Auswahl der wissenschaftlichen Literatur zum Thema „Joint Senior Command and Staff Programme“

The growing number of armed conflicts in Africa has impacted adversely on women who fall victims to violence, sexual abuse and harassment. Women play a minimal role as combatants during the armed conflicts and as peace negotiators after the armed conflicts. This article looks at the role women play in the pre-armed and post-armed conflict phases in an African context. Data for this article were gathered through questionnaires distributed to twenty women officers who participated in the Joint Senior Command and Staff Programme (JSCSP) at the South African National War College. The findings make it evident that women often participate unwillingly as combatants in an armed conflict; they face social changes in the post-armed conflict phase that make their roles change in both their families and communities, and often neglected in the postarmed conflict negotiations and conflict resolution processes.

The Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986 was the most comprehensive and important defense reorganization legislation since its initial establishment in 1947. It has administrated the way the United States has organized, planned, and conducted military operations for the last thirty years. Despite this, a strong opposition movement organized primarily by Navy Secretary John F. Lehman, almost endangred the adoption of the mentioned above law. This opposition also included members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prominent Senators and Congressman, and Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger. A ten year retrospective of the Act’s passage at the National Defense University (NDU) in 1999 detailed its six most significant achievements. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as an individual, was designated the principal military advisor to the President and other senior officials. The Chairman was assigned new responsibilities in the areas of strategic planning, logistics, net assessments, joint doctrine, and joint programs and budgets. A Vice Chairman position, outranking the other chiefs was created to assist the Chairman and act as the Chairman in his or her absence. The Joint Staff was expanded beyond 400 members and placed directly under the control of the Chairman. The power and influence of the deployed unified commanders was also increased by providing them authority over subordinate commands in their areas of responsibility, especially regarding joint training, force organization, and force employment. Finally, the Joint Specialty Officer program was mandated. This program was designed to ensure the services assigned some of their highest quality officers to joint duty.”1 Nearly all in attendance at the 1999 NDU event concluded that passage of the legislation was a universal good. The subject of the article is the influence of international US military campaigns on the adoption of Goldwater-Nichols Act. This article tends to examine the background which led to the adoption of Goldwater Nichols Act, the opposition of the Marines and Navy against the aforementioned Act. The goal is to analyze the main changes brought in by the Goldwater-Nichols Act and their impact on the development of the US military. The phenomena concern “Joint Forces” and the increase of effective cooperation between the departments. The key provisions, which strengthened the position of the Secretary of Defense and outlined its role in the chain of command, will be evaluated. Keywords: Goldwater-Nichols Act, reorganization, conflict, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, unified commanders

BackgroundQuality improvement (QI) has been shown to deliver better patient outcomes, and improved operational, organisational and financial performance when led effectively and supported by organisational systems and training. Surveys of staff and patient satisfaction also show positive effects. In many trusts that Care Quality Commission (CQC) has rated as outstanding, a culture of QI has been embedded throughout the organisation.ObjectivesWe wanted to hear trusts’ experiences of using QI as a systematic approach to improving service quality, efficiency and morale, and share learning from these organisations to drive further improvement to quality of care.MethodsUsing CQC’s comprehensive inspection programme of all healthcare providers nationally, we identified 19 trusts for inclusion and carried out an in-depth review of their improvement journeys.ResultsWe found that commitment from the board and senior leadership is crucial to ensuring success on the QI journey, modelling effective leadership behaviours that enable all staff to deliver improvement. These organisations have a systematic approach to QI, using a consistent model, anchored in a systems perspective, and often across a health system. The model of improvement requires leaders of all backgrounds and frontline staff to work together in improvement, and can help to break down barriers between managers and clinicians, and providers and patients, so there is a shared purpose to deliver better care to patients.ConclusionsQI is not a magic bullet, but is an important factor in the evolution of an organisation from a traditional ‘command and control’ form of management towards higher performing approaches to the design and management of work.

ABSTRACT: #2017-026 The objective of this paper is to highlight Arctic planning and response collaboration initiative between the Norwegian Coastal Administration (NCA) and United States Coast Guard (USCG) Office of Marine Environmental Response (MER) Policy on numerous spill preparedness and response topics. The paper focuses on engagement efforts between NCA and USCG MER on IOSC’s 2017 overarching themes of Prevent, Prepare, Respond, and Restore. The NCA and USCG MER signed a Letter of Intent to Cooperate in 2014 on spill preparedness and response topics. These collaboration efforts include sharing of exercise lessons learned during joint workshops, training opportunities, and response equipment testing. As a result of these collaboration efforts, USCG MER representatives attended the 2015 Norwegian Clean Seas Association (NOFO)/NCA annual test of new spill technologies and procedures. The exercise was hosted by NOFO/NCA and was held offshore in the North Sea approximately 140 miles northwest of Stavanger, Norway. The exercise was held June 9–11, 2015, at the abandoned Frigg Oilfield and included verification of the Marine Oil Spill (MOS) Sweeper I, Desmi Forlense, MOS Sweeper II, NorLense Oiltrawl, Current Buster 6, and NASA remote sensing equipment. Another result of this collaboration is that NCA will evaluate its present Incident Command System (ELS). As part of this evaluation, NCA sent two senior staff members to Yorktown in September 2015 to participate in two USCG courses: 1) OSC Crises Management, and 2) ICS-410 Advanced Incident Command.

This study examines a teaching-oriented higher education community which undertook a major programme of change when planning a new campus and redesigning its pedagogics. This is a single case qualitative study based on in-depth interviews of community members and field observations and using activity theory as an analytical framework. It is suggested that instead of merely being a rhetorical tool of senior management, distributed leadership can be practised in higher education communities for the benefit of the learners, the teaching and administrative staff and the local community. The study emphasises the importance of the joint sense making of the pedagogical approach in the creation of distributed leadership practices in a teaching-oriented higher education community. It also highlights how higher education students may take an active role in a work system characterised by distributed leadership, and how the infrastructure of a campus building may support distributed leadership.

Novembra 2011 je na Poveljstvu za doktrino, razvoj, izobraževanje in usposablja- nje potekalo 5. redno srečanje Foruma centralnih evropskih držav o vojaškem izo- braževanju (Central European Forum on Military Education – CEFME). Osrednja tema posveta je bila izobraževanje vojaških strategov. Na srečanju so sodelovali visoki predstavniki s področja vojaškega izobraževanja iz devetih srednjeevropskih držav in predstavnik zveze Nato. Osrednja referata sta pripravila Uroš Krek, preda- vatelj predmeta vojaška strategija v generalštabnem programu Slovenske vojske, in polkovnica Mojca Pešec. V nadaljevanju avtorja predstavljata poglede na programe izobraževanja vojaških strategov v Sloveniji s teoretičnega in praktičnega vidika in utemeljujeta potrebo po intenzivnejšem in kakovostnejšem študiju strateške teorije za učitelje in študente predmeta vojaška strategija, nujnost oblikovanja celovitega programa učenja strategije z vidika izbora udeležencev in predavateljev ter potrebo po postavljanju dosegljivih ciljev, ko gre za časovni obseg in določanje vsebin programa. In November 2011, the 5th regular meeting of the Central European Forum on Military Education (CEFME) was convened at the Doctrine, Development, Education and Training Command. The central theme of the conference was military strategist training. The meeting brought together senior military education representatives from nine Central European countries, and a represen- tative of NATO. The two central papers were prepared by Uroš Krek, military strategy lecturer in the Slovenian Armed Forces General Staff Programme, and by Colonel Mojca Pešec. In their article, the authors present views on education programmes for military strategists in Slovenia from the theoretical and practical point of view, and substantiate the need for more intensive and better quality strategic theory study programmes for military strategy teachers and students. They also define the need for developing a comprehensive programme of learning the strategy in terms of selection of participants and lecturers, and the need for setting up achievable targets when it comes to time frame and the determination of programme subjects.

The following document, previously unpublished, was written in March 2010 by a recently retired ( June 2009) U.S. Army colonel with thirty years experience in the Middle East, including tours of duty and advisory roles (in both military/security and civilian domains) from North Africa to the Persian Gulf. The subject of the informal report is the author's first two trips as a "civilian" to Israel and the West Bank, where he had served two tours of duty, most recently as U.S. military attachéé in Tel Aviv during Israel's 2005 unilateral disengagement from Gaza and the formation of the U.S. Security Coordinator's (USSC) mission to reform Palestinian Authority (PA) security forces. Written as an internal document for military colleagues and government circles, the report has been circulating widely——as did the author's earlier briefings on travel or missions in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and especially Iraq——among White House senior staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency, CENTCOM (U.S. Central Command), EUCOM (U.S. European Command), and the USSC team. The document's focus is the state of the "peace process" and the current situation in the West Bank, with particular attention to the PA security forces and the changes on the ground since the author's last tour there ended in mid-2007. But the real interest of the paper lies in the message directed at its intended audience of military and government policy officials——that is, its frank assessment of the deficiencies of the U.S. peace effort and the wider U.S. policy-making system in the Israel-Palestine arena, with particular emphasis on the disconnect between the situation on the ground and the process led by Washington. The critique has special resonance in light of the emerging new thinking in the administration fueled by the military high command's unhappiness (expressed by CENTCOM commander General David Petraeus and Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Admiral Michael Mullen) with the State Department's handling of Middle East diplomacy, especially with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, on the grounds that diplomatic failures are having a negative impact on U.S. operations elsewhere in the region. For most JPS readers, the report has additional interest as an insider's view of the U.S. security presence in the Israel-Palestine arena. It also reflects a military approach that is often referenced but largely absent in public discourse and academic writings. The author, in addition to his tours of duty and peacekeeping missions in various Middle Eastern countries, has served as advisor to two U.S. special Middle East envoys, the U.S. negotiating team with Syria, General Petraeus, Lieutenant General Keith Dayton, Vice President Dick Cheney, and, more generally, to CENTCOM, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, among others. In retirement, he has worked with CENTCOM as a key primary subject matter expert in the development of analyses and solutions for its area of responsibility, leads predeployment briefings for army units heading to Iraq, and travels frequently to Iraq and elsewhere in the region as an independent consultant. He is currently in Afghanistan with the CENTCOM commander's Afghanistan-Pakistan Center of Excellence. The report, made available to JPS, is being published with the author's permission.

Forty-three organisations from 22 countries network their capacities of research in SARNET (Severe Accident Research NETwork of excellence) to resolve the most important remaining uncertainties and safety issues on severe accidents in existing and future water-cooled nuclear power plants (NPP). After a first project in the 6th Framework Programme (FP6) of the European Commission, the SARNET2 project, coordinated by IRSN, started in April 2009 for 4 years in the FP7 frame. After 2,5 years, some main outcomes of joint research (modelling and experiments) by the network members on the highest priority issues are presented: in-vessel degraded core coolability, molten-corium-concrete-interaction, containment phenomena (water spray, hydrogen combustion…), source term issues (mainly iodine behaviour). The ASTEC integral computer code, jointly developed by IRSN and GRS to predict the NPP SA behaviour, capitalizes in terms of models the knowledge produced in the network: a few validation results are presented. For dissemination of knowledge, an educational 1-week course was organized for young researchers or students in January 2011, and a two-day course is planned mid-2012 for senior staff. Mobility of young researchers or students between the European partners is being promoted. The ERMSAR conference is becoming the major worldwide conference on SA research.

In the increasingly complex security environment the education of military strategists is a topic which is again becoming of interest. More than ever before, the armed forces need leaders who will be capable of strategic thinking. In November 2011, the 5th regular meeting of the Central European Forum on Military Education (CEFME) was convened at the Doctrine, Development, Education and Training Command. The central theme of the conference was the training of military strategist. The meeting brought together senior military education representatives from nine Central European countries, and a representative of NATO. The two central papers were prepared by Uroš Krek, military strategy lecturer in the Slovenian Armed Forces General Staff Programme, and by Colonel Mojca Pešec. In their article, the authors present views on education programmes for military strategists in Slovenia from the theoretical and practical point of view, and substantiate the need for more intensive and better quality strategic theory study programmes for military strategy teachers and students. They also define the need for developing a comprehensive programme of learning the strategy in terms of selection of participants and lecturers, and the need for setting up achievable targets when it comes to the time frame and the determination of programme subjects. It is essential to form a new generation of competent officers who will be able to identify the 21st century security challenges and contribute expertly to the civil-military process of the strategies formulation. Izobraževanje vojaških strategov je tema, ki v pogojih vedno bolj kompleksnega varnostnega okolja postaja ponovno aktualna. Vojske bolj kot kdaj koli prej potrebujejo voditelje, ki bodo sposobni strateškega razmišljanja. Novembra 2011 je na Poveljstvu za doktrino, razvoj, izobraževanje in usposabljanje potekalo 5. redno srečanje Foruma centralnih evropskih držav o vojaškem izobraževanju (Central European Forum on Military Education – CEFME). Osrednja tema posveta je bilo izobraževanje vojaških strategov. Na srečanju so sodelovali visoki predstavniki s področja vojaškega izobraževanja iz devetih srednjeevropskih držav in predstavnik zveze Nato. Osrednja referata sta pripravila Uroš Krek, predavatelj predmeta vojaška strategija v generalštabnem programu Slovenske vojske, in polkovnica Mojca Pešec. V nadaljevanju avtorja predstavljata poglede na programe izobraževanja vojaških strategov v Sloveniji s teoretičnega in praktičnega vidika in utemeljujeta potrebo po intenzivnejšem in kakovostnejšem študiju strateške teorije za učitelje in študente predmeta vojaška strategija, nujnost oblikovanja celovitega programa učenja strategije z vidika izbora udeležencev in predavateljev ter potrebo po postavljanju dosegljivih ciljev, ko gre za časovni obseg in določanje vsebin programa. Oblikovanje nove generacije kompetentnih častnikov, ki bodo sposobni prepoznati varnostne izzive 21. stoletja in strokovno prispevati k civilno- vojaškemu procesu oblikovanja strategij, je nujno.

I first arrived at the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, then simply the Institute of Development Economics, at the beginning of October 1960. It was located on the top floor of the Old Sindh Assembly Building on Bunder Road in Karachi. At the time the Joint Director, the resident head of the Institute, was Irving Brecher, a Canadian economist. The Director of the Institute was Emile Despres, the ex-officio head of Ford Foundation’s Pakistan Project administered from Williams College, later from Stanford University, who spent only a few weeks each year at the Institute. The Institute had a number of foreign research advisers funded by the Ford Foundation Project and a handful of Pakistani staff members, very few of them at senior levels. For me the Institute was a refuge. Since my graduation from the Dhaka University at the end of 1959 I had been teaching in the Department of Economics. I had also been selected for graduate studies in England starting the fall of 1960 under an award of the newly-instituted Commonwealth Scholarship programme. In July 1960 I was dismissed from my teaching position at the University due to alleged undesirable political antecedents during my student days. A few weeks later my scholarship for study abroad was also withdrawn by the Government of Pakistan whose approval was a prerequisite for the finalisation of the award. The prospect of alternative employment was bleak with little private sector demand for economics graduates at the time. I had been interviewed by Emile Despres and his colleagues who were on a recruitment mission the previous winter in Dhaka. The teaching appointment at the University, coming on the heels of the interview, had preempted a possible offer from them. A few weeks after I lost my scholarship, I received a telegram from the Institute offering me the position of a Research Officer (later named Staff Economist). This rescued me from what appeared to be virtual banishment from all possibility of a meaningful career. This was the beginning of the series of many kind acts by the Institute and its members which over time made me accustomed to treating it as a home even after my formal employment in it ended.

Since 2002 the Joint Senior Command and Staff Programme was annually presented at the South African National War College (SANWC) in Pretoria. This qualification was from 2008 to 2018 accredited with the Safety and Security Seta (SASSETA) as an NQF level 7 diploma in Defence Studies. In 2019 the qualification migrated to the Council on Higher Education as an NQF level 8, postgraduate diploma in Defence Studies. The aim of the qualification is to enable graduates to function as commanders and staff officers on the operational level of war (the planning and conduct of major operations and campaigns) to be utilised within the African battle space. It is also an entry requirement for the highest National Defence Force qualification, the Security and Defence Study Programme, presented at the South African National Defence College in Thaba Tshwane. This programme is accredited on NQF level 9, a master’s degree in Defence Studies. The credibility of the academic subject disciplines presented on the programme is an important facet of education and the development of problem-solving skills. Deep learning also develops a critical mindset in students with the approach that the educator’s knowledge is but an expression of current scientific research results, something that can change. The main research question is, to what extent did deep learning take place in the academic subjects on the programme of 2018? Secondly, why did the learning process during 2018 take place the way that it did? The third question is, what can be done to improve the level of deep learning as it stands to reason that it will contribute to the credibility of the qualification in a postgraduate dispensation? The research focused on the phases of the learning process, curriculum design, facilitation and assessment of selected subjects and educational quality assurance. The research findings were that the curriculum design only partially complied with the tenets of deep learning and the adherence to deep learning during the facilitation, and assessment processes were incidental. In accordance with the third research question, it is recommended that the learning process can be improved if some aspects of the programme are redesigned.
Thesis (PhD)--University of Pretoria, 2020.
pt2021
Humanities Education
PhD
Unrestricted

Set at the September 4, 1991, congressional hearing at the Rayburn Office Building, Washington, D.C., the chapter uses Lieutenant General John Shalikashvili’s testimony to a House Armed Services Committee defense panel on military operations other than war (MOOTW) to thumbnail how Operation Provide Comfort was successfully concluded. It also describes how the success of the mission led to Shalikashvili’s current position as Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell. It also flashes back to Shalikashvili’s tour as a major in the Vietnam War, when he served as a senior district advisor for Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). In that posting he was heavily involved in pacification efforts (increasing rice production, building roads, constructing hospitals, etc.) as well Operation Fisher, another significant refugee resettlement program. Shalikashvili’s Vietnam experience would be a major developmental step leading him to being more open to the use of force than Colin Powell.