Dissertationen: „Hume, David, 1711-1776 Philosophy“

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Rowan, Michael. „Hume, probability and induction“. Title page, contents and abstract only, 1985. http://web4.library.adelaide.edu.au/theses/09PH/09phr877.pdf.

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Cruz, Fernão de Oliveira Salles dos Santos. „As condições de possibilidade da ciência da natureza humana: crítica da metafísica e ciência do homem“. Universidade de São Paulo, 2007. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-26112007-141351/.

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Desde sua primeira obra, David Hume anuncia ao leitor o projeto de constituição de uma ciência da natureza humana. O principal objetivo deste trabalho consiste em examinar os argumentos utilizados por Hume para construir as condições de possibilidade desse saber.
Since his first work David Hume announces his intentions to constitute a science of human nature. The main target of this thesis is to examine the arguments used by Hume to build the conditions of possibility of this field of knowledge.

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Jenkins, Joan (Joan Elizabeth). „The Enlightenment Legacy of David Hume“. Thesis, University of North Texas, 1989. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc332061/.

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Although many historians assert the unity of the Enlightenment, their histories essentially belie this notion. Consequently, Enlightenment history is confused and meaningless, urging the reader to believe that diversity is similarity and faction is unity. Fundamental among the common denominators of these various interpretations, however, are the scientific method and empirical observation, as introduced by Newton. These, historians acclaim as the turning point when mankind escaped the ignorance of superstition and the oppression of the church, and embarked upon the modern secular age. The Enlightenment, however, founders immediately upon its own standards of empiricism and demonstrable philosophical tenets, with the exception of David Hume. As the most consistent and fearless empiricist of the era, Hume's is by far the most "legitimate" philosophy of the Enlightenment, but it starkly contrasts the rhetoric and ideology of the philosophe community, and, therefore, defies attempts by historians to incorporate it into the traditional Enlightenment picture. Hume, then, exposes the Enlightenment dilemma: either the Enlightenment is not empirical, but rather the new Age of Faith Carl Becker proclaimed it, or Enlightenment philosophy is that of Hume. This study presents the historical characterization of major Enlightenment themes, such as method, reason, religion, morality, and politics, then juxtaposes this picture with the particulars (data) that contradict or seriously qualify it. As a result, much superficial analysis, wishful thinking, even proselytizing is demonstrated in the traditional Enlightenment characterization, especially with regard to the widely heralded liberal and progressive legacy of the era. In contrast, Hume's conclusions, based on the method of Newton-the essence of "enlightened" philosophy, are presented, revealing the authoritarian character (and legacy) of the Enlightenment as well as the utility and relevance of its method when honestly and rigorously applied. Through David Hume, the twentieth century can truly acquire what the Enlightenment promised—an understanding of human nature and a genuinely secular society.

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Déragon, Sonia. „Identité personnelle chez David Hume : Imagonation et passions“. Aix-Marseille 1, 2001. http://www.theses.fr/2001AIX10104.

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L'idée que nous défendons est celle suivant laquelle les discussions au sujet de l'identité personnelle développées dans les Livre I et II du Traité de la Nature Humaine sont consistantes l'une avec l'autre. Afin de démontrer cette thèse, nous discutons les propos tenus par Hume dans ces Livres et montrons que les discussions répondent à différentes questions et qu'elles se complètent bien théoriquement. Cette thèse se divise en trois parties. Nous expliquons, tout d'abord,"L'existence des substances matérielles". Nous montrons que nous trouvons chez Hume une première formulation de la thèse de la collection ainsi qu'une précision importante quant à la nature du lien entre les perceptions. Nous expliquons les croyances au sujet des corps extérieurs et soutenons que c'est grâce à la conception chez Hume de l'imagination que ces croyances "naturelles" peuvent être expliquées et justifiées. Nous distinguons, finalement, la croyance et la fiction et montrons l'importance de cette différenciation pour suivre correctement le propos humien. Dans la deuxième partie, nous discutons de "L'existence des substances spirituelles". Nous distinguons l'idée du moi et le moi des passions et montrons que l'idée "vraie" du moi ou de l'esprit est une idée complexe [. . . . ] Nous présentons ce que soutient Hume dans l'Appendice concernant l'identité et défendons les thèses suivant lesquelles 1) il n'y a pas de deuxième circularité théorique dans son traitement de l'identité et que 2) Hume est insatisfait de son explication de l'unité réelle de l'esprit humain. Dans la dernière partie, nous discutons de l'identité en tant qu'elle concerne les passions. Nous défendons l'idée suivant laquelle les passions contribuent grandement à la formation du moi et que, par conséquent, nous pouvons le différencier des fictions établies dans le Livre I. Nous expliquons le rôle essentiel que joue l'idée du moi dans les passions indirectes ainsi que dans les mécanismes de la sympathie et de la comparaison. Nous montrons, dans nos conclusions, la relation étroite entre le moi et l'autre ainsi que le rôle privilégié du corps humain dans la conception humienne de l'identité personnelle.

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Le, Jallé Éléonore. „L'autorégulation chez Hume“. Paris 10, 2001. http://www.theses.fr/2001PA100165.

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La nature humaine telle que Hume nous la présente peut être envisagée comme un système autorégulé. Telle serait la signification de ce que Hume nomme « l'inventivité » de la nature humaine, une inventivité qui n'est pas seulement le propre du vivant mais la marque d'une espèce douée d'une puissance d'artifice. De nombreux principes de la nature humaine s'avèrent, en effet, capables de se réorienter spontanément à chaque fois que leur direction primitive menace l'équilibre ou la survie du système. Au cceur du système « de l'entendement », l'imagination agit comme un pivot régulateur. A l'origine d'emportements parfois intempestifs, elle est aussi une source de régularisation et de stabilisation. Cette faculté est surtout le sujet d'une remarquable logique vitale, seule capable de préserver la vivacité du jugement lorsque l'excès de régularité de la logique stricte menace de le suspendre ou de l'exténuer. Le système des passions quant à lui engendre, grâce au changement de direction spontané de « l'amour du gain » (passion inventive s'il en est), un système de conventions et d'artifices lui aussi caractérisé par l'autorégulation. Etant donné que Hume, notamment grâce à son analyse de la convention, donne à voir une harmonisation concertée des intérêts qui ne se confond pas selon nous avec une pure « harmonie involontaire », sa pensée politique peut se caractériser comme un constructivisme autorégulé. L'autorégulation est aussi le propre de la science de la nature humaine. Puisque la science de l'homme est Nature humaine, la même autorégulation qui caractérise cette dernière doit aussi caractériser le « vrai système », dont les principes s'identifient ainsi aux principes mêmes de son objet. L'écriture philosophique n'est pas, dès lors, autre chose qu'une tendance capable, comme toute propension, de changer de direction lorsque sa meilleure satisfaction l'exige
Human Nature, as described by Hume, may be characterized as a self-organized system. Such is the meaning of the « inventivity » of this species. Many principles of human nature are able to change their own direction whenever this change is required by the sability or the preservation of the whole. Within the system « of the Understanding », the imagination is a kind of regulating faculty, which is able to control and to correct its own disordered propensities. This faculty maintains a vital logics which preserves judgment whenever formal logics threatens to suspend or to destroy it. Thanks to the spontaneous change of direction of a particularly inventive passion, i. E. « the love of gain », the natural system of the passions gives rise to an artificial system of institutions ; also a self-organized system. Self-organization may be applied to the science of Human Nature. Since Human Nature is the science of Man, the principles of the science are equal to the principles ot the object of the science, and self-organization characterizes both of them. Thus, the philosophical writing process turns out to be nothing but a propensity, which is able to change its own direction, while increasing its own satisfaction

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Luquet, Laurent. „Le problème des relations chez Hume“. Caen, 2003. http://www.theses.fr/2003CAEN1384.

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Ce travail tente de renouveler la lecture du thème de l'association chez Hume. Loin de comprendre l'associationnisme du seul point de vue des idées, on peut montrer que l'originalité de Hume consiste à mettre l'accent sur des renforcements entre divers niveaux de l'association. Chaque niveau a son régime propre et correspond lui-même à la fois à un point de vue sur l'esprit et à un point de vue sur l'homme. Ainsi, de même que l'homme est compris comme être spéculatif, affectif et social, de même y a-t-il une association des idées, une association des impressions et une association sociale. Afin de préparer l'étude de ces associations, nous commençons par un retour sur les perceptions humiennes. Dans un second temps, nous essayons de dégager la spécificité de chaque niveau de l'association. Ce travail se clôt par l'étude des effets des associations pour montrer le passage de la réalité mentale, spéculative et affective, à la réalité sociale des relations.

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Etchegaray, Claire. „La croyance naturelle chez David Hume et Thomas Reid : scepticisme et réalisme“. Clermont-Ferrand 2, 2008. http://www.theses.fr/2008CLF20010.

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Cette étude se propose d'examiner la façon dont les philosophies de David Hume et Thomas Reid ont promu le concept de croyance afin de repenser la logique qu'ils tenaient pour traditionnelle, et la métaphysique entendue comme réflexion sur la fiabilité de nos facultés naturelles. L'opposition philosophique entre ces deux auteurs invite d'une part à reconstruire le sens respectif de la "croyance naturelle" chez chacun d'eux sans y projeter les connotations que les débats ultérieurs du XIXe siècle ont pu donner à ce concept. D'autre part il faut comprendre si et comment une philosophie qui assume la distanciation critique, telle celle de Hume, peut rendre compte de notre réalisme naturel ; et inversement si et comment la croyance naturelle peut avoir un sens au sein d'une philosophie réaliste par principe, telle celle de Reid. Cette croyance étant considérée comme un fait de nature, comment est-il possible d'en rendre raison et d'en être responsable : à quelles épistémologies et quelles éthiques de la croyance, les décisions naturalistes de Hume et de Reid pourraient-elles donc donner lieu ? Une première partie est donc consacrée à l'élucidation du concept de croyance dont le rôle premier semble être de promouvoir une logique de l'existant, en repensant le jugement comme comportement mental. Une seconde partie cherche à évaluer la consistance de leurs psychologies ainsi promues à l'aune de leurs options respectives en métaphysique. On en vient alors à considérer le rapport entre scepticisme et naturalisme chez Hume, entre théisme et naturalisme chez Reid, et ce faisant les linéaments respectifs d'une éthique de la croyance
The aim of this study is to examine how David Hume's and Thomas Reid's philosophies promoted the concept of belief in order to be able to rethink the so-called "traditional logic", and the metaphysical reflection on the reliability of our natural faculties. Fisrtly, the philosophical opposition between the two thinkers requires that we redefine the respective meanings that they have given to the notion of "natural belief", without taking into account the subsequent connotations that arose from the debates of the nineteenth century. Secondly, the goal is to understand if and how a philosophy such as Hume's, which takes on a critical distance, is able to account for our natural realism ; but also to understand what meaning a philosophy such as Reid's, which is realistic by principle, might give to the notion of natural belief. Since belief is regarded as a fact of nature, how can it be epistemologically justified and imputable to our responsability ? What epistemologies and what ethics of belief do Hume's and Reid's naturalistic decisions imply ? The first part is devoted to the elucidation of the concept of belief whose role is prima facie to promote a logic of the existing by redefining judgment as mental behaviour. The second part aims at evaluating the consistency of the promoted psychologies, considering their respective options in metaphysics. Henceforth the link between scepticism and naturalism for Hume, and between theism and naturalism for Reid can be drawn, and their respective athics of belief outlined

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Perinetti, Dario. „Hume, history and the science of human nature“. Thesis, McGill University, 2002. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=38509.

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This thesis sets out to show that a philosophical reflection on history is, in the strongest possible way, an essential feature of Hume's project of a science of human nature: a philosophical investigation of human nature, for Hume, cannot be successful independently of an understanding of the relation of human beings to their history. Hume intended to criticize traditional metaphysics by referring all knowledge to experience. But it is almost always assumed that Hume means by "experience" the result of an individual's past sense perception or personal observation. Accordingly, Hume's criticism of traditional metaphysics is taken to lead to an individualistic conception of knowledge and human nature. In this thesis I claim that this picture of Hume's "empiricism" is simply wrong. He is not a philosopher who reduces "experience" to the merely private happenings within a personal psychology. On the contrary, Hume has a wider notion of experience, one that includes not only personal observation and memory, but, fundamentally, one that includes implicit knowledge of human history. Experience, so understood, brings about what I term a historical point of view, namely, the point of view of someone who seeks to extend his experience as far as it is possible in order to acquire the capacity to produce more nuanced and impartial judgments in any given practice. It is precisely this historical point of view that enables us to depart from the individualistic perspective that we would otherwise be bound to adopt not only in epistemology but, most significantly, in politics, in social life, in religion, etc.
Chapter 1 presents the historical background against which Hume elaborates his views of history's role in philosophy. Chapter 2 discusses and criticizes the individualist reading of Hume by showing that he had a satisfactory account of beliefs formed via human testimony. Chapter 3 presents a view of Hume on explanation that underscores his interest in practical and informal explanations as those of history. Chapter 4 provides a discussion of Hume's notion of historical experience in relation both to his theory of perception and to his project of a "science of man."

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Bonicco, Céline. „Sympathie et interaction : une lecture croisée de David Hume et Erving Goffman“. Paris 1, 2008. http://www.theses.fr/2008PA010614.

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Cette étude se propose de montrer comment le concept humien de sympathie constitue le principe d'explication de l'unité d'analyse minutieusement explorée par Erving Goffman : l'interaction. Elle se donne pour tache d'explorer une pensée du social en germe dans la philosophie de Hume et qui s'épanouit dans la sociologie de Goffman. Il ne s'agit pas simplement de retracer la généalogie d'une certaine sociologie de l'action mais d'en mettre au jour les prémisses conceptuelles et les implications théoriques, grâce à la redécouverte de la radicalité philosophique du concept humien. Dans une première partie, nous établissons la filiation entre la sympathie et l'interaction telle qu'elle est introduite par Robert Ezra Park dans la sociologie américaine, et nous pointons son oubli par ses héritiers, notamment par Goffman. Dans une seconde partie. Nous montrons que l'intervention dans une explication sociologique d'un principe psychologique comme la sympathie ne conduit nullement à nier la spécificité du social mais révèle au contraire le caractère non exclusivement individuel d'une partie du psychisme. Dans une troisième partie, nous étudions comment l'évolution de l’œuvre de Goffman rend compte de l'insuffisance d'un concept d'interaction uniquement descriptif, et comment le recours à la sympathie humienne permet d'expliquer son fonctionnement. Enfin, nous analysons comment la sociologie de I'interaction éclairée par son origine philosophique contribue à résoudre un problème crucial pour la théorie sociale : comment penser le changement social ?

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Oliveira, Roberto Carlos de. „Sociedade e artÃficio na teoria politica de Hume“. [s.n.], 2007. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/278704.

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Orientador: Jose Oscar de Almeida Marques
Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
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Resumo: A análise de David Hume (1711-1776) vincula a epistemologia, a moral e a política de forma tal que a sociedade é apresentada como resultado da interação entre as faculdades naturais dos homens e os recursos artificiais decorrentes da reflexão. O artifício denota as invenções refletidas e voluntárias que ampliam as perspectivas da natureza humana, ou seja, os mecanismos de sociabilização do homem que promovem seu desenvolvimento social, situando-o no universo da moral e da política e adaptando seus interesses particulares ao interesse público. A essência do artifício reside na capacidade humana de dominar seus impulsos mediante a sublimação, que direciona os desejos para uma perspectiva estável de satisfação. Nesse sentido, ele amplia as possibilidades de realização do homem, além de cooperar na manutenção da sociedade. Este estudo pretende mostrar como Hume compõe uma filosofia que analisa a sociedade a partir das implicações e desdobramentos de princípios naturais e mostrar como o artifício estabelece um vínculo entre a moral e a política, entre os interesses particulares dos indivíduos e os interesses gerais da sociedade, contribuindo para o estabelecimento das instituições sociais e da autoridade
Abstract: The analysis of David Hume (1711-1776) entail the epistemology, the morals and the politics so that the society is presented like the result of interaction between the natural faculties of men and the artificial recourses current from reflexion. The artifice connotes the reflected and voluntary inventions that ampliflies the perspectives of human nature, that is, the mechanisms of sociabilization of man which promote their social development, placing them in the universe of morals and politics and adapting their particular interests to the public interest. The essence of the artifice resides in the human capability to dominate their impulses through sublimation, which directionates the desires to an estable perspective of satisfaction. In this sense, it amplifies the possibilities of man's realization, yonder to collaborate with the maintenance of society. This study intends to display how Hume composes a philosophy which analyses the society from the implications and unfoldments of natural principles and to indicate how the artifice establishes an entailment between moral and politics, between the particular interests of individuals and the general interests of society, contributing to the establishment of social instituitions and the authority
Mestrado
Ética e Política
Mestre em Filosofia

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Njoh, Victor. „Hume, lecteur des morales de l'Antiquité“. Paris 1, 1999. http://www.theses.fr/1999PA010581.

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Mal compris du grand public dans sa philosophie morale, juge, peut-etre a tort ou a raison hermetique et abstrus, david hume, philosophe ecossais, s'est propose de reprendre les grandes lignes de sa philosophie morale developpee dans le traite de la nature humaine (1739), dans les essais moraux(1742) que leur traducteur francais, a. Leroy a appele les quatre philosophes. Hume imagine quatre philosophes : l'epicurien, le stoicien, le platonicien et le sceptique, places cote a cote. Ils forment ainsi quatre portraits. Ces tenants de doctrine exposent, chacun a sa maniere, comment la philosophie est un art de vivre susceptible de nous conduire au bonheur. Le sceptique, contrairement aux trois precedents, ne dispose pas d'une doctrine etablie. Il petrit sa methode de la matiere recue des autres philosophes et la transforme en une attitude de vie
David hume, scottish philosopher, was disappointed by the attitude of public after his publishing of treatise of human nature (1739), where he has explained the tenets of his moral philosophy. He decided again to explain more simply these tenets in his moral essays (1742) which became more popular. These essays were presented as four portraits of philosophers : epicurean, stoic, platonist and the sceptic. Every philosopher thinks that philosophy is an art of life. This art may be conduct us to happiness. And at last, the sceptic uses the ideas of the three others in order to make up his method. Consequently, happiness consist in attitude to maintain generally us in life

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Silva, Laila T. Correa e. 1987. „A crença na existência do mundo exterior e o ceticismo mitigado em Hume“. [s.n.], 2012. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/278710.

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Orientador: José Oscar de Almeida Marques
Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
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Resumo: David Hume, no Tratado da Natureza Humana, livro 1, parte 4, seção 2, "Do ceticismo quanto aos sentidos", pretende explicar a causa de nossa crença na existência do mundo exterior, isto é, a crença em existências contínuas e distintas da mente e da percepção. Ele inicia a seção com a seguinte afirmação: devemos dar nosso assentimento ao princípio referente à existência dos corpos, embora não possamos ter a pretensão de sustentar a sua veracidade por meio de argumentos filosóficos (T 1.4.2.1). Mas, ao final da seção, sua postura diante da crença na existência do mundo exterior muda totalmente, como Hume mesmo diz, em T 1.4.2.56, penúltimo parágrafo: "iniciei este tema com a premissa de que deveria ter uma fé implícita em nossos sentidos, e que essa é a conclusão que extrairia da totalidade de meu raciocínio", contudo, argumenta ele, "sinto-me neste momento possuído pelo sentimento contrário", ou seja, Hume não deposita mais nenhuma confiança nos sentidos, ou antes, imaginação. Por que Hume chega a tal conclusão? Hume argumenta que essas existências contínuas e distintas são ficções da imaginação e, como tais, não merecem nosso assentimento e confiança. Essa situação embaraçosa conduz Hume a um ceticismo radical que, segundo o próprio filósofo, somente pode ser curado por meio do "descuido e desatenção". Mas, como poderíamos interpretar essa declaração de Hume? Minha proposta de interpretação defende que através do conceito humeano de ceticismo mitigado presente no Tratado, livro 1, parte 4, seção 7, "Conclusão deste livro", e na Investigação sobre o Entendimento Humano, seção 12, "Da filosofia acadêmica ou cética", somos capazes de compreendê-la. Nas duas obras mencionadas Hume apresenta o modo de investigação filosófica que é, para ele, o mais adequado, a saber: o método cético. Contudo, o ceticismo de Hume não é o ceticismo radical que impede toda a ação, mas sim um ceticismo mais mitigado que combina consigo uma parcela da "mistura bruta e terrena" (T 1.4.7.14), constituinte da vida comum e afazeres cotidianos
Abstract: David Hume, in the Treatise of Human Nature, book 1, part 4, section 2, "Of scepticism with regard to the senses", wants to explain the cause of our belief in the existence of external world, i.e., the belief in existence continued and distinct of the mind and perception. He begins the section with the following affirmation: we might give our assentiment to the principle regarding the existence of external world, even though we cannot pretend to sustain its veracity through philosophical arguments (T 1.4.2.1). But, at the end of section, Hume's position as regards of the belief of external world changes completely, as Hume says, in T 1.4.2.56: "I begun this subject with premising, that we ought to have an implicit faith in our senses, and that this wou'd be the conclusion, I shou'd draw from the whole of my reasoning", however, he says, "I feel myself at present of quite contrary sentiment", i.e., Hume didn't deposit any more trust in the senses, or first, imagination. Why Hume concluded that? Hume says that these continued and distinct existences are fictions of imagination, and in this way, don't diserve our trust and assentiment. This complicated situation brings Hume to the radical scepticism that, according to himself, can only be cured by "carelessness and in-attention". But how can we interpret Hume's declaration? My proposal is that by means of the humean concept of mitigate scepticism present in the Treatise, book 1, part 4, section 7, and in Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, section 12, we can comprehended Hume's situation. In both books, he presented for us a way of philosophical investigation that is, for him, more adequate: the sceptical method. However, humean scepticism is not the radical one that obstructed all action, instead, more mitigated humean scepticism brings with itself one part of the "gross earthy mixture, as an ingredient" (T 1.4.7.14), that constitutes common life
Mestrado
Filosofia
Mestre em Filosofia

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Lunardi, Giovani Mendonça. „Sensibilidade moral e normatividade em Hume“. reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/17668.

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A filosofia moral de David Hume é interpretada, predominantemente, como representante de um ceticismo normativo ou de uma moralidade psicologizada. Tais interpretações privilegiam um determinado hábito de leitura dos textos humeanos, influenciadas pelas denominadas "teorias da razão prática", afirmando que seu sistema filosófico não contempla a estrutura de racionalidade necessária para a fundamentação da normatividade da moralidade. De forma contrária, a presente investigação sustenta que a filosofia moral humeana permite uma interpretação normativa através do exame da "dinâmica dos sentimentos" presentes na natureza humana. A normatividade da moral é estabelecida, de acordo com o filósofo escocês, a partir do conteúdo valorativo dos sentimentos naturais de "dor" e "prazer" que "sentimos" de forma imediata. No entanto, isso não implica que sua filosofia moral possa ser reduzida a um puro hedonismo, subjetivismo ou relativismo moral. Defendemos que a sensibilidade moral, segundo Hume, providencia a discriminação das ações humanas com conteúdo valorativo através da comunicação dos sentimentos (simpatia) avaliados de um ponto de vista imparcial (espectador judicioso). Essa "dinâmica dos sentimentos" é o que denominamos de normatividade como reflexividade, ou seja, a sucessiva reflexividade produz um resultado normativo. Nossa tese conclui que, na visão do filósofo escocês, o problema da normatividade da moralidade pode ser respondido a partir das seguintes perspectivas: do conteúdo valorativo de sentimentos naturais, não de valores impostos por uma razão prática; da comunicação de sentimentos entre os agentes, não da deliberação solipsista do agente moral; do ponto de vista imparcial de um espectador judicioso, não dos interesses dos agentes envolvidos; da dinâmica de sentimentos com uma sucessiva reflexividade, não da reflexão de uma "pura razão".
David Hume's moral philosophy is mainly understood as a representative of a normative scepticism and also as a psychologised morality. Such conceptions privilege a reading habit of humeans texts influenced by the so called "theories of the practical reason'" stating that his philosophical system does not contemplate the rationality structure necessary for the grounds of normativity of morality. As opposed to this, the present investigation supports the idea that humean moral philosophy allows a normative interpretation by examining "dynamic of feelings" present in human nature. The normativity of moral is established, according to the Scottish philosopher, from the evaluative contents of natural feelings of "pain" and "pleasure" in which, we immediately "feel". However, that does not mean that his moral philosophy can be reduced to pure hedonism, subjectivism or moral relativism. We support the idea that moral sensibility, according to Hume, provides discrimination of worthy human actions through communication of the feelings (sympathy) evaluative from an impartial point of view (judicious spectator). Such "dynamic of feelings" is what we call normativity as reflexivity, in other words, successful reflexivity producing normative outcome. Our thesis concludes that according to the Scottish philosopher's view, the normativity of morality question can be answered from the following perspectives: from natural feelings' worth rather than from the worth imposed by practical reason; from communication of feelings between agents, rather than from the solipsist deliberation of moral agent; from the impartial point of view of a judicious spectator, rather than from the interests of the involved agents; from the dynamic of feelings with successive reflexivity, rather than from the reflexion of a "pure reason".

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Leme, Antonio Cesar da Silva 1972. „O tema da identidade pessoal no livro 1 do Tratadode Hume“. [s.n.], 2013. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/279805.

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Orientador: José Oscar de Almeida Marques
Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
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Resumo: Esta dissertação examina o tema da identidade pessoal no Livro 1 do Tratado da natureza humana de David Hume, e a sua retomada nos textos da Sinopse e do "Apêndice". Trata-se de explicar o sentido de algumas afirmações feitas por Hume sobre esse tema. Na seção "Da Identidade Pessoal", Hume, por um lado, nega a existência da ideia do eu e, por outro, propõe uma tese sobre o eu, segundo a qual o eu é um sistema de diferentes percepções, encadeadas pelos princípios de associação de ideias. Ao retomar o tema da identidade pessoal no "Apêndice", Hume mostra-se decepcionado com sua própria explicação oferecida previamente para esse assunto no Tratado e na Sinopse. Diante dessas afirmações, o objetivo do nosso trabalho é cotejar suas afirmações iniciais sobre o tema do eu com sua reconsideração posterior a fim de tentar entender o motivo da sua insatisfação. Seguindo a hipótese proposta por Piston, defendo que Hume apresenta uma concepção do eu alternativa para as explicações de Descartes e Locke. Além disso, sugiro que Hume mantém no "Apêndice" a mesma concepção de identidade pessoal apresentada inicialmente no texto do Tratado. Para sustentar essas hipóteses, é imprescindível distinguir o objeto da crítica de Hume, o eu inventado pelos filósofos, da proposição humeana acerca sobre o eu como um sistema de percepções em fluxo constante
Abstract: This dissertation examines the theme of personal identity in Book 1 of the Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume, and its resumption in the texts of the Synopsis and the "Appendix." It intends to explain the meaning of some statements made by Hume on this topic. In the section "Personal Identity" Hume, on the one hand, denies the existence of the idea of the self and, on the other, proposes a thesis about the self, according to which the self is a system of different perceptions, linked by the principles of association of ideas. When he revisited the issue of personal identity in the "Appendix", Hume appears disappointed with his own explanation previously offered for that subject in the Treatise and in the Synopsis. Given these statements, the aim of this work is to collate Hume's initial statements on the subject of the self with his subsequent reconsideration, in order to try to understand the reason for his dissatisfaction. Following a hypothesis proposed by Piston, I argue that Hume presents a conception of the self alternative to explanations of Descartes and Locke. Furthermore, I suggest that Hume holds in the "Appendix" the same conception of personal identity presented initially in the text of the Treatise. To support these hypotheses, it is essential to distinguish the object of Hume's criticism, the self invented by philosophers, from Hume's proposition about the self as a system of perceptions in constant flux
Mestrado
Filosofia
Mestre em Filosofia

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Silva, Gilberto Cabral da. „Para além de Deus e da natureza: Elementos de filosofia trágica nos diálogos sobre a religião de David Hume“. Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, 2005. https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/2150.

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This Work intends an epistemological approach of David Hume s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion by French philosopher Clément Rosset s category of tragic philosophy . We propose a new interpretative possibility of Hume s thought in the Dialogues, different form the naturalism and beyond the simple skepticism . The concept of tragic philosophy allows one to think the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion as a work of tragic philosophy, in which the concept of nature is completely dissolved by the skeptic arguments.
Esta dissertação pretende uma abordagem epistemológica dos Diálogos sobre a Religião Natural de David Hume por meio da categoria de filosofia trágica , trabalhada pelo filósofo francês Clément Rosset. Propomos uma nova possibilidade interpretativa do pensamento de David Hume, diferente do naturalismo e além do simples ceticismo. O conceito de filosofia trágica permite pensar os Diálogos sobre a Religião Natural como uma obra de filosofia trágica, na qual é efetuada, através dos argumentos céticos, a completa dissolução do conceito de natureza .

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Cabezas, Barra Domingo. „El laberinto de la identidad personal en la filosofía de David Hume“. Doctoral thesis, Universitat de Barcelona, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/398034.

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En esta tesis analizaremos la filosofía de la identidad personal elaborada por Hume. Para ello, partiremos del análisis de los principios expuestos en el Tratado de la Naturaleza Humana. Distinguiremos detalladamente lo que los estudiosos de Hume han llamado los primeros y los segundos pensamientos sobre la identidad personal, profundizando en el crucial momento en el que en los segundos pensamientos, Hume confiesa que "todas mis esperanzas se desvanecen" al intentar explicar los principios que enlazan nuestras sucesivas percepciones. Ello nos sugiere que se siente frustrado al intentar explicitar, desde sus principios epistemológicos, las conexiones reales que enlazarían las percepciones y que son necesarias para el funcionamiento de la memoria. Encontraremos a Hume ante un dilema imposible, pues o bien ha de renunciar a la identidad personal y a la memoria o bien tiene que renunciar a los principios de su filosofía. Por ello, Hume se encontrará perdido dentro del laberinto de la identidad personal, de tal manera que la única salida posible es sentarse en el banco de escepticismo.
In this thesis we will discuss the philosophy of personal identity developed by Hume. Starting from the analysis of the principles outlined in the Treatise of Human Nature, we will thoroughly describe what the experts in the work of Hume have called the first and second thoughts about personal identity. Then we will delve in the crucial moment when, while discussing second thoughts, Hume confesses that "all my hopes vanish" when trying to explain the principles that link our successive perceptions. This implies that he feels frustrated when trying to explain, from its epistemological principles, the real connections that would link perceptions and that are necessary for the functioning of memory. Here we find Hume facing an impossible dilemma, since he has to give up either his personal identity and memory or the principles of his philosophy. Therefore, Hume will be lost in the maze of personal identity, until the only way out is to sit on the bench of skepticism.

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Simon, Alexandre. „Scepticisme et politesse dans l'œuvre de David Hume“. Thesis, Besançon, 2016. http://www.theses.fr/2016BESA1005/document.

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Ce travail étudie la relation entre scepticisme et politesse dans l’œuvre de David Hume afin de contribuer à la compréhension philosophique de l’art d’écrire de Hume et de son évolution. Du Traité de la nature humaine (1739-1740) aux œuvres suivantes (les Essais, les deux Enquêtes, les Four Dissertations et les Dialogues sur la religion naturelle), on observe un incontestable changement dans la manière de communiquer la science de l’homme au public du XVIIIe siècle. Inspiré en partie du journalisme philosophique d’Addison et de Steele et destiné à rendre la philosophie abstraite accessible au public de la conversation, l’art d’écrire de Hume témoigne d’une intégration progressive de la culture de la politesse au scepticisme mitigé et à son expression. Mais cela signifie tout sauf un renoncement aux ambitions spéculatives du Traité, que Hume aurait abandonnées pour la recherche d’une gloire mondaine. Au contraire, comme expression de la bonne humeur caractéristique du « vrai sceptique » et comme préparation littéraire de la réception critique de la philosophie au sein de la République des Lettres, l’art d’écrire de Hume cherche à donner à cette science sceptique – et science nouvelle – qu’est la science de l’homme le public dont elle a besoin pour assurer sa fondation. Le scepticisme mitigé apparaît alors comme étant essentiellement un scepticisme policé, c’est-à-dire comme la meilleure manière de faire entrer la « métaphysique » dans la voie sûre de la civilisation
This study deals with the relationship between scepticism and politeness in the works of David Hume, in order to contribute to the understanding of Hume’s art of writing from a philosophical point of view. From the Treatise of human nature (1739-1740) to the later works (the Essays, the two Enquiries, the Four dissertations and the Dialogues concerning natural religion), one can observe an obvious change in the manner of communicating the science of man to the public of the eighteenth century. Partly inspired by the philosophical journalism of Addison and Steele and designed to make abstract philosophy accessible to the public of conversation, Hume’s art of writing shows a progressive integration of the culture of politeness with scepticism and its expression. But this certainly does not mean that Hume would have left the speculative ambitions of the Treatise for worldly success. On the contrary, as an expression of the good humour which characterizes the « true sceptic » as well as a literary preparation of the critical reception of philosophy in the Republic of Letters, Hume’s art of writing tries to give to the science of man, considered as a sceptical – and new – science, the public that it needs for its foundation. Hence mitigated scepticism appears essentially as a polite scepticism, the best way for « metaphysics » to enter upon the secure path of civilization

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Mareschal, de Charentenay Simon. „Origines et développement de la loi de Hume dans la pensée juridique“. Montpellier 1, 2008. http://www.theses.fr/2008MON10031.

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Ferraz, Marilia Cortes de. „Liberdade e imputabilidade moral em Hume“. [s.n.], 2006. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/281518.

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Orientador: Jose Oscar de Almeida Marques
Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas
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Resumo: A dissertação examina a análise de Hume dos conceitos de liberdade e imputabilidade moral. O texto de referência para a pesquisa é a seção VIII da Investigação sobre o entendimento humano. Mostro, a partir do estudo dessa seção, em que sentido os conceitos de liberdade e necessidade são compatíveis para Hume. Para tanto, analiso o compatibilismo humeano enfatizando a unidade explicativa que o autor esposa claramente na obra citada. De fato, Hume, em seu exame das noções de liberdade e necessidade anuncia introduzir novidades que prometem ao menos algum resultado na decisão da controvérsia entre a doutrina da necessidade e a doutrina da liberdade (da vontade). Ele propõe um 'projeto de reconciliação¿ (reconciling project) que consiste em mostrar que liberdade e necessidade são perfeitamente compatíveis entre si, e que afirmar que as ações humanas são livres não é afirmar que estejam fora do âmbito da necessidade, mas apenas que se realizaram sem constrangimento. Em seguida, esclareço as razões que conduzem à crença na vontade livre, crença esta infundada, segundo Hume. Por fim, procuro estabelecer as conseqüências que o compatibilismo humeano traz para a noção de responsabilidade moral. Hume entende que não só é perfeitamente possível explicar os juízos morais pelo seu compatibilismo, como também que o seu compatibilismo é a única alternativa de fato consistente para dar conta dos ajuizamentos que fazemos acerca da moralidade. Entendo que a explicação dos juízos morais de imputabilidade oferecida por Hume representa uma hipótese altamente persuasiva e com vigor suficiente para responder a objeções geralmente apresentadas pelos incompatibilistas
Abstract: The dissertation examines the analysis of Hume of the concepts of freedom and moral imputability. The text of reference for the research is section VIII of the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. I show, from the study of this section, how freedom and necessity are compatible for Hume. To this effect, I analyze the humean compatibilism emphasizing the unit of the explanation that the author maintains in the cited work. Hume, in his examination of freedom and necessity, announces a new approach that promises at least some results for the decision of the controversy between the doctrine of the necessity and the doctrine of the freedom (of the will). He proposes a conciliatory project that consists in showing that freedom and necessity are perfectly compatible, and that to say that the human actions are free is not to say that they are out of the scope of the necessity, but only that they are without constraint. After that, I clarify the reasons that lead to the belief in free will, which is baseless according to Hume. Finally, I establish the consequences that humean compatibilism brings for the notion of moral responsibility. Hume understands not only that it is perfectly possible to explain moral judgments by means of his compatibilism, but also that his compatibilism is the only consistent alternative to account for moral judgement. I understand that the explanation of moral judgments of imputability offered by Hume represents a highly persuasive hypothesis, and strong enough to answer the objections generally raised by incompatibilists
Mestrado
Filosofia Moral
Mestre em Filosofia

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Okan, Ecem. „Entre histoire et analyse : le progrès selon David Hume et Adam Smith“. Thesis, Paris 1, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018PA01E050.

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Cette thèse porte sur la relation entre histoire et analyse dans les considérations de Hume et de Smith sur le progrès. Son objectif est double. En premier lieu, elle vise à montrer que ces deux auteurs écossais articulent une approche historique, dite conjecturale, avec une autre approche historique qui relève de leur analyse de l’émergence de la société civile. Tandis que Hume rassemble ces deux approches historiques distinctes dans sa philosophie politique, Smith fait émerger son analyse économique de sa philosophie politique, qui est une histoire conjecturale de la société civile. Selon les deux auteurs, le gouvernement naît d’une inégalité de richesse au sein de la société et son but principal est de sécuriser la propriété privée. L’analyse économique de la Richesse des Nations dérive de cette théorie du gouvernement et de la justice. En second lieu, ce travail a pour but de souligner que Smith donne un moindre rôle à l’histoire dans sa théorie économique que Hume. Les attitudes divergentes de Hume et Smith vis-à-vis du problème de la dette publique britannique en témoigne. Tandis que Hume met en avant le danger provenant de la politique belliqueuse de la Grande Bretagne en traçant un parallèle avec l’Empire romain, Smith privilégie les effets économiques de la dette, qui, malgré leur nocivité, sont compensés par l’épargne privée. Une telle comparaison explique l’émergence ultérieure de l’école classique qui privilégie une analyse économique purement théorique, dépourvue de contexte historique
This dissertation examines the relationship between history and analysis in Hume’s and Smith's considerations on progress. Its objective is twofold. First, it aims to show that these two Scottish thinkers bring together an historical approach, i.e. conjectural history, with another historical approach stemming from their analysis of the rise of civil society. Hume conflates these two distinct historical approaches in his political philosophy, whereas Smith separates gradually his economic analysis of from his political philosophy ― which is a conjectural history of civil society. According to both of them, the government originates from the inequality of wealth within society and its main purpose is to secure private property. The economic analysis of the Wealth of Nations derives from this theory of government and justice. Secondly, this study aims to emphasize that Smith’s economic theory is less historical than Hume. This is illustrated by the difference between Hume’s and Smith’s stance on the problem of the British public debt. While Hume points out the danger proceeding from Great Britain's aggressive international politics ― by drawing a parallel with the Roman Empire ―, Smith brings to the fore the economic effects of public debt, which, despite their harmfulness, are offset by private savings. Such a comparison explains the subsequent emergence of the classical school which deploys a purely theoretical economic analysis that lacks historical context

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Soares, Mascarenhas Rogério. „Le statut de l’éloquence dans la philosophie de David Hume : dépassements spatiotemporels et identitaires à la lumière d’une propédeutique“. Thesis, Université Clermont Auvergne‎ (2017-2020), 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018CLFAL015/document.

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Quiconque scrute le statut de l’éloquence chez Hume ne peut se dispenser d’interroger les analyses de l’auteur dans le Traité de la nature humaine, tout en accordant une attention soutenue aux Essais moraux, politiques et littéraires, et à l’Enquête sur l’entendement humain. L’examen de la verve au sein de la philosophie humienne peut s’avérer risquée et complexe, d’autant que la fragmentation dans la manière d’aborder le sujet s’accompagne de considérations qui peuvent obscurcir plutôt qu’éclaircir la compréhension d’un certain nombre de problèmes. Le présent travail cherche à démontrer que, chez Hume, l’’éloquence peut être comprise sous le prisme d’une activité délibérée et amusante de « connaissance de soi de l’imagination (esprit), puisque celle-ci se replie sur elle-même lorsqu’elle se représente une myriade d’existences possibles. De cette manière, l’éloquence quitte son statut de pratique risquée et hasardeuse pour se faire la garante d’une propédeutique scientifique, c’est-à-dire d’une discipline d’initiation à la science humienne de l’homme
Anyone who scrutinizes the status of eloquence in Hume cannot dismiss questioning the author's analyses in A Treatise on Human Nature, while paying close attention to the Moral, Political, and Literary Essays, and to An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Examination of the verve within humian philosophy can be risky and complex, especially as the fragmentation in the approach to the subject is accompanied by considerations that may obscure rather than clarify the understanding of a number of problems. This work seeks to demonstrate that, in Hume, eloquence can be understood under the prism of a deliberate and amusing activity of “self-knowledge of the imagination (spirit)”, since it is withdrawn on itself even when it represents a myriad of possible existences. In this way, eloquence abandons its status of risky and hazardous practice to make itself the guarantor of a scientific propaedeutic endeavor, that is to say, a discipline of initiation to the humian science of man

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Lodoli, Federico. „Le corps et la critique : perspectives sur une philosophie de la production“. Thesis, Paris, EHESS, 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019EHES0175.

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Quelle est la relation entre la critique et le corps ? Dans l’histoire de la philosophie le but de la critique a été toujours de mettre en question les prétentions de la pensée, à l’égard de la vérité. Mais puisque la philosophie occidentale a toujours conçu la vérité comme une essence suprasensible, c’est l’immanence du corps qui devient alors le véritable fil conducteur pour atteindre à ce but. En prenant le corps comme critère d’enquête, la critique devient une investigation génétique et généalogique de la formation des idées du monde et du soi. En même temps, le corps change de nature, car lui-même devient la cible de la critique. Autrement-dit, il ne peut plus être considéré dans le cadre d’une simple opposition entre corps et esprit, comme le fait l’idéalisme. Le corps se révèle le paradigme d’une pensée naturelle, le point de vue décentré de l’existence, la perspective morcelée et dynamique de l’immanence. Sujet et objet de la critique, le corps devient la dimension originaire d’un naturalisme de la production immanente. En résumé, cette thèse porte sur une compréhension du concept du corps afin d’évaluer la possibilité qu’il devienne le critère d’un naturalisme critique : c’est-à-dire une pensée plongée dans le temps et la vie, dans le devenir et la matière, parmi une multitude de singularités. Pour comprendre une telle pensée, on convoque les philosophes qui, dans l’histoire de la philosophie, ont déjà indiqué les grandes « raisons du corps » : Spinoza, Hume, Nietzsche. Les questions qui traversent cette thèse, donc, sont les suivantes : qu’est-ce que sont la critique et le corps du point de vue de l’immanence ? Est-ce la critique est possible à partir du corps ? Est-ce que le corps, est-il un principe capable de produire du sens et de la valeur ? Qu’est-ce qu’une philosophie de la production immanente ?
What is the relationship between body and critique? In the history of philosophy, the aim of the critique has always been to unveil the pretentions of thought towards the truth. Yet, since western philosophy has always conceived truth as a transcendent value, the only appropriate way to achieve this aim, looks like to adopt the immanence of the body, as the starting point and the main force of this quest. By adopting the body, as the method of the philosophical examination, the critique becomes a genetic and genealogic investigation on how our ideas are produced. At the same time, the body too change his nature, as it becomes the object of the critique. It means that the body is no longer considered in a simple opposition to the mind, as it is conceived within the Mind-Body problem debate. That would mean to remain within the perspective of idealism. On the contrary, the body reveals itself as the paradigm of a natural thinking, the decentralized point of view of existence, the fragmented and dynamic perspective of the immanence. Subject and object of the critique, the body becomes the primordial dimension of a productive naturalism So, the aim of this thesis is to investigate the possibilities for the body to become the criteria of the critique, and the force of a naturalistic philosophy of production. It means to produce a form of thinking that arises directly from life and time, becoming and matter, singularities and multiples. In order to do so, we discuss the philosophies of those thinkers who, during the history of western thought, have already recognised this productive potential of the body: Spinoza, Hume, Nietzsche. Finally, the questions guiding this thesis are: What are critique and body from an immanent perspective? Is it possible a critique starting from the body? Can the body become a force apt to produce values and thoughts? What is, then, philosophy of natural production?

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Espinoza, Verdejo Alex. „David Hume : aspects ontologiques et épistémologiques de l'induction“. Nantes, 2005. http://www.theses.fr/2005NANT3018.

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Contrairement à beaucoup de penseurs modernes, Hume ne trace pas une démarcation nette entre l'être et la connaissance de l'être. Pour argumenter en faveur de la thèse antidivisionniste de Hume, nous avons déterminé cinq sources du problème de l'induction : les sources physiques, psychologique, logique, métaphysique et sociologique. Dans chacune d'elles (mise à part une interprétation purement formaliste de la source logique) nous avons trouvé une idée commune : la connaissance est un processus qui mêle inextricablement l'objectif et le subjectif, l'être et le connaître. L'analyse détaillée des sources du problème de l'induction, et les nombreuses comparaisons des idées de Hume avec celles de penseurs anciens, modernes ou contemporains, nous ont conduit à la conclusion que la philosophie de Hume, en particulier en ce qui concerne les aspects ontologiques et épistémologiques de l'induction, serait une classe de "réalisme pragmatique".

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Ouellet, Dominique. „Science et scepticisme chez David Hume“. Master's thesis, Université Laval, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11794/26324.

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L’oeuvre philosophique de David Hume repose sur un incontournable paradoxe. Dans le premier livre du Traité de la nature humaine, le projet d'une science expérimentale de la nature humaine se trouve curieusement juxtaposé à l'expression d'un scepticisme radical. Notre objectif consiste principalement à rendre compte, au-delà de cette contradiction apparente, de la cohérence de la position épistémologique de Hume. Nous tenterons de mettre en évidence la compatibilité des conceptions humiennes de science et de scepticisme. Nous chercherons également à souligner l'invraisemblance de l'interprétation traditionnelle qui dissout la tension entre science et scepticisme en réduisant la philosophie humienne à un scepticisme autodestructeur.

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Mullen, Shirley Annette. „David Hume and the partility-impartiality debate“. Thesis, University of Wales Trinity Saint David, 1999. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.683165.

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Espinosa, Sarmiento Ruth. „El Problema de Hume: Epistemología, escepticismo y metafísica“. Tesis, Universidad de Chile, 2008. http://www.repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/108472.

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[…] Por mucho tiempo se pensó que en Hume no había tal cosa como un interés propiamente epistemológico, es decir se pensó que no había interés alguno por describir condiciones normativas que justificaran nuestro conocimiento, sino más bien una descripción psicológica y por ende subjetiva del modo en que tienen lugar nuestros estado de “certeza” subjetiva. Por otra parte, hay una de las tres condiciones mencionadas que pocas veces es tratada en el marco del problema de la justificación, a saber, la verdad de la creencia. La verdad de la creencia, sin embargo, como se verá, no necesariamente ha de ser considerada como la verdad objetiva más allá del marco de las creencias del sujeto. Es decir, no es necesario, según creo, adquirir compromisos ontológicos en el marco de una teoría realista para sostenes una teoría de la justificación epistémica propiamente normativa. Para llegar a este punto en la filosofía de Hume, sin embargo, se analizará en el primer capítulo el origen y principales influencias del proyecto humeano de la ciencia del hombre. En la sección I, intentaré mostrar cómo la filosofía de Hume se comprende de manera más cabal en contraste con la filosofía a la que se opone, a saber, la metafísica racionalista. Leeremos, tal como Hume sugiere en su correspondencia, su Tratado de la Naturaleza Humana, en contraste con la filosofía cartesiana. En ella hallaremos una de las teorías de la justificación más conocidas y debatidas en la espistemología, a saber, el fundacionalismo clásico. En este mismo contexto haré notar la búsqueda de Hume de una renovada concepción de conocimiento capaz de subsanar los vicios de la vieja escuela. En las secciones II y III intentaré mostrar los principales recursos de Hume para levantar una nueva metafísica, que no es sino su así llamada ciencia de la naturaleza humana. En esta nueva ciencia la adopción del método experimental de razonar juega un rol central. Luego de ello, esbozaré en la misma sección la recepción y la interpretación de las doctrinas humeanas acerca del conocimiento humano en la epistemología contemporánea. Con ello se habrá delineado la visión estándar del autor del Treatise. Esta visión, sin embargo, no agota el pensamiento de nuestro autor, y debe ser considerada tan solo como la parte negativa de su filosofía. En el segundo capítulo, intentaré mostrar que la visión estándar de Hume, puede ser matizada por nuevas interpretaciones del proyecto de Hume, como una doctrina metafísica propositiva y no como un mero diagnosticador de los problemas del conocimiento. En ella, sostendré que es posible encontrar una teoría de la justificación fundada en una nueva comprensión de la naturaleza humana y fundamentalmente de la racionalidad.

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Robel, Gilles. „Lumières et conservatisme dans la pensée politique de David Hume“. Paris 3, 1997. http://www.theses.fr/1998PA030013.

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Cette etude possede une triple ambition : souligner la coherence et l'unite de l'oeuvre de hume ; montrer en quoi sa comprehension appelle une critique de l'historiographie traditionnelle, qui presente lumieres et conservatisme comme des courants antagonistes ; enfin rehabiliter la pensee politique de hume, encore negligee en france. On examine d'abord la place du politique dans son oeuvre et sa carriere, ainsi que le mode d'articulation de son epistemologie a son ethique et a sa politique, et on montre qu'il est fecond de deplacer le centre de gravite des etudes humiennes vers le politique et les essays. On procede alors a une analyse de la relation de hume tant aux idees qu'aux acteurs des lumieres francaises et ecossaises. Hume se revele moins conservateur que la plupart des penseurs du scottish enlightenment, defini comme lumieres conservatrices, mais il n'epouse pas pour autant le radicalisme et le dogmatisme des philosophes. On examine le contenu de sa doctrine politique et l'on montre que loin de defendre le statu quo, il preconise une reforme profonde des institutions et des mentalites, et insiste sur le caractere dynamique de la societe. Un tel reformisme souleve la question du conservatisme : apres s'etre penche sur les evolutions de la perception du conservatisme humien, on procede a une anatomie de la pensee conservatrice en combinant approche substantialiste et approche historiciste. On examine notamment sa place sur l'echiquier politique, et son analyse de la revolution. Il ressort que si l'on peut definir une vision du monde conservatrice, elle trouve des traductions politiques variees, et le conservatisme humien a pour particularite d'etre un conservatisme sceptique. On determine alors quelle marque le scepticisme imprime au conservatisme de hume, la question etant celle des normes de l'action politique. On montre que la tension entre le possible et le reel chez hume se resout par la notion de "spectateur engage". En tant que spectateur engage, hume a recours a des criteres relatifs d'evaluation politique, tels que la pratique etablie ou l'utilite. Son contextualisme, et son utilitarisme ne le conduisent pas a reduire le devoir-etre a l'etre, mais lui permettent de determiner des orientations de changement adaptees aux pratiques. Sa politique peut alors etre comprise comme une veritable philosophie du progres
The present study aims at stressing the coherence of hume's work ; at showing why it cannot be fully understood without questionning the traditional historiography of the 18th century, which depicts enlightenment and conservatism as two antagonistic trends ; at rehabilitating hume's political thought, which is still overlooked in france. The study starts with an examination of the part played by politics in hume's work and career, and of the main connexions between his epistemology, his ethics and his politics. It explains why humean studies should focus less on his epistemology and more on his political thought and on his essays. It then moves on to an analysis of hume's relationship to the actors and ideas of the scottish and french enlightenments. Hume appears to be less conservative than most of the literati of the scottish enlightenment - defined as a conservative enlightenment - but is also critical of the radicalism and dogmatism of the philosophes. A detailed examination of his political programme shows that, far from defending the status quo, he advocates far-reaching reforms of institutions and ways of thinking. Hume's reformism raises the question of his conservatism : having showed that the perception of his conservatism evolved considerably, the study approaches conservatism in a substantialist and in an historicist perspective. Hume's position on the political scene and his approach to revolution(s) are examined. This twofold analysis reveals that while it is possible to identify one conservative world view, conservative responses to political events are varied. Hume's conservatism can best be described as a sceptical conservatism, which raises the question of the influence of hume's scepticism on his conservatism, and of hume's political standards. His thought seems to hesitate between "what is established" and "what is best", but the tension can be resolved by resorting to the notion of "committed spectator". As a committed spectator, hume assesses political practices by using relative stantards, such as the "established practice" or the notion of utility. Hume's contextualism, and his utilitarianism, do not lead him to reduce what ought to what is, but they help him determine directions of change which are adapted to practices. His political thought can thus be described as a true philosophy of improvement

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Claisse, Thomas. „Hume et la mélancolie sceptique : une approche par la dynamique des discours“. Thesis, Lille 3, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014LIL30050/document.

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Le discours mélancolique de Hume, placé au terme du premier livre de son oeuvre de jeunesse, met en danger la philosophie, en tirant les conclusions nécessaires d'une théorie empiriste de la connaissance : si le monde, et même l'existence toute entière, ne sont que des idées produites par l'imagination, la recherche philosophique, qui place la raison en exergue de toutes les facultés humaines, est alors vaine et dénuée de sens. Cependant, Hume, qui n'a que vingt-huit ans lorsqu'il publie les deux premiers livres du traité, vouera sa vie à la philosophie, et ira jusqu'à s'imaginer marchandant avec Charon un peu plus de temps à vivre pour terminer ses recherches et en voir l'accueil du public. Comment un tel dépassement est-il possible, d'une stupeur mélancolique désespérée à cette passion philosophique qui emplira toute une vie ? D'une mise en danger profonde et sérieuse de toute possibilité de science à un travail sans relâche dans les domaines de la métaphysique, de la morale, de la philosophie politique, de la religion, de l'histoire ? Et ce, qui plus est, sur les principes mêmes qui seront la cause de ce danger ? Nous proposons une lecture nouvelle et critique de cette 'fin de la philosophie' et de son dépassement, par le développement, en interaction avec l'objet d'étude lui-même, d'une conception originale de l'histoire de la philosophie. inspirée par l'articulation du discours de Hume et des problèmes qu'il soulève. Nous construirons, en la mettant directement à l'épreuve dans l'analyse des discours qui en sont l'impulsion première, une pratique efficace de l'histoire des idées. Nous tenterons grâce à celle-ci de répondre à cet enjeu final que Hume lance non seulement à la philosophie, mais aussi à toute entreprise humaine de science : à quoi bon penser et philosopher, si tout objet de connaissance n'est que chimère et simulacre d'un monde que nous ne pouvons que supposer, et qui n'existe peut-être même pas ?
The melancholic speech of Hume, placed in the term of the first book of its early work, puts in danger the philosophy, by drawing the necessary conclusions of an empiricist theory of the knowledge

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MendonÃ§a, Maria Magdalena Cunha de. „Dialetica e contingencia no ceticismo em David Hume“. [s.n.], 2007. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/280583.

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Orientador: Luiz Roberto Monzani
Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas
Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-08T09:48:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 MendonA§a_MariaMagdalenaCunhade_D.pdf: 1195890 bytes, checksum: 85621e781ac4392de410372167192caf (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007
Resumo: Este trabalho investiga a relevÃ¢ncia da crÃtica humeana ao pensamento teleolÃ³gico, a partir da anÃ¡lise crÃtica do argumento do desÃgnio exposta no texto dos DiÃ¡logos da ReligiÃ£o Natural e sua articulaÃ§Ã£o com o projeto filosÃ³fico do autor. Objetiva-se mostrar que a reflexÃ£o de Hume a respeito da religiÃ£o natural, nÃ£o se reduz a uma espÃ©cie de querela entre teÃsmo e ateÃsmo, deixando claro o entrelaÃ§amento existente entre a recusa do raciocÃnio finalista e a crÃtica ao determinismo teolÃ³gico e cientÃfico, a fim de deixar evidente o distanciamento do filÃ³sofo escocÃªs da metafÃsica, sobretudo, das filosofias das ciÃªncias e epistemologia. No texto dos DiÃ¡logos da ReligiÃ£o investiga-se tambÃ©m a estrutura argumentativa filosÃ³fica do autor no intuito de precisar o sentido dialÃ©tico e referencial cÃ©tico presentes na sua compreensÃ£o e uso singular do estilo dos diÃ¡logos e sua ruptura com o discurso filosÃ³fico da tradiÃ§Ã£o, precisamente platÃ'nico-aristotÃ©lica. Em um segundo momento deste trabalho, precisamente no terceiro capÃtulo, a motivaÃ§Ã£o maior consiste em reafirmar o tom radical da crÃtica humeana ao argumento do desÃgnio em que se investiga a articulaÃ§Ã£o entre os textos dos DiÃ¡logos da ReligiÃ£o natural e o da HistÃ³ria da ReligiÃ£o natural, procurando tornar clara a manutenÃ§Ã£o do padrÃ£o da contrariedade dialÃ©tica no contraponto que Hume apresenta entre politeÃsmo e teÃsmo, bem como, a compatibilidade entre a postura de Hume na obra da HistÃ³ria da ReligiÃ£o natural e a do expositor do ceticismo e crÃtico maior do argumento teolÃ³gico no texto dos DiÃ¡logos, a saber, Philo. AlÃ©m disso, ainda nesta parte do trabalho, busca-se localizar no conceito de contingÃªncias a expressÃ£o da crÃtica de Hume ao raciocÃnio teleolÃ³gico da filosofia experimental da sua Ã©poca, que pretende apoiar-se no postulado da anÃ¡lise observacional objetiva, da necessidade fÃsica da esfera natural e do agir humano. No quarto capÃtulo o intuito Ã© o de analisar o duplo papel que desempenha o conceito de circunstancia no pensamento de Hume: elemento fundamental da sua visÃ£o de um cosmo antifinalista e linha mestra da sua ruptura com o pensamento teleolÃ³gico presente nas reflexÃµes tradicionais e moderna sobre os problemas morais. Detendo-se na anÃ¡lise da noÃ§Ã£o de valor , particularmente nas reflexÃµes sobre o problema filosÃ³fico da felicidade, busca-se tornar clara a recusa de Hume Ã visÃ£o teleolÃ³gica religiosa e cientÃfica em suas pretensÃµes de padronizaÃ§Ã£o dos comportamentos humanos, ou â?¿formas de vidaâ??, enfim, da singularidade e diversidade das mÃºltiplas formas de pensar, crer e viver de cada homem
Abstract: This work examines the relevance of the humean critique regarding the critical analysis of the argument of design ( purpose) exposed in the text of the Dialogues of Natural Religion and its articulation with the authorÂ's philosophical project. The object is to demonstrate that HumeÂ's reflection in regards to the natural religion does not confine itself to a kind of quarrel between theism and atheism, making clear the present intertwining between the refusal of the finalist reasoning and the critique to the theological and scientific determinism, in order to prove this scotch philosopherÂ's detachment from methaphysics, especially, from the philosophies of the sciences and the epistemology. The text of Dialogues of the Religion examines also the argumentative philosophical structure of the author with the purpose of determining the dialectic meaning and skeptical referential present in his comprehension and his singular utilization of style of dialogues and its rupture with the philosophical discourse of tradition, precisely platonic-aristotelian. In a second moment of this work, precisely on the third chapter, the major motivation consists of reaffirming the radical tone of the humean critique of the design in which it examines the articulation between the texts of the Dialogues of Natural Religion and of the Natural Religion History, endeavoring to make clear the maintenance of the pattern of dialectic contrariness in the counterpoint that Hume presents between polytheism and theism, as well as, the compatibility between HumeÂ's posture in the work History of Natural Religion and that of the exposer of skepticism and principal critic of the theological argument in the text of the Dialogues, that is, Philo. Besides, still in this part of the work, one endeavors to locate in the concept of the contingences the critical expression of Hume to the teleological reasoning of the experimental philosophy of his period , which intents to base itself in the postulate of the objective observational analysis, the physical necessity of the natural sphere, and of human acting. In the fourth chapter the intention is to analyse the double role played by the concept of contingence in HumeÂ's thinking . : fundamental element of his vision of an antifinalist cosmos and main support of his rupture with the current teleological thought in the traditional and modern reflections regarding the moral problems. Lingering on the analysis of the notion of value, particularly in the reflections about the philosophical problem of happiness, it intends to make clear the refusal of Hume to the religious and scientific teleological visions in their pretensions of standardizing the human behaviors, or Â¨forms of lifeÂ¨ in which it becomes evident, once again, the dialectical tone of his sceptical philosophy. Accompanying the dialectic argumentative structure present in the humean texts it endeavors to stress the difficulties that HumeÂ's dialectic-sceptic argumentative structure presents to natural religion and science in their normative and moralizing pretensions regarding the acting of individuals starting from the none in the least fortuitous abstraction of the singularity and diversity of the multiple forms of thinking , believing and living of every human being
Doutorado
Filosofia Moderna
Doutor em Filosofia

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Feuerhake, Garbarini Ernesto. „Empirismo y crítica. Husserl y Deleuze a través de Hume“. Tesis, Universidad de Chile, 2014. http://www.repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/129774.

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Tesis para optar al grado de Magíster en Filosofía
El objetivo general de esta tesis es elucidar una vía de entrada hacia las relaciones entre la filosofía de Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) y la escuela fenomenológica. Se trata de una relación crítica. Nos acercamos a ella a través de la lectura y la evaluación de los análisis que tanto Husserl como Deleuze hicieron del pensamiento del filósofo empirista escocés David Hume. Husserl era un lector asiduo de Hume, cuyo peculiar empirismo representaba una amenaza interior para la fenomenología. De otra parte, Deleuze elaborará un pensamiento que se ha dado en llamar "empirismo trascendental". Por tanto, nos ha parecido que la conflictividad existente entre ambos pensadores debía de pasar por el examen del empirismo. El empirismo, sin embargo, tal como nos ha parecido leerlo en Deleuze, no es exactamente una "doctrina". Es más: la evaluación del empirismo, de esto que no es una doctrina, nos echará luces ahora, a la inversa, sobre cuál puede ser el sentido de un conflicto filosófico. De modo que los exámenes que llevamos a cabo cumplen un doble propósito: mapear el diferendo entre Deleuze y la fenomenología en clave de crítica, y esclarecer un motivo posible para el peculiar trascendentalismo deleuziano.

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Barthélémy, Philippe. „Le personnage de Philon dans les dialogues sur la religion naturelle de David Hume“. Lille 3, 1994. http://www.theses.fr/1994LIL30009.

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Le but de cette thèse est d'établir la représentation définitive que Hume se fait de la religion et de la théologie à partir d'un commentaire des tirades du personnage de Philon dans les dialogues sur la religion naturelle et d'une étude des influences du scepticisme ancien qui ont inspiré Hume. Le livre I est consacré à une étude du rapport que Hume entretient avec son personnage principal et comprend quatre moments : une analyse des diverses interprétations du rapport Philon-Hume, une comparaison entre les dialogues et ses deux modèles historiques, le de natura deorum de Cicéron et l'alciphron de Berkeley, et enfin un exposé des raisons du recours à la forme dialoguée. Cette réflexion préliminaire a pour but de recenser les éléments nécessaires à la construction d'une nouvelle hypothèse en faveur d'un Philon nourrissant quelques sympathies à l'égard d'un dieu immanent. Le livre II expose la philosophie de la religion de Philon. Sur un plan historique, sa démarche est plus proche de la tradition du scepticisme empirique de sextus empiricus que de la tradition académicienne. Sur un plan philosophique, son scepticisme épistémologique sur le problème de l'essence de dieu n'exclut pas des préférences subjectives en faveur de l'hypothèse déiste d'un principe d'ordre intelligent et immanent mais dépourvu de qualités morales. Mais la question du rapport Philon-Hume demeure cependant un phénomène au sens sceptique du terme. En conclusion, la philosophie humienne de la religion s'établit autour de ces trois thèmes : la critique radicale de la religion naturelle et du caractère prétendument naturel de la croyance théiste, l'affirmation de la futilité du débat théologique, et l'indépendance de la morale par rapport à la religion
The aim of this thesis is to determine hume's final representation of religion and theology through a comment of the monologue said by the character of philo in the dialogues concerning natural religion on the one hand, and through a study of the influences of ancient scepticism which have inspired hume on the other hand. The first part consists in a study of the relationship that hume has with his main character. This part is divided into four chapters : an analysis of the different historical interpretations of the philo-hume relationship, a comparison bet ween the dialogues and its two historical patterns, cicero's de natura deorum and berkeley's alciphron, and finally an account of the reasons for the use of the dialogue form. This preliminary survey aims at compiling the necessary elements to base a new hypothesis acknowledging a philo getting some feeling for an immanent god. The second part explains philo's philosophy of religion. From a historical point of view, his standpoint is closer to sextus empiricus's school of empirical scepticism than to the academician school. From a philosophical point of view, hi s epistemologic scepticism on the question of the nature of god doesn't preclude any subjective preferences for the deis t hypothesis of an intelligent and immanent

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Larruscahim, Márcio. „Os elementos da filosofia de Hume“. reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/13821.

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O presente trabalho procura mostrar que para Hume poder fazer as distinções que ele pretende fazer no início do Tratado da Natureza Humana, entre impressões e idéias e entre idéias da imaginação e idéias da memória, Hume precisa ter recurso a elementos que não são dados empiricamente, como a crença em um mundo externo, atitudes em relação a percepções (crença) e propensões da mente. No entanto, argumentamos que estes não são nem pressupostos irrefletidos de Hume, nem medidas de contenção usadas quando problemas começam a aparecer, mas que constituem elementos imprescindíveis de sua filosofia, amplamente trabalhados por ele, e sem os quais a compreensão de sua filosofia ficaria severamente prejudicada.
The present work tries to show that, for Hume to be able to make the distinctions he intends to make at the beginning of A Treatise of Human Nature, between impressions and ideas, and between ideas of imagination and ideas of memory, Hume needs to make use of elements which are not given empirically, such as belief in an external world, attitudes towards perceptions (belief), and propensities of the mind. However, we argue that they are neither unexamined presuppositions made by Hume, nor accessory measures used to solve problems as they begin to show up in his philosophy; rather, they are necessary elements of his philosophy, thoroughly worked by him, and without which the understanding of Hume’s philosophy would become very limited.

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Bernard, Christopher. „The role of the imagination in Hume's science of man“. Thesis, University of St Andrews, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2940.

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In recent years there has been an explosion of writing on David Hume. His scepticism, his writings on morality, politics, and religion, have all received substantial attention. What I attempt to do in this thesis is to suggest that his revolutionary contributions in all these fields can be better understood if we consider his attempt to found the sciences on the imagination. What little work there is on the imagination in Hume's writings is almost all concerned with Book I of the Treatise. As regards Book I, I suggest that Hume's overarching problem is to argue that belief is dependent on the imagination, whilst still keeping a contrast with the whims of the 'fancy'. He wants to disabuse us of the idea that we believe on account of reason; but he wants to distinguish the claims of science from the claims of poets. But I also examine why he thinks his explanation of the production of passions support his conclusions about belief. And I argue that his former account guides conclusions found in other genres. So for example, I examine certain essays and letters about politics, and his explanation of religious events in the History of England. Why do men falsely believe that they are distinguished from the animals through possessing reason? On the one hand Hume tries to explain the origin of the sciences; on the other hand, he tries to show how men have come to have a false conception of themselves. A central aim of the thesis is to bring out these themes through showing the use Hume makes of principles of the imagination. I pay special attention to Hume's attempt to argue that Christianity plays a major role in the sustaining of the false view.

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Díaz, Lara Juan Carlos. „Pasión y 'razón' : Hume y el proceso de la evaluación moral“. Bachelor's thesis, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2005. http://tesis.pucp.edu.pe/repositorio/handle/123456789/5418.

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El auge de la filosofía anglosajona de inicios del siglo XX dedicada al análisis del lenguaje moral, convirtió este tema en núcleo de buena parte de la ética contemporánea. Hume, cuyo pensamiento fue revalorizado sobre todo en el campo epistémico, fue ulteriormente convertido en interlocutor, precursor y defensor de posiciones que atendían al lenguaje de la evaluación. Pero hay que señalar y distinguir desde el inicio que Hume se ocupó de elaborar una teoría general de la evaluación moral, constituida por una descripción del proceso mismo y por el estatuto de los objetos que dicho proceso evalúa, como veremos, las tendencias del carácter. Hume no dedicó ningún estudio orientado a analizar la función y estatuto del lenguaje moral. Estamos pues ante dos problemas distintos. Esta observación es importante porque delimita qué cosas preocuparon a Hume y qué cosas no fueron atendidas por él. La argumentación de Hume se dedica al proceso de la evaluación moral. Este proceso no desestima la cooperación entre pasiones y razonamiento, si bien éste tiene rasgos peculiares, y, a la vez, rechaza la afirmación según la cual los elementos más afectivos de dicho proceso no sean significativos.
Tesis

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Zavala, Scherer Demetrio. „Aproximación hermenéutica a la obra de David Hume“. Doctoral thesis, Universitat de Barcelona, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/394044.

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El propósito central de esta tesis es contribuir a la comprensión de la unidad del pensamiento de David Hume a través de una lectura fenomenológica del Tratado de la naturaleza humana. La orientación hermenéutica fundamental en el desarrollo de nuestra lectura la hemos tomado de cierta argumentación heideggeriana que culmina en la afirmación de que la fenomenología ha de ser la forma de la investigación ontológica. Lo que sostenemos es que, al referirse al Tratado, lo que dicha orientación muestra, en primer lugar, es la continuidad estructural entre la así llamada "teoría de las ideas" y el análisis del conocimiento (razón). Pensamos que, entre otras cosas, el énfasis en dicha continuidad ofrece una alternativa de interpretación viable y consistente en el contexto de los debates contemporáneos en torno al "realismo" y el "escepticismo" de Hume. Lo que la orientación muestra en segundo lugar es la continuidad estructural entre el ámbito del conocimiento (razón) y el de la decisión/conducta. Entendemos que dicha articulación constituye el núcleo de lo que Hume denomina naturaleza humana y que es esta centralidad lo que justifica nuestra defensa de la unidad de su pensamiento. Por último, la orientación inicial conduce a la conclusión -también moldeada a través de Heidegger- de que, si bien la naturaleza humana se realiza en la mera articulación entre conocimiento (razón) y decisión/conducta, su auténtica realización ocurre en la aparición y el cultivo de la conciencia moral, es decir, en la tematización y el enjuiciamiento de la conducta. En Hume, dicha conciencia ocurre bajo la forma de una sensibilidad (no vinculante) cuya posibilidad reside en el elemento estructural de las pasiones indirectas que Hume llama pasión tranquila (calm passion). Cabe señalar que, más allá de las orientaciones generales, nuestra tesis se fue construyendo a través de un intenso diálogo con las interpretaciones del pensamiento de Hume de Felipe Martínez Marzoa y Gines Deleuze. A la exposición y el análisis de los contenidos anteriormente descritos hemos agregado, al final del trabajo, una breve reflexión sobre la cuestión de la justicia entendida desde la perspectiva de nuestra interpretación.
The main purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the comprehension of the unity of David Hume's thought through a phenomenological reading of the Treatise of Human Nature. We have taken the basic hermeneutical orientation in the development of our reading from certain heideggerian argumentation which results in the statement that phenomenology ought to be the basis for any ontological investigation. We maintain that, referred to the Treatise, what this orientation shows, in the first place, is the continuity between the so called "theory of ideas" and the analysis of knowledge (reason). We think that, among other things, the emphasis on this continuity offers a viable and consistent alternative of interpretation in the context of the contemporary debates on Hume's "realism" and "skepticism". What the orientation shows in the second place is the continuity between the realm of knowledge and that of decision/behavior. We believe that this articulation constitutes the core of that which Hume calls human nature, and that this centrality justifies our defense of the unity of his thought. Lastly, our initial orientation leads to the conclusion -also adapted from Heidegger-that, even though it is through the mere articulation between knowledge (reason) and decision/behavior that human nature accomplishes itself, its authentic accomplishment depends on the development and nourishment of the moral conscience, that is to say, on the reflection on, and evaluation of behavior. In Hume, this conscience takes the forro of a (non-binding) sensibility. The possibility of this sensibility resides in the structural element of the indirect passions that Hume calls ca/m passion. It is fair to say that, beyond the general orientations, our thesis was developed through an intense dialogue with the interpretations of Hume's thought of Felipe Martínez Marzoa and Gilles Deleuze. To the exposition and analysis of the contents described aboye we have added, at the end, a brief reflection on the matter of justice, understood from the perspective of our interpretation.

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Bergont, Sophie. „Raison et empirisme chez David Hume“. Thesis, Paris 1, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018PA01H214/document.

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Il est courant de reconnaître en Hume un philosophe empiriste et un critique de la raison. Cette étude s’attache à examiner le lien unissant ces deux caractérisations, et à mettre en évidence le geste d’extension de l’empirisme par lequel, sous la plume de Hume, l’entendement en vient à être pensé selon un modèle empirico-sceptique. Contrairement à l’idée reçue qui voudrait que la théorie humienne de la raison s’énonce à l’encontre de conceptions «métaphysiques» ou «rationalistes» de cette dernière, il s’agit de montrer que c’est à des auteurs couramment désignés comme empiristes que Hume se confronte lorsqu’il prend la raison pour objet, en tant que ces auteurs seraient restés prisonniers d’une compréhension superficielle de l’expérience. En explorant différents champs (connaissance, passions, morale, histoire, sciences constituées, telle la mécanique), cette étude souligne que la critique humienne de la raison naît d’un approfondissement de l’empirisme, approfondissement qui vient interroger l’idée traditionnelle d’une continuité vis-à-vis des philosophes «empiristes» (notamment Locke et Hutcheson) et d’une mise à distance des auteurs «rationalistes» (notamment Leibniz et Malebranche). Ces positionnements à première vue surprenants s’enracinent dans une exigence d’analyse de l’expérience : c’est seulement en analysant l’expérience immédiate et ordinaire que nous faisons de notre raison qu’il est possible de parvenir à une juste idée de ses pouvoirs, et de poser à nouveaux frais la question de sa légitimité à gouverner notre croyance
Hume is commonly seen as an empiricist philosopher and as a critic of reason. The project of this thesis is to examine the relation between these two characterizations, and to highlight the way that Hume expands empiricism into the faculty of reason, resulting in a new conception of the understanding, which is both empirical and skeptical. In opposition to the generally accepted idea, which states that Hume's theory of reason is set against "metaphysical" or "rationalist" conceptions of this faculty, the thesis argues that, in his account of reason, Hume mainly critiques "empiricist" philosophers. These thinkers are critiqued for being confined to a superficial view of experience. Through an exploration of several fields (theory of experience, theory of the passions, theory of morals, history, contemporary sciences, such as mechanics), it is shown that Hume's critique of reason stems from an extension and intensification of empiricism. This demonstration challenges the traditional view of Hume, as the heir to the "empiricist" tradition (particularly Locke and Hutcheson) and as a mere critic of the "rationalist" philosophers (particularly Leibniz and Malebranche). These positions, which seem at first sight surprising, are rooted in the demand that experience be analysed : it is only through analysing the immediate and ordinary experience we have of our reasoning that we can arrive at a true account of the powers of reason, and give new ground to the question of the legitimacy of reason to govern our beliefs

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Jesus, Paulo Renato Cardoso de. „Poétique de l'ipse : temps, affection et synthèse dans l'unité du Je théorique kantien“. Paris, EHESS, 2006. http://www.theses.fr/2006EHES0096.

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Le « Je théorique » kantien constitue une unité sémantique unifiante qui se produit de façon epigénétique. Ainsi cette fonction cognitive spontanée - poïétique - s'avère-t-elle à la fois irréductible à une simple « forme logique » et non-assimilable à une « entité substantielle ». Le « Je pense », l'aperception transcendantale, est un pouvoir-force morphogénétique qui se déploie sur le mode d'un processus continu de synthèse virtuellement infini dont la visée est la production d'un système organique de connaissance. Sa modalité logique est la nécessité et sa manière d'agir est méta-phénoménologique ; « devoir pouvoir accompagner toutes mes représentations », signifie « instituer la forme-acte de toute représentation », à savoir son appartenance à un seul et même moi. En pensant Kant avec Hume, Leibniz et Fichte, cette étude tente d'élucider l'instabilité inévitable du passage critique à un Cogito postmétaphysique
The Kantian "theoretical I" constitutes a unifying semantic unity wich produces itself epigenetically. Thus, this spontaneous - poetic - cognitive function appears to be both irreducible to a mere "logical form" and non-identifiable with a "substantial entity". The "I think", transcendental apperception, is a morphogenetic power-force wich unfolds as a continuous - virtually infinite - process of synthesis whose aim is the production of an organic system of knowledge. Its logical modality is necessity and its manner of acting is metaphenomenological ; "to must be capable of accompanying all my representations" means "to institute the act-form of all representation as such", namely their belonging to one and the same self. By questioning Kant with Hume, Leibniz and Fichte, this research attempts to elucidate the inevitable instability of the critical transition to a postmetaphysical Cogito

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Darantière, Louis. „Du rôle de la théorie des idées dans la formation du criticisme kantien : essai sur l'esthétique transcendantale et sa gestation précritique, comparée à la méthode métaphysique de Descartes et Berkeley“. Paris 1, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011PA010527.

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Les idées, dans les théories de la connaissance de Descartes à Hume, sont des normes intuitives pour interpréter la nature. Quelle cosmologie en résulte? Un matérialisme (l'analyse de Berkeley le montre), débouchant chez Locke puis Hume sur l' agnosticisme, et une théorie de l'entendement qui est le modèle de l'idéalisme kantien. Mais Kant a rejoint la théorie des idées indépendamment, par le problème métaphysique de l'espace, qu'il déclare idéal en 1770, pour corriger sa théorie de l'espace absolu de 1768. De ce point, on peut tenter de suivre la construction de l'idéalisme transcendantal, et comprendre sa convergence avec la métaphysique cartésienne et l'empirisme de Locke.

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Cabrera, Cabrera Margarita. „Breve investigación sobre la vinculación entre las dos definiciones de causalidad en el Tratado de la naturaleza humana de David Hume“. Tesis, Universidad de Chile, 2019. http://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/170059.

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Informe de Seminario para optar al grado de Licenciado en Filosofía
La finalidad de este escrito fue estudiar la doble definición de causalidad en el Tratado de la naturaleza Humana de David Hume. Lo anterior se desarrolló principalmente desde la interpretación de dos comentaristas y el contraste que emerge entre ellos. Cabe destacar que no se busca dar una respuesta definitiva a tal problemática, sino que cimentar ciertas bases para un trabajo de profundización ulterior. La clave interpretativa se llevó a cabo a través del libro Hume on causation de la filósofa Helen BeeBee, la cual contrasta su postura con la lectura co -extensiva del filósofo Don Garrett. Por lo tanto, se consideraron ambas posturas con la intención de tener una mirada enriquecedora respecto a los contenidos. De manera análoga, se buscó contextualizar históricamente la filosofía de Hume a través de una escueta revisión a la metafísica cartesiana, específicamente en la III Meditación. A raíz de lo anterior, se sugiere que hay una resistencia al innatismo, lo cual origina una nueva noción de causalidad ajena al intelecto. Respecto a la doble definición de causalidad, se propone entenderla a la luz de una cierta autonomía entre cada una de ellas, pero además poseen un grado de influencia bajo ciertos respectos que serán abordados en la parte final del escrito. Se describe los términos de la co -extensión entre las definiciones según Don Garrett en Cognition and Commitment, pero no es una lectura plausible ya que se aleja de las afirmaciones que hizo Hume tal y como lo deja en evidencia BeeBee. Por último, para una ampliación de esta investigación se requiere mayor bibliografía secundaria y también mayor conocimiento de la obra humeana. En consecuencia, se buscará profundizar en otros textos del filósofo escocés para una comprensión más acabada.

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Nicolì, Laura. „Il dibattito filosofico sul politeismo nel Settecento francese (1704-1770)“. Thesis, Paris, EPHE, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015EPHE5068.

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La thèse traite du débat sur l'origine et la nature du polythéisme qui anima la pensée française au XVIIIe siècle. Depuis le début du siècle, ce débat commence à déborder le périmètre théologique auquel il se limitait auparavant. Le polythéisme cesse d’être une question d’exégèse scripturaire et devient un problème historique, puis philosophique. La thèse a pour objet d'éclaircir les différentes étapes de cette évolution. On montre en particulier que le remplacement progressif du modèle du monothéisme originel par celui du polythéisme primitif provoque un changement du statut de la question : d'enquête principalement antiquaire sur un sujet spécifique, elle devient une réflexion philosophique sur l'origine et la nature de la croyance religieuse tout court. La première des deux parties de la thèse est consacrée aux recherches sur les religions païennes des érudits, des antiquaires et des historiens : on y examine les principales théories sur l'origine du paganisme nées dans ce contexte (évhémérisme, allégorisme, théories de l'origine de l'idolâtrie des arts visuels et des signes de l'écriture) afin de montrer qu'elles préparèrent la réflexion des philosophes, en proposant un nouveau regard historique sur le polythéisme. La deuxième partie porte sur les aspects plus proprement philosophiques du débat ; l'attention est concentrée sur les deux figures-clés de Pierre Bayle et de David Hume et sur deux axes théoriques principaux : un axe logique ou gnoséologique, touchant à ce que signifie penser la divinité en tant que plurielle ; et un axe anthropologique ou psychologique sur l'origine de la croyance en plusieurs dieux
The subject of this thesis is the debate on the origin and nature of polytheism, which took place in France in the Eighteenth century. From the beginning of the century, this debate started to unfold outside of the theological frame within which it had been confined earlier. Polytheism stopped being an issue of biblical exegesis to become a question of historical and then philosophical nature. This thesis aims to shed light on the steps of this change. In particular, it is shown that the gradual substitution of the orthodox model of original pure monotheism with that one of primitive polytheism changed the nature of the issue: from a specific question mainly of antiquarians' interest, it became a philosophical inquiry on the origin and nature of religious belief in general. The first part of the thesis is about the researches on pagan religions conducted by antiquarians and historians: the main theories on the origin of paganism which arose in this context are examined (Euhemerism, allegorism, theories of the origin of idolatry from visual arts and writing signs), aiming to show that these theories paved the way to the reflection of philosophers, proposing a new historical approach to polytheism. The second part of the thesis deals with more strictly philosophical aspects of the debate, focusing on two key figures ‒ Pierre Bayle and David Hume ‒ and on two fundamental theoretical lines: a logical or gnoseological one, about what it means to conceive divinity as multiple; and an anthropological or psychological one, on the origin of the belief in several divinities

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Cordeiro, Thais Cristina. „A formação do juízos morais na teoria moral de David Hume“. reponame:Repositório Institucional da UFPR, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1884/45416.

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Orientador: Profª. Drª. Maria Isabel Limongi
Dissertaçao (mestrado) - Universidade Federal do Paraná, Setor de Ciências Humanas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia. Defesa: Curitiba, 27/03/2013
Inclui referências : f. 64-65
Área de concentração: Historia da Filosofia Moderna e Comtemporânea
Resumo: Pretendo, neste trabalho, analisar a formação de conceitos na construção do sistema moral de Hume atrás de um debate entre o autor escocês e três representantes de sistemas morais distintos. Respectivamente John Locke e sua moral demonstrativa, Francis Hutcheson e a moral sentimentalista e por fim Thomas Hobbes e a moral egoísta. Hume elaborou um sistema moral inédito, mas não podemos desconsiderar que suas críticas e elogios a outros filósofos morais são fundamentais na constituição de seu projeto sobre as ações morais. Propomos neste trabalho, elencar três concepções distintas às quais Hume recorre para justificar seu ataque à tradição moral racionalista, às relações de ideias encontradas no Ensaio sobre o entendimento humano de John Locke. Focaremos esse ponto da teoria moral lockeana, pois Hume pretende provar que a moral não é passível de demonstração aos moldes da matemática, conforme pretendia Locke. Em seguida apresentaremos o elogio de Hume conferido aos sentimentalistas morais. Tomamos como representante da presente corrente Francis Hutcheson. Hume adota o moral sense e o rearranja conforme sua concepção própria. Por fim, apresentamos a moralidade em Thomas Hobbes, que é egoísta. Notamos que com essa conversa entre Hume e nossos filósofos escolhidos os papéis da razão e das paixões são recolocados de modo original para a época. Depois de expormos as teorias desses três filósofos, e de posicionarmos Hume, estruturando dessa maneira a sua edificação sobre a moralidade, pretendemos demonstrar como para a Hume a moral é regulada e podemos alcançar, a partir da própria natureza humana, juízos morais estáveis.
Abstract: I intend in this work to analyze important concepts in the construction of Hume's moral system behind a debate between the Scottish author and three representatives of different moral systems. Respectively John Locke and his moral demonstrative, Francis Hutcheson and moral sentimentalist and finally Thomas Hobbes and his selfish moral. Hume developed a novel system of morality, but we can not ignore that his criticisms and compliments the other moral philosophers are fundamental in the constitution of his Project. We propose in this paper, listing three different conceptions of which Hume uses to justify his attack on the moral rationalist tradition, on the relation of ideas found in the Essay concerning human understanding by John Locke. We will focus this point of Lockean moral theory, since Hume intends to prove that morality is not susceptible to molds demonstration of mathematics, as intended Locke. Then, we present the praise given to Hume's moral sentimentalists. We take this as representative of the current Francis Hutcheson. Hume adopts the moral sense and rearrange as your own design. Finally, we present morality in Thomas Hobbes, that is selfish. We note that this conversation between Hume and our philosophers chosen the roles of reason and the passions are replaced so original for its time. After exposing the theories of these three philosophers, and position ourselves Hume, thus structuring your edification about morality, we intend to demonstrate how Hume morality is regulated and can achieve from the very human nature, stable moral judgments.

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Vos, James Antony. „The motivating force of moral beliefs“. Thesis, Rhodes University, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1003804.

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I investigate the issue of whether or not one's holding a moral belief is sufficient to motivate one to act as that belief prescribes. I argue that rational persons who hold a moral belief that is also a 'self-referential belief' will form a desire to act as that belief prescribes and thereby be motivated to act on the moral belief. I argue for this claim by, firstly, showing that the demand that moral judgements must be intrinsically motivating, Internalism, should only apply to rational persons, that is, the link between moral judgement and motivation can be broken in cases of irrationality. Secondly, I argue against the Humean claim that one cannot rationally form a desire simply because one believes that one ought to have that desire. This claim requires an investigation into a variety of views of Practical Reason and an argument concluding that Practical Reason is broader in scope than the Instrumentalist or Humean allows. I undertake this task in chapter 2. Thirdly, I argue that believing that I ought to perform a certain action will give me an internal commitment to perform that action, insofar as I am rational. I argue that an internal commitment is a form of desire. Once I recognise that I have a moral belief and an internal commitment, I will be motivated to act as that belief and commitment prescribe.
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Silva, Jean Pedro Malavolta e. „Simpatia e sentimentos morais em David Hume“. reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/156341.

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O tema desta dissertação encontra-se na filosofia moral de David Hume, e este trabalho busca lançar luz sobre sua fundamentação a fim de esclarecer algumas dificuldades e ambiguidades. O problema aqui apresentado refere-se à natureza da simpatia e dos sentimentos morais na filosofia humeana, e visa determinar qual é o objeto adequado dos juízos morais e o status moral da simpatia enquanto produtora de conteúdo moral ou enquanto mecanismo de comunicação de sentimentos, bem como tratar de uma ambiguidade referente ao objeto próprio dos juízos morais e ao objeto próprio da simpatia. Isto será feito através de uma análise dos livros 2 e 3 do Tratado da Natureza Humana e nas Investigações dos Princípios da Moral das ocorrências do princípio da simpatia, atentando para seu papel no contexto de cada passagem e sua relação com as noções de prazer e dor, aprovação e desaprovação, no contexto da teoria moral humeana A tese de que apenas o caráter do agente ou motivo da ação pode ser objeto próprio de avaliação moral será problematizada através das relações que Hume estabelece entre os sentimentos de prazer e dor produzidos por ações e nossos sentimentos morais, onde não se trata do caráter ou motivo do agente, mas sim seus efeitos que constituem o objeto de avaliação moral, o que (tal como aponta o comentador Bernard Wand) poderia gerar ambiguidade em relação ao objeto próprio dos juízos morais ou dificuldades na explicação humeana para as avaliações morais. Minha intenção é esclarecer estas dificuldades e, através do exame de alguns outros comentadores da obra humeana, afastar a interpretação de Wand esclarecendo que não há ambiguidade ou circularidade entre causa e efeito dos juízos morais na teoria humeana. Ao longo deste procedimento, serão examinadas dificuldades que também dizem respeito às correções e às condições necessárias de operação adequada do mecanismo da simpatia, a fim de oferecer uma explicação coerente com os propósitos de Hume de explicar as origens de nossa aprovação e desaprovação morais a partir de um princípio geral de explicação.
The subject of this dissertation is in David Hume's moral philosophy, and this work seeks to cast light on its fundaments in order to clarify some difficulties and ambiguities. The problem here presented refers to the nature of sympathy and moral sentiments in Humean philosophy, and is aimed in determinate the proper object of moral judgment and the moral status of sympathy as source of moral content or as a mechanism of communication of sentiments, as well as solve an ambiguity concerning the proper object of moral judgments and the proper object of sympathy. This shall be done through an analysis of the books 2 and 3 of the Treatise of Human Nature and the Enquiries Concerning The Principles os Morals of the occurrences of the principle of sympathy, paying attention to its role in the context of each account and its relations with the notions of pleasure and pain, approval and disapproval in the context of the Humean moral theory The thesis that only the agent's motive or character can be the object of moral valuation will be problematized through the relations Hume establishes between the feelings of pleasure and pain produced by actions and our moral feelings, where it is not the agent’s character or motive, but its consequences, which constitute the object of moral appraisals, and this (as Bernard Wand points) might constitute an ambiguity concerning the proper object of moral evaluation. My intention is to clarify this difficulties and, through the analysis of other critics of Hume, refusing Wands interpretation and clarifying that there is no ambiguity and no circularity between the cause and effect of moral judgment in Hume’s theory. Throughout this procedure, difficulties will be examined concerning the corrections and the necessary conditions for sympathy’s proper operation, in order to offer a coherent explanation with Hume purposes of explaining the origins of our moral approval and disapproval from a general principle of explanation.

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Araújo, Alexandre Madruga da Costa. „A noção de pessoas de Henrique Vaz : uma resposta à negação da identidade pessoal em Hume“. reponame:Repositório Institucional da UnB, 2016. http://repositorio.unb.br/handle/10482/22048.

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Dissertação (mestrado)-Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Ciências Humanas, Departamento de Filosofia, 2016.
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Esta dissertação visa apresentar uma crítica e uma alternativa ao problema da negação da identidade pessoal levantado por Hume, a partir de alguns elementos presentes na Antropologia Filosófica de Henrique Vaz, especialmente centrada no conceito de pessoa. Trata-se do confronto de duas propostas bem distintas: a primeira de cunho empirista e cético, e, a segunda, ancorada em categorias metafísicas. _______________________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT
This dissertation aims to present a critique and an alternative to the problem of personal identity's negation raised by Hume, based on some elements present in Henrique Vaz's philosophical anthropology, which are specially focused on the concept of person. It is about the confrontation of two very different proposals: the first one, with a skeptical and empiricist hallmark and the second one, anchored in metaphysical categories.

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Klaudat, André Nilo. „Os limites da razão : uma investigação sobre a filosofia teórica de Hume no Treatise“. reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 1991. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/165539.

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Soares, Franco Nero Antunes. „A inatividade da crença na teoria da motivação de David Hume“. reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/150324.

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O objetivo principal desta pesquisa é defender a interpretação da filosofia de David Hume segundo a qual não há crença que possa ser a única causa de paixões motivacionais, volições ou ações. O problema que orienta a discussão é determinar até que ponto os aspectos cognitivos ou racionais da mentalidade controlam ou não o aparato emocional dos seres humanos. Em primeiro lugar, defende-se que a teoria das percepções resultante da metodologia empirista de Hume não inclui a noção de uma faculdade racional sobrenatural com conteúdos ou princípios inatos ou a priori. Em segundo lugar, defende-se ume leitura compatibilista da liberdade humana em Hume segundo a qual volições são as paixões motivacionais que necessariamente antecedem a produção de ações voluntárias. Depois, sustenta-se que os processos inferenciais que caracterizam a racionalidade humana segundo Hume não são suficientes para produzir paixões motivacionais, volições e ações. Por fim, defende-se que as percepções produzidas por raciocínios, as crenças, também não são suficientes para produzir tais efeitos práticos. Uma premissa importante para o argumento principal é que a presença de certas paixões motivacionais, cuja origem não pode ser atribuída a crenças ou a inferências, é necessária para a produção de ações.
The main objective of this research is to defend that no belief can be the sole cause of motivational passions, volitions or actions according to David Hume’s theory of motivation. The problem that guides the discussion is to determine to what extent the cognitive or rational aspects of the human mind control or not the emotional apparatus of human beings. First, it is argued that Hume’s empiricist theory of perceptions does not include the notion of a supernatural rational faculty with innate or a priori contents or principles. Second, it defends a compatibilist reading of human freedom in Hume whereby volitions are the motivating passions that necessarily precede the production of voluntary actions. Then, it is argued that the inferential processes that characterize human rationality according to Hume are not enough to produce motivational passions, volitions and actions. Finally, it is argued that perceptions produced by reasoning, beliefs, are not sufficient to produce such practical effects. An important premise for the main argument is the view that the presence of certain motivational passions, whose origin cannot be attributed to beliefs or inferences, it is necessary for the production of actions.

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Souza, Rafael de 1986. „O padrão do gosto na filosofia de Hume = um argumento e os seus aspectos“. [s.n.], 2011. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/278711.

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Orientador: José Oscar de Almeida Marques
Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
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Resumo: "Do padrão do gosto" já pode ser considerado um texto de filosofia clássico na área da Estética, pois ainda é estudado e admirado por muitos, talvez atualmente mais do que nunca, passados mais de duzentos anos. Tal apelo universal se deve, em parte, ao gênero de investigação do ensaio e, é claro, por ele levar o nome desse filósofo maior que foi David Hume. Pode-se classificá-lo ao lado daquelas obras que discutem o que é a beleza (questão essa que aparece desde os tempos mais remotos na filosofia); mais particularmente, o que conta para as belezas das artes mais finas, digamos, para aquelas da literatura. Além disso, esse é um dos textos mais eminentes de uma das discussões mais características do século XVIII britânico, qual seja, como considerar a nossa capacidade de perceber belezas, ou o que é o gosto. O ensaio, portanto, está ligado a tradições bastante fortes entre nós. Agora, certamente a sua pertinência não teria se mantido sem a excelência de sua escrita - e sobretudo isso. Me refiro não apenas às suas qualidades literárias, que bastariam para explicar o interesse que essa obra tem incessantemente despertado ao longo dos anos e em diferentes países; acredito que o ensaio tem uma primorosa estrutura argumentativa, uma que tem produzido uma enorme variedade de leituras, e deixado muitos leitores simplesmente perplexos. O seu argumento é tal que parece incorrer no tratamento de uma série de questões, procedentes de diferentes "lugares", pelo menos é essa a impressão que passa a literatura ao seu respeito. Assim, o desafio que se coloca para qualquer leitor seu seria descobrir quais são as questões mais relevantes e significativas, como elas entram na argumentação, até que ponto elas são desenvolvidas e com qual finalidade; pois não é de se supor que todas elas tenham um igual destaque ao longo do argumento, ainda que talvez se ligassem a algum outro interesse que justificasse que fossem trabalhadas a partir do ensaio. Com essa observação, gostaria de chamar a atenção para o fato de que o ensaio (como qualquer outro texto filosófico) pode e deve ser pensado a partir de várias questões, mas é igualmente importante de se lembrar que algumas dessas devem ser mais representativas de seu argumento do que outras. Ora, a minha intenção é indicar quais seriam elas, e para justificar as minhas escolhas, mostrarei como elas conferem ao ensaio uma estrutura argumentativa, e vice-versa, como uma ou outra maneira de se estruturá-lo permite pensar em umas ou outras questões; isso, é claro, requer que se determine quais seriam as suas partes constitutivas e de como elas poderiam estar relacionadas, assim como um poder reconhecer essas questões, nomeá-las e apresentá-las
Abstract: "Of the standard of taste" is certainly a key text in aesthetics, for it is the object of study and admiration for many, perhaps more nowadays than ever, more than two centuries later. Such an universal appeal is partially due to the genre of inquiry of the essay, and obviously, to the fact that it carries the name of this major philosopher that was David Hume. It can be classified beside those works that discuss what is beauty (a theme that appears in philosophy since its beginnings); more precisely, what counts for the beauty of the finer arts, especially, for those of literature. Besides, it is also one of the most eminent texts of one of the most characteristics debates of the eighteenth century in Great-Britain, to wit, how to consider our capacity to perceive beauties or what is taste. The essay, therefore, is related to very strong traditions among us. Now, it is evident that its pertinence would not have prevailed without the excellence of its writing - and that above all. I mean not only its literary qualities, which explain sufficiently the interest that this work has aroused throughout the years and in different countries; I believe the essay has an excellent argumentative structure, one that has produced a great variety of readings, and has left perplexed a lot of readers. Its argument is such that it seems to incur in dealing with a series of problems, proceeding from different "places", at least this is the impression one gets from the literature concerning it. Thus, the task of every reader should be to ascertain which problems are more relevant and significant, how are they introduced in the argumentation, up to what point are they developed and with what purpose; for it is not to be supposed that all of them should be equally outstanding in the course of the argument, even if they were related to some other interest that should justify dealing with them in the essay. With this observation, I would like to pay attention to the fact that the essay (like any other philosophical text) can and should be thought of by a variety of problems, but it is equally important to remember that some of these must be more representative that others in comprehending its argument. Now, my intention is to point out what those problems should be, and to justify my choices, I will show how do they give an argumentative structure to the essay, and vice-versa, how one or another way of structuring the essay permits us to think of one or other set of problems
Mestrado
Filosofia
Mestre em Filosofia

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CAMPELO, Wendel de Holanda Pereira. „A fundamentação da ciência da natureza humana de David Hume: uma epistemologia experimental“. Universidade Federal do Pará, 2013. http://repositorio.ufpa.br/jspui/handle/2011/5868.

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A ciência da natureza humana é o projeto de Hume que concerne à toda sua filosofia –estética, ética, política, teoria do conhecimento, história, economia, filosofia da religião, etc. – coisa de que jamais poderíamos dar conta, dado a natureza do trabalho de mestrado. Por isso, contentamo-nos em falar apenas da fundamentação da ciência da natureza humana, referente à investigação acerca da origem das ideias e operações do entendimento, ou da investigação sobre as causas e os poderes ocultos do entendimento humano, com base no método experimental. A questão a que o nosso trabalho visa a lançar luz é precisamente esta: o que é uma ciência da natureza humana baseada no método experimental? Essa será, pois, a nossa tarefa adiante. Julgamos que, a partir de uma abordagem holística e científica da mente humana, Hume tenta explicar a natureza dos poderes ou faculdades intelectuais, sobretudo suas limitações e sua fragilidade. Sendo, pois, a base da ciência do homem o método experimental, o qual, por sua vez, tem o seu fundamento sólido na experiência e na observação, então é preciso perguntar: como e em que medida o uso de tal método tornou-se imprescindível à filosofia moral – isto é, às questões filosóficas de modo geral – e que tangem à ciência da natureza humana? Compreender isso é compreender a etapa inicial do projeto filosófico humiano, ou seja, o estudo do entendimento humano que, por sua vez, subdivide-se em dois momentos, a saber: (1) A ciência da mente, pela qual Hume mostra as limitações de nossas faculdades e poderes intelectuais e (2) o ceticismo que é, pois, as consequências desse estudo, a constatação da fragilidade e das limitações do entendimento humano. Nesse sentido, sentimo-nos livres para falar de algumas reflexões tanto do Tratado quanto da primeira Investigação, muitas vezes de maneira indistinta, tentando ressaltar que tais obras, quando comparadas, podem revelar o amadurecimento de um mesmo projeto filosófico que é a ciência da natureza humana. E este é exatamente o fio condutor de nossa pesquisa: como uma ciência da natureza humana é projetada por Hume e em que medida é possível falar do amadurecimento de seus propósitos? Com este exame inicial, poderemos responder alguns problemas acerca da visão pela qual Hume foi falsamente apontado como um cético radical. Apresentaremos por que a crítica sobre a sua “teoria das ideias” elaborada pelos filósofos do senso comum não considera importantes pontos de sua ciência da mente, gerando muitos mal-entendidos na posteridade. Em suma, no Capítulo 1 deste trabalho, examinaremos o que seria o projeto filosófico de Hume e, por meio desse exame, tentaremos apresentar, no Capítulo 2, as bases em que essa ciência da mente construída por Hume está sustentada. No capítulo 3, mostraremos que a interpretação cético-destrutiva da posteridade está equivocada, na medida em que desconsidera os meios que Hume encontrou à sua fundamentação da ciência da natureza humana.
The science of human nature is the Hume’s project concerning to all his philosophy – aesthesis, ethic, politic, theory of knowledge, history, economy, philosophy of religion etc. -; matter that we never could to account, because of the nature of a work of master’s degree. Hence, we just content ourselves to talk about to the foundation of science of human nature, concerning to the research about the origin of ideas and operations of understanding, or about the research regarding the causes and occult powers of human understanding, based on experimental method. The question that ours work seek to explain is closely this: What is a science of human nature based on experimental method? This one will, therefore, ours task from now on. We regard, from a holistic and scientific approach of human mind, Hume tries to explain the nature of powers or intellectual faculties, mainly its boundaries and weakness. Being, hence, the base of the science of man the experimental method that, in turn, has its solid foundation on the experience and observation; we must, then, to ask: how and to what extend the use of a such method became indispensable to the moral philosophy – that is, to the philosophical questions altogether – and that it touch on science of human nature? To know it is to know the initial step of philosophical Humean project, that is, the study of human understanding that, on the other hand, it is subdivided in two moments, viz, (1) the science of man, by which Hume shows the boundaries of ours faculties and intellectual powers and (2) the skepticism that is, then, the outcome this study, the finding of weakness and boundaries of human understand. In this sense, we feel free to talk about some account both of Treatise as first Enquiry, many times indistinctly, trying to emphasize that such works, when compared, can to reveal the maturation of a same philosophical project that is the science of human nature. And this is exactly this tread of ours research: how a science of human nature is projected by Hume and to what extend is possible to talk to maturation of its purposes? With this initial exam, we will be able to answer some problems concerning to the view by which Hume was appointed like radical skeptical. We will show why the critique regarding his “theory of ideas” taken by philosophers of common sense does not regard important points of his science of mind, generating many misunderstanding for posterity.In short, in the Chapter 1 of this work, we will examine what it was the Hume’s philosophical project and, by means of this exam, we will try to show, in the Chapter 2, the bases in which this science of mind constructed by Hume is sustained. In the Chapter 3, we will show that the interpretation skeptical-destructive of the posterity is misguided, in that it disregard the means found by Hume to his foundation of the science of human nature.

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Alves, Marcelo de Sousa Ferreira. „O papel da imaginação no conhecimento humano segundo David Hume“. www.teses.ufc.br, 2015. http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/14485.

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ALVES, Marcelo de Sousa Ferreira. O papel da imaginação no conhecimento humano segundo David Hume. 2015. 74f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2015.
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This dissertation offers an account of the relation of the faculty of imagination whith the formation of belief and with other faculties such as memory and understanding in Hume’s thought. The main focus of the investigation is the work Treatise on Human Nature, nonetheless some considerations will be made about the contribution of the work Investigation on Human Understanding to the topic at stake. This is a work purported to show that the imagination has a fundamental role in the reasoning processes about the work and about the empirical sciences.
Esta dissertação aborda a relação da faculdade da imaginação com a formação de crenças e com as outras faculdades como a memória e a razão no pensamento de David Hume. O foco principal da imaginação é o livro I da obra Tratado da Natureza Humana, entretanto algumas considerações serão feitas acerca da contribuição da obra Investigações sobre o Conhecimento Humano para o assunto aqui abordado. Pretende-se mostrar que, para Hume, a imaginação tem um papel fundamental na formação dos raciocínios sobre o mundo e sobre as ciências empíricas.

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Reis, Nilo Henrique Neves dos. „Hume e Machiavelli: fronteiras e afinidades“. Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, 2010. https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/11838.

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This thesis seeks to identify the presence of Niccolò Machiavelli's thinking within David Hume's writings. Both were theorists of political realism. Since the writings of Machiavelli had been circulating in England during the eighteenth century, it is plausible to consider that the next generation following the Florentine found inspiration in new political constructions arising from their readings of Machiavelli. With regard to Hume, both Humanist and Renaissance concepts served as necessary tools with which to base his critique of the British political system. As a moderate figure in political issues, Hume disagreed with the basic characteristics of the monarchic republican model called mixed in effect in the English nation, which according to Hume, favored recurring crises, oscillating between the two forms monarchy and republic - without focusing on one in particular. This system permitted that private interests enter in juxtaposition to collective ones, through the parliamentarians. Hume works with the interpretations of the authors of his time, and deepens the political issue with his own originality. Similar to the Florentine perspective, Hume suggests the effective monarchy as the way to put an end to the deficiencies of the system. It is necessary, however, to identify certain features (human nature, history, faction, trade), because Hume did not leave these marks in an evident way. Indeed, Hume seems to disguise the conceptual itinerary that associated him to his privileged interlocutor. Nevertheless he was aware that a connection would hinder somehow, a useful reading of his writings, as a result of the prejudice and of the negative criticisms that were attached to the Italian thinker
Procura-se identificar a presença do pensamento de Niccolò Machiavelli nos escritos de David Hume, ambos teóricos do realismo político. Tendo os escritos de Maquiavel circulado na Inglaterra do século XVIII, torna-se plausível afirmar que os pósteros do Florentino tenham se inspirado em novas construções políticas a partir de suas leituras. No caso de Hume, os conceitos dos humanistas e renascentistas serviram como ferramentas necessárias para embasar suas críticas ao sistema político britânico. Como um moderado em assuntos de política, ele estava em desacordo com as características do modelo monárquico republicano, denominado misto, vigente na nação inglesa que, segundo ele, favorece crises recorrentes à medida que oscila entre duas formas, monarquia e república, sem se fixar em uma determinada. Tal sistema permite que os interesses particulares justaponham aos coletivos, através dos parlamentares. Hume parte das interpretações dos autores de sua época e aprofunda com originalidade a política. De modo semelhante ao Florentino, aponta a monarquia efetiva como o caminho para findar as deficiências do sistema. É preciso, contudo, identificar estes traços (natureza humana, história, facção, comércio), pois ele não deixou estas marcas evidentes. Em verdade, Hume parece disfarçar o itinerário conceitual que o associava ao seu interlocutor privilegiado. Tinha, todavia, consciência de que essa ligação dificultaria, de algum modo, a leitura profícua de seus escritos, em virtude do preconceito e da crítica negativa que estava adstrita ao pensador italiano

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