Auswahl der wissenschaftlichen Literatur zum Thema „Jeu à information incomplète“
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Zeitschriftenartikel zum Thema "Jeu à information incomplète"
Fernandez, Marcelo Ariel, Kirill Rudov und Leeat Yariv. „Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information“. American Economic Review: Insights 4, Nr. 1 (01.03.2022): 18–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20210123.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleForges, Françoise. „Coopération en information incomplète : quelques modèles stratégiques“. Revue d'économie politique 127, Nr. 4 (2017): 467. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/redp.274.0467.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleSchummer, James, und Rodrigo A. Velez. „Sequential Preference Revelation in Incomplete Information Settings“. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 13, Nr. 1 (01.02.2021): 116–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20180065.
Der volle Inhalt der Quellede Clippel, Geoffroy, Jack Fanning und Kareen Rozen. „Bargaining over Contingent Contracts under Incomplete Information“. American Economic Review 112, Nr. 5 (01.05.2022): 1522–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201026.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleHanany, Eran, Peter Klibanoff und Sujoy Mukerji. „Incomplete Information Games with Ambiguity Averse Players“. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 12, Nr. 2 (01.05.2020): 135–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20180302.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleJong-Hee Hahn. „Monopoly Pricing of Congestible Resources with Incomplete Information“. Journal of Economic Research (JER) 12, Nr. 2 (November 2007): 243–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.17256/jer.2007.12.2.005.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleLiu, Crocker H., Adam D. Nowak und Patrick S. Smith. „Asymmetric or Incomplete Information about Asset Values?“ Review of Financial Studies 33, Nr. 7 (16.09.2019): 2898–936. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz096.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleLaffont, Jean-Jacques. „Collusion et information asymétrique“. Articles 73, Nr. 4 (09.02.2009): 595–609. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/602242ar.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleLaffont, Jean-Jacques, Michel Moreaux, Marcel Boyer und Philippe Mahenc. „Concurrence spatiale et distorsions de localisation en information incomplète“. Revue économique 42, Nr. 6 (1991): 1047–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/reco.1991.409329.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleBoyer, Marcel, Jean-Jacques Laffont, Philippe Mahenc und Michel Moreaux. „Concurrence spatiale et distorsions de localisation en information incomplète“. Revue économique 42, Nr. 6 (November 1991): 1047. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3502023.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleDissertationen zum Thema "Jeu à information incomplète"
Gensbittel, Fabien. „Analyse asymptotique de jeux répétés à information incomplète“. Phd thesis, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I, 2010. http://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00579522.
Der volle Inhalt der QuellePourtallier, Odile. „Étude d'un jeu dynamique en information incomplète : le jeu du chasseur et du lapin“. Nice, 1990. http://www.theses.fr/1990NICE4417.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleGrün, Christine. „Jeux différentiels stochastiques à information incomplète“. Thesis, Brest, 2012. http://www.theses.fr/2012BRES0017/document.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleThe objective of this thesis is the study of stochastic differential games with incomplete information. We consider a game with two opponent players who control a diffusion in order to minimize, respectively maximize a certain payoff. To model the information incompleteness we will follow the famous ansatz of Aumann and Maschler. We assume that there are different states of nature in which the game can take place. Before the game starts the state is chosen randomly. The information is then transmitted to one player while the second one only knows the respective probabilities for each state. In this thesis we establish a dual representation for stochastic differential games with incomplete information. Therein we make a vast use of the theory of backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs), which turns out to be an indispensable tool in this study. Moreover we show how under some restrictions that this representation allows to construct optimal strategies for the informed player.Morover we give - using the dual representation - a strikingly simple proof for semiconvexity of the value function of differential games with incomplete information. Another part of this thesis is devoted to numerical schemes for stochastic differential games with incomplete information. In the last part we investigate continuous time optimal stopping games, so called Dynkin games, with information incompleteness. We show that these games have a value and a unique characterization by a fully non-linear variational PDE for which we provide a comparison principle. Also we establish a dual representation for Dynkin games with incomplete information
Umbhauer, Gisèle. „Information incomplete et qualite des produits“. Strasbourg 1, 1989. http://www.theses.fr/1989STR10013.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleThis thesis points out the impact of incomplete and asymmetric information on product prices and qualities, in a context of monopolistic competition in quality. To this aim one constructs a few models where one or more sellers face a consumer group, whose particularity consists in perceiving the product quality only after purchase. The study of these models leads to an analysis of the recent game theory equilibrium criteria. It underlines the fact that most of these criteria fail some logical tests, or do not take into account the whole rationality of the players. So it leads to the construction of three new equilibrium criteria, which are based on the absence of contradiction in the interpretation of players' actions, and on a whole exploitation of the signals conveyed both by deviations (of equilibrium strategies) and equilibrium actions. These criteria bring into light the complexity of the impact of incomplete and asymmetric information on the most important variables of the studied price and quality models
Gruen, Christine. „Jeux différentiels stochastiques à information incomplète“. Phd thesis, Université de Bretagne occidentale - Brest, 2012. http://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00802378.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleLaraki, Rida. „Jeux répétés à information incomplète : approche variationnelle“. Paris 6, 2000. http://www.theses.fr/2000PA066263.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleWu, Xiaochi. „Jeux différentiels avec information incomplète : signaux et révélations“. Thesis, Brest, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018BRES0023/document.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleIn this thesis we investigate two-person zero-sum differential games with incomplete information. The information structure is related to a signal communicated to the players during the game.In such games, the information is symmetric if both players receive the same signal (namely it is a public signal). Otherwise, if the players could receive different signals (i.e. they receive private signals), the information is asymmetric. We prove in this thesis the existence of value and the characterization of the value function by a partial differential equation for various types of such games.A particular type of such information structure is the symmetric case in which the players receive as their signal the current state of the dynamical system at the moment when the state of the dynamic hits a fixed target set (the unknown initial data are then revealed to both players). For this type of games, we introduce the notion of signal-depending non-anticipative strategies with delay and we prove the existence of value with such strategies.As the value functions are in general irregular (at most continuous), a crucial step of our approach is to prove the uniqueness results and the comparison principles for viscosity solutions of new types of Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation associated to the games studied in this thesis
As, Soulaimani Sami. „Approchabilité, viabilité et jeux différentiels en information incomplète“. Brest, 2008. http://www.theses.fr/2008BRES2034.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleIn this thesis we study three main problems related to the lack of information framework in game theory. First, we study the notion of approachability in a repeated game with vector payoffs from a new point of view using qualitative differential game techniques. Namely we relate the sufficient condition for approachability (B set) to the notion of discriminating domain for a suitably chosen differential game and we introduce *approachability in related deterministic repeated game. We prove that a closed set is *approachable if and only if it contains a nonempty B-set, hence approachability and *approchability coincide. In addition one of the main goals of this part is to state a precise link between the strategies in the differential game and in the repeated game preserving approachability properties. In the second part, we study an infinite horizon discounted zero-sum differential game with lack of information on both sides. For doing this we follow the model adopted by Cardaliaguet : we find a sub-dynamic programming principle then we prove that the upper and lower value functions are respectively sub and super viscosity solutions in the dual sense of a suitable Hamilton Jacobi equation. Using a comparison principle we prove the uniqueness of a viscosity solution in the dual sense and thus the existence of the value. The last part is devoted to provide an extension of the Viability and Invanance Theorems in the Wasserstein metric space of probability measures. As application we consider an optimal control prob1em of Mayer type with uncertainty on the initial state modeled by a probability measure. Following Frankowska, we prove using the epigraphical viability approach that the value function is the unique proximal episolution of a suitable Hamilton Jacobi equation
Li, Junkang. „Games with incomplete information : complexity, algorithmics, reasoning“. Electronic Thesis or Diss., Normandie, 2023. http://www.theses.fr/2023NORMC270.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleIn this dissertation, we study games with incomplete information. We begin by establishing a complete landscape of the complexity of computing optimal pure strategies for different subclasses of games, when games are given explicitly as input. We then study the complexity when games are represented compactly (e.g.\ by their game rules). For this, we design two formalisms for such compact representations. Then we concentrate on games with incomplete information, by first proposing a new formalism called combinatorial game with incomplete information, which encompasses games of no chance (apart from a random initial drawing) and with only public actions. For such games, this new formalism captures the notion of information and knowledge of the players in a game better than extensive form. Next, we study algorithms and their optimisations for solving combinatorial games with incomplete information; some of these algorithms are applicable beyond these games. In the last part, we present a work in progress that concerns the modelling of recursive reasoning and different types of knowledge about the behaviour of the opponents in games with incomplete information
Marino, Alexandre. „Finance et Jeux répétés avec asymétrie d'information“. Phd thesis, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I, 2005. http://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00010291.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleBücher zum Thema "Jeu à information incomplète"
Scott, Gates, und Humes Brian D, Hrsg. Game theory topics: Incomplete information, repeated games, and N-player games. Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications, 1998.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenBayle, Alain. Accès à l'information et protection de la vie privée: Du phénomène politique au jeu politique, perspectives québécoises. [Québec]: [Laboratoire d'études politiques et administratives, Département de science politique, Faculté des sciences sociales, Université Laval], 1991.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenBuchteile zum Thema "Jeu à information incomplète"
Beris, Antony N., und Brian J. Edwards. „The Dynamical Theory of Liquid Crystals“. In Thermodynamics of Flowing Systems: with Internal Microstructure. Oxford University Press, 1994. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195076943.003.0016.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleKonferenzberichte zum Thema "Jeu à information incomplète"
Pease, Leonard F., und Judith Ann Bamberger. „Attached Jet Velocity Profiles in Mixing Tanks“. In ASME 2020 Fluids Engineering Division Summer Meeting collocated with the ASME 2020 Heat Transfer Summer Conference and the ASME 2020 18th International Conference on Nanochannels, Microchannels, and Minichannels. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/fedsm2020-20220.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleKhoshnoud, Farbod, Ibrahim I. Esat, Richard H. C. Bonser, Clarence W. de Silva, Michael M. McKerns und Houman Owhadi. „Self-Powered and Bio-Inspired Dynamic Systems: Research and Education“. In ASME 2016 International Mechanical Engineering Congress and Exposition. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/imece2016-65276.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleBerichte der Organisationen zum Thema "Jeu à information incomplète"
Dufour, Quentin, David Pontille und Didier Torny. Contracter à l’heure de la publication en accès ouvert. Une analyse systématique des accords transformants. Ministère de l'enseignement supérieur et de la recherche, April 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.52949/2.
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