Dissertationen zum Thema „H.Z.A“

Cette thèse porte sur la philosophie pénale de Herbert Hart, c’est-à-dire sur ses réflexions au sujet de la définition de la peine, de la justification de la peine, de la responsabilité pénale et de la détermination de la peine en qualité et en quantité. Nous soutenons que Hart ne défend ni une théorie mixte de la peine, ni une forme d’utilitarisme de la règle, ni une forme d’utilitarisme libéral, ni une approche goal / constraint. Son approche est pluraliste. En effet, son pluralisme des valeurs, très proche de celui d’Isaiah Berlin, lui permet de résoudre la tension entre la justification utilitariste de la peine et certains principes de justice concernant la responsabilité pénale (par exemple, ne pas punir ceux qui n’auraient pas pu agir autrement) et la détermination de la peine (par exemple, ne pas infliger des peines disproportionnées). Par ailleurs, son pluralisme des formes de raison morale lui permet d’admettre une pluralité de justifications de la peine qui ne sont pas du même type (la justification utilitariste, celle fondée sur le droit spécial a l’obéissance des désobéissants, celle fondée sur le droit général a un niveau raisonnable de sécurité) et d’expliquer comment la commission d’une infraction peut en elle-même justifier l’infliction d’une sanction. Tout au long de cette thèse, nous analysons les rapports complexes entre Hart et la tradition utilitariste (en particulier Bentham et Mill). Même si Hart a indéniablement une dette envers l’utilitarisme, il ne cesse de critiquer son monisme et la tentative de fonder l’ensemble de nos convictions morales bien pesées sur le principe d’utilité. En outre, nous essayons de montrer que la philosophie du langage ordinaire a eu une influence non négligeable sur sa philosophie pénale, même si cette influence est moins visible que dans sa théorie générale du droit. Enfin, nous accordons une attention particulière au débat Hart/Wootton dont les enjeux ont été sous-estimés : la question du choix entre un système pénal base sur des peines et un système préventif base sur des mesures, selon nous, reste ouverte. Cette thèse ne vise pas uniquement à corriger les mauvaises interprétations de la philosophie pénale de Hart. Elle cherche également à approfondir les idées qu’il a seulement esquissées, à clarifier les principes qu’il a défendus, à mettre en évidence les points faibles de sa pensée et à mettre de l’ordre dans ses réflexions. En ce sens, elle est autant la lecture d’une œuvre qu’un dialogue avec celle-ci
This dissertation focuses on Herbert Hart’s penal philosophy, i.e. his thoughts on the definition of punishment, justification of punishment, criminal responsibility, and sentencing. We argue that Hart defends neither a mixed theory of punishment, nor a form of rule-utilitarianism, nor a form of liberal utilitarianism, nor a goal/constraint approach. His approach is pluralist. Indeed, his value pluralism, very close to that of Isaiah Berlin, allows him to resolve the tension between the utilitarian justification of punishment and certain principles of justice concerning criminal responsibility (e.g. not punishing those who could not have acted otherwise) and sentencing (e.g. not inflicting disproportionate punishments). In addition, his pluralism about forms of moral reason enables him to admit a plurality of justifications of punishment that are not of the same type (the utilitarian justification, that based on the special right to the obedience of disobedient persons, that based on the general right to a reasonable level of security) and to explain how the commission of an offence may in itself justify the imposition of a sanction. Throughout this dissertation, we analyse the complex relationship between Hart and the utilitarian tradition (particularly Bentham and Mill). Although Hart undeniably owes a debt to utilitarianism, he is a constant critic of its monism and the attempt to base all of our considered moral convictions on the principle of utility. Moreover, we try to show that ordinary language philosophy has had a significant influence on his penal philosophy, even if this influence is less visible than in his jurisprudence. Finally, we pay particular attention to the Hart/Wootton debate, the stakes of which have been underestimated: the question of the choice between a penal system based on punishment and a preventive system based on measures, in our view, remains open. This dissertation is not only intended to correct the misinterpretations of Hart’s penal philosophy. It also seeks to deepen the ideas he only sketched out, to clarify the principles he defended, to highlight the weaknesses in his thinking, to put his thoughts in order. In this sense, it as much the reading of a work as a dialogue with it

Cette thèse cherche à reconstituer les bases philosophiques de la pensée juridique de H.L.A. Hart (1907-1992), figure majeure du positivisme juridique anglo-saxon au XXe siècle, et professeur de jurisprudence à l'université d'Oxford de 1952 à 1968. Ses travaux demeurent largement méconnus en France.Dégager les sources philosophiques du « positivisme analytique » de Hart permettra, premièrement, de reconstruire le dialogue entre le juriste d'Oxford et certaines figures importantes de la théorie du droit continentale. Hart oppose d’importantes critiques à certaines formes continentales de positivisme juridique, comme le normativisme de Hans Kelsen ou le réalisme scandinave d'Alf Ross. Cependant, cette thèse montrera également qu'il est possible d'établir des rapprochements étroits entre la pensée de Hart et celle du juriste francophone Chaïm Perelman. L'étude des bases philosophiques de la pensée juridique de Hart offre ainsi des points de contact intéressants entre ces différentes cultures juridiques.Deuxièmement, cette thèse cherche à faire ressortir l'influence déterminante de la philosophie du langage ordinaire qui se développa à Oxford au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Notre propos s'appuiera notamment sur un « premier corpus » de textes philosophiques publiés avant son accession à la chaire de jurisprudence en 1952, ainsi que sur les travaux préparatoires à son ouvrage The Concept of Law (1961). Nous défendons l'idée que ses prises de position philosophiques se retrouvent dans sa réflexion juridique et permettent de comprendre la cohérence de son œuvre, ainsi que la forme d'empirisme juridique qui sous-tend sa conception de la notion de Constitution
This thesis bears on the implicit epistemology and methodological considerations underlying the legal philosophy of H.L.A. Hart (1907-1992), the major representative of XXth century legal positivism in the English speaking world, and Oxford chair of jurisprudence (1952-1968). His work remains little known in France.We will seek to answer the view that Hart might not really have been durably influenced by ordinary language philosophy. We will address these questions by examining a corpus of earlier (overlooked) articles which he published as a young Oxford linguistic philosopher. This “early work” consists of the articles which Hart published before he in was elected to the Oxford chair of jurisprudence. Our view is that the work in general philosophy which he did in this early period is crucial to understand some of the positions which he defends in his legal writings. This thesis will thus show that Hart was active in the epistemological debate opposing the Oxford philosophers and the British representatives of logical atomism and logical empiricism. It will also show that these early positions are carried over into his later jurisprudence, including his major work The Concept of Law (1961).Shedding light on these philosophical foundations of Hart’s legal theory will ultimately allow us to reconstruct the debate opposing his own “analytical positivism” and Continental forms of positivism, such as Hans Kelsen’s normativism or Alf Ross Scandinavian legal realism. It will also allow us to draw important parallels between Hartian legal theory and that of the francophone philosopher Chaïm Perelman

Thesis (M.S.)--Kutztown University of Pennsylvania, 1988.
Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 45-06, page: 2770. Abstract precedes thesis as [1] preliminary leaf. Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaf 31).

Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina. Centro de Ciencias Juridicas
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O presente trabalho tem por objetivo analisar a teoria jurídica de Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart, a partir de uma (re)leitura da Filosofia da Linguagem Ordinária (especialmente através de Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Lagshaw Austin) e da semiologia (através das categorias de Ferdinand de Saussure). Tal método deriva do fato de Hart realizar uma abordagem do direito a partir de uma perspectiva hermenêutica, privilegiando a função do intérprete (participante) do sistema e destacando o papel exercido pela linguagem na formação dos enunciados jurídicos. Ao mesmo tempo, ao reconhecer uma textura aberta do direito, este autor abre a ciência jurídica à possibilidade de uma abordagem interdisciplinar. Inicialmente realizamos uma leitura da obra de WITT-GENSTEIN, com especial atenção à segunda fase de sua obra, marcada pela publicação do livro Investigações Filosóficas, procurando uma compreensão da linguagem enquanto instrumento de intermediação na relação sujeito-sujeito. Em seguida apresentamos a "teoria dos atos de fala" de J.L. AUSTIN, a qual nos possibilitará responder a questão de como as palavras podem produzir efeitos jurídicos. O capítulo I contém ainda a exposição das principais categorias de SAUSSURE, objetivando explicitar a sua concepção dos signos lingüísticos e do processo de significação. Em seguida, no capítulo II, procuramos explicitar a concepção de Hart acerca do fenômeno da obrigação jurídica, enfocando o caráter hermenêutico da sua teoria jurídica e demonstrando a importância daquilo que este autor denomina o "ponto de vista interno" sobre as normas. O capítulo III destina-se a fornecer uma compreensão da estrutura global do sistema jurídico de HART, entendido como a união de normas primárias e secundárias e destacando o seu funcionamento. Realizamos ainda uma abordagem da textura aberta do direito, procurando enfatizar o caráter incompleto dos enunciados jurídicos e de que forma o direito operacionaliza esta questão. Ao final do trabalho, apresentamos uma síntese crítica do pensamento de Hart, objetivando levantar as questões que permanecem na sua obra e algumas das críticas que lhe são feitas.

This dissertation uses new archival materials to analyze the intellectual journey of H.L.A. Hart and his ideas in the United States, focusing on Hart's year as a visiting professor at Harvard, 1956-57, and its immediate aftermath. The dissertation situates Hart's work in the United States in the historical and intellectual context of the Legal Process School, the jurisprudential movement that dominated legal thought at Harvard during Hart's visit. When Hart arrived at Harvard in 1956, he found himself on a harmonious intellectual trajectory with the process theorists, seeking a middle road between legal formalism and legal realism, despite the deep suspicion with which American legal theorists viewed analytical jurisprudence and legal positivism. Over the course of the year, Hart and the process theorists collaborated and debated constantly - clarifying their methodological disagreements and also their shared jurisprudential mission. In close contact with the process theorists, Hart developed an account of legal decision-making and the relationship between legal indeterminacy and the rule of law that resonated deeply with process theory. He expressed these ideas in a lost essay, Discretion, written shortly after his arrival at Harvard. Discretion spurred a year of fruitful debate in the newly formed Legal Philosophy Discussion Group on topics ranging from the value of Hart's analytical methodology to the core problems of American democracy. Throughout the year, for example, Hart exchanged views with Lon Fuller about the applicability of the fact-value distinction to jurisprudence, constituting a "pre-Hart-Fuller debate Hart-Fuller debate," largely unreconstructed until now, which informs what was really at stake in the published Hart-Fuller exchange. In the spring, Hart delivered his famous Holmes Lecture, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals. Understood in historical context, the lecture represented the culmination of a year of collaboration and debate with the Legal Process School, and Hart's attempt to defend a new, truly liberal formulation of legal positivism that responded specifically to the challenges his methodological outlook had encountered in the United States. Ultimately, however, Hart's ideas were unable to transcend the broiling debate over the role of the judiciary in American democracy in the wake of Brown vs. Board of Education. As progressive politics in the United States came increasingly to depend on an activist judiciary enforcing moral rights, Hart's positivism seemed to resonate more with Learned Hand's criticism of judicial review (which came out the same month as Hart's Holmes Lecture) than with justice-oriented defenses of the Warren Court. Further, Hart's process theoretic account of judicial discretion came to conflict with the Warren Court's activist judicial stance, partly due to the "botched" reception of Herbert Wechsler's 1959 lecture, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, which was heavily influenced by Hart's Discretion essay. But at the deepest level, Hart held a view about liberalism in which open, rational democratic deliberation, not judicial intervention, was the primary force for social change - a view the Process School largely shared, yet a view that was sidelined in the Warren Court era. For largely political reasons, Hart's liberal legal positivism failed to gain traction. In telling this history, this dissertation makes an original contribution to the literature in several ways: by drawing on a wealth of new source material, by situating Hart's year at Harvard in the intellectual context of the Legal Process School, by providing a complete historical analysis of the Legal Philosophy Discussion Group, by analyzing Hart's lost essay Discretion and Fuller's forgotten "Reply to Critics," by reconstructing the interactions between Hart and Fuller before their published exchange, and by interpreting Hart's Holmes Lecture in the context of process theory's decline. Hart's extraordinary year in America and the legacy of analytical legal positivism and the Legal Process School remain topics of great importance to legal philosophy, and my goal is to contribute a new, I hope helpful, historical interpretation to the scholarly conversation.

• OBJETIVO: Evaluar el valor predictivo del índice de Rockall para resangrado y mortalidad en el paciente con episodio de hemorragia digestiva alta de origen no variceal MATERIALES Y METODOS: Se realizó un estudio de tipo Analítico, Longitudinal y Prospectivo. Fueron escogidos 299 pacientes por muestreo estratificado. El método que se realizó para la recolección de datos consistió en Ficha de Recolección de datos a la llegada al servicio de emergencia elaborada por médicos especialistas de Gastroenterología del Hospital María Auxiliadora. RESULTADOS: Se encontró que el Índice de Rockall tiene un valor predictivo a partir del valor 5 para resangrado con una sensibilidad de 83% y una especificidad de 88% con un área debajo de la curva ROC de 0.87; mientras que para mortalidad tiene el mismo valor predictivo, a partir de 5 con una sensibilidad de 90.2% y especificidad de 78%, y un área bajo la curva COR de 0.88 CONCLUSIONES: De acuerdo a los resultados obtenidos podemos concluir que el índice de Rockall es un instrumento confiable con alto valor predictivo para Resangrando y Mortalidad en pacientes con HDA no variceal durante el periodo Julio 2015 y Marzo 2016

Criminology and legal philosophy still have much to gain from the exchange of ideas. However, attention must be paid to how this exchange is being made and what is being transferred. This project attempts to examine a currently unacknowledged exchange between the disciplines; that of an historicist, logos-centric method of knowledge production. Specifically, using a refashioned dialectic method, the debate between H.L.A. Hart and Lon L. Fuller will be compared and contrasted with Robert Agnew’s representation of criminology. This will give some clarity to the different ways by which the disciplines (re)produce knowledge. Importantly, the process of (re)production detailed here is characterized by a (dis)unity between how the disciplines rhetorically justify their methodology and the actual analyses being produced. To give this process colour, it will be examined in relation to criminology’s crisis. Ultimately, the analysis presented here raises doubts about the truthfulness of legal philosophical and criminological knowledge produced in this way.

Scott Shapiro, an exclusive legal positivist, argues that inclusive legal positivism is inconsistent with the view that legal norms must conceptually provide reasons for agents of a legal system to act in specified ways. I defend inclusive legal positivism from Shapiro's charge of inconsistency.

Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2006.
Title from title screen. Andrew Altman, committee chair; Andrew J. Cohen, William Edmundson, committee members. Electronic text (75 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed Apr. 17, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (p. 73-75).

A presente dissertação de mestrado tenta estabelecer como e em qual medida o Conceito de Direito de Herbert Hart é influenciado por teorias da linguagem do século XX. Com este objetivo, são primeiro analisadas as passagens do livro e as considerações do autor que indicam uma influência de teses próprias da filosofia da linguagem em sua obra. Após, são expostas algumas intepretações do tema, tanto no sentido de concordar que existe esta relação entre as teses de Hart e a filosofia da linguagem do século 20, quanto no sentido de negar este vínculo. Especial atenção é atribuída a interpretação de Ronald Dworkin do tema, tendo em vista a sua relevância histórica e o fato do autor reconhecer a vinculação referida e a utilizá-la como base para críticas das teses do Conceito de direito. Estabelecidas estas interpretações divergentes, são então expostas as principais ideias e propostas dos filósofos da linguagem do ambiente acadêmico de Oxford, tendo em vista a relação e proximidade de Hart a estes autores. Expostas estas teses, diferentes pontos da carreira bibliográfica de Hart são analisados, com o objetivo de traçar a relação dos escritos do autor com as teorias recém vistas e de tentar estabelecer a evolução da linha argumentativa que culminou no Conceito de Direito. Uma vez que os argumentos dessa obra forem analisados e um entendimento específico dessas teses for defendido, as críticas de Dworkin e de outros autores são revistas. Este exercício, por fim, mostra como o entendimento defendido neste trabalho serve também como defesa contra algumas caracterizações da obra de Hart que considero equivocadas.
The main goal of this paper is to establish to what extent the work “The Concept of Law” was influenced by philosophical theories of language from the 20th century. First are considered some passages of this work, together with some pronouncements of its author Herbert Hart that appear to confirm that his theses were so influenced. Then are shown some interpretations that recognize the influence between the author and theses from the philosophy of language, together with other interpretations that deny this relationship. Special attention is given to the perception of Ronald Dworkin of the subject given its historical relevance and the fact that it recognize a relationship between these theses and uses it as basis for criticism of the arguments expressed in The Concept of Law. Once these distinctive interpretations are stablished, the main ideas and goals of the Oxford language philosophers, given their relationship and proximity to Hart, are exposed. Once these theses are dealt with, varied moments of the bibliography of Herbert Hart are considered in order to show the connection between his works and the language theses here exposed. After these point are considered and a distinct understanding of the subject is developed the criticism of Dworkin and other authors are retaken. This last point aims to show how the understanding developed in this paper also develops a defense of Hart’s theory from some mischaracterizations of his work.