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Dissertationen zum Thema „Justice of equality“
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1
Roberts-Thomson, Simon Eric. „Slavery, Equality, and Justice“. Diss., The University of Arizona, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/194474.
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Slavery is an unjust institution. Indeed, slavery is often seen to be a paradigmatic case of injustice. Despite this, there is little agreement on how to best explain the injustice of slavery. In this dissertation I examine and reject three main explanations of the injustice of slavery: that slavery is unjust because slaves lack freedom, that slavery is unjust because slaves are alienated from their social world, and that slavery is unjust because slaves lack self-respect. Such explanations are unable to explain the injustice of slavery itself because they cannot identify all cases of slavery as unjust. Instead, I argue that slavery is unjust because it makes it impossible for slaves to realise both their interest in self-respect and their interest in being at home in the world. Slavery is not the only institution, however, that places people in this dilemma; any institution that treats some people as inferior to others will be unjust for the same reason, although not necessarily to the same extent. Thus the explanation of the injustice of slavery also provides us with an explanation of the importance of political equality.
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Ip, Ka-Wai. „Equality and global justice“. Thesis, University of Oxford, 2012. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:87b8c848-5cbb-4fbd-85dc-72351a5c91e6.
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This dissertation aims to defend an egalitarian conception of global distributive justice. Many hold that the scope of egalitarian justice should be defined by membership of a single political community but my dissertation will challenge this view. I begin by considering three distinctive arguments against the ideal of global equality. They maintain that egalitarian obligations of justice apply only to those people who are subject to the same sovereign authority which coerces them to abide by its rules; or to those who contribute to the preservation of each other’s autonomy through collectively sustaining a state; or to those who belong to the same nation. The first three chapters deal with these arguments respectively. Central to these arguments is the assumption that the domestic and the global contexts are different in some morally relevant way so egalitarian principles of justice apply to the former but not the latter. After rebutting these anti-egalitarian arguments I turn to the more constructive task of developing a form of global egalitarianism that is grounded in the value of equality as a normative ideal of how human relations should be conducted. I argue in Chapter 4 that relational equality—that is, standing in relations of equality to one another (rather than relations characterized by domination or exploitation)—is a demand of justice in the global context. This ideal of relational equality has distributive implications. In Chapter 5 I try to spell out these implications by defending a set of principles of global distributive justice that would follow from our commitment to global relational equality. In the sixth and final chapter, I discuss what responsibilities we have in relation to global injustice, how to distribute the burdens associated with these responsibilities, and whether they are excessively demanding on complying agents.
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Dekker, Teun. „Reconciling justice as equality and justice as desert“. Thesis, University of Oxford, 2006. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.431021.
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Schemmel, Christian. „Social justice as relational equality“. Thesis, University of Oxford, 2009. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.530072.
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5
Tsang, Sui-ming, und 曾瑞明. „Equality, participatory parity and global justice“. Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2011. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B46076499.
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Griffin, Christopher George. „Democratic collective decision making: Equality and justice“. Diss., The University of Arizona, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/284868.
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Democratic procedures allow us to decide as a society what to do. We intuitively embrace the ideal of a democratic state. But do we need democracy? Some argue that the social institutions we need to live well legitimately evolve through the spontaneous and decentralized activity of free individuals, thereby making democratic decisions unnecessary. But because unjust inequalities in power inevitably develop through the evolution of property regimes and market systems, there are strong moral reasons for the community to establish democratic procedures to monitor and rehabilitate these historically entrenched institutions. Executing this corrective function is a central reason why we do in fact need democracy. Yet there is considerable disagreement about democracy's precise justification beyond this functional rationale. John Stuart Mill and Richard Arneson both argue for the claim that the justification of popular rule is solely a matter of democracy's ability to generate morally correct outcomes. I reject these views. Democracy is valuable beyond being a means to some other morally desirable ends. Democracy is justified, I argue, because it is an intrinsically just procedure. The challenge is to understand what this means. Joshua Cohen suggests that democracy is intrinsically just because in the process of democratic deliberation reasonable citizens are given reasons to accept exercises of state power. I reject Cohen's deliberative model because it does not adequately appreciate the range of moral disagreement in contemporary democracies. Further, the standard of reasonableness at the heart of his justification for democracy is not consistent with the use of majority rule, an essential element of the democratic process. Instead, I argue that democracy is an intrinsically just procedure because it distributes political power over the decisions regarding the basic rules of social life equally, and thereby satisfies each individual's interest in the public affirmation of his or her basic social standing. Democracy matters because the public declaration of equal moral standing matters.
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Fourie, Carina. „Justice and the duties of social equality“. Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2007. http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/777/.
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The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that John Rawls’s conception of social justice should be revised to include duties that will require individuals to uphold social equality. Social equality, as I describe it, is characterised by the values of, at a minimum, respect-for-persons, civility and toleration. Informal social equality occurs when these values are upheld outside of a legal or official institutional context, such as through personal choice and within civil society. Rawls’s conception of justice, which focuses primarily on institutional justice, does not include fair personal choice as a requirement of justice. As choice, I will argue, affects the distribution of primary social goods such as the social basis of self-respect, if we want to describe a fair society, we should include a description of fair choice. If informal social equality is upheld, justice in choice will also be upheld. To correct the neglect of justice in choice, we can thus describe a fair society as one where (1) institutions would be fair and (2) individuals would fulfil duties of social equality. In the context of current debate on the role of individual behaviour in social justice, my thesis can be distinguished from what I refer to as the original ‘personal choice argument’. According to this argument, advocated by G. A. Cohen and Liam B. Murphy, for example, Rawls’s principles of justice for institutions should be applied to individuals so that fair personal choice becomes a requirement of distributive justice. Cohen and Murphy’s arguments are unconvincing, however, because (i) we could apply principles other than the institutional, for example, principles for individuals, to choice and (ii) we have good reason not to apply the institutional principles to choice, for example, because they do not properly address interferences with self-respect. Instead of applying the institutional principles of justice to individuals, I argue that Rawls’s principles for individuals should be revised according to the values of social equality: 1. the duty of mutual respect needs to be revised to include requirements for individuals and associations to comply with the demands of social equality, which are (i) respect-for-persons, (ii) civility and (iii) toleration; and 2. the duty of justice should be adapted to specify that individuals are required to help establish and to uphold informal (not merely formal) justice, thus to uphold justice in personal choice.
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Armstrong, Chris. „Complex equality and sexual inequality“. Thesis, University of Bristol, 2001. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.367936.
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Laing, Marie. „20th century women, redefining equality, justice and freedom“. Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1999. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape10/PQDD_0032/NQ46867.pdf.
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Gill, David Ronald. „Civic equality and social justice in Aristotle's "Politics"“. Diss., The University of Arizona, 1994. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/186763.
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In the Politics, Aristotle claims that a distinctive feature of civic relations is that citizens are "free and equal". Also in the Politics, Aristotle claims that, as a matter of social justice, political power should be unequally distributed because citizens differ in axia ("worth" or "merit"). The tensions that the conjunction of these two claims introduces for Aristotle's political thought, and the theoretical moves Aristotle makes to overcome these tensions, have (I believe) been insufficiently explored. The following study (1) examines Aristotle's explanation of each of the above claims, (2) considers the problem which their conjunction produces for Aristotle's general account of the nature of the political community, and (3) explains and evaluates Aristotle's efforts to accommodate an aristocratically-rooted principle of distributive justice to a basic equality of status among all citizens. In the end, I argue, these efforts are not completely successful; however, Aristotle's project of reconciliation is itself historically important, and is one of the keys to understanding Aristotle's departure from previous thinkers in political theory, most notably Plato.
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Hawkins, Michelle. „Global Equality: A Normative Defence with Practical Considerations“. Thesis, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/33184.
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In this thesis I aim to build a normative argument for equality of access to advantage at the global level, and motivate action conducive to the realization of this ideal.
The normative argument is presented over the course of the first two chapters. In Chapter One I ask, ‘How should we conceive of distributive equality?’ Following G.A. Cohen, I argue that equality is best conceived as equality of access to advantage. I interpret this to require equal access to both ‘worldly autonomy’—a term I invoke to describe a certain basic threshold level of autonomy—and subjective preference satisfaction.
In Chapter Two, I establish a justificatory basis for equality on a global scale. I argue that equality is justified at the global level on the basis of justice as reciprocity for the mutual provision of the global system of state-enforced borders, in which the participation of all people is equally necessary, and that makes possible a wide variety of institutional goods predominately enjoyed by people in rich developed countries.
In Chapter Three, I take up the second aim of the thesis: to motivate action conducive to the realization of this global distributive ideal. I engage the concern that global equality is a poor ideal, demanding too much change in the attitudes and lifestyles of the well-off to motivate them to pursue it. I aim to show that, even if most people are not motivated to pursue global equality, there are alternative grounds for immediately feasible global reforms and redistributions likely to have greater motivational purchase on people’s sensibilities. Alternative grounds for redistribution and reform include reparative justice, cooperative justice, respect for basic human rights, and self-interest. Making these redistributions and reforms would not only be desirable from the perspective of the alternative grounds that explain them, but will have the further happy result of bringing the world closer to the global distributive ideal of equality of access to advantage. Plausibly, it will bring the world sufficiently close to this ideal that people will be motivated to pursue it for its own sake.
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Quinn, Michael. „Justice and egalitarianism : formal and substantive equality in some recent theories of justice“. Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1988. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.314308.
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Savage, Deborah. „The paradox of democratic equality : democracy and transnational justice“. Thesis, University of Essex, 2011. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.589538.
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This thesis explores the relationship between democratic theory and transnational justice. These two theoretical frameworks are connected but in tension; this is relationship is explicated by 'the paradox of democratic equality': that democratic theory has normative logics of both inclusion, inclining it towards universalist conceptions of justice based on human equality, and exclusion, because clear demarcations of the boundaries of membership of democratic associations seem to be preconditions of understanding the demos as a self- determining collective moral agent. The claim is that the concept of human equality can be a conceptual bridge between normative democratic theory and the idea of transnational justice. To give an account of the proper relationship of democracy and transnational justice, this research explores this paradox. I examine the role of human equality as a foundation for political equality - thus crucial to the justification of democracy itself - and for relational accounts of democratic association. I then examine typical cosmopolitan accounts of universal obligations and conclude that cosmopolitanism makes a moral case democratic theory ought to find compelling but overlooks essential features of democratic association, including those that enable democracies to act as agents of justice in the way cosmopolitans assume they should. To resolve the paradox and develop a plausible theory of democratic transnational justice, I develop an account of democratic moral agency based on the concept of collective moral reactive attitudes. Moral reactive attitudes, I argue, can give us an understanding of human equality as an immanent quality in human relations; interpreted collectively, this gives a basis for understanding how universal moral equality can be incorporated in the self-understanding of the demos. I then propose a conception of democratic cosmopolitanism, understood as transnational fraternity, and based on a principle of a responsibility to uphold and further the capacity for collective self-determination of other demoi.
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Wilson, Angelia R. „The gay and lesbian agenda : justice, equality and freedom“. Thesis, University of York, 1994. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/9764/.
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Celentano, Denise. „Cooperating as Peers : Labor Justice between Distributive and Relational Equality“. Thesis, Paris, EHESS, 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019EHES0024.
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Le travail est sous-représenté dans les débats sur la justice sociale. La thèse contribue à combler cette lacune, en considérant le problème de la justice du travail avec une attention particulière aux inégalités du travail.Premièrement, la thèse montre que les théories de la justice ne sont que partiellement équipées pour considérer la justice du travail. La thèse analyse des modèles normatifs de plusieurs traditions : justice distributive, théorie critique, égalitarisme relationnel, perspectives normatives du travail. La thèse considère chaque modèle à la fois comme un interlocuteur critique et comme une ressource potentielle dans la conceptualisation de la justice du travail. On considère trois cas paradigmatiques d’inégalité du travail, évalués à travers un « test de justice contributive » : le « sale boulot », la division genrée du travail, et l’« hétéromation » technologique. L’analyse montre que sans une conception d'égalité, on n'a pas d’outils pour répondre à des formes contestables de division du travail. Si l’on veut éviter de défendre une perspective de « meaningful work pour quelques-uns », il faut que l’autonomie et la liberté s’accompagnent de considérations d’égalité.Deuxièmement, la thèse propose une perspective alternative centrée sur la norme de « parité contributive ». Selon cet idéal, les formes de travail injustes doivent être transformées lorsqu’elles empêchent aux individus de contribuer à la coopération sociale en tant que pairs, et non parce qu’elles ne se conforment pas un sens intrinsèque du travail ou une idée prédéfinie de nature humaine (pluralisme). De cette façon, cette conception de justice du travail prévient les conséquences paternalistes et le solipsisme moral de certaines théories du « meaningful work », tout en défendant la justice du travail. Globalement, cette norme contribue à recentrer le débat de problèmes concernant le sens intrinsèque du travail et la réalisation de soi, au problème de la juste coopération.Puisque les conditions de la justice du travail ne peuvent pas être satisfaites que par les principes de libre choix de l’occupation ou la redistribution, mais concernent aussi les relations sociales, les processus décisionnels, et la nature des tâches et des occupations, la thèse défend une conception multidimensionnelle de justice du travail. La parité contributive demande que pour que tous puissent contribuir à la coopération sociale en tant que pairs, au moins quatre dimensions de justice du travail doivent être satisfaites : économique-distributive (égale liberté du besoin matériel pour un réél libre choix de l’occupation, et juste accès au produit de son travail et de la richesse sociale) ; sociale-relationnelle (être traité.e.s comme égaux soit dans les interactions soit dans les structures du travail) ; politique-démocratique (prendre part aux décisions concernant son travail), et contributive (la qualité et la quantité du travail). La parité contributive est mieux réalisée quand ces dimensions de justice du travail sont réalisées conjointement.Le concept de parité contributive est une réinterprétation dans le contexte de la justice du travail de la norme de « parité participative » proposée par Nancy Fraser (2003). La thèse amende et développe autonomement certaines de ses intuitions, dans la direction d’une conception de justice du travail multidimensionnelle, égalitaire, déontologique, et pluraliste, alors qu’elle incorpore des intuitions de l’égalitarisme relationnel et de la justice distributive dans un cadre plus compréhensif. Globalement, au lieu d’offrir une véritable théorie de justice du travail, l’idéal de parité contributive se propose d’offrir un standard critique-normatif aidant à évaluer formes existantes de division du travail et stratégies de justice du travail en compétition, et donc à envisager des formes de travail alternativesDespite its relevance, work is underrepresented in debates about social justice. In this way, political philosophy remains distant from real people’s lives, and cannot address objectionable forms of work. The thesis contributes to fill in this gap, addressing the problem of labor justice with particular attention to labor inequalities.First, the thesis shows that the resources provided by most contemporary views of justice are only partly equipped to address problems of labor justice. Normative models belonging to various traditions are scrutinized: distributive justice, critical theory, relational egalitarianism, contemporary normative debates about work. The thesis considers each of these models both as a critical interlocutor and as a potential resource in the conceptualization of labor justice. Three paradigmatic cases of labor inequality are thus considered to assess these models through a “contributive justice test”: “dirty work”, the gendered division of labor, and technological heteromation. The analysis shows that without some conception of equality, we have no tools to address objectionable forms of division of labor. And in order to avoid a view of “meaningful work for the few”, concerns for autonomy and freedom are to be complemented with concerns for equality.Second, the thesis suggests an alternative perspective based on the norm of “contributive parity”. According to this ideal, unjust forms of work are to be changed when they prevent people from contributing to social cooperation as peers, not because they do not meet some inherent meaning of work or fail to fulfill some predefined idea of human nature (pluralism). This way, this conception of labor justice avoids the paternalistic consequences and moral solipsism of some theories of meaningful work, while still defending the need for justice at work. Overall, this norm contributes to shift the focus of the debate from problems of the inherent meaning of work and self-realization, to the problem of fair cooperation.Since requirements of labor justice cannot be met by free occupational choice or income redistribution alone, but relate also to social relationships, decision-making processes, and the nature of tasks and occupations, the thesis advocates a multidimensional conception of laborjustice. Contributive parity requires that in order for all to contribute to social cooperation as peers, at least four dimensions of labor justice should be satisfied: economic- distributive (equal freedom from material need for real free occupational choice, and fair access to the product of one’s labor as well as to social wealth), social-relational (being treated as equals both in labor interactions and in labor structures), political-democratic (taking part in decisions that concern one’s work), and contributive (the quality and quantity of one’s labor). Contributive parity isbest realized when these dimensions of labor justice are realized jointly: it is not sufficient that wage is fair, one should consider also workers’ status, voice and contributive justice (multidimensionality). This way, concerns for distributive justice are not merely dismissed, but rather integrated into a more comprehensive framework. The concept of contributive parity is a reinterpretation in the context of labor justice of the norm of “participatory parity” proposed by Nancy Fraser (2003). The thesis autonomously amends and develops some of her intuitions into thedirection of a multidimensional, egalitarian, deontological, and pluralist view of labor justice, while incorporating insights from relational egalitarianism and distributive justice into a more comprehensive framework. Overall, far from offering a fully-fledged theory of labor justice,the ideal of contributive parity is intended to provide a critical-normative standard that helps to assess existing forms of division of labor and competing strategies of labor justice, and therefore to envisage alternative, fair forms of work
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Proto, Pisani Andrea. „Brief notes on equality issues“. IUS ET VERITAS, 2017. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/122791.
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It is necessary put aside the idea that infinite economic development is the solution to terminate inequalities that exist in the world. Should consider a new model of society, which look for specify in the reality the value of justice, the hand of principles of equality and fraternity, where man is in a world of cooperation with others.Es necesario dejar de lado la idea de que el desarrollo económico infinito es la solución para dar fin a las desigualdades existentes en el mundo. Debe plantearse un nuevo modelo de sociedad, el cual busque concretar en la realidad el valor de la justicia, de la mano de los principios de igualdad y fraternidad, donde el hombre se encuentre en un mundo de cooperación con los demás.
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Tayshete, Neha. „Gandhian perspective on "work ethic" for substantive distributive justice/equality“. Doctoral thesis, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 2020. https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/315987/3/ulti.pdf.
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Mohandas Gandhi had an interesting conception called “work ethic”. It propounded that one ought to focus on the process of work rather than the result of the work. “Full effort is thus full victory” in Gandhi’s conception. This is because the result can be corrupted with self interest maximization of the productive sector of society. I translated this concept into the rigour of analytical philosophy with original thought experiments, Kantian contractarianism etc.I submitted that Gandhi reached a different conclusion despite unintentionally sharing the same methodology of western/analytical philosophers such as John Rawls, Gerald Cohen, T M Scanlon and others. I reiterate that the methodology pertained to Kantian contractarianism and intuitive ethics. Precisely, the different conclusion was that Gandhi espoused much lesser desert, incentives, social appraisal. (“Desert” is considered "deserving compensation of work or deserving the product of one's labour.) In contrast, Rawls, Cohen, Ronald Dworkin, Scanlon et al allowed comparatively more desert, incentives and social appraisal. Lesser desert, incentives, social appraisal for the productive individuals creates higher taxes for these privileged individuals and this benefits the least advantaged. This is individual ethic but it can be the groundwork or an emerging ethos for future institutional implementations i.e. higher taxes levied on the privileged.As an example, the relevance is that Gandhi’s “work ethic” submitted that luxury consumption is regrettable and one ought to conscientiously and personally struggle to reduce this without external or governmental coercion. Contrarily, Dworkin, Rawls, Scanlon, Cohen and others respect luxury consumption as personal pursuits, especially with Cohen's latest statements and Rawls' “rational plan” concept. There are several illustrations in the thesis to demonstrate the main contribution of the thesis i.e. Gandhi’s conception espoused much lesser desert, incentives, social appraisal compared to the research of Dworkin, Rawls, Scanlon, Cohen and others. It, additionally, in the seventh chapter, submitted that humility is vital because it can provide a response in a world saturated by undeserved suffering. Humility is connected to “work ethic”. Gandhi's definition of humility is novel. It is different from the existing definitions in political theory, different from Kellenberger’s and Cooper’s account on humility, for example. The juxtaposition of Gandhi’s and Dostoevsky’s oeuvre engenders a nuanced understanding of humility. Crucially, it has significant benefits in the field of distributive justice/solidarity. It addresses many of the challenges traditionally associated with humility. Ralph Ellison, drawing from his perspective as a Black American in segregation times, propounded that humility is susceptible to be used to further oppress the already oppressed. This thesis asserts that Gandhi’s earlier writings indeed embody the dangers delineated by Ellison. However, Gandhi’s later writings not only respond to this cogent argument but also enhances it. Both Ellison and Gandhi reinvent humility as the ability of the marginalised to perform service without self promotion while not being obsequious to those in power.Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished
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陳創輝 und Chong-fai Chan. „Liberty, equality and justice: a critique of Kai Nielsen's radical egalitarianism“. Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 1997. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B29812793.
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Lazenby, Hugh T. C. „A conception of equality of opportunity“. Thesis, University of Oxford, 2011. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:9aa71505-3263-429d-bbb7-8f5bd5e06625.
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This thesis defends a conception of equality of opportunity. It comes in two parts. The first part elaborates the conception. It begins by clarifying the concept of equality of opportunity, showing it to be made up of four basic elements: a distributive pattern, a set of subjects, an opportunity obstacle and a distributive object. The conception I build from these elements explains the value of the distributive pattern, equality, in terms of a concern for fairness, takes persons as its subject and takes well-being as its object. The conception presented is partial, rather than comprehensive, in that it does not include a detailed account of an opportunity obstacle. The conception of equality of opportunity that I present can also be characterised as a luck egalitarian principle. My aim in elaborating the conception is to show that it has intuitive appeal; it constitutes a pro tanto moral principle. The second part of the thesis examines the implications of luck egalitarianism in two contexts. It begins by examining the context of gifts, arguing that although luck egalitarianism is highly restrictive with respect to the freedom to give this only confirms that it is a merely pro tanto moral principle. It continues by examining the context of markets, arguing that luck egalitarianism makes intuitively correct judgments in several specified cases. My aim in applying luck egalitarianism is to show that its implications do not give us reason to reject its initial intuitive appeal. I examine luck egalitarianism generally, rather then the partial conception I elaborate, to allow for the possibility that my earlier arguments are wrong in some respect. Overall, I hope the arguments presented provide reasons to accept the conception presented as morally valuable.
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Chan, Chong-fai. „Liberty, equality and justice : a critique of Kai Nielsen's radical egalitarianism /“. Hong Kong : University of Hong Kong, 1997. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record.jsp?B18404194.
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Vrousalis, Nicholas. „Equality, Ownership, and Time : On the Content and Structure of Intergenerational Justice“. Thesis, University of Oxford, 2009. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.508663.
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Hübner, Dietmar. „Die Bilder der Gerechtigkeit : zur Metaphorik des Verteilens /“. Paderborn : Mentis, 2009. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=018615209&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.
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Eriksson, Viktor. „Cosmopolitanism as a Demand of Justice“. Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Filosofiska institutionen, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-356686.
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Campbell, Katharine M. „New Territories of Equality: Conceptualizations of Climate Justice in International Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations“. Ohio University / OhioLINK, 2013. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ohiou1366731277.
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Calvert, John Sinclair. „Luck egalitarianism and educational equality“. Thesis, University of Canterbury. School of Educational Studies and Leadership, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10092/10438.
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This thesis investigates whether luck egalitarianism can provide a cogent and coherent interpretation of educational equality. Historically, the belief that each child should receive an equally good education has exerted a strong influence on policy makers and thus on educational practice, and this despite the vagueness of the egalitarian formula. More recently however, the ideal has been undermined in practice by the rise of neoliberalism and in theory by a number of thinkers advocating other principles of educational justice. But it is vital to be clear about what each child is owed because of the profound effects of education on a person’s life prospects. The motivation for this work is therefore to determine whether educational equality can be rescued as a desirable and animating ideal of educational justice. In order to achieve this, I examine luck egalitarianism, a theory of distributive justice that has its origins in the work of John Rawls, but is now the major rival to his account of egalitarian justice. I probe at the fundamental moral intuitions underpinning luck egalitarianism and how it brings together the morally potent ideas of equality, luck and choice. I argue that these are of relevance for the education each child is owed and I propose a luck egalitarian conception of educational equality, argue that it is a cogent interpretation of egalitarian justice, and conclude that a luck egalitarian conception shows educational equality to be an ideal that is relevant, coherent and what morally matters most for justice in education.
I describe luck egalitarianism as resting on three basic moral beliefs: that distributive equality is a fundamental demand of justice; that luck undermines fair equality; and that a person’s genuine choices can sometimes, under certain background conditions, render some otherwise objectionable inequalities not unjust. I then examine whether these three beliefs are compatible with each other and what, if anything, links them. Next, I consider luck egalitarianism’s status as a theory of distributive justice and argue that far from this being a weakness, as Elizabeth Anderson (1999) has notably argued, it is a strength of the position. But to appreciate this it needs to be seen that luck egalitarianism makes no claim to being all of justice and that the equalisandum of equality is complex and egalitarianism is intrinsically pluralist in nature (with a particular understanding of what is meant by pluralist). I consider too whether it is a mistake to say that inequalities that are largely due to luck can really be thought of as unjust. Thomas Nagel (1997) has argued that it is merely misfortune, unless the result of deliberate actions or social structures for which someone is responsible. I reject that position and argue that no one has to be responsible for an inequality for it to be unjust.
Having interrogated luck egalitarianism and found it to be a sound account of egalitarian distributive justice, I turn to looking at whether it can illuminate our understanding of educational equality. Educational equality is often interpreted in terms of equality of educational opportunity. I look particularly at a conception of equality of educational opportunity, strongly influenced by Rawls, that has been thoughtfully and carefully articulated by Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift (2008). I find their conception powerful, but flawed, and argue that a luck egalitarian conception can account for the appeal of their conception, but is an advance on it. I end by looking at a specific question of educational justice to test the luck egalitarian conception – is there anything inegalitarian about ability grouping? I conclude that, while still needing to have its implications worked out in full, particularly as regards choice, a luck egalitarian conception provides a compelling account of educational equality and reasserts that equality matters for justice in education.
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Vandenbroucke, Frank. „Social justice and individual ethics in an open society : equality, responsibility, and incentives“. Thesis, University of Oxford, 1999. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.285437.
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Johansson, Stig Thomas. „Towards spherical justice : a critical theoretical defence of the idea of complex equality“. Thesis, University of Southampton, 2003. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.288463.
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Heleta, Savo. „The Darfur conflict from the perspective of the rebel justice and equality movement“. Thesis, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10948/970.
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In 2003, a conflict broke out in Darfur, Sudan’s western province, between the mainly “African” rebels and the government forces and their proxy “Arab” militias. It is estimated that about 200,000 people have so far died in the conflict from fighting, disease, and starvation. The UN and aid agencies estimate that over two million Darfurians, out of the population of about six million, are living in refugee camps. Even though the majority of all deaths in Darfur have occurred in 2003 and 2004, the conflict is nowhere near the end. Even after more than five years since the Darfur conflict began, there is hardly any comprehensive information about the rebels’ aims, objectives, and plans for the future. We cannot fully understand the conflict and plan peace negotiations between the warring parties if we do not know enough about the rebels. This study has critically explored the aims and perspectives of the Justice and Equality Movement, currently the most powerful Darfur rebel movement. The author has used the first-hand information gathered through interviews with the representatives of the rebel movement and additional data about the conflict and the rebels collected through an extensive literature analysis to portray the movement and its aims, perspectives, and plans for the future. Using the grounded theory approach as the data analysis tool, the author has presented key findings about the Darfur conflict from the perspective of the Justice and Equality Movement that have emerged from the data collected in this study.
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CIOTOLA, MARCELLO RAPOSO. „RELATIVISM, UNIVERSALISM AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE. A STUDY CONCERNING THE THEORY OF COMPLEX EQUALITY AND THE THEORY OF JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS“. PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2005. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=6220@1.
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PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIROA presente tese de doutorado realiza um estudo comparativo, no âmbito da teoria da justiça, envolvendo a teoria da igualdade complexa, formulada por Michael Walzer, autor inserido no rol dos comunitaristas, e a teoria da justiça como imparcialidade, formulada por John Rawls, autor inserido no rol dos liberais. Trata-se, portanto, de um estudo comparativo de autores baseado na categoria da justiça distributiva, conceito cuja formulação original remonta ao pensamento aristotélico. A tese - que contém elementos de filosofia moral, filosofia política e filosofia do direito - tem por objetivo verificar se a teoria da igualdade complexa, com sua metodologia particularista e seus princípios internos de distribuição, possibilita, como apregoa Michael Walzer, a crítica social ou se, de outra forma, esta crítica deve estar associada a uma moral universalista, como, por exemplo, a que nos é fornecida pelo modelo rawlsiano.
The present doctorate thesis aims to make a comparative study, in the context of the theory of justice, involving the theory of complex equality, formulated by Michael Walzer, author inserted in the communitarians` list, and the theory of justice as fairness, formulated by John Rawls, author inserted in the liberals` list. It`s about, therefore, a comparative study of authors based on the category of distributive justice, whose concept was originally formulated by the aristotelic thought. The thesis - that contains elements of moral philosophy, political philosophy and philosophy of law - aims to verify if the theory of complex equality, with its particularistic methodology and its internal principles of distribution, makes possible, as well as Michael Walzer proclaims, the social criticism or if, on the other hand, this criticism has to be associated to an universalistic moral, as, for example, that one provided by the rawlsian model.
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Matundura, Antonina. „Countering the Counterfactual : A Case for Rectificatory Justice for Colonialism“. Thesis, Linköpings universitet, Centrum för tillämpad etik, 2015. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-120380.
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Rectificatory justice for colonialism has been, in recent years, included in the discussion of global justice. The idea is that former colonial powers acknowledge, apologise and make reparations for the harms caused during colonialism. However, there are some objections to rectificatory justice for colonialism. This paper examines one of the main objections, the counterfactual argument. This objection has been found to have some plausibility due to the difficulty in estimating the effect of past injustice on present conditions, as well as the claim that African countries did indeed benefit from colonialism. However, due to the exploitative nature of colonialism, it is reasonable to argue for rectificatory justice based solely on the harm caused, without having to conceptualise a world without the occurrence of colonialism. The aim of this paper is to claim that the harms of colonialism are partly to blame for the current global inequality and that rectificatory justice will go a long way in decreasing this inequality.
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Forti, Sarah. „Refocusing gender equality on gender justice : a critique of the politics of gender equality interpretation in the field of international development assistance“. Thesis, University of Kent, 2011. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.589947.
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'Refocusing Gender Equality on Gender Justice: A Critique of the Politics of Gender Equality Interpretation in the Field of International Development Assistance' is a critical analysis of the interpretation of gender equality in the field of IDA. The various interpretations examined are extracted from key spheres composing the field of IDA, such as the theory, international legislation and international policy, donor and national policy and the programme sphere at field level.
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Wong, Man-kin. „Cong duo yuan zhu yi de guan dian kan ying de de yi yi : dui Wo'erze (Michael Walzer) zheng yi li lun de chan shi /“. View abstract or full-text, 2003. http://library.ust.hk/cgi/db/thesis.pl?HUMA%202003%20WONGM.
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Thesis (M.Phil.)--Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 2003.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 119-123). Also available in electronic version. Access restricted to campus users.
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Cantlon, P. Michael. „Women's equality in the Canadian criminal justice system, something less than a fair shake“. Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1999. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape9/PQDD_0021/MQ49326.pdf.
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Cohen, Joshua. „Review of "Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality" by Michael Walzer“. Journal of Philosophy, 1986. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/5448.
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Terzi, Lorella. „Equality, capability and social justice in education : re-examining disability and special educational needs“. Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2005. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/10019825/.
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This study is a philosophical conceptualisation of educational equality in relation to provision for disabled students and students with Special Educational Needs. Its theoretical core is the outline of a principled framework for a just distribution of educational opportunities to these students. Situated within liberal egalitarianism, this conceptualisation relates principles of justice as fairness (as developed by John Rawls) and the capability approach (as developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum) to the areas of disability studies and special and inclusive education. Current perspectives on disability, and in particular the social model of disability, and positions on Special Educational Needs, as well as related policies, present theoretical and operational limits not only in relation to the achievement of inclusion, but also in addressing the equal entitlement of children to education. These limits derive primarily from the absence of clear principles, and relate specifically to the understandings of disability and special educational needs informing these perspectives. This conceptualisation of educational equality operationalises the capability approach with reference both to issues of definitions and of provision. The capability approach is a normative framework where equality is evaluated within the space of the actual freedoms - or capabilities - people have to pursue their ends and to convert resources into functionings they value. In connecting capability to the demands of justice, this approach contributes important insights to the theorisation of a principled framework for resource distribution. The framework theorised entails principles of justice as fairness informed by a capability metric, which is sensitive to the interests of disabled students and students with learning difficulties, and underpinned by definitions of disability and Special Educational Needs reconsidered in terms of functionings and capabilities. Whilst re-establishing the centrality of educational equality, this study reconceptualises disability and Special Educational Needs within a framework of justice.
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Alvarado, Beatriz Irene. „Justice, Fairness, and Moral Development: Differences in the Generation of Exemplars“. Diss., The University of Arizona, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/242383.
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Fairness and justice are often used interchangeably in socio-legal research. The goal of this study was to use 157 student-produced examples of either "injustice" or "unfairness" to determine whether differences exist in the content of the stories, and by extension, the definitions of these terms, and on participants' scores on modified versions of Kohlberg and Gilligan's levels of moral development. As hypothesized, the two terms were related, yet significantly different, with "unfairness" stories highlighting violations of equality, and "injustice" stories highlighting legal interactions and violations of equity. Sex differences were also found such that females were more likely to write stories rated high on unfairness and therefore equality, but no sex differences were found in level of moral reasoning reached by this sample. Future research is aimed at developing theory to explain differences, including the possible innate nature of "fairness" and environmental requirements leading to a concept of "justice".
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Sapata, Christelle. „Essays on Equality of Opportunity“. Doctoral thesis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/107956.
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La teoría de la igualdad de oportunidad permite justificar algunas desigualdades: las desigualdades generadas por factores por el cual el individuo es responsable (llamados esfuerzo) son justas y no dan lugar a redistribución. Al contrario, las desigualdades que son causadas por factores ajenos a la responsabilidad individual (llamados circunstancias) son injustas y por tanto deben ser corregidas.
A pesar de que conste un consenso sobre la frontera entre desigualdades justas e injustas, distintas estrategias de medición existen que pueden conllevar a diferencias en las conclusiones. En esta tesis, estudiamos tres técnicas de medición de la desigualdad de oportunidad con el fin de evaluar el impacto de las técnicas usadas sobre las conclusiones en término de desigualdad de oportunidad.
En el primer capitulo, investigamos hasta que punto la magnitud de la desigualdad de oportunidad varia cuando (1) incluimos una o varias variables de circunstancia, (2) tomamos o no en cuenta el efecto indirecto de las circunstancias, (3) cambiamos la frontera entre esfuerzo y circunstancia. Medimos la magnitud de la desigualdad de oportunidad en la adquisición de ingresos laborales en España y encontramos que ésta es sensible a la inclusión de varias circunstancias. En efecto, no solo la educación de los padres es une circunstancia relevante, pero otros factores generan desigualdad de oportunidad tal como el país de nacimiento ó el genero. El efecto indirecto es también importante dado que explica cerca de la mitad de la desigualdad de oportunidad total. Finalmente, cambiar la frontera entre circunstancias y esfuerzo no es de gran impacto en nuestro caso porque los factores, que son sin ambigüedad fuera de la responsabilidad individual, son los que mas impactan sobre la desigualdad de ingresos.
El segundo capitulo analiza tos cuestiones: Es el esfuerzo premiado de la misma manera en todas las regiones de Francia? Son las regiones igualmente jerarquizadas en término de desigualdad de oportunidad y de desigualdad de ingresos? Para contestar a ello, primero estimamos una ecuación de ingresos en función de variables de esfuerzo y de circunstancias. Después, calculamos un ingreso justo que sólo depende de las variables de esfuerzo y obtenemos una medida de desigualdad de oportunidad basada en la distancia entre el ingreso observado y el ingreso justo. Encontramos desigualdades de oportunidad en todas las regiones de Francia y amplias diferencias en los premios al esfuerzo entre las regiones. Por otro lado, la jerarquía de las regiones en término de desigualdad de ingreso y de desigualdad de oportunidad es muy similar, lo cual es conforme a otros estudios que investigan la correlación entre desigualdad de ingreso y desigualdad de oportunidad.
En el tercer capitulo, asumimos que los individuos tienen preferencias heterogéneas sobre el consumo y el ocio. En este caso, los criterios de igualdad de oportunidad deben ser adaptados lo cual ha sido formulado por Fleurbaey y Maniquet. Proponemos un método que permita aplicar estos criterios ordinales, y que sea aplicable a otros criterios. Con este fin, usamos un modelo econométrico que llega a identificar preferencias de grupo, y añadimos información sobre las decisiones de los individuos en término de consumo y ocio, para aproximar las preferencias individuales. También, proponemos dos métodos para comparar los criterios ordinales propuestos por Fleurbaey y Maniquet con los criterios cardinales propuestos por Roemer y Van de gaer. Encontramos muy poco apareamiento entre los criterios y concluimos que las diferencias en los resultados dados por cada criterio muestran que las estrategias de medición son tan importantes como los criterios usados.The theory of equality of opportunity leads to legitimate some inequalities: inequalities due to factors for which the individual can be held responsible are fair. On the contrary, when inequalities are due to factors that are beyond individual's responsibility, these inequalities are unfair and should be removed. Even though a consensus emerges about the cut between fair and unfair inequalities, distinct measurement strategies have emerged and may lead to distinct conclusions. In this thesis, we study three aspects concerning the measurement of equality of opportunity to assess the impact of the techniques used on the conclusions about unfair inequalities. To measure inequality of opportunity, we can (1) measure the impact of one or several non-responsibility factors on individuals' outcomes, (2) account or not for the indirect impact of non-responsibility factors on responsibility factors and (3) move the cut that separates both types of factors. The first chapter investigates to which extent the magnitude of inequality of opportunity is sensitive to the change in one of these three decisions. We perform the analysis for Spain and find that the magnitude of ex-ante inequality of opportunity is sensitive to the inclusion of several non-responsibility factors. Family background is found to explain inequalities in income, but other non-responsibility variables such as country of birth are also found to be important determinants of inequalities. The indirect effect of non-responsibility factors is found to be of main importance as it explains around half the overall inequality of opportunity. Finally, the cut between responsibility and non-responsibility factors is not found to be of main impact as the variables that are obviously beyond individuals' responsibility are the ones that impact the most on inequality. The second chapter addresses two questions: Is effort equally rewarded across regions of France and is ex-post inequality of opportunity distributed in the same way as income? To this end, we estimate a wage equation as a function of circumstance and effort variables. We calculate the fair income which is the income that depends on effort only and we take the distance between the actual earnings and the fair income to obtain a measure of ex-post inequality of opportunity. We exhibit the presence of inequality of opportunity in all the regions of France and the way responsibility factors are rewarded differ across regions. On the other hand, the rankings of the regions in terms of equality of opportunity and inequality in income change slightly, which is consistent with other studies on the correlation between income inequality and inequality of opportunity. In the third chapter, we assume individuals have heterogeneous preferences on consumption and leisure. In this case, the criteria of equality of opportunity have to be adapted as proposed by Fleurbaey and Maniquet. Our aim is to propose a model to apply these criteria and make them comparable with cardinal criteria. To this end, we start from a model that identifies groups' preferences and we make use of information on individuals' choices to approximate individuals' preferences. We also propose two ways of cardinalizing our measure such as to compare our results with two cardinal criteria. We show very little matching among the criteria. The target of redistribution policy changes as we move from the egalitarian equivalence criterion to the conditional equality criterion. Then, we find strong similarities between Van de gaer's criterion and the conditional equality criterion. Roemer's criterion appears to give very distinct conclusions with respect to the other three criteria. To conclude, the difference in the results given by each criterion shows that the strategies of measurement are at least as important as the criterion used.
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Barry, Nicholas. „Defending luck egalitarianism /“. Connect to this title, 2006. http://theses.library.uwa.edu.au/adt-WU2007.0036.
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Kirby, Nikolas Norman Patrick. „A society of equals : the meaning, justification and implications of our basic moral equality“. Thesis, University of Oxford, 2015. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:e7953411-b057-47cc-b3b3-48e0645bb5c8.
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This is a thesis about our basic moral equality as human beings: its meaning, its justification and its implications for our society. It offers the fundamental principles of how we are obligated to live together in a Society of Equals. Its major conclusions are as follows. First, whilst there is more than one meaning to the claim that 'we are one another's basic moral equals', the most important meaning for political philosophy is that each individual has Equal Authority. More specifically, each individual has fundamental authority over herself, and herself alone. Secondly, the justification of this fundamental authority over ourselves lies in our common limitation: we are all fallible. Further, we are not merely all fallible in the sense that any one of our beliefs could be false, but also in the sense that we have no non-circular way of judging the reliability of any of our beliefs. This aspect of our natural epistemic position justifies our equal, fundamental, practical authority over ourselves alone. Finally, the most important implication of this justification is that each individual's most basic reason for action is to promote not merely her own, but each and every individual's compliance with her fundamental authority over herself. It follows that each individual has decisive reason to constrain her own compliance with her own fundamental authority over herself, where necessary, to allow the equal promotion of someone else's compliance with her fundamental authority over herself. This principle is called 'Equal Respect'. Upon this principle of Equal Respect arises an architectonic System of Right, and correlative duties, that is called Equal Sovereignty. Under this system, our rights and duties with respect to one another are distributed in accordance with a hypothetical auction and insurance scheme to ensure that each individual is truly sovereign over their own equal share of the world.
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Abdo, Dina Taha Hussien. „Effects of IMF Conditional Loans on Gender Equality“. Youngstown State University / OhioLINK, 2021. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ysu162086139444451.
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Odor, Tay JoAnne Schield. „Gender and justice in the worshipping communities of the Christian Churches/Churches of Christ“. Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN) Access this title online, 2004. http://www.tren.com.
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Kates, Michael. „Institutional egalitarianism and its critics : a defense of Rawls' focus on the basic structure“. Thesis, McGill University, 2005. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=83186.
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In constructing and evaluating a theory of justice, it is crucial to determine the scope of justice---that is, the range of cases to which considerations of justice are appropriately applied. One important strand of contemporary political thought, best exemplified by John Rawls, argues that the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, i.e., its major political and social institutions. Rawls' position has not, however, been without its share of critics. An alternative to institutional egalitarianism begins by emphasizing that the structure of institutions alone is of uncertain benefit when it comes to meeting the demands of justice. If we are truly concerned with social justice, we should be sensitive to the fact that individual choices can go a long way towards upsetting the balance of equality that justice requires. This thesis defends Rawls' focus on the basic structure against this challenge.
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Saunders-Hastings, Emma Mary. „Private Virtues, Public Vices: Governing Philanthropy“. Thesis, Harvard University, 2014. http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:11548.
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Philanthropy is often considered an unproblematic way for individuals (and especially the rich) to benefit recipients and society by "giving their money away." But philanthropy also gives donors influence and authority, and these powers can be subject to criticism on democratic and egalitarian grounds. This dissertation frames philanthropy as one way in which private money can shape public options and the choices open to individuals. In light of this, it asks what kinds of regulation of philanthropy are appropriate for states committed both to liberal rights and to some vision of equality.Government
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Lu, Xiaoyan. „Survey and experimental methods to group decisions : equality of opportunity and weighted majority voting“. Thesis, Aix-Marseille 2, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011AIX24025.
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Cette thèse est la compilation d’essais qui appliquent les méthodes expérimentales et d’enquêtes à deux sujets portant sur la prise de décisions en groupe. La prise de décision en groupe est un type de processus participatif dans lequel plusieurs individus agissent collectivement, analysent des problèmes ou des situations, examinent et évaluent les solutions alternatives d’action, et choisissent parmi les différentes alternatives, une ou plusieurs solutions (Van den Ven et Delbeq, 1974). Une des caractéristiques parmi les plus importantes dans la prise de décisions en groupe est que les individus ont une responsabilité individuelle (Katzenbach et Smith, 1993). Par conséquent, cette thèse s’intéresse à la fois aux décisions effectivement prises au niveau du groupe, mais également aux opinions individuelles.Le premier sujet s’inscrit dans le domaine du bien-être et du choix social et porte sur l’égalité des chances (désignée EOP par la suite). Nous testons d’abord les fondements intuitifs de l’EOP au moyen d’une enquête, pendant laquelle les individus sont "des spectateurs impartiaux" sans aucun gain personnel. Cette enquête nous permet d’illustrer la notion de justice impartiale en absence d’intérêt. Nous testons ensuite les fondements au cours d’une expérience non coopérative, où les décisions prises ont des conséquences sur les gains des individus. L’expérience utilisée dans ce sujet s’intéresse aux préférences révélées en matière de justice par les preneurs de décisions. Le deuxième sujet porte sur les systèmes de vote à majorité pondérée (désignés WMV par la suite). Nous réalisons d’abord une enquête auprès de différents groupes d’étudiants pour découvrir que les individus ne tiennent pas compte de la relation non monotone entre le nombre de votes et le pouvoir de vote associé. Nous menons ensuite plusieurs expériences de laboratoire afin de tester si cette relation non monotone peut être apprise dans le cadre d’un jeu répété. Ainsi, la première partie de cette thèse comprend deux chapitres à propos de l’EOP, tandis que la deuxième comprend deux chapitres à propos des WMV. Le premier chapitre est une introduction générale, le Chapitre 6 expose les conclusions.Le Chapitre 2 présente l’enquête de l’EOP, laquelle est une enquête sur les préférences utilisant de nombreux visuels pour présenter des scénarios hypothétiques. Ceci nous permet de révéler les préférences des individus sur les principes de l’EOP. À notre connaissance, notre enquête est la première tentative pour explorer pleinement le concept de l’EOP du point de vue d’un “spectateur impartial”. Nous avons analysé systématiquement cinq facteurs qui relèvent de l’EOP dans deux vignettes et plusieurs scénarios. Entre les deux vignettes : ventes et alcool, nous avons trouvé un niveau élevé de consensus sur les circonstances. Toutes les personnes ne devraient pas subir les conséquences liées aux circonstances dans toutes les situations pour au moins deux raisons : premièrement, cela serait clairement arbitraire du point de vue moral et deuxièmement parce qu’il faut ajuster la péréquation résultante. Le maigre consensus sur l’effort et la chance brute est également présenté dans nos résultats. Puisque la chance brute est définie par rapport au décroissement des risques liés à la chance de non-option, elle peut entrainer des résultats non souhaitables au regard de l’EOP. Inversement, l’effort est défini comme un reflet du comportement des individus. Ils contrôlent cet effort, lequel exerce une influence sur leur statut. Ainsi, les effets des différents niveaux d’effort pourraient être non neutralisésDecision making in groups largely exists in almost every aspect of daily life. In this thesis, we use survey and experimental methods to examine decision making in two different areas, equality of opportunity (EOP) and weighted majority voting (WMV). The goal of the research efforts is to understand the importance of achieved decisions for the functioning of the group, involving taking into account the needs and opinions of every group member.In the survey study of EOP, we used the attitude survey consisting of vignettes to elicit stated preferences of quasi-spectators over the conceptions of EOP problems. Impartiality in this study is achieved by considering only evaluations of individuals who have no stake in the situation they are judging. We analysed whether individuals are considered to be held responsible for outcomes by different factors: circumstances, effort, talent, brute luck and option luck. Apart from the baseline treatment, another compared treatment was designed to test context effect, with the introduction of ``need'' and social-cognitive age. In these two treatments, we found a high level of consensus on non-responsibility of circumstances, slight consensuses to responsibility of effort but non-responsibility of brute luck, and no agreement on talent and option luck. When other considerations are not involved, inequality caused by differential option luck and talent is unobjectionable. While with other considerations, people should not fully be held responsible for the outcomes resulting from option luck and talent.We then tested revealed preferences over the conceptions of EOP problems in an experiment, where subjects were stakeholders of each decision. People were recruited to form a micro society, and engaged in actual decisions about redistribution of their own money they earned in a previous phase through four factors: circumstances, effort, brute and option luck. Yet despite a lot of self-interested behaviours when participants have a stake in the redistribution, we clearly observe that participants are sensitive to the different factors through which people can earn their money. There were three treatments in our experiment: the baseline, prior reflection and talent treatments. The voting results among three treatments are very homogeneous, with only one exception on effort in the talent treatment, and present a very high level of self-serving bias.For WMV, the survey study investigates whether people have the knowledge of the relation between the number of votes and corresponding power which they have in a committee that takes decisions with a WMV system. Power indices show that actual voting power is often quite different from the nominal distribution of voting weights. Our survey observed that subjects cannot see through the non-monotonic relationship between the number of votes and voting power. In addition, we found that subjects trained in political sciences had more acquaintance on this issue.The experiment on WMV wanted to see whether people could learn this non-monotonic relation between the number of votes and the actual voting power. In the laboratory experiment, people played similar games 20 times. The first stage of games was the votes apportionment stage, where two out of four subjects in a group independently and simultaneously made decisions to determine the distribution of votes among four members. The second stage of games was the point allocation stage, where four member bargained to divide fixed amount of resources among themselves through the WMV determined in the first stage. The results of our experiments show that initially subjects tend to choose an option that gives them more votes ignoring how remaining votes are distributed among others. But, as subjects ``learn'' about the payoffs they can obtain in the points allocation stage, they start to choose the option in the first stage that could have chance to give them higher payoffs
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Fugo, Justin I. „Behind 'The Veil of Race-Neutrality': Sharing Responsibility for Racial Justice and Cultivating Democratic Equality of Difference“. Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2017. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/482623.
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PhilosophyPh.D.
This dissertation adopts a ‘social criticism’ model in order to analyze racism in our contemporary world – particularly the United States. This analysis offers a detailed account of racism as rooted in social structural processes, and prioritizes oppression and domination as the chief wrongs resulting from racism. To do so, said analysis highlights norms, ideals, policies, and actions, that are often assumed to be ‘race neutral’ (e.g., impartiality, merit, ‘natural rights’, and autonomy), and the role they play in the production of racial injustice. More specifically, it exposes how these norms function to undermine human agency by restricting means for self-development and self-determination. As such, the role that inclusive and democratic deliberation can play in combating racial oppression and domination is developed. In light of this analysis, a defense of a ‘concrete morality’ which prioritizes the fight against oppression and domination, is made against an ‘abstract morality’ that adheres to ‘ideally just’ principles regardless of the injustice that results from doing so. Moreover, this project develops a ‘shared responsibility model’ for racial injustice, articulating varying degrees and kinds of responsibility we have for correcting it. It concludes by offering ‘democratic equality of difference’ as a normative ideal for cultivating racial justice. Generally, said ideal aims to: create basic conditions for the self-development and collective self-determination of all; cultivate a universally inclusive and ongoing process of democratic deliberation for solving collective problems; and attend to difference when deliberating about matters of justice.
Temple University--Theses
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Han, Rui. „Luck egalitarianism : criticisms and alternatives /“. Click to view the E-thesis via HKUTO, 2009. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record/B4413826X.
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47
Furubayashi, Reid. „A Scheme of International Distributive Justice: Exploring the Roles of State Sovereignty, Freedom, and Luck“. Scholarship @ Claremont, 2015. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1098.
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Presented here is a critical analysis of the administration, measurement, and application of justice on an international scale. To develop a general framework through which to analyze an international theory of justice, I will start by laying out the differences between the cosmopolitan conception of justice and Thomas Nagel’s political conception of justice. I will offer my own hybrid account that designates nation-states, rather than individuals, as the primary actors of justice. An examination of how justice is measured is necessary for conceptualizing relevant compensation systems and intervention schemes. I investigate justice as measured by Ronald Dworkin’s equality of resources and justice as measured by Amartya Sen’s capability approach, both of which differ in their treatment of non-democratic and corrupt nation-states. I advocate the expansion of political freedoms and a compensation scheme based on the use of natural resources to provide a system of international justice that encourages the preservation of native tradition and respects the nature of cultural difference.
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Viehoff, Juri. „Social justice in the European Union : a social democratic ideal for an 'ever closer union'“. Thesis, University of Oxford, 2014. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:a34be45e-866f-4919-bfd5-cba2eb2337d9.
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In recent decades the European Union has moved from a multilateral treaty to a distinctive social, political, and economic order among European states. During the same period political philosophers have increasingly turned their attention to questions of justice beyond the state. But their discussions have largely focused on global justice, and have paid relatively little attention to the distinctive moral and political questions raised by the emergence of a new type of order among European states. This thesis fills this lacuna, by developing a conception of ‘social democratic’ or ‘egalitarian’ social justice for the specific institutional arrangements of the EU. In Chapters one through three, I delineate a general conception of ‘pluralist egalitarianism’, the view that we have a variety of grounds for endorsing equality-inclined economic institutions domestically. Direct egalitarian arguments stress the internal requirements of institutional fairness to which basic economic institutions are subject. Indirect egalitarian arguments favour egalitarian economic outcomes based on concerns of social equality. I further differentiate between a transnationalist and an internationalist position. Direct transnationalist arguments stress the EU’s similarity to domestic institutions and derive egalitarian economic requirements for the EU as a whole. Indirect transnationalists argue that EU citizens stand in a distinctive kind of relationship such that the value of social equality has purchase amongst them, and social equality requires a limitation on economic inequalities at the EU level. By contrast, internationalists insist on the continuing importance of national self-determination. However, they endorse more substantive economic institutions at the EU level to protect existing social democratic welfare state arrangements. In chapter four to seven, I assess the extent to which each of these arguments can support a more egalitarian organisation of basic economic institutions at the EU level. Finally, I offer one practical proposal that would help the EU to realise the social democratic vision I have defended. This is the idea of an EU social minimum. I explain how such a social minimum would be conceived and implemented, and I demonstrate why transnationalists and internationalists should endorse such a policy.
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Kibar, Sibel. „An Inquiry On Justice: Bases, Bearers And Principles“. Phd thesis, METU, 2011. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12613484/index.pdf.
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One of the prevalent notions in the late twentieth century&lsquos political philosophy, justice lies at the heart of ethics, politics and jurisprudence. In this study, while I insist on the dominion of politics and the economic mode of production over morality and law, I consider the ethical realm to be also very important in justifying political movements and transformations. Defining the concept of justice plays a role more or less in the realization of justice on the Earth. I try to reveal the bases of justice in the second chapter. My attitude can be defined as foundationalism and realism molded with historical materialism. Subsequently, I attempt to deal with the bearers of justice
i.e., individuals, institutions, or structures. The contemporary political theories on justice pay attention to the notion of the individual and the faculty of rationality. Although I admit the role ofindividuals in ensuring justice, social structures are the main bearers of justice. In the fourth chapter, I cover the main principles or pillars of justice, namely, equality, freedom, and rights. Equality can be classified as legal, political, social, economic and moral. I claim that economic equality is the principal one among others since economic inequality usually generates other inequalities. Economic equality can be satisfied through just production in which alienation and exploitation do not take place. Absence of exploitation is also required for realization of freedoms and human rights. Thus, I propose the principle of absence of exploitation as a primary justice principle, which is necessary but not sufficient to eradicate injustices in the world.
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Barnard, Stephen R. Johnson Victoria L. „Crooked coverage a study of (de)racialized texts in print media /“. Diss., Columbia, Mo. : University of Missouri-Columbia, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10355/4948.
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Thesis (M.A.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2007.The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file. Title from title screen of research.pdf file (viewed on January 3, 2008) Includes bibliographical references.