Zeitschriftenartikel zum Thema „Indian Army – Organization“

The British-led 14th Army was the Indian Army’s principal formation fighting against the Imperial Japanese Army in Burma from 1942 to 1945. Successive defeats in the Far East made the Indian Army the object of disdain, ridicule and scorn expressed by the senior political and military leadership in London. This leadership dismissed their socially inferior Indian Army counterparts as a “second xi”, commanding a second-rate organization comprising “black” troops. The Indian Army, however, had learnt from its earlier mistakes and had undergone a remarkable recovery and successful organizational transformation amidst bitter combat against their Japanese foe. Improvements in leadership, training and morale, tactical innovations, and the brilliant execution of operational strategy helped resolve London’s strategic impasse over the war against Japan. The end result was the greatest Japanese military defeat in history until it was eclipsed by the Red Army’s decisive blow against Japanese forces in Manchuria in August 1945.

The basic as well as desirable needs of a person for decent survival in today’s materialistic and globalised world demand corresponding financial resources in hand. Irrespective of the profession and societal strata, individuals have their own financial aspirations and challenges. Financial literacy enables a person with understanding of financial terms and concepts besides imbibing skills, consciousness, talent and attitude to take important financial decisions. Military service having peculiar service conditions and limited exposure to financial field further makes it imperative to study the subject for inclusivity as very few studies have looked into financial issues pertaining to military personnel. The main aim of this research paper is to ascertain financial literacy of Commissioned Officers of Indian Army. For the study, 133 serving Commissioned Officers of Indian Army of varying age and length of service constituted the sample. Non-Probability technique of selecting sample has been used for the study wherein Purposive sampling is used to draw responses from the sample units. A structured questionnaire was developed to collect Primary data from serving Commissioned Officers of Indian Army. Detailed analysis has been carried out for the collected data using various tools and techniques in Microsoft Excel and SPSS. The study has brought out that financial literacy levels of serving commissioned officers of Indian Army are high. Though the demographic variables and financial literacy levels of Indian Army officers are not statistically associated, however overall high levels of financial literacy indicate their maturity of thought and quest for learning. Overall, the study outcomes indicate a healthy state for the organization and the Nation in terms of financial literacy of serving Commissioned Officers of Indian Army with respect to personal financial planning.

Inclusion means to have a sense of belongingness, feel valued and respected for the person you are, and getting commitment and support to enable you to give your best. A gender-inclusive diverse workforce is progressively being accepted to contribute significantly towards improved performance of any organization. With this underlying concept, the article attempts to understand the linkages between HR policies and gender inclusion in Indian Army. This study is based on primary data collected from officers of the different branches of Indian Army and the extant literature review. Data has been assessed using confirmatory factor analysis and multivariate analysis of variance. Proposed empirical article will offer meaningful insight to the policy formulators and the policy executors for improving the existing policies and framing the new HR policies that will help achieve effective gender inclusion.

AbstractEmerging as a mission in East London in 1865, the Salvation Army quickly became known for its militant and unconventional evangelism on the streets of British towns and cities. Convinced that unrepentant souls were headed for hell, Salvationists employed sensational tactics to attract the attention of the lower working classes. This strategy did not change when the Salvation Army sent a small party of missionaries to Bombay in 1882. They not only arrived in Indian dress but held noisy processions through the city’s streets. While these methods reflected the Salvation Army’s revivalist theology, they brought Salvationists into collision with the colonial authorities. Fearing that the Army’s aggressive and sensational evangelism would lead to religious rioting and reduce the religion of the ruling race to ridicule, the Bombay police arrested the Salvationists on several occasions between September 1882 and April 1883. Although the city’s British residents generally approved of the actions of the police, many Indians and missionaries came to the defence of the evangelical organization, believing that imperial officials had acted unjustly towards the Army’s missionaries. Bolstered by this support, Salvationists repeatedly defied colonial authority for the sake of religious liberty, demonstrating through their words and actions that the Salvation Army could be anything but a benefit to imperial stability and prestige on the subcontinent.

Historians have generally explained the consolidation of Company power in terms of the superior fiscal base which it came to acquire in north India. Bayly argues that in the eighteenth century the ‘commercialisation of royal power’, begun under the Mughals, extended to meet the needs of military organization and growing bureaucratizationof the numerous small polities that succeeded the Mughals. He argues that in this perio Indian merchant capital was redeployed in the search for greater control over labour productivity through control over revenue collections of all sorts; and the unified merchant class met in the new qasbahs and the small permanent markets (ganjs) attached to them. It was here that theinfrastructure for Europea trade in, and ultimate dominion over, India was constructed.1 The efficiency and wide scale on which the Company could exercise and extend the pre-colonial practice of military fiscalism2 has provided another explanation for the dominant position it came to occupy more specifically, in south India.3 Yang highlights the role ofthe Indian elite in facilitating the Company's revenue collection and thereby contributin to its political dominance and stability in the Saran district of Bihar. He constructs a model of'limited Raj', to explain the a free flow of revenue. He analyses the dynamics ofthis 'limited Raj' by explaining its functioning at the lowest level where the power of the colonial state tapered off and the landholders' system of control took over. Yang argues that these two control systems collectively sustained British rule in the region.4 More recently the Company's superior power in north Indian politics has been explained in terms of its exclusive right to violence. R. Mukherjee, analysing the 1857 mutiny, arguesthat 'British rule in India, as an autocracy, had meti meticulously constructed a monopoly of violence. The revolt of 1857 shatteredthat monopoly by matching an official, alien violence by an indigenous violence of the colonised

The article describes and analyzes the activities of the Indian Navy during the COVID-19 pandemic. The author looks at the experience of the Indian Navy at the beginning of the pandemic, noting that it mainly consisted of helping the states of the Indian Ocean region affected by hurricanes and monsoons, and evacuating Indian citizens and residents of neighboring countries from areas of hostilities. At the same time, the Indian Navy did not have specialized floating hospitals. The author analyzes the situation in which India found itself at the beginning of the pandemic: a gradual slowdown in GDP growth questioned the further expansion of the Navy, and the outbreak of conflict with China further emphasized the importance of the Air Force and the Army. In these conditions, the Indian Navy was forced to prove its value for the Indian external and domestic policy. The author then describes how the Indian Navy fought COVID-19, concluding that Indian sailors were able to prevent the pandemic from spreading to naval bases and ships. The Navy fully retained its combat capability and was able to take part in two large-scale operations: the “Samudra Setu”and “Sagar” missions. During the former, several thousand people were evacuated from Iran, Sri Lanka and the Maldives, the latter involved providing medical assistance to the population of the Maldives, Seychelles, Comoros, Madagascar and Mauritius affected by the pandemic. The author notes the high level of organization of both missions, which made it possible to avoid pandemic spreading among the ship crews. He argues that the conduct of Operation “Sagar” allowed India to increase its influence in the Indian Ocean region amid the pandemic and demonstrate its role as a security provider countering unconventional threats. The author then describes the joint exercises carried out by the Indian Navy during the pandemic and notes their significant political role. In conclusion, he analyzes the experience of the Indian Navy using soft power and proposes an original concept of “floating soft power” based on the constant presence of hospital ships in remote regions. In his opinion, this format of presence could also be suitable for projecting Russian interests in the South Pacific.

Unlike other civilian leaders, Xi Jinping pushed ahead with sweeping military reforms after taking office as General Secretary of the Communist Party and Chairman of the Central Military Commission. This was a reaction to the situation in which the chairman had not been able to secure control of the military since Deng Xiaoping. Through anti-corruption, Xi Jinping eliminated high-ranking officials who used the military as a tool for personal gain, and tried to eliminate trafficking of official posts and factions within the military. In addition, through structural reorganization, the power of command of the military commander, who had been ineffective, was clarified. The 4 headquarters that interfered with the commander's command system were dismantled and reconstituted as an organization that assisted the military commission. The defense- oriented 7 military districts were also reorganized into 5 theater to prepare for both peacetime and wartime. And the army was established to break the grand army principle, strengthen the status of other forces necessary for modern warfare, and rearrange the composition of troops for them. The theater is not just a defense system, but a system responsible for operations. Accordingly, the eastern theater was responsible for Taiwan, the southern theater was responsible for the South China Sea and Vietnam, the western theater was responsible for India and Central Asia, the northern theater was responsible for the Korean Peninsula, and the central theater was responsible for the mission of the strategic reserve force. In general, it is evaluated that the risk of war in the Taiwan Strait, which is in charge of the Eastern Front, is the highest. However, the area where the largest number of troops are actually deployed is in the Western Front. There are two group army, as well as Xinjiang and Xizang military district. This is because west operation area is vast and its borders are very long, even though China has continuously pushed for weapon modernization. In addition, India is the only country that China does not have a border agreement with, and continues to confront each other across the LAC. In addition, the region should be responsible for operations in Central Asia in case of emergency. Therefore, west are organizing units and distributing weapons with the possibility of a small-scale armed clash or conflict rather than a large-scale war. In fact, it is judged that the possibility of an armed conflict in this area is much higher than in the Taiwan Strait.

The recruitment to military in modern nation states, by and large, is voluntary. Although it is commonly assumed that a soldiers’ job in the army is to fight against the enemies of their motherland, the Indian Army has a regiment of Tibetan soldiers who are not Indians as per the law of the land. Known as Special Frontier Force (SFF), this regiment was until recently a secret wing of the Indian Army. Joining the Indian Army during the heydays of their diasporic dispersal due to the Chinese territorial aggrandizement and Sino-Indian war of 1962, with a hope of direct encounter with their enemies, Tibetans continue to be voluntarily recruited to the now non-secret SFF. As part of the Indian Army, they should be ready to fight the enemies of their host country. In fact, over the decades, they have been requested by India to take part in several military exercises. In the changed international geopolitics, Tibetans in exile may not get another opportunity to fight against their own enemies. The trajectory of the value orientations of the Tibetan soldiers in the Indian Army constitutes the axial concern of this article.

Subject area Management (interdisciplinary): corporate social responsibility/financial management/social entrepreneurship. Study level/applicability Undergraduate/MBA. Case overview The case revolves around a Delhi-based non-governmental organization (NGO), GOONJ founded by 40-year-old social activist, Mr Anshu Gupta. Winner of several awards, this NGO is trying to highlight some ignored but basic needs of the poor by using the surplus of the cities (supply of discarded commodities: clothes, furniture, toys, waste paper, utensils stationary, etc. due to space constraints and the growing consumerism) to address scarcity of essential commodities to the poor in the rural areas and creating it as a powerful developmental resource. GOONJ has a number of collection centers across the nation through which the old clothes are collected. Thereafter, the clothes are washed, dried, repaired and packed and then reached to the far flung villages with help of partner grassroots NGO, panchayats, Indian army, etc.There are three key issues raised in the case: This NGO has been operating without any formal funding for last many years. With annual expenses over ten million, how does NGO operate so successfully. Also, it is interesting to find out how they are able to maintain cost of just 97 paisa (1 paisa=1/100 rupee) from the time old clothing is collected to the point where it has been delivered to a needy. The second issue about the synergy that is created by the NGO – corporate partnership. Further, this case also gives the audience to explore synergy between NGO and B-schools. To understand the problem areas of distribution management when so many different stakeholders are involved. Expected learning outcomes To explore innovations in resource mobilization (sources of financing) and cost management. To appreciate the synergy created by forming partnerships between different stakeholders: NGO, corporate houses, B-schools. To appreciate issues and problems of distribution management – especially in the case when there are different stakeholders involved.

Access to sources of information has allowed states to use media as a tool of propaganda warfare. It can be observed that within the South Asian theatre, India and Pakistan are involved in propaganda warfare, spreading disinformation campaigns with the aim to disrepute the other's international image. To understand the techniques of propaganda warfare, Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky's propaganda model provides a befitting conceptual cushion to study propaganda warfare techniques using news media to propagate disinformation. This paper tends to focus on how New Delhi exercises control over news media to portray Pakistan as a failed state, a safe haven for terrorist organizations, installing anti-army information, building war hysteria in South Asia, and targeting Pakistan's stance on Kashmir and Balochistan. The paper argues that Indian news media has become a tool in the hands of the Indian political elite in generating false propaganda against Pakistan.

Abstract Introduction There is tremendous need for efficacious and accessible interventions for smoking cessation among American Indians and Alaska Natives. We tested the efficacy of an Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT)-based smartphone application (iCanQuit) versus US Clinical Practice Guidelines-based smartphone application (QuitGuide) for smoking cessation among American Indians and Alaska Natives. Aims and Methods We compared cessation, changes in ACT-based processes, engagement and satisfaction between American Indian and Alaska Native iCanQuit (n = 89) and QuitGuide (n = 80) participants enrolled in the iCanQuit trial. The primary outcome was self-reported, complete-case, 30-day point-prevalence abstinence. Follow-up timepoints were 12, 6, and 3 months. Results Randomized American Indians and Alaska Natives from 31 US states (70% urban, 30% rural, with 25% of participants residing on tribal land). The outcome data retention rates were 93%, 92%, and 90% at the 12-, 6-, and 3-month follow-ups, respectively, with no differential retention between arms. The 30-day point-prevalence abstinence for iCanQuit versus QuitGuide was 30% versus 18% at 12 months (odds ratio [OR] = 1.96; 95% confidence interval [CI]: 0.90 to 4.26) 25% versus 11% at 6 months (OR = 2.62; 95% CI: 1.06 to 6.45), and 15% versus 6% at 3 months (OR = 2.93; 95% CI: 0.90 to 9.59). Increases in acceptance of internal cues to smoke mediated the effect of treatment on smoking cessation at 12 months. iCanQuit arm participants were also significantly more engaged and satisfied with their assigned application. Conclusions In a nationwide sample with high data retention and participant engagement, this is the first study to show that a digital intervention may be efficacious for helping American Indians and Alaska Natives quit smoking. Implications This is the first study to provide evidence of an efficacious, accessible, and engaging treatment for helping American Indians and Alaska Natives quit smoking. Compared to a US Clinical Practice Guidelines-based smartphone application (QuitGuide), an ACT-based smartphone application (iCanQuit) was more efficacious, engaging, and satisfactory among American Indians and Alaska Natives nationwide. Our results will inform the tailoring of the iCanQuit smartphone application for American Indian and Alaska Native tribal communities and organizations with potential for broad dissemination and high impact.

Humour in military organizations can be antithetical given the rigid hierarchy, high degrees of work formalization, and obedience to hierarchy. This paper explores how humour is initiated, propagated and maintained in the Indian Army. We conducted twelve in-depth interviews with retired army professionals and used Braun and Clarke’s (2006) thematic analysis to capture the study's main findings. Three major themes emerged – organizational humour, leader humour, and team humour. We found humour is essential in combating stress, increasing social cohesion, facilitating newcomer assimilation, and promoting a positive work environment. We also found evidence of subversive humour used in forms of resistance to challenge the hierarchical structure subtly. We have provided a three-part schema of workplace humour which sheds interesting insights on workplace humour. Our findings will contribute to understanding how military humour helps to maneuver challenges of a stressful work situation.

Throughout human history, the spread of disease has closed borders, restricted civic movement, and fueled fear of the unknown; yet at the same time, it has helped build cultural resilience. On 11 March 2020 the World Health Organization (WHO) classified COVID-19 as a pandemic. The novel zoonotic disease, first reported to the WHO in December 2019, was no longer restricted to Wuhan or to China, as the highly contagious coronavirus had spread to more than 60 countries. The public health message to citizens everywhere was to save lives by staying home; the economic fallout stemming from this sudden rupture of services and the impact on people’s well-being was mindboggling. Around the globe museums, galleries, and popular world heritage sites closed (Associated Press 2020). The Smithsonian Magazine reported that all 19 institutes, including the National Zoo and the National Museum of the American Indian (NMAI), would be closed to the public on 14 March (Daher 2020). On the same day, New Zealand’s borders closed, and the tourism industry, so reliant on international visitors, choked. Museums previously deemed safe havens of society and culture became petri dishes to avoid; local museums first removed toys from their cafés and children’s spaces, then the museum doors closed and staff worked from home. In some cases, front-of-the-house staff were redeployed to support back-of-the-house staff with cataloguing and digitization projects. You could smell fear everywhere.

The time from the initial stage of existence on Earth, the war continued. In this concern, India’s DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organization) and OFB (Ordnance Factory Board) worked appreciatively to develop new protective gear against assault weapons. The main focus of bullet or blast proof structures is to safeguard the life of soldiers, their accessories and gears, along with confidential and classified acquittance, firearm and ammunition, and sensitive systems. Defence structures like bunkers and tranches were designed in such discipline to keep them active round-the-clock with heavy armoury and made functional near to Line of Control (LOC) and Line of Actual Control (LAC) which oppose the effect of highly intensive blast waves. In such a manner, field testing with different Indian assault rifles i.e. INSAS (Indian Small Arms System), SIG 716i (US origin), and INSAS LMG (Indian Small Arms System-Light Machine Gun) was made from different ranges starting from 50mts to 300 mts extreme. Such structures were designed to protect the safety of soldiers from the bump of bullet effect. Structures designed are very strong and durable with opposition to high lateral load and visible surfacing. Construction material used for building plays a foremost role. The investigation is based on unique and advanced ideas in designing the defence structures. The investigation elaborates on the difference between conventional designing and the special designing of defence structures, as the advanced concept of polythene aggregates performs better than ordinary concrete.

The relationship between and among the foreign political units of the world waite since the establishment of modern state system (1648 Westphalia treaty). With the development of science and technology (sophisticated arms, means of transportation and communication) international relation has been highly complex. Likewise, modernism also has dragged international relation towards vagueness. International relations is a phenomena emerged with the creation of nation states. The development of nation states itself was a logical corollary to the growth of capitalism. Capitalism created larger territories which was basically due to expanding markets. Capitalism not only to the emergence of Nation-state but to colonialism as well. Therefore, international relations, till the end of world war II, was not between sovereign equal nations but most often between colonial power which were European and their colonies. To study international relations, colonization and decolonization theory, idealist school, realist school, liberalist school and geopolitical theory etc. are commonly used. While talking about foreign policy of Nepal and India, we find similarities i.e. NAM, panchasheela, respect to international law/organization etc, but Indian foreign policy practice towards Nepal is quite different than its theories.

This paper shares lessons learned recruiting and engaging participants in the BRAVE study, a randomized controlled trial carried out by the Northwest Portland Area Indian Health Board and the mHealth Impact Lab. The team recruited 2330 American Indian/Alaska Native (AI/AN) teens and young adults nationwide (15–24 years old) via social media channels and text message and enrolled 1030 to participate in the 9 month study. Teens and young adults who enrolled in this study received either: 8 weeks of BRAVE text messages designed to improve mental health, help-seeking skills, and promote cultural pride and resilience; or 8 weeks of Science Technology Engineering and Math (STEM) text messages, designed to elevate and re-affirm Native voices in science, technology, engineering, math and medicine; and then received the other set of messages. Results indicate that social media channels like Facebook and Instagram can be used to recruit AI/AN teens and young adults. Retention in this study was high, with 87% of participants completing both the BRAVE and STEM intervention arms. Lessons learned from this process may help teen and young adult-serving organizations, prevention programs, policy makers, researchers, and educators as they support the next generation of AI/AN change makers.

Compared to other countries in Southeast Asia, Indonesia is a great reflection of ethnicity, language and culture. Almost all major religions grow here. Various ethnic groups and residents live in a very tolerant spirit. Foreigners who arrived here and then stayed, especially Arabs, Persians, Indians, Chinese and Europeans, were welcomed with open arms and quickly integrated into the population of the entire archipelago. This discussion uses a type of library research approach. As for the results in terms of civilization, there were three ministerial decrees in 1975, two ministerial decrees in 1984, and madrasah madrasas from UUSPN, MI, MT, MA to major academies such as UIN, IAIN, STAIN in 1989. What is. Not only junior high school, but also high school and other major academies such as UI, UNJ, ITB, UNPAD, UPI, UGM, UNDIP. Pesantren, from traditional pesantren to modern pesantren, are also developing productively in both urban and rural areas. From the perspective of thought, namely Starting from the replenishment of Islamic learning ideas in Minankabau, following the revival of learning pursued by the Middle East in Indonesia, the Islamic revival has grown into a social organization, a socio-religious organization such as Salekat Dagan Islam (SDI) Bogor. (1909)) and Solo (1911) and others.

This article describes the training system of special operations forces of the Indian Armed Forces. Selection for the units of special operations forces is carried out from army units, in which psychological and intellectual tests are conducted, as well as a check of physical fitness level. The training takes place in various geographical conditions, including in the desert and mountains. Also, urban tactics are practiced. Units of special operations forces perform combat tasks using force methods in extreme conditions with the use of special tactics in specific conditions, which requires a high level of psychological, ideological, physical and combat training of military personnel. The doctrine of joint training of the Armed Forces of India demonstrates the intention of the country’s leaders to put into practice contemporary technologies for training the Armed Forces personnel, to increase the effectiveness of troops in modern military warfare, which are characterized by the use of hybrid forms of armed struggle. The doctrine reveals the essence and content of challenges and threats to national security. According to the military and political leadership of the state, it is considered the result of the activities of terrorist organizations and the foreign policy courses of China and Pakistan, which are aimed at reducing the role of India in South Asia. The existence of interstate disagreements with the countries of South Asia on territorial issues, the implementation by the leadership of neighboring states of military programs aimed primarily at increasing nuclear potential, is considered by Delhi as the main source of military conflict in the region, in which the armed forces may be involved.

Introduction. The relevance of the research topic is determined by the fact that it has not been studied in the national historical science. Meanwhile, the experience of training effective managerial personnel in England in the last third of the XIX – early XX centuries seems worthy of study and reflection. The purpose of the paper is to analyze the problem on the case study of the United Services College, its history and biographies of its most prominent graduates. The novelty of the research is determined by the fact that this problem has not been the subject of special research in Russian historiography. Materials and Methods. The sources used for the analyses consist of documents on the history of the school, memoirs of its graduates, Kipling’s novel “Stalky and Co.” based on the writer’s school years, documents of the “Kipling Society”. The following methods were used: narrative, descriptive, comparative. Analysis. The United Services College was founded in 1874 with the aim of providing the sons of military personnel with inexpensive school education and prepare boys to go on to cadet colleges to train for a military career. Mission of the school was to mold “men of action”, to teach patriotism, team spirit, leadership skills. Students were brought up to become practical, efficient, brave and effective leaders. Extra curriculum activities were consistent with these purposes. The rules were strict, physical punishment was an accepted teaching method and bullying was common. The examination oftheUSC graduates’ careers is essential for assessing the effectiveness of students’ preparation for their future services. Results. Despite a rather short history the United Services College provided the country with a large number of military and civil personnel. 468 graduates joined the British Army, nearly all served throughout the Empire. 198 graduates joined the Indian Army, 51 did service in the Royal Navy and associated forces, 308 USC’s graduates worked abroad in civil organizations, often in Colonial Service Some graduates reached high ranks of Admiral or General. During World War I USC’s graduates earned numerous awards and decorations. Many of them including two Generals, died in the war. The careers of the most distinguished USC’s graduates: Kipling and Dunsterville provide an example of the school’s capacity to effectively train boys for the future.

<p>Globalization has led to diverse workforce for most of the multinational corporations. Today's workforce is highly diverse based on Gender, Race, Ethnicity, Nationality, Age, Physical capabilities at a surface level and values, attitudes, personality, education and religion at a deeper level.</p><p>Diversity Management means valuing the differences in people. In India, Diversity mostly referred to gender related initiatives in the past. But today companies are moving to include national culture, age, physical ability and sexual orientation. In the context of generational diversity, four generations exist at workplace today namely the Veterans, Baby Boomers, Gen X and Gen Y. Gen Y is born between 1980 and 2000 make up 25% of the world population and nearly half the Indian population. They will soon form the largest employee base for organizations around the globe. However there is lack of substantial academic research on Indian Gen Y. <strong>Purpose</strong>: The study tries to explore and understand the important workplace expectations of Gen Y through the lens of psychological contract. 11 focus group discussions were held with 89 Gen Y employees currently working in IT/ITES companies. It further explores the unique expectations of Gen Y women and Gen Y differently-abled employees which may contribute to the unique elements in their psychological contract. <strong>Research Design/Methodology</strong>: Focus Group Discussions <strong>Exploratory study Findings</strong>: The study revealed that Salary, Career Growth, Opportunities at work, Job Satisfaction and Work Life Balance emerged as the top expectations of Gen Y as a whole. However it was interesting to note that when comparison was made between men, women and differently-abled employees within Gen Y, the expectations were completely different with only challenging work being common to all the three groups. <strong>Research Limitations</strong>: This study is an exploratory study with focus groups and qualitative data. A further large scale cross sectional study needs to be done with quantitative analysis to confirm the important workplace expectations of Gen Y. Study is limited to IT/ITES employees in Bengaluru. Only three specific employee groups under Gen Y namely men, women and differently-abled were explored due to time constraints. Studies in the future can include more employee groups like ex-army employees, employees from rural and urban background, LGBT etc. <strong>Practical Implication</strong>: If IT/ITES organizations want to attract engage and retain young Gen Y employees, they must proactively understand the needs and expectations of these youngsters. It is also critical that specific needs of various employee groups within Gen Y are also understood and met. <strong>Originality</strong>: Until now most organizations have had a reactive approach to managing diversity either as a response to a minority discrimination case or legal compliance. The paper argues for a more proactive approach to managing Generation Y expectations using psychological contract framework which has never been proposed before.</p>

Background Leveraging internet-based communication tools (eg, messaging apps, SMS text messaging, and email) may be an effective avenue for delivery of HIV prevention messages to men who have sex with men (MSM) in India, but there are limited models for such internet-based interventions. Objective The CHALO! pilot was an online educational and behavioral intervention aimed to determine the feasibility, acceptability, and preliminary impact of a peer-delivered, internet-based messaging intervention for HIV testing and consistent condom use for MSM in India. The messages addressed barriers to HIV testing and condom use and were theoretically based on the information-motivation-behavioral skills model. Methods Between February and March 2015, we recruited, enrolled, and randomized 244 participants via online advertisements on mobile dating apps and Facebook. Eligible men (18 years or older, sexually active with other men, and self-reported HIV-negative or unknown status) were randomized to receive educational and motivational messages framed as either approach (ie, a desirable outcome to be achieved) or avoidance (an undesirable outcome to be avoided) over 12 weeks via internet-based messaging platforms. Participants completed online surveys at baseline and immediately postintervention. Results Participants were similar across arms with respect to sociodemographic and behavioral characteristics. Over 82.0% (200/244) of participants were retained (ie, viewed final messages), and 52.3% (130/244) of them completed the follow-up survey. Of those completing the follow-up survey, 82.3% (107/130) liked or strongly liked participating in CHALO!. The results showed a significant increase in self-reported HIV testing in the past 6 months from baseline to follow-up (41/130, 31.5% to 57/130, 43.8%; P=.04). When including those who reported intentions to test, this percentage increased from 44.6% (58/130) at baseline to 65.4% (85/130) at follow-up (P<.01). When examining intentions to test among those without prior HIV testing, intentions increased from 32% (16/50) of the sample at baseline to 56% (28/50) of the sample at follow-up (P=.02). Condom use during anal sex did not significantly change from baseline to follow-up. HIV testing and condom use did not significantly differ between approach and avoidance conditions at follow-up. Conclusions As one of the first studies of an online HIV prevention intervention for Indian MSM, CHALO! was feasible to implement by a community-based organization, was acceptable to participants, and demonstrated potential to improve HIV testing rates.

Subject area Governance challenges in reverse value chain. Study level/applicability Women employment system in textile and clothing industry. Case overview The textile and clothing firms, often frustrated by frequent labor issues, used an innovative employment scheme – Sumangali scheme – to employ young female workers from poor families in rural areas, aged between 18 and 25 years, as apprentices for three years who would stay in dormitories located in the vicinity of the factories, draw low wages with minimum benefits. But the scheme was criticized by labor unions and Europe- and US-based non-governmental organization (NGOs) on the grounds of alleged violation of labor rights such as freedom of association, freedom of movement, exploitative working conditions, low wages with minimum or no benefits, long working hours and abusive supervisors. Their public campaign against the alleged employment practices has put tremendous pressure on the global buyers to take steps to ameliorate the situation. In the wake of campaign by NGOs, few buyers have even terminated the relationship with the manufacturers. Others have warned action against those erring manufacturers. The actions by global buyers, NGOs against some of the women employment practices raised several questions in the minds of manufacturers. They were wondering why US- and Europe-based NGOs were up in arms to dump an employment scheme unmindful of socio-economic realities in India? Is it a clever ploy that developed nations use some private, voluntary, corporate social responsibility norms to stop companies purchasing textile and clothing products from a developing country like India on the grounds of violation of labor rights? As per the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention No. 81, it is the responsibility of central/state governments to inspect and monitor labor employment practices in an industry. Then why NGOs and other private groups volunteer to become watch dogs of labor practices and launch campaigns against mills? Would it not undermine the role of government in ensuring industrial harmony? Even if NGOs' actions are justified on the grounds of moral and ethical principles, what role should they play when it comes to management–worker relationship? In the Indian context, only the government can interfere if the relationship turns sour? Should NGOs need to use a different set of ethical standards which are more relevant and contextual to the socio-economic environment in India? Expected learning outcomes To understand evolution of apparel global value chain and workforce development challenges in India; to explore the link between consumer activism and corporate social responsibility; to explore the challenge of addressing issues such as alleged human rights violation and labor exploitation by independent suppliers located in India; to explore the challenges faced by global buyers in contextualizing, operationalizing and realizing certain human rights along the supply chain located in India; and to explore sustainability challenges of women employment in textile and clothing mills in India. Supplementary materials Teaching notes are available for educators only. Please contact your library to gain login details or email support@emeraldinsight.com to request teaching notes. Social implications Sustenance of women employment system in India's textile and clothing industry and its associated challenges.

Abstract Accessibility to medical care is related health insurance. The U.S. military health system (MHS) provides beneficiaries with universal health care. Our previous studies showed improved survival of the MHS patients with lung cancer compared to those in the US general population covered by the Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER) program. This study expanded the previous studies by further comparing MHS patient with SEER patients with different insurances to provide evidence on the effects of insurance status on survival. The MHS patients were identified from the Department of Defense's (DoD) Automated Central Tumor Registry (ACTUR). The SEER patients were identified from the 18 cancer registries of the SEER program. All patients were diagnosed with histologically confirmed lung cancer between 2007 and 2013. The SEER program defines insurance type as insured (private insurance, Medicare administered through a managed care plan or private supplement), insured/no specifics (Medicare NOS, insurance NOS), any Medicaid (Indian/Public health Service, Medicaid, Medicaid administered through a managed care plan, Medicare with Medicaid eligibility), and uninsured (no insurance, self-pay). The results showed that compared to ACTUR, SEER patients with non-small cell lung cancer exhibited increased risk of mortality regardless of their insurance type. Specifically, the adjusted HR (95% CI) was 1.08 (1.03-1.13), 1.22 (1.16-1.28), 1.40 (1.33-1.47), 1.49 (1.41-1.58), for SEER insured, insured/no specifics, Medicaid, and uninsured, respectively. This pattern was consistently observed in subgroups by age, gender, race, and tumor stage. Among small-cell lung cancer patients, the higher HR compared to ACTUR was significant only for Medicaid (HR=1.24, 95% CI=1.11-1.38) and uninsured (HR=1.28, 95% CI=1.13-1.45). Furthermore, compared to ACTUR, the likelihood of receiving surgery was significantly lower in SEER with odds ratios (95% CIs) of 0.85 (0.76-0.95), 0.64 (0.57-0.72), 0.40 (0.36-0.45), and 0.34 (0.29-0.39) for insured, insurance/no specifics, Medicaid, and uninsured, respectively, and was observed regardless of tumor stage. Our study suggests that the MHS lung cancer patients had survival advantage over the SEER patients and the advantage was even larger when compared to Medicaid or uninsured patients. In addition, the SEER patients were less likely to receive surgery regardless of tumor stage, especially for Medicaid or uninsured patients. Disclaimer: The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views, opinions, or policies of the USUHS, HJF, the DoD or the Departments of the Army, Navy, or Air Force. Mention of trade names, commercial products, or organizations does not imply endorsement by the U.S. Government. Citation Format: Jie Lin, Craig Shriver, Kangmin Zhu. Insurance and survival among lung cancer patients: Comparison of the US military health system and the surveillance, epidemiology, and end results (SEER) program [abstract]. In: Proceedings of the American Association for Cancer Research Annual Meeting 2022; 2022 Apr 8-13. Philadelphia (PA): AACR; Cancer Res 2022;82(12_Suppl):Abstract nr 5861.

Abstract Introduction: Calreticulin (CALR) is a calcium binding multifunctional protein encoded by the CALR gene, whose job is to bind to mis-folded proteins and prevent them from being exported from the endoplasmic reticulum to the golgi apparatus. Outside the endoplasmic reticulum it is found both intra- and extracellularly on the cell surface and has been implicated in diverse processes including proliferation, apoptosis, phagocytosis and immunogenic cell death. In December 2013, somatic mutations in exon 9 of CALR were identified as the second most prevalent acquired nucleotide changes in JAK2 mutation negative essential thrombocythosis (ET) and primary myelofibrosis (PMF) patients but not in polycythaemia vera (PV) patients. At that time CALR mutations were found mutually exclusive with JAK2 and MPL. Recently there have been some reports on co-occurence of JAK2 and CALR mutations, not only in ET and PMF but also in some PV cases. Indels in CALR have also been reported in a JAK2 mutation negative PV patient. All CALR mutations are insertions or deletions resulting in a frameshift and cluster in exon 9 which is the last exon of the gene. Thus far, more than 50 different types of mutations in CALR have been reported. Two specific mutations, Type I (52bp deletion) and Type II (5bp insertion), are most prevalent. Overall, these two mutation types are found in more than 80% of patients with mutant CALR. One report found absence of Type II mutations and scatter point mutations in PMF patients of India. In the light of currently available literature, reported from North America (USA), Europe (Cyprus/Italy/Spain), Eastern Europe (Poland), and East Asia (Mainland China/Taiwan China), indel mutations in CALR exon 9 occur with a similar frequency in both ET and PMF patients regardless of ethnic diversity. CALR mutations have been shown to have important diagnostic and prognostic significance in ET and PMF patients and will likely be incorporated into the World Health Organization diagnostic criteria for MPN. Methods: Clinical and hematological features were obtained from 51 MPN patients. We studied 10 patients with PV, 17 patients with ET, 12 patients with MF and 9 patients with Undifferentiated MPN. JAK2 V617F mutation was analyzed by DNA tetra-primer amplification refractory mutation system (ARMS-PCR). CALR mutations were identified by bi-directional Sanger sequencing. Results: In our cohort, CALR mutations were detected in 7 patients (13.7%; 7/51) of which one patients was positive for JAK2 V617F as well. All those who showed positive results for CALR mutations were ET patients (41.17%; 7/17). Type I mutation was found in 3 patients (42.8%; 3/7) and among them 2 had two new scattered point mutations (c.1081C>G and c.1086C>G) as well, Type II in 2 patients (28.5%; 2/7), and others in 2 patients (28.5%; 2/7). Among those 2 patients with CALR mutations other than Type I or Type II, one had novel CALR mutation pattern of 10bp deletion (c.1130_1139del) whereas other had reported CALR 12bp deletion (c.1214_1225del) profile. When CALR positive ET patients were statistically compared with JAK2 V617F positive patient, insignificant differences were found in platelet counts (p-value 0.198) and hemoglobin level (p-value 0.380) which might be due to the fact that there was only one JAK2 V617F positive patient in the cohort. No differences were also observed in hemoglobin, white blood cell, platelet counts, hepatomegaly, and splenomegaly between CALR positive and CALR negative patients (p-value >0.05). Conclusion: In our cohort of 51 MPN patients CALR mutations were found associated with ET only that is different from other studies worldwide. Prevalence of both scatter point and Type I and Type II CALR mutations are in agreement with worldwide studies but differ from the study conducted on Indian population which shows the need to conduct studies with large sample size in this region to explore the CALR mutation profile in the patients of MPN here. Disclosures No relevant conflicts of interest to declare.

Military justice in any nation refers to a collection of laws aimed at regulating the personnel of the country's armed forces. Each state requires a code of regulations and guidelines for the raising, support, and organization of its military, which may all be viewed as the field of military regulation. The object of the disciplinary code is to guarantee that the desire of the commandant is placed into impact. Military regulation in this way traces its origin to the prerogative force of rulers. The Indian Army, Air Force, and Naval Force in India have special laws formed to govern the Land, Air and Water forces, also known as The Indian Army, Air Force, and Naval Force in India. The purpose of military regulation is to ensure that the trooper is not empowered to get away from the commitments of his country's normal regulation or of global regulation. The three Army, Navy and Air Force Acts are nearly identical, but there are a few differences in the authorities and processes. The Air Force has three kinds of Court Martial - General Court Martial, District Court Martial and Summary General Court Martial. The Indian Army has one kind of court-martial during peacetime and also a disciplinary tribunal during times of war. The Indian Military Justice System has multiple drawbacks that often lose out on the purpose of granting justice and restrict it for the military officials . The Indian Armed Forces have a structure of regulation, standards, and methods called military regulation, which has encountered rehashed modifications and changes. This research slightly touches and compares certain drawbacks of the Indian Military Justice System to the procedures of the USA and UK military forces The Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) was established in 2007, but it failed to make a mark due to the rigidity of the tribunal and the lack of support from the Government. The AFT has failed to provide adequate verdicts for the cases due to lack of experts in the tribunal, and there is a serious case of the non-execution of the final orders that could’ve granted relief to the complainants.

Purpose: Mahabharata is an epic war described in poetic form, an integral part of Indian mythology. While a full-blown war of such a colossal scale in an ancient time of around 3000 B.C. is intriguing for the civilizations today, the first war involving almost every contemporary major economy of the world whose horrors survived for generations, giving ramifications to date is in itself a “lesson learnt hard way”. The main purpose of this paper is to reflect on the management lessons based on Indian traditions. In this paper, the researchers discuss team collaboration vs. team competition between two cousins of Mahabharta the Pandavas and the Kauravas and to bring literature evidence of why the Kauravas lost the Mahabharata war despite having the best-in-class warriors and a larger army. Objective: The researchers have set the following main objectives and the present study investigates 3 wide-ranging research questions: (1) To recognize team collaboration and team competition characters from the Mahabharata War. (2) To assess the reasons why Kauravas, lose the Mahabharata War. (3) To evaluate which team effectiveness model is best for collaboration & and competition. Design/Methodology/Approach: The study is based on secondary data and available shreds of evidence. The hypotheses have been stated for the selected variables and were investigated to prove or disprove the same without any errors. Findings/Results: The researchers draw lessons from the epic story and highlight the great war of Mahabharata is no doubt an epic war, described perfectly which gives numerous lessons on every nook and corner. In the complex scenario, when the Kauravas were in crisis, they often tended to rush into decisions without proper reflection and demonstrated an inability to decide based on subtle, intangible, and often very vital elements like emotion, intuition, and spiritual discernment. At the same time, the Pandavas team's effectiveness and setting the stage for great performance are very much needed in teams to work together successfully. In the end, researchers consider these factors, to have an edge in Mahabharata War. Research Limitations/Implications: Further the fact that the battle between the Pandavas and the Kauravas was already battled, the decision had been made and concluded before it even began, as revealed by Shri Krishna in his Visvarupa to Arjuna, the reason that Kauravas lost was basically due to an act of deceptive stupidity which can be traced back to one crucial event. Originality/New Knowledge/Interpretation/Value: Thus, it can be aforesaid that if we apply the finest practices of the Mahabharata War to the finest practices of Management, we might have renewed associate and can function better in the coming years and make the organization & team glance and perform better in the years to come. Paper Type: The study is based on secondary data and available shreds of evidence.

PurposeThe purposes of this research article are as follows: to explore the understanding of the Industry 4.0 (I4.0) concept among Indian manufacturing industries, to determine the motivating factors for I4.0 implementation, to identify I4.0 enabling technologies which are used by Indian manufacturing industries and assess their sustainability, to explore the impact of above identified enabling technologies on sustainability pillars, to determine how Indian manufacturing industries interpret the concept of I4.0 and to develop a road map for I4.0 implementation and sustainability.Design/methodology/approachTo perform this research work, a dual research methodology was adopted. Questionnaires were sent to 16 Indian manufacturing industries, and expert interviews were conducted with seven experts who have been practicing the I4.0 concept since the last three years in their business. Also, a sustainability measurement tool was developed to measure the sustainability of the used I4.0 enabling technologies.FindingsIn this research article, it is found that smart sensors and robot arms have high sustainability, whereas cyber physical systems (CPSs) and big data analytics have low sustainability. During an expert interview, it has been found that adoption of the I4.0 concept in Indian manufacturing industries is creating job loss fear in employees. Also, it is found that Indian workers must be trained to adopt and sustain I4.0 enabling technologies.Research limitations/implicationsThe sustainability of I4.0 enabling technologies in Indian manufacturing industries was indicated by analyzing responses received through questionnaires and expert interviews. There are other measures of sustainability which are beyond this study. Further studies are expected to fill the gap.Practical implicationsThe authors have explored reasons for low sustainability of I4.0 enabling technologies in Indian manufacturing industries, suggested a road map for its implementation and sustainability and identified the relationship between different parameters (such as job loss, job creation, workers’ qualification and business profit) and I4.0 sustainability, therefore helping Indian organizations to develop sustainable manufacturing systems based on the I4.0 concept.Originality/valueThis research article gives an idea about sustainability of I4.0 enabling technologies in Indian manufacturing industries.

The World Health Organization categorizes violence as including self-harm such as suicide, interpersonal violence such as domestic violence and violent crime, and collective violence such as inter-communal violence and international war. Peace and security issues in India abound in all of these categories. To name a few, they range from cases of farmer suicides, violence against women and female infanticide, religious, communal, and political violence, land-acquisition disputes, crime, policing, regional disputes between Indian states and other groups over scarce natural resources, separatist movements, military expenditure and policy, and territorial disputes and arms races with neighboring countries. This symposium focuses on points of interpersonal and inter-communal violence, largely restricting its attention to India’s internal rather than external concerns.

The main purpose of this article is to describe and analyze Indigenous women’sparticipation in the prolonged takeover of Wounded Knee in 1973. Indigenouswomen’s grassroots activism was fundamental for sustaining and keeping the occu-pation alive, yet their contributions were largely eclipsed by the actions of theirmedia-savvy, male comrades-in-arms. What is more important, Indigenous women inthe American Indian Movement (AIM) frequently claimed that they were in a state of“double oppression” or “double colonization”—first, through colonial domination andracial inequality, and second, through male privilege and female subordination—itself,part of the legacy of colonization and the imposition of dominant white patriarchalmasculinity.2 Nationalist struggles such as that of the anticolonial AIM tend to repli-cate the very structures of male dominance that they struggle against. While womenhave been included in public discourse, they have been largely left out of politicaldecision-making.3At Wounded Knee, Indigenous women took on a series of interrelated roles andresponsibilities that kept the occupation alive. Indigenous women skillfully renegoti-ated their gendered position of power within the masculinist organization, constructingfemininities that shifted between domesticated motherhood and female comrades-in-arms. In so doing, they both reaffirmed and challenged sexist and chauvinist attitudes&nbsp;within AIM. They were well known as long-standing community organizers, andtheir active participation at the Wounded Knee takeover was an indication of female empowerment.&nbsp;

Abstract Background Hypertension is a major preventable risk factor for cardiovascular disease. Occupational factors such as having served or serving in armed forces may be associated with hypertension. This study aimed to assess the prevalence and factors associated with hypertension among veterans of the Indian Gorkha army living in western Nepal. Methods A community-based cross-sectional study was conducted among the veterans living in the Pokhara metropolitan city. Data on blood pressure (BP), anthropometric measurements, and behavioral factors were collected by face-to-face interviews using the World Health Organization's non-communicable disease risk factor surveillance (STEPS) tool. Hypertension was defined as systolic blood pressure (BP) ≥ 140 mm Hg and/or diastolic BP of ≥ 90 mm Hg or currently on antihypertensive medication. Results The age-adjusted prevalence of hypertension was 66.2 % among the study participants (317). Mean systolic and diastolic blood pressure was 144.5 mmHg (± 18.3) and 89.3mmHg (± 16.0), respectively. Among the hypertensive participants, 67 % were aware of their disease, 90 % of them were under treatment, and 14 % of the individuals who received treatment had their hypertension under control. The proportion of smokers was 12.9 % and alcohol drinker was 86.1 %. One-fourth (25.9 %) of the participants had a family history of hypertension. Veterans aged 55-64 years had higher odds (AOR: 5.3; 95 % CI: 1.8–15.9; p = 0.003) of being associated with hypertension as compared to 35–44 years. Being a current alcohol drinker (AOR: 2.5; 95 % CI: 1.4–4.5; p = 0.003), overweight (AOR: 1.9; 95 % CI: 1.0-3.5; p = 0.04), obese (AOR: 3.1; 95 % CI: 1.1–8.3; p = 0.03) and family history of hypertension (AOR: 2.9; 95 % CI: 1.5–5.8; p = 0.002) were independently associated with hypertension. Conclusions Hypertension was prevalent in retired Nepal veterans. Hypertension was associated with a number of modifiable lifestyle and behavioral factors. Our findings suggest the need for screening, education and management of Nepal veterans for hypertension.

Numerous terrestrial and marine organisms, including cephalopods, are capable of light emission. In addition to communication, bioluminescence is used for attraction and defense mechanisms. The present review aims to: (i) present updated information on the taxonomic diversity of luminous cephalopods and morphological features, (ii) describe large-scale biogeographic patterns, and (iii) show the research trends over the last 50 years on cephalopod bioluminescence. According to our database (834 species), 32% of all known cephalopod species can emit light, including oegopsid and myopsid squids, sepiolids, octopuses, and representatives of several other smaller orders (bathyteuthids, and the monotypic vampire “squid”, Vampyroteuthis infernalis and ram’s horn “squid”, Spirula spirula). Most species have a combination of photophores present in different locations, of which light organs on the head region are dominant, followed by photophores associated with the arms and tentacles and internal photophores. Regarding the biogeographic patterns of cephalopod species with light organs, the most diverse ocean is the Pacific Ocean, followed by the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. The least diverse are the Southern and the Arctic Oceans. Regarding publication trends, our systematic review revealed that, between 1971 and 2020, 277 peer-reviewed studies were published on bioluminescent cephalopods. Most research has been done on a single species, the Hawaiian bobtail squid Euprymna scolopes. The interest in this species is mostly due to its species-specific symbiotic relationship with the bacterium Vibrio fischeri, which is used as a model for the study of Eukaryote–Prokaryote symbiosis. Because there are many knowledge gaps about the biology and biogeography of light-producing cephalopods, new state-of-the-art techniques (e.g., eDNA for diversity research and monitoring) can help achieve a finer resolution on species’ distributions. Moreover, knowledge on the effects of climate change stressors on the bioluminescent processes is nonexistent. Future studies are needed to assess such impacts at different levels of biological organization, to describe the potential broad-scale biogeographic changes, and understand the implications for food web dynamics.

The history of Regional Anesthesia is a beautiful narrative of man’s quest to conquer pain from a disease or surgery. From its ancient beginnings, to the discovery of cocaine as an anesthetic and to the evolution of modern technology, Regional Anesthesia has revolutionized not only how pain is treated but also how surgeries are performed. It has also promoted a culture of safety that translates to better patient care, outcome, and satisfaction. The beginnings of Regional Anesthesia date back to the ancient civilizations. The Greeks and Egyptians pioneered the use of opium, alcohol, and scopolamine to alleviate pain. The Chinese used acupuncture. The Indian culture used both herbal medicine and yoga.1 However, most historians consider the official birth of Regional Anesthesia in 1884 when Carl Koller discovered the local anesthetic properties of cocaine. His tongue became numb after accidentally licking a few grains of cocaine. He then translated this discovery into using a solution of cocaine as an anesthetic for the eye.2 In the following year, the first documented nerve block was performed by two surgeons - William Stewart Halsted and Richard Hall. They blocked the inferior alveolar nerve and the antero-superior dental nerve using cocaine as an anesthetic. This anesthesia technique has made a big impact in the practice of odontology since its introduction in 1885, because it offered dentists a way of performing maxillary procedures without pain.3 As cocaine is highly addictive, toxic, and has many adverse effects, the next century saw the development of local anesthetics that are longer-lasting and have better safety profiles such as lidocaine, tetracaine, bupivacaine, and ropivacaine.4 The 20th century also saw the introduction of the nerve stimulator. It allowed anesthesiologists to locate nerves more accurately, thus improving the efficacy and safety of nerve blocks. However, this technique was still at risk of failure and did not prevent injuries involving direct puncture on blood vessels and nerves.5 In the past 50 years, Regional Anesthesia has since advanced exponentially, especially after the introduction of ultrasoundguided regional anesthesia. La Grange and his colleagues described and documented the first ultrasound-guided nerve block in 1978 wherein they used a Doppler device in performing supraclavicular blocks for upper extremity procedures.6 With the invention of modern ultrasound machines that provide clearer imagery of nerves and the structures surrounding them, the practice of Regional Anesthesia has become safer and more effective. The history of Regional Anesthesia in the Philippines mirrors its global history – from its rudimentary beginnings to the advanced clinical practices that are uniquely intertwined with the challenges of the healthcare system of a developing country. Long before the advent of modern medicine, indigenous Filipino communities had already been using various plant extracts, folk medicine, and traditional methods to relieve pain.7 The Spanish colonial period introduced Western medical practices to the Philippines, but it was only during the American occupation, after World War II, that significant medical advancements in anesthesia trickled into our country. During this time, Filipino anesthesiologists trained abroad, returned home, and became pioneers in providing safer anesthesia techniques including knowledge and skills in Regional Anesthesia. One of them was Dr. Quintin J. Gomez, considered as the Father of Philippine Anesthesia. With his army-type portable to-and-fro Heidbrink anesthesia machine, he introduced and transformed the practice of modern anesthesia in the country, making it safer, more effective, and accessible.8 The next five decades that followed the war were a time of growth for Philippine Anesthesia. Regional Anesthesia then was performed mainly using anatomical landmarks and at times through the help of a nerve stimulator. Dr. Benigno Sulit Jr. and Dr. Wilfredo Alarcon stand as prominent figures among the pillars of Regional Anesthesia during this period, having championed the early advancements and training in the discipline.9 During this period, the Philippine Society of Anesthesiologists (PSA) and the Philippine Board of Anesthesiologists (PBA) were also established. They played a key role in advancing the anesthesia practice by overseeing anesthesia training, research, and policy development.10 The start of the 21st century brought with it new challenges and opportunities for Regional Anesthesia in the Philippines. This period is characterized by a rapid development in the Regional Anesthesia practice. Driven by the global trend towards safer and more effective pain management techniques that allowed for faster patient recovery and reduced hospital stay, Filipino anesthesiologists trained abroad in major regional anesthesia training centers in Europe, North America, and Asia. Upon returning home, they introduced the technique of performing neuraxial, peripheral nerve, and fascial plane blocks under ultrasound guidance. They also organized and conducted workshops, local and international conferences, journal clubs, lectures, and simulations all over the Philippines, attended by both local and foreign speakers, facilitators, and delegates.9 To further promote the common interests of regionalists, to continue the spread of knowledge, to teach the skills, and to further advance the safe practice of regional anesthesia, two organizations were established – Regional Anesthesia Society of the Philippines (RASPhil) in 2017 and the Manila Academy of Regional Anesthesiologists (MARA) in 2019. In recognition of the need for formal training in Regional Anesthesia, the last decade has also seen the establishment of Regional Anesthesia Fellowship Programs in several training institutions in our country, including our very own Regional Anesthesia Fellowship Training Program at the University of the Philippines - Philippine General Hospital which started accepting trainees in 2019. Last year, the Philippine Board of Anesthesiologists conferred the title of Specialists in Regional Anesthesia to 88 Anesthesiologists.9,11 Thus, the seed that Dr. Sulit and Dr. Alarcon have planted has grown into a full-fledged and well-organized subspecialty. Looking forward, the future of Regional Anesthesia in the Philippines is very promising, but will still require continuous effort in several key areas. Right now, access to the technology of modern imaging equipment is limited to the major tertiary centers of the country. There should be continued investment in healthcare infrastructure, training, safety protocols, and technology. More Regional Anesthesia specialists should also be trained and deployed in the remote and underserved areas of the country. In conclusion, the story of Regional Anesthesia in the Philippines is a testament to the strength and adaptability of the anesthesia community. From its indigenous roots to the modern era, the history of Philippine Regional Anesthesia is a story of progress and perseverance to further elevate, innovate, and provide better health care for the Filipino.

Introduction The highly contagious COVID-19 virus has presented particularly difficult public policy challenges. The relatively late emergence of an effective treatments and vaccines, the structural stresses on health care systems, the lockdowns and the economic dislocations, the evident structural inequalities in effected societies, as well as the difficulty of prevention have tested social and political cohesion. Moreover, the intrusive nature of many prophylactic measures have led to individual liberty and human rights concerns. As noted by the Victorian (Australia) Ombudsman Report on the COVID-19 lockdown in Melbourne, we may be tempted, during a crisis, to view human rights as expendable in the pursuit of saving human lives. This thinking can lead to dangerous territory. It is not unlawful to curtail fundamental rights and freedoms when there are compelling reasons for doing so; human rights are inherently and inseparably a consideration of human lives. (5) These difficulties have raised issues about the importance of social or community capital in fighting the pandemic. This article discusses the impacts of social and community capital and other factors on the governmental efforts to combat the spread of infectious disease through the maintenance of social distancing and household ‘bubbles’. It argues that the beneficial effects of social and community capital towards fighting the pandemic, such as mutual respect and empathy, which underpins such public health measures as social distancing, the use of personal protective equipment, and lockdowns in the USA, have been undermined as preventive measures because they have been transmogrified to become a salient aspect of the “culture wars” (Peters). In contrast, states that have relatively lower social capital such a China have been able to more effectively arrest transmission of the disease because the government was been able to generate and personify a nationalist response to the virus and thus generate a more robust social consensus regarding the efforts to combat the disease. Social Capital and Culture Wars The response to COVID-19 required individuals, families, communities, and other types of groups to refrain from extensive interaction – to stay in their bubble. In these situations, especially given the asymptomatic nature of many COVID-19 infections and the serious imposition lockdowns and social distancing and isolation, the temptation for individuals to breach public health rules in high. From the perspective of policymakers, the response to fighting COVID-19 is a collective action problem. In studying collective action problems, scholars have paid much attention on the role of social and community capital (Ostrom and Ahn 17-35). Ostrom and Ahn comment that social capital “provides a synthesizing approach to how cultural, social, and institutional aspects of communities of various sizes jointly affect their capacity of dealing with collective-action problems” (24). Social capital is regarded as an evolving social type of cultural trait (Fukuyama; Guiso et al.). Adger argues that social capital “captures the nature of social relations” and “provides an explanation for how individuals use their relationships to other actors in societies for their own and for the collective good” (387). The most frequently used definition of social capital is the one proffered by Putnam who regards it as “features of social organization, such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, “Bowling Alone” 65). All these studies suggest that social and community capital has at least two elements: “objective associations” and subjective ties among individuals. Objective associations, or social networks, refer to both formal and informal associations that are formed and engaged in on a voluntary basis by individuals and social groups. Subjective ties or norms, on the other hand, primarily stand for trust and reciprocity (Paxton). High levels of social capital have generally been associated with democratic politics and civil societies whose institutional performance benefits from the coordinated actions and civic culture that has been facilitated by high levels of social capital (Putnam, Democracy 167-9). Alternatively, a “good and fair” state and impartial institutions are important factors in generating and preserving high levels of social capital (Offe 42-87). Yet social capital is not limited to democratic civil societies and research is mixed on whether rising social capital manifests itself in a more vigorous civil society that in turn leads to democratising impulses. Castillo argues that various trust levels for institutions that reinforce submission, hierarchy, and cultural conservatism can be high in authoritarian governments, indicating that high levels of social capital do not necessarily lead to democratic civic societies (Castillo et al.). Roßteutscher concludes after a survey of social capita indicators in authoritarian states that social capital has little effect of democratisation and may in fact reinforce authoritarian rule: in nondemocratic contexts, however, it appears to throw a spanner in the works of democratization. Trust increases the stability of nondemocratic leaderships by generating popular support, by suppressing regime threatening forms of protest activity, and by nourishing undemocratic ideals concerning governance (752). In China, there has been ongoing debate concerning the presence of civil society and the level of social capital found across Chinese society. If one defines civil society as an intermediate associational realm between the state and the family, populated by autonomous organisations which are separate from the state that are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their interests or values, it is arguable that the PRC had a significant civil society or social capital in the first few decades after its establishment (White). However, most scholars agree that nascent civil society as well as a more salient social and community capital has emerged in China’s reform era. This was evident after the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, where the government welcomed community organising and community-driven donation campaigns for a limited period of time, giving the NGO sector and bottom-up social activism a boost, as evidenced in various policy areas such as disaster relief and rural community development (F. Wu 126; Xu 9). Nevertheless, the CCP and the Chinese state have been effective in maintaining significant control over civil society and autonomous groups without attempting to completely eliminate their autonomy or existence. The dramatic economic and social changes that have occurred since the 1978 Opening have unsurprisingly engendered numerous conflicts across the society. In response, the CCP and State have adjusted political economic policies to meet the changing demands of workers, migrants, the unemployed, minorities, farmers, local artisans, entrepreneurs, and the growing middle class. Often the demands arising from these groups have resulted in policy changes, including compensation. In other circumstances, where these groups remain dissatisfied, the government will tolerate them (ignore them but allow them to continue in the advocacy), or, when the need arises, supress the disaffected groups (F. Wu 2). At the same time, social organisations and other groups in civil society have often “refrained from open and broad contestation against the regime”, thereby gaining the space and autonomy to achieve the objectives (F. Wu 2). Studies of Chinese social or community capital suggest that a form of modern social capital has gradually emerged as Chinese society has become increasingly modernised and liberalised (despite being non-democratic), and that this social capital has begun to play an important role in shaping social and economic lives at the local level. However, this more modern form of social capital, arising from developmental and social changes, competes with traditional social values and social capital, which stresses parochial and particularistic feelings among known individuals while modern social capital emphasises general trust and reciprocal feelings among both known and unknown individuals. The objective element of these traditional values are those government-sanctioned, formal mass organisations such as Communist Youth and the All-China Federation of Women's Associations, where members are obliged to obey the organisation leadership. The predominant subjective values are parochial and particularistic feelings among individuals who know one another, such as guanxi and zongzu (Chen and Lu, 426). The concept of social capital emphasises that the underlying cooperative values found in individuals and groups within a culture are an important factor in solving collective problems. In contrast, the notion of “culture war” focusses on those values and differences that divide social and cultural groups. Barry defines culture wars as increases in volatility, expansion of polarisation, and conflict between those who are passionate about religiously motivated politics, traditional morality, and anti-intellectualism, and…those who embrace progressive politics, cultural openness, and scientific and modernist orientations. (90) The contemporary culture wars across the world manifest opposition by various groups in society who hold divergent worldviews and ideological positions. Proponents of culture war understand various issues as part of a broader set of religious, political, and moral/normative positions invoked in opposition to “elite”, “liberal”, or “left” ideologies. Within this Manichean universe opposition to such issues as climate change, Black Lives Matter, same sex rights, prison reform, gun control, and immigration becomes framed in binary terms, and infused with a moral sensibility (Chapman 8-10). In many disputes, the culture war often devolves into an epistemological dispute about the efficacy of scientific knowledge and authority, or a dispute between “practical” and theoretical knowledge. In this environment, even facts can become partisan narratives. For these “cultural” disputes are often how electoral prospects (generally right-wing) are advanced; “not through policies or promises of a better life, but by fostering a sense of threat, a fantasy that something profoundly pure … is constantly at risk of extinction” (Malik). This “zero-sum” social and policy environment that makes it difficult to compromise and has serious consequences for social stability or government policy, especially in a liberal democratic society. Of course, from the perspective of cultural materialism such a reductionist approach to culture and political and social values is not unexpected. “Culture” is one of the many arenas in which dominant social groups seek to express and reproduce their interests and preferences. “Culture” from this sense is “material” and is ultimately connected to the distribution of power, wealth, and resources in society. As such, the various policy areas that are understood as part of the “culture wars” are another domain where various dominant and subordinate groups and interests engaged in conflict express their values and goals. Yet it is unexpected that despite the pervasiveness of information available to individuals the pool of information consumed by individuals who view the “culture wars” as a touchstone for political behaviour and a narrative to categorise events and facts is relatively closed. This lack of balance has been magnified by social media algorithms, conspiracy-laced talk radio, and a media ecosystem that frames and discusses issues in a manner that elides into an easily understood “culture war” narrative. From this perspective, the groups (generally right-wing or traditionalist) exist within an information bubble that reinforces political, social, and cultural predilections. American and Chinese Reponses to COVID-19 The COVID-19 pandemic first broke out in Wuhan in December 2019. Initially unprepared and unwilling to accept the seriousness of the infection, the Chinese government regrouped from early mistakes and essentially controlled transmission in about three months. This positive outcome has been messaged as an exposition of the superiority of the Chinese governmental system and society both domestically and internationally; a positive, even heroic performance that evidences the populist credentials of the Chinese political leadership and demonstrates national excellence. The recently published White Paper entitled “Fighting COVID-19: China in Action” also summarises China’s “strategic achievement” in the simple language of numbers: in a month, the rising spread was contained; in two months, the daily case increase fell to single digits; and in three months, a “decisive victory” was secured in Wuhan City and Hubei Province (Xinhua). This clear articulation of the positive results has rallied political support. Indeed, a recent survey shows that 89 percent of citizens are satisfied with the government’s information dissemination during the pandemic (C Wu). As part of the effort, the government extensively promoted the provision of “political goods”, such as law and order, national unity and pride, and shared values. For example, severe publishments were introduced for violence against medical professionals and police, producing and selling counterfeit medications, raising commodity prices, spreading ‘rumours’, and being uncooperative with quarantine measures (Xu). Additionally, as an extension the popular anti-corruption campaign, many local political leaders were disciplined or received criminal charges for inappropriate behaviour, abuse of power, and corruption during the pandemic (People.cn, 2 Feb. 2020). Chinese state media also described fighting the virus as a global “competition”. In this competition a nation’s “material power” as well as “mental strength”, that calls for the highest level of nation unity and patriotism, is put to the test. This discourse recalled the global competition in light of the national mythology related to the formation of Chinese nation, the historical “hardship”, and the “heroic Chinese people” (People.cn, 7 Apr. 2020). Moreover, as the threat of infection receded, it was emphasised that China “won this competition” and the Chinese people have demonstrated the “great spirit of China” to the world: a result built upon the “heroism of the whole Party, Army, and Chinese people from all ethnic groups” (People.cn, 7 Apr. 2020). In contrast to the Chinese approach of emphasising national public goods as a justification for fighting the virus, the U.S. Trump Administration used nationalism, deflection, and “culture war” discourse to undermine health responses — an unprecedented response in American public health policy. The seriousness of the disease as well as the statistical evidence of its course through the American population was disputed. The President and various supporters raged against the COVID-19 “hoax”, social distancing, and lockdowns, disparaged public health institutions and advice, and encouraged protesters to “liberate” locked-down states (Russonello). “Our federal overlords say ‘no singing’ and ‘no shouting’ on Thanksgiving”, Representative Paul Gosar, a Republican of Arizona, wrote as he retweeted a Centers for Disease Control list of Thanksgiving safety tips (Weiner). People were encouraged, by way of the White House and Republican leadership, to ignore health regulations and not to comply with social distancing measures and the wearing of masks (Tracy). This encouragement led to threats against proponents of face masks such as Dr Anthony Fauci, one of the nation’s foremost experts on infectious diseases, who required bodyguards because of the many threats on his life. Fauci’s critics — including President Trump — countered Fauci’s promotion of mask wearing by stating accusingly that he once said mask-wearing was not necessary for ordinary people (Kelly). Conspiracy theories as to the safety of vaccinations also grew across the course of the year. As the 2020 election approached, the Administration ramped up efforts to downplay the serious of the virus by identifying it with “the media” and illegitimate “partisan” efforts to undermine the Trump presidency. It also ramped up its criticism of China as the source of the infection. This political self-centeredness undermined state and federal efforts to slow transmission (Shear et al.). At the same time, Trump chided health officials for moving too slowly on vaccine approvals, repeated charges that high infection rates were due to increased testing, and argued that COVID-19 deaths were exaggerated by medical providers for political and financial reasons. These claims were amplified by various conservative media personalities such as Rush Limbaugh, and Sean Hannity and Laura Ingraham of Fox News. The result of this “COVID-19 Denialism” and the alternative narrative of COVID-19 policy told through the lens of culture war has resulted in the United States having the highest number of COVID-19 cases, and the highest number of COVID-19 deaths. At the same time, the underlying social consensus and social capital that have historically assisted in generating positive public health outcomes has been significantly eroded. According to the Pew Research Center, the share of U.S. adults who say public health officials such as those at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention are doing an excellent or good job responding to the outbreak decreased from 79% in March to 63% in August, with an especially sharp decrease among Republicans (Pew Research Center 2020). Social Capital and COVID-19 From the perspective of social or community capital, it could be expected that the American response to the Pandemic would be more effective than the Chinese response. Historically, the United States has had high levels of social capital, a highly developed public health system, and strong governmental capacity. In contrast, China has a relatively high level of governmental and public health capacity, but the level of social capital has been lower and there is a significant presence of traditional values which emphasise parochial and particularistic values. Moreover, the antecedent institutions of social capital, such as weak and inefficient formal institutions (Batjargal et al.), environmental turbulence and resource scarcity along with the transactional nature of guanxi (gift-giving and information exchange and relationship dependence) militate against finding a more effective social and community response to the public health emergency. Yet China’s response has been significantly more successful than the Unites States’. Paradoxically, the American response under the Trump Administration and the Chinese response both relied on an externalisation of the both the threat and the justifications for their particular response. In the American case, President Trump, while downplaying the seriousness of the virus, consistently called it the “China virus” in an effort to deflect responsibly as well as a means to avert attention away from the public health impacts. As recently as 3 January 2021, Trump tweeted that the number of “China Virus” cases and deaths in the U.S. were “far exaggerated”, while critically citing the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's methodology: “When in doubt, call it COVID-19. Fake News!” (Bacon). The Chinese Government, meanwhile, has pursued a more aggressive foreign policy across the South China Sea, on the frontier in the Indian sub-continent, and against states such as Australia who have criticised the initial Chinese response to COVID-19. To this international criticism, the government reiterated its sovereign rights and emphasised its “victimhood” in the face of “anti-China” foreign forces. Chinese state media also highlighted China as “victim” of the coronavirus, but also as a target of Western “political manoeuvres” when investigating the beginning stages of the pandemic. The major difference, however, is that public health policy in the United States was superimposed on other more fundamental political and cultural cleavages, and part of this externalisation process included the assignation of “otherness” and demonisation of internal political opponents or characterising political opponents as bent on destroying the United States. This assignation of “otherness” to various internal groups is a crucial element in the culture wars. While this may have been inevitable given the increasingly frayed nature of American society post-2008, such a characterisation has been activity pushed by local, state, and national leadership in the Republican Party and the Trump Administration (Vogel et al.). In such circumstances, minimising health risks and highlighting civil rights concerns due to public health measures, along with assigning blame to the democratic opposition and foreign states such as China, can have a major impact of public health responses. The result has been that social trust beyond the bubble of one’s immediate circle or those who share similar beliefs is seriously compromised — and the collective action problem presented by COVID-19 remains unsolved. Daniel Aldrich’s study of disasters in Japan, India, and US demonstrates that pre-existing high levels of social capital would lead to stronger resilience and better recovery (Aldrich). Social capital helps coordinate resources and facilitate the reconstruction collectively and therefore would lead to better recovery (Alesch et al.). Yet there has not been much research on how the pool of social capital first came about and how a disaster may affect the creation and store of social capital. Rebecca Solnit has examined five major disasters and describes that after these events, survivors would reach out and work together to confront the challenges they face, therefore increasing the social capital in the community (Solnit). However, there are studies that have concluded that major disasters can damage the social fabric in local communities (Peacock et al.). The COVID-19 epidemic does not have the intensity and suddenness of other disasters but has had significant knock-on effects in increasing or decreasing social capital, depending on the institutional and social responses to the pandemic. In China, it appears that the positive social capital effects have been partially subsumed into a more generalised patriotic or nationalist affirmation of the government’s policy response. Unlike civil society responses to earlier crises, such as the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, there is less evidence of widespread community organisation and response to combat the epidemic at its initial stages. This suggests better institutional responses to the crisis by the government, but also a high degree of porosity between civil society and a national “imagined community” represented by the national state. The result has been an increased legitimacy for the Chinese government. Alternatively, in the United States the transformation of COVID-19 public health policy into a culture war issue has seriously impeded efforts to combat the epidemic in the short term by undermining the social consensus and social capital necessary to fight such a pandemic. Trust in American institutions is historically low, and President Trump’s untrue contention that President Biden’s election was due to “fraud” has further undermined the legitimacy of the American government, as evidenced by the attacks directed at Congress in the U.S. capital on 6 January 2021. As such, the lingering effects the pandemic will have on social, economic, and political institutions will likely reinforce the deep cultural and political cleavages and weaken interpersonal networks in American society. Conclusion The COVID-19 pandemic has devastated global public health and impacted deeply on the world economy. Unsurprisingly, given the serious economic, social, and political consequences, different government responses have been highly politicised. Various quarantine and infection case tracking methods have caused concern over state power intruding into private spheres. The usage of face masks, social distancing rules, and intra-state travel restrictions have aroused passionate debate over public health restrictions, individual liberty, and human rights. Yet underlying public health responses grounded in higher levels of social capital enhance the effectiveness of public health measures. In China, a country that has generally been associated with lower social capital, it is likely that the relatively strong policy response to COVID-19 will both enhance feelings of nationalism and Chinese exceptionalism and help create and increase the store of social capital. 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Introduction Daffodil Day, usually held in spring, raises funds for cancer awareness and research using this symbol of hope. On that day, people who donate money to this good cause are usually given a yellow daffodil pin to wear. When I lived in Auckland, New Zealand, on the last Friday in August most people walking around the city centre proudly wore a cheerful yellow flower. So many people generously participated in this initiative that one almost felt obliged to join the cause in order to wear the ‘uniform’ – the daffodil pin – as everyone else did on that day. To donate and to wear a daffodil is the social expectation, and operating in social environment people often endeavour to meet the expectation by doing the ‘appropriate things’ defined by societies or communities. After all, who does not like to receive a beam of acceptance and appreciation from a fellow daffodil bearer in Auckland’s Queen Street? States in international society are no different. In some ways, states wear ‘uniforms’ while executing domestic and foreign affairs just as human beings do within their social groups. States develop the understandings of desirable behaviour from the international community with which they interact and identify. They are ‘socialised’ to act in line with the expectations of international community. These expectations are expressed in the form of international norms, a prescriptive set of ideas about the ‘appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 891). Motivated by this logic of appropriateness, states that comply with certain international norms in world politics justify and undertake actions that are considered appropriate for their identities. This essay starts with examining how international norms can be spread to different countries through the process of ‘state socialisation’ (how the countries are ‘talked into’ wearing the ‘uniform’). Second, the essay investigates the idea of ‘cultural match’: how domestic actors comply with an international norm by interpreting and manipulating it according to their local political and legal practices (how the countries wear the ‘uniform’ differently). Lastly, the essay probes the current international normative community and the liberal values embedded in major international norms (whether states would continue wearing the ‘uniform’). International Norms and State Socialisation: Why Do States Wear the ‘Uniforms’? Norm diffusion is related to the efforts of ‘norm entrepreneurs’ using various platforms to convince a critical mass of states to embrace new norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 895-896). Early studies of norm diffusion tend to emphasise nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) as norm entrepreneurs and advocates, such as Oxfam and its goal of reducing poverty and hunger worldwide (Capie 638). In other empirical research, intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) were shown to serve as ‘norm teachers,’ such as UNESCO educating developing countries the value of science policy organisations (Finnemore 581-586). Additionally, states and other international actors can also play important roles in norm diffusion. Powerful states with more communication resources sometimes enjoy advantages in creating and promoting new norms (Florini 375). For example, the United States and Western European countries have often been considered as the major proponents of free trade. Norm emergence and state socialisation in a normative community often occurs during critical historical periods, such as wars and major economic downturns, when international changes and domestic crises often coincide with each other (Ikenberry and Kupchan 292). For instance, the norm entrepreneurs of ‘responsible power/state’ can be traced back to the great powers (mainly the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union) and their management of international order at the end of WWII (see Bull). With their negotiations and series of international agreements at the Cairo, Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam Conference in the 1940s, these great powers established a post-World War international society based on the key liberal values of international peace and security, free trade, human rights, and democracy. Human beings are not born to know what appropriate behaviour is; we learn social norms from parents, schools, peers, and other community members. International norms are collective expectations and understanding of how state governments should approach their domestic and foreign affairs. States ‘learn’ international norms while socialising with a normative community. From a sociological perspective, socialisation summarises ‘how and to what extent diverse individuals are meshed with the requirement of collective life’ at the societal level (Long and Hadden 39). It mainly consists of the process of training and shaping newcomers by the group members and the social adjustment of novices to the normative framework and the logic of appropriateness (Long and Hadden 39). Similarly, social psychology defines socialisation as the process in which ‘social organisations influence the action and experience of individuals’ (Gold and Douvan 145). Inspired by sociology and psychology, political scientists consider socialisation to be the mechanism through which norm entrepreneurs persuade other actors (usually a norm novice) to adhere to a particular prescriptive standard (Johnston, “Social State” 16). Norm entrepreneurs can change novices’ behaviour by the methods of persuasion and social influence (Johnston, “Treating International Institutions” 496-506). Socialisation sometimes demands that individual actors should comply with organisational norms by changing their interests or preferences (persuasion). Norm entrepreneurs often attempt to construct an appealing cognitive frame in order to persuade the novices (either individuals or states) to change their normative preferences or adopt new norms. They tend to use language that can ‘name, interpret and dramatise’ the issues related to the emerging norm (Finnemore and Sikkink 987). As a main persuasive device, ‘framing’ can provide a singular interpretation and appropriate behavioural response for a particular situation (Payne 39). Cognitive consistency theory found in psychology has suggested the mechanism of ‘analogy’, which indicates that actors are more likely to accept new ideas that share some similarities to the extant belief or ideas that they have already accepted (see Hybel, ch. 2). Based on this understanding, norm entrepreneurs usually frame issues in a way that can associate and resonate with the shared value of the targeted novices (Payne 43). For example, Finnemore’s research shows that when it promoted the creation of state science bureaucracies in the 1960s, UNESCO associated professional science policy-making with the appropriate role of a modern state, which was well received by the post-war developing countries in Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia (Finnemore 565-597). Socialisation can also emanate actors’ pro-norm behaviour through a cost-benefit calculation made with social rewards and punishments (social influence). A normative community can use the mechanism of back-patting and opprobrium to distribute social reward and punishment. Back-patting – ‘recognition, praise and normative support’ – is offered for a novice’s or member’s cooperative and pro-norm behaviour (Johnston, “Treating International Institutions” 503). In contrast, opprobrium associated with status denial and identity rejection can create social and psychological costs (Johnston 504). Both the reward and punishment grow in intensity with the number of co-operators (Johnston 504). A larger community can often create more criticism towards rule-breakers, and thus greatly increase the cost of disobedience. For instance, the lack of full commitment from major powers, such as China, the United States, and some other OECD countries, has arguably made global collective action towards mitigating climate change more difficult, as the cost of non-compliance is relatively low. While being in a normative environment, novice or emerging states that have not yet been socialised into the international community can respond to persuasion and social influence through the processes of identification and mimicking. Social psychology indicates that when one actor accepts persuasion or social influence based on its desire to build or maintain a ‘satisfying self-defining relationship’ to another actor, the mechanism of identification starts to work (Kelman 53). Identification among a social group can generate ‘obligatory’ behaviour, where individual states make decisions by attempting to match their perceptions of ‘who they are’ (national identity) with the expectation of the normative community (Glodgeier and Tetlock 82). After identifying with the normative community, a novice state would then mimic peer states’ pro-norm behaviour in order to be considered as a qualified member of the social group. For example, when the Chinese government was deliberating over its ratification of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety in 2003, a Ministry of Environmental Protection brief noted that China should ratify the Protocol as soon as possible because China had always been a country ‘keeping its word’ in international society, and non-ratification would largely ‘undermine China’s international image and reputation’ (Ministry of Environmental Protection of PRC). Despite the domestic industry’s disagreement with entering into the Protocol, the Chinese government’s self-identification as a ‘responsible state’ that performs its international promises and duties played an important role in China’s adoption of the international norm of biosafety. Domestic Salience of International Norms: How Do States Wear the ‘Uniforms’ Differently? Individual states do not accept international norms passively; instead, state governments often negotiate and interact with domestic actors, such as major industries and interest groups, whose actions and understandings in turn impact on how the norm is understood and implemented. This in turn feeds back to the larger normative community and creates variations of those norms. There are three main factors that can contribute to the domestic salience of an international norm. First, as the norm-takers, domestic actors can decide whether and to what extent an international norm can enter the domestic agenda and how it will be implemented in policy-making. These actors tend to favour an international norm that can justify their political and social programs and promote their interests in domestic policy debates (Cortell and Davis, “How Do International Institutions Matter?” 453). By advocating the existence and adoption of an international norm, domestic actors attempt to enhance the legitimacy and authority of their current policy or institution (Acharya, “How Ideas Spread” 248). Political elites can strengthen state legitimacy by complying with an international norm in their policy-making, and consequently obtain international approval with reputation, trust, and credibility as social benefits in the international community (Finnemore and Sikkink 903). For example, when the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), only four states – Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States – voted against the Declaration. They argued that their constitutional and national policies were sufficiently responsive to the type of Indigenous self-determination envisioned by UNDRIP. Nevertheless, given the opprobrium directed against these states by the international community, and their well-organised Indigenous populations, the four state leaders recognised the value of supporting UNDRIP. Subsequently all four states adopted the Declaration, but in each instance state leaders observed UNDRIP’s ‘aspirational’ rather than legal status; UNDRIP was a statement of values that these states’ policies should seek to incorporate into their domestic Indigenous law. Second, the various cultural, political, and institutional strategies of domestic actors can influence the effectiveness of norm empowerment. Political rhetoric and political institutions are usually created and used to promote a norm domestically. Both state and societal leaders can make the performative speech act of an international norm work and raise its importance in a national context by repeated declarations on the legitimacy and obligations brought by the norm (Cortell and Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact” 76). Moreover, domestic actors can also develop or modify political institutions to incorporate an international norm into the domestic bureaucratic or legal system (Cortell and Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact” 76). These institutions provide rules for domestic actors and articulate their rights and obligations, which transforms the international norm’s legitimacy and authority into local practices. For example, the New Zealand Government adopted a non-nuclear policy in the 1980s. This policy arose from the non-nuclear movement that was leading the development of the Raratonga Treaty (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone) and peace and Green party movements across Europe who sought to de-nuclearise the European continent. The Lange Labour Government’s 1984 adoption of an NZ anti-nuclear policy gained impetus because of these larger norm movements, and these movements in turn recognised the normative importance of a smaller power in international relations. Third, the characteristics of the international norm can also impact on the likelihood that the norm will be accepted by domestic actors. A ‘cultural match’ between international norm and local values can facilitate norm diffusion to domestic level. Sociologists suggest that norm diffusion is more likely to be successful if the norm is congruent with the prior values and practices of the norm-taker (Acharya, “Asian Regional Institutions” 14). Norm diffusion tends to be more efficient when there is a high degree of cultural match such that the global norm resonates with the target country’s domestic values, beliefs or understandings, which in turn can be reflected in national discourse, as well as the legal and bureaucratic system (Checkel 87; Cortell and Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact” 73). With such cultural consistency, domestic actors are more likely to accept an international norm and treat it as a given or as ‘matter-of-fact’ (Cortell and Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact” 74). Cultural match in norm localisation explains why identical or similar international socialisation processes can lead to quite different local developments and variations of international norms. The debate between universal human rights and the ‘Asian values’ of human rights is an example where some Asian states, such as Singapore and China, prioritise citizen’s economic rights over social and political rights and embrace collective rights instead of individual rights. Cultural match can also explain why one country may easily accept a certain international norm, or some aspect of one particular norm, while rejecting others. For example, when Taiwanese and Japanese governments adapted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples into their local political and legal practice, various cultural aspects of Indigenous rights have been more thoroughly implemented compared to indigenous economic and political rights (Gao et al. 60-65). In some extreme cases, the norm entrepreneurs even attempt to change the local culture of norm recipients to create a better cultural match for norm localisation. For example, when it tried to socialise India into its colonial system in the early nineteenth century, Britain successfully shaped the evolution of Indian political culture by adding British values and practices into India’s social, political, and judicial system (Ikenberry and Kupchan 307-309). The International Normative Community: Would States Continue Wearing ‘Uniforms’? International norms evolve. Not every international norm can survive and sustain. For example, while imperialism and colonial expansion, where various European states explored, conquered, settled, and exploited other parts of the world, was a widely accepted idea and practice in the nineteenth century, state sovereignty, equality, and individual rights have replaced imperialism and become the prevailing norms in international society today. The meanings of the same international norm can evolve as well. The Great Powers first established the post-war international norms of ‘state responsibility’ based on the idea of sovereign equality and non-intervention of domestic affairs. However, the 1980s saw the emergence of many international organisations, which built new standards and offered new meanings for a responsible state in international society: a responsible state must actively participate in international organisations and comply with international regimes. In the post-Cold War era, international society has paid more attention to states’ responsibility to offer global common goods and to promote the values of human rights and democracy. This shift of focus has changed the international expectation of state responsibility again to embrace collective goods and global values (Foot, “Chinese Power” 3-11). In addition to the nature and evolution of international norms, the unity and strength of the normative community can also affect states’ compliance with the norms. The growing size of the community group or the number of other cooperatives can amplify the effect of socialisation (Johnston, “Treating International Institutions” 503-506). In other words, individual states are often more concerned about their national image, reputation and identity regarding norm compliance when a critical mass of states have already subscribed into the international norm. How much could this critical mass be? Finnemore and Sikkink suggest that international norms reach the threshold global acceptance when the norm entrepreneurs have persuaded at least one third of all states to adopt the new norm (901). The veto record of the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) shows this impact. China, for example, has cast a UNSC veto vote 17 times as of 2022, but it has rarely excised its veto power alone (Security Council Report). For instance, though being sceptical of the notion of ‘Responsibility to Protect’, which prioritises human right over state sovereignty, China did not veto Resolution 1973 (2011) regarding the Libyan civil war. The Resolution allowed the international society to take ‘all necessary measure to protect civilians’ from a failed state government, and it received wide support among UNSC members (no negative votes from the other 14 members). Moreover, states are not entirely equal in terms of their ‘normative weight’. When Great Powers act as norm entrepreneurs, they can usually utilise their wealth and influence to better socialise other norm novice states. In the history of promoting biological diversity norms which are embedded in the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the OECD countries, especially France, UK, Germany, and Japan, have been regarded as normative leaders. French and Japanese political leaders employed normative language (such as ‘need’ and ‘must’) in various international forums to promote the norms and to highlight their normative commitment (see e.g. Chirac; Kan). Additionally, both governments provided financial assistance for developing countries to adopt the biodiversity norms. In the 2011 annual review of CBD, Japan reaffirmed its US$12 million contribution to assisting developing countries (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity 9). France joined Japan’s commitment by announcing a financial contribution of €1 million along, with some additional funding from Norway and Switzerland (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity 9). Today, biological diversity has been one of the most widely accepted international environmental norms, which 196 states/nations have ratified (United Nations). While Great Powers can make more substantial contributions to norm diffusion compared to many smaller powers with limited state capacity, Great Powers’ non-compliance with the normative ‘uniform’ can also significantly undermine the international norms’ validity and the normative community’s unity and reputation. The current normative community of climate change is hardly a unified one, as it is characterised by a low degree of consensus. Major industrial countries, such as the United States, Canada, and Australia, have not yet reached an agreement concerning their individual responsibilities for reducing greenhouse emissions. This lack of agreement, which includes the amount of cuts, the feasibility and usefulness of such cuts, and the relative sharing of cuts across various states, is complicated by the fact that large developing countries, such as China, Brazil, and India, also hold different opinions towards climate change regimes (see Vidal et al.). Experts heavily criticised the major global powers, such as the European Union and the United States, for their lack of ambition in phasing out fossil fuels during the 2022 climate summit in Egypt (COP27; Ehsan et al.). In international trade, both China and the United States are among the leading powers because of their large trade volume, capacity, and transnational network; however, both countries have recently undermined the world trade system and norms. China took punitive measures against Australian export products after Australia’s Covid-19 inquiry request at the World Health Organisation. The United States, particularly under the Trump Administration, invoked the WTO national security exception in Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to justify its tariffs on steel and aluminium. Lastly, norm diffusion and socialisation can be a ‘two-way path,’ especially when the norm novice state is a powerful and influential state in the international system. In this case, the novices are not merely assimilated into the group, but can also successfully exert some influence on other group members and affect intra-group relations (Moreland 1174). As such, the novices can be both targets of socialisation and active agents who can shape the content and outcome of socialisation processes (Pu 344). The influence from the novices can create normative contestation and thus influence the norm evolution (Thies 547). In other words, novice states can influence international society and shape the international norm during the socialisation process. For example, the ‘ASEAN Way’ is a set of norms that regulate member states’ relationships within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It establishes a diplomatic and security culture characterised by informality, consultation, and dialogue, and consensus-building in decision-making processes (Caballero-Anthony). From its interaction with ASEAN, China has been socialised into the ‘ASEAN Way’ (Ba 157-159). Nevertheless, China’s relations with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) also suggest that there exists a ‘feedback’ process between China and ARF which resulted in institutional changes in ARF to accommodate China’s response (Johnston, “The Myth of the ASEAN Way?” 291). For another example, while the Western powers generally promote the norm of ‘shared responsibility’ in global environment regimes, the emerging economies, such as the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), have responded to the normative engagement and proposed a ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibilities’ regime where the developing countries shoulder less international obligations. Similarly, the Western-led norm of ‘Responsibility to Protect’, which justifies international humanitarian intervention, has received much resistance from the countries that only adhere to the conventional international rules regarding state sovereignty rights and non-intervention to domestic affairs. Conclusion International norms are shared expectations about what constitutes appropriate state behaviour. They are the ‘uniforms’ for individual states to wear when operating at the international level. States comply with international norms in order to affirm their preferred national identities as well as to gain social acceptance and reputation in the normative community. When the normative community is united and sizable, states tend to receive more social pressure to consistently wear these normative uniforms – be they the Geneva Conventions or nuclear non-proliferation. Nevertheless, in the post-pandemic world where liberal values, such as individual rights and rule of law, face significant challenges and democracies are in decline, the future success of the global normative community may be at risk. Great Powers are especially responsible for the survival and sustainability of international norms. The United States under President Trump adopted a nationalist ‘America First’ security agenda: alienating traditional allies, befriending authoritarian regimes previously shunned, and rejecting multilateralism as the foundation of the post-war global order. While the West has been criticised of failing to live up to its declared values, and has suffered its own loss of confidence in the liberal model, the rising powers have offered their alternative version of the world system. Instead of merely adapting to the Western-led global norms, China has created new institutions, such as the Belt and Road Initiatives, to promote its own preferred values, and has reshaped the global order where it deems the norms undesirable (Foot, “Chinese Power in a Changing World Order” 7). Great Power participation has reshaped the landscape of global normative community, and sadly not always in positive ways. Umberto Eco lamented the disappearance of the beauty of the past in his novel The Name of the Rose: ‘stat rosa pristina nomine, nomina nuda tenemus’ ('yesterday’s rose endures in its name, we hold empty names'; Eco 538). If the international community does not want to witness an era where global norms and universal values are reduced to nominalist symbols, it must renew and reinvigorate its commitment to global values, such as human rights and democracy. It must consider wearing these uniforms again, properly. 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In 2019, Mattel introduced a series of Barbie dolls in connection with National Geographic which included a Polar Marine Biologist, an Entomologist, a Wildlife Photojournalist, and a mostly "made from recycled ocean-bound plastic" Barbie ("Mattel Launches Barbie Loves the Ocean") followed in 2021. One year later, the company issued an "Eco-Leadership Team" composed of a Conservation Scientist, a Renewable Energy Engineer, Chief Sustainability Officer, and Environmental Advocate. This can be understood as an attempt to introduce children to the urgency of ecological issues and communicating to them the importance of research into climate change in an age-appropriate manner. Yet, despite the pedagogical opportunities the dolls might offer, I argue that their introduction and presentation primarily represents an instance of greenwashing, "the act or practice of making a product, policy, activity, etc. appear to be more environmentally friendly or less environmentally damaging than it really is" (Merriam-Webster). In order to support my thesis, I will analyse four issues: first, I will have a closer look at the way in which the four "Eco-Leadership" dolls express ecological concerns. I will then turn to the material Barbie is made of, plastic, and examine its environmental impact together with Mattel's "The Future of Pink Is Green" campaign. Next, I will discuss the conspicuous consumption Barbie models, focussing on the Malibu Dream House. I will address how this is entangled with settler colonialism in the fourth and final part. Eco-Leadership Barbie? The "Eco-Leadership" set, billed as "2022 Career of the Year" collection, consists of four dolls. They come in a cardboard box so that the toys are not immediately visible, and their accessories are stored in a paper bag inside. On the one hand, this makes the dolls less appealing, depriving the potential consumers of visual pleasure. On the other hand, this generates an element of suspense, much like a wrapped present. In keeping with Mattel's slogan "The Future of Pink Is Green", the colour pink is toned down, even though each doll sports at least one accessory in this colour. The toys are sold as a team, thus perhaps suggesting that "eco-leadership" is a collaborative project, which departs from the emphasis on individualism otherwise suggested by Barbie packaging. In their promotional material, Mattel mentions that all of the professional fields the dolls represent are male-dominated ("Barbie Eco-Leadership Team"). The combination of the careers featured makes a telling statement about Mattel's framing of ecological issues. First, there is a Conservation Scientist with binoculars and a notebook, implying that she is undertaking research on larger animals, presumably endangered species. Such a focus on mammals tends to downplay structural issues and the "slow violence" that affects ecological systems, as Arno Hölzer has argued (65). She is joined by a Renewable Energy Engineer with a solar panel, referencing the least controversial form of "green energy". Significantly, this is the classic blond Barbie. Together, these two dolls suggest that science and technology will find solutions to current ecological crises, global warming, et cetera (not that such issues are explicitly mentioned). The third doll is advertised as Chief Sustainability Officer. "She works with a company or organization to make sure their actions and products are economically, environmentally and socially sustainable", as Mattel puts it ("Barbie Eco-Leadership Team"). Here, businesses are portrayed not as the source of environmental pollution, but as part of the solution to the problem. While this is not entirely false, this particular approach to environmental issues is severely limited, firmly remaining within a neoliberal, capitalist ideology. It reflects what Dan Brockington and Rosaleen Duffy, following Sklair, term "mainstream conservation", which "proposes resolutions to environmental problems that hinge on heightened commodity production and consumption" (4). In this context, a company's promotion of "ethical consumption" "achieves its ethically positive results by not counting various aspects of the production and consumption of its commodities" (9). Finally, there's the Environmental Advocate – not activist (the term was probably too controversial). She is always mentioned last. Her poster reads: "Barbie loves the earth", possibly the most inane ecological slogan ever devised. It is made of plastic. Acquainting children with ecological issues in an age-appropriate manner is an important task. Playing environmental advocate, or scientist, might certainly be more educational in terms of ecological issues than many of the other career options the "I can be anything" series features. But the absence of a politician in the set, for instance, speaks volumes. The "recipe" for sustainability the dolls embody only requires a heavy dose of science and technology, whipped up by well-meaning entrepreneurship, with a little love for the planet sprinkled on top. One gets a prettier picture if one looks at the toys from different perspectives. The group is rather diverse, with a Black Conservation Scientist, an Environmental Advocate of Asian descent, and a Chief Sustainability Officer that might be Latinx, and "curvy". Again, though, there is a glaring omission. Indigenous people are not included, despite the fact that, due to environmental racism, they are among the communities most dramatically affected by environmental pollution. Benjamin F. Chavis Jr., who coined the term "environmental racism," defined it as racial discrimination in environmental policy-making, enforcement of regulations and laws, the deliberate targeting of communities of color for toxic waste disposal and the siting of polluting industries … , [and] the history of excluding people of color from the mainstream environmental groups, decision-making boards, commissions, and regulatory bodies. (Chavis 3) The consequences for Native Americans were and are severe. By 1999, Winona LaDuke notes, 317 reservations … [were] threatened by environmental hazards … . Reservations have been targeted as sites for 16 proposed nuclear waste dumps [and] [o]ver 100 … toxic waste [sites] … . There have been 1,000 atomic explosions on Western Shoshone land in Nevada, making the Western Shoshone the most bombed nation on earth. (LaDuke 2-3) The absence of an Indigenous doll in the Barbie "Eco-Leadership Team" is also noteworthy considering the long history of Native American and First Nations resistance to habitat destruction and environmental degradation, from nineteenth-century Lakota Little Thunder and Anishnaabe leader Wabunoquod (LaDuke 3, 5) to the #NoDAPL movement (Gilio-Whitaker 1-13). Following Robin Wall Kimmerer, one could even argue that sustainability, or "beneficial relations between people and the environment", are integral to Native (here: Potawatomi) culture (Kimmerer 6). On a very different note, any ecological consideration of Barbie dolls must also address their material properties. According to Mattel, the four dolls "are made from recycled plastic … , wear clothing made from recycled fabric and are certified CarbonNeutral® products" ("Barbie Eco-Leadership Team"). This does not apply to the heads and the hair, however – arguably the most distinctive parts of the toys. This had already been the case with the "Barbie Loves the Ocean" series ("Mattel Launches Barbie Loves the Ocean") – apparently, this is not an issue that can easily be fixed. In other words, only some components of the dolls are manufactured from recycled plastic. Further, in 2022, over 175 different Barbie dolls circulated, of which at least 166 were not made from recycled plastic (Google). To speak of "eco-leadership" is thus rather misleading. To further examine this, I want to have a closer look at the materials the dolls consist of. Life in Plastic… For a while now, it has become common knowledge that "life in plastic" might not be so "fantastic" after all, Aqua's song notwithstanding. Plastic pollution of the oceans is a huge problem, killing birds, whales, and other seaborne animals; so are non-biodegradable plastic landfill, neo-colonial waste export, the detrimental health effects of phthalates in plastic, and so on (Moore, Freinkel). But what James Marriott and Mika Minio-Paluello call the uneven "distribution of violence" during the transformation of fossil fuel into plastic is less well known. Oil production and transport are frequently militarised, they show, with company interests taking precedence over human rights (173-74, 176). Heavily guarded pipelines cut through traditional grazing and farming areas, endangering people's livelihoods as well as local ecosystems (Marriott and Minio-Paluello 176, 178-79). To the consumers who buy the plastic produced from this oil, such violence is invisible, not least because production processes and their environmental consequences are actively screened from view by fossil fuel companies and local governments (173-74). "Although these social and environmental impacts are inherent within its constitution, the plastic product in its uniformity is seemingly wiped clean of all that violence and disruption", the authors conclude (181). Where these matters have rarely been discussed in academic research on Barbie, they garnered significant public interest around the time the movie was released in 2023. That the film itself received the Environmental Media Association (EMA) gold seal (Plastic Pollution Coalition) did not lay such concerns to rest. "After the movie frenzy fades, how do we avoid tonnes of Barbie dolls going to landfill?", Alan Pears asked in The Conversation. Waste Online highlighted the "Not-So-Pretty Side of Plastic Toys", Tatler headlined "How Barbie is making climate change worse", and in Medium, Eric Young even aimed to show "How To Save The World from the Toxicity of Barbie!" (with an exclamation rather than a question mark). Based on a 2022 study by Sarah Levesque, Madeline Robertson, and Christie Klimas, Pears noted that "every 182 gram doll caused about 660 grams of carbon emissions, including plastic production, manufacture and transport" (Pears 2). According to Duke Ines, CEO of Lonely Whale, a campaign devoted to protecting the oceans, "80% of all toys end up in a landfill, incinerators, or the ocean" (Mendez 3). Discarded toys make up around 6% of all plastic in landfills (Levesque et al. 777). There are estimates that, by 2030, in the US emissions from plastic production will supersede those from coal (Pears 2). Mattel seems to have recognised the problem. In 2021, the company announced its "The Future of Pink Is Green" campaign as part of its "goal to use 100% recycled, recyclable or bio-based plastic materials and packaging by 2030" ("Mattel Launches" 2). The efforts include educational vlogger episodes and Mattel PlayBack, a toy return program aimed at recycling materials in toy production. With Barbie, this is difficult, though. As Dorothea Ruffin and others have noted, the dolls are composed of different kinds of plastics. The heads consist of hard vinyl, with water-based spray paint used for the eyes; the torso is manufactured from ABS (acrylonitrile butadiene-styrene), the arms of EVA (ethylene-vinyl acetate), and the legs of polypropylene and PVC (polyvinyl chloride) (Ruffin 2). This makes recycling difficult, perhaps even unfeasible. So in effect, I agree with environmental educator Kristy Drutman that Mattel's eco-friendly self-presentation currently qualifies as greenwashing (Mendez 2). With Lyon's and Maxwell's description of the practice as "selective disclosure of positive information about a company's environmental or social performance, without full disclosure of negative information on these dimensions, so as to create an overly positive corporate image" (9) as reference point, it becomes clear that Mattel's strategy perfectly fits this pattern. Their recycling efforts concern only a small number of the Barbie dolls they produce, and even those are only partly fashioned from salvaged material. Both the release of the "Eco-Leadership" set and the "The Future of Pink Is Green" campaign seem designed primarily to bolster the company's reputation. Conspicuous Consumption and the Malibu Dream House A central component of the problem is the scale of plastic toy consumption, as Levesque et al. observe. Mattel sells around 60 million Barbies annually (Ruffin 2). This amounts to over one billion dolls since 1959 (ETX Daily UP 2). What the scientists call "the overproduction and purchase of toys" (Levesque et al. 791) testifies to the continued centrality of "conspicuous consumption", the demonstrative, wasteful squandering of resources which, as Thorstein Veblen already noted in 1899, signifies and produces social distinction (Veblen 53; cf. 43-72). As he argued, "an unremitting demonstration of ability to pay" (Veblen 54) was and is central for upholding not only one's social standing, but also one's self-esteem. This is at the core of Mattel's business model: stimulating repeated purchases by issuing and marketing ever-new, "must-have" dolls, clothing, and other accessories. These tend to normalise an upper-class lifestyle, as Barbie's sports car, horse, and dream house attest. The Malibu Dream House, part of the Barbie universe since 1962, plays a specific role in this context. It symbolises fun, conspicuous leisure, and glamour. With its spectacular beaches, its exclusiveness, and its proximity to Hollywood celebrity culture, Malibu represents the apex of social aspiration for many people. Houses are also sexy, as Marjorie Garber observes in Sex and Real Estate. "Real estate today has become a form of yuppie pornography. … Buyers are entering the housing market with more celerity (and more salaciousness?) than they once entered the marriage market" (Garber 3, 4). The prominence of the house in the Barbie movie is thus not incidental. Malibu is among the most expensive locations in the US. The median property value is US$4.25m. Due to its beachfront location, its "iconic design" and "cultural value", local brokerage Ruby Home estimated that "the price of the doll's DreamHouse [could be] an eye-watering $10 million" (McPherson). With the understatement typical of the profession, the author of the article writes: "unsurprisingly, Barbie’s home would only be available to high-net-worth buyers". This does more than reinforce classism. The richest segment of the global population also has an inordinately large carbon footprint and overall negative impact on climate change. According to Oxfam, the richest 1% produced 16% of global consumption emissions in 2019. The propagation of Malibu Dream House living thus does not exactly rhyme with "eco- leadership". Barbie and Settler Colonialism The wasteful, environmentally detrimental lifestyle of the very wealthy is part and parcel of US settler colonialism. Unlike other forms of colonialism, settler colonialism attempts to replace the Indigenous population. The term does not only signify a devastating past but names an ongoing process, since Native people have not in fact "disappeared". Lorenzo Veracini puts it succinctly: "settler colonialism is not finished" (Veracini 68-94). As Patrick Wolfe famously wrote, "'settler-colonial state' is Australian [and US] society's primary structural characteristic rather than merely a statement about its origins… . Invasion is a structure not an event" (163). Malibu is traditional Chumash territory. The name derives from the Ventureño Chumash word Humaliwo, meaning "where the surf sounds loudly" (Sampson). The Chumash were forcibly deprived of their land by the Spanish Mission system in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Deborah A. Miranda has movingly detailed the traumatic effects of this violence in her memoir Bad Indians. But the Chumash are not gone. In fact, the Wishtoyo Chumach Foundation, whose mission it is to "protect and preserve the culture, history, and lifeways of Chumash and Indigenous peoples, and the environment everyone depends on", runs Chumash Village, "with a goal of raising awareness of Chumash people's historical relationship and dependence upon the natural environment as a maritime people", right in Malibu (Wishtoyo Chumach Foundation). None of this is mentioned by Mattel or the Greta Gerwig movie, which does not only signal a missed opportunity to demonstrate "eco-leadership". Rather, such an omission is typical for settler colonial culture. In order to buttress their claim to the land, settlers try to write Indigenous people out of North American history through a strategy White Earth Ojibwe scholar Jean O'Brien has called "firsting", that is, claiming the European settlers were there first, they "discovered" something, etc. The opening of the movie is a classic example. To the voiceover of "since the beginning of time – since the first little girl ever existed", it shows not Native inhabitants, but European American children in vaguely historical, possibly nineteenth century settler clothing. At other points, Barbie's and Ken's cowboy outfits, their glaring whiteness, references to Davy Crockett and, as Stentor Danielson mentioned in their presentation on "Barbieland's Fantasy Ecology: Terra Nullius on the Pink Beach" at the conference "'You Can Be Anything': Imagining and Interrogating Barbie in Popular Culture", to the Black Hills aka Mount Rushmore, clearly mark them as settlers. J.M. Bacon has coined the term "colonial ecological violence" to reference the ways in which environmental degradation and settler colonialism are inextricably intertwined (59). Effectively combatting environmental pollution thus also requires addressing settler colonial economic, social, and cultural structures. As Dina Gilio-Whitaker has forcefully argued, the success of environmental justice movements in the US, especially vis-à-vis the fossil fuel industry, may depend on building coalitions with Indigenous activists. Some of the most promising examples actually come from California, where beaches have been protected from corporate development because sacred Native sites would have been negatively affected (148). "It may well be that organizing around Native land rights holds the key to successfully transitioning from a fossil-fuel energy infrastructure to one based on sustainable energy", Gilio-Whitaker concludes (149). "Effective partnerships with allies in the environmental movement will provide the best defence for the collective well-being of the environment and future generations of all Americans, Native and non-Native alike" (162). This is a far cry from any policy Mattel has so far advertised, not to mention implemented. Conclusion In different respects, the promise of "Eco-Leadership" Barbies rings hollow. Not only do they suggest an extremely limited understanding of environmental concerns and challenges, Mattel's breezy pronouncements are clearly at odds with its simultaneous boosting of conspicuous consumption, let alone the focus on financial profit generally characteristic for its managerial decisions. 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