Auswahl der wissenschaftlichen Literatur zum Thema „History – naval operations“
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Zeitschriftenartikel zum Thema "History – naval operations"
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Allard, Dean C., und Keith R. Tidman. „The Operations Evaluation Group: A History of Naval Operations Analysis.“ Military Affairs 49, Nr. 3 (Juli 1985): 161. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1987933.
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SCIPANOV, Lucian Valeriu, und Valentin Costinel TOTIR. „The Need to Adapt Naval Tactics to Technological Evolution – Drones and Drone-Carrying Platforms“. Romanian Military Thinking 2023, Nr. 3 (01.09.2023): 36–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.55535/rmt.2023.3.02.
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The creative genius and strategic vision of great commanders, influenced by technological advancements, have led to a continuous adaptation of naval tactics employed in independent or joint military actions throughout history. A significant period of time has passed during which it seemed that nothing had changed in the realm of tactics. The evolution of modern military operations, in the context of hybrid warfare, multidomain operations, and both conventional and special military actions, signals the need to reconsider the ways in which naval forces are involved in combat operations. The historical and evolutionary analysis of naval tactics suggests the necessity of conceptual adaptation to the demands of the operational environment and optimization of operational planning in light of technological developments. In this context, our concern is to identify theoretical approaches to the utilization of modern platforms that respond to the need for projecting new vectors. To achieve it, our focus is directed towards exploring the opportunities for developing drone tactics, particularly in the maritime environment, as well as promoting the concept of drone-carrying platforms.
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SCIPANOV, Lucian Valeriu, und Valentin Costinel TOTIR. „Nevoia de adaptare a tacticilor navale la evoluția tehnologică – drone și platforme port-drone –“. Gândirea Militară Românească 2023, Nr. 3 (01.09.2023): 46–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.55535/gmr.2023.3.02.
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The creative genius and strategic vision of great commanders, influenced by technological advancements, have led to a continuous adaptation of naval tactics employed in independent or joint military actions throughout history. A significant period of time has passed during which it seemed that nothing had changed in the realm of tactics. The evolution of modern military operations, in the context of hybrid warfare, multidomain operations, and both conventional and special military actions, signals the need to reconsider the ways in which naval forces are involved in combat operations. The historical and evolutionary analysis of naval tactics suggests the necessity of conceptual adaptation to the demands of the operational environment and optimization of operational planning in light of technological developments. In this context, our concern is to identify theoretical approaches to the utilization of modern platforms that respond to the need for projecting new vectors. To achieve it, our focus is directed towards exploring the opportunities for developing drone tactics, particularly in the maritime environment, as well as promoting the concept of drone-carrying platforms.
4
Nickerson, William C., Mehdi Amiri und Nagaraja Iyyer. „Building environmental history for Naval aircraft“. Corrosion Reviews 37, Nr. 5 (25.09.2019): 367–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/corrrev-2019-0022.
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AbstractThe operating environment of Navy aircraft varies to a good degree depending upon the squadron location, flight requirements, and other field and ground activities. All these conditions promote corrosion of one type or the other. The aircraft operations will also have influence on the type of corrosion. Thus, building an environment history that can monitor and track the damage development in many areas of the aircraft structure based on aircraft activities, operating environment, and service history data is crucial. The development of such environmental history builder has two main advantages: first, it provides a tool to treat corrosion as a structural issue, and second, it accounts for time variation of environmental factors such as relative humidity (RH) and temperature rather than average environmental data. This paper will demonstrate how the environmental history builder could be used, in conjunction with predictive models, to predict corrosion damage.
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McLaughlin, Rob. „United Nations Mandated Naval Interdiction Operations in the Territorial Sea?“ International and Comparative Law Quarterly 51, Nr. 2 (April 2002): 249–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/iclq/51.2.249.
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The practice of imposing economic sanctions in order to influence the actions of states and other parties—historically with varied levels of actual effectiveness—has a long and chequered history.2 Given, however, that more than 90 per cent of the world's trade is carried by sea,3 it is one particular form of sanction management—the ‘so called economic weapon’ of naval blockade— which tends to dominate the implementation of sanctions regimes.4 Yet despite the frequency with which naval forces are used to implement maritime sanctions—or perhaps because of the long but erratic history of naval embargo and blockade—the regime as a whole remains haunted by some uncertainties as to its conceptual basis. As WL Martin observes, ‘some measures such as “pacific blockade”, have at times acquired a technical meaning’ which has left them ill-equipped to deal with and adjust to new developments in blockade practice.5 Even prior to 1914, the notion of ‘blockade’ was a dualist concept. On one hand, it was clearly a weapon of war.6
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Goldrick, James. „Book Review: Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas“. International Journal of Maritime History 15, Nr. 2 (Dezember 2003): 521–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0843871403015002118.
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Dorwart, Jeffery M., und Mary Klachko. „Admiral William Shepherd Benson: First Chief of Naval Operations“. Journal of American History 75, Nr. 1 (Juni 1988): 291. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1889758.
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Till, Geoffrey, und David Brown. „Naval Operations of the Campaign in Norway, April-June 1940“. Journal of Military History 65, Nr. 2 (April 2001): 535. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2677219.
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Bradford, James C., und Mary Klachko. „Admiral William Shepherd Benson: First Chief of Naval Operations“. American Historical Review 93, Nr. 4 (Oktober 1988): 1126. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1863694.
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Lambert, Andrew. „Writing the Battle: Jutland in Sir Julian Corbett’s Naval Operations“. Mariner's Mirror 103, Nr. 2 (03.04.2017): 175–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00253359.2017.1304700.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleDissertationen zum Thema "History – naval operations"
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Jones, Jerry W. 1964. „U.S. Battleship Operations in World War I, 1917-1918“. Thesis, University of North Texas, 1995. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc278002/.
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This dissertation is an examination of the operations of U.S. battleships in World War I. The study examines tactical cooperation between units of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet and the British Grand Fleet and relations between the two navies; the efficiency of U.S. battleships in terms of both personnel and material; and the strategic ideas of U.S. naval leaders governing the use of capital ships. The manuscript is based primarily on records of the Department of the Navy in the National Archives and Admiralty records at the Public Record Office. Also important are the private papers of principal naval leaders, located at the Library of Congress and the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich, U.K. The published memoirs of several of the participants are also utilized. The first chapter examines Anglo-American naval relations and traces diplomatic events leading to the U.S. Navy Department's decision to dispatch dreadnought battleships to European waters. The following two chapters discuss the amalgamation of Battleship Division Nine into the British Grand Fleet. Chapter IV examines the gunnery efficiency of U.S. battleships serving with the Grand Fleet. Chapter V reviews Anglo-American planning for a possible German battle cruiser raid against the Atlantic convoys. Chapter VI deals with the movement of Battleship Division Six to Berehaven, Ireland. Chapter VII discusses the use of pre-dreadnought battleships as training ships, convoy escorts, and troop transports. The study concludes that U.S. battleships made a subsidiary, but important contribution toward victory at sea. The addition of U.S. battleships allowed the Allies to protect Scandinavian commerce and the supply lines from the United States from German surface raiders while also maintaining superiority in the North Sea.
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Fender, Harrison G. „Admiral Roger Keyes and Naval Operations in the Littoral Zone“. Ohio University / OhioLINK, 2019. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ohiou155597191393568.
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Cho, Duk-Hyun. „Don't give up the ships : United States naval operations during the first year of the Korean War /“. The Ohio State University, 2002. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1486463321624547.
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Macfarlane, J. Allan C. „A naval travesty : the dismissal of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, 1917“. Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/5022.
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This dissertation relates to the dismissal of Admiral Jellicoe, First Sea Lord from November 1916 to December 1917, by Sir Eric Geddes, First Lord of the Admiralty, at the behest of the Prime Minister, David Lloyd George. The dismissal was peremptory and effected without rational explanation, despite Jellicoe having largely fulfilled his primary mission of combating the German U-boat threat to British merchant shipping. The outcome of the war may well have been affected if the level of shipping losses sustained through U-boat attack in April 1917 had continued unabated. The central argument of the dissertation is that the dismissal was unjustified. As an adjunct, it argues that the received view of certain historians that Jellicoe was not successful as First Sea Lord is unwarranted and originates from severe post war critism of Jellicoe by those with a vested interest in justifying the dismissal, notably Lloyd George. Supporting these arguments, the following assertions are made. Firstly, given the legacy Jellicoe inherited when joining the Admiralty, through the strategies adopted, organisational changes made and initiatives undertaken in anti-submarine weapons development, the progress made in countering the U-boat threat was notable. Secondly, the universal criticism directed at the Admiralty over the perceived delay in introducing a general convoy system for merchant shipping is not sustainable having regard to primary source documentation. Thirdly, incidents that occurred during the latter part of 1917, and suggested as being factors which contributed to the dismissal, can be discounted. Fourthly, Lloyd George conspired to involve General Haig, Commander of the British Forces France, and the press baron, Lord Northcliffe, in his efforts to mitigate any potential controversy that might result from Jellicoe's removal from office. Finally, the arguments made by a number of commentators that the Admiralty performed better under Jellicoe's successor, Admiral Wemyss, is misconceived.
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Pattee, Phillip G. „A Great and Urgent Imperial Service: British Strategy for Imperial Defense During the Great War, 1914-1918“. Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2010. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/79576.
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HistoryPh.D.
This dissertation investigates the reasons behind combined military and naval offensive expeditions that Great Britain conducted outside of Europe during the Great War. It argues that they were not unnecessary adjuncts to the war in Europe, but they fulfilled an important strategic purpose by protecting British trade where it was most vulnerable. Trade was not a luxury for the British; it was essential for maintaining the island nation's way of life, a vital interest and a matter of national survival. Great Britain required freedom of the seas in order to maintain its global trade. A general war in Europe threatened Great Britain's economic independence with the potential of losing its continental trading partners. The German High Seas Fleet constituted a serious threat that also placed the British coast at grave risk forcing the Royal Navy to concentrate in home waters. This dissertation argues that the several combined military and naval operations against overseas territories constituted parts of an overarching strategy designed to facilitate the Royal Navy's gaining command of the seas. Using documents from the Cabinet, the Foreign and Colonial Offices, the War Office, and the Admiralty, plus personal correspondence and papers of high-ranking government officials, this dissertation demonstrates that the Offensive Sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defense drafted the campaign plan. Subsequently, the plan received Cabinet approval, and then the Foreign Office, the Admiralty, and the Colonial Office coordinated with allies and colonies to execute the operations necessary to prosecute the campaign. In Mesopotamia, overseas expeditions directed against the Ottoman Empire protected communications with India and British oil concessions in Persia. The combined operations against German territories exterminated the logistics and intelligence hubs that supported Germany's commerce raiders thereby protecting Britain's world-wide trade and its overseas possessions.
Temple University--Theses
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Drolet, Marc 1968. „The North American squadron of the Royal Navy, 1807-1815 /“. Thesis, McGill University, 2002. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=82857.
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This study explores the role of the Royal Navy's North American squadron in protecting Britain's colonies and trade in North America from 1847 to 1815. The squadron had its origins in the war of 1739--48, when it became clear that a fleet based on the eastern Atlantic or the West Indies could not adequately support operations in the North American theatre. The British naval establishment, however, even when North America was the principle theatre of war, never developed as strong an attachment to the North American squadron as it did to its fleets in the West Indies or other theatres. It was, with a few notable exceptions, generally treated as one of the lesser commands of the Royal Navy, and rarely received more than secondary consideration from the Admiralty. This was especially true during the Napoleonic Wars, in which the North American station was viewed a one of the 'quiet' stations, especially when compared to the more active stations in the West Indies.England's main priority was in defeating France, and she was willing to achieve this at the expense of antagonizing the United States, leading to an unnecessary war with them in 1812. Yet even when faced with a new war in North America, the needs of the squadron were considered of secondary importance to the war in Europe, and several months passed before sizable reinforcements were sent to the North American theatre. Even when the war in Europe ended in 1814, the British leaders continued to treat North America as a secondary theatre. Their efforts to gain victory were at best half-hearted, and the government was more interested in demobilizing the navy to cut costs than in defeating the United States.
The War of 1812 brought little glory to England or the Royal Navy, and there was much criticism in the way the conflict was fought after the war. The inability of England's leaders to correctly read the situation in the United States or to understand the American threat led them to send forces inadequate to wage more than a limited war in North America. Despite this, the performance of the North American Squadron in this period was far more commendable than has generally been acknowledged, especially in light of the handicaps set upon it. This work will give a detailed description of the operations of the squadron, to give a better understanding of its role in this period.
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Drolet, Marc. „[The] North American squadron of the Royal Navy, 1807-1815“. Thesis, McGill University, 2003. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=107545.
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Note:This study explores the role of the Royal Na'vy's North American Squadron in protecting Britain' s colonies and trade in North America from 1807 to 1815. The squadron had its origins in the war of 1739-48, when it became clear that a fleet based on the eastem Atlantic or the West Indies could not adequately support operations in the North American theatre. The British naval establishment, however, even when North America was the principle theatre of war, never developed as strong an attachment to the North American Squadron as it did to its fleets in the West Indies or other theatres. It was, with a few notable exceptions, generally treated as one of the lesser commands of the Royal Navy, and rarely received more than secondary consideration from the Admiralty. This was especially true during the Napoleonic Wars, in which the North American station was viewed a one of the 'quiet' stations, especially when compared to the more active stations in the West Indies.
Notre étude trace le role de la marine britannique en Amérique du Nord entre 1807 et 1815. L'origine de la flotte remonte à la guerre de 1739-48, quand c'était devenu évident que les flottes dans le secteur de l'est Atlantique ou dans les Antilles n'étaient pas capables de supporter des opérations en Amérique du Nord. Mais cette flotte était rarement considérée comme une des flottes importantes dans la marine britannique. Ceci était le cas durant la guerre contre Napoléon, quand la flotte américaine protégeait un secteur perçu comme tranquille comparativement à la flotte antillaise, elle plus active.
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Furlet, Brooke (Brooke Gardiner). „The Influence of Naval Strategy on Churchill's Foreign Policy: May - September 1940“. Thesis, University of North Texas, 1993. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc501254/.
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This study examines Churchill's struggle during the summer of 1940 to preserve Britain's naval superiority worldwide, through the neutralization of the French fleet and by securing the active participation of the United States. Sources consulted included autobiographies of the participants, especially those by Churchill, Reynaud, Baudouin, and Weygand, document collections, and British and American official histories. This study is organized to give a chronological analysis of Churchill's efforts from 10 May to 2 September 1940, ending with the United States' acceptance of the destroyers-for-bases agreement. This act committed them to shared strategical responsibilities with Great Britain. The thesis concludes that Churchill's efforts in this period laid the foundation for later Allied victory.
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Baker, William C. „Capital Ships, Commerce, and Coalition: British Strategy in the Mediterranean Theater, 1793“. Thesis, University of North Texas, 2014. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc699881/.
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In 1793, Great Britain embarked on a war against Revolutionary France to reestablish a balance of power in Europe. Traditional assessments among historians consider British war planning at the ministerial level during the First Coalition to be incompetent and haphazard. This work reassesses decision making of the leading strategists in the British Cabinet in the development of a theater in the Mediterranean by examining political, diplomatic, and military influences. William Pitt the Younger and his controlling ministers pursued a conservative strategy in the Mediterranean, reliant on Allies in the region to contain French armies and ideas inside the Alps and the Pyrenees. Dependent on British naval power, the Cabinet sought to weaken the French war effort by targeting trade in the region. Throughout the first half of 1793, the British government remained fixed on this conservative, traditional approach to France. However, with the fall of Toulon in August of 1793, decisions made by Admiral Samuel Hood in command of forces in the Mediterranean radicalized British policy towards the Revolution while undermining the construct of the Coalition. The inconsistencies in strategic thought political decisions created stagnation, wasting the opportunities gained by the Counter-revolutionary movements in southern France. As a result, reinvigorated French forces defeated Allied forces in detail in the fall of 1793.
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Mitchener, Donald Keith. „The American Doctrine for the Use of Naval Gunfire in Support of Amphibious Landings: Myth vs. Reality in the Central Pacific of World War II“. Thesis, University of North Texas, 2006. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc5609/.
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The United States Marine Corps and the United States Navy developed during the interwar period a doctrine that addressed the problems inherent in the substitution of naval gunfire for artillery support in an amphibious assault. The invasion of Betio Islet, Tarawa Atoll, in November of 1943 was the first test of this doctrine. It has been said many times since the war that the doctrine basically passed this test and that lessons learned at Tarawa increased the efficiency with which the Marine Corps and Navy applied the prewar doctrine during the rest of the war. An analysis of the planning and execution of naval bombardments in the Central Pacific Campaign, after the invasion of the Gilberts, does not support this claim. This analysis leads the researcher to three conclusions. First, the Japanese developed defenses against many of the effects of the gunfire support doctrine that blunted much of the force of American firepower. American planners were slow to recognize the implications of these changes and, consequently, were slow to react to them. Second, many naval commanders responsible for providing naval gunfire support for Central Pacific operations still equated tonnage of ordnance to effectiveness of bombardment, regardless of their frequent references to "the lessons of Tarawa." Finally, strategic concerns and outright ignorance played a large part in determining the use of naval gunfire, the first taking precedence over the "lessons" and the second leading to the ignoring of the "lessons" all together.
Bücher zum Thema "History – naval operations"
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O'Rourke, Ronald. Naval issues: Background and operations. Herausgegeben von Eanuzzi Anthony D. Hauppage, N.Y: Nova Science Publisher's, 2011.
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Ireland, Bernard. Jane's naval history of World War II. New York: HarperCollinsPublishers, 1998.
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Almira Heredia, Héctor Mario, 1959-, Hrsg. Girón: La operación naval. La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2011.
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J, Marolda Edward, und Tensor Industries, Hrsg. Operation End Sweep: A history of minesweeping operations in North Vietnam. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, Dept. of the Navy, 1993.
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Hoyt, Edwin Palmer. U-Boats: A pictorial history. London: Stanley Paul, 1987.
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S, Dudley William, Crawford Michael J, Hughes Christine F. 1949- und Naval Historical Center (U.S.), Hrsg. The Naval War of 1812: A documentary history. Washington: Naval Historical Center, Dept. of Navy, 1985.
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Walters, Derek. The history of the British 'U' Class submarine. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Maritime, 2004.
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Tucker, Spencer. The Civil War naval encyclopedia. Santa Barbara, Calif: ABC-CLIO, 2011.
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Allen, Gardner Weld. A naval history of the American Revolution. Cranbury, NJ: Scholar's Bookshelf, 2005.
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Vego, Milan N. Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas. London: Taylor & Francis Inc, 2003.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenBuchteile zum Thema "History – naval operations"
1
Fink, Martin. „A Short History of Maritime Interception Operations“. In Maritime Interception and the Law of Naval Operations, 33–59. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-249-1_3.
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Wilson, Monica, und Leonard Thompson. „Co-Operation and Conflict: The Zulu Kingdom and Natal“. In A History of South Africa to 1870, 334–90. London: Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003310655-8.
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Vitzthum, Virginia J. „11. How It Works“. In Human Evolutionary Demography, 251–90. Cambridge, UK: Open Book Publishers, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/obp.0251.11.
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Tinbergen (1963) proposed that a complete understanding of any behavior requires knowledge of its function, evolutionary history, developmental history, and mechanism of operation. This chapter is largely concerned with gaining some insight into the nature of the biological mechanisms generating variation in human fertility and, consequently, demographic diversity within and across populations. My inquiry is informed by life history theory, an analytical framework within evolutionary theory for studying maturation, reproduction, and aging and the associated behavioral and physiological mechanisms underlying the allocation of resources to these processes. Different allocation patterns are referred to as life history strategies (LHSs) and are subject to natural selection. Biological mechanisms can be usefully conceptualized as a set of suitably timed strategic responses to signals. I discuss this and other ideas about the mechanisms that underlie the implementation of LHSs, and introduce the concepts of “ecomarkers” and “the physiological fallacy.” Drawing on empirical studies and theoretical models, I examine some intriguing features of human reproductive physiology that are directly relevant to demographic research in both low- and high-fertility populations. Several points, some contrary to common assumptions, emerge from this inquiry. For example: (1) The marked within- and between-population variation in many features of female reproductive functioning challenges the widespread assumption that there is a universal “normal” human biology. (2) The most likely outcome of a human conception is early loss. This unseen natural selection in the production of offspring may hamper investigations of hypothesized associations of post-natal reproductive success with resources or with offspring quality, even in low fertility populations. (3) Competition between incompatible but essential functions shape the timing and operation of various mechanisms. Some biological, psychological and behavioral functions cannot readily co-occur. Of necessity, successful LHSs must juggle such incompatibilities regardless of the abundance of energy and other resources, therefore some reproductive mechanisms may not depend upon (or be responsive to) energy availability. (4) Biomedically, the absence of ovulation is typically considered a pathology (and in some cases it may be). But from a life history perspective, each option of ovulating/not ovulating is a fork in the reproductive road at which there is a strategic decision to continue engaging in the possibility of reproduction or to forego the current opportunity. Not ovulating in a given cycle can be the best strategy for optimizing lifetime reproductive success.
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Tuck, Christopher. „Amphibious Operations“. In Naval Policy & History. Routledge, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203002131.ch5.
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Till, Geoffrey. „Quarantine Operations“. In Naval Policy & History. Routledge, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203002131.ch7.
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Chin, Warren. „Operations in a War Zone“. In Naval Policy & History. Routledge, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203002131.ch10.
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Dalton, Jane. „International law and coalition operations“. In Naval Policy & History. Routledge, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203945322.ch2.
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Ferris, John. „SSTR as history“. In Naval Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Operations, 26–41. Routledge, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203887233.ch3.
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Wilson, Evan. „Particular skills: warrant officers in the Royal Navy, 1775–1815“. In A new naval history, 29–46. Manchester University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.7228/manchester/9781526113801.003.0002.
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Historians of the Royal Navy in the age of sail have focused their attention on two groups of men: the commissioned officers and the lower deck. Few have bothered to study the men in the middle: the warrant officers, whose particular skills were necessary on board. Masters, pursers, chaplains, and surgeons—the warrant officers of wardroom rank—straddled the civilian and military worlds. They therefore provide a unique window into both the Royal Navy’s command structure and the continuing significance and evolution of social status boundaries in Georgian Britain. This paper focuses on warrant officers during the half-decade following the battle of Trafalgar, when British manpower resources were stretched thinly and exhausted from more than a decade of operations. Between 1805 and 1808, the Admiralty enacted a series of reforms designed to alleviate some of these problems. To make a career as a warrant officer more attractive, the reforms granted surgeons uniforms, increased surgeons’, pursers’, and masters’ pay, and gave all of them a larger share of the prize money spoils. The reforms acknowledged, both implicitly and explicitly, that warrant officers sat uncomfortably in the naval hierarchy. They were crucial to the Navy’s operations, but they lacked the social prestige and promotion prospects of commissioned officers. The reforms suggest that naval administrators were finally beginning to recognize the significance and social standing of warrant officers.
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Husain, Faisal H. „Shipyards“. In Rivers of the Sultan, 40–58. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197547274.003.0003.
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This chapter provides a history of the Ottoman naval fleet in the Tigris-Euphrates basin, referred to as the Shatt River Fleet in Ottoman bureaucratic parlance. In the sixteenth century, the Ottomans established two shipyards at the two ends of the river basin—Birecik in the north and Basra in the south. Both shipyards became the administrative centers for the Ottoman navy operating on the Tigris and Euphrates. Boats of the Shatt River Fleet were fitted with light cannon pieces and played a combat and support role in Ottoman military operations. They cooperated with land forces based in the fortresses to strengthen the Ottoman presence along the eastern frontier. While the literature on naval warfare in the early modern Military Revolution has largely focused on developments taking place at sea, this chapter shows how the Ottoman Empire adapted the latest naval technologies to a fluvial landscape.
Konferenzberichte zum Thema "History – naval operations"
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Olsen, D. K., P. S. Sarathi, M. L. Hendricks, R. K. Schulte und L. A. Giangiacomo. „Case History of Steam Injection Operations at Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 3, Teapot Dome Field, Wyoming: A Shallow Heterogeneous Light-Oil Reservoir“. In SPE International Thermal Operations Symposium. Society of Petroleum Engineers, 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.2118/25786-ms.
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Parkes, G. J. „No process for initiative“. In International Ship Control Systems Symposium. IMarEST, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.24868/issn.2631-8741.2018.027.
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Throughout naval aviation engineering history, processes have continually developed and improved safety, especially with rapidly evolving complex aircraft systems. With more processes to follow, technicians will become more reliant on those processes. The post Hadden-Cave era has led to increased understanding of accountability, thereby diminishing initiative or the application of engineering principles to solve real life engineering problems. High level policy and accountability rhetoric have cascaded throughout engineering management to engineering technicians, with the warning ‘do not deviate from process’ from fear air safety may be compromised. This, coupled with the perceived threat of consequence to the individual should compliance be ignored, leads to a culture of process rather than a culture of lateral thought around complex engineering issues. Consequently, naval engineers feel unable to innovate or improvise practical solutions to problems despite engineers understanding the need to maintain air safety. As a war-fighting organisation which extends to disaster relief operations or damage control at sea, the supervisor/team leader may find themselves without a process and potentially unable to respond with confidence to the situation at hand. A key attribute of a Petty Officer is initiative; as reliance on process increases and reliance on effective intelligence decreases, are the Royal Navy limiting their future leaders? Attitudes and competence take time to change and develop; there is an increasing risk that the naval engineer of the future fails to think around problems and it is imperative that we encourage and develop initiative in naval aviation engineers.
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Iliev, Andrej, Lazar Gjurov und Zoran Cikarski. „HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP IN WARFARE“. In SECURITY HORIZONS. Faculty of Security- Skopje, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.20544/icp.2.5.21.p19.
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The Industrial Revolution of the 19th century had a profound effect on the way the wars were fought. Historians often refer to the American Civil War (1861-65) as the first genuine modern war. History has shown that the effects of technological advances in industry are processes which follow the revolution in the history of war. Napoleon's military campaigns formed the basis of formal military education and lidership in the Western world. Wars as a social phenomenon were more effective through the use of the first modern railways, roads, and warships, which in most military operations changed the doctrine and tactics of warfare and the deployment of military forces on the battlefield. The first and second generation of modern warfare was dominated by the massive use of military force, and numerous armies. This generation of warfare culminates in the Renaissance with the wars of the french emperor and one of the famoust strategic military leaders in that time, Napoleon Bonaparte. The third generation of warfare was a product of the First World War and was generally developed by the German army and was better known as “Blitzkrieg” or maneuver warfare. The strategic military leader in this generation of warfare was Adolf Hitler. The fourth generation of warfare is an evolved form of rebellion that uses all available networks: political, economic, social, and military, in order to create an imaginary image of the adversary. Also, the fifth generation of warfare is defined as contactless warfare, which states and destroys a specific goal without the physical presence of a human. This generation of warfare begins with long-range artillery and naval firearms and longrange missile systems and has been studied since the US terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Strategic leadership in the fourth and fifth generation of warfare have been most developed by US military strategic leaders especially after the US terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. World-class warriors are strategic leaders which have moved beyond tactical and operational competence in the employment of the future force. They understand and implement a full spectrum of operations at the strategic level to include theater and campaign strategy, joint force, interagency in multinational operations. At the end, the military strategic leaders are using all spectrum of military elements of national political 208 power and technology in the execution of the national security strategy. The aim of this paper is to analyze the historical development of strategic lidership in warfare throughout history, taking into account the comprehensive social changes that have taken place in the world over the last two centuries. Keywords: historical development, strategic lidership, generations of warfare, strategy, tactics
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Wickenheiser, Vincent, und Karl Stambaugh. „Fatigue Life Analysis of the US Coast Guard’s 47 Motor Life Boat“. In SNAME Chesapeake Power Boat Symposium. SNAME, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.5957/cpbs-2016-011.
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The Surface Forces Logistics Center’s Naval Architecture Section was tasked to review the operational history and conditions of the US Coast Guard’s 47 MLBs and determine if they will have sufficient remaining hull structural fatigue life to extend their service life to 50 years as part of a business case analysis. In this process, a fatigue analysis approach was developed to provide guidance to support a feasibility level decision. Fatigue analysis of small craft is not common and the Naval Architecture Section developed a relatively quick and easy method for performing the analysis. The analysis utilized regional wave buoy information, operation profiles, operating hours from Coast Guard databases, ABS and Savitsky methods for predicting pressure and slamming loads, and simple finite element models to predict the structural response. An approach is presented to infer long term loading history using the statistical relationships of the Rayleigh statistics and operational wave conditions. In this analysis, the boats were categorized into three different operating regions, East Coast, West Coast, and Great Lakes based on differences in wave environment and further subdivided based on a number of annual operating hours. Results of the analysis indicate that the 47 MLBs will have a fatigue life of over 25 years from delivery; however, approximately one third of the 47 MLBs will develop fatigue cracks before 50 years of service based on current utilization rates. Recommendations are provided to evenly distributing the hours of operation within districts and by home port rotations between different regions on a 10 to 15 year rotation cycle. If fully implemented by the operators and maintainers, this approach would extend the hull structure service life of all of the 47 MLBs to 50 years without requiring structural modifications.
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Rowley, C., und G. Ford. „Digitally Empowering Naval Fleet Support“. In 14th International Naval Engineering Conference and Exhibition. IMarEST, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.24868/issn.2515-818x.2018.058.
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Throughout history, the Royal Navy (RN) has invested in technical innovation to gain warfare advantage over its opponents. However, innovation often comes with change to the asset design, its operation and through life support. The most obvious example was during the turn of the 20th century when the RN moved from coal to oil powered propulsion systems, resulting in a major change to the skills of the crew and the support chain. The demands placed on the RN have continued to grow during the 21st century, with a fleet of highly complex surface ships and submarines that provide the UK conventional and nuclear strike capability. This paper explains how warfare advantage can be further improved by information exploitation that is targeted at the improvement of fleet availability, capability and safety by empowering the operator and its shore-side support organisation. The projects described in this paper have been developed in collaboration with the RN as part of the Maritime Support Information Exploitation Strategy (known as MarSIX). The paper therefore discusses the information principles used within Babcock’s Support Strategy to deliver Navy Command’s MarSIX vision.
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Schofield, J. S., und D. J. Wright. „Efficient Procurement of Low Vulnerability Warships“. In 14th International Naval Engineering Conference and Exhibition. IMarEST, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.24868/issn.2515-818x.2018.024.
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In recent decades the UK has made significant advances in its approach to, and its results from, the management of naval platform vulnerability. This paper explores the history, guiding principles and assessment techniques of successful vulnerability management. World War II lessons learned are reviewed and shown to be still relevant today. These include structural and systems design features for the management of blast and fragmentation. Requirements must be set which are realistic and contractual. Through the design of several classes of ship using current vulnerability management principles it is now clear what can be achieved. Therefore realistic requirements can be effectively set. Quantitative vulnerability assessment is a key part of the design process, from the earliest concept to build and beyond. It is never too early to consider vulnerability, as the biggest gains can be made for the least cost during the early concept phases. However, early promise can be compromised by careless addition of supporting systems and services, so continuous monitoring is required. In order for vulnerability assessments to keep pace with and guide the direction of the developing design, efficient assessment tools are needed. If the model takes too long to build, the tool offers purely an audit function, rather than being a design aid. Such a tool is also an important input to Operational Analysis of the in-service fleet. As such, very large parameter spaces of results are needed, for the full threat spectrum against the whole fleet in a range of scenarios. SCL has developed the Purple Fire tool to facilitate the sorts of assessment required for modern platform designs, weapon programmes and operational analysis in support of the fleet. It provides the analyst with the ability to construct platform representations very quickly, meaning less model build time and more analysis time. It automates the consideration of large parameter spaces allowing in-depth assessments to be conducted quicker than ever.
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Kovalenko, A. V., F. F. Belyayev, V. V. Lazarev und V. V. Lupandin. „Spa “Mashproekt” Combined Cycle Plants“. In ASME 1994 International Gas Turbine and Aeroengine Congress and Exposition. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1994. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/94-gt-198.
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The paper describes the history of design, development and 15 years’ sea-going experience of the MASHPROEKT combined cycle plants. Four R060 type ships powered by eight combined cycle plants each rated at. 25.000 h.p. and three naval ships with six cruise combined cycle plants each rated at. 10, 000 h.p. are in service now. Using of combined cycle permitted to increase their thermal efficiency by 20–30 per cent. To increase efficiency at a speed of 15…18 knots, a special mode of operation is used: the gas turbine and waste heat boiler operate at one board and steam generated by this waste heat boiler is used for a steam turbine of other board. Total operation life of all marine gas turbine units exceeds 330,000 hours.
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Nichols, Timothy, Glenn Ashe und Dennis Kruse. „The Global Shipbuilding Executive Summit Series: Partnering with the Navy and Coast Guard to Improve Naval Shipbuilding“. In SNAME Maritime Convention. SNAME, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.5957/smc-2014-p29.
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The shipbuilding industry is approaching a historic crossroads. The demand for new and more capable ships is surging while a wave of retirements and operational obsolescence will place enormous challenges on shipbuilders around the world. However, recent performance setbacks in the form of protracted delays in delivery of new ships that were over budget and not compliant with essential requirements clearly confirmed that the industry must do better. At the same time, increased fleet operations are placing significant pressure on fleet maintenance budgets to achieve expected fleet availability metrics within the bounds of available resources. The challenges that these conditions are placing on the shipbuilding industry prompted a group of industry and government leaders in the USA to have the first Global Shipbuilding Executive Summit in 2010 that was jointly sponsored by the American Society of Naval Engineers and Siemens PLM Software. Based on the view that Public Private Partnerships are best suited to deal with such broad systematic issues, a group of like-minded leaders came together to focus on solutions to the top shipbuilding industries challenges. The summit began with introductory comments by prominent shipbuilding leaders from both the USA and Europe. The European perspective was a very important and challenging viewpoint on how leading shipyards are addressing similar challenges and moreover competing in the export market for high performance vessels. Then close to 100 executives spent several hours developing a set of specific recommendations to improve industry performance and productivity.
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Cairns, John A. „DDG51 Class Land Based Engineering Site (LBES): The Vision and the Value“. In ASME Turbo Expo 2012: Turbine Technical Conference and Exposition. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/gt2012-70155.
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The Arleigh Burke guided missile destroyer program (DDG 51) represents the largest ship class in the US Navy. The DDG 51 Land Based Engineering Site (LBES) is a test complex that was built to provide & demonstrate a stable level of operational effectiveness and suitability for mobility and support systems during ship construction and fleet introduction of the class. Integrated systems testing on the LBES proved to be paramount in the success of the overall shipbuilding program as technical risks discovered in Philadelphia were able to be solved with a mix of hardware and computer program changes prior to shipbuilder trials or sailaway. This success in risk/cost avoidance also led to program office investment in LBES upgrades such as Flight IIA DDGs, multi-year option class changes, and DDG midlife/modernization changes that are still proving to carry very high cost avoidance and return on investment. LBES has also afforded several indirect benefits such as navy crew training, the genesis of DDG 51 class distant support, and equipment or system vendor ECP testing. Most recently LBES has been used for the navy’s Great Green Fleet R&D proof of concept testing (e.g. biofuel in 2010 and hybrid electric drive in 2011–12). This article will describe the DDG 51 LBES contribution to one of the most successful ship acquisition programs in U.S. naval history.
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Noble, Peter G. „Lessons to be Learned from the Study of Indigenous Craft“. In SNAME 13th International Conference on Fast Sea Transportation. SNAME, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.5957/fast-2015-054.
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By looking backwards we can often discover solutions that will allow forward progress. We see in the bible the idea that history repeats itself: What has been will be again, what has been done will be done again; there is nothing new under the sun. Ecclesiastes 1:9 But the author subscribes to the idea put forward by the American humorist, Mark Twain: History doesn’t repeat itself, but sometimes it rhymes. The design and construction of water-borne craft using “scientific” methods is a relatively recent development in the context of the whole history of that activity, and is by no means universally applied even today Many traditional craft in current service still rely on the process akin to natural selection, as proposed by Darwin, that is, it is not the strongest, most intelligent nor the fittest that survive but those that best adapt. And the evolutionary process continues today. From Bangkok water taxis with “long-tail” propulsion systems, and from Haitian fishing boats with high performance new sails to whaling umiaks in NW Alaska covered with tensioned membrane skins made from walrus hide and equipped with outboard motors, there can be value in studying the design, construction and operational approaches of these craft. Such consideration can lead to insights for the modern naval architect. A number of well-researched publications (Tapan Adney, 1964) and (Haddon, 1975) give a wealth of information on indigenous craft. Sturgeon Nose Canoe USN ZUMWALT Class Destroyer. Noble Lessons to be learned from the study of indigenous craft 2 Lessons such as optimizing weight/strength ratios, minimizing resistance, utilizing materials in clever ways, developing repairable structures etc., can all be learned from the study of indigenous craft. The sense of continuity with a living past obtained by the study of the work of previous generations of designers and builders, realizing that many current problems were their problems too, is both valuable and satisfying. That said, not all examples given in this paper can be directly linked to designers actively seeking out past developments. Some examples have occurred by coincidence, some by accident and some by unwitting “reinvention of the wheel”. Many “new” ideas, however, have been tried before and it is very often possible to test a new idea against past experience. This paper builds on previous ethno-technical study, (Noble 1994) describing the author’s experience in this field and uses a number of specific examples to illustrate the premise.
Berichte der Organisationen zum Thema "History – naval operations"
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Ryan, Dennis K. Air Force Air Refueling for Naval Operations: History, Practice, and Recommendations. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, August 1990. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada228351.
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