Auswahl der wissenschaftlichen Literatur zum Thema „Knowability“
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Zeitschriftenartikel zum Thema "Knowability"
Wójcik, Arkadiusz. „The Knowability Paradox and Unsuccessful Updates“. Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 62, Nr. 1 (01.06.2020): 53–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/slgr-2020-0013.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleWilliamson, Timothy. „Knowability and Constructivism“. Philosophical Quarterly 38, Nr. 153 (Oktober 1988): 422. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2219707.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleJago, M. „Closure on knowability“. Analysis 70, Nr. 4 (24.08.2010): 648–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anq067.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleChalmers, D. J. „Actuality and knowability“. Analysis 71, Nr. 3 (18.05.2011): 411–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anr038.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleDouven, Igor. „The Knowability Paradox“. Ars Disputandi 6, Nr. 1 (Januar 2006): 163–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15665399.2006.10819919.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleWilliamson, Timothy. „Definiteness and Knowability“. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33, S1 (März 1995): 171–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1995.tb00769.x.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleDeVidi, David, und Tim Kenyon. „Analogues of Knowability“. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81, Nr. 4 (Dezember 2003): 481–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/713659757.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleHand, Michael, und Jonathan L. Kvanvig. „Tennant on knowability“. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77, Nr. 4 (Dezember 1999): 422–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048409912349191.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleHeylen, Jan, und Felipe Morales Carbonell. „Concepts of Knowability“. Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso, Nr. 23 (26.12.2023): 287–308. http://dx.doi.org/10.22370/rhv2023iss23pp287-308.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleMurzi, Julien. „Knowability and bivalence: intuitionistic solutions to the Paradox of Knowability“. Philosophical Studies 149, Nr. 2 (19.02.2009): 269–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9349-y.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleDissertationen zum Thema "Knowability"
Percival, P. R. „Infinity, knowability and understanding“. Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1986. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.384322.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleKubyshkina, Ekaterina. „La logique de l'agent rationnel“. Thesis, Paris 1, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018PA01H208.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleMany-valued logics is a family of non-classical logics, which is characterized by the fundamental fact that they do not restrict the truth values to only truth and falsity. According to this line of inquiry, Kleene (1938) constructed a logic that is based on the idea that every proposition is either true, or false, but there exist propositions for which the truth value is unknown. The formalisation of this idea leads to the introduction of a third assignment of truth value to propositions, interpreted as “unknown”. However, this formalisation contains an ambiguity, because it does not permit the resolution of a contradiction between the fact that every proposition is either true or false, and the fact that there exist propositions for which the assignment of truth value is neither “true” nor “false”. The initial aim of the present thesis is to explore Kleene’s idea in order to introduce and analyse a new many-valued logic, to be called the logic of a rational agent, that is founded on Kleene’s ideas, but that eliminates the above-mentioned ambiguity.The logic of a rational agent models the reasoning of an agent, taking into account the knowledge (or ignorance) of the classical truth value of a proposition that the agent can have. On the technical level, we introduce diverse definitions of entailment relations and construct consistent and complete semantics on this base. We then show the interest inherent in such a formalisation, by proposing an application of this logic to a famous epistemological problem, known as the “knowability paradox”. On the epistemological level, the logic of a rational agent permits us to offer an analysis of the notion of ignorance, as understood independently from the notion of knowledge. Such a formalization
Liu, Mo. „Dynamic Epistemic Logic with Quantification And Normative Systems“. Electronic Thesis or Diss., Université de Lorraine, 2023. http://www.theses.fr/2023LORR0077.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleWe live in a world where information is constantly being updated. Logics with dynamic operators are capable of reasoning about multi-agent information change. Dynamic epistemic logic is the logic of knowledge change. For example, in public announcement logic, an announcement restricts the domain to states where it is true to represent the consequences of knowledge change. A generalization of dynamic epistemic logic is the extension with quantification. It bridges an interesting gap between propositional modal logic and first-order logic in expressivity and decidability. Arbitrary public announcement logic extends public announcement logic by adding quantification over all announcements. It is more expressive than modal logics and public announcement logic, but undecidable. In this thesis, we propose some novel versions of arbitrary public announcement logic. Firstly, we can restrict the quantification from over all announcements to over subsets of them. To be specific, the announcements involved could use only a subset of all propositional variables or implied or implying a given formula. Even though these variants of arbitrary public announcement logic are still undecidable, we show there is an interesting hierarchy of relative expressivity of them. Another approach is based on the idea of packing operators together. Packed operators represent more complex notions and also restrict the expressivity of languages. The notion of "knowability'' can be interpreted as "there is a possible information change after which the agent knows something''. It is natural to represent by the package of a quantified dynamic operator and a epistemic operator. In this thesis, we propose logics of knowability using such packed operators. We show that if there is no restriction on announcements, then the logic of knowability is more expressive than public announcement logic, but undecidable; if we only quantify over boolean announcements, then the logic has the same expressivity as propositional modal logic. Besides the extension with quantification, in this thesis, we also combine dynamic epistemic logic with normative system. Arrow update logic contains modalities that specify which relations should be preserved after updating by source and target conditions. It is designed to reason about multi-agent belief change. We can also use it to represent the notion of "norm'' which regulates behaviors of agents in a consequential way. We propose normative arrow update logic which combines arrow update logic and normative temporal logic. It also concludes additive, multiplicative and sequential combination of norms. Normative arrow update logic can distinguish between static and dynamic ways to consider norms as dynamic epistemic logic. We show its relative expressivity with other related logics, its decidability, and complexity
Řičař, Jiří. „Otázka přirozené poznatelnosti Boha u Tomáše Akvinského a její recepce u vybraných současných autorů“. Master's thesis, 2016. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-348233.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleBücher zum Thema "Knowability"
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. The knowability paradox. New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2006.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenJoe, Salerno, Hrsg. New essays on the knowability paradox. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenPohle, Joseph. God: His knowability, essence, and attributes : a dogmatic treatise. St. Louis, Mo: B. Herder, 1985.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenKennedy, Philip. Deus humanissimus: The knowability of God in the theology of Edward Schillebeeckx. Fribourg, Switzerland: University Press, 1993.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenLipskiy, Boris, Stanislav Gusev, Grigoriy Tul'chinskiy und Boris Markov. Fundamentals of Philosophy. ru: INFRA-M Academic Publishing LLC., 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.12737/1014627.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleKvanvig, Jonathan L. Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press, 2006.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenKvanvig, Jonathan L. Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press, 2008.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenKvanvig, Jonathan L. Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press, 2006.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenSalerno, Joe, Hrsg. New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285495.001.0001.
Der volle Inhalt der QuellePohle, Joseph. God: His Knowability, Essence And Attributes. Kessinger Publishing, LLC, 2007.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenBuchteile zum Thema "Knowability"
McCain, Kevin. „Knowability Paradox“. In Epistemology: 50 Puzzles, Paradoxes, and Thought Experiments, 231–34. New York: Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003121091-51.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleUsberti, Gabriele. „The Paradox of Knowability“. In Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, 345–77. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24605-0_9.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleWen, Xuefeng, Hu Liu und Fan Huang. „An Alternative Logic for Knowability“. In Logic, Rationality, and Interaction, 342–55. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24130-7_25.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleJohn, Maya. „(Un)Knowability of a Disease“. In Pandemic Perspectives, 23–45. London: Routledge, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003480297-3.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleSalerno, Joe. „Knowability and a New Paradox of Happiness“. In Jaakko Hintikka on Knowledge and Game-Theoretical Semantics, 457–74. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62864-6_19.
Der volle Inhalt der Quellevan Rooij, Robert. „Nonmonotonicity and Knowability: As Knowable as Possible“. In Outstanding Contributions to Logic, 53–65. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47843-2_3.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleUsberti, Gabriele. „The Paradox of Knowability from an Intuitionistic Standpoint“. In Advances in Proof-Theoretic Semantics, 115–37. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-22686-6_7.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleCarrara, Massimiliano, Daniele Chiffi und Davide Sergio. „A Multimodal Pragmatic Analysis of the Knowability Paradox“. In Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning, 195–209. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-58507-9_9.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleCohen, Michael. „A Dynamic Epistemic Logic with a Knowability Principle“. In Logic, Rationality, and Interaction, 406–10. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48561-3_33.
Der volle Inhalt der QuellePrebble, Mark. „Public Value, Knowability, and Legitimacy: A Thought Experiment“. In Challenges to Public Value Creation, 99–107. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46030-2_7.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleKonferenzberichte zum Thema "Knowability"
Baltag, Alexandru, Nick Bezhanishvili und David Fernández-Duque. „The Topology of Surprise“. In 19th International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning {KR-2022}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/kr.2022/4.
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