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Auswahl der wissenschaftlichen Literatur zum Thema „Kant`s three critiques“
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Zeitschriftenartikel zum Thema "Kant`s three critiques"
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Riley, Patrick. „Kant against Hobbes in Theory and Practice“. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4, Nr. 2 (2007): 194–206. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1740468107079255.
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AbstractIn the middle section of Theory and Practice, Kant speaks briefly `against Hobbes'; but for a fuller version of Kant's anti-Hobbesianism one must turn to the three Critiques, the Groundwork, and Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. It is in those works that one learns that, for Kant, Hobbes's notion of `will' as fully determined `last appetite' destroys the freedom needed to take `ought' or moral necessity as the motives for self-determined action; that Hobbes' s version of the social contract is thus incoherent; that Hobbes is not even able to show how moral ideas (i.e. `ought') are conceivable through the `pressure' of `outward objects'. For Kant, in short, Hobbes has no adequate notions of will, freedom, moral necessity, ideation, or even obligatory contract, and therefore fails in his own stated aims.
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Nikolic, Olga, und Igor Cvejic. „Social justice and the formal principle of freedom“. Filozofija i drustvo 28, Nr. 2 (2017): 270–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1702270n.
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The aim of this paper is to show, contra the right-libertarian critique of social justice, that there are good reasons for defending policies of social justice within a free society. In the first part of the paper, we will present two influential right-libertarian critiques of social justice, found in Friedrich Hayek?s Law, Legislation and Liberty and Robert Nozick?s Anarchy, State and Utopia. Based on their approach, policies of social justice are seen as an unjustified infringement on freedoms of individual members of a society. In response to this critique, we will introduce the distincion between formal and factual freedom and argue that the formal principle of freedom defended by Hayek and Nozick does not suffice for the protection of factual freedom of members of a society, because it does not recognize (1) the moral obligation to help those who, without their fault, lack factual freedom to a significant degree, and (2) the legal obligation of the state to protect civic dignity of all members of a society. In the second part of the paper, we offer an interpretation of Kant?s argument on taxation, according to which civic dignity presupposes factual freedom, in order to argue that Kant?s justification of taxation offers good reasons for claiming that the state has the legal obligation to protect factual freedom via the policies of social justice.
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Soc, Andrija. „Kant and the legitimacy of rebellion against the sovereign“. Theoria, Beograd 56, Nr. 4 (2013): 63–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1304063s.
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The main topic of this paper is Kant?s position with respect to whether rebellion of citizens against their sovereign is justified. The first part of the paper introduces the social contract theory and considers three well-known answers to this question - Hobbes?s Locke?s and Rousseau?s. In the second part I deal with Kant?s views relying on those of his works where the relation between government and citizens is the chief subject. It is usually thought that Kant believes that rebellion, or revolution against sovereign is unjustified, or even contradictory. In the third part of the paper I try to outline an alternative interpretation that ascribes him the positive attitude towards revolution in certain contexts, and to which I arrive by using mainly the textual evidence present in the Critique of Judgment.
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Smajevic, Milica. „Deduction of morality and freedom in Kant’s ethics“. Theoria, Beograd 63, Nr. 1 (2020): 29–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo2001029s.
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In the third section of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant seeks, on the basis of the idea of the necessary presumption of freedom, to provide a deduction of the supreme moral principle and to prove its objective validity. Three years later, in the Critique of Practical Reason, he explicitly denies the possibility of making such deduction, and by changing methodological assumptions, tries to show that awareness of the moral law as a fact of reason is the basis for the deduction of freedom. In this paper we will argue that a direct contrast between Kant?s two texts clearly shows that a radical shift in his thought has taken place. The purpose of this text is to show that Kant had reasons to be dissatisfied with the deduction of the moral law offered in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, which led him to change his argumentative course when writing the Second Critique.
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Hahmann, Andree. „Kant’s Critical Argument(s) for Immortality Reassessed“. Kant Yearbook 10, Nr. 1 (04.10.2018): 19–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kantyb-2018-0002.
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AbstractKant’s postulate of the immortality of the soul has received strikingly little attention among Kant scholars, and only very few have regarded it positively. This is not surprising given the numerous problems associated with his argument. However, it is not the only argument for immortality that Kant offers in his critical philosophy. There is also a second argument that differs from the one furnished in the Second Critique and can be found both in the Critique of Pure Reason and later texts from the 1790s. Kant also addresses here many of the problems that interpreters have found with his postulate of immortality in both earlier and later texts. This paper considers the main difficulties associated with the postulate and proposes a coherent interpretation of Kant’s argument. I show that despite the apparent change in his approach to immortality Kant did not in fact substantially alter his position during his critical period.
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Micic, Stefan. „The question of personal identity: Kant and Kantian perspectives“. Theoria, Beograd 66, Nr. 2 (2023): 17–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo2302017m.
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In this paper, we will be examining the question of personal identity in the context of Immanuel Kant?s philosophy, as well as among contemporary Kantian thinkers such as Christine Korsgaard. Our investigation will focus primarily on those aspects of the issue that are relevant to moral philosophy. While some may believe that personal identity is not a primary concern of philosophy, or that it does not merit extensive discussion, we argue that it is indeed a significant philosophical question, particularly in the context of moral philosophy. Our inquiry will begin with Kant?s theoretical philosophy, specifically his transcendental deduction of categories and his treatment of paralogisms, as we aim to gain a deeper understanding of Kant?s views on personal identity. Following our analysis of the relevant parts of Kant?s work, we will then turn to the contemporary Kantian thinker Kristin Korsgaard, who has offered critiques of Derek Parfit?s understanding of personal identity.
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Lazos, Efraín. „Kant y el conocimiento de sí mismo“. Theoría. Revista del Colegio de Filosofía, Nr. 6 (01.11.1998): 31–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/ffyl.16656415p.1998.6.191.
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The paper takes up J. McDowell’s claim in Mind and World that the lack of a serious notion of second nature is an obstacle to an effective response by Kant to the Cartesian view of the self. A reconstruction of the Cartesian model of the mind is offered, as well as an analysis of key passages in the Critique of Pure Reason and P.F. Strawson ́s reception of them, to the effect that there is a sense in which Kant may successfully do away with Cartesian temptations without recourse to the abovementioned notion.
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Nakano, Hirotaka. „ Unum, Verum, Bonum and the System Formation of Critical Philosophy“. Kant-Studien 113, Nr. 4 (25.11.2022): 613–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kant-2022-2042.
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Abstract This article deals with Kant’s intentions in adding § 12 of the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. Here, Kant remarks on the so-called transcendentals (unum, verum, bonum) in the metaphysical or ontological tradition. This article focuses on their trans-categorial character to clarify their role in the system formation of Kant’s three critiques. In order to clarify Kant’s difficult terminology in § 12, fragments from his reflections and transcripts of his lectures are analyzed. Furthermore, an examination of Kant’s references to qualitative unity, plurality, and perfection reveals that these logical criteria of cognition in general help him to organize the content of the three critiques.
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Nurkic, Petar. „Hume’s and Kant’s understanding of epistemic normativity“. Theoria, Beograd 64, Nr. 3 (2021): 91–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo2103091n.
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Question (d) how do we form beliefs?, implies descriptive answers. On the other hand, the question (n) how should we form beliefs?, implies normative answers. Can we provide answers to (n) questions without answering (d) questions? This (n) - (d) relation can be characterized as epistemic normativity. Hume and Kant provide answers to both questions. Hume is more inclined to psychologize these answers through an empirical approach to questions related to beliefs. While Kant is more inclined to consider a priori conditions of our reasoning. Through general rules and epistemic maxims, Hume and Kant provide normative guidelines in accordance which we should form beliefs. However, in order to be able to talk about normativity, at all, we need to answer questions related to doxastic voluntarism. For Kant, the question of freedom is, to some extent, an obvious precondition for his critiques (especially of the practical mind). While with Hume, precisely because of his empirical approach to beliefs and desires, the matter is more obscure, and it seems as if Hume advocates doxastic involuntarism. In this paper, I will try to present the similarities between Hume and Kant in terms of epistemic normativity. Where it seems as if their views are incompatible, I will try to examine why this is the case. I will focus on Hume?s Treatise of Human Nature and Kant?s Second Analogy. In the end, I will present a couple of thought experiments and try to ?test? Hume and Kant. If I manage to confirm the initial hypotheses, then this paper will be a successful epistemic endeavor. However, if I fail to find the expected similarities between Hume?s and Kant?s understanding of epistemic normativity, then this work can be characterized as a historical approach to the normative framework of ?dogmatic slumber?.
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McCurdy, Jennifer. „In Defense of Cosmopolitanism: Kant’s Conceptions in a Neocolonial World“. Political Science Undergraduate Review 2, Nr. 2 (15.02.2017): 53–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.29173/psur38.
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This article engages with Immanuel Kant´s timeless essay Perpetual Peace in order to explore the colonial aspect of cosmopolitanism. Mainly, it explores the question can Kant´s cosmopolitanism exist outside of colonialism? It will investigate three key aspects of Kant´s essay. Firstly, his calls for a loose federation of nation states, secondly, his insistence that the citizenry must be in charge of all decisions of warfare, and lastly, his assertion of existing universal moral codes. By investigating these three key, yet often misunderstood, aspects and using recent case studies as evidence, this essay concludes that colonialism is not a presupposition of Kant´s conception of cosmopolitanism. Kant´s cosmopolitanism is a separate and legitimate entity that exists outside of and can transcend colonial relations.
Dissertationen zum Thema "Kant`s three critiques"
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Sinha, Susil. „Problems related with the synthetic Apiori in Kant`s three critiques“. Thesis, University of North Bengal, 1993. http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/67.
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Eckart, Förster, Hrsg. Kant's transcendental deductions: The three critiques and the Opus postumum. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1989.
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The crisis of judgment in Kant's three critiques: In search of a science of aesthetics. New York: P. Lang, 1995.
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Ward, Andrew. Kant: The Three Critiques. Polity Press, 2021.
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Ward, Andrew. Kant: The Three Critiques (Key Thinkers). Polity Press, 2006.
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Domhoff, G. William. Does Dreaming Have Any Adaptive Function(s)? Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190673420.003.0009.
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Chapter 8 critiques three separate theories that claim that dreaming has a forward-looking adaptive function, such as problem-solving, threat simulation that prepares people to deal with waking threats, or memory consolidation. It shows that all three theories rest on questionable assumptions and are contradicted by a wide range of systematic empirical studies. The chapter concludes with the hypothesis that dreaming is a nonadaptation, a byproduct of cognitive skills that were selected for other reasons. The chapter further suggests that dreaming is in some ways a useful nonadaptation because in the course of human history virtually all cultures have invented uses for dreams, such as in healing and religious ceremonies. The final section reminds readers that there is psychological meaning in dreams, and claims that both cultural uses and psychological meaning have to be considered separately from the issue of evolutionary adaptations to develop a viable theory of dreams.
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Oliver, Wendy R. Writing About Dance. Human Kinetics, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781718212862.
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Master the art of writing about dance! And learn about dance at the same time. This comprehensive guide provides students with instructions for writing about dance in many different contexts. It brings together the many different kinds of writing that can be effectively used in a variety of dance classes from technique to appreciation. In addition, it offers strategies for improving critical thinking skills, and shows how writing and critical thinking are closely linked. Part I focuses on informal writing such as freewriting, with sample exercises and prompts. Part II outlines approaches to writing three different kinds of formal papers: critiques, essays and research papers. Writing about dance teaches on two levels. First, the writer is learning dance content as s/he writes. Engaging in the writing assignment causes the writer to take a look at an aspect of dance and to become a 'momentary expert'. Secondly, writing itself is a way of learning. Writing involves the brain in three kinds of interaction, that is, the intellectual act of critically thinking, the physical act of writing or typing, and the visual aspect of seeing the writing on the page. The critical thinking and contemplation involved in writing can deepen students understanding of dance technique, dance creativity, and dance as an art form. Students will use this book on their own, or teachers may make assignments from it. It teaches about dance writing, but also about the very basics of dance appreciation.
Buchteile zum Thema "Kant`s three critiques"
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Allison, Henry E. „Reflective Judgement and the Application of Logic to Nature: Kant ‘s Deduction of the Principle of Purposiveness as an Answer to Hume“. In Strawson and Kant, 169–83. Oxford University PressOxford, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199252824.003.0011.
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Abstract In his analysis of judgement in the two versions of the introduction to the Critique of Judgment Kant introduces the purposiveness of nature as a new transcendental principle pertaining to judgement in its reflective capacity; and in the second or published Introduction he provides it with a transcen-dental deduction. Although this principle has been the topic of considerable discussion in recent years, neither its role as a general condition of empirical knowledge nor the nature and force of its deduction have been adequately explored. Such an exploration is the concern of this chapter. I shall argue that this principle lies at the centre rather than the periphery of Kantian epistemology; and that, even though Kant does not present it as such, its deduction may be viewed as his definitive answer to Hume regarding the rational grounding of induction broadly construed. The discussion is divided into three parts. The first examines the principle of purposiveness, its source in reflective judgement, and its multifaceted epistemic function. The second analyses the deduction of this principle in section V of the published Introduction. The third evaluates the adequacy of this deduction as an answer to Hume.
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Kitcher, Patricia. „What Is Transcendental Psychology?“ In Kant‘s Transcendental Psychology, 3–29. Oxford University PressNew York, NY, 1990. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195059670.003.0001.
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Abstract P.F.Strawson opens his important essay on Kant ‘s Critique of Pure Reason with these brief denunciations of transcendental psychology in order to justify a particular interpretive strategy. Although he is forth right that “[t)he idiom of the work is throughout a psychological idiom,” he will not read the book psychologically, but as an analytical argument. He describes this strategy as one of “disentangling” the psychological and the analytical sides of the Critique. In the discussions of the Aesthetic, Analytic, and Dialectic that follow, however, there is little disentangling.
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Cassam, Quassim. „A Priori Concepts“. In Strawson and Kant, 87–108. Oxford University PressOxford, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199252824.003.0006.
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Abstract Are there any a priori concepts? On one reading, a concept is a priori if and only if it cannot be derived or acquired from experience. In Kant ‘s terminology, a priori concepts ‘must be in a position to show a certificate of birth quite other than that of descent from experiences ‘ (A 86-7/B II9 ). The contrast is with empirical concepts, which can be derived from experience. The concepts whose apriority Kant is most concerned to emphasize in the first Critique are the categories, but he also applies the label a priori ‘ to many other concepts, including those of space and time, mathematical concepts, moral concepts, and the transcendental ideas. When a concept is deemed to be a priori in virtue of the fact that it cannot be derived from experience I will say that it is derivationally a priori.
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Gowans, Christopher W. „Kantian Critiques of the Phenomenological Argument“. In Innocence Lost, 184–217. Oxford University PressNew York, NY, 1994. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195085174.003.0008.
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Abstract Besides utilitarianism, the normative standpoint that has been the main source of opposition to the idea of inescapable moral wrongdoing has been that of Kant and positions inspired by Kant. In this chapter I consider Kantian arguments against RT and in particular Kantian critiques of the phenomenological argument for RT. The chapter has two main parts. In the first three sections I focus on Kant himself. It is clear that Kant rejects any form of genuine moral conflict and hence that he rejects inescapable moral wrongdoing. Yet there is a central idea in Kant, that of respect for persons as ends in themselves, that has some similarity to the responsibilities to persons account and that might be thought to allow for the possibility of inescapable moral wrongdoing. I argue that Kant does not allow for this because he interprets respect for persons as ends in light of his conception of moral law as modeled on physical law. In addition, I maintain that Kant’s position is ultimately inadequate because, despite the concept of respect for persons as ends, Kant’s understanding of the moral law has the effect of significantly displacing persons as direct objects of moral concern.
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Gibbons, Sarah L. „Introduction“. In Kant’s Theory of Imagination, 1–13. Oxford University PressOxford, 1994. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198240419.003.0001.
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Abstract The main works of Kant’s mature philosophy are of course his three Critiques —the critiques of pure reason, practical reason, and judgement. For many years it has been the practice of commentators (especially those in the Anglo-American tradition) to consider these works in isolation, focusing on Kant’s epistemology, moral philosophy, or aesthetic and teleological theories, respectively, each as a contribution to a distinct area of philosophical enquiry. When I first began working on Kant, I believed that such single-critique approaches were fundamentally flawed, since the Critiques are supposed to be interconnected parts of a single system. I am now, however, less dogmatic on this point: one can read the first Critique fruitfully without reading the third! None the less, such a reading misses what I find to be one of the most powerful aspects of Kant’s work, namely, his attempt to construct an overall picture of the human knowing and judging subject.
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Kalpouzos, Ioannis. „Armed Drone“. In International Law's Objects, 118–29. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198798200.003.0009.
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The most widely reproduced image of an armed drone is a Photoshop construct combining the object, the missile, and the Afghan landscape. This chapter enquires into the symbolic and material functions of the object in relation to international humanitarian law through three perspectives/images: that of the object itself as proliferated in the media; the image(s) the object generates for targeted killing; and that of the object for the targeted. The qualities of the object and those images speak to the promise and threat that international law(yers) see in the armed drone. The chapter assesses and critiques the drone’s promise of precision, in targeting and governing armed conflict, as well as the promises of asymmetry and invulnerability. It argues that the object of the armed drone plays a mythical function, in establishing a ‘new paradigm’ of war and law through new weapons technology in the context of the ‘war on terror’.
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Kenny, Anthony. „Cognitive Scientism“. In Wittgenstein and Analytic Philosophy, 250–62. Oxford University PressOxford, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199213238.003.0011.
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Abstract Once upon a time it was easy to classify propositions. There were analytic propositions, true in virtue of their meaning, and there were synthetic propositions that contained information about the world. All analytic propositions were known a priori; empirical propositions, known a posteriori, were all synthetic. Out of respect for Kant philosophers would inquire whether any propositions were synthetic a priori, but commonly the question was raised only to be answered in the negative. In the latter part of the twentieth century the tidy dichotomy — analytic a priori vs synthetic a posteriori— came under attack from two opposite directions. In 1951 Quine ‘s ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism ‘ sought to undermine the analytic/synthetic distinction, replacing it with a continuum of propositions of varying degrees of entrenchment in the web of our beliefs. In 1969 there appeared Wittgenstein ‘s On Certainty, which drew attention to an important class of propositions which appeared to be neither analytic nor empirical. Instead of two packages of propositions, we were offered either a single package or three packages. Quine denied that analyticity could be defined in terms of synonymy or necessity, and he rejected the idea that a sentence was synthetic if it could be verified or falsified by experience. It is not single sentences, he argued, but whole systems— which include mathematics and logic as well as geography and history — that are verified or falsified. ‘Our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in the interior of the field.