenstein tentang eksistensi Tuhan. Pokok masalah difokuskan pada upaya mengungkap bagaimana seting historis Witgenstein, bagaimana pemikirannya dan implikasi pemikirannya. Kajian ini menggunakan pendekatan historis filosofis, dengan tujuan untuk mengidentifikasi konsep pemikiran Witgenstein tentang eksistensi Tuhan berikut historisitas pemikirannya. Dalam usahanya mengetahui Tuhan, Witgenstein menggunakan pendekatan filsafat bahasa. Witgenstein beranggapan bahwa setiap hal yang dipikirkan harus pula dapat diucapkan. Ketika kita berbicara tentang bahasa sebagai ekspresi pengucapan pikiran, demkian Wittgenstein, maka pembatasan bahasa juga berarti pembatasan pikiran. Dari sini ia kemudian melihat bahwa pengalaman mistik merupakan pengalaman yang hanya dapat ditunjuk dan dialami, tetapi kita tidak bisa berbicara tentangnya karena bahasa kita sendiri juga sifatnya terbatas. Sesuatu yang berbau metafisika, seperti Tuhan menurutnya adalah mistik dan tidak perlu ditafsirkan, karena Tuhan bukanlah obyek fisik yang terbatas, Tuhan bukanlah sebuah nama barang, Tuhan merupakan semangat dan bukan fisik. Pemikiran Witgenstein semacam ini pada gilirannya telah melahirkan aliran positivisme logis.

Mulyadhi Kartanegara memusatkan perhatiannya pada diskursus filsafat Islam yang ide-idenya telah dituangkan ke dalam berbagai bentuk karya ilmiah. Epistemologi integarasi ilmu Mulyadhi Kartanegara menyorot aspek integrasi sumber ilmu dan integrasi metode ilmu. Sumber ilmu menurut Mulyadhi yakni indra, akal dan intuisi, sedangkan ilmuan Barat (materialisme-positivisme) hanya mengakui panca indra sebagai sumber ilmu. Metodologi ilmu dalam epistemologi Mulyadhi yakni, metode observasi atau eksperimen untuk obyek-obyek fisik, metode logis untuk obyek metaempirik, dan metode intuitif (irfani) untuk mengenal obyek secara langsung. Sedang ilmuan modern hanya mengakui metode ilmu observasi atau eksperimen dan menampik metode ilmu yang lain. Selanjutnya, dalam relasi epistemologis dan status ontologis, epistemologi Islam mengakui realitas secara integral-holistik (alam materi, mitzal dan akal dan Tuhan yang merupakn puncak realitas). Kritik Mulyadhi terhadap bangunan ilmu modern adalah tertuju pada rasionalisme-empirik (paradigma Cartesian-Newtonian) yang melahirkan aliran pemikiran: naturalisme, idealisme dan sekulerisme yang bercorak mekanistik dalam memandang realitas semesta. Selanjutnya Mulyadhi melontarkan respon kritisnya pada materialisme melalui islamisasi epistemologis pada aspek klasifikasi ilmu dan metodologi ilmu.

L’un des principaux arguments opposés aux juristes pour les convaincre de ce que leur activité dogmatique ne relève pas de la science est tiré de son défaut d’empiricité. La dogmatique ne serait pas scientifique, car lui manquerait un objet empirique. Dans la mesure où elle se caractérise par la théorisation de règles légales ou prétoriennes, elle ne porterait pas sur des faits et toute scientificité devrait, à ce titre, lui être refusée. En ce sens, les juristes seraient enfermés dans une sombre alternative : le silence ou le bavardage ; en toute hypothèse, rien de ce qu’ils pourraient dire ne saurait être pris scientifiquement au sérieux. C’est contre une telle analyse, dont le réalisme issu du positivisme logique est le plus radical représentant, que s’inscrit la présente contribution. Elle se propose d’ouvrir un chemin par lequel les règles travaillées par la doctrine seraient pensées comme des faits, comme une empirie, au même titre que les données issues des sens. Elle prône alors un élargissement du concept de fait, et ce en s’appuyant sur trois instruments conceptuels : la contrainte, la tradition et le signifiant saussurien. En se donnant les moyens épistémologiques de penser la dogmatique comme une science empirique, l’on serait en mesure d’allouer aux juristes une parole qui, tout en leur demeurant propre sans faire de concessions aux points de vue externes, réponde aux critères modernes de la scientificité.

In legal research, one of the instruments for collecting data and legal materials is the survey method. Often researchers in the field of legal science see surveys as a means to collect data from informants or research informants to conduct observations and interviews on an empirical approach (non-doctrinal legal research). This understanding is a form of simplification of survey methods as a research instrument that is complex and comprehensive. Research surveys were developed as a form of positivist approach to the social sciences. The conclusion of this research is the same as the study of social sciences, in the study of law, research is a building of logic, which from beginning to end must be a series of mutually explain each other. A legal research using scientific steps and stages which is systematic, logical and rational, makes the whole process of scientific writing as an explanation of logical logic which is a dialectical process between theory and data. In legal research, survey methods are used to evaluate various policies and decisions, and the implications of regulations on the community. The survey results can also be used to make predictions about a particular social phenomenon, including the application of positive law in the context of social and state social life. Keywords: Survey Method, Legal Research Abstrak Di dalam penelitian hukum, salah satu instrumen untuk mengumpulkan data dan bahan-bahan hukum adalah metode survey. Seringkali peneliti dibidang ilmu hukum melihat survey sebagai sarana untuk mengumpulkan data dari nara sumber atau informan penelitian untuk melakukan pengamatan dan wawancara pada pendekatan empiris (penelitian hukum non doktrinal). Pemahaman tersebut merupakan bentuk penyederhanaan metode survey sebagai instrumen penelitian yang bersifat kompleks dan komprehensif. Survey riset dikembangkan sebagai bentuk pendekatan positivis pada ilmu-ilmu sosial. Kesimpulan penelitian ini sama halnya dengan studi ilmu-ilmu sosial, dalam studi ilmu hukum, penelitian adalah suatu bangunan logika, yang dari awal sampai akhir harus merupakan rangkaian yang saling menjelaskan satu sama lain. Suatu penelitian hukum dengan menggunakan langkah-langkah dan tahapan ilmiah yang sistematis, logis dan rasional, menjadikan seluruh proses penulisan ilmiah sebagai suatu penjelasan logika pemikiran yang merupakan proses dialektikan antara teori dan data. Pada penelitian hukum, metode survey dimanfaatkan untuk melakukan evaluasi berbagai kebijakan dan keputusan, dan implikasi regulasi pada masyarakat. Hasil survey juga dapat digunakan untuk mengadakan prediksi mengenai suatu fenomena sosial tertentu, termasuk didalamnya adalah berlakunya hukum positif dalam konteks kehidupan sosial kemasyarakatan dan bernegara.Kata Kunci: Metode Survey, Penelitian Hukum

Abstract This article critically interrogates the episteme of alternativity in international relations (IR) to rethink the purpose of critical knowledge in global politics. It questions what critical knowledge is for and whose purpose it serves. While alternativity is the very condition that has given rise to critical approaches, there is a deep-rooted division among critical scholars regarding the relationship between criticality and alternativity. This article argues that alternativity provides an opportunity for critical scholars to remain relevant without being affiliated with positivist logics of inquiry. In examining the potential of alternativity, the article explores three modes of alternativity in peace and conflict studies: critique-without-alternative, critique-as-alternative, and critique-with-alternative. It probes the merits and limits of the episteme of alternativity in generating new possibilities for advancing emancipatory interests and saving critical theory from losing its original transformative impetus. In the final part, the article explores future directions for rejuvenating the purpose of critique by exploring the nexus between criticality and alternativity on postparadigmatic and practical grounds.

ABSTRAK Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui secara yuridis terhadap kedudukan Jaksa Penuntut Umum dalam mengajukan upaya hukum Peninjauan Kembali kepada Mahkamah Agung. Peninjauan Kembali berdasarkan Pasal 263 ayat (1) hanya dapat dilakukam oleh terpidana atau ahli waris terpidana, namun pada kenyataannya Jaksa Penuntut Umum pernah mengajukan permintaan Peninjauan Kembali dan diterima oleh Mahkamah Agung. Metode yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah penelitian normatif yaitu pendekatan yang menggunakan konsep logis positivis yang menyatakan bahwa hukum adalah identik dengan norma-norma tertulis yang dibuat dan diundang oleh lembaga-lembaga atau pejabat yang berwenang. Hasil penelitian diketahui bahwa terdapat kekosongan norma hukum mengenai kedudukan Jaksa Penuntut Umum dalam mengajukan permintaan Peninjauan Kembali dan menyarankan dibentuknya aturan khusus mengenai kedudukan Jaksa Penuntut Umum dalam mengajukan peninjauan kembali. Kesimpulan yaitu Sesuai dengan Pasal 263 ayat (1) KUHAP Jaksa Penuntut Umum tidak berhak mengajukan peninjauan kembali, karena yang berhak mengajukan peninjauan kembali hanya terpidana dan ahli warisnya dan peninjauan kembali tidak bisa dilakukan terhadap putusan bebas atau putusan lepas dari segala tuntutan hukum dan diperlukan aturan khusus mengenai peninjauan kembali yang diajukan oleh Jaksa Penuntut Umum, sehingga terwujudnya keadilan, kepastian hukum, dan kemanfaatan hukum. ABSTRACT This study aims to find out juridically about the position of the public prosecutor in filing legal remedies for judicial review to the Supreme Court. A review based on Article 263 paragraph (1) can only be carried out by the convict or the convict's heirs, but in reality the Public Prosecutor has submitted a request for reconsideration and was accepted by the Supreme Court. The method used in this research is normative research, which is an approach that uses a positivist logical concept which states that law is identical to written norms made and invited by authorized institutions or officials. The results of the study show that there is a vacuum in legal norms regarding the position of the Public Prosecutor in submitting a request for reconsideration and suggesting the formation of special rules regarding the position of the Public Prosecutor in filing a review. The conclusion is that in accordance with Article 263 paragraph (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Public Prosecutor has no right to file a review, because only the convict and his heirs are entitled to apply for a review and the review cannot be carried out against an acquittal or a decision to be released from all lawsuits and regulations are required. specifically regarding the review submitted by the Public Prosecutor, so that justice, legal certainty and legal benefits can be realized.

The psychoanalytical case history was in many ways the pivot point of John Forrester’s reflections on case-based reasoning. Yet the Freudian case is not without its own textual forebears. This article closely analyses texts from two earlier case-writing traditions in order to elucidate some of the negotiations by which the case history as a textual form came to articulate the mode of reasoning that we now call ‘thinking in cases’. It reads Eugène Azam’s 1876 observation of Félida X and her ‘double personality’—the case that brought both Azam and Félida to prominence in late 19th-century French science—against a medico-surgical case penned by the Bordeaux physician in the same decade. While the stylistics of Azam’s medical case mirror its epistemic underpinnings in the ‘vertical’ logics of positivist science, the multiple narratives interwoven in Félida’s case grant both Azam and his patient the role of knowledge-making actors in the text. This narrative transformation chimes with the way Azam reasons ‘horizontally’ from particulars to Félida’s singular condition, but sits in tension with his choice to structure the observation along a ‘vertical’ axis. Between the two, we glimpse the emergence of the psychological observation as a mode of writing and thus of thinking in cases.

Responding to calls for a more theoretically driven, post-positivist and radical marine spatial planning research that approaches the policy as a political project, this paper develops a post-structuralist discourse theory approach to critical marine spatial planning. Elaborating radical contingency as an ontological condition of social life, which points to the ineradicability of power and conflict in marine spatial planning social relations, the paper problematizes marine spatial planning as constituting politics, or key practices that attempt to organize human coexistence and thus, conceal this radical contingency. These practices (e.g. ecosystem-based management, participation, planning regulation and the organization of socio-natural spaces), whose outcomes are far from adaptive, consensual or neutral are discussed as sites of ‘politics’ that effectively marginalize particular groups of people and ‘herd’ their participation and ways of knowing toward achieving limited policy outcomes. Drawing on the EU Marine Spatial Planning Directive, the paper further teases out how specific narratives and rhetorical signifiers around ‘integrating’ and ‘balancing’ potentially irreconcilable sustainable development objectives may interpellate particular stakeholders in ways that render them ideologically complicitous in sustaining, rather than challenging, neoliberal logics of managerialism and economic maximization of marine resources. But in tune with the ontological condition of the social as radically contingent, the paper discusses how and why participatory spaces may constitute a potential space of contestation for marginalized voices and thus, reveal the political moment of marine spatial planning. Calls are made for future empirically grounded research that explores how these marine spatial planning practices are lived in both planning and extra-planning settings, and with what implications for marine protection and extant social relations of power in different marine spatial planning contexts.

Purpose – Many universities now offer courses online using learning management systems (LMS). Numerous studies have been conducted to assess the effectiveness of the LMS but few studies have examined how student online behavior within the course, or what they think about the online course, are related to their actual learning outcomes. The paper aims to discuss this issue. Design/methodology/approach – In this study, student activity in an online business course was captured though learning analytics and assignments to determine if online activity and reflective learning impact final grade. A post-positivist ideology was employed. The dependent variable was the grade resulting from five assignments assessed using rubrics. Correlation, t-tests, multiple regression, surface response regression, General Linear Model (GLM)/F-tests, text analytics, analysis of means (ANOM), and cluster analysis were used to test the hypotheses. Findings – Four statistically significant predictors of online student learning performance were identified: course logins, lesson reading, lesson quiz activity, and lesson quiz scores. This four factor model captured 78 percent of variance on course grade which is a strong effect and larger than comparative studies using learning analytics with online courses. Text analytics and ANOM conducted on student essays identified 17 reflective learning keywords that were grouped into five clusters to explain online student behavior. Research limitations/implications – First, from a pedagogy standpoint, encouraging students to complete more online lessons including quizzes, generally promotes learning, resulting in higher grades, which is a win:win for students and for the university. Second, from an IT perspective, the student pre and post testing resulted in statistically significant increase of IT-course knowledge, which puts students on a solid foundation to begin an online business course. Additionally, the link between students voicing IT problems but nonetheless scoring very well on the course certainly implies the development of IT self-efficacy, developed partly through the pre and post testing process. A clear link was established between course learning objectives and student learning performance by using a unique text analytics procedure. Originality/value – The mixed-methods research design started with hypothesis testing using parametric and nonparametric techniques. Once a statistically significant predictive GLM was developed, qualitative data were collected from what the students thought as expressed in their last essay assignment. Text analytics was used to identify and statistically weight the 17 most frequent reflective learning keywords from student essays. A visual word cloud was presented. Parametric statistics were then used to partition the reflective learning keywords into grade boundaries. Nonparametric cluster analysis was used to group similar reflective keyword-grade associations together to form five clusters. The five clusters helped to explain student online behavior.

Middle East Studies for the New Millennium sheds light on the trials and tribulations of Middle East area studies in the highly charged and politi- cized context of American academia and broader US policy. In this respect, it is an important exposition of how American universities produce knowl- edge about different world regions (ix). The study is the outcome of a research project that spanned a period of nearly fifteen years since 2000. The introductory chapter, by book editors Shami and Miller-Idriss and titled “The Many Crises of Middle East Stud- ies” (MES), refers to the contextual status of the field and relates its ‘crises’ to an American setting in which knowledge and power are intrinsically, even if not always clearly, juxtaposed. Shami and Miller-Idriss point out that three main institutional actors define the politics of the field: univer- sities, federal government, and private philanthropic foundations (8). The role of the US federal government in producing knowledge, the relation- ship between knowledge and power, and ways of knowing about ‘other’ cultures and places has long been a source and subject of numerous debates and controversies (1), but the authors problematize it in terms of the “se- curitization of academic knowledge in the name of ‘national interest,’ the challenges arising out of the possibilities of unbounded, transnational fields of scholarship and the future of the university as an institution” (2). The MES also faced an additional crisis as a growing number of social scientists came to perceive it as too focused on in-depth studying of areas instead of seeking to produce knowledge based on universal theories or explanations. MES, thus, increasingly occupied a diminishing space in social sciences in favor of a humanistic turn toward cultural and linguistic approaches (9). This, according to Shami and Miller-Idriss was not simply a matter of intel- lectual skepticism, but rather a reflection of deliberate attempts at siphon- ing social scientists from universities, narrowing knowledge to specific agenda-settings, and limiting space for alternative perspectives. Due to the perceived ‘anti-Americanism’ of MES, in good measure emanating from claims about Edward Said’s “pernicious influence,” the field has increasingly come under siege through federal monitoring, campus watch, scrutiny of scholars exchanges, and funding restrictions (10). Problematizing the context of MES in such terms helps frame the ap- proach of this study around three main themes that comprise the three parts of the book and its eleven chapters. These include the relationship be- tween MES and other social science disciplines, reconfigurations, and new emphases in MES focusing on university restructuring, language training and scholarly trends, and the politics of knowledge as they relate specifical- ly to the many crises in the Middle East (11). Part I, titled “Disciplines and its Boundaries,” comprises four chap- ters, which highlight the interdisciplinary nature of area studies as a sub- field within the entire “problem-solving” structure of social sciences. This tendency distinguished area studies from earlier Orientalist/civilizational scholarly traditions. The four chapters in Part I cover the relationship be- tween area studies and political science (Lisa Wedeen), sociology (Reshat Kasaba), economics (Karen Pfeifer), and geography (Amy Mills and Timur Hammond). Together, they demonstrate how the privileged discipline or “prestige area” for theorizing reflects a different relationship with area studies depending on the discipline’s definition of the “universal” (11). Wedeen challenges positivist/methodological claims about the separation of fact and value, and the unification of liberalism and science in such a fashion as to render the subfield of American studies a standard universal “nonarea”, reflecting American exceptionalism (12). Kasaba examines the historically cyclical relationship between sociology and area studies “as a push-and-pull reaction to particular political imperatives,” related to how social sciences and American foreign policy have been intertwined since WWII (12). Pfeifer focuses on how international financial institutions have shaped much of western economists’ approaches to the Middle East region, entrenching neoclassical economic ideas associated with stabilization, lib- eralization, and privatization (13). Mills and Hammond examine the “spa- tial turn” in area studies, and how spatial methodologies have provided for a means to understand the broad socio-economic and political dynamics that have served to shape the Middle East. They point also to the interdisci- plinary nature of spatial studies that could very well transform area studies by linking the region to its global context (14-15). Part II, titled “Middle East Studies and the University,” comprises four chapters by Jonathan Z. Friedman and Cynthia Miller-Idriss, Elizabeth An- derson Worden and Jeremy M. Browne, Laura Bier, and Charles Kurzman and Carl W. Ernst. These chapters highlight how knowledge about the Middle East are produced through changing institutional structures and architectures, particularly in relation to the rise of “the global” as a major organizational form within American universities. They also focus on the “capacities” needed to produce a new generation of qualified specialists ca- pable of dealing with profound regional changes that would also require dif- ferent policy and educational approaches (15). Friedman and Miller-Idriss look at the Hagop Kevorkian Center for Near Eastern Studies at New York University (NYU) in order to investigate how area studies centers as well as universities are to transform themselves into global institutions. They point to two separate but coexisting logics of internationalization: that of the specialist with deeper knowledge of the area, and the cosmopolitan who emphasizes breadth in global experience in order to produce the ‘global citizen’ (15-16). Worden and Browne focus on reasons why it was difficult for American institutions to produce proficient Arabic language speakers in significant numbers. They offer an explanation in terms of structural and cultural factors related to time constraints that graduate students face in or- der to learn the language, the relative lower status of language instructors, the devaluation of language learning by some social sciences disciplines, and, for all practical purposes, the difficulty of learning Arabic. Bier ana- lyzes PhD dissertations concerned with the Middle East across six social sciences disciplines (political science, sociology, anthropology, economics, history and MES) during the period 2000-2010, focusing on their themes, topics and methods (253). She points out that neoliberalism and what is termed the ‘Washington Consensus’ have come to dominate political sci- ence, sociology and economics, while issues of identity, gender, colonial- ism, the nation, and Islam dominate in anthropology, history, and MES. Kurzman and Ernst go beyond Bier’s thematic approach to highlight the renewed and significant institutional growth of interest in Islamic studies for national security concerns. They point as well to the encouragement offered by a number of universities to promote cross-regional approaches, not constrained by narrower definitions of distinct regions, although they also raise the problem of lack of adequate federal funding for such purpos- es. Part III, titled “the Politics of Knowledge,” comprises three chapters by Seteney Sami and Marcial Godoy-Anativia, Ussama Makdisi, and Irene Gendzier; and an ‘Afterward’ by Lisa Anderson. These chapters examine not only the production of knowledge but also how knowledge is frequently silenced by forces that “structure and restrict freedom of speech, censor- ship and self-censorship”—the so-called “chilling effects” (19). Sami and Godoy-Anativia examine the themes of campus watch or surveillance and public criticism of MES, especially after the 9/11 events of 2001, and their impact on academia and “institutional architectures” as knowledge is secu- ritized and “privatized” (19). Makdisi and Gendzier question how Ameri- can scholarship about the region has changed over time, yet almost always highly charged and politicized in large measure due to the Arab-Zionist/ Israeli conflict (20-21). Despite moves toward more critical and postna- tionalist approaches, Makdisi emphasizes that overall academic freedom has nevertheless been curtailed. Genzier, in turn, points to how “ignorance has [come to have] strategic value,” as “caricatured images” pass for anal- ysis (21-22). Finally, given the securitization and other intimidating mea- sures undertaken around campuses and universities, Anderson concludes that the state of a “beleaguered” (442) MES is deplorable, describing it as “demoralized, lacking academic freedom and reliable research data, and function in a general climate of repression, neglect and isolation” (22, 442). This important book—with extensive bibliographies in each chapter and its detailed exploration of the state of the field of United States MES in the twenty-first century—stands as a reference source for all interested in Middle East studies. “Infrastructures for Knowledge” could have made for a provocative main title of this work, in reference to the production of knowledge on the Middle East and the reproduction of new generations of Middle Eastern specialists. Its most salient aspect is that it highlights and underscores the formal and informal authoritarian and securitization mea- sures adopted by US federal agencies as well as universities to set effective restrictions on what can or cannot be said and/or taught about MES, both in academic institutions and in the media. In addition to the proliferation of both private and public watchdogs monitoring how MES is being taught on campuses, the establishment since 2003 of twelve Homeland Security Centers of Excellence at six universities (with grants totaling about 100 million dollars) is indicative of the scale of intrusive measures (101). The broader problem is that such infringements do not take place only in US universities. Given that county’s totalizing and vested interests in influenc- ing how knowledge is produced and consumed globally, not least in and about the Middle East, the extent of its hegemonic control in that region can only be surmised. Amr G.E. SabetDepartment of Political ScienceDalarna University, Falun, Sweden

Alongside a brief historical account of the rise of the Viena circle, the author lists the main viewpoints concerning tlie conception of logic and epistemology inaugurated in the work of Hans Hahn, Otto Neurath and Moritz Schlick. A possible critique of the logical positivist conception of logic-mathematics resides in the appearance, for example, of alternative geometrical models of a non-Euclidian character where it is shown that logical-mathematical judgements do not only contain a tautological character. The epistemological positions of the followers of logical positivism remain within the framework of so-called traditional epistemology. The author emphasises the conflictual points of these epistemological viewpoints (foundationalism and coherentism) proffering a possible critique from the standpoint of a naturalized approach to the questions of the theory of knowledge,

The essence of science in the body of logical positivism is based on the basis of the developmentof the exact sciences, so that the sciences developed are not always in line with the developmentof society. The objectivity that is concerned with the sciences is precisely molded in terms of theunfolding of the sciences, so it is absolute to use subjectivism which in principle will reflect itsobjectivity. Scientific truths are measured positivistically, in the true sense and the real must beconcrete, logical, accurate and rewarding. The effect behind it is that the abstract and qualitativedimensions of life are neglected and apart from observation. No doubt if the criticism andcorrection of positivism waged because of its naturalistic and diterministik. Humans are seenonly as dependent and not as independent variables.Keywords: Logical Positivism, Languange, Truth, and Logic

Abstract Logics of Critical Explanation proposed a methodological approach that could render the insights of Poststructuralist Discourse Theory (PDT) and post-Marxist political theory more conducive to critical empirical research. It also offered a language with which to counter positivist tendencies to colonize the space of methods and research strategies, showing how PDT could facilitate both explanatory and critical endeavours. Since its publication in 2007, a number of studies have applied the logics framework to empirical cases, while critically engaging with its methodological and theoretical arguments. The main purpose of this article is to evaluate some of these developments, and to set out some future challenges faced by this research programme.

El presente artículo desarrolla una sistematización y análisis sobre una intervención desarrollada en mi actividad profesional como trabajador social en un Centro de Recuperación estatal. Surge de las tensiones en el abordaje con una persona con diagnóstico de demencia y la inquietud por generar narrativas que posibiliten prácticas y discursos despatologizantes.El marco teórico consta de cuatro ejes, donde destacan: discursos/prácticas en claves de poder-saber, la herencia positivista y su reproducción acrítica; la categoría de enfermedad mental como construcción teórica; los aportes del análisis institucional; y la denuncia de lo natural desde la semiología.La metodología consiste en el enfoque biográfico-narrativo, entendiendo la identidad narrativa como permanente (re)significación en relación con los espacios transitados, generando la apertura a nuevos discursos y universos de sentido, a nuevas realidades.La reflexión se centra en la necesidad de generar discursos/prácticas por fuera de las hegemónicas biologicistas, conscientes de las lógicas de poder que las atraviesan, construyendo lugares más empáticos con el sufrimiento humano. AbstractThis article develops a systematization and analysis of an intervention made in my professional activity as a social worker in a state Recovery Center. It comes from the tensions in the approach of a person diagnosed with dementia and the need to create narratives that enable de-pathologizing practices and discourses.The theoretical framework consists of four main ideas, including: discourses/practices in the form of power-knowledge, the positivist heritage and its uncritical reproduction; the category of mental illness as a theoretical construction; the contributions of institutional analysis; and the criticism of what is natural from semiotics.The methodology consists of a biographical-narrative approach, understanding the narrative identity as a constant (re)signification in relation to the inhabited spaces, welcoming new discourses and universes of meaning, new realities.The reflection is focused on the need to create discourses/practices outside the hegemonic biologistic ones, being aware of the logics of power that go through them, building places which are more empathetic with human suffering.

La legge di Hume e la critica alla fallacia naturalistica di Moore sono state usate come base per il non-cognitivismo etico, per affermare che i valori non si possono conoscere razionalmente, ma solo intuirli o lasciarli alla sfera soggettiva delle emozioni. Sottesa alla dicotomia fatti/valori della legge di Hume, c’è una concezione riduttiva della realtà, considerata solo come l’insieme di fatti, quantificabili, misurabili, anzi verificabili (principio di verificazione neopositivista). Collegata alla dicotomia fatti/valori, si è imposta – sempre in ambito analitico – la dicotomia analitico/sintetico: le proposizioni analitiche (logiche) non hanno bisogno di verifica (sono sempre vere), mentre le proposizioni sintetiche sono sottoposte alla verifica dell’esperienza e di esse si può affermare il vero o il falso. Da questo rigido schema fuoriescono le proposizioni etiche che, quindi, non possono essere né vere né false. Secondo H. Putnam, le stesse scoperte scientifiche, che hanno ipotizzato aspetti del reale non direttamente verificabili, hanno causato sia la fine della dicotomia analitico/sintetico, sia quella della dicotoma fatto/valore, perché, come ha evidenziato Quine, non si può fare scienza senza valori epistemici. In ambito analitico le posizioni neo-positiviste sono state superate con il pragmatismo, per il quale non c’è separazione tra fatti e valori e si può parlare di oggettività in etica, ma è un’oggettività debole, costruita in modo intersoggettivo, con il rischio di scambiare il buono con l’utile. Il dogma della dicotomia fatti/valori è stato superato, ma non quello del rifiuto della metafisica (ad eccezione del cosiddetto “tomismo analitico”). La bioetica, avendo come ambito le problematiche della vita sottoposta alle tecnoscienze, può aiutare non solo ad andare oltre la dicotomia fatti/valori, ma a recuperare un’unità di senso in cui la ragione esistenziale non si oppone a quella metafisica: per cogliere la complessità della vita bisogna avere gli strumenti per vedere la sua forma, il suo finalismo. ---------- Hume’s Law and Moore’s critique of the naturalistic fallacy were used as the basis for a non-cognitive ethic in order to affirm that values cannot be known rationally, but only intuitively or through the subjective sphere of the emotions. Behind the facts/values dichotomy of Hume’s Law there is a reductive conception of reality, which is considered solely as a collection of quantifiable, measurable and verifiable facts (the neo-positive principle of verification). On top of the facts/values dichotomy, – in any analytic context – there is also the analytic/synthetic dichotomy: analytic propositions (logical) have no need of verification (they are always true), while synthetic propositions are subject to the verification of experience and thus can be said to be true or false. From this rigid scheme emerged the ethical propositions that there cannot be either truth nor falsehood. According to H. Putnam, the same scientific discoveries, which have given rise to hypotheses about aspects of reality which are not directly verifiable, have led to the end of both the analytic/synthetic dichotomy and the facts/values dichotomy, since, as Quine has shown, one cannot undertake research without epistemological values. In the analytic field, the neo-positive positions have been superseded by pragmatism, in which there is no separation between facts and values and one cannot speak of objectivity in ethics, but only of a weak, inter-subjective objectivity, which carries with it the risk of confusing the “good” with the “useful”. The dogma of the facts/values dichotomy has been superseded, but not that of the denial of metaphysics (with the exception of so-called “analytic Thomism”). Bioethics, which is concerned with life issues that are subject to technology and science can help not only to go beyond the facts/values dichotomy, but to recover a unity of meaning in which existential reason is not opposed to metaphysical reason: to describe the complexity of life one needs to have tools with which to see its shape and its finality.

Abstract This article contributes a securitisation-based, interpretive approach to state weakness. The long-dominant positivist approaches to the phenomenon have been extensively criticised for a wide range of deficiencies. Responding to Lemay-Hébert's suggestion of a ‘Durkheimian’, ideational-interpretive approach as a possible alternative, I base my conceptualisation on Migdal's view of state weakness as emerging from a ‘state-in-society's’ contested ‘strategies of survival’. I argue that several recent developments in Securitisation Theory enable it to capture this contested ‘collective knowledge’ on the state: a move away from state-centrism, the development of a contextualised ‘sociological’ version, linkages made between securitisation and legitimacy, and the acknowledgment of ‘securitisations’ as a contested Bourdieusian field. I introduce the concept of ‘securitisation gaps’ – divergences in the security discourses and practices of state and society – as a concept aimed at capturing this contested role of the state, operationalised along two logics (reactive/substitutive) – depending on whether they emerge from securitisations of the state action or inaction – and three intensities (latent, manifest, and violent), depending on the extent to which they involve challenges to state authority. The approach is briefly illustrated through the changing securitisation gaps in the Republic of Lebanon during the 2019–20 ‘October Uprising’.

Wu en chinois, mu en japonais peut se traduire par rien, non-être, néant, vide. Quant à la notion chinoise de wu wei, que l’on traduit habituellement par passivité ou non agir, elle désigne ou plutôt suggère une attitude de réceptivité et de disponibilité extrême aux évènements et aux situations dans lesquels nous nous trouvons inclus et impliqués sans en avoir la maitrise. Pour comprendre cette notion qui remet en question les relations habituelles entre le sujet et l’objet et est susceptible d’affiner l’observation et ce que je propose d’appeler le moment ethnographique de l’anthropologie, il nous faut d’abord réaliser combien il est difficile de penser ce que la langue chinoise appelle wu à partir des présupposés dualistes de la philosophie européenne de l’être et du non-être et même beaucoup plus communément du oui et du non, le non étant envisagé soit comme privation (« il n’y a pas », « ce n’est pas » ou « ce n’est plus ») soit comme négation. Dans le premier cas le non apparait irréel et alors il n’y a rien à en dire. Dans le second il est franchement oppositionnel, c’est-à-dire source de conflit, ce qui fait horreur à la pensée chinoise. Chaque fois que dans une langue européenne nous utilisons le verbe être, c’est pour affirmer une réalité, ce qui rend explicite une évidence partagée par tout le monde : l’adéquation de l’être et du réel. Être et non être sont dans ces conditions des antithèses. Il n’en va pas de même pour la culture (et d’abord la langue) chinoise qui ne se résigne pas à reconnaître le néant comme étant le vide absolu. Ce que nous appelons « non être » ou « néant », d’un point de vue chinois, ce n’est pas grand-chose, mais ce n’est pas rien. C’est très proche de ce que Jankélévitch (1981) appelle « le presque rien ». Dans ce « presque rien », il y a tant de possibles en genèse, tant de virtualités. Elles n’adviennent nullement, comme dans les monothéistes, d’un acte de création, mais d’un processus d’éclosion succédant à une germination qui va peu à peu connaître une maturation, puis une altération avant une disparition. L’être tend inéluctablement vers le non-être, l’apparaître vers le disparaître, mais ce qui est premier et génère l’essor puis l’élan est bien le non-être, le il n’y a pas (wu) précédant le il y a (you) et est une potentialité d’il y aura ou plutôt il pourra y avoir, il pourrait y avoir, avoir non au sens de posséder mais d’advenir. Si donc le wu est une négation, ce n’est nullement une négation privative mais plutôt une indétermination (le « je-ne-sais-quoi » de Jankélévitch), une matrice dont l’une des caractéristiques est l’invisibilité mais qui est d’une extrême fécondité car d’elle peuvent jaillir différentes possibilités. Pour approcher du caractère processuel du wu, il nous faut suspendre la logique antithétique et antinomique de l’affirmation et de la négation et envisager une modalité non absolue de la négation (Laplantine 2016). Autrement dit dans une perspective chinoise, il peut y avoir des contradictions mais non des contraires, source de contrariété et de division. Il ne saurait y avoir d’opposition (frontale) ni de négation (pure) car ces dernières ne se rencontrent jamais dans le vivant. Mais le négatif (cuo) n’en existe pas moins pour autant. Il est la face cachée susceptible au terme d’un processus secret et silencieux de maturation d’arriver à éclosion. Ce qui était jusqu’alors invisible entre le champ de vision. Le négatif peut même conduire à une inversion (zong) de ce qui nous apparaissait stable et homogène comme dans le cas du métal fondu en train de devenir liquide. Cuo n’a rien d’une substance (appelant dans les langues européennes des substantifs), d’un principe ni même d’une forme hétérogène. Cuo, ce n’est pas l’autre (encore moins « l’Autre ») mais bien le même qui se transforme et devient, par modulations successives, différent de ce qu’il était. Le wu wei n’est pas un concept. C’est une notion empirique qui s’expérimente dans un processus de dessaisissement et de non affirmation de soi. Ce processus a certes été originellement pensé dans la matrice taoïste de la civilisation chinoise (Lao-Tseu 2002, Tchouang-Tseu 2006) mais il n’est pas cependant indéfectiblement lié à cette dernière. Il a des implications précises sur les méthodes d’observation dans les sciences humaines et sociales et singulièrement sur ce que les anthropologues appellent le regard. C’est un mouvement qui s’effectue dans un mode de temporalité très lent consistant à laisser venir, à ne pas (trop) intervenir, à ne pas opérer un tri parmi les perceptions. Le wu-wei est une attention diffuse non focalisée, non précipitée, non arrêtée et bloquée sur une perception particulière, ce qui risquerait d’anticiper une position et de contrarier le flux d’un processus en cours. La conscience se déleste de toute intentionnalité, de toute finalité, de toute préméditation. Si nous envisageons le wu wei selon la dimension du voir, nous pouvons dire que ce que nous voyons n’est qu’une partie du voir car il y a aussi ce qui nous regarde. Or le regard de l’ethnographie classique tend à ignorer le passif. C’est un regard orienté et concentré. Ce que je vois, je m’en satisfais. D’une part il n’y a pas d’invisibilité. D’autre part il n’y a pas d’autre vectorialité que celle que j’assigne à des « objets ». La chose est entendu, cela va de soi, il n’y a pas lieu d’y revenir : seul existe ce que nous voyons qui est nécessairement devant. Ce qui nous regarde, à l’inverse, est susceptible de remettre en question l’unidirectionnalité du devant. Pour dire les choses autrement, dans une conception positiviste de l’ethnographie, ce qui nous regarde tend à être éliminé. Ce qui nous regarde ne nous regarde pas. À partir de l’expérience d’être regardé que chacun de nous a effectué sur le terrain, il convient alors de délier le voir et l’avoir, le voir et le prendre. Car il existe un voir ethnographique qui peut nous conduire jusqu’aux limites du perdre et du se perdre. Tel me semble être l’attitude du wu wei : nous ne poursuivons pas à proprement parler un but, nous ne visons pas un résultat, nous ne cherchons pas à capter, capturer, maîtriser, saisir, prendre mais à nous déprendre de cette position vectorielle qui est celle de la conquête. Une observation par imprégnation doit être distinguée d’une observation par concentration et fixation. Or nous avons résolument privilégié être concentré sur au détriment d’être absorbé par. La concentration permet certes le discernement mais peut aussi conduire à la discrimination. Wu wei n’est pas pour autant la sidération et encore moins la possession. Ce n’est pas la vigilance sans être pour autant la somnolence. Ce n’est ni l’impatience ni la nonchalance mais ce que j’appellerai une passivité affairée. C’est une attitude qui est assez proche de ce que Rousseau appelle la rêverie : la conscience errante et flottante non orientée vers un but particulier. Ce régime de connaissance (mais d’abord de perception) peut être figuré par un éventail ouvert permettant une amplitude maximum. Une démarche d’observation rigoureuse fécondée par le wu wei consiste à mettre nos perceptions en état d’éveil mais aussi en état de variation continue en ne cherchant pas à les dompter, à les organiser et à les orienter en vue d’un résultat ou d’une résolution finale. Tout doit être considéré et d’abord perçu à égalité et aucun réglage des sensations ne doit être effectué à partir d’une position centrale éliminant ce qui ne serait pas digne d’intérêt. Il y a de la spontanéité dans le wu-wei qui défait ce qui est de l’ordre de l’intention, de la volonté et des illusions du sujet croyant dominer « son » objet et maitriser « son » terrain. Mais cette spontanéité n’a aucune connotation anti-intellectualiste (Confucius 2006). Elle consiste simplement dans une disponibilité à l’évènement. Or force est de constater que la tendance principale de la rationalité scientifique européenne nous apprend à nous engager dans une toute autre direction. Elle est encore tributaire d’un héritage hellénique qui peut être qualifié de thétique au sens grec de témi, poser, affirmer, défendre une position, soutenir une thèse, ce qui peut contribuer à un blocage de l’attention sur une posture exclusive. Cette attitude privilégie la préhension (qui peut devenir prédation), le recueil au détriment de l’accueil, des dispositifs d’objectivation au détriment des dispositions du chercheur, bref des opérations de forçage (consistant à ramener l’inconnu au connu) au détriment de ce que l’on appelle en psychanalyse un processus de frayage. La disponibilité dans l’imprégnation du terrain ne peut être dans ces conditions considérée que comme une invasion, une dispersion et une déperdition de soi. Dans le wu wei, la position affirmative n’est pas à proprement parler congédiée mais suspendue dans une expérience qui n’est plus celle du vieil idéalisme européen de la conscience lucide et de la maîtrise de soi-même et des autres. C’est une attitude qui est faite d’ajustements successifs, de patience et de prudence. Elle ne consiste pas à accepter, mais plutôt à ne pas s’opposer avec précipitation, à s’imprégner de ce qui advient, survient, devient, revient, à laisser agir en soi des situations en perpétuelle transformation. Il convient dans ce qui ne peut plus être exactement considéré comme une perspective mais une ouverture des perceptions de suspendre ce qui est volontaire : non plus adopter une position (de principe) mais s’adapter aux situations. Le wu wei n’est pas un point d’arrivée mais de départ qui peut redonner du souffle à l’anthropologie. Il permet, dans un cheminement long, lent et méthodique, une plus grande marge de manœuvre et est susceptible d’affiner le moment ethnographique de l’anthropologie. Car malgré tout le travail effectué par les fondateurs de notre discipline, la notion même d’ethnographie demeure une notion balbutiante, laissée en friche en marge des constructions théoriques et quelque peu abandonnée épistémologiquement soit à des protocoles fonctionnels soit au bon vouloir de chacun. L’ethnographie se trouve en quelque sorte coincée entre des techniques objectives éprouvées et la bonne volonté. Le wu wei peut débloquer cette situation en ouvrant à des possibles qui n’avaient pas été essayés. Ce que nous apprendrons au contact de la Chine et du Japon est que le réel a un caractère non pas structurel ni à l’inverse pulsionnel, mais pulsatif, processuel, évènementiel et situationnel. Or cette pulsation rythmique de la respiration est aussi la pulsation rythmique de la méthode. Elle a des implications très concrètes en ethnographie et en anthropologie qui ont elles aussi besoin de respirer. L’ethnographie positiviste en effet ne respire pas assez. Elle est arythmique et étrangère au mouvement du vivant fait de flux et de reflux, de traits et de retraits, d’apparition et de disparition alors que ce mouvement même est susceptible d’inspirer la méthode. Quant à l’anthropologie académique, elle s’en tient souvent à une opération de construction dans lequel différents éléments sont assemblés pour constituer une totalité supérieure (Saillant, Kilani, Graezer-Bideau 2011). La voie négative du wu wei n’est pas moins opératoire et n’est pas moins « moderne » que la négativité à la manière de Freud ou d’Ardono. Si nous désencombrons cette notion formée dans la matrice taoïste de significations trop chargées, si nous la libérons de son carcan ésotérique pour la restituer à sa vocation anthropologique, nous nous apercevons que le taoïsme n’a rien d’un théisme. La voie inspirée par le wu wei est celle d’une désubstantialisation et d’une désessentialisation de notre rapport au réel. Elle provoque une déstabilisation mais ne doit pas être confondue avec le relativisme et encore moins avec l’idée occidentale de nihilisme. Elle en est même le contraire. S’imprégner méthodiquement de ce qui est en train de se passer et de passer ne conduit nullement à un renoncement, à la manière bouddhiste d’une dissolution du réel qui aurait un caractère illusoire, mais à une dé hiérarchisation des cultures et à une désabsolutisation des valeurs

Investigative journalist Bill Moyers interviews Jon Stewart of The Daily Show: MOYERS: I do not know whether you are practicing an old form of parody and satire…or a new form of journalism. STEWART: Well then that either speaks to the sad state of comedy or the sad state of news. I can’t figure out which one. I think, honestly, we’re practicing a new form of desperation…. July 2003 (Bill Moyers Interview of Jon Stewart, on Public Broadcasting Service) Transmission, while always fraught and ever-changing, is particularly so at a moment when coincidentally the exponential increase in access to new media communication is paired with the propagandized and state-dominated moment of war, in this case the U.S. preemptive invasion of Iraq in 2003. U.S. fighter planes drop paper propaganda along with bombs. Leaked into mainstream media by virtue of new media technologies, the violations of Abu-Ghraib represent the challenge of conducting war in a digital era. Transmissions are highly controlled and yet the proliferation of access poses a new challenge – explicitly named by Rumsfeld in December 2005 on the Jim Lehrer news hour: DONALD RUMSFELD: No, I think what is happening – and this is the first war that has ever been conducted in the 21st century when you had talk radio, the Internet, e-mails, bloggers, 24-hour news, digital cameras, video cameras, instant access to everything, and we haven’t accommodated to that yet. … And what’s happening is the transmission belt that receives it spreads all these things. … Rumsfeld’s comments about the convergence of new media with a time of war highlights what those of us studying cultural communication see as a crucial site of study: the access and use of new media to transmit dissenting political commentary is arguably a sign of new counter-public spaces that coincide with increased mainstream media control and erosion of civil liberties surrounding free speech. In this particular instance, the strategic use of media by U.S. political administration to sell a morally questionable war to the public through deceptions and propaganda raises new questions about the transmission and phenomenon of truth claims in a digital age. In this essay I examine three sites through which satire is used to express political commentary in the convergent moment of repression combines with increased affordances. The examples I offer have been chosen because they illustrate what I recognize as a cultural shift, an emotional sea change even for staunch postmodernists: replacing Jameson’s characterization of the “waning of affect,” there has emerged renewed desire for truthfulness and accountability. What’s unique is that this insistence on the possibility of truthfulness is held in simultaneous contradiction with cynical distrust. The result is a paradoxical affective sentiment shared by many: the simultaneous belief that all truths are rhetorically constructed along with the shared certainty that we have been lied to, that this is wrong, and that there is a truthfulness that should be delivered. This demand is directed at the corrupted synergy created between media and politicians. The arguments used to counter the dominant content (and form) of transmission are made using new digital media. The sea-change in transmission is its multidirectionality, its frequency, and its own rapidly-changing modes of transmission. In short, communication and the political role of media has become exponentially complex in the simultaneous demand for truthfulness alongside the simultaneous awareness that all truth is constructed. Visual satire offers an ideal form to transmit the post-9/11 contradictions because irony turns on the unsaid; it uses the dominant forms of logic to express what is otherwise silenced as dissenting didacticism; it expresses horrors in forms that are palatable; it creates a sense of shared meaning and community by using the unsaid to create a recognition of the dominant culture as misrepresentation. While irony has been used for centuries as a political tool, what is unique about the digitally produced and disseminated cultures created through visual ironies after 9/11 is that these expressions explicitly reference again and again a desire for accountability. Much could be said about the history of political satire, and if space permitted I would develop here my discussion of affect and parody, best excavated beginning with a history of political satire moving up to current “fair use legislation” which legally protects those who perform parody, one subset of satire. A more general comment on the relation of humor to politics helps set a context for the relationship of satire to contemporary political transmissions I address. Humor … helps one only to bear somewhat better the unalterable; sometimes it reminds both the mighty and the weak that they are not to be taken seriously. …One’s understanding of political jokes obviously depends on one’s understanding of politics. At one level, politics is always a struggle for power. Along with persuasion and lies, advice and flattery, tokens of esteem and bribery, banishment and violence, obedience and treachery, the joke belongs to the rich treasury of the instruments of politics. We often hear that the political joke is an offensive weapon with which an aggressive, politically engaged person makes the arrangements or precautions of an opponent seem ridiculous. But even when political jokes serve defensive purposes, they are nonetheless weapons (Speier and Jackall 1998, 1352). The productions I am studying I define as digital dissent: the use of new media to engage in tactical media, culture jamming, or online civic participation that interrupts mainstream media narratives. The sites I am studying include multimedia memes, blogs, and mirrored streaming of cable-channel Comedy Central’s highly popular news satire. These three examples illustrate a key tension embedded in the activity of transmission: in their form (satirical) and content (U.S. mainstream media and U.S. politicians and mistakes) they critique prevailing (dominant) transmissions of mainstream media, and perform this transmission using mainstream media as the transmitter. The use of the existing forms to critique those same forms helpfully defines “tactical media,” so that, ironically, the transmission of mainstream news is satirized through content and form while in turn being transmitted via corporate-owned news show. The following illustrations of digital dissent employ irony and satire to transmit the contradictory emotional sensibilities: on the one hand, the awareness that all truth claims are constructed and on the other, a longing for truthful accountability from politicians and media. The Daily Show with Jon Stewart The Daily Show (TDS) with Jon Stewart is a highly-popular news satire. “The most trusted name in fake news” is transmitted four nights a week in the U.S. and Canada on cable television and often on another local network channel. TDS format uses “real” news clips from mainstream media – generally about Washington D.C. politics – and offers satirical and ironic commentary about the media representations as well as about the actions and speech of the politicians represented. Aired in Europe through CNN as well througha half-hour once weekly version, TDS is also streamed online both through Comedy Central’s official site as well as on mirrored independent streaming. The Daily Show has been airing for 6 years, has 1.7 million television viewers, a wide audience who view TDS online, and a larger segment of age 18-31 viewers than any other U.S. nightly news show (Friend 28). Jon Stewart has become an icon of a cross-partisan North American critique of George W. Bush in particular (though Stewart claims himself as non-partisan). Particularly since his appearance on CNN news debate show Crossfire and now poised to host the Academy Awards (two days until Oscar broadcast as I write), Jon Stewart emblematizes a faith in democracy, and demand for media accountability to standards of civic discourse seen as central to democracy. (In a March 2, 2006 blog-letter to Jon Stewart, Ariana Huffington warns him against losing his current political legitimacy by blowing it at the Oscars: “Interjecting too much political commentary – no matter how trenchant or hilarious – is like interrupting the eulogy at a funeral to make a political point … . At the same time, there is no denying the fact, Jon, that you are going to have the rapt attention of some 40 million Americans. Or that political satire – done right – can alter people’s perceptions (there’s a reason emperors have always banned court jesters in times of crisis). Or that a heaping dose of your perception-altering mockery would do the American body politic a load of good.”) “Stop hurting America” Stewart pleads with two mainstream news show hosts on the now-infamous Crossfire appearance, (an 11 minute clip easily found online or through ifilm.com). Stewart’s public shaming of mainstream media as partisan hackery theatre, “helping corporations and leaving all of us alone to mow our lawns,” became the top-cited media event in the blogosphere in 2004. The satirical form of The Daily Show illustrates how the unsaid functions as truth. Within the range of roles classically defined within the history of humor and satire, Jon Stewart represents the court jester (Jones). First, the unsaid often occurs literally through Stewart’s responses to material: the camera often shows simply his facial expression and speechlessness, which “says it all.” The unsaid also occurs visually through the ironic adoption of the familiar visuals of a news show: for example, situating the anchor person (Stewart) behind his obscenely large news desk. Part of this unsaid is an implicit questioning of the performed legitimacy of a news report. For viewers, The Daily Show displaces a dominant and enforced hegemonic cultural pastime: individuals in isolated living rooms tuned in to (and alienated by) the 11 o’clock dose of media spin about politicians’ and military versions of reality have been replaced by a new virtual solidarity of 1.2 million living rooms who share a recognition of deception. Ironically, as Bill Moyers expresses to Jon Stewart, “but when I report the news on this broadcast, people say I’m making it up. When you make it up, they say you’re telling the truth” (“Transcript”). The unsaid also functions by using actual existing logics, discourses, and even various familiar reiterated truth claims (the location of WMD; claims made by Hans Blix, etc.) and shifting the locutionary context of these slightly in order to create irony – putting “real” words into displaced contexts in a way that reveals the constructed-ness of the “real” and thereby creates an unsaid, shared commentary about the experience of feeling deceived by the media and by the Pentagon. Through its use of both “real” news footage combined with ironic “false” commentary, The Daily Show allows viewers to occupy the simultaneous space of cynicism and desire for truth: pleasure and satisfaction followed by a moment of panic or horror. Bush in 30 Seconds The Bushin30seconds campaign was begun by the organization MoveOn, who solicited entries from the public and received over 500 which were streamed as QuickTime videos on their Website. The guidelines were to use the form of a campaign ad, and the popularly-selected winner would be aired on major network television during the 2004 Superbowl. The majority of the Bushin30Seconds ads include content that directly addresses Bush’s deception and make pleas for truth, many explicitly addressing the demand for truth, the immorality of lies, and the problems that political deception pose for democracy (along with a research team, I am currently working on a three year project analyzing all of these in terms of their content, rhetorical form, and discursive strategies and will be surveying and interviewing the producers of the Bushin30Seconds. Our other two sites of study include political blogs about the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and online networks sparked by The Daily Show). The demand for truthfulness is well exemplified in the ad called “Polygraph” (see also #27 A Big Puzzle). This ad invokes a simulated polygraph – the polygraph being a classic instrument of rational positivism and surveillance – which measures for the viewer the “truth” quotient of Bush’s own “real” words. Of course, the polygraph is not actually connected to Bush’s body, and hence offers a visual symbolic “stand in” for the viewer’s own internal or collectively shared sensibility or truth meter. Illustrating my central argument about the expressed desire for truthfulness, the ad concludes with the phrase “Americans are dying for the truth.” Having examined 150 ads, it is remarkable how many of these – albeit via different cultural forms ranging from hip hop to animation to drama to pseudo-advertisement for a toy action figure – make a plea for accountability, not only on behalf of one’s own desire but often out of altruistic concern for others. The Yes Men I offer one final example to illustrate transmissions that disrupt dominant discourses. The Yes Men began their work when they created a website which “mirrored” the World Trade Organization site. Assumed to represent the WTO, they were subsequently offered invitations to give keynotes at various international conferences and press meetings of CEOs and business people. (Their work is documented in an hour-long film titled The Yes Men available at many video outlets and through their web site.) The main yes man, Bichlbaum, arrives to these large international meetings with careful attire and speech, and offers a straight-faced keynote with subversive content. For example, at a textile conference he suggests that slavery had been a very profitable form of labor and might be reintroduced as alternative to unionized labor. At another conference, he announced that the WTO had decided to disband because it has realized it is only causing harm to international trade and economy. In December 2004, the Yes Men struck again when they were invited by the BBC as representatives of DOW chemical on the 20th anniversary of the Union Carbide Bhopal accident in India. Those who watched the BBC news and Channel 4 and the hundreds of thousands who viewed these clips afterwards are made aware of the anniversary of the worst chemical accident in history; are apprised of the ongoing effects on the people of Bhopal; and hear an unusual primetime soundbyte lambasting the utter absence of social responsibility of corporations such as Dow Chemical. The Yes Men illustrate what some might call tactical media, some might call media terrorism, and what some aspire to in their own activism. “They compare their work to that of a “funhouse mirror” – exaggerating hideous features. ‘We do that kind of exaggeration operation, but with ideas. We agree with people – turning up the volume on their ideas as we talk, until they can see their ideas distorted in our funhouse mirror. Or that’s what we try to do anyhow. As it turns out, the image always seems to look normal to them,’ Bichlbaum said” (Marchlewski). Another article describes their goal as follows: When newspapers and television stations out their acts, it’s not just the Yes Men who get attention, but also the issues they address … . The impersonations, which the two call identity corrections, are intended to show, in a colorful and humorous way, what they say are errors of corporate and government ways. (Marchlewski 2005) In conclusion, these three examples illustrate the new media terrain of access and distribution which enables transmissions that arguably construct significant new public spheres constructed around a desire for truthfulness and accountability. While some may prefer “civil society,” I find the concept of a public useful because its connotations imply less regimentation. If the public sphere is in part constructed through the reflexive circulation of discourse, the imaginary relation with strangers, and with affect as a social glue (my addition to Michael Warner’s six features of a public), we have described some of the ways in which counterpublics are produced (Warner 2002; Boler, forthcoming). If address (the circulation and reception of a cultural production under consideration) in part constructs a public, how does one imagine the interactivity between the listener/bystander/participant and the broadcast or image? To what extent do the kinds of transmission I have discussed here invite new kinds of multi-directional interactivity, and to what extent do they replicate problematic forms of broadcast? Which kind of subject is assumed or produced by different “mediated” publics? What is the relationship of discourse and propaganda to action and materiality? These are some of the eternally difficult questions raised when one analyzes ideology and culture in relation to social change. It is indeed very difficult to trace what action follows from any particular discursive construction of publics. One can think of the endings of the 150 Finalists in the Bush in30 Seconds campaign, each with an explicit or implicit imperative: “think!” or “act!” What subject is hailed and invoked, and what relationship might exist between the invocation or imagining of that listener and that listener’s actual reception and translation of any transmission? The construction of a public through address is a key feature of the politics of representation and visions of social change through cultural production. Each of the three sites of productions I have analyzed illustrate a renewed call for faith in media as an institution which owes a civic responsibility to democracy. The iterations of calls for truthful accounts from media and politicians stand in tension with the simultaneous recognition of the complex social construction of any and all truth claims. The uncertainty about whether such transmissions constitute “an old form of parody and satire…or a new form of journalism” reflects the ongoing paradox of what Jon Stewart describes as a “new form of desperation.” For those who live in Western democracies, I suggest that the study of political transmission is best understood within this moment of convergence and paradox when we are haunted by paradoxical desires for truths. References “American Daily.” 7 Nov. 2003 http://www.americandaily.com/article/5951>. Boler, Megan. “Mediated Publics and the Crises of Democracy.” Philosophical Studies in Education 37 (2006, forthcoming), eds. Justen Infinito and Cris Mayo. Colebrook, Claire. Irony. London: Routledge, 2004. Jameson, Frederic. “Postmodernism and Consumer Society.” The Anti-Aesthetic. Ed. H. Foster. Seattle: Bay Press, 1983. Jones, Jeffrey. Entertaining Politics: New Political Television and Civic Culture. New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2004. Fletcher, M.D. Contemporary Political Satire. New York: University Press of America, 1987. Friend, Tad. “Is It Funny Yet? Jon Stewart and the Comedy of Crisis”. The New Yorker 77.47 (11 Feb. 2002): 28(7). Huffington, Ariana. “Memo to Jon Stewart: Tread Lightly and Carry a Big Schtick.” 2 March 2006. 4 March 2006 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/arianna-huffington/memo-to-jon-stewart-trea_b_16642.html>. Latour, Bruno. “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern.” Critical Inquiry 30.2 (2004). http://www.uchicago.edu/research/jnl-crit-inq/issues/v30/30n2.Latour.html>. Marchlewski, Kathie. “Hoaxsters Target Dow, Midland Daily News.” 20 May 2005 http://www.theyesmen.org/articles/dowagmmidlanddailynews.html>. Speier, Hans, & Robert Jackall. “Wit and Politics: An Essay on Laughter and Power.” The American Journal of Sociology 103.5 (1998): 1352. “The News Hour with Jim Lehrer.” 8 Dec. 2005. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/fedagencies/july-dec05/rumsfeld_12-08.html>. “Transcript – Bill Moyers Inverviews Jon Stewart.” 7 Nov. 2003 . Warner, Michael. “Publics and Counterpublics.” Public Culture 14.1 (2002): 49-90. Citation reference for this article MLA Style Boler, Megan. "The Transmission of Political Critique after 9/11: “A New Form of Desperation”?." M/C Journal 9.1 (2006). echo date('d M. Y'); ?> <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0603/11-boler.php>. APA Style Boler, M. (Mar. 2006) "The Transmission of Political Critique after 9/11: “A New Form of Desperation”?," M/C Journal, 9(1). Retrieved echo date('d M. Y'); ?> from <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0603/11-boler.php>.