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1
Allwood, Anna-Lucy. „The imagination in Hume and Kant“. Thesis, University of Oxford, 1995. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.320804.
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Brewer, Cameron David. „Kant, Hume, and the Notion of Material Substance“. Thesis, University of Illinois at Chicago, 2013. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3574269.
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3
Roy, Chowdhury Uday Sankar. „The Nature and function of imagination in Hume and Kant“. Thesis, University of North Bengal, 1994. http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/53.
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4
Lima, T?lio Sales Souza. „Os argumentos transcendentais: Kant e o problema de Hume“. Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte, 2010. http://repositorio.ufrn.br:8080/jspui/handle/123456789/16442.
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Previous issue date: 2010-05-11This work whose title is "The transcendental arguments: Kant Andy Hume's problem" has as its main objective to interpret Kant's answer to Hume's problem in the light of the conjunction of the causality and induction themes which is equivalent to skeptical- naturalist reading of the latter. In this sense, this initiative complements the previous treatment seen in our dissertation, where the same issue had been discussed from a merely skeptical reading that Kant got from Hume thought and was only examined causality. Among the specific objectives, we list the following: a) critical philosophy fulfills three basic functions, a founding, one negative and one would argue that the practical use of reason, here named as defensive b) the Kantian solution of Hume's problem in the first critisism would fulfill its founding and negative functions of critique of reason; c) the Kantian treatment of the theme of induction in other criticisms would will fulfill the defense function of critique of reason; d) that the evidence of Kant's answer to Hume's problem are more consistent when will be satisfied these three functions or moments of criticism. The basic structure of the work consists of three parts: the first the genesis of Hume's problem - our intention is to reconstruct Hume's problem, analyzing it from the perspective of two definitions of cause, where the dilution of the first definition in the second match the reduction of psychological knowledge to the probability of following the called naturalization of causal relations; whereas in the second - Legality and Causality - it is stated that when considering Hume in the skeptic-naturalist option, Kant is not entitled to respond by transcendental argument A?B; A?B from the second Analogy, evidence that is rooted in the position of contemporary thinkers, such as Strawson and Allison; in third part - Purpose and Induction - admits that Kant responds to Hume on the level of regulative reason use, although the development of this test exceeds the limits of the founding function of criticism. And this is articulated in both the Introduction and Concluding Remarks by meeting the defensive [and negative] function of criticism. In this context, based on the use of so-called transcendental arguments that project throughout the critical trilogy, we provide solution to a recurring issue that recurs at several points in our submission and concerning to the "existence and / or the necessity of empirical causal laws. In this light, our thesis is that transcendental arguments are only an apodictic solution to the Hume s skeptical-naturalist problem when is at stake a practical project in which the interest of reason is ensured, as will, in short, proved in our final considerations
O presente trabalho - Os argumentos transcendentais: Kant e o problema de Hume -, tem como seu objetivo geral interpretar a resposta de Kant ao problema de Hume ? luz da conjun??o das tem?ticas de causalidade e indu??o o que equivale a uma leitura c?tico-naturalista deste. Neste sentido, tal iniciativa complementa o tratamento anterior visto em nossa disserta??o de mestrado, onde a mesma tem?tica fora examinada a partir de uma leitura meramente c?tica que Kant fez do pensamento humeano e onde foi analisada apenas a causalidade. Dentre os objetivos espec?ficos, listamos os seguintes: a) a filosofia cr?tica cumpre tr?s fun??es b?sicas, uma fundante, uma negativa e uma que defenderia o uso pr?tico da raz?o, aqui nomeada de defensiva; b) a solu??o kantiana do problema de Hume na primeira cr?tica cumpriria as fun??es fundante e negativa da cr?tica da raz?o; c) o tratamento kantiano da tem?tica da indu??o nas demais cr?ticas cumpriria a fun??o defensiva da cr?tica da raz?o; d) que as provas da resposta de Kant ao problema de Hume s?o mais consistentes quando se consideram cumpridas estas tr?s fun??es ou momentos da cr?tica. A estrutura b?sica do trabalho comporta tr?s partes: na primeira - A g?nese do problema de Hume -, nossa pretens?o ? reconstituir o problema de Hume, analisando-o sob a ?tica das duas defini??es de causa, onde a dilui??o da primeira defini??o na segunda corresponde ? redu??o psicol?gica do conhecimento ? probabilidade, do que se segue a chamada naturaliza??o das rela??es causais; na segunda - Legalidade e Causalidade -, menciona-se que quando se considera Hume na op??o c?tico-naturalista, Kant n?o est? habilitado a lhe responder atrav?s do argumento transcendental A?B; A?B da segunda Analogia, prova que est? embasada na posi??o de pensadores contempor?neos como Strawson e Allison; na terceira parte - Finalidade e Indu??o -, admite-se que Kant responde a Hume no n?vel do uso regulativo da raz?o, embora o desenvolvimento dessa prova exceda os limites da fun??o fundante da cr?tica. E isto fica articulado tanto na Introdu??o quanto nas Considera??es Finais, atrav?s do cumprimento da fun??o defensiva [e negativa] da cr?tica. Neste contexto, com base no recurso aos ditos argumentos transcendentais que se projetam por toda a trilogia cr?tica, procuramos estabelecer solu??o para uma quest?o recorrente que reaparece em v?rias passagens de nossa apresenta??o e que diz respeito a exist?ncia e/ou a necessidade das leis causais emp?ricas . Diante disso, nossa tese ? que os argumentos transcendentais somente constituem uma solu??o apod?tica para o problema c?tico-naturalista de Hume quando est? em pauta um projeto pr?tico em que o interesse da raz?o esteja assegurado, conforme ser?, enfim, provado em nossas Considera??es Finais
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Boqvist, Per. „Estetiska omdömens paradoxala natur : En jämförelse av Hume och Kant“. Thesis, Umeå universitet, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier, 2014. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-101531.
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Tiefenbacher, Alexander. „Vernunft und Gefühl : der Versuch eines versöhnenden Blickes auf die Moralphilosophie von David Hume und Immanuel Kant /“. Würzburg : Ergon-Verl, 2009. http://opac.nebis.ch/cgi-bin/showAbstract.pl?u20=9783899136715.
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Peddicord, Clark. „Die Wunderkritik Immanuel Kants“. [S.l. : s.n.], 2001. http://deposit.ddb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?idn=96192523X.
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Griseri, P. „The master of the passions? : An examination of the role of reason in action“. Thesis, University of Kent, 1988. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.235027.
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Kong, Camillia E. H. „Beyond the sub-Humean model : instrumental reason in Aristotle, Hume and Kant“. Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2010. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2788/.
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The thesis illustrates the importance of philosophical frameworks to our conception of instrumental reason through the comparative exegetical analysis of Aristotle, Hume, and Kant. Interpretations of each thinker reveal the significance of their respective philosophical frameworks in helping them avoid the subjectivist and freestanding connotations of the standard model. Specifically, since Aristotle, Hume, and Kant incorporate a notion of ethical normative objectivity within their frameworks, I show that these three thinkers represent a rich if divergent historical tradition according to which an adequate understanding of the normative significance of instrumental practical reasoning depends on situating it within a broader moral, social, or metaphysical framework. I establish how Aristotle's, Hume's, and Kant's thinking about practical reason is integrated within a more general frame of moral and political theorising that in each case reflects a degree of philosophical unease with the allure of a freestanding conception of instrumental rationality. Thus, a sympathetic examination of these historical thinkers' metaphysical commitments are important to illustrate the need for contemporary philosophers to directly confront, examine and articulate the comparative moral framework situating our current conception of instrumental reason.
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Landy, David Nelson Alan Jean. „The synthesis of concepts inferentialism and semantic theory in Hume, Kant, and Hegel /“. Chapel Hill, N.C. : University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2008. http://dc.lib.unc.edu/u?/etd,1929.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2008.Title from electronic title page (viewed Dec. 11, 2008). "... in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy." Discipline: Philosophy; Department/School: Philosophy.
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Demé, Nelly Renée. „La methode sceptique dans la philosophie de hume“. Nantes, 1988. http://www.theses.fr/1988NANT3005.
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Le terme de scepticisme est depuis l'antiquite employe avec un sens d'opprobre, par les chercheurs en sciences, par tous les hommes dans leur action et leurs jugements de valeur, et par les hommes de foi. Hume en est une grande figure, qu'elle plaise ou non. C'est a l'historien de comprendre, plutot que de juger, sa philosophie. I)- un detour est necessaire par les sceptiques grecs pour saisir comment il se situe par rapport a la diversite des ecoles ou il etudie. Ii)- hume apparemment met l'accent sur l'entreprise experimentale que contient son systeme, plus que sur sa critique de l'enten- dement humain, ou un double mouvement de la reflexion ebauche un renversement copernicien. Mais la question critique et la recherche experimentale sont ordonnees a la question fondamentale : qu'est-ce que l'homme ? iii)- le jugement porte sur hume par kant (eloge de la methode, condamnation du scep- ticisme) permet retrospectivement de saisir le role critique de la methode sceptique dans la connaissance, l'action, la foi. Iv)- des travaux recents en allemagne, qui se poursuivent, apportent une considerable contribution concernant la double decouverte de hume par kant, et une redecouverte de hume pour nousThe word skepticism, since the ancients, has been used with an opprobrious meaning, by the searchers in the sciences, by all men in their actions and value-judgments, and by men of faith. Hume is one of their great figures, whether one likes it or not. It is up to the historian to understand rather than to judge his philosophy. I)- it is essential to look back over the greek skeptics, to see hume's place with regard to the different schools of skeptical thought he studied. Ii)- hume apparently stresses the experimen- tal enterprise which his system contains, more than the critique of human under- standing. In the latter, he sketches in two phases of reflexion a copernican revolution. But the critical question and the experimental enquiry both point to the fundamental question : what is man ? iii)- kant's judgment of hume (praise of the method, blame of scepticism) allows a reading-back so as to grasp the critical part of the skeptical method, in knowledge, in action, and in faith. Iv)- the recent work by german scholars has contributed enormously to a double discovery of hume by kant, and is going to contribute to a rediscovery of hume in modern times
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Meucci, Arthur. „O papel do habitus na teoria do conhecimento: entre Aristóteles, Descartes, Hume, Kant e Bourdieu“. Universidade de São Paulo, 2010. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-21052010-115236/.
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Esta dissertação de mestrado propõe analisar a seguinte questão: saber em que medida o habitus mostra ser um conceito relevante para as principais teorias sobre o conhecimento científico e tentar detectar quais são os fatores prováveis de sua omissão nas pesquisas em filosofia da ciência. No intuito de estudar a concepção de habitus científico e seus desdobramentos na história da filosofia, selecionei cinco pensadores consagrados que tratam do tema: Inicio com Aristóteles e sua teoria da hexis demonstrativa, passo ao estudo da negação do habitus científico na filosofia de Descartes; estudo a seguir, a posição de Hume que atribuía ao hábito à possibilidade de justificação do conhecimento científico; passo então pelas críticas de Kant à teoria humeana do hábito e, por fim, analiso as teorias contemporâneas sobre o conceito de habitus na sociologia da ciência de Pierre Bourdieu.This master dissertation proposes to analyzes the following question: In what measure the concept of habitus is relevant the main theories of scientific knowledge and try to detect which are probable factors involved in its omission from philosophy of science´s researches. In order to study the conception of scientific habitus and its developments in the history of philosophy, I selected five philosophers which treat: I begin with Aristotle and its theorie of demonstrative hexis; I pass to the study of Descartes denial of a scientific habitus; I study Hume position, that attributed to habitus the possibility of justifying scientific knowledge; I pass through Kant´s critiques Hume´s of habit and finally I analyse the contemporary theories about the concept of habitus in Pierre Bourdieu\'s sociology of science.
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Tiefenbacher, Alexander. „Vernunft und Gefühl der Versuch eines versöhnenden Blickes auf die Moralphilosophie von David Hume und Immanuel Kant“. Würzburg Ergon-Verl, 2007. http://d-nb.info/992844169/04.
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Mareschal, de Charentenay Simon. „Origines et développement de la loi de Hume dans la pensée juridique“. Montpellier 1, 2008. http://www.theses.fr/2008MON10031.
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Hipolito, Jeffrey Nevin. „Extremes meet : Coleridge on ethics and poetics /“. Thesis, Connect to this title online; UW restricted, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/9427.
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Goski, Joseph Wyllie. „Kant's School of Morals: The Challenge of Radical Evil and the Need for Moral Education in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone“. Thesis, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/31825.
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My aim in this thesis is to demonstrate that common interpretations of Kant’s theory of respect do not account for the motivation a subject feels to follow the moral law. A large number of interpreters focus on Kant’s early ethical works—such as the Grounding and the Critique of Practical Reason—to justify how the moral law alone motivates a subject to act rightly.
However, by the time he published Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, Kant had discovered the problem of radical evil—the fact that people tend to feel more motivated by the inclinations than by the moral law. Kant’s solution to this challenge comes in the form of moral education: the contingent practices of historical institutions (factors that are extraneous to the moral law) are required to learn respect for the law. By the end of the Religion, it will be asked whether duty for duty’s sake is ever achieved.
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Henning, Wiebke [Verfasser], Birgit [Gutachter] Sandkaulen und Helmut [Gutachter] Pulte. „Kausalität und Naturgesetze bei Hume und Kant / Wiebke Henning ; Gutachter: Birgit Sandkaulen, Helmut Pulte ; Fakultät für Philosophie und Erziehungswissenschaft“. Bochum : Ruhr-Universität Bochum, 2019. http://d-nb.info/1193252504/34.
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Espinosa, Sarmiento Ruth. „Tiempo y causalidad: la importancia del tiempo en la formulación del problema de la causalidad en Hume y Kant“. Tesis, Universidad de Chile, 2005. http://www.repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/110225.
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El problema de la causalidad es, probablemente, una cuestión atingente a casi todas las áreas del saber humano. En el reconocimiento de determinadas relaciones causales se funda en gran medida toda nuestra vida cotidiana, nuestra subsistencia como especie y por supuesto nuestras ciencias.
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Giordanetti, P. E. „La "Critica del giudizio estetico" nei suoi rapporti con Hume e Burke. Ricerche su alcune fonti della terza "Critica di Kant"“. Doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Milano, 1996. http://hdl.handle.net/2434/453015.
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McGinness, John Neil. „On the function of ground in Deleuze's philosophy, or, An introduction to pathogenesis“. Thesis, University of Dundee, 2013. https://discovery.dundee.ac.uk/en/studentTheses/7f7e1c86-712a-4621-9adf-85f45813f6e7.
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This thesis introduces pathogenesis as methodology for a vitalist metaphysics, where life is understood as emerging and developing through functioning and grounding. This methodology is defined in an analysis of the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, whose work is used as central resource alongside the work of historical figures – Plato, Hume, Kant, Bergson and Nietzsche – and contemporary writings on Deleuze as secondary resources. The analysis proceeds by problematising the related concepts of function and ground in relation to Deleuze’s vitalist philosophy and in relation to the supplementary material indicated.
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Reitsma, Regan Lance. „Personal ideals and rationally impotent desires“. Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University, 2007. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1190123916.
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Coelho, Bruna Martins. „O campo e os princípios de repetição: ensaio sobre o inconsciente segundo Gilles Deleuze (1953-1968)“. Universidade de São Paulo, 2014. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-26052014-122902/.
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Esta dissertação apresenta a inerência do problema do inconsciente à trajetória intelectual de Gilles Deleuze. Tendo como horizonte Diferença e Repetição, que responderia, entre outros, à tentativa de construir uma noção de inconsciente como um campo imanente correlata à crítica da imagem tradicional do pensamento, mostramos como este projeto já estava em germe em seus estudos monográficos sobre Hume, Bergson, Nietzsche, Proust e Sacher-Masoch. Junto à problematização do inconsciente como um campo ou um plano assubjetivo, Deleuze pensa os processos sintéticos de constituição do sujeito no tempo ou as individuações impessoais a partir da repetição, conceito ontológico maior, através de sínteses operadas pelo hábito, pela memória, pelo eterno retorno e pelo instinto de morte. Primeiramente apresentadas nas monografias de Deleuze, Diferença e Repetição reapresenta estas sínteses do tempo ou do inconsciente, refundando a estética transcendental. Recolocar o problema do inconsciente fornecendo-lhe um estatuto ontológico positivo depende de sua interlocução com as psicanálises freudiana e lacaniana e com as ontologias do negativo das quais eram tributárias.The following dissertation introduces the \"unconscious\" as an intrinsical matter of Gilles Deleuze\'s intellectual path. Having as a horizon \"Difference and Repetition\", which would answer, among others, the attempt of constructing a notion of the \"unconscious\" as an \"immanent field\", simultaneously with the critic of the traditional image of thought, it is shown how this project was already being developt on his monographic studies about Hume, Bergson, Nietzsche, Proust and Sacher-Masoch. Together with the \"unconscious\" issue as a field, Deleuze thinks both the temporal and the constitutional of the subject, or of the unpersonal individualizations, processes from the repetition, major ontological concept, through the description of syntheses operated by habit, memory, the eternal return and by the death instinct. Firstly introduced on Deleuze\'s monographys, \"Diference and Repetition\" reintroduces these synthesis as of the \"time\" or of the \"unconscious\", refunding a transcendental esthetics. Replace the \"unconscious\" problem giving it a positive ontological status, depends on it\'s dialogue with Freud\'s and Lacan\'s psychoanalysis and with the ontologies of the negative, which they were tributed to.
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Alexander, Sarah Ann. „Resting in the Court of Reason: Kant's Resolution to the Antinomy of Pure Reason“. unrestricted, 2007. http://etd.gsu.edu/theses/available/etd-08032007-105300/.
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Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2007.Title from file title screen. Melissa M. Merritt, committee chair; Jessica Berry, Sebastian Rand, committee members. Electronic text (81 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed Nov. 9, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (p. 79-81).
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Weis, Kristin K. „Art as Negation: A Defense of Conceptual Art as Art“. Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2016. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1461602608.
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Jesus, Paulo Renato Cardoso de. „Poétique de l'ipse : temps, affection et synthèse dans l'unité du Je théorique kantien“. Paris, EHESS, 2006. http://www.theses.fr/2006EHES0096.
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Le « Je théorique » kantien constitue une unité sémantique unifiante qui se produit de façon epigénétique. Ainsi cette fonction cognitive spontanée - poïétique - s'avère-t-elle à la fois irréductible à une simple « forme logique » et non-assimilable à une « entité substantielle ». Le « Je pense », l'aperception transcendantale, est un pouvoir-force morphogénétique qui se déploie sur le mode d'un processus continu de synthèse virtuellement infini dont la visée est la production d'un système organique de connaissance. Sa modalité logique est la nécessité et sa manière d'agir est méta-phénoménologique ; « devoir pouvoir accompagner toutes mes représentations », signifie « instituer la forme-acte de toute représentation », à savoir son appartenance à un seul et même moi. En pensant Kant avec Hume, Leibniz et Fichte, cette étude tente d'élucider l'instabilité inévitable du passage critique à un Cogito postmétaphysiqueThe Kantian "theoretical I" constitutes a unifying semantic unity wich produces itself epigenetically. Thus, this spontaneous - poetic - cognitive function appears to be both irreducible to a mere "logical form" and non-identifiable with a "substantial entity". The "I think", transcendental apperception, is a morphogenetic power-force wich unfolds as a continuous - virtually infinite - process of synthesis whose aim is the production of an organic system of knowledge. Its logical modality is necessity and its manner of acting is metaphenomenological ; "to must be capable of accompanying all my representations" means "to institute the act-form of all representation as such", namely their belonging to one and the same self. By questioning Kant with Hume, Leibniz and Fichte, this research attempts to elucidate the inevitable instability of the critical transition to a postmetaphysical Cogito
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Schmidt, Johannes, und Michael Rosenthal. „Im Spiegel“. Saechsische Landesbibliothek- Staats- und Universitaetsbibliothek Dresden, 2013. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:14-qucosa-125430.
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Es gibt Situationen, in denen das Leben seine Glaubwürdigkeit verliert. Lukian erfährt dies am eigenen Leib. Er kann nicht glauben, dass sein Großvater gestorben ist. Und dann liegt da auf einmal diese geheimnisvolle Papierrolle unter seinem Bett. Ihr Inhalt stellt all das in Frage, was Lukian bisher selbstverständlich erschien. Was ist der Mensch – nur eine Marionette in einem großen Theaterstück? Die Suche nach Antworten treibt ihn auf eine abenteuerliche Reise zu den Wurzeln unserer Kultur. Er trifft auf die großen Denker der Vergangenheit und diskutiert mit ihnen über die Freiheit des Willens und die Existenz des Ichs. Ein kleiner, unscheinbarer Spiegel begleitet ihn dabei. Zunächst erscheinen in ihm nur rätselhafte Umrisse. Doch nichts bleibt, wie es ist – auf dem Weg zum Ende der Welt.
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Green, Jonathan. „Edmund Burke's German readers at the end of Enlightenment, 1790-1815“. Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2018. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/274121.
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Amidst the upheaval of the French Revolution, the British parliamentarian and political theorist Edmund Burke received a vibrant reception in German-speaking Europe. Anxious to uncover the ideological roots of the anarchy that enveloped France – and worried that their own society might be vulnerable to a similar fate – a series of important German thinkers began studying his Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790). This dissertation brings into focus the diverse interpretations of Burke that were assembled in this turbulent era, and explains them vis-à-vis contemporary debates among German idealists (Kant and his heirs) about the philosophical nature of freedom. This dissertation centers on Burke’s three most perceptive and influential students: the civil servant and philosopher August Wilhelm Rehberg; the journalist, translator, and diplomat Friedrich Gentz; and the political economist and cultural critic Adam Müller. For many decades, both German- and English-speaking intellectual historians have shoehorned these thinkers into a rigid ideological box labeled ‘conservatism’. Inspired by Burke, they are said to have turned away from the ideals of Enlightenment, theorizing an illiberal form of politics that was traditionalistic, authoritarian, and reactionary. A careful, contextualized reconstruction of their engagements with Burke, however, renders this thesis untenable. Far from triggering a monolithic backlash against Enlightenment, Burke in fact inspired a series of divergent, and often incompatible, analyses of the Revolution’s origins, grounded in different readings of his Reflections. Rehberg, for instance, saw Burke as a principled skeptic: he admired the Reflections as an incisive critique of the revolutionaries’ philosophical dogmatism. Gentz, an erstwhile student of Kant, disagreed completely, arguing that Burke’s politics were entirely compatible with Kantian metaphysics. In his view, the Reflections’ central insight was that it takes political prudence to realize the rights of man in practice. Müller, finally, read the Reflections as a lament for the fall of Christendom, and as a diagnosis of the social alienation and moral confusion that had followed its demise. In other words, whereas Rehberg was a Humean skeptic and Gentz was a Kantian liberal, Müller was a Trinitarian Christian. Each of these men, moreover, claimed Burke as an ally. What this means is that Rehberg, Gentz, and Müller cannot have jointly invented a single thing called ‘conservatism’, and Burke cannot have inspired it. This becomes clear only after we recognize that at the turn of the nineteenth century, neither the meaning of Enlightenment nor the crux of Burke’s Reflections was clear: these were not fixed variables, but points of contemporary debate. By recapturing the diversity of Burke’s German reception, this thesis invites scholars to consider the ways that his students shepherded their differing visions of Enlightenment through the fires of the Revolution, down into the nineteenth century.
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Darantière, Louis. „Du rôle de la théorie des idées dans la formation du criticisme kantien : essai sur l'esthétique transcendantale et sa gestation précritique, comparée à la méthode métaphysique de Descartes et Berkeley“. Paris 1, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011PA010527.
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Les idées, dans les théories de la connaissance de Descartes à Hume, sont des normes intuitives pour interpréter la nature. Quelle cosmologie en résulte? Un matérialisme (l'analyse de Berkeley le montre), débouchant chez Locke puis Hume sur l' agnosticisme, et une théorie de l'entendement qui est le modèle de l'idéalisme kantien. Mais Kant a rejoint la théorie des idées indépendamment, par le problème métaphysique de l'espace, qu'il déclare idéal en 1770, pour corriger sa théorie de l'espace absolu de 1768. De ce point, on peut tenter de suivre la construction de l'idéalisme transcendantal, et comprendre sa convergence avec la métaphysique cartésienne et l'empirisme de Locke.
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Saunders, Josiah Paul. „Kant's Departure from Hume's Moral Naturalism“. Thesis, University of Canterbury. Philosophy and Religious Studies, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10092/992.
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This thesis considers Kant's departure from moral naturalism. In doing so, it explores the relationship between ethics, naturalism, normativity and freedom. Throughout this exploration, I build the case that Kant's ethics of autonomy allows us to make better sense of ethics than Hume's moral naturalism. Hume believes that morality is ultimately grounded in human nature. Kant finds this understanding of ethics limiting. He insists that we are free - we can critically reflect upon our nature and (to an extent) alter it accordingly. This freedom, I contend, renders the moral naturalist's appeal to nature lacking. Of course, a Kantian conception of freedom - some form of independence from the causal order - is fairly unpopular in contemporary circles. In particular, a commitment to naturalism casts doubt on such a notion of freedom. I argue with Kant that such a conception of freedom is essential to the conception of ourselves as rational agents. The critical turn, unlike naturalism, warrants this conception of freedom, accommodating the point of view of our rational agency. It thus allows Kant's ethics of autonomy to better grasp certain key elements of morality - normativity and our agency - than Hume's moral naturalism.
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Ho, Wai Chung. „Cong "Zuo zhuan" dao "Shi ji" : kan xian Qin zhi Qin Han jian "tian ren guan" liu bian zhi yi li /“. View abstract or full-text, 2004. http://library.ust.hk/cgi/db/thesis.pl?HUMA%202004%20HOW.
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Li, Xiujuan. „Cong zhong gu ru sheng zi zai Henan fang yan zhong de du yin kan "Zhong yuan yin yun" de yu yin ji chu /“. View abstract or full-text, 2006. http://library.ust.hk/cgi/db/thesis.pl?HUMA%202006%20LI.
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Wong, Man-kin. „Cong duo yuan zhu yi de guan dian kan ying de de yi yi : dui Wo'erze (Michael Walzer) zheng yi li lun de chan shi /“. View abstract or full-text, 2003. http://library.ust.hk/cgi/db/thesis.pl?HUMA%202003%20WONGM.
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Thesis (M.Phil.)--Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 2003.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 119-123). Also available in electronic version. Access restricted to campus users.
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Chan, Edmund Sze Shing. „Cong "Di jian tu shuo" kan Zhang Juzheng xin mu zhong li xiang jun wang de xing xiang, jian lun ta de di shi jue se /“. View abstract or full-text, 2008. http://library.ust.hk/cgi/db/thesis.pl?HUMA%202008%20CHAN.
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Lau, Lawrence Yue Kwong. „Da sheng fo xue "you an" guan de li lun chong jian : cong "wei shi suo xian" kan wang xin xi you xiang wei shi xue dui "wu ming" de li jie /“. View abstract or full-text, 2005. http://library.ust.hk/cgi/db/thesis.pl?HUMA%202005%20LAU.
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Schafschetzy, Steiner Miguel. „Ética, sufrimiento y procreación. Posibilidad de una ética naturalista del deber“. Doctoral thesis, Universitat de Barcelona, 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/2036.
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Los conceptos principales manejados en la historia del pensamiento ético, así como en las discusiones comunes, son inexplicables si no se relacionan con la experiencia del sufrimiento. Concretamente, el concepto del deber puede explicarse como asunción racional de la naturaleza coactiva del sufrimiento. Esta perspectiva permite el desarrollo de una teoría cuyo carácter deontológico se vincula a una imperatividad natural. Igualmente permite la tematización ética -largamente postergada- de la procreación, factor elemental para una mayor o menor presencia del sufrimiento en el mundo. La decisión de tener hijos es éticamente discutible.La certeza hedonista del carácter decisivo de la diferencia entre el bienestar y el malestar de las personas se puede salvar también para una ética deontológica. Si bien todo potencial moral se deriva de las posibilidades del uso de la razón para determinar nuestra conducta de modo alternativo a las inclinaciones, el origen de toda valoración moral es el sufrimiento como mal radical. Kant, al rechazar esta base empírica e identificar no sólo al agente moral sino también al objeto de la atención moral con el ser racional, se ve obligado a sustituir la imperatividad natural por la coherencia lógico-performativa, con resultados en la práctica pobres y cuestionables, que en todo caso no caracterizan la acción moral hasta donde parece posible y necesario. La razón proporciona la posibilidad de la conducta ética; su necesidad, sin embargo, es extrarracional y reside en la sensibilidad, en la capacidad de sentir.
De la teoría ética no es posible deducir la acción práctica. Sí puede evidenciar un criterio para distinguir entre lo bueno y lo malo que junto a una interpretación realista de las circunstancias y el sopesamiento de los efectos de nuestras acciones puede ayudar a guiar nuestras acciones de acuerdo con nuestras pretensiones morales. La necesidad de reducir, evitar y prevenir el sufrimiento, que resulta del criterio defendido en el trabajo, también nos hace adoptar medidas que lo implican en mayor o menor grado. La justificación de estas medidas sólo puede residir en su concepción como mal menor, ya que se trata de medios en sí mismos malos. Los sacrificios voluntarios o los castigos son, si son justificables, males menores.
A menudo mantenemos actitudes positivas incluso ante nuestro propio sufrimiento. Esta actitud probablemente constituye una respuesta adecuada a nuestros problemas. Una disposición psicológica positiva es más llevable y puede frenar reacciones precipitadas Pero esta actitud útil se transformaría en una falacia si se formulara en el nivel teórico como bondad del sufrimiento, porque su función también consiste en paliar problemas y no en decir que éstos son buenos como tales. Siempre nos encontramos con la lucha contra el sufrimiento y la imposibilidad teórica de rehabilitarlo. Opiniones como que el sufrimiento sirve para madurar, o que la vida sería aburrida sin él sólo tienen sentido si hay alguna necesidad de madurar o si el aburrimiento es más molesto que el remedio.
La discusión en tomo a la capacidad del ser humano de controlar su descendencia evidenciará su relevancia ética. Es evidente que hay una relación proporcional entre el número de víctimas de todo tipo de problemas (entre ellos la muerte segura, normalmente traumática) y el número de seres humanos existentes. Sin embargo, nada se ha avanzado en el tratamiento teórico de este aspecto desde que Malthus descubriera la relación entre el crecimiento poblacional y la miseria. La capacidad de renunciar a tener hijos, abre la posibilidad de una incidencia cuantitativa que, sin colisionar con otras acciones a favor de un futuro globalmente mejor, puede reducir la presencia en el mundo de la tortura y toda clase de atroces sufrimientos.
Cuestionar el propio escenario de las respuestas éticas necesarias, la vida, no significa abandonar éstas, sino ser coherente con las mismas. La razón por la cual se defienden unas u otras fórmulas para mejorar el mundo es la misma que preside nuestra propuesta adicional. La consigna podría ser: pan para hoy sin hambre para mañana. Y de la misma manera que el objetivo último no es que haya pan sino que no haya hambre, se debe entender que los objetivos últimos en general no están en las propuestas progresistas sino en la ausencia de los problemas que las motivan.
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Keddy, Jared. „Reason, Reasons, and Reasoning“. 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10222/13064.
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Proceduralists about practical rationality and reasons for action argue that practical rationality is only capable of criticizing our reasons for action when, through deliberation, they are reachable through our current beliefs and desires. Using this model of practical rationality, proceduralists also typically argue that the only reasons for action we have are instrumentally valuable ones. Substantivists disagree, however, and argue that practical rationality is capable of criticizing our actions despite our desires, preferences and interests. Substantivists argue that although we have instrumental reasons for action, there are also other reasons for action we have, specific non-instrumental ones, which we are required to act for on pain of irrationality. In this thesis I argue that a substantivist model of practical rationality and reasons for action is correct, and that understanding practical rationality and reasons for action in this way has surprising consequences for moral theory.
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Saunders, Joe. „Kant's departure from Hume's moral naturalism : a thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy /“. 2007. http://library.canterbury.ac.nz/etd/adt-NZCU20080114.085033.
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Farzam-Kia, Arash. „Moral Responsibility and Preconditions of Moral Criticism“. Thesis, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/1974/5918.
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Traditionally, the central threat to the defensibility of the range of practices and attitudes constitutive of moral criticism has been seen to be posed by the Causal Thesis, the view that all actions have antecedent causes to which they are linked by causal laws of the kind that govern other events in the universe. In such a world, agents lack the sort of underived origination and agency required for the appropriateness of moral criticism. However, Peter Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” marks a move away from a metaphysical conception of agency and conditions of the appropriateness of moral criticism. On Strawson’s account, the problem of moral responsibility is centrally a normative problem, a problem about the moral norms that govern interpersonal relationships, and the conditions of appropriateness of the range of attitudes and sentiments occasioned by the agents’ fulfillment or non-fulfillment of these norms. In this dissertation I argue that the success of normative conceptions of conditions of appropriateness of moral criticism is contingent of the amelioration of the tension between two strategies in “Freedom and Resentment.” Naturalist interpretations hold that sentiments and practices constitutive of moral criticism are natural features of human psychological constitution, and therefore neither allow nor require justification. Rationalist interpretation, by contrast, are based on an analysis of conditions under which moral criticism can be justifiably modified or suspended. Both of these strategies, I argue, are false. The naturalistic interpretation is false not because of its inability to offer a plausible account of the conditions of justifiability of reactive attitudes, but rather because of its inability to offer a principled account of the way moral norms are grounded. The rationalistic interpretation, in turn, not only relies on an implausible psychological account of conditions of responsible agency, but puts an unacceptable emphasis on the agent’s intention. A plausible interpretation of the normative strategy requires emphasizing not only the significance of attitudes and feelings, but also the role reasons play in constituting moral norms and justifying moral criticismThesis (Ph.D, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2010-07-05 16:42:43.601
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Gauthier, Élaine. „Les fondements naturels du jugement moral : rationalisme et sentimentalisme à l'ère des neurosciences“. Mémoire, 2011. http://www.archipel.uqam.ca/4621/1/M12313.pdf.
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Ce mémoire porte sur les fondements naturels du jugement moral et l'objectif principal de ce travail est de faire ressortir l'importance de revoir nos conceptions philosophiques sur ce sujet. C'est en nous appuyant sur deux principaux modèles philosophiques, le sentimentalisme et le rationalisme, que nous identifions les éléments constitutifs du jugement moral. L'étude de ces modèles se réfère aux travaux de David Hume et Emmanuel Kant et permet de souligner que la définition du rôle des émotions et de la raison dans la formation du jugement moral diffère dans chacune de ces conceptions. Ensuite, c'est en nous appuyant sur le modèle intuitionniste social proposé par Jonathan Haidt que nous étudions l'influence humienne sur la conception contemporaine du jugement moral. La problématique soulevée se trouvant essentiellement dans une dichotomie entre les définitions que proposent les modèles sentimentaliste et rationaliste en ce qui a trait aux rôles respectifs des émotions et de la raison, nous tentons d'éclairer le problème en exposant différentes études neuroscientifiques sur la question afin de reconsidérer les définitions présentées. Pour ce faire, nous nous intéressons à la question morale d'un point de vue phylogénique et ontogénique. D'abord, en étudiant les fondements génétiques, les bases neuronales, les fondements émotionnels et les mécanismes fondamentaux, ensuite en étudiant les déterminants sociaux et culturels. Finalement, nous concluons avec l'idée que les théories philosophiques contemporaines peuvent tirer certains bénéfices en considérant les observations scientifiques récentes au sujet des fondements du jugement moral.
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MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Jugement moral, sentimentalisme, rationalisme, intuitionnisme social, neurosciences.
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Novák, Lukáš. „Role empatie v etickém jednání“. Master's thesis, 2018. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-384334.
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More than two hundred years ago David Hume together with his fellow philosopher Adam Smith posited, that ethical behaviour arises from so called: "moral sense". In the other words, they share the same idea, that passions are principle evoking and guiding human behaviour. Hume claim: "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions" (…). It is possible that this statement - among others - woke up from the 'dogmatic dream' one of the greatest philosophers of all time - Immanuel Kant, who propose, - contrary to Hume - that reason but not necessary passions can determinate human actions. In the question of what rule the passions in ethics have, it seems to be helpful to use the knowledge which follows from recent science. During this thesis we will use methods such as: comparison, analysis and synthesis. Main aim of this thesis will be to deal with the following question: what relationship can be observed between empathy, "moral sense" and ethical behaviour in perspective of recent science. This enquiry will therefore try to deal with the old question: what the the relationship between reason, passions and ethical behaviour is.