Thematische Bibliographien / Judgement bias

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Zeitschriftenartikel
Dissertationen
Bücher
Buchteile
Konferenzberichte

Auswahl der wissenschaftlichen Literatur zum Thema „Judgement bias“

Autor: Grafiati

Veröffentlicht am 24. Juni 2021

Zuletzt aktualisiert am 1. Februar 2022

Geben Sie eine Quelle nach APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard und anderen Zitierweisen an

Wählen Sie eine Art der Quelle aus:

Machen Sie sich mit den Listen der aktuellen Artikel, Bücher, Dissertationen, Berichten und anderer wissenschaftlichen Quellen zum Thema "Judgement bias" bekannt.

Neben jedem Werk im Literaturverzeichnis ist die Option "Zur Bibliographie hinzufügen" verfügbar. Nutzen Sie sie, wird Ihre bibliographische Angabe des gewählten Werkes nach der nötigen Zitierweise (APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver usw.) automatisch gestaltet.

Sie können auch den vollen Text der wissenschaftlichen Publikation im PDF-Format herunterladen und eine Online-Annotation der Arbeit lesen, wenn die relevanten Parameter in den Metadaten verfügbar sind.

Zeitschriftenartikel zum Thema "Judgement bias"

Tredger, E. R. W., J. T. H. Lo, S. Haria, H. H. K. Lau, N. Bonello, B. Hlavka und C. Scullion. „Bias, guess and expert judgement in actuarial work“. British Actuarial Journal 21, Nr. 3 (September 2016): 545–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1357321716000155.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

AbstractExpert judgement is frequently used within general insurance. It tends to be a method of last resort and used where data is sparse, non-existent or non-applicable to the problem under consideration. Whilst such judgements can significantly influence the end results, their quality is highly variable. The use of the term “expert judgement” itself can lend a generous impression of credibility to what may be a little more than a guess. Despite the increased emphasis placed on the importance of robust expert judgements in regulation, actuarial research to date has focussed on the more technical or data-driven methods, with less emphasis on how to use and incorporate softer information or how best to elicit judgements from others in a way that reduces cognitive biases. This paper highlights the research that the Getting Better Judgement Working Party has conducted in this area. Specifically, it covers the variable quality of expert judgement, both within and outside the regulatory context, and presents methods that may be applied to improve its formation. The aim of this paper is to arm the insurance practitioner with tools to distinguish between low-quality and high-quality judgements and improve the robustness of judgements accordingly, particularly for highly material circumstances.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Ayton, Peter, und Eva Pascoe. „Bias in human judgement under uncertainty?“ Knowledge Engineering Review 10, Nr. 1 (März 1995): 21–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0269888900007244.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

AbstractThe claim is frequently made that human judgement and reasoning are vulnerable to cognitive biases. Such biases are assumed to be inherent in that they are attributed to the nature of the mental processes that produce judgement. In this paper, we review the psychological evidence for this claim in the context of the debate concerning human judgemental competence under uncertainty. We consider recent counter-arguments which suggest that the evidence for cognitive biases may be dependent on observations of performance on inappropriate tasks and by comparisons with inappropriate normative standards. We also consider the practical implications for the design of decision support systems.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Maley, Jennifer E., Maree Hunt und Wendy Parr. „Set-size and Frequency-of-occurrence Judgements in Young and Older Adults: The Role of the Availability Heuristic“. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A 53, Nr. 1 (Februar 2000): 247–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/713755883.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

Two experiments examined the cognitive processes underlying judgements of set size and judgements of frequency of occurrence in young (Experiments 1 and 2) and older (Experiment 2) adults. Previous research has implicated the availability heuristic in set-size judgements, whereas an automatic processing mechanism has been implicated in judgements of frequency of occurrence. In the current experiments, path analysis was employed to investigate the role of an availability bias in performance on the judgement tasks. In Experiments 1 and 2, both types of judgement were influenced by repetition frequency of words independent of the availability (recall) of specific exemplars. Experiment 2 extended the investigation to include age differences. Although older adults’ recall performance was poorer overall, the availability bias was age invariant, and there were no age differences in either set-size or frequency-of-occurrence judgements. Our results indicate that both set-size and frequency-of-occurrence judgements are independent of the availability bias evident in recall, and they support the notion that an automatic processing mechanism underlies both types of judgement.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Klamer, Pim, Cok Bakker und Vincent Gruis. „Research bias in judgement bias studies – a systematic review of valuation judgement literature“. Journal of Property Research 34, Nr. 4 (02.10.2017): 285–304. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09599916.2017.1379552.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Hampton, J. R. „Treatment bias and clinical judgement“. Age and Ageing 31, Nr. 1 (01.01.2002): 3–4. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ageing/31.1.3.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Jolobe, O. M. P. „Treatment bias and clinical judgement“. Age and Ageing 31, Nr. 5 (01.09.2002): 413–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ageing/31.5.413.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Kregiel, J., N. Malek, P. Popik, K. Starowicz und R. Rygula. „Anandamide mediates cognitive judgement bias in rats“. Neuropharmacology 101 (Februar 2016): 146–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropharm.2015.09.009.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Košťál, Ľubor, Zuzana Skalná und Katarína Pichová. „Studying affect induced judgement bias in birds“. Pharmacological Reports 71, Nr. 6 (Dezember 2019): 1310–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pharep.2019.09.010.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Murrell, John. „Judgement of professional competence: Bags of bias“. Social Work Education 12, sup1 (Januar 1993): 5–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02615479311220271.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Osório, António. „Judgement and ranking: living with hidden bias“. Annals of Operations Research 253, Nr. 1 (03.10.2016): 501–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10479-016-2341-y.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Mehr Quellen

Dissertationen zum Thema "Judgement bias"

Ackelman, Emma. „Cognitive Judgement Bias as an Indicator for Animal Welfare“. Thesis, Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för fysik, kemi och biologi, 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-166576.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

Animal welfare has long been a subject under debate. Since animals are unable to voice concerns about their living standards it is of interest to find other ways to secure their wellbeing. A new measurement has been introduced where animals’ own judgement can act as an indicator for their emotional state and welfare. This study summarizes key elements from previous literature and research in order to explain the connection between welfare and judgement bias. Emotions have been defined as either an observable reaction to a stimulus or a subjective conscious experience of the stimulus. The second has been difficult to assess in animals since they cannot vocalise their own interpretations, hence emotions in animals are assessed based on the first definition. The study of animal welfare is in short the study of animal’s judgement of the world, which in turn indicate how animals feel. Cognitive judgement bias has been defined as whether an animal assess an ambiguous stimulus as negative or positive, a common method used to demonstrate this concept is the go no-go method. Animals learn to discriminate between two stimuli and is then presented with an ambiguous stimulus. The response to the ambiguous stimulus is recorded and determine if the animal is optimistic or pessimistic in its judgement. Research has been rather successful in determining factors which can affect animal welfare, opening up for deeper discussions concerning animal cognition, awareness and their effect on welfare, but further refinements are required to assess the influence of judgement bias.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Lawrence, Adam. „Investigating the limits of how expectation can shape affective judgement“. Thesis, University of Manchester, 2017. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/investigating-the-limits-of-how-expectation-can-shape-affective-judgement(1a10bbf9-1db7-481f-b350-dba27a65e282).html.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

The generation of predictions shapes our experience of the world around us. By making inferences about what is likely to happen within a given scenario, we can conserve cognitive resources and enhance our prospects of survival. Predictive coding accounts of perception indicate that this is achieved by minimally processing information that is consistent with our expectations, and prioritising the processing of unexpected or meaningful information. Predictions are also beneficial in situations where accurate perception is difficult, and clues like contextual information allow expectations to ‘fill in the blanks’ when sensory information is noisy or ambiguous. This comes at a cost, however, and a reliance upon expectations can lead to perceptual biases, and in certain cases misperceptions. According to Assimilation Contrast Theory (ACT) and the Affective Expectation Model (AEM), when we attempt to judge affectively ambiguous stimuli, our judgements are biased by expectations in a similar manner. If stimuli are within an acceptable range of an existing expectation, minor discrepancies will be ignored and judgements of those stimuli will fall in line with expectations (assimilation). Alternatively, if the affective discrepancy between expectation and stimulus is so large that it is acknowledged, the extent of that discrepancy will be exaggerated instead (contrast). This thesis aimed to investigate the boundaries and time-course of these effects. A series of behavioural experiments were conducted to investigate: (i) whether predictive cues promoted a state of affective readiness, where judgements across a range of stimuli were biased based upon the assumption that they were broadly part of a positive or negative category (chapters 3 and 4); (ii) whether affective biases (assimilation effects) persisted over time (chapters 5 and 6); and (iii) whether the boundaries of affective and perceptual assimilation effects remained consistent over time (chapter 6 and 7). Psychophysical measures of affective bias indicated that predictive cues influenced participants to judge the same stimuli differently, according to whether they expected those stimuli to be positive or negative. Furthermore, after expectations were learned, judgements of the same stimuli continued to be biased toward expectations after a period of one week. When stimuli from affectively or perceptually distinct categories were manipulated slowly over time, to the point where they became identical, judgements of those stimuli continued to be influenced by the expectation that they should remain distinct. These findings indicate that the boundaries of perceptual and affective assimilation effects may not be static, and if deviations from expectation are small enough to go generally unnoticed, people may update their internal representations of items over time, and the boundaries of acceptance which surround those representations.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Deakin, Amanda Irene. „Decision-making under ambiguity : cognitive judgement bias in a bird and an insect model“. Thesis, University of Bristol, 2017. https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.761201.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Wei, Ran. „On Estimation Problems in Network Sampling“. The Ohio State University, 2016. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1471846863.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Spencer, Peter. „Cognitive bias and heuristics and their effects on clinical judgement amongst psychological therapists: a review, and, Problem solving in an empathic task: an experimental study of expertise and intuition“. Thesis, University of Sheffield, 2013. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/4655/.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Frey, Darren. „The identification of individual-specific conflict detection sensitivities“. Thesis, Sorbonne Paris Cité, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017USPCB238.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

Les développements récents de la recherche en sciences cognitives ont établi que les individus détectent fréquemment qu'ils sont en train de commettre certaines erreurs de raisonnement, alors même qu'ils n'identifient pas, et peut-être ne peuvent pas identifier, la source de ces erreurs. Jusqu'à maintenant, ce programme de recherche a principalement visé à démontrer que même les individus aux raisonnements les plus biaisés faisaient preuve de tendances à la détection de conflits. Le présent travail s'appuie sur ces résultats et analyse trois domaines d'enquête connexes et encore inexplorés : (1) les sous-types de détection de conflits ; (2) les différences individuelles quant à la détection ; (3) le caractère de généralité ou de spécificité au domaine des sensibilités pour la détection de conflits. En identifiant des sous-types de détection de conflits de plus en plus spécifiques, ce projet a pour objectif d'examiner les corrélations entre, d'une part, certaines sensibilités pour la détection de conflits, et des prédicteurs cognitifs, d'autre part. Il s'agit, fondamentalement, d'un travail préparatoire en vue d'une analyse différentielle complète des sensibilités particulières de détection de conflits parmi les individus en train de raisonner
Recent state of the art research into cognitive biases has revealed that individuals often detect that they are making certain reasoning errors even when they themselves do not, perhaps cannot, articulate the source of the error. Until now, this research has focused primarily on demonstrating the existence of conflict detection tendencies among even the most biased reasoners. This thesis builds on this research by analyzing three related and unexplored areas of inquiry: (1) subtypes of conflict detection; (2) individual-specific differences among detectors; and (3) the domain generality or specificity of conflict detection sensitivities. By identifying increasingly fine-tuned detection subtypes, the project aims to explore correlations between particular conflict detection sensitivities and other cognitive predictors. It is, essentially, preparatory work for a complete differential analysis of conflict detection sensitivities among reasoners

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Munari, Alessandra. „Exploring a simplified affective state test in the red junglefowl“. Thesis, Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för fysik, kemi och biologi, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-176743.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

Affective states of animals are emotions with positive or negative valance. Positive and negative affective states affect animal welfare, and can bias interpretation of information positively or negatively, respectively. Judgement bias tests measure affective states based on responses to ambiguous cues, intermediate to cues with learnt positive and negative outcomes. Responses closer to those of positive cues indicate positive affective state. However, animals need extensive training to learn initial associations to reference cues. Therefore, I here aimed to validate an alternative affective state test based on instinctive avoidance of patterns resembling eyespots. Responses to ambiguous eyespot cues similar to responses to full eyespot cues could indicate negative affective state. To test this, behavioural responses of red junglefowl (Gallus gallus) chicks to ambiguous cues from a validated judgement bias test were compared to responses to cues resembling eyespots. In a second cohort of birds, I developed simplified tests with only one ambiguous cue in each tests. I predicted that responses in both tests would correlate positively. In the original tests, shorter distance and latency to approach ambiguous cues correlated positively with latency to approach one of the eyespot cues, a full eyespot cue. This pattern was only observed in females. In the simplified tests, at 4 weeks of age, shortest latency to approach cues correlated among tests. This pattern was not observed when chicks were tested at 2 weeks of age. Overall, the eyespot test is a promising alternative affective state test, but further studies exploring sex- and age-effects, are needed.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Bradon, Peter. „Outcome bias in judgements of the quality of experimental designs“. Thesis, University of Plymouth, 1996. http://hdl.handle.net/10026.1/2063.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

This thesis is concerned with the evaluation of experimental design. It reviews design research in general and notes some methodological limitations. The process of experimental design is considered in the light of this review, particularly in terms of the ability of designers to evaluate potential designs. Experiment 1, a prospective study involving the creative design of psychology experiments, reports inadequate assessment of experimental power and little or no evidence of explicit evaluation processes. Experiment 2 assesses the evaluation of existing experimental designs and demonstrates that judgements of the quality of experimental design are influenced by the presence of outcome information more than any other factor. Following this result a review of the hindsight and outcome bias literature is presented. Experiments 3, 4 and 5 demonstrate that outcome bias is a pervasive effect not mediated by task presentation, explicit definitions of quality or statistical expertise. Also, by manipulating subjects' perspective, Experiment 5 differentiates between the effects of outcomes themselves and their financial implications. The term outcome salience is defined as "the relative importance of the implications of an outcome from the point of view of the subject". It is shown that both the size and direction of an outcome bias are determined by (and could be predicted from) the associated outcome salience. Experiment 6 explores subjects' beliefs about the relevance of experimental factors, outcome information and the financial implications of outcomes to quality judgements. Ratings of relevance are shown to be in direct opposition to the actual use of these factors in judgements. Relevance ratings are also shown to be influenced by a subject's perspective. Experiment 7 tests the links between outcome bias effects and traditional, memory based, hindsight bias effects using a memory based paradigm. Results show that, in addition to biases of judgement in foresight, the same outcome information will also bias the memory of earlier judgements and the memory of relevant task details in hindsight. The practical implications of outcome bias are discussed. Using a motivational account based on the concept of outcome salience, hindsight bias is redefined as one particular form of outcome bias. This account unifies two previously separate research areas and is shown to explain a number of previously unexplained effects in the hindsight literature. Accounts of reasoning are reviewed, as are information processing and motivational accounts of hindsight bias. The theoretical implications of the present results are discussed in the light of these accounts.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Scott, Peter J. „An analysis of judgemental bias in housing choice“. Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2011. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/242424.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

Buying a home is among the most important choices that any individual is likely to make in their lifetime. It has lasting consequences for happiness, well-being and personal finances. Yet, given the infrequency with which such decisions are made; the difficulty getting information from an opaque and decentralised marketplace; and the high transactions costs involved, there is a significant risk that decision making may depart from the high standard imposed by the normative economic concept of 'rational choice'. This thesis uses the insights of the economic theory of choice - from behavioural economics in particular - to examine housing choice from a new perspective. It considers the potential for estate agents, knowingly or otherwise, to exploit behavioural biases in decision making to influence preference and, ultimately, choices over housing. This naturally is of interest to estate agents and policy makers involved in housing markets; but most importantly to individuals as decision makers: making better decisions relies on understanding when and where vulnerability to manipulation may lie. Using evidence from a series of classroom experiments with 280 student volunteers and from two online surveys with over 4,000 adult respondents, significant areas where individuals may be consistently vulnerable to manipulation of judgement are found and recorded. In particular, both student and adult respondents are susceptible to biases involving manipulation of the decision making context, known as the choice frame. Students also tend to rely on arbitrary 'anchor' points to make value estimates, which results in significantly impaired judgements, even in the presence of incentives for accuracy. Finally, evidence of a significant new form of behavioural bias is found, in which elements of the choice frame have an unexpectedly negative impact on perceptions. This new bias is persistent across several experimental scenarios and is labelled the 'choice pollution effect'.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Eriksson, Gabriella. „On Physical Relations in Driving: Judgements, Cognition and Perception“. Doctoral thesis, Stockholms universitet, Psykologiska institutionen, 2014. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-100762.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

Drivers need to make judgements of physical relationships related to driving speed, such as mean speed, risks, travel time and fuel consumption, in order to make optimal choices of vehicle speed. This is also the case for the general public, politicians and other stakeholders who are engaged in traffic issues. This thesis investigates how drivers’ judgements of travel time (Study I and II), fuel consumption (Study III) and mean speed (Study IV) relate to actual physical measures. A cognitive time-saving bias has been found in judgements of travel time. The time saving bias implies that people overestimate the time saved when increasing speed from a high speed and underestimate the time saved when increasing speed from a low speed. Previous studies have mainly investigated the bias from a cognitive perspective in questionnaires. In Study I the bias was shown to be present when participants were engaged in a driving simulator task where participants primarily rely on perceptual cues. Study II showed that intuitive time saving judgements can be debiased by presenting drivers with an alternative speedometer that indicate the inverted speed in minutes per kilometre. In Study III, judgements of fuel consumption at increasing and decreasing speeds were examined, and the results showed systematic deviations from correct measures. In particular, professional truck drivers underestimated the fuel saving effect of a decrease in speed. Study IV showed that subjective mean speed judgements differed from objective mean speeds and could predict route choice better than objective mean speeds. The results indicate that biases in these judgements are robust and that they predict behaviour. The thesis concludes that judgements of mean speeds, time savings and fuel consumption systematically deviate from physical measures. The results have implications for predicting travel behaviour and the design of driver feedback systems.
Förare bör göra bedömningar som relaterar till hastighet, såsom bedömningar av medelhastighet, risk, restid och bränsleåtgång. Dessa bedömningar är nödvändiga för att föraren ska kunna välja en optimal hastighet, men också för att allmänheten, politiker och andra intressenter som är involverade i trafikfrågor ska kunna fatta välgrundade beslut. Denna avhandling består av fyra delstudier där förares bedömningar av restid (Studie I och II), bränsleåtgång (Studie III) och medelhastighet (Studie IV) studeras i relation till faktiska fysikaliska mått. Tidigare enkätstudier har påvisat ett kognitivt bias i tidsvinstbedömningar vid höga och låga hastigheter som påverkar mänskligt beteende. Studie I visade att detta bias också förekommer i en primärt perceptuell motorisk uppgift där förarna i studien kör i en körsimulator. Studie II visade att dessa intuitiva tidsbedömningar kan förbättras genom att köra med en alternativ hastighetsmätare i bilen som indikerar den inverterade hastigheten i minuter per kilometer istället för hastigheten i kilometer per timme. I Studie III undersöktes bedömningar av bränsleåtgång vid hastighetsökningar och hastighetssänkningar, och resultaten visar att bedömningarna systematiskt avviker från faktisk bränsleåtgång. Ett intressant resultat var att lastbilsförare i allmänhet underskattade bränslebesparingen som kan göras till följd av en hastighetssänkning. Studie IV visade att subjektiva bedömningar av medelhastighet som avviker från objektiva medelhastigheter kan predicera vägval, vilket tyder på att systematiska fel i dessa bedömningar är robusta och kan predicera vägval. Sammanfattningsvis visar avhandlingen hur bedömningar av medelhastighet, tidsvinst och bränsleåtgång systematiskt avviker från fysikaliska mått. Resultaten har betydelse för modellering av resebeteende och design av förarstödssystem.

At the time of the doctoral defense, the following papers were unpublished and had a status as follows: Paper 2: Submitted. Paper 3: Submitted.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Bücher zum Thema "Judgement bias"

Willington, Gary Leslie. Homophobia in clinical psychology and bias in clinical judgement. Birmingham: University of Birmingham, 1995.

Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle finden

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Lawrence, Michael J. "Individual bias in judgements of confidence". Fontainbleau: INSEAD, 1986.

Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle finden

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Changshan, Sun, und Zhang Wenxue, Hrsg. Xing fa zhi xing bian geng li lun yu shi wu. Beijing: Ren min fa yuan chu ban she, 2000.

Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle finden

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Zhongguo zheng quan min shi pei chang an jian si fa cai pan wen shu hui bian: The court's judgements collection of civil compensation cases in securities in China. Beijing Shi: Beijing da xue chu ban she, 2013.

Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle finden

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Secret Life of Decisions: How Unconscious Bias Subverts Your Judgement. Taylor & Francis Group, 2013.

Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle finden

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

How linguistic bias affects judgement and memory: Author: Sophia Temperley. Germany: Sophia Temperley, 2019.

Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle finden

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Bhopal, Raj S. Cause and effect: The epidemiological approach. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/med/9780198739685.003.0005.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

Cause and effect understanding is the highest form of scientific knowledge. In epidemiology, demonstrating causality is difficult because of the long and complex natural history of many human diseases and because of ethical restraints. Epidemiologists should: hold the attitude that all judgements of cause and effect are tentative; understand that causal thinking demands a judgement; be alert for the play of chance, error, and bias; always consider reverse causality and confounding, utilize the power of causal models that broaden causal perspectives; apply guidelines for causality as an aid to thinking and not as a checklist; and look for corroboration of causality from other scientific frameworks for assessment of cause and effect. The ultimate aim of epidemiology is to use knowledge of cause and effect to break links between disease and its causes and to improve health. The application of erroneous knowledge has serious repercussions.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Summerfield, Christopher, und Tobias Egner. Attention and Decision-Making. Herausgegeben von Anna C. (Kia) Nobre und Sabine Kastner. Oxford University Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199675111.013.018.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

This chapter reviews formal models of the decision process in humans and other primates, and discusses divergent accounts of how attention might intervene to bias or facilitate judgements about sensory stimuli. The review covers established decision-theoretic models, such as signal detection theory and serial sampling models, and other computational accounts that draw upon psychophysical and neurobiological mechanisms of early vision. It considers whether such decisions are limited by attentional capacity, or by noise, as suggested by normative models of choice. The authors revisit a debate concerning whether attention acts to boost inputs, enhance activity, or reduce noise. Finally, the authors consider the relationship between attention and expectation in perceptual decision-making.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Buchteile zum Thema "Judgement bias"

Dawson, Phillip. „Exemplars, feedback and bias“. In Developing Evaluative Judgement in Higher Education, 99–107. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2018.: Routledge, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315109251-11.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Lawrence, Michael. „Design and testing of a DSS to help reduce bias in judgemental forecasting“. In Implementing Systems for Supporting Management Decisions, 261–69. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-34967-1_17.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Boraud, Thomas. „Bias and Heuristics“. In How the Brain Makes Decisions, 119–26. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198824367.003.0018.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

This chapter addresses the cognitive bias and heuristics of judgement. It also considers possible underlying neural mechanisms. Economist Herbert Simon introduced the notion of heuristics in judgement to define the approximate rational rules upon which individuals rely to make decisions. Experimental psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky transformed this notion of heuristics by highlighting the cognitive biases that influence judgements. From his work with Tversky, Kahneman elaborated the two-systems theory. According to him, human decision-making is the result of a competition between a fast, automatic system (System 1) that is prone to make mistakes and a slower, more demanding but also more reliable one (System 2). Both systems use heuristics, but the second compensates with anticipation. This chapter then looks at initial bias and beliefs. It also explains the anchoring effect, as well as the dilution effect. Anchoring is the excessive influence of a first impression on judgements.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Hadlackzy, Gergö. „Cognitive biases in suicide risk assessment“. In Oxford Textbook of Suicidology and Suicide Prevention, herausgegeben von Danuta Wasserman und Camilla Wasserman, 363–68. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/med/9780198834441.003.0043.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

Cognitive biases result from automatic/unconscious cognitive processes that allow us to come to quick conclusions when facing uncertain or insufficient information. Although these strategies are often useful in providing quick and efficient answers, they can also lead to systematic errors in judgement and decision-making. This text explores the potential adverse effects of cognitive biases on decisions and judgements specific to clinician’s assessment of suicidality. An in-depth description of specifically relevant heuristics and biases, such as the representativeness heuristic and confirmation bias, are described. Different strategies to minimize their negative effects on the suicide risk assessment of the patient are also discussed.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

„Perspective-taking abilities across the lifespan: A review of hindsight bias and theory of mind“. In Individual Differences in Judgement and Decision-Making, 157–75. 1 Edition. | New York : Routledge, 2017.: Psychology Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315636535-13.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Gilby, Emma. „Attentiveness and Indifference“. In Descartes's Fictions, 141–56. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198831891.003.0007.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

This chapter argues that the project of contextualizing Descartes with reference to poetics can also impact our understanding of his mature writings, with a focus here on the common theme of attention. It commences with Descartes’s statements on attentiveness, indifference, judgement, and the problem of error. In the Meditations, Descartes comes up against various problems relating to human hubris, blindness, and bias. In Meditation Four, he pursues a theory of judgement, tackling the interaction of the will and the intellect as they work on the clear and distinct ideas on which his search for truth relies. Here, again, his philosophy resonates with the language of tragedy, as a renowned strand of secondary criticism has noted; the chapter therefore turns to the characterization of Descartes as a ‘tragic’ figure.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Murphy, Eimear, Luca Melotti und Michael Mendl. „Assessing emotions in pigs: determining negative and positive mental states“. In Understanding the behaviour and improving the welfare of pigs, 455–96. Burleigh Dodds Science Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.19103/as.2020.0081.13.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

This chapter reviews assessing emotions in pigs, specifically focusing on the ways of determining negative and positive mental states. It begins by examining behavioural indicators of emotion such as behavioural tests, qualitative behaviour assessment, vocalisations, play behaviour, defence cascade responses and facial expression and body posture. The chapter also assesses cognitive indicators of emotion in pigs and judgement bias. This is followed by a discussion of neurophysiological indicators of emotion in pigs, focusing specifically on the physiology of negative and positive emotions.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Raydugin, Yuri G. „High-level Overview of Project Risk Management (PRM)“. In Modern Risk Quantification in Complex Projects, 11–34. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198844334.003.0002.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

Selection of adequate project risk management (PRM) methodologies should be based on deep understanding of PRM context of a project to avoid PRM context—PRM method mismatch. Various realizations of bias can impede the selection. All PRM methodologies can be grouped as either conventional (they follow traditional PRM process steps to identify, evaluate, address, monitor, etc.) and unconventional (they are focused mostly at risk assessments). All PRM methodologies—deterministic (scoring), probabilistic (Monte Carlo), parametric, etc—have limitations. Deterministic (scoring) methods can help with development of risk addressing although they are useless for development of project contingencies. Monte Carlo methods can be used for development of project contingencies only if they take into account all relevant components of project risk exposure consistently. Parametric methods suffer from using biased sampling—convenience and judgement sampling—that undermine their accuracy. Two emerging methodologies—system dynamics and artificial neural networks (ANN)—can be considered unconventional.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Makowski, Krzysztof A. „Between Germans and Poles: The Jews of Poznań in 1848“. In Polin: Studies in Polish Jewry Volume 14, 68–82. Liverpool University Press, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.3828/liverpool/9781874774693.003.0005.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

This chapter considers the stance of the Jews of Poznań during the tumultuous Spring of Nations in 1848. It attempts to put an end to the simplifications, myths, and stereotypes in the historical literature concerning the Spring of Nations in the Poznań region. With a few exceptions, the stereotypes formed in 1848 in evaluations of the attitude of Poznań's Jews have been continually and uncritically repeated, and, as a result, have become established in historical literature. In many publications, the judgement of authors has additionally been clouded by emotion and bias, not to mention occasionally even partisanship or hatred. Therefore, the chapter seeks to re-evaluate the attitude of the Jews in the Grand Duchy of Poznań to the events of the Springtime of the Nations in a way that is free of oversimplification. Because of its limited framework, the chapter only summarizes and gives a critique of the literature on the subject to date. It also pays some attention to how the events of 1848 resonated beyond the Duchy.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Kalantar, Bahareh, Husam A.H. Al-najjar, Hossein Mojaddadi Rizeei, Maruwan S.A.B. Amazeeq, Mohammed Oludare Idrees, Alfian Abdul Halin und Shattri Mansor. „Urban Planning Using a Geospatial Approach: A Case Study of Libya“. In Sustainability in Urban Planning and Design. IntechOpen, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.86355.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

Large scale developmental projects firstly require the selection of one or more cities to be developed. In Libya, the selection process is done by selected organizations, which is highly influenced by human judgement that can be inconsiderate of socioeconomic and environmental factors. In this study, we propose an automated selection process, which takes into consideration only the important factors for city (cities) selection. Specifically, a geospatial decision-making tool, free of human bias, is proposed based on the fuzzy overlay (FO) and technique for order performance by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS) techniques for development projects in Libya. In this work, a dataset of 17 evaluation criteria (GIS factors) across five urban conditioning factors were prepared. The dataset served as input to the FO model to calculate weights (importance) for each criterion. A support vector machine (SVM) classifier was then trained to refine weights from the FO model. TOPSIS was then applied on the refined results to rank the cities for development. Experimental results indicate promising overall accuracy and kappa statistics. Our findings also show that highest and lowest success rates are 0.94 and 0.79, respectively, while highest and lowest prediction rates are 0.884 and 0.673, respectively.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Konferenzberichte zum Thema "Judgement bias"

Novianti, Suzy, Keviniana Tunbonat und Intiyas Utami. „Accountability and Herding Bias: An Experimental Study on Audit Fraud Judgement“. In Proceedings of The First International Conference on Financial Forensics and Fraud, ICFF, 13-14 August 2019, Bali, Indonesia. EAI, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4108/eai.13-8-2019.2294265.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Al-Hajri, Jefain, und Moray Kidd. „A Critical Assessment of How Leaning the Risk Assessment Process Induces Biased Judgement“. In ASME 2012 International Mechanical Engineering Congress and Exposition. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/imece2012-89817.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

Annotation:

Over the years, the hydrocarbon industry has been riddled with accidents and incidences that can be partly blamed on “cost cutting” driven risk assessments and operational “lean management”. The epicentre of lean management is the elimination of waste for any industrial setup. However, when the processes are too lean accidents may ensue; putting the facilities, workers and the business at risk. Even though the hydrocarbon industry has reliable quantitative risk assessment techniques that may incorporate probabilistic measures to predict the likelihood of systems failure, there are times when “human call” is cardinal to decisions. Whenever human call is used in risk assessment there is a possibility of biasness in the judgement for risk partly due to the social-cultural influence on risk assessors. Therefore the aim of this research was to examine the level of social and cognitive bias in risk assessment of lean management processes at four oil and gas refinery plants in Kuwait. Using ethnomethodology as a research strategy it was possible to gather contextual primary information from the workers at the four refineries. Results from the research indicate that there is a high level of human involvement in risk assessment processes where social-cultural and psychological attributes of the risk assessors are evident. However, current risk assessment tools and processes do not engage risk assessors at a social-cultural level; hence ignoring the influence of biased judgement on risk scores. It can therefore be concluded that unlike technical risk assessment, there is poor incorporation of social-cultural and psychological initiatives in the processes leading to poor decisions that endanger hydrocarbon installations. It is recommended that the hydrocarbon industry in Kuwait strives to apply lean management principles by ensuring that there is detailed analysis of social and cognitive bias in the technical proceedings so as to simultaneously promote efficiency and safety at work.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

„JUDGEMENTAL BIAS AND HOUSING CHOICE“. In 17th Annual European Real Estate Society Conference: ERES Conference 2010. ERES, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.15396/eres2010_242.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Bando, Lorena Leal, Falk Scholer und Andrew Turpin. „Sentence length bias in TREC novelty track judgements“. In the Seventeenth Australasian Document Computing Symposium. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2407085.2407093.

Der volle Inhalt der Quelle

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO und andere Zitierweisen

Wir bieten Rabatte auf alle Premium-Pläne für Autoren, deren Werke in thematische Literatursammlungen aufgenommen wurden. Kontaktieren Sie uns, um einen einzigartigen Promo-Code zu erhalten!