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1

Gordon, John-Stewart. „Justice or Equality?“ Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensethik 7, Nr. 2 (2006): 183–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/1439-880x-2006-2-183.

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2

Miller, David. „Equality and Justice“. Ratio 10, Nr. 3 (Dezember 1997): 222–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9329.00042.

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3

Luzárraga, Ramón. „Justice as Equality“. Political Theology 13, Nr. 6 (Januar 2012): 768–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1558/poth.v13i6.768.

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4

Quong, Jonathan. „Justice Beyond Equality“. Social Theory and Practice 36, Nr. 2 (2010): 315–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract201036215.

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5

Pallikkathayil, Japa. „Rescuing Justice and Equality“. Journal of Philosophy 108, Nr. 10 (2011): 583–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil20111081032.

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6

Meyer, Kirsten. „Relational Equality and Justice“. Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensethik 7, Nr. 2 (2006): 202–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/1439-880x-2006-2-202.

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7

Macleod, Alistair M. „Equality, Justice, and Democracy“. Social Philosophy Today 15 (2000): 413–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/socphiltoday2000159.

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8

Simmons, J. Aaron. „Luck, Justice, and Equality“. Southwest Philosophy Review 27, Nr. 2 (2011): 9–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview201127228.

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9

Harris, Ian. „Pluralism, justice and equality“. International Affairs 71, Nr. 4 (Oktober 1995): 848. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2625129.

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10

Wall, Steven. „RESCUING JUSTICE FROM EQUALITY“. Social Philosophy and Policy 29, Nr. 1 (14.12.2011): 180–212. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052511000136.

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AbstractIn the wake of G. A. Cohen's masterful critique of Rawls's work, this paper discusses Rawlsian justice in general and the difference principle in particular. It argues that Rawlsian arguments for the difference principle present a puzzle and that to respond adequately to the puzzle we must engage in rational reconstruction. After explaining the puzzle and considering and rejecting a number of responses to it, the paper begins its reconstructive project. It presents the case for viewing the difference principle as a maximizing prioritarian principle of justice, one that that contains no trace of commitment to equality as a distributive norm. The paper concludes by bringing out some of the implications of viewing Rawlsian justice in this light.
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11

Nickel, James W., David Miller und Michael Walzer. „Pluralism, Justice, and Equality.“ Philosophical Review 106, Nr. 1 (Januar 1997): 127. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2998346.

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12

Arneson, Richard J. „JUSTICE IS NOT EQUALITY“. Ratio 21, Nr. 4 (Dezember 2008): 371–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2008.00409.x.

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13

Alm, David. „Equality and Comparative Justice“. Inquiry 53, Nr. 4 (14.07.2010): 309–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2010.493366.

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14

KANE, JOHN. „Justice, Impartiality, and Equality“. Political Theory 24, Nr. 3 (August 1996): 375–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0090591796024003003.

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15

Axelsen, David V., Juliana Bidadanure und Tim Meijers. „Equality, responsibility, and justice“. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 22, Nr. 3 (15.02.2018): 237–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2018.1438774.

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16

Navin, Mark. „Rescuing Justice and Equality“. Journal of Moral Philosophy 7, Nr. 3 (2010): 411–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/174552410x511473.

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17

Fenner, Dee E. „Equality, equity, and justice“. American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology 223, Nr. 5 (November 2020): 619–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ajog.2020.09.042.

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18

MacLeod, Colin M. „Partial Equality“. Dialogue 37, Nr. 4 (1998): 775–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300009823.

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Despite the diversity and important disagreement which characterizes theorizing in political philosophy, most contemporary theories of justice yield remarkably similar verdicts on the moral adequacy of current distributions of wealth, income, and opportunity. By almost any standard of justice defended today, we live in a profoundly unjust world. It is obvious, for instance, that utilitarianism, the difference principle, equality of resources, and even modest-sounding principles of equality of opportunity all condemn the yawning gulf which separates the rich and the poor of the world. Even Nozick's recommendation that the difference principle be used as a rough principle for rectifying historical injustice indicates how little immediate practical difference there is between Rawls's theory and its supposed libertarian antithesis. All this suggests that there is a surprising theoretical consensus about the immediate practical demands of justice. In short, moving toward justice requires substantially reducing the dramatic inequalities which plague our world.
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19

Cuellar, Norma G. „Justice Is Equality . . . But Equality of What? (Aristotle)“. Journal of Transcultural Nursing 32, Nr. 2 (18.02.2021): 93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1043659620984291.

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20

Furendal, Markus. „Rescuing Justice from Indifference“. Social Theory and Practice 44, Nr. 4 (2018): 485–505. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract201891345.

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G. A. Cohen has argued that egalitarian justice proscribes equality-upsetting economic incentives, but that individuals nevertheless are required to make a sufficiently large productive contribution to society. This article argues, however, that Cohen’s claim that justice is insensitive to Pareto concerns and simply is equality, undermines such a duty. In fact, Cohen cannot say that justice prefers a distribution where everyone is equally well off to one where everyone is equally badly off. Individuals hence cannot have a duty of justice to use their talents at a more productive level. This indifference risks removing Cohen’s egalitarianism’s appeal as an alternative to the Rawlsian position it challenges. Several ways of avoiding this problem are proposed and evaluated. Ultimately, it is argued that such a duty to contribute must instead be based on a concern for both equality and human flourishing. The ethos Cohen defends must hence be made pluralist, and encourage a commitment to both principles.
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21

Pojman, Louis. „Equality and Desert“. Philosophy 72, Nr. 282 (Oktober 1997): 549–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100062410.

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Justice is a constant and perpetual will to give every man his due. The principles of law are these: to live virtuously, not to harm others, to give his due to everyone. Jurisprudence is the knowledge of divine and human things, the science of the just and the unjust. Law is the art of goodness and justice. By virtue of this [lawyers] may be called priests, for we cherish justice and profess knowledge or goodness and equity, separating right from wrong and legal from the illegal. (Ulpian in the Digest of the Roman book of law Corpus Juris, ca 200AD)
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22

Jasso, Guillermina. „(In)Equality and (In)Justice“. Civitas - Revista de Ciências Sociais 16, Nr. 2 (31.08.2016): 189. http://dx.doi.org/10.15448/1984-7289.2016.2.23118.

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23

Harsanyi, John C. „Rule Utilitarianism, Equality, and Justice“. Social Philosophy and Policy 2, Nr. 2 (1985): 115–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s026505250000323x.

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Utilitarianism and the Concept of Social UtilityIn this paper I propose to discuss the concepts of equality and justice from a rule utilitarian point of view, after some comments on the rule utilitarian point of view itself.Let me start with the standard definitions. Act utilitarianism is the theory that a morally right action is one that in the existing situation will produce the highest expected social utility. (I am using the adjective “expected” in the sense of mathematical expectation.) In contrast, rule utilitarianism is the theory that a morally right action is simply an action conforming to the correct moral rule applicable to the existing situation. The correct moral rule itself is that particular behavioral rule that would yield the highest expected social utility if it were followed by all morally motivated people in all similar situations.
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24

Buchanan, James M. „EQUALITY, HIERARCHY, AND GLOBAL JUSTICE“. Social Philosophy and Policy 23, Nr. 01 (07.01.2006): 255. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052506060110.

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25

Celentano, Denise. „Automation, Labour Justice, and Equality“. Ethics and Social Welfare 13, Nr. 1 (31.08.2018): 33–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17496535.2018.1512141.

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26

Morse, Nuala. „Museums, equality and social justice“. International Journal of Heritage Studies 23, Nr. 8 (09.11.2016): 782–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13527258.2016.1255911.

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27

BAXTER, BRIAN. „Equality in Liberty and Justice“. Philosophical Books 31, Nr. 3 (12.02.2009): 179–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.1990.tb00330.x.

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28

Orange, Jennifer A. „Museums, Equality and Social Justice“. Curator: The Museum Journal 55, Nr. 3 (Juli 2012): 373–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2151-6952.2012.00161.x.

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29

Grant, Otis B. „Social Justice Versus Social Equality“. Journal of Black Studies 33, Nr. 4 (März 2003): 490–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0021934702250031.

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30

Hervey, Tamara K. „Sex Equality as Substantive Justice“. Modern Law Review 62, Nr. 4 (Juli 1999): 614–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.00228.

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31

Holtug, Nils. „Equality, priority and global justice“. Journal of Global Ethics 5, Nr. 3 (Dezember 2009): 173–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17449620903403283.

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32

Mayer, Seth. „Equality, Democracy, and Transitional Justice“. Social Philosophy Today 35 (2019): 177–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/socphiltoday2019353.

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33

Maffettone, Pietro. „Reciprocity, Equality and International Justice“. Global Policy 5, Nr. 2 (22.10.2013): 181–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12027.

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34

Mladenović, Ivan. „PUBLIC EQUALITY, DEMOCRACY AND JUSTICE“. Anali Hrvatskog politiloškog društva 12, Nr. 1 (2016): 21–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.20901/an.12.02.

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35

Flew, Antony. „Equality, yes surely; but Justice?“ Philosophical Papers 15, Nr. 2-3 (November 1986): 197–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/05568648609506260.

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36

SALAGER‐MEYER, FRANÇOISE. „Academic Equality and Cooperative Justice“. TESOL Quarterly 43, Nr. 4 (Dezember 2009): 703–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/j.1545-7249.2009.tb00196.x.

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37

Macleod, Colin. „Justice, Educational Equality, and Sufficiency“. Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 36 (2010): 151–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2010.10717658.

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Among the novel objects that attracted my attention during my stay in the United States, nothing struck me more forcibly than the general equality of condition among the people. (de Tocqueville 1990, 7)There are significant inequalities in the lives of America's children, including inequalities in the education that these children receive. These educational inequalities include not only disparities in funding per pupil but also in class size, teacher qualification, and resources such as books, labs, libraries, computers, and curriculum, as well as the physical condition of the school and the safety of students within it. While not all schools attended by poor children are bad schools, and not all schools attended by well-off children are good schools, there are clear patterns. Poor children are more likely to attend crowded and poorly equipped schools with less qualified teachers than the children of more affluent families. They are less likely to have computers, books, and advanced placement academic courses. (Satz 2007, 623)
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38

Norman, Richard. „Equality, Priority and Social Justice“. Ratio 12, Nr. 2 (Juni 1999): 178–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9329.00086.

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39

King, Preston, und Stephanie Lawson. „Justice and equality: an introduction“. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 18, Nr. 1 (02.01.2015): 1–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2014.995497.

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40

Matravers, Matt, und Lukas Meyer. „Introduction: democracy, equality, and justice“. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 13, Nr. 1 (März 2010): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698230903326224.

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41

Jenkins, Kirsten E. H., und Darren McCauley. „Energy Security, Equality, and Justice“. Energy 83 (April 2015): 805–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2015.02.049.

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42

Huq, Aziz. „Equality's Understudies“. Michigan Law Review, Nr. 118.6 (2020): 1027. http://dx.doi.org/10.36644/mlr.118.6.equality.

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43

Cantillon, Sara, und Kathleen Lynch. „Affective Equality: Love Matters“. Hypatia 32, Nr. 1 (2017): 169–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12305.

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The nurturing that produces love, care, and solidarity constitutes a discrete social system of affective relations. Affective relations are not social derivatives, subordinate to economic, political, or cultural relations in matters of social justice. Rather, they are productive, materialist human relations that constitute people mentally, emotionally, physically, and socially. As love laboring is highly gendered, and is a form of work that is both inalienable and noncommodifiable, affective relations are therefore sites of political import for social justice. We argue that it is impossible to have gender justice without relational justice in loving and caring. Moreover, if love is to thrive as a valued social practice, public policies need to be directed by norms of love, care, and solidarity rather than norms of capital accumulation. To promote equality in the affective domains of loving and caring, we argue for a four‐dimensional rather than a three‐dimensional model of social justice as proposed by Nancy Fraser (2008). Such a model would align relational justice, especially in love laboring, with the equalization of resources, respect, and representation.
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44

Soleh, A. Khudori. „Mencermati Teori Keadilan Sosial John Rawls“. ULUL ALBAB Jurnal Studi Islam 5, Nr. 1 (26.12.2018): 175–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.18860/ua.v5i1.6152.

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Rawls' justice theory is based on three basic concepts: concept of property from John Locke, social contract from Rousseau, and imperative categories from Kant. This Rawls' justice conception itself emerges as a respond for social injustice in society as well as i nequitable behavior affected by the ethics of utilitarianism. Furthermore, according to Rawls, justice is fairness. The principles of justice are, (1) equal and maximum feasible liberty for all, (2) power and wealth to be distributed equally, except where inequalities; would work for the adage of all and where all would have equal opportunity to attain the higher position. The first principle supposes as permanent principle and, which cannot be interpreted. On the other hand, the second principle degrades two formulas: (a) everyone’s advantage (b) equally open. So forth, from formula (a) can be degraded two possibilities: principle of efficiency and principle of differentiation, whereas from formula (b) also can be degraded two possibilities: equality as careers open to talents and equality as equality of fair opportunity): Hencefonh, from possibility of (a) and (b) yielded four possibilities of justice interpretation: natural freedom, free equality, free aristocracy and the equality democratize.
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45

Tan, Kok-Chor. „Equality and Special Concern“. Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 36 (2010): 73–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2010.10717655.

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IntroductionThe various special concerns and commitments that individuals ordinarily have, for example towards family members, friends, and possibly compatriots, present an interesting challenge for justice. Justice, after all, is said to be blind and imposes demands on persons that ought to be impartial, at least in some respects, to personal ties and relationships. Yet individual special concerns are obviously of moral importance and are deeply valued by participants in these relationships. Thus any conception of justice to be plausible has to be able to accommodate to some extent the various types of valuable and valued special concern characteristic of ordinary social life. In particular, it is important to see how the impartial demands of justice can be maintained while accommodating special concern.
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46

Baker, Gale S. „Is Equality Enough?“ Hypatia 2, Nr. 1 (1987): 63–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1987.tb00852.x.

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I am concerned that, in our quest to end discrimination, we as feminists may be concentrating too much on equality and ignoring more basic issues of social justice. I argue that we must not lose sight of where we as a society are going in the effort to make sure we all get there together. The primary goal, after all, is not simply for women to get what men have, but justice for all.
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47

Ronzoni, M. „Rescuing Justice and Equality, by Gerard Allan Cohen. * Justice, Equality, and Constructivism: Essays on G. A. Cohen's 'Rescuing Justice and Equality', ed. Brian Feltham.“ Mind 122, Nr. 485 (01.01.2013): 267–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzt038.

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48

Thrasher, John, und Keith Hankins. „When Justice Demands Inequality“. Journal of Moral Philosophy 12, Nr. 2 (21.03.2015): 172–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/17455243-4681035.

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In Rescuing Justice and Equality G.A. Cohen argues that justice requires an uncompromising commitment to equality. Cohen also argues, however, that justice must be sensitive to other values, including a robust commitment to individual freedom and to the welfare of the community. We ask whether a commitment to these other values means that, despite Cohen’s commitment to equality, his view requires that we make room for inequality in the name of justice? We argue that even on Cohen’s version of egalitarianism equality, freedom, and welfare are not always compatible. Justice will require trade-offs between these values. Sometimes, equality will need to be sacrificed. This is a surprising result and to show it, we use two informal impossibility proofs drawn from examples in Rescuing Justice and Equality.
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49

Porter, Thomas. „Justice, Equality and Constructivism: Essays on G.A. Cohen's ‘Rescuing Justice and Equality’- Brian Feltham (ed.)“. Philosophical Quarterly 61, Nr. 243 (24.03.2011): 434–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.695_11.x.

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50

Bierschbach, Richard A. „Equality in Multi-door Criminal Justice“. New Criminal Law Review 23, Nr. 1 (2020): 60–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/nclr.2020.23.1.60.

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As contemporary criminal justice practices have grown more varied, the equality concerns they raise have grown more nuanced and complex. This essay explores the interplay between equality in criminal justice and the mix of punitive and non-punitive mechanisms that have proliferated in parallel in the criminal justice systems of many post-industrial societies in the last thirty years. Multi-door criminal justice does not fare well under the dominant conception of equality in American criminal law, which seeks to stamp out disparities in punishment and ensure roughly equal outcomes for roughly similar offenders. But we need not view that as fatal to multi-door criminal justice. Tension between a multi-door system and our reigning approach to equality might suggest reasons to question the latter more than it does the former. Alternative, more flexible, more process-oriented conceptions of equality might exist that could better accommodate a multi-door world while still protecting and advancing egalitarian norms and ideals. At the same time, shifting our perspective on equality will not eliminate all equality concerns that flow from multi-door criminal justice, and it likely will reveal new ones. The question then becomes not whether multi-door criminal justice is unequal in some absolute sense. The question is whether it is less unequal—or unequal in more palatable ways—than what we have now.
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