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Sterkenburg, Tom F. „THE META-INDUCTIVE JUSTIFICATION OF INDUCTION“. Episteme 17, Nr. 4 (07.02.2019): 519–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.52.
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ABSTRACTI evaluate Schurz's proposed meta-inductive justification of induction, a refinement of Reichenbach's pragmatic justification that rests on results from the machine learning branch of prediction with expert advice.My conclusion is that the argument, suitably explicated, comes remarkably close to its grand aim: an actual justification of induction. This finding, however, is subject to two main qualifications, and still disregards one important challenge.The first qualification concerns the empirical success of induction. Even though, I argue, Schurz's argument does not need to spell out what inductive method actually consists in, it does need to postulate that there is something like the inductive or scientific prediction strategy that has so far been significantly more successful than alternative approaches. The second qualification concerns the difference between having a justification for inductive method and for sticking with induction for now. Schurz's argument can only provide the latter. Finally, the remaining challenge concerns the pool of alternative strategies, and the relevant notion of a meta-inductivist's optimality that features in the analytic step of Schurz's argument. Building on the work done here, I will argue in a follow-up paper that the argument needs a stronger dynamic notion of a meta-inductivist's optimality.
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Jacquette, Dale. „How (Not) to Justify Induction“. KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy 1, Nr. 24 (01.01.2011): 1–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/krt-2011-012402.
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Abstract A conceptual analysis of the problem of induction suggests that the difficulty of justifying probabilistic reasoning depends on a mistaken comparison between deductive and inductive inference. Inductive reasoning is accordingly thought to stand in need of special justification because it does not measure up to the standard of conditional absolute certainty guaranteed by deductive validity. When comparison is made, however, it appears that deductive reasoning is subject to a counterpart argument that is just as threatening to the justification of deductive as to inductive inference. Trying to explain induction in such a way that it satisfies a special justificatory requirement in contrast with deduction is therefore not the way to justify induction. An alternative approach is sought in a style of justification developed by Aristotle for the law of noncontradiction and by Kant for the conclusions of transcendental reasoning that with variations can be used to justify both deduction and induction. This strategy upholds a principle when the principle must be presupposed even to raise doubts about the principle's justification.
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Rosenkrantz, R. D. „The Justification of Induction“. Philosophy of Science 59, Nr. 4 (Dezember 1992): 527–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/289693.
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Chihara, Charles S. „Horwich's justification of induction“. Philosophical Studies 48, Nr. 1 (Juli 1985): 107–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00372411.
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Nedeljković, Mitar. „The problem of justifying inductive reasoning“. Zbornik radova Filozofskog fakulteta u Pristini 51, Nr. 2 (2021): 387–408. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/zrffp51-30620.
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In this paper, the author considers the classical strategies of defense from Hume's argument against induction, and assesses the extent to which they were found to be successful. Synthetic, linguistic, a priori, pragmatic, and inductive strategies of defending induction are considered, as well as the question of the extent to which the justification of induction is a problem for grounding scientific knowledge. A new argument is introduced for the a priori justification of induction, as well as a critique of the synthetic and inductive defenses of induction by Black and Jacquette.
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Nielsen, Michael. „A new justification of induction“. Metascience 29, Nr. 2 (22.04.2020): 209–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11016-020-00522-2.
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Schurz, Gerhard. „Meta-Induction and Social Epistemology: Computer Simulations of Prediction Games“. Episteme 6, Nr. 2 (Juni 2009): 200–220. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/e1742360009000641.
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ABSTRACTThe justification of induction is of central significance for cross-cultural social epistemology. Different ‘epistemological cultures’ do not only differ in their beliefs, but also in their belief-forming methods and evaluation standards. For an objective comparison of different methods and standards, one needs (meta-)induction over past successes. A notorious obstacle to the problem of justifying induction lies in the fact that the success of object-inductive prediction methods (i.e., methods applied at the level of events) can neither be shown to be universally reliable (Hume's insight) nor to be universally optimal. My proposal towards a solution of the problem of induction is meta-induction. The meta-inductivist applies the principle of induction to all competing prediction methods that are accessible to her. By means of mathematical analysis and computer simulations of prediction games I show that there exist meta-inductive prediction strategies whose success is universally optimal among all accessible prediction strategies, modulo a small short-run loss. The proposed justification of meta-induction is mathematically analytical. It implies, however, an a posteriori justification of object-induction based on the experiences in our world. In the final section I draw conclusions about the significance of meta-induction for the social spread of knowledge and the cultural evolution of cognition, and I relate my results to other simulation results which utilize meta-inductive learning mechanisms.
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Nelson, John O. „Induction: A Non-Sceptical Humean Solution“. Philosophy 67, Nr. 261 (Juli 1992): 307–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100040432.
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Pre-analytically at least some of our inductions seem to be possessed of rational justification. This comment would apply, for instance, to my present induction, ‘If that climber high on the Flatirons falls he will be killed,’ not to mention such more momentous inductions as, ‘If a full-scale nuclear war breaks out there will be greater destruction than in World War II.’ Notoriously, however, a few Humean reflections seem to strip even the most plausible of our inductions of all possible rational justification, leaving them mere bare psychological faits accomplis: in effect, section V of the Enquiry's ‘Sceptical Solution of these Doubts.’
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Brueckner, Anthony. „Bonjour’s a Priori Justification of Induction“. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82, Nr. 1 (März 2001): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0114.00115.
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Campbell, Scott, und James Franklin. „Randomness and the Justification of Induction“. Synthese 138, Nr. 1 (Januar 2004): 79–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/b:synt.0000012206.01154.c7.
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CARGILE, JAMES. „The Problem of Induction“. Philosophy 73, Nr. 2 (April 1998): 247–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819198000205.
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No one doubts that philosophers have discussed at length ‘the problem of induction’, but it would also be generally recognized that there would be disagreement as to precisely what that problem is. Rather than tackle the formulation problem, I will borrow from a popular text:Our existence as well as science itself is based on the principle of induction that tells us to reason from past frequencies to future likelihoods, from the limited known of the past and present to the unknown of the past, present, and future ... But though inductive probability is psychologically inescapable, we have trouble providing a rational justification for it.We might say, then, that there is such a practice as induction, and a problem associated with it is that of justifying engaging in it. We engage in reasoning from things we know about the past and present to conclusions about the past, present and future. We can't resist doing this but we have trouble finding a rational justification for doing so. This problem suggests a generalization. We engage in reasoning, reaching new conclusions. It would be hard to resist engaging in this practice. How do we provide a rational justification for it?
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Johansson, Lars-Göran. „Induction and Epistemological Naturalism“. Philosophies 3, Nr. 4 (18.10.2018): 31. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/philosophies3040031.
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Epistemological naturalists reject the demand for a priori justification of empirical knowledge; no such thing is possible. Observation reports, being the foundation of empirical knowledge, are neither justified by other sentences, nor certain; but they may be agreed upon as starting points for inductive reasoning and they function as implicit definitions of predicates used. Making inductive generalisations from observations is a basic habit among humans. We do that without justification, but we have strong intuitions that some inductive generalisations will fail, while for some other we have better hopes. Why? This is the induction problem according to Goodman. He suggested that some predicates are projectible when becoming entrenched in language. This is a step forward, but not entirely correct. Inductions result in universally generalised conditionals and these contain two predicates, one in the antecedent, one in the consequent. Counterexamples to preliminary inductive generalisations can be dismissed by refining the criteria of application for these predicates. This process can be repeated until the criteria for application of the predicate in the antecedent includes the criteria for the predicate in the consequent, in which case no further counterexample is possible. If that is the case we have arrived at a law. Such laws are implicit definitions of theoretical predicates. An accidental generalisation has not this feature, its predicates are unrelated. Laws are said to be necessary, which may be interpreted as ‘“Laws” are necessarily true’. ‘Necessarily true’ is thus a semantic predicate, not a modal operator. In addition, laws, being definitions, are necessarily true in the sense of being necessary assumptions for further use of the predicates implicitly defined by such laws. Induction, when used in science, is thus our way of inventing useful scientific predicates; it is a heuristic, not an inference principle.
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Ernst, Gerhard. „Justifying the justification of induction of Salmon“. Enrahonar. Quaderns de filosofia 37 (07.07.2005): 77. http://dx.doi.org/10.5565/rev/enrahonar.353.
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Huber, Franz. „On the justification of deduction and induction“. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 7, Nr. 3 (08.06.2017): 507–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13194-017-0177-1.
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Сепетий, Дмитро Петрович. „Karl Popper’s Solution to the Problem of Induction and the Non-Justificationist Conception of Rationality“. Актуальні проблеми духовності, Nr. 22 (21.11.2021): 70–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.31812/apd.v0i22.4447.
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The article provides a detailed account and elucidation of Karl Popper’s solution to Hume’s problem of induction. It is pointed out that the solution has two major aspects. The first, explicitly described by Popper as his solution to the problem of induction, is the replacement of the inductivist account of the development of empirical knowledge, according to which cognition begins with observations of particular events and proceeds through inductive inferences to certainly true or highly probable theories-generalisations, with the hypothetico-deductivist account, according to which cognition begins with a problem and proceeds through conjecturing its possible solutions (advancing hypotheses) and attempts to falsify them by reproducible results of observations/experiments. The second aspect has to do with the problem of justification of the hypothetico-deductivist account (which replaces Hume’s problem of the justification of induction). This problem is shown to be dealt with within Popper’s-Bartley’s general solution to the problem of justification, usually described as «non-justificationism», which admits the impossibility of absolute definitive justification (for any position) and replaces the search for such justification with the evaluation of relative advantages/disadvantages of competing approaches, which can provide us with reasons to prefer or tentatively accept one of them. The comparison is made between Popper’s hypotheticodeductivist account and Charles Pierce’s account based on abduction, or inference to the best explanation. It is shown that these accounts has similar logical structures, that with respect to empirical science they suggest mutual corrections and clarifications, and that inference to the best explanation can provide justification for the assumption of the existence of laws of nature, which is implicit in the hypothetico-deductivist account.
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Spelda, Petr, und Vit Stritecky. „Human Induction in Machine Learning“. ACM Computing Surveys 54, Nr. 3 (Juni 2021): 1–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3444691.
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As our epistemic ambitions grow, the common and scientific endeavours are becoming increasingly dependent on Machine Learning (ML). The field rests on a single experimental paradigm, which consists of splitting the available data into a training and testing set and using the latter to measure how well the trained ML model generalises to unseen samples. If the model reaches acceptable accuracy, then an a posteriori contract comes into effect between humans and the model, supposedly allowing its deployment to target environments. Yet the latter part of the contract depends on human inductive predictions or generalisations, which infer a uniformity between the trained ML model and the targets. The article asks how we justify the contract between human and machine learning. It is argued that the justification becomes a pressing issue when we use ML to reach “elsewhere” in space and time or deploy ML models in non-benign environments. The article argues that the only viable version of the contract can be based on optimality (instead of on reliability, which cannot be justified without circularity) and aligns this position with Schurz's optimality justification. It is shown that when dealing with inaccessible/unstable ground-truths (“elsewhere” and non-benign targets), the optimality justification undergoes a slight change, which should reflect critically on our epistemic ambitions. Therefore, the study of ML robustness should involve not only heuristics that lead to acceptable accuracies on testing sets. The justification of human inductive predictions or generalisations about the uniformity between ML models and targets should be included as well. Without it, the assumptions about inductive risk minimisation in ML are not addressed in full.
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White, Roger. „THE PROBLEM OF THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION“. Episteme 12, Nr. 2 (Juni 2015): 275–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.9.
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AbstractTo solve the problem of induction we had first better know what it is. Some ways of formulating the worry about induction are underwhelming as they depend on assumptions that don't survive much scrutiny. Perhaps the most disturbing argument for inductive skepticism appeals to the claim that we could not possibly be justified in taking our inductive methods to be reliable independently of our use of those methods. And the use of inductive methods cannot give us justification to suppose that they are reliable. I argue for a new way to escape the first horn of this dilemma.
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Kaminski, Marek Mikolaj. „Generalized Backward Induction: Justification for a Folk Algorithm“. Games 10, Nr. 3 (30.08.2019): 34. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g10030034.
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I introduce axiomatically infinite sequential games that extend Kuhn’s classical framework. Infinite games allow for (a) imperfect information, (b) an infinite horizon, and (c) infinite action sets. A generalized backward induction (GBI) procedure is defined for all such games over the roots of subgames. A strategy profile that survives backward pruning is called a backward induction solution (BIS). The main result of this paper finds that, similar to finite games of perfect information, the sets of BIS and subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) coincide for both pure strategies and for behavioral strategies that satisfy the conditions of finite support and finite crossing. Additionally, I discuss five examples of well-known games and political economy models that can be solved with GBI but not classic backward induction (BI). The contributions of this paper include (a) the axiomatization of a class of infinite games, (b) the extension of backward induction to infinite games, and (c) the proof that BIS and SPEs are identical for infinite games.
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Schurz, Gerhard. „The Impact of Meta-Induction: From Skepticism to Optimality“. Philosophies 6, Nr. 4 (26.11.2021): 95. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/philosophies6040095.
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In the first section, five major attempts to solve the problem of induction and their failures are discussed. In the second section, an account of meta-induction is introduced. It offers a novel solution to the problem of induction, based on mathematical theorems about the predictive optimality of attractivity-weighted meta-induction. In the third section, how the a priori justification of meta-induction provides a non-circular a posteriori justification of object-induction, based on its superior track record, is explained. In the fourth section, four important extensions and refinements of the method of meta-induction are presented. The final section, summarizes the major impacts of the program of meta-induction for epistemology, the philosophy of science and cognitive science.
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Sankey, Howard. „How Not to Know the Principle of Induction“. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 11, Nr. 3 (07.06.2021): 243–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10020.
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Abstract In The Problems of Philosophy, Bertrand Russell presents a justification of induction based on a principle he refers to as “the principle of induction.” Owing to the ambiguity of the notion of probability, the principle of induction may be interpreted in two different ways. If interpreted in terms of the subjective interpretation of probability, the principle of induction may be known a priori to be true. But it is unclear how this should give us any confidence in our use of induction, since induction is applied to the external world outside our minds. If the principle is interpreted in light of the objective interpretation of induction, it cannot be known to be true a priori, since it applies to frequencies that occur in the world outside the mind, and these cannot be known without recourse to experience. Russell’s principle of induction therefore fails to provide a satisfactory justification of induction.
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Tchaban, Vasyl. „Theoretical justification of faraday's experimental law“. Computational Problems of Electrical Engineering 13, Nr. 1 (05.12.2023): 31–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.23939/jcpee2023.01.031.
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So far, the fundamental laws of nature can only be obtained experimentally. Among them is Faraday's law of electromagnetic induction in mathema-tical representation as Maxwell's second law of the elec-tric field. Theoretically, it is impossible to obtain it on the basis of the laws of electrodynamics. Therefore, in the work, a bold attempt is made to theoretically obtain its analogue in the gravitational field, and then, on the basis of electromechanical analogies, to return to the electric field. What has been successfully done. But before that, there was a need to mathematically rehabili-tate the electromechanical analogies themselves, the reputation of which had suffered in the process of the reverse extension of the law from electricity to gravity under the name of gravito(electro)magnetism. Such immersion in the world of two disciplines - electricity and mechanics − is fundamental for a deeper understanding of physical processes, and at the same time for their quantitative detection.
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Sterkenburg, Tom F. „The Metainductive Justification of Induction: The Pool of Strategies“. Philosophy of Science 86, Nr. 5 (Dezember 2019): 981–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/705526.
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Bo, Chen. „Justification of Induction: Russell and Jin Yuelin. A Comparative Study“. History and Philosophy of Logic 33, Nr. 4 (November 2012): 353–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2012.680703.
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Kanareykin, Aleksandr. „Theoretical justification of the induction heating method for strength research“. E3S Web of Conferences 431 (2023): 02024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202343102024.
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The paper proposes a theoretical justification of the test method for thermal strength, similar to the method of radiation heating. The use of the induction heating method itself provides for the ability to control the heating temperature with good accuracy, which makes it possible to heat the part evenly and quickly to the desired temperature due to overheating of the product, and also with the chosen method it is possible to completely eliminate the appearance of smoke, oil pollution and strong odours. In this case, external heating of samples of electrically conductive materials is carried out by high-frequency currents, which significantly expands the possibilities of obtaining preliminary experimental results and simplifies the experimental technique.
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Beisbart, Claus. „Lässt sich die Induktion doch rechtfertigen? Eine kritische Diskussion von neuen Ansätzen zum Induktionsproblem“. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 76, Nr. 3 (15.09.2022): 358–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.3196/004433022835885609.
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This paper discusses recent attempts to solve the problem of induction. Two broad strategies to escape Hume's fork can be distinguished. The first tries to localize the justification of specific inductions in uncontroversial empirical knowledge, e.g.mundane scientific knowledge (J. D. Norton) or perception (M. Lange). I argue that related attempts to (dis)solve the problem fail. The second strategy tries to put forward an argument in favor of induction. As a discussion of work by R. White shows, this argument can barely prove that induction is reliable or at least not unreliable. But D. Steel, F. Huber and G. Schurz could show that enumerative induction is necessary and sufficient for a certain epistemic goal or optimal in a certain sense. These proofs, however, only solve the problem of induction if the goal or a certain standard has priority over the avoidance of error. This suggests that the difficulties to justify induction do not so much derive from Hume's fork, but rather from a plurality of sensible epistemic goals that can conflict with each other.
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Schurz, Gerhard. „META-INDUCTION IN EPISTEMIC NETWORKS AND THE SOCIAL SPREAD OF KNOWLEDGE“. Episteme 9, Nr. 2 (Juni 2012): 151–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2012.6.
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AbstractIndicators of the reliability of informants are essential for social learning in a society that is initially dominated by ignorance or superstition. Such reliability indicators should be based on meta-induction over records of truth-success. This is the major claim of this paper, and it is supported in two steps. (1) One needs a non-circular justification of the method of meta-induction, as compared to other (non-inductive) learning methods. An approach to this problem (a variant of Hume's problem) has been developed in earlier papers and is reported in section 2. It is based on the predictive optimality of meta-inductive learning, under the assumption that objective success records are globally available. (2) The rest of the paper develops an extension of this approach, so-called local meta-induction. Here individuals can access only success records of individuals in their immediate epistemic neighborhood. It is shown that local meta-inductive learning can spread reliable information over the entire population, and has clear advantages compared to success-independent social learning methods such as peer-imitation and authority-imitation.
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Kenneth R. Merrill. „Hume's Problem: Induction and the Justification of Belief (review)“. Hume Studies 29, Nr. 1 (2003): 155–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hms.2011.0145.
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Backmann, Marius. „Varieties of Justification—How (Not) to Solve the Problem of Induction“. Acta Analytica 34, Nr. 2 (08.11.2018): 235–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12136-018-0371-6.
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Storms, Sven. „The Buridan-Volpin Derivation System; Properties and Justification“. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 28, Nr. 4 (Dezember 2022): 533–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/bsl.2022.35.
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AbstractLogic is traditionally considered to be a purely syntactic discipline, at least in principle. However, prof. David Isles has shown that this ideal is not yet met in traditional logic. Semantic residue is present in the assumption that the domain of a variable should be fixed in advance of a derivation, and also in the notion that a numerical notation must refer to a number rather than be considered a mathematical object in and of itself. Based on his work, the central question of this thesis is what kind of logic, if any, results from removing this semantic residue from traditional logic.We differ from traditional logic in two significant ways. The first is that the assumption that a numerical notation must refer to a number is denied. Numerical notations are considered as mathematical objects in their own right, related to each other by means of rewrite rules. The traditional notion of reference is then replaced by the notion of reduction (by means of the rewrite rules) to a normal form. Two numerical notations that reduce to the same normal form would traditionally be considered identical, as they would refer to the same number, and hence they would be interchangeable salva veritate. In the new system, called Buridan-Volpin (BV), the numerical notations themselves are the elements of the domains of variables, and two numerical notations that reduce to the same normal form need not be interchangeable salva veritate, except when they are syntactically identical (i.e., have the same Gödel number).The second is that we do away with the assumption that the domains of variables need to be fixed in advance of a derivation. Instead we focus on what is needed to guarantee preservation of truth in every step of a derivation. These conditions on the domains of the variables, accumulated in the course of a derivation, are combined in a reference grammar. Whereas traditionally a derivation is considered valid when the conclusion follows from the premisses by way of the derivation rules (and possibly axioms), in the BV system a derivation must meet the extra condition that no inconsistency occurs within the reference grammar. For if the reference grammar were to give rise to inconsistency (i.e., it would be impossible to assign domains to all the variables without breaking at least one of the conditions placed on them in the reference grammar), there is no longer a guarantee that truth has been preserved in every step of the derivation, and hence the truth of the conclusion is not guaranteed by the derivation.In Chapter 2 the BV system is introduced in some formal detail. Chapter 3 gives some examples of derivations, notably totality of addition, multiplication and exponentiation, as well as a lemma needed for the proof of Euclid’s Theorem. These examples, taken from prof. Isles’ First-Order Reasoning and Primitive Recursive Natural Number Notations, show that there is a real proof-theoretical difference between traditional logic and the BV system. Here we also find the first major point of departure between myself and prof. Isles, centered on the notion of inheritance of conditions in the reference grammar by way of lemmata. These different points of view are best illustrated in the sections on the totality of exponentiation and on Euclid’s Lemma: prof. Isles maintains that the proof of totality of exponentiation is not BV valid, while I maintain that it is. But I do agree with him that the traditional proof of Euclid’s Lemma is not BV valid. Chapter 6 also expands the arguments for my choice in this matter.Now that it has been shown that there is a difference between traditional logic and BV, the properties of BV need to be examined. In Chapter 4 we give a proof of Cut-elimination for BV minus induction and the subformula property for BV, which allows us to prove the consistency of BV minus induction. We also expand on the reasons for excluding induction. In Chapter 5 we consider in detail the proof of a finite analog to the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem given by prof. Isles in his article with the same title. He proves that under certain conditions it is always possible, given the existence of a (possibly uncountable) model for a derivation, to give a finite model for this derivation. The system he considers deviates from BV as considered in this thesis in two significant ways: it does not contain the induction rule and the domains contain numbers instead of numerical notations. We then go on to show that it is possible to extend the result to include induction, in the sense that the existence of a possibly uncountable model for a derivation guarantees the existence of a model that is at most countable. We also consider the complications that arise from taking numerical expressions instead of numbers as the elements of domains.Finally, in Chapter 6 we consider the philosophical consequences of the BV system, informed by the formal results from the previous chapters. In particular we discuss the relation between reduction and reference, the status of reference grammars, the notion of induction and its function within BV, and some brief considerations on the consequences of the BV system for the discussion regarding nominalism and realism with regard to mathematical objects. The object of the chapter is twofold. On the one hand applying the formal results to philosophical questions, on the other hand arguing that BV is not just a theoretically acceptable alternative to traditional logic, but is in fact deserving of further development and research into its properties. The latter will probably appeal most to those of a nominalist and/or finitist bent.Abstract prepared by Harrie de Swart and Sven Storms.E-mail:sven.storms@tilburguniversity.eduURL:https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/files/61701294/Storms_The_Buridan_Volpin_04_05_2022.pdf
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Vázquez Gutiérrez, Ricardo. „Una posible respuesta de Ch. S. Peirce al problema tradicional de la inducción“. Theoría. Revista del Colegio de Filosofía 34 (01.06.2018): 193–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/ffyl.16656415p.2018.0.819.
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Ch. S. Peirce recognizes induction as one of the three moments of the scientific method. This means that he thought that the induction was, in a way, justified. In this paper I intend to review what Peirce’s response might be to the traditional problem of induction, namely, the problem of justifying a general principle of inductive inferences. This principle is traditionally characterized as the Principle of uniformity of nature (PU). Particularly, then, I am interested in evaluating Peirce’s opinion regarding the justification of a PU version, namely, the Principle of regularity of nature (PR). The work is composed of three sections, the first will present a version of the argument that gives rise to the traditional problem of induction; in the second, a reconstruction of the characterization of Peirce’s PRwill be offered; and in the third, it will be reviewed in which way for Peirce the PR could be justified—which would seem to solve Hume’s problem; finally, in the fourth section, as a conclusion, a brief evaluation of this possible answer of Peirce to Hume’s problem will be offered.
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Ribeiro, Gustavo, Marcilde Sabadin, Marilha Naccari und Thuana Raimondi. „Hume's criticisms of induction and Peirce's semiotic epistemology: the value of pluralistic approaches for organizational knowledge“. Concilium 23, Nr. 21 (29.11.2023): 364–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.53660/clm-2451-23s46.
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This article proposes a comparative analysis between two fundamental philosophical theories that contribute to the construction of knowledge: David Hume's Critique of Induction and Charles Sanders Peirce's Cooperation of Truth. We will examine how these two approaches address the process of knowledge acquisition and reasoning. While Hume questions the validity of induction, Peirce develops a semiotic epistemology based on sign mediation. The analysis demonstrates that both highlight the role of inference in knowledge acquisition, though there are differences regarding the reliability of inductive reasoning. Furthermore, while Hume emphasizes the problem of justification, Peirce focuses on the cooperative pursuit of truth. By exploring these theories, we aim to discuss how they contribute to our understanding of the process through which we acquire and justify knowledge, also within an organizational context.
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Lee, Byeong D. „A Constructivist Solution to the Problem of Induction“. Dialogue 50, Nr. 1 (März 2011): 95–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217311000138.
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ABSTRACT: Ever since Hume raised the problem of induction, many philosophers have tried to solve this problem; however, there still is no solution that has won wide acceptance among philosophers. According to Wilfrid Sellars, the reason is mainly that these philosophers have tried to justify induction by theoretical reasoning rather than by practical reasoning. In this paper I offer a sort of Sellarsian proposal. On the basis of the instrumental principle and the constructivist view of the concept of epistemic justification, I argue that it is reasonable to accept induction.
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Ladyman, James, und Stuart Presnell. „Identity in Homotopy Type Theory, Part I: The Justification of Path Induction“. Philosophia Mathematica 23, Nr. 3 (01.06.2015): 386–406. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkv014.
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Johansson, Lars-Göran. „Induction, Experimentation and Causation in the Social Sciences“. Philosophies 6, Nr. 4 (16.12.2021): 105. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/philosophies6040105.
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Inductive thinking is a universal human habit; we generalise from our experiences the best we can. The induction problem is to identify which observed regularities provide reasonable justification for inductive conclusions. In the natural sciences, we can often use strict laws in making successful inferences about unobserved states of affairs. In the social sciences, by contrast, we have no strict laws, only regularities which most often are conditioned on ceteris paribus clauses. This makes it much more difficult to make reliable inferences in the social sciences. In particular, we want knowledge about general causal relations in order to be able to determine what to do in order to achieve a certain state of affairs. Knowledge about causal relations that are also valid in the future requires experiments or so called ‘natural experiments’. Only knowledge derived from such experiences enable us to draw reasonably reliable inferences about how to act in order to achieve our goals.
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Crane, Mark, und Michael C. Newman. „Scientific method in environmental toxicology“. Environmental Reviews 4, Nr. 2 (01.04.1996): 112–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1139/a96-007.
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Environmental toxicologists, like all scientists, are presented with choices over the philosophical frameworks within which they work. However, most scientists do not receive formal training in scientific method and this may lead to inappropriate choices. The use of inductive and hypothetico-deductive approaches in science is described and the problems of each are discussed. Problems with induction include logical circularity and the selection of appropriate observations. Problems with hypothetico-deduction include generalizing from deductions, true predictions from false theories, the falsification of true theories, criteria for theory rejection, practical application in some sciences, and the potentially large number of unrefuted theories. Problems shared by both induction and hypothetico-deduction are the theory dependence of observations and the ahistorical nature of both of these explanations of scientific justification. The role of induction and hypothetico-deduction in environmental toxicology is discussed. Environmental toxicologists face two types of problems: (i) monitoring of the current fate and effect of a chemical, which is a historical and local problem that may often best be solved by an emphasis on hypothetico-deductive techniques; and (ii) prediction of the future fate and effects of chemicals, which usually has the objective of general applicability across time, species, and habitats, and may best be solved by an emphasis on inductive techniques. The systematic combination of both induction and hypothetico-deduction within a pluralistic framework is likely to yield the greatest progress in most areas of environmental toxicology.Key words: scientific method, induction, hypothetico-deduction, monitoring, prediction.
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WALSH, PATRICK. „CATEGORICAL HARMONY AND PATH INDUCTION“. Review of Symbolic Logic 10, Nr. 2 (14.03.2017): 301–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755020317000077.
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AbstractThis paper responds to recent work in the philosophy of Homotopy Type Theory by James Ladyman and Stuart Presnell. They consider one of the rules for identity, path induction, and justify it along ‘pre-mathematical’ lines. I give an alternate justification based on the philosophical framework of inferentialism. Accordingly, I construct a notion of harmony that allows the inferentialist to say when a connective or concept is meaning-bearing and this conception unifies most of the prominent conceptions of harmony through category theory. This categorical harmony is stated in terms of adjoints and says that any concept definable by iterated adjoints from general categorical operations is harmonious. Moreover, it has been shown that identity in a categorical setting is determined by an adjoint in the relevant way. Furthermore, path induction as a rule comes from this definition. Thus we arrive at an account of how path induction, as a rule of inference governing identity, can be justified on mathematically motivated grounds.
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Mackonis, Adolfas. „GERIAUSIO PAAIŠKINIMO IŠVEDIMAS. TARP DEDUKCIJOS, INDUKCIJOS IR ABDUKCIJOS“. Problemos 76 (01.01.2009): 150–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/problemos.2009.0.1936.
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Geriausio paaiškinimo išvedimas (GPI) išskiriamas kaip pagrindinė mokslo hipotezes ir teorijas atrandanti ir pagrindžianti samprotavimo forma. Straipsnyje tiriamas GPI ir jo santykis su pagrindinėmis samprotavimo rūšimis: dedukcija, indukcija ir abdukcija. GPI pasižymi abdukcijos samprotavimo mechanizmu, tačiau, priešingai nei abdukcija, GPI teikia ne galimą, bet esą teisingą išvadą. GPI yra induktyvus plačiąja prasme samprotavimas, nes jis nepatenkina dedukcijos taisyklių ir jo išvadai nepakanka duomenų. Straipsnyje teigiama, jog nepaisant pastarųjų GPI ypatumų, kurie rodo, kad GPI nėra ir negali būti deduktyviu samprotavimu, GPI reiškia pretenzijas į savo išvados absoliutų teisingumą, t. y. tvirtinamas kone deduktyvus GPI išvados pagrįstumas.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: geriausio paaiškinimo išvedimas, dedukcija, indukcija, abdukcija.Inference to the Best Explanation. Among Deduction, Induction and AbductionAdolfas Mackonis SummaryInference to the best explanation (IBE) is considered to be the main means of discovery and justification of scientific hypotheses and theories. The article investigates this inference and its relationship to the main kinds of inference: deduction, induction and abduction. IBE has an abductive inference mechanism, but, contrary to abduction, infers not a possible, but a true conclusion. IBE is an inductive inference, because it is underdetermined by the rules of deduction and by evidence. The article claims that despite its abductive and inductive features which demonstrate that it is not and cannot be deductive inference, IBE nevertheless makes pretense to an absolute truth of its inference, i.e. claims for an almost deductive validity.Keywords: inference to the best explanation, deduction, induction, abduction.px;">
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Korotaeva, T. V. „Psoriatic Arthritis: Pathogenetic Justification of Current Therapeutic Approaches“. Doctor.Ru 20, Nr. 7 (2021): 19–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.31550/1727-2378-2021-20-7-19-25.
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Objective of the Review: To analyse and summarise information on the pathogenesis of psoriatic arthritis (PsA); to discuss therapeutic targets, actual and long-term drug therapy strategies for this disease. Key Points. PsA pathogenesis is still a matter of argument; some of its mechanisms are still studied poorly. It is assumed that, in patients with genetic predisposition, the disease is triggered by the environmental factors, dysbiosis, infections, stress, that can cause and maintain aberrant activation of the innate and adaptive immune system. We found out that increased expression of such cytokines as IL-6, TNF-α and IL-17A causes synovitis; activates neoangiogenesis, bone resorption and erosion; leads to destruction and inflammation of cartilage as a result of induction of several molecular paths in synovial fibroblasts and macrophages, endothelial cells, osteoblasts, osteoclasts, cartilage cells, and immune cells. Taking into account available information on pathogenic mechanisms of PsA and psoriasis, we have developed several drugs targeting cells, cytokines or other mediators, playing a central role in the pathogenesis of the disease. Conclusion. Currently, treatment of psoriasis and PsA involves the use of traditional basic synthetic anti-inflammatory medicines, genetically engineered biological agents, and target oral synthetic medications, particularly phosphodeisterase-4 inhibitors and Janus kinase inhibitors, a majority of which can treat the entire range of skin and bone manifestations of the disease. Taking into account the varying PsA phenotype, comorbidities and a wide range of medicinal products that can be used by medical professionals, a majority of authors are of the opinion that it is necessary to improve the algorithms of individual approaches to the management of each patient. Keywords: psoriatic arthritis; immunopathogenesis; genetically engineered biological agents.
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Balandin, Ivan. „Justification for the Strategic Entrepreneurship Necessity in the Hockey Industry“. Bulletin of Kemerovo State University. Series: Political, Sociological and Economic sciences 2024, Nr. 1 (20.03.2024): 40–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.21603/2500-3372-2024-9-1-40-48.
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Strategic entrepreneurship is a relatively new type of entrepreneurial activity that aims to improve various aspects of the country’s socio-economic development, increase national wealth, ensure the national security of the economy in conditions of uncertainty and international pressure. The sports industry belongs to the complex objects of general welfare, since some of its aspects face a number of serious problems and crisis phenomena. Hockey requires significant investments from those who are engaged in it due to low level of state funding. Strategic entrepreneurship can improve all aspects of the hockey industry development, but it requires complex theoretical and applied measures. The purpose of the study is to substantiate the need to introduce strategic entrepreneurship into the hockey industry. The main objective is to systematize approaches to the development of strategic entrepreneurship and to substantiate its significance for the hockey development. The study uses general scientific methods, such as collection, processing and generalization of information, analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction. The main results of the study are theoretical. The author proposes recommendations that justify the need to implement strategic entrepreneurship in the sports industry as a whole, as well as in the hockey industry in particular.
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Solomin, Andrey V. „Combination Traction and Lateral Stabilisation System for Magnetic Levitation Transport“. Transportation systems and technology 3, Nr. 4 (15.12.2017): 107–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.17816/transsyst201734107-126.
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The problems of improvement of modern types of transport and creation of new ones are important and topical for the human society development. One of the most promising and environmentally-friendly modes of transport is the high-speed maglev transport, moving at speeds of approximately 500 km/h. Objective. Justification of linear induction motor, development and research of various constructions of this type of motors. Methods. Description of linear induction motor with longitudinal and transverse magnetic flux for combined traction and lateral stabilisation system of maglev transport, having increased lateral stabilisation forces. The mathematical modelling of magnetomotive force (MF) in the air gap of traction linear motor of this type has been conducted. To analyse the MF the assumption has been made about even distribution of magnetic induction in the air gap in transverse direction and its sinusoidal longitudinal direction, making it possible to develop new mathematical model of MF distribution in the air gap of linear induction motor with longitudinal and transverse magnetic flux Results. The developed mathematical model for calculation of MF on traction linear machine will enable increasing accuracy of traction and lateral stabilisation combined system forces for maglev transport. The same relates to mutual location of inductor to the secondary element. All this proves the successful ten-year commercial operation experience of magnetically suspended train carrying passengers from an airport to Shanghai, P.R. China. The values of traction and lateral stabilisation forces of linear induction motor with longitudinal and transverse magnetic flux is greatly influenced by the character of current distribution in the secondary element. The character itself is influenced by MF distribution in the air gap.
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Kostic, Miloje. „Analysis of induction motor efficiency class change at partial load“. Facta universitatis - series: Electronics and Energetics 23, Nr. 3 (2010): 333–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fuee1003333k.
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Motors with efficiency high values can became inefficient then standard motors when they are lightly loaded. The calculation procedure for the estimation of any part load efficiency when two load points are given is presented in paper. Efficiency dependence is expressed in the form of ? =?N ?k(1-?N), where is magnitude kP = f1(P0,P?N,P/PN), so that changes-deviations of efficiency values compared to rated value (?N) would be explicitly expressed. Based on those deviations, energy efficiency class changes of observed motors are directly identified with load change. Efficiency curve for several motors, with typical shapes, are considered, especially for loads P/PN = 0.50-1.00. These results are shown justification claim that efficiency values at 50% and 75% load shall be stated in the documentation. The users can then select the motor best suited for their application.
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Kılıç, Emrah, und Helmut Prodinger. „Asymmetric generalizations of the filbert matrix and variants“. Publications de l'Institut Math?matique (Belgrade) 95, Nr. 109 (2014): 267–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/pim1409267k.
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Four generalizations of the Filbert matrix are considered, with additional asymmetric parameter settings. Explicit formula are derived for the LU-decompositions, their inverses, and the inverse matrix. The approach is mainly to use the q-analysis and to leave the justification of the necessary identities to the q-version of Zeilberger?s algorithm for some of them, and for the rest of the necessary identities, to guess the relevant quantities and proving them later by induction.
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Velbaum, Katrin. „Maxwell, Nicholas (2017), Understanding Scientific Progress: Aim-Oriented Empiricism, St. Paul, MN: Paragon House, 232pp, ISBN: 978-1557789242“. Acta Baltica Historiae et Philosophiae Scientiarum 10, Nr. 2 (11.12.2022): 134–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.11590/abhps.2022.2.09.
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In his book Understanding Scientific Progress: Aim-Oriented Empiricism, Nicholas Maxwell intends to solve the problem of scientific progress. For that, he distinguishes between eight relevant issues: the problem of induction, the problem of underdetermination, the problem of verisimilitude, the problem of what it means for a theory to be unified, the question of what rationale we have to prefer unified theories, the problem of the scientific method, the problem of justification of the scientific method, and the problem of scientific discovery.
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Ivanov, E. A., L. Yu Malinina, N. N. Pushkarenko und A. V. Korotkov. „Accounting support for justification of hop production costs under government granting“. IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science 935, Nr. 1 (01.12.2021): 012034. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1755-1315/935/1/012034.
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Abstract As one of the leading segments of modern agriculture in the Russian Federation, the hop production is currently on the rise and upscales its activities every year. This is largely facilitated by strong financial government support. The purpose of this study is to examine the main theoretical and methodological aspects of organizing the appropriate production accounting to provide the common approaches to cost justification while filing of applications by hop farms for grants. To reveal the main scientific provisions, such techniques and methods as observation, induction and deduction, analysis and synthesis, observation, comparison and other were used. The findings of the study point to the fact that no updated regulatory framework for accounting of costs in hop farms is available, and the issue of the structure and content of the incurred cost information carrier has not been completely elaborated within the government grant issuing mechanism. A small number of international and Russian studies to determine the essential characteristics of hops as a biological asset has a negative impact on the arrangement of the accounting process. The article suggests the methodology for organizing cost accounting by the main agro-technological stages of hop management and cultivation.
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Michaelian, Kourken. „Testimony as a Natural Kind“. Episteme 5, Nr. 2 (Juni 2008): 180–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/e1742360008000312.
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ABSTRACTI argue, first, that testimony is likely a natural kind (where natural kinds are accurately described by the homoeostatic property cluster theory) and that if it is indeed a natural kind, it is likely necessarily reliable. I argue, second, that the view of testimony as a natural kind and as necessarily reliable grounds a novel, naturalist global reductionism about testimonial justification and that this new reductionism is immune to a powerful objection to orthodox Humean global reductionism, the objection from the too-narrow induction base.
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Szubka, Tadeusz. „Epistemologia pragmatyczna Adama Groblera“. Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia 17, Nr. 3 (15.11.2022): 25–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.19195/1895-8001.17.3.4.
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In his latest book, Adam Grobler gives an ingenious account of the main issues of contemporary epistemology, and puts forward an original sandwich theory of knowledge. The paper brings to light pragmatic threads of Grobler’s views, including his approach to scepticism, to the justification of induction, and to the notion of truth. It is suggested that the idea of relative truth, currently rigorously elaborated by John MacFarlane, would be more useful for his purposes than the notion of truth as superassertibility proposed by Crispin Wright.
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Fedin, Vladimir, Alexey Bortz, Yulia Ronzhina, Yevgeniy Dudkin und Ludmila Andreeva. „JUSTIFICATION OF RAIL FASTENING SELECTION FOR HEAVY HAUL RAILWAY OPERATION“. Bulletin of scientific research results, Nr. 1 (17.03.2018): 71–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.20295/2223-9987-2018-1-71-86.
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Objective: To improve track maintenance, which includes the reduction of damageability and life endurance improvement of ferroconcrete rail sleepers in maintenance, elimination of factors of increased dynamic impact on sub rail support, rail fastening design for heavy haul operation, which provides for traffic safety and improvement of economic performance indicators under increased mechanical loading conditions, taking into account severe weather conditions (freeze and thaw). Methods: Service damage analysis, laboratory and benchmark tests of individual track elements and in the assembled condition. Results: Operation rate and axial load increase demands improved durability of the applied track structure components under complete passenger transportation safety control. In this case economic efficiency of the applied components is a significant factor. The research results and technical solutions, having a common purpose – to improve track maintenance under the conditions of heavy haul operation were presented in the study. The measures on elimination of factors of increased dynamic impact on sub rail support were suggested in the study: 1) application of more reliable in operation bonded-bolted joints and metal-polymer bars instead of composite ones; 2) the use of higher quality rail induction welding. The improved rail fastening design was developed for rapid curves and heavy haul operation, leading to significant increase of service life of both metal parts, due to heat strengthening of the latter, and the fastening as a whole. Practical importance: The results of the conducted research make it possible to minimize the cases of destruction of ferroconcrete sleepers and solve the issues of qualitative improvement of rail fastening components.
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Frolova, N. A., Y. V. Tezikov und I. S. Lipatov. „Justification of the choice of diosmin vasoprotective as a preventive agent of pre-eclampsia“. Reproductive health of woman 1 (26.02.2021): 40–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.30841/2708-8731.1.2021.229710.
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In this study, the effectiveness of vasoprotective Diosmin for the prevention of pre-eclampsia in pregnant women of high-risk group with severe forms of placental insufficiency was evaluated. The choice of prophylactic agent in the clinical group is justified by close pathogenetic relationship between placental insufficiency and pre-eclampsia on the one hand, and proved fetoprotective action of Diosmin in case of placental insufficiency on the other hand. It is shown that a normalizing effect on the uterine-placental- fetal blood flow, the functional state of the endothelium of blood vessels, the production of growth factors, the induction of apoptosis of immunocompetent cells by trophoblasts, metabolism and angiogenesis in the placenta, contributes to clinically significant reduction in the frequency of implementation of fetoplacental complex pathology and pre-eclampsia.
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Ivanchenko, Olga. „LEGITIMACY OF LAW AS ITS JUSTIFICATION AND RECOGNITION“. Baltic Journal of Economic Studies 8, Nr. 4 (30.11.2022): 77–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.30525/2256-0742/2022-8-4-77-83.
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The subject of research is social relations in the field of legitimacy of positive law in the modern state. Methodology. The methodological basis of the study is the methods of induction and deduction, dialectical-materialistic method, method of analysis and synthesis, historical method, which allowed to objectively comprehend the content and essence of the issues under study. The purpose of the article is a theoretical and legal study of the legitimacy of law as its justification and recognition. The results of the study are: the legitimacy of law from the point of view of the theory of communicative rationality is investigated; the historical and theoretical process of development of interaction between subjects and the process of recognition, legitimation of norms in society as a social evolution is investigated; the development of the ideas of legitimacy and moral consciousness in the modern legal order is investigated; the tendencies of legitimization of positive law in the modern state on the basis of morality are determined; the peculiarities of ensuring the legitimacy of power through the legitimacy of law are highlighted. Conclusions. Law and modern morality stem from traditional relations, and they are interconnected. Legal norms are not just orders, they are fulfilled not only out of fear of coercion, but also out of respect for the law. However, for this, the legal order must be legitimate, enjoy the authority of citizens, and this is possible only if the positive law does not contradict the moral norms shared by a given society. The legitimacy of law lies, first of all, in the development of the legal basis of state and social life. But the meaning of the legitimacy of law in a society that calls itself democratic is seen not in the mere fact of existence and strict implementation of even legally perfect legislation, but in the extent to which it comprehensively embodies universally recognized humanistic goals, ideals, and values. Among them are the recognition of the people as the exclusive source of power and law, the rule of law, separation of powers, inadmissibility of usurpation and unlimited power, equality of all before the law and the court, inviolability of justice, etc. Of course, it is about fundamental human rights and freedoms with the legislative consolidation of the state's obligations to ensure and protect them. The legitimacy of law is the idea, requirement and system of real expression of law in the laws of the state, in lawmaking itself, in subordinate lawmaking with the steady recognition and perception by the population of the state.
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Sokuler, Zinaida A. „The Problem of Induction as a Problem of Religious and Moral Revival in the Teaching of F. Bacon’s Method“. Voprosy Filosofii, Nr. 1 (2022): 89–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/0042-8744-2022-1-89-99.
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Francis Bacon’s name is associated with the justification of the idea that science should be inductive and with the attempt to develop scientific induction. However, induction in any form suffers from serious difficulties. The paper refutes attempts to defend Bacon and his project by claiming that it is only about eliminative induction. It is shown that Bacon is an inductivist in the full sense of the word: he hopes to construct a method that makes any conjectures completely unnecessary. Nature itself, as if taking the researcher by the hand, will lead him to more and more general and profound statements. The Baconian version of scientific induction can be criticised from different perspectives. One may wonder why Bacon himself did not see the defects in his inductivist methodology. The following answer is suggested: for him these problems are not solved by logic, but by religious and moral regeneration. This is proved by referring to Bacon’s short text New Atlantis, famous for the project of a fundamentally new organisation of science presented here. However, it should be noted that from the first lines of New Atlantis the theme of Christianity clearly resounds. Turning to one of the central episodes of New Atlantis – the story of how the inhabitants of an island lost in the Pacific Ocean found the Gospels in 50 AD – shows, firstly, that Christianity was brought to the island by a miracle; secondly, it came in its original purity, not clouded by human interpretations. Bacon’s narrative should lead readers to believe that the islanders received Christianity at first hand, free from papism, theology and scholasticism. It is argued that Bacon’s idea is to take this fact into account in order to explain the success of the science of the island, which, of course, follows his scientific induction. The question of the Old Testament roots of the House of Solomon described by Bacon and the significance of the figure of the Jew named Joabin as mediator between the narrator and the House of Solomon is also considered.