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Thematische Bibliographien / Justification of induction

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Auswahl der wissenschaftlichen Literatur zum Thema „Justification of induction“

Autor: Grafiati

Veröffentlicht am 18. Mai 2024

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Zeitschriftenartikel zum Thema "Justification of induction"

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Sterkenburg, Tom F. „THE META-INDUCTIVE JUSTIFICATION OF INDUCTION“. Episteme 17, Nr. 4 (07.02.2019): 519–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.52.

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ABSTRACTI evaluate Schurz's proposed meta-inductive justification of induction, a refinement of Reichenbach's pragmatic justification that rests on results from the machine learning branch of prediction with expert advice.My conclusion is that the argument, suitably explicated, comes remarkably close to its grand aim: an actual justification of induction. This finding, however, is subject to two main qualifications, and still disregards one important challenge.The first qualification concerns the empirical success of induction. Even though, I argue, Schurz's argument does not need to spell out what inductive method actually consists in, it does need to postulate that there is something like the inductive or scientific prediction strategy that has so far been significantly more successful than alternative approaches. The second qualification concerns the difference between having a justification for inductive method and for sticking with induction for now. Schurz's argument can only provide the latter. Finally, the remaining challenge concerns the pool of alternative strategies, and the relevant notion of a meta-inductivist's optimality that features in the analytic step of Schurz's argument. Building on the work done here, I will argue in a follow-up paper that the argument needs a stronger dynamic notion of a meta-inductivist's optimality.

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Jacquette, Dale. „How (Not) to Justify Induction“. KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy 1, Nr. 24 (01.01.2011): 1–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/krt-2011-012402.

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Abstract A conceptual analysis of the problem of induction suggests that the difficulty of justifying probabilistic reasoning depends on a mistaken comparison between deductive and inductive inference. Inductive reasoning is accordingly thought to stand in need of special justification because it does not measure up to the standard of conditional absolute certainty guaranteed by deductive validity. When comparison is made, however, it appears that deductive reasoning is subject to a counterpart argument that is just as threatening to the justification of deductive as to inductive inference. Trying to explain induction in such a way that it satisfies a special justificatory requirement in contrast with deduction is therefore not the way to justify induction. An alternative approach is sought in a style of justification developed by Aristotle for the law of noncontradiction and by Kant for the conclusions of transcendental reasoning that with variations can be used to justify both deduction and induction. This strategy upholds a principle when the principle must be presupposed even to raise doubts about the principle's justification.

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Rosenkrantz, R. D. „The Justification of Induction“. Philosophy of Science 59, Nr. 4 (Dezember 1992): 527–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/289693.

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Chihara, Charles S. „Horwich's justification of induction“. Philosophical Studies 48, Nr. 1 (Juli 1985): 107–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00372411.

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Nedeljković, Mitar. „The problem of justifying inductive reasoning“. Zbornik radova Filozofskog fakulteta u Pristini 51, Nr. 2 (2021): 387–408. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/zrffp51-30620.

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In this paper, the author considers the classical strategies of defense from Hume's argument against induction, and assesses the extent to which they were found to be successful. Synthetic, linguistic, a priori, pragmatic, and inductive strategies of defending induction are considered, as well as the question of the extent to which the justification of induction is a problem for grounding scientific knowledge. A new argument is introduced for the a priori justification of induction, as well as a critique of the synthetic and inductive defenses of induction by Black and Jacquette.

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Nielsen, Michael. „A new justification of induction“. Metascience 29, Nr. 2 (22.04.2020): 209–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11016-020-00522-2.

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Schurz, Gerhard. „Meta-Induction and Social Epistemology: Computer Simulations of Prediction Games“. Episteme 6, Nr. 2 (Juni 2009): 200–220. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/e1742360009000641.

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ABSTRACTThe justification of induction is of central significance for cross-cultural social epistemology. Different ‘epistemological cultures’ do not only differ in their beliefs, but also in their belief-forming methods and evaluation standards. For an objective comparison of different methods and standards, one needs (meta-)induction over past successes. A notorious obstacle to the problem of justifying induction lies in the fact that the success of object-inductive prediction methods (i.e., methods applied at the level of events) can neither be shown to be universally reliable (Hume's insight) nor to be universally optimal. My proposal towards a solution of the problem of induction is meta-induction. The meta-inductivist applies the principle of induction to all competing prediction methods that are accessible to her. By means of mathematical analysis and computer simulations of prediction games I show that there exist meta-inductive prediction strategies whose success is universally optimal among all accessible prediction strategies, modulo a small short-run loss. The proposed justification of meta-induction is mathematically analytical. It implies, however, an a posteriori justification of object-induction based on the experiences in our world. In the final section I draw conclusions about the significance of meta-induction for the social spread of knowledge and the cultural evolution of cognition, and I relate my results to other simulation results which utilize meta-inductive learning mechanisms.

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Nelson, John O. „Induction: A Non-Sceptical Humean Solution“. Philosophy 67, Nr. 261 (Juli 1992): 307–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100040432.

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Pre-analytically at least some of our inductions seem to be possessed of rational justification. This comment would apply, for instance, to my present induction, ‘If that climber high on the Flatirons falls he will be killed,’ not to mention such more momentous inductions as, ‘If a full-scale nuclear war breaks out there will be greater destruction than in World War II.’ Notoriously, however, a few Humean reflections seem to strip even the most plausible of our inductions of all possible rational justification, leaving them mere bare psychological faits accomplis: in effect, section V of the Enquiry's ‘Sceptical Solution of these Doubts.’

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Brueckner, Anthony. „Bonjour’s a Priori Justification of Induction“. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82, Nr. 1 (März 2001): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0114.00115.

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Campbell, Scott, und James Franklin. „Randomness and the Justification of Induction“. Synthese 138, Nr. 1 (Januar 2004): 79–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/b:synt.0000012206.01154.c7.

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Dissertationen zum Thema "Justification of induction"

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Mukesh, Ragini. „The Problem of justification of induction“. Thesis, University of North Bengal, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/81.

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Kammer, Quentin. „Projection, justification et description dans l'oeuvre de Nelson Goodman“. Thesis, Bordeaux 3, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018BOR30034.

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Cette thèse de doctorat étudie la façon dont Nelson Goodman comprend la correction d’une projection, c’est-à-dire du passage d’un certain ensemble d’items à un ensemble plus large. Une projection est justifiée par sa conformité avec des règles générales de projections et ces règles sont justifiées par leur conformité avec des projections que nous tenons pour valides. Il suffit de décrire pour justifier : une règle est justifiée si elle peut compter comme une description des projections admises. Cette injonction à seulement décrire soulève un dilemme. Si une règle est un standard de la correction de ses cas d’application, comment peut-elle être justifiée par sa seule adéquation descriptive à l’égard de ses cas d’applications ? Si la règle n’est justifiée par rien d’autre, en quoi se distingue-t-elle d’une description de nos comportements réguliers ? Notre objet est de montrer comment Goodman pourrait surmonter ce dilemme
This PhD dissertation examines how Nelson Goodman understands rightness of projection, i.e. the transition from a set of items to a wider one. A projection is justified by its conformity to general rules of projection and rules are justified by their conformity to some projections we consider valid. To justify, all one needs to do is to describe: a rule is justified if it can count as a description of admitted projections. Yet this call for description faces a dilemma. If a rule is a standard for rightness of its applications, how could it be justified by its sole descriptive adequacy to those cases of application? If a rule is justified by nothing else, what could distinguish it from a mere description of our regular behaviors? Our object is to show how Goodman could resolve this dilemma

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Künstler, Raphaël. „Défense intégrative du réalisme scientifique contre l’argument pessimiste“. Thesis, Aix-Marseille, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014AIXM3020.

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Il est souvent arrivé que, par le passé, les scientifiques affirment l'existence d'objets inobservables dont ils rejettent aujourd'hui l'existence. Quelle leçon tirer de ce fait ? On est tenté d'en conclure que les méthodes qu'emploient les scientifiques pour connaître l'inobservable ne sont pas fiables, de sorte que cette connaissance serait située hors de leur portée. Cette thèse identifie et rejette deux présupposés qui conduisent à cette conclusion, à savoir que la méthode de l'hypothèse serait la seule manière de produire des connaissances des inobservables, et que cette méthode se déploierait de manière instantanée. Si, au contraire, les modalités concrètes de l'activité expérimentale et la dimension diachronique de la recherche théorique sont prises en compte, chacun de ces deux présupposés doit être rejeté comme abstrait. La connaissance des effondrements théoriques passés légitime alors la croyance en la vérité des théories actuelles
History of science presents us with numerous cases in which scientists conclude that an unobservable entity previously posited as real actually does not exist. What the lesson is to be drawn from this fact ? One is tempted to draw the conclusion that the methods employed by scientists to produce knowledge of unobservable objects are not reliable: gaining this knowledge would be beyond their reach. This thesis identifies and rejects two presuppositions that lead to this conclusion: that the method of hypothesis is the only way to produce knowledge of unobservables and that it can be employed in an instantaneous manner. On the contrary, if the concrete modalities of the experimental activity and the diachronical dimension of theoretical research are taken into account, each of these two presuppositions appear to be too abstract and should be rejected. Knowledge of past theoretical collapses then legitimates the belief in the truth of current scientific theories

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Bücher zum Thema "Justification of induction"

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Kawalec, Paweł. Structural reliabilism: Inductive logic as a theory of justification. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003.

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Induktion und Rechtfertigung. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1985.

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Read, Rupert J. Practices without foundations?: Sceptical readings of Wittgenstein and Goodman : an investigation into the description and justification of induction and meaning at the intersection of Kripke's 'Wittgenstein on rules and private language' and Goodman's 'Fact, fiction and forecast'. Ann Arbor, Mich: UMI, 1997.

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4

Howson, Colin. Hume's Problem: Induction and the Justification of Belief. Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2000.

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Hume's Problem: Induction and the Justification of Belief. Oxford University Press, USA, 2001.

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Howson, Colin. Hume's Problem: Induction and the Justification of Belief. Oxford University Press, USA, 2003.

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Will, Frederick L. Induction and Justification: An Investigation of Cartesian Procedure in the Philosophy of Knowledge. Cornell University Press, 2020.

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Johnsen, Bredo. Nelson Goodman. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190662776.003.0008.

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Goodman addressed the problem of induction twice. His first approach is famous, centers on his “new riddle of induction,” and is the locus classicus of modern reflective equilibrium theory. In it the focus is on inductive inferences and rules of inductive inference. In his second approach, the focus is instead on the conclusions of inductive inferences to explanations of the available data. Here reflective equilibrium theory is more fully developed. The author in this chapter argues that Goodman’s two accounts of inductive justification in terms of reflective equilibrium share a deep commonality.

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Franklin, James. Pre-history of Probability. Herausgegeben von Alan Hájek und Christopher Hitchcock. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199607617.013.3.

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The history of the evaluation of uncertain evidence before the quantification of probability in 1654 is a mass of examples relevant to current debates. They deal with matters that in general are as unquantified now as ever – the degree to which evidence supports theory, the strength and justification of inductive inferences, the weight of testimony, the combination of pieces of uncertain evidence, the price of risk, the philosophical nature of chance, and the problem of acting in case of doubt. Concepts similar to modern “proof beyond reasonable doubt” were developed especially in the legal theory of evidence. Moral theology discussed “probabilism”, the doctrine that one could follow a probable opinion in ethics even if the opposite was more probable. Philosophers understood the difficult problem of induction. Legal discussion of “aleatory contracts” such as insurance and games of chance developed the framework in which the quantification of probability eventually took place.

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Hoskin, Peter, Thankamma Ajithkumar und Vicky Goh, Hrsg. Imaging for Clinical Oncology. 2. Aufl. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/med/9780198818502.001.0001.

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Imaging is a critical component in the delivery of radiotherapy to patients with malignancy, and this text teaches the principles and practice of imaging specific to radiotherapy. Introductory chapters outline the basic principles of the available imaging modalities, including X-rays, CT, ultrasound, MRI, nuclear medicine, and PET. Site specific chapters then cover the main tumour sites, reviewing optimal imaging techniques for diagnosis, staging, radiotherapy planning, and follow-up for each site. The important areas of radiation protection, exposure justification, and risks are also covered, exploring issues such as balancing radiation exposure with long-term risks of radiation effects, such as second cancer induction. This second edition has been fully revised and updated to reflect current techniques, and includes two brand new chapters on imaging for radiotherapy treatment verification, and the role of specialist MRI techniques and functional imaging for radiotherapy planning.

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Buchteile zum Thema "Justification of induction"

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Truran, Peter. „More on Induction and Justification“. In Practical Applications of the Philosophy of Science, 55–60. Heidelberg: Springer International Publishing, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-00452-5_9.

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Carabelli, Anna M. „The Logical Foundations of Analogy and the Justification of Induction by Common Sense“. In On Keynes’s Method, 73–87. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-19414-8_5.

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Tokumaru, Natsuka. „Popper's Analysis of the Problems of Induction and Demarcation and Mises' Justification of the Theoretical Social Sciences“. In Rethinking Popper, 161–74. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9338-8_13.

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Rott, Benjamin. „Inductive and Deductive Justification of Knowledge“. In Freiburger Empirische Forschung in der Mathematikdidaktik, 121–45. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33539-7_6.

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Baker, Tawrin. „Christoph Scheiner’s The Eye, that is, The Foundation of Optics (1619): The Role of Contrived Experience at the Intersection of Psychology and Mathematics“. In Archimedes, 21–54. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-52954-2_2.

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AbstractAccounts of the development of experimental methods (including controls, broadly understood) in the seventeenth century have tended to overlook Aristotelians. Until recently the consensus was that, because of the art-nature distinction and a focus on final causes, Aristotelianism had significant issues incorporating experiments and contrived experiences into the natural sciences, including “middle” sciences such as optics.I argue that this picture relies, in part, on misreading Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics as a treatise on epistemology. In particular, book 2 chapter 19 has been seen as an account of how Aristotle justified grasping the principles of a science based on so-called “common sense” experience. Recent Aristotle scholars have challenged this, instead arguing that this notorious chapter on “Aristotelian induction” is, instead, just a general psychological description of how sensation leads to memory, from memory to experience, and from there to the grasping the universal first principles of either an art or a science. The epistemic justification for those principles, for any particular art or science, is rather more complex and domain-specific.What, then, did early modern Aristotelians in fact present as an account of how to actually grasp the first principles of any particular science? This contribution examines the Jesuit polymath Christoph Scheiner’s 1619 work, The Eye, that is, The Foundation of Optics, in which he argues for the revolutionary position that the retina, not the crystalline lens, is the seat of visual sensation. Scheiner relies on first-hand anatomy, contrived experiences, and experiments to establish at the axioms of optics, but I argue that his Aristotelianism presented no special obstacles to this. What Scheiner means by sensation, memory, and experience in this treatise are complex, and Scheiner’s implementation of control practices is rather sophisticated for the time. In this he was part of a general trend in the seventeenth century, most noticed in anti-Aristotelians such as Francis Bacon, in which we see scientific methodology being examined critically and experimental precepts, including control strategies, developed explicitly.

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Kawalec, Paweł. „Inductive Logic as a Structural Reliabilist Theory of Justification“. In Structural Reliabilism, 53–106. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0259-2_2.

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Zimmermann, Jörg, und Armin B. Cremers. „Foundations of Artificial Intelligence and Effective Universal Induction“. In Robotics, AI, and Humanity, 29–42. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54173-6_3.

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AbstractThe term Artificial Intelligence was coined in 1956. Since then, this new research area has gone through several cycles of fast progress and periods of apparent stagnation. Today, the field has broadened and deepened significantly, and developed a rich variety of theoretical approaches and frameworks on the one side, and increasingly impressive practical applications on the other side. While a thorough foundation for a general theory of cognitive agents is still missing, there is a line of development within AI research which aims at foundational justifications for the design of cognitive agents, enabling the derivation of theorems characterizing the possibilities and limitations of computational cognitive agents.

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Schurz, Gerhard. „Justification of Inductive Reasoning“. In Optimality Justifications, 146–74. Oxford University PressOxford, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198887546.003.0007.

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Abstract This chapter starts with an overview of proposed solutions to the problem of induction and their failures. Thereafter a centrepiece of the epistemological programme of this book is presented: the a priori justification of the optimality of meta-inductive prediction methods. A predecessor of this account was Reichenbach’s best alternative account of induction. Reichenbach’s account failed because it was developed for object-induction (induction applied to events), while the proposed account establishes optimality for meta-induction (induction applied at the level of methods). Based on recent discoveries in machine learning it is demonstrated that there exists a meta-inductive strategy, called attractivity-weighted meta-induction, that is predictively optimal in all possible worlds among all prediction methods accessible to the epistemic agent. Building on this result, a meta-inductive a posteriori justification of object-induction is given, based on the superior success record of inductive over non-inductive methods of prediction. Taken together these achievements provide a non-circular solution to Hume’s problem. A major philosophical merit of meta-induction is its openness to all kinds of possibilities. Because of this openness, meta-induction offers a novel solution to the epistemological problem of fundamental disagreement. Various further generalizations and applications of meta-induction are presented, including its generalization to discrete prediction games with arbitrary loss functions and with expanding pools of candidate methods, to the rational choice of actions within action games, to the spread of knowledge by meta-inductive forms of social learning and to the theory of cultural evolution.

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„Chapter Eight. Induction“. In Knowledge and Justification, 204–48. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9781400870738-009.

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„The justification of induction“. In In Defense of Pure Reason, 187–216. Cambridge University Press, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511625176.008.

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Konferenzberichte zum Thema "Justification of induction"

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Ruban, Nikolay, Alisher Askarov und Ekaterina Daminova. „Justification of the double fed induction generator model for estimation of the influence of wind power installations on the operation mode of power systems“. In INTERNATIONAL YOUTH SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE “HEAT AND MASS TRANSFER IN THE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM OF TECHNICAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL ENERGY EQUIPMENT” (HMTTSC 2019). AIP Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/1.5120687.

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Li, Yong, Joseph McManus und Howard Thompson. „Cost-Effective and Environmentally Sustainable Permanent Magnet Motor for Artificial Lift“. In SPE Annual Technical Conference and Exhibition. SPE, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.2118/210208-ms.

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Abstract The challenge of climate change and the imperative of moving to a low carbon economy has intensified and added to traditional objectives of affordable, safe, and clean energy in oil and gas production. Recycling parts from artificial lift equipment has been an industry-standard practice for decades. Equipment component reclaim has been a way to deliver high-quality, cost-effective products to our customers, especially in tough market times. It will be a critical best practice to reduce carbon emissions and enhance environmental sustainability. With customer cooperation, service companies develop procedures to re-use the most significant components of an Electrical Submersible Pump (ESP) system. These include the pump, cable, seal chamber section, and motor. The motor stator, bearings, and rotors are a high percentage of reclaimable parts in an ESP system. Reclaiming the induction motor (IM) rotors has been standard practice for decades. However, with the advent of permanent magnet motors (PMM) and the change in rotor construction, the current process does not apply. The driving force for PMM application is to improve energy efficiency and lower cradle to grave carbon emissions. We could not fully realize the vision of environmental sustainability and reduced carbon footprint if PMM rotors were not part of the reclaim process. Therefore, recycling the PMM rotors strengthens the justification for replacing IMs with PMMs, especially given that the value of magnetic material is highly variable and has doubled in the past year. The PMM rotors from a recovered motor may suffer from de-magnetization or be contaminated with production fluids or metal debris. Like IM rotors, the most effective method to remove contaminants from the PM rotor is to bake at high temperatures for a period. However, baking the PMM rotor magnets at elevated temperatures will be at least partially de-magnetized during the process and result in the PMM rotors no longer meeting performance specifications. This paper will present innovative technology and apparatus to re-magnetize the de-magnetized rotors for reclaiming. The research has developed a process where, without disassembling the rotor, the magnets in the rotor are re-magnetized in-situ by a specific apparatus. Testing has proven that PMMs assembled with reclaimed rotors have the same performance-rated power and torque as those built with new rotors. On the other hand, since magnets in PMMs account for more than 50% of total carbon emission of all reclaimable parts in PMMs, factoring in mining, manufacturing, logistics, and processing of magnets that generates toxic by-products to the environment, PMM rotor recycling contributes to corporate responsibility and our overall ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) rating. Furthermore, reclaiming PMM rotors can enable us to build PMM more cost-effectively, gain competitiveness in the market, and keep our PMM supply chain more stabilized.

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Machado, Luan Theodoro. „Interim relief: Historical evolution and controversial points in the 2015 code of civil procedure“. In III SEVEN INTERNATIONAL MULTIDISCIPLINARY CONGRESS. Seven Congress, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.56238/seveniiimulti2023-172.

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Introduction: This article proposes a brief historical analysis of the evolution of provisional protection in the Brazilian legal system, followed by a discussion of the application of the institute within the scope of the 2015 Code of Civil Procedure, specifically dealing with the problems involving the modalities of urgency and evidence. Objective: It is known that the 2015 Code of Civil Procedure brought a new look to the old precautionary guardianship, which in addition to being renamed, was adapted to the constitutional vision of the effectiveness of the process. However, the novelties presented, although virtuous, have brought to light some points of practical conflict, such as: fungibility, granting provisional relief ex officio, provisional relief on appeal, reversibility of the measure, partial anticipation and stabilization of the guardianship, which this article seeks to analyze. Justification: This research is relevant because it aims to bring to the center of the study the historical context of interim relief in order to understand its evolution and from there, interpret the problems that have arisen in the current procedural conjuncture. Methodology: In short, the research was carried out using a qualitative approach, the bibliographical review procedure and inductive-deductive logic, in order to carry out a theoretical survey of the problem presented and apply it to the content studied. Secondary sources were also used, especially publications in books, academic studies and scientific articles that cover the central question of the research. Conclusion and result: In the end, it can be concluded that provisional protection has been present in our legal system since the beginning of the codifications, although usually identified by other names. Hence its importance in the legal world. On the other hand, the study identified that interim relief is a complex institute that should always be studied for the sake of efficient judicial protection.

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Machado, Luan Theodoro. „The insulating and debiasing techniques and the objective impartiality of the judge in civil proceedings“. In III SEVEN INTERNATIONAL MULTIDISCIPLINARY CONGRESS. Seven Congress, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.56238/seveniiimulti2023-171.

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Introduction: Impartiality is linked to the balance of process and due process and can be classified under two biases: subjective and objective. The first reflects on the judge's relations with the parties. The second relates the magistrate to the object of the case. Currently, the only hypotheses of breach of impartiality are provided for, exhaustively, in Articles 144 and 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure and deal with impediment and suspicion. However, taxativity limits the hypotheses of bias, which is why it is proposed to use the techniques of debiasing and insulating. Objective: Initially, it is proposed the analysis of the "biases of cognition. From there it will be necessary to understand that debiasing combats biases through pedagogical instruments and insulating removes biased subjects from the judicial activity. In this sense, the question arises about how the techniques act to ensure the objective impartiality of the judge in the civil process? Justification: According to the report of the Justice Confidence Index in Brazil, from 2013-2017, it was found that trust in the Judiciary fell to 24% in 2017. Hence also the importance of the present study that aims to apply the techniques of debias in favor of the recovery of the credibility of the judiciary, which is intended from the stoning of the psychological profile of the judge. Methodology: In short, the research developed used a qualitative approach, the bibliographic review procedure and the inductive-deductive logic, in order to carry out a theoretical survey on the problem presented and apply it to the content studied. Secondary sources were also used, especially publications in books, academic studies and scientific articles. Conclusion and result: After completing the research, it is possible to infer that the techniques presented can be applied in the control of the judge's bias. This happens to the extent that the technique allows the expansion of the hypotheses of the CPC.

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