Dissertationen zum Thema „Intencionality“

La tesi fa un estudi intens i crític de l'obra filosòfica del professor nordamericà John Searle, qui va formalitzar el que es coneix com "teoria dels actes de parla". Es presenta una investigació sobre els temes principals del pensament de Searle: llenguatge, ment i "background" així com les conexions que hi ha entre ells. Aquest estudi suposa una crítica a alguns aspectes poc clars de la concepció del llenguatge de Searle, i, a la vegada, una aposta a possibles solucions a aquestos aspectes.

MOITA, Cristiano de Aguiar Portela. Entre hermenêutica filosófica e hermenêutica jurídica: do caráter produtivo da compreensão a uma crítica ao argumento intencionalista. 2016. 125 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Direito) - Faculdade de Direito, Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Direito, Fortaleza, 2016.
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The problem of understanding has acquired a perspective as much promising as polemic since the developments of the philosophical hermeneutics. The contemporary legal hermeneutics must deal with this school of thought if it wants to depurate its studies concerning the interpretation and the application of texts, specially the juridical ones. One of the several paths that it must follow is the one related to the meaning of texts, not just one possible meaning, but the adequate and the correct one. And that was always afflicted to the jurist, i.e., to identify a secure criterion to the textual interpretation. Until today, enough updated, some theories struggle to develop methods which can guarantee certain objectivity in the interpretation. That is the case of intentionalism and the originalism. But this search for interpretative certainty cannot disregard what lies behind every and single act of understanding, i.e., a preconceptual structure, essentially historic, that can put down some of these theories of meaning. That does not imply a relativistic attitude, but the recognition that the understanding can be non-arbitrary. Thereby, this work aims in establish a specific contribution that philosophical hermeneutics can provide to legal hermeneutics: a description of the understanding phenomenon that can help jurists avoid some arguments, especially those intentionalists and originalists, which are constantly and decisively brought in some legal decisions. This research seeks to demonstrate this contribution through the following way: firstly, it exposes some of the fundamental traces of philosophical hermeneutics; secondly, it analyses the first contact held between this school of thought and the legal hermeneutics in order to defend the possibility of a correct, non-relativistic interpretation; thirdly, it deepens in the relation between philosophical hermeneutics and legal hermeneutics, through the explanation of the productive character of the understanding, something already noticed by some legal theorists but centralized in such peculiar way by Gadamer around the fundamental problem of the application; lastly, after demonstrating some difficulties in contemporary intentionalists theories, it analyses a legal decision that has used similar arguments, contestable by the theses defended in this research.
O problema da compreensão adquiriu uma perspectiva tão promissora quanto polêmica a partir dos desenvolvimentos da hermenêutica filosófica. A hermenêutica jurídica contemporânea tem de lidar com essa corrente de pensamento se quiser depurar os estudos acerca da interpretação e da aplicação de textos, mormente os jurídicos. Uma das várias sendas que deve percorrer é aquela que diz respeito ao sentido dos textos, não só um sentido possível, mas o sentido adequado e correto. E isso sempre foi aflitivo para o jurista: identificar um critério seguro para a interpretação textual. Ainda hoje, bastante atualizadas, algumas teorias esforçam-se por desenvolver métodos que garantam certa objetividade na interpretação. É o caso do intencionalismo. Mas essa busca por segurança interpretativa não pode desconsiderar aquilo que está por trás de todo ato de compreensão, isto é, uma estrutura preconceitual, essencialmente histórica, que pode pôr abaixo algumas teses dessas teorias do sentido. Isso não implica uma postura relativista, mas sim o reconhecimento de que a compreensão pode não ser arbitrária. Dessa maneira, este trabalho preocupa-se em estabelecer uma contribuição específica que a hermenêutica filosófica pode fornecer para a hermenêutica jurídica: uma descrição do fenômeno da compreensão que ajude juristas evitar alguns argumentos, especialmente os de caráter intencionalista e originalista, cotidiana e decisivamente colacionados em algumas decisões judiciais. Esta pesquisa pretende demonstrar esta contribuição pelo seguinte caminho: em primeiro lugar, expondo alguns dos traços fundamentais da hermenêutica filosófica; em segundo lugar, analisando o primeiro contato travado entre essa corrente e a hermenêutica jurídica e defendendo a possibilidade de uma compreensão correta, não relativista na hermenêutica filosófica; em terceiro lugar, aprofundando-se na relação entre hermenêutica filosófica e hermenêutica jurídica, a partir da explicação do caráter produtivo da compreensão, algo já notado por alguns teóricos do direito, mas que foi centralizado de maneira peculiar por Gadamer em torno do problema fundamental da aplicação; por fim, após demonstrar algumas dificuldades de teorias intencionalistas contemporâneas, analisar uma decisão que recorreu a argumentos similares, contestáveis a partir da tese defendida nesta pesquisa.

En aquesta tesi es tracta un cas concret i significatiu d'interacció entre anàlisi conceptual i investigació científica en psicologia cognitiva: l'aspecte demostratiu de la percepció, un tret central que ha estat estudiat recentment per filòsofs com ara Peter Strawson, Gareth Evans, Christopher Peacocke, John McDowell, John Campbell i Bill Brewer (encara que ja fou objecte d'atenció per part de Hegel a les primeres seccions de la Fenomenologia de l'espirit). La gran majoria dels filòsofs esmentats postulen un mode de presentació demostratiu perceptual distintiu, i tracten d'explicar en què consisteix. Per aquest propòsit, i en consonància amb una utilització heurística de desenvolupaments recents en l'anàlisi dels modes de presentació de les expresions indèxiques, es proposa que el mode de presentació demostratiu en els judicis de percepció és reflexiu del exemplar (token-reflexive). Aquest enfocament està d'acord amb el de Searle d'una manera general, però en el seu desenvolupament concret s'incorpora l'aspecte atencional enfasitzat per John Campbell i Naomi Eilan. La proposta es modela inicialment mitjançant una descripció ('l'objecte atès en aquest acte d'atenció) que s'interpreta referencialment per explicar el tret de particularitat de la percepció.
A la segona part de la tesi s'analitza l'accés conscient a (adonar-se de) aquest mode de presentació (assenyalat per l'expressió demostratiu a la descripció anterior). El problema s'enfoca partint de l'examen d'algunes motivacions per postular que la percepció es dóna normalment en virtut de l'exemplificació de qualitats sensorials o qualia en el subjecte. S'adopta en aquest punt la hipòtesi auxiliar que una concepció dels qualia parcialment funcional i externista defensada en escrits recents per autors com ara Shoemaker i García-Carpintero permet superar amb èxit els coneguts problemes de les teories representacionistes de la percepció si se li afegeix la idea que els qualia dels subjectes de percepció formen part com defensen els autors esmentats de coneixement implícit o "no-tematitzat". Sobre aquesta base, s'argumenta que l'atenció perceptual a l'objecte s'ha d'entendre com "unió" de qualia, dels quals el subjecte de percepció s'adona com a pertanyents a objectes materials.
Després d'examinar les principals aproximacions a una teoria empírica general de l'atenció (com ara les de Broadbent, Kahneman, Allport i Posner) en relació, per una banda, als nivells d'explicació en ciència cognitiva (nivells de Marr) i, per l'altra, les anàlisi conceptuals i basades en la psicologia de sentit comú (William James), la investigació es centra especialment en la teoria de l'atenció selectiva deguda a Anne Treisman. S'argumenta que els trets (features) que com a entitats teòriques es postulen en aquesta teoria són qualitats sensorials semblants als qualia, amb la diferència important que els criteris d'individuació dels trets en qüestió responen a les exigències específiques dels mecanismes funcionals postulats a la teoria empírica en qüestió. Aquest parentiu implica que, encara que la proposta formulada en la investigació sobre el mode de presentació perceptual és sostinguda principalment per arguments a priori, es podria veure afectada pel desenvolupament de la investigació empírica, si bé només en el cas que aquesta resultés ser incompatible amb la postulació de qualia. La posició defensada a la tesi es situa així en una perspectiva defensada d'una manera general per Martin Davies segons la qual les anàlisi conceptuals sobre allò mental tenen conseqüències en els nivells dels mecanismes subpersonals, de manera que són revisables si no s'acompleixen les expectatives corresponents en aquests nivells. Tanmateix, aquesta relació de dependència és menys directa que la postulada a la teoria de Campbell, la qual tracta de caracteritzar directament el mode demostratiu perceptual en termes de mecanismes subpersonals. En les pàgines finals de la tesi s'argumenta que aquest enfocament no és capaç d'explicar els aspectes racionals de la utilització de modes de presentació demostratius.
This dissertation is about a specific and significant case of interaction between conceptual analysis and scientific research in cognitive psychology, namely, the demonstrative aspect of perception, a central feature which has been recently discussed by philosophers such as Peter Strawson, Gareth Evans, Christopher Peacocke, John McDowell, John Campbell and Bill Brewer (although it was already treated by Hegel in the first sections of The Phenomenology of Mind). A great majority among the philosophers mentioned postulate a distinctive perceptual mode of presentation, and try to give an account of it. Making an heuristic use of recent developments in the anaylsis of modes of presentation of indexical expressions to this purpose, the contention is made that the mode of presentation in perceptual judgements is token-reflexive. This approach is in agreement with Searle's in a general way, but the present development integrates into it the key attentional aspect emphasized by John Campbell and Naomi Eilan. The proposal is initially modeled by means of a description ('The object attended in this act of attention) referentially conceived on account of the particularity of perception.
In the second part of the dissertation the notion of conscious access (awareness) to this mode of presentation is analyzed. (The need for an account of this is obvious from the use of the linguistic demonstrative in the above description.) This problem is approached from the discussion of motivations to postulate that perception occurs normally in virtue of the instantiation of sensorial qualities or qualia in a subject. At this point an appeal is made to the auxiliary hypothesis that a partially functional and externalist view of qualia advocated in recent writtings due to Shoemaker and García-Carpintero allows to overcome successfully the well-known problems that plague representative theories of perception in conjuntion with the view that awareness of qualia is to be understood as implicit or unthematized, also defended by the mentioned authors. On this basis, it is argued that perceptual attention to the object is to be understood by a "binding" of qualia of which the subject is aware as belonging to material objects.
After examining the main approaches to a general empirical theory of attention (such as those of Broadbent, Kahneman, Allport i Posner) in connection, on the one hand, to levels of explanation in cognitive science (Marr's levels) and, on the other, to conceptual and folk-psychology analysis (William James), inquiry focuses specially in the theory of selective attention due to Anne Treisman. It is argued that the features postulated as theoretical entities in such a theory are sensorial qualities similar to qualia, the only significant difference between the two being the fact that the individuation criteria of features are responsive to the specific requirements of the functional mechanisms postulate in the empirical theory at issue. This kinship implies that developments in empirical research have a bearing on the proposal on the perceptual mode of presentation advanced in the dissertation, which might be affected by them even if it is supported mainly by a priori arguments. This, however, could happen only if such developments are incompatible with the postulation of qualia. Thus, the position argued for in the dissertation belongs in a perspective (advocated in a general way by Martin Davies) according to which conceptual analysis in the field of the mental have implications for the subpersonal levels of the mechanisms, so that those analysis are to be revised if the expectatives at those levels which such analysis imply turn out not to be fulfiled. Nevertheless, this dependency relation is less direct than the one involved by Campbell's theory, according to which perceptual modes of presentation are to be characterized directly by appeal to subpersonal mechanisms. In the concluding pages of the dissertation it is argued that this approach is not able to account for the rational aspects of the occurence of perceptual modes of presentation.

Aquesta tesi tracta sobre la gestió de l’espai públic a Barcelona en la era neoliberal actual mitjançant tres perspectives. La primera, a nivell municipal, analitza la localització, la tipologia i la distribució de les inversions municipals en l’espai públic. La segona, la qual cobreix la escala de districte, estudia les transformacions de diferents espais i el seus dissenys actuals en Ciutat Vella i Nou Barris. La tercera, que aprofundeix en l’àmbit de les relacions socials, examina les conseqüències d’allò anterior en les conductes dels individus. Al llarg d’aquestes pàgines, es mostra com el mode de gestió municipal de l’espai públic ha prioritzat la producció econòmica sobre les formes de reproducció social, articulant els impulsos del capitalisme en Ciutat Vella y Barcelona, en general, i com en Nou Barris, es va passar d’una gestió paternalista amb finalitat política a dissenys homogeneïtzats als de la resta de la ciutat.
Esta tesis estudia la gestión del espacio público en Barcelona en la era neoliberal reciente mediante tres perspectivas. La primera, a nivel municipal, analiza la localización, la tipología y la distribución de las inversiones municipales en espacio público. La segunda, en la que se pasa a la escala de distrito, indaga sobre las transformaciones de diversos espacios y sus diseños actuales en Ciutat Vella y Nou Barris. La tercera, que se adentra en el ámbito de las relaciones sociales, examina las consecuencias de lo anterior en las conductas de los individuos. A lo largo de estas páginas se evidencia cómo el modo de gestión municipal del espacio público ha priorizado la producción económica sobre las formas de reproducción social articulando los impulsos del capitalismo en Ciutat Vella y, Barcelona en general, y cómo, en Nou Barris, se pasó de una gestión paternalista con fines políticos a diseños homogéneos como los del resto de la ciudad.
This thesis developments three perspectives about how the public space has been managed in the neoliberal era in Barcelona. First, it has been analysed how the local investments are localised, distributed and classified in the public space in Barcelona City. Second, the research shows how different areas the both districts, Ciutat Vella and Nou Barris, have been transformed and designed. Finally, the last analysis examines how the spatial transformations, mentioned above, have influenced upon the social relationship of the users in the studied areas. Municipal management about public space in Barcelona City increasingly articulates the impulses of capitalist production rather than social reproduction. This process is consolidated in Ciutat Vella but, also, in Barcelona City. In Nou Barris, a homogenised design, similar to the rest of the city, has replaced a more paternalist management of the space.

The aim of this dissertation is to provide a non-reductive account of cognitive phenomenology and the experience of thinking. The nature of conscious thought is an issue that has occupied philosophers since ancient times, and still many questions in this domain remain unanswered. One of them is the relation between thought and experience or phenomenal consciousness, in the particular way explored in this thesis: when we undergo a certain cognitive mental episode, should we recognize an experience like our other sensory, perceptual, or emotional experiences or should we rather recognize a very different sort of experience? Experiences are usually characterized by a phenomenal character or what-it-is-likeness for the subject to undergo them, which is usually taken as the mark of phenomenal consciousness and which, for mainstream contemporary philosophy of mind, has been limited to sensory and perceptual experiences, or even to emotional experiences. My general thesis is that conscious thought should be included in the domain of phenomenal consciousness and that there is an experience of thinking or conscious thought with a specific phenomenal character, namely, a phenomenal character that cannot be reduced to other non-cognitive kinds of phenomenologies. The thesis has three main parts, which are divided in several chapters. In the first part, Introduction, I present the basic elements to be able to start the investigation. I firstly clarify the relevant issues involved in the debate (Chapter 1), I justify the terminology chosen and I present the main views and a brief history of the problem. I then propose a way to approach the experience of thinking from a methodological point of view (Chapter 2), through a study of some methodological problems in philosophy and psychology, mainly related to introspection and introspective evidence. In the second part of the thesis, Main Arguments in Cognitive Phenomenology, I defend my non-reductive view with several arguments. I present the obvious argument (Chapter 3) for the conclusion that conscious thoughts have phenomenal properties and I resist some putative cases against the argument. I then present my version of the phenomenal argument (Chapter 4), which shows that there is a phenomenal change between two cognitive experiences contrasted and that this change cannot be explained by appealing to the sensory/emotional elements that by hypothesis remain constant. My presentation of this argument is complemented by a defense against some restrictivist views (Chapter 5). I then present the epistemic argument, which claims that we have introspective immediate knowledge of the kind of mental episode we are in (and of different cognitive atittudes), and that this would not be possible unless cognitive episodes have a specific cognitive phenomenology (Chapter 6). I finally consider another argument, the ontological argument, that might support the reductionist view , but I argue that it does not succeed (Chapter 7). In the third part of the thesis, The Specification of Cognitive Phenomenology, and as a further step in the discussion, I propose a specification of cognitive phenomenology in relation to intentionality and its two main components in conscious thought, cognitive content (Chapter 8) and cognitive attitude (Chapter 9). This proposal provides us with a way of determining similarities and differences in cognitive phenomenology that result in different experiential kinds and different types of conscious thought in virtue of their phenomenology. Moreover, it offers an answer to the question of the relation of determination between both components and their phenomenal character. This dissertation questions well some well-established assumptions in philosophy of mind and consciousness studies: (i) it implies a comprehension of phenomenal consciousness as including cognition, (ii) it rejects the assymetry between sensory/perceptual experience and cognitive one (regarding temporal structure and specification attempts) and (iii) it questions separatist positions between intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. It also opens new research in relation to other philosophical topics and empirical studies and it contributes to the examination of two research fields (consciousness and cognition) that have normally been investigated separately.
L’objectiu d’aquesta tesi és presentar una teoria no reductivista de la fenomenologia cognitiva i de l’experiència del pensament. La naturalesa del pensament conscient és una qüestió que ha preocupat als filòsofs des de l’antiguitat i un àmbit on encara trobem moltes qüestions que no tenen resposta. Una d’elles és la relació entre el pensament i l’experiència o la consciencia fenomènica, en el sentit particular que exploro en aquesta tesi: quan tenim una experiència d’un cert episodi mental cognitiu, es tracta d’una experiència com les altres experiències sensorials, perceptives o emocionals, o bé es tracta d’un tipus molt diferent d’experiència? Les experiències normalment es caracteritzen per tenir un caràcter fenomènic o un “com a què és” (what it is like) pel subjecte tenir aquestes experiències, que es prèn com la marca de la consciència fenomènica i que, en filosofia contemporània de la ment, generalment es restringeix a les experiències sensorials, perceptives o, fins i tot, emocionals. La tesi general que defenso és que el pensament conscient ha de ser inclòs en l’extensió de la consciència fenomènica i que existeix una experiència de pensament conscient amb un caràcter fenomènic específic, és a dir, un caràcter fenomènic que no es pot reduir a altres tipus de fenomenologies. Aquesta conclusió general qüestiona alguns supòsits ben establerts en filosofia de la ment i estudis sobre consciència, i així obre la porta a noves investigacions en aquesta direcció. Per tal de defensar aquesta teoria no reductivista, primerament clarifico les qüestions rellevants en el debat i examino com hem d’aproximar-nos a l’experiència del pensament (Capítols 1 i 2). En segon lloc, presento una sèrie d’arguments a favor de la meva tesi (Capítols 3, 4 i 6) i argumento en contra d’estratègies restrictivistes (Capítols 5 i 7). Finalment, com a un pas més en la discussió, proposo una especificació de la fenomenologia cognitiva en relació a la intencionalitat i els seus dos components principals en el pensament conscient, el contingut cognitiu (Capítol 8) i l’actitud cognitiva (Capítol 9), oferint respostes a la qüestió de la relació de determinació entre ambdós components i el seu caràcter fenomènic.

A la tesi s'elabora un marc teòric interdisciplinar per fonamentar l'estudi dels inicis del desenvolupament comunicatiu i lingüístic dels infants i es presenten els resultats d'una investigació sobre diferents aspectes del desenvolupament pragmàtic i del desenvolupament lexical en el primer any i mig de vida.

Al primer capítol s'aborden els temes de la intencionalitat comunicativa i del significat. S'integren aportacions de disciplines diverses i es proposa una definició operacional d'acte comunicatiu. Al segon capítol es presenten les perspectives funcionals de l'adquisició del llenguatge i es revisen els treballs sobre els mecanismes preadaptats per a la interacció social, la intersubjectivitat i l'ajuda adulta. Al tercer capítol es delimita l'àmbit del desenvolupament pragmàtic i s'ubica la investigació dins del conjunt de fenòmens pragmàtics. També es realitza un apunt sobre l'evolució vocàlica i gestual en les etapes prelingüística i de les primeres paraules, es revisen els estudis sobre el desenvolupament de les habilitats implicades en la gestió de l'atenció conjunta i els treballs sobre l'expressió d'intencions comunicatives en les esmentades etapes. En aquest capítol s'acaba configurant, partint de les aportacions de diversos autors, una aproximació pragmàtica a l'adquisició del lèxic inicial.

En el quart capítol es presenten els objectius i hipòtesis de la recerca, així com els diferents aspectes metodològics. Els objectius generals de l'estudi són: 1) mostrar que la intencionalitat comunicativa i el significat són processos graduals i observables en el marc de la interacció nadó-adult; 2) estudiar l'evolució de l'expressió d'intencions comunicatives al llarg de les etapes prelingüística i de les primeres paraules; 3) estudiar l'evolució de les intencions comunicatives maternes i 4) abordar els processos d'aprenentatge pragmàtic que operen en els inicis de l'adquisició del llenguatge. S'ha dut a terme un estudi longitudinal/obervacional de tres parelles mare-fill/a en context familiar, durant els àpats. Els registres audiovisuals han estat transcrits en format CHAT (CHILDES-Child Language Data Exchange System; MacWhinney, 2000; MacWhinney i Snow, 1985, 1990). Per a la codificació de les intencions comunicatives s'ha traduït i adaptat el sistema de categories elaborat per Ninio i Wheeler (1984, 1988).

Als capítols 5, 6, 7 i 8 es presenten els resultats relacionats amb cadascun dels objectius de l'estudi. En relació amb el primer objectiu, el capítol 5 mostra, a través d'exemples, com als actes comunicatius dels infants poden correspondre diferents nivells d'intencionalitat i de significat d'acord amb un conjunt d'indicadors observacionals.

Pel que fa a l'expressió d'intencions comunicatives infantils (cap, l'estudi ratifica les tendències generals assenyalades en treballs previs (Ninio, 1983a, 1984, 1993b; Ninio i Goren, 1993; Snow, Pan, Imbens-Bailey i Herman, 1996). No obstant, l'aportació fonamental de l'estudi és identificar diferències individuals, tant quantitatives com qualitatives, en el perfil comunicatiu dels infants.

Els capítols 7 i 8 recullen respectivament els resultats relacionats amb l'evolució de les intencions comunicatives expressades per la mare i amb els processos d'aprenentatge pragmàtic que operen en els inicis de l'adquisició del llenguatge. Per aquests dos objectius, les dades analitzades corresponen a una sola parella mare-filla. Pel que fa a l'expressió d'intencions comunicatives maternes, els resultats mostren tant constants com canvis al llarg del període estudiat. Entre les constants, cal destacar la presència, des del primer mes de vida, de certes modalitats d'intercanvi comunicatiu que formen part del nucli identificat per Snow et als. (1996) als 14, 20 i 32 mesos. Els canvis s'interpreten com un reflex d'ajustaments pragmàtics subtils per part de la mare a la creixent competència comunicativa i lingüística de la nena.

Finalment, el capítol 8 presenta alguns resultats a favor de la hipòtesi segons la qual l'infant aprèn a usar les paraules seguint les regles forma-funció que els adults utilitzen en la interacció amb ell.

In this paper I will be mapping so-called intentional profile of juvenile delinquents. This is way of their perception and experience of surrounding world, how they apply significance and how they think about it. Part of this profile is idea of role and participation within the frame of this world. Next goal of this research is explanation of delinquent behavior as part of intentional profile. Research took place in youth detention center. It consisted of narrative and discourse analysis of four fifty minute long autobiographic interviews with four boys sixteen or seventeen years old with delinquent past. In interviews was emphasized independent selection of subject by respondents themselves. Result of analysis was formation of so-called theory of egocentrism. This theory has been compared with other theories and research and embodied in context of social sciences in second part of this paper. Egocentrism is compared with splitting defense mechanism according to M. Klein. In conclusion of this paper were formulated psychotherapeutic recommendations for employees of youth detention centers for work with juvenile delinquents based on findings of performed research.

This work aims to pursue the roots and sources of intentionality. Intentional structure of consciousness is the very core of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology and plays the main role since his Logical investigations. The problem of intentionality is complicated and complex and resonates through the Husserl lifelong work Our starting point is Husserl's late work Erfahrung und Urteil. The reason why we choose this work is twofold. First, this work shows the thoughts which result from the life long investigation of problematics. And the second reason is, this work hasn't been the subject of examination as much as Husserl's earlier works so far. The key to our work is the perspective in which every phenomenon shows. That's the reason, why we follow intentionality in three perspectives, which gradually uncovers itselves. The first perspective is the descent from acts of judgment to the original layers of intentionality. This brings us to the second perspective, which is the instinctive intentionality. This is the subject of following part of our work. The exposing of instinctive intentionality underlines the role of embodiment. The importance of embodiment in regard to intentionality is the final perspective. We investigate this with help of Maurice Merleau-Ponty Phenomenology of perception. This will...

The diploma thesis describes the topic of manipulation in connection with education. Theoretical part analyzes the concept and related essential phenomena and approaches the links between manipulation and education. Mainly, it draws from pedagogical literature, in its social and philosophical context. Qualitative research is based on interviews with primary school teachers. The aim of the survey was to bring closer how educators perceive manipulation in the school environment based on their experience. The results show that manipulation itself manifests, with a few exceptions, as normal part of the educational process. Teachers manipulate pupils directly during teaching. Some of them consider it present at the moment when they apply coercion to pupils, others as more hidden procedures. They perceive manipulation mainly as harmful, which is why some teachers try to avoid it. At the same time, it is partly viewed as a necessary part of normal teaching. Therefore,the phenomenon of manipulation appears to be variously understood. The unifying sign of manipulation is the perception of its realization from a position of power. It is mainly used with the aim of facilitating the education process. KEYWORDS Manipulation, enforcement, objectification, intencionality, education

Muito se debate sobre a existência de grupos heterogéneos em contexto de sala de aula. Estes grupos, heterogéneos respetivamente às faixas etárias, e consequentemente não só, são um desafio tanto para os Educadores do Pré-Escolar como para os Professores do 1.º Ciclo do Ensino Básico. Cabe aos docentes gerir e aproveitar os saberes e características das diferentes idades no contexto e levar as crianças a uma maior motivação, a um maior envolvimento em sala de aula, tornando o grupo homogéneo ao nível das motivações para a própria aprendizagem. A linguagem oral e a escrita, como meios supremos de comunicação e de expressão que transversalizam idades, consideram-se promotoras dessa motivação que promove aprendizagens e um vínculo aos saberes e competências deles decorrentes. Neste sentido, o presente relatório relata e reflete as experiências nos contextos de Educação Pré-Escolar e de 1.º Ciclo do Ensino Básico, evidenciando-se aspetos considerados fulcrais em cada nível de ensino e outros considerados transversais aos dois contextos. Assim, são focadas especificidades como transversalidade, continuidade educativa, intencionalidade, interdisciplinaridade, ambientação das salas e motivação. Para a construção deste Relatório Final foi imperativa a consulta de teoria que sustentou as opções tomadas durante todo o percurso de estágio nos dois contextos, assim como a construção de variadíssimos instrumentos de observação e de avaliação que permitiram uma maior perceção e apropriação da realidade dos contextos numa perspetiva global, permitindo várias reflexões sobre a prática construída.
Much has been debated about the existence of heterogenical groups in classroom context. In these groups, heterogenous respectfully to the age, and therefore not only, are challenging both to the Preschool teachers, as well for 1st cycle of Basic Education teachers. It is up to the teachers to manage and leverage the knowledge and characteristics of different ages in the context and take the children to a higher motivation, a greater involvement in the classroom, making the group homogeneous in terms of the motivation to their own learning. The spoken and written language, as supreme means of communication and expression that cross ages, are considered promoters of that motivation that leads to learning and a link to the knowledge and skills resulting therefrom. In this way, this report describes and reflects the experiences in the context of Preschool and 1st cycle of basic education, evidencing key aspects considered in each grade level and others considered transversal to both levels. This way, specifities as transversatility, educational continuity, intentionality, interdisciplinarity, room environment and motivation. To elaborate this Final Report was imperative to consult theory resulted from the options taken thorough the internship course on both contexts, as well as the construction of numerous different instruments of observation and evaluaton that allowed a greater perception and appropriation of the reality of context in a global perspective, allowing several reflections about the constructed practice.

The study concentrates on possible connection between phenomenological thought of Edmund Husserl and Jean-Paul Sartre by focusing on the way by which each of them frames pre-reflexive self-awareness of consciousness and its role in the process of constitution of the identity of the "Ego" as a subjective pole. Essential motivation derives from the effort of highlighting those moments of Husserl's thinking, which might have been or actually were a source of inspiration for Sartre and the formulation of these concepts in the early stages of his career. Subsequently, the quest is to clarify the scale of this inspiration and to shed some light on the question whether Sartre did not push his constructions over the boundaries of the scientific field set by Husserl. The study also incorporates several of Husserl's works which are in their conclusions tending to go against those presented as a possible source of Sartre's inspiration. That is done in order not to simplify the ambivalence of Husserl's work over the acceptable limit as well as to emphasize the nature of the investigations preferred by Sartre. These investigations lead in his work to the conceptualization of human existence as necessarily free, which is the conclusion of the presented study. Key words: Husserl, Sartre, consciousness,...

The main objective of this research is to look at the topic of everyday life from a dynamic perspective. The definition of everyday life that this thesis stands upon, i.e. the presence of a subject in the world with the other(s) outlines also two main sources of its dynamics: the world and the other. The essential aim of this thesis is to show that the different attitudes towards the world and the other in the works of Husserl and Lévinas consequently influence the understanding of the everyday life as such, as well as the requirements it imposes upon the subject. The chapter dedicated to Husserl presents his concept of the world as a horizon, the irreplaceable position of perception in our access to the world and the creation of the other within the subject itself. On the contrary, Lévinas stresses the separation of the subject and he understands the world and the other as inherently belonging to this never-ending process. The motive of dependence and responsibility of the subject for the other belongs to the most significant differences between the two philosophers. Whereas Husserl proposes us a subject in the world which he accesses via perception and in which he encounters the other, Lévinas shows us subject that is born to the pre-reflexive and intersubjective world from which he first has to...

This thesis deals with the notion of conceptual thought as developed by the Czech philosopher, Ladislav Hejdánek, within the referential framework of Husserl's phenomenology. The aim of the thesis is to thoroughly reconstruct the points of departure and basic motifs of Hejdánek's concept, since the reflection of conceptual thought is one of the milestones of Hejdánek's critical thinking, which has not yet been systematically worked out by Hejdánek or anyone else. Hejdánek is interpreted here mainly in the context of Husserl's noematic theory of meaning, enabling us to view Hejdánek through the predicates of a philosophical mainstream as well as to explore some of the problematic points of Husserl's thought processes that are not usually noticed and which have been approached creatively by Hejdánek from an unexpected perspective. The first two chapters present a preliminary overview of Husserl's philosophy (from his Göttingen period in particular), drawing on in-depth research into Husserl's manuscripts carried out by Petr Urban. This overview is followed by four chapters that interpret Hejdánek's concept and finish with a summary, applying the concept of conceptual thought to the world of knowledge and placing the notion of conceptuality within Hejdánek's thought. The individual chapters discuss...

The submitted thesis deals with the relation of intuition to meaning in Edmund Husserl's early work. The structure of the thesis is given by Husserl's triadic structure of epistemic acts, which is formed by the realm of subjectivity, ideality and objectiveness. In this framework, we treat the meaning in its proper sense of meaning-intention, which is but also related to the objectiveness. This relation is made possible by meaning-fulfilment, which is intuitive. At the end, we also emphasize the role of intuition not only in the Logical Investigations, which are to our thesis the central work of Husserl, but also in the whole of Husserl's philosophy.

The present doctoral thesis addresses the insufficient exploration of the concept of play style in current video game player's research. To reach the goal, theoretical framework of style as an intentional model of player's believes and desires is used. The main proposition of this particular paper is based on the presumption that play style works as a tool for predicting opponent's behavior. The research consists of two parts. The first one proposes a categorization which might in greater accuracy explain existing forms of play. The second part researches the topic of intentionality further through the procedural model of style prediction in progaming area, which is exemplified by the video game League of Legends. The results are based on extensive analysis of players' texts, interviews with semiprofessional players, commentators and game journalists. The conclusion implies a significant number of play styles and procedural complexity of recursive theory of mind ("I think about what you think that I think") in the field of video games. Keywords: Play Style, Intentionality, Intentional Model, Metagame, Metacognition, Mindgame, Progaming, Theory of Mind, Player Typology, Video Game

This research is dedicated to the connection between phenomenology of music and the temporal conception of Edmund Husserl who influenced new awareness of time in general and musical time in particular. The purpose of the research is foremost to expand horizons and options of musical-philosophical analysis through discovering the alternative understanding of musical perception in author's works especially in his «Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins». The research consists of five main parts arranged by deductive principle: from the general key points of the subject - phenomenology of music (chapter 1), the role of musical art in studies and heritage of E. Husserl (chapter 2) and principles of phenomenological method as a base of temporality conception (chapter 3) the emphasis gradually shifts towards the research of Husserl's temporality conception which is directly connected to musical art which makes our subject notably actual. Besides that the research raises such questions as the role of the concept of time in music, comparison of Husserl's philosophy and A. Webern's music, importance of sense in composition and others. The fundamental and rare scientific studies of philosophy, musicology, sociology of music and other contiguous subjects in Czech and English languages were...

The Function of Speech in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty The submitted doctoral thesis is an attempt to describe the development of the intentional function of speech in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. The intentional function is defined as the change of expressed meaning that is engendered by the expression itself. We trace Husserl's position from the Logical Investigations and the first book of his Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy, where he describes speech as the non- productive mirroring of other kinds of intentionality, to the late text The Origin of Geometry, where he discerns two functions of speech: it provides thought its ideality, which is different from the ideality of species; and it provides thought its objectivity, i.e. the form of object that lasts in history as identical. In The Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty adopts Husserl's late position with several profound modifications. The starting-point ceases to be the linguistic sign, and speech becomes a kind of gesture. As a consequence, the difference between linguistic and non-linguistic ideality disappears. Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty holds that the expression accomplishes the meaning of what it expresses. In this way, speech becomes creative and ceases to be just an empty intention of...

The submitted doctoral thesis is an attempt to describe the nature and of the development of Brentano's theory of judgment. This description is followed by an introduction to the further development of Brentano's theory in the work of Brentano's most distinguished students Kazimierz Twardowski (1866-1938), Alexius Meinong (1853-1920), Anton Marty (1843-1914) and Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). The thesis is divided into five parts: The first part is dedicated to the explanation of Brentano's theory of judgment and starts with an interpretation of Brentano's two early books on Aristotle - On the several senses of Being in Aristotle (1862) and The Psychology of Aristotle (1867). The thesis presents Brentano's understanding of "being" in the sense of truth, his interpretation of the Aristotelian categories, his theory of parts and wholes, and his theory of intentionality and self-consciousness. Our interpretation then proceeds to Brentano's most known work, i.e. to Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874), and presents the basic concept of this book, the concept of psychical phenomena. The resulting classification of psychical phenomena into three kinds introduces judgments as a kind of psychical phenomenon whose main feature consists in existential affirmation or rejection of an intentional object....

The thesis deals with the problem of the existence of consciousness in the physical world. It denies the approach that is prevailing in the contemporary philosophy of mind that treats the phenomenal consciousness and intentionality separately. The position held in this thesis is to claim that the phenomenal character of consciousness and intentionality are inseparable and that it is impossible to understand the former without understanding the latter, and vice versa. The problem of the existence of consciousness in the physical world is viewed as the problem of the existence of (conscious) intentionality in the physical world. With the aim to achieve an analysis of intentionality that would keep its phenomenal character and the first person point of view, and, at the same time, shed light on its realization in the physical world, thoughts of Peter Strawson, G. E. M. Anscombe, Tim Crane, Colin McGinn and John Searle are discussed. The result is an outline of intentionality that allows to explain the fundamental level of intentionality as a physical process and the higher levels of intentionality as a development of the fundamental level. Two principles are crucial for this approach: the development of intentionality from the fundamental level to the higher level is comprehensible only if we keep the...

The aim of the thesis is to examine both Husserl's and Kant's transcendentalism in a way that would avoid the tendency to put the main accent on Husserl, which is an approach common to almost all literature dealing with this topic so far. Since it is for the most part Husserl's own critique of Kant that inspires such ongoing underestimation of Kant in comparison to Husserl, this work focuss on the question of the legitimacy of this critique. The core of the thesis is an original interpretation of Kant's transcendental philosophy which, instead of taking for granted the phenomenological point of view, attempts to describe Kant's philosophical enterprise from its own perspective and in its own right. In its second part, the thesis provides a brief description of how Husserl, starting initially from the position of descriptive psychology, arrives at a transcendental dimension. When so put side by side, it becomes evident that the two transcendental positions are in fact very different. Husserl's critique of Kant then appears as unjustified, even though quite understandable as an attempt to draw back from certain immature motives of his own philosophy.