Zeitschriftenartikel: „Government ownership“

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Makhdalena, Makhdalena. „PENGARUH OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE DAN CORPORATE PERFORMANCE TERHADAP FIRM VALUE“. EKUITAS (Jurnal Ekonomi dan Keuangan) 20, Nr. 3 (04.09.2018): 388–412. http://dx.doi.org/10.24034/j25485024.y2016.v20.i3.71.

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Penelitian mengenai ownership structure (foreign ownership, government ownership dan public ownership), corporate performance dan firm value telah banyak dilakukan oleh peneliti, tetapi hasilnya belum konsisten, yaitu ada yang berpengaruh positif dan ada pula yang berpengaruh negatif. Dengan demikian peneliti tertarik untuk meneliti ulang mengenai ownership structure (foreign ownership, government ownership dan public ownershihp) dan corporate performance serta pengaruhnya terhadap firm value. Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk menguji dan menganalisis pengaruh ownership structure (foreign ownership, government ownership dan public ownershihp) dan corporate performance terhadap firm value. Populasi dari penelitian ini adalah perusahaan yang listing di Bursa Efek Indonesia yang memiliki data yang lengkap tentang foreign ownership, government ownership, public ownership dan corporate performance serta firm value untuk enam tahun berturut-turut (2008-2013). Jenis data dari variabel penelitian ini adalah data sekunder yang diperoleh dengan teknik dokumentasi yang bersumber dari ICMD. Metode analisis data menggunakan regresi. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa foreign ownership, government ownership dan public ownership tidak berpengaruh terhadap firm value dan corporate performance berpengaruh positif terhadap firm value.

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La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes und Andrei Shleifer. „Government Ownership of Banks“. Journal of Finance 57, Nr. 1 (Februar 2002): 265–301. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1540-6261.00422.

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3

Aljaaidi, Khaled Salmen. „The effectiveness of the internal corporate governance mechanism and the ownership of the government and agencies“. Accounting 7, Nr. 7 (2021): 1655–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.5267/j.ac.2021.5.005.

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This paper examines the impact of the government and its agencies’ ownership on the effectiveness of one the main internal governance mechanisms, namely; board of directors, for a sample of 140 energy and petrochemical Saudi listed firms over 2012-2019. The Saudi Arabia provides an interesting context due to the domination of government-linked corporations’ ownership. This setting arranges for the impact of such ownership on the board of directors’ monitoring and advisory roles. The board of directors’ effectiveness is measured as an interaction term of the board size and meetings of the board of directors. The study finds that government-linked energy and petrochemical corporations’ ownerships are inversely related to the board of directors’ effectiveness. This result is sensitive to the measurement of the board of directors’ effectiveness as each variable consisting of the board of directors’ effectiveness was examined individually. The study also finds that government-linked corporations’ ownership had a strong negative impact on the board size. In contrast, the proposed model does not provide any evidence supporting the relationship of the government-linked corporations’ ownerships with board meetings. Overall, the evidence supports the substitution hypothesis on the relationship of government-linked corporations and board of directors’ effectiveness.

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Borisova, Ginka, Jesus M. Salas und Andrey Zagorchev. „CEO compensation and government ownership“. Corporate Governance: An International Review 27, Nr. 2 (12.12.2018): 120–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/corg.12265.

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5

Boardman, Anthony, Ruth Freedman und Catherine Eckel. „The price of government ownership“. Journal of Public Economics 31, Nr. 3 (Dezember 1986): 269–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(86)90061-7.

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6

Hariyanto, Hariyanto, Mabarroh Azizah und Nurhidayatuloh Nurhidayatuloh. „Does the Government’s Regulations in Land Ownership Empower the Protection of Human Rights?“ Journal of Human Rights, Culture and Legal System 4, Nr. 2 (28.05.2024): 391–421. http://dx.doi.org/10.53955/jhcls.v4i2.222.

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Protection of land ownership has been regulated in various policies to protect human rights. However, it is essential to comprehensively examine the government's role in protecting land ownership because there are still various land conflicts. This research analyzes the government's role in protecting land ownership based on human rights principles and compares it with the Netherlands. This research uses a normative legal approach, using laws and cases and comparing policies with the policies of other countries. The research results show first, the Indonesian government guarantees the protection of land ownership through basic regulations on agrarian principles and the Indonesian government is trying to protect land ownership by registering land, limiting foreign land ownership, and developing governance plans at the regional level. Second, the Dutch government protects land ownership through a systematic, transparent land registration system implemented effectively to provide legal certainty for owners, investors, and related parties. Thirdly, Indonesia's regulatory approach adheres to the basic regulations on agrarian principles system, and the Netherlands uses civil law. However, both countries experience the same problems, such as land ownership disputes and scarcity. Therefore, the government needs to implement human rights-based policies through a transparent and fast land ownership process and public consultation in resolving land disputes.

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Tang, Tanya, Phyllis Lai Lan Mo und K. Hung Chan. „Tax Collector or Tax Avoider? An Investigation of Intergovernmental Agency Conflicts“. Accounting Review 92, Nr. 2 (01.07.2016): 247–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-51526.

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ABSTRACT Local governments play dual, but conflicting, roles in China's tax system. That is, they are both tax collectors and controlling shareholders of firms subject to tax payments. We investigate how local governments balance their tax collection and tax avoidance incentives. We find that the conflicts between central and local governments arising from the 2002 tax sharing reform have led to more tax avoidance by local government-controlled firms, particularly when the local government's ownership percentage of the firms is higher than the tax sharing ratio. We also find evidence that the overall level of tax avoidance by local government-controlled firms in a region is positively associated with local fiscal deficits. As a high level of government ownership of corporations and intergovernmental tax sharing are common phenomena in many transitional economies, this study offers valuable insights into how the dual roles played by local governments affect tax policy enforcement in these economies. JEL Classifications: H26; H71; M40; G38.

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Odhiambo, Fredrick Onyango, und Nixon Oduor Omindi. „Government Ownership and Value of Listed Firms in Kenya: A Panel Data Evidence“. American Journal of Trade and Policy 2, Nr. 2 (31.08.2015): 45–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.18034/ajtp.v2i2.382.

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This study examines the relationship between government ownership and performance of listed firms on the Nairobi Securities Exchange. The quadratic term of government ownership is included in the model to test for the effect of increasing government ownership levels on performance. We use panel data techniques on 102 firm-year observations between 2003 and 2013 for all the listed firms in which the government directly owns some shares. We find no relationship between government ownership and performance at lower levels of government ownership. We find a negative relationship between government ownership and performance at higher levels of government ownership. We estimate, through differentiation of the Tobin’s Q model, that government ownership has a negative effect on performance when government ownership exceeds 41%. The study concludes that lower government ownership levels do not affect firm performance but as the ownership rises, government ownership has a detrimental effect on firm performance. We provide implications of these results for policy and practice. JEL Classifications Code: G34

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MUSALLAM, SAMI RM, und Coral Choo Pei Lin. „AN OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES AND DIVIDEND POLICY: EVIDENCE FROM LISTED PLANTATION COMPANIES IN MALAYSIA“. Management and Accounting Review (MAR) 18, Nr. 2 (31.08.2019): 21. http://dx.doi.org/10.24191/mar.v18i2.706.

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This research analyzes the relationship of ownership structures with dividend policy using a sample of 43 plantation companies listed on Bursa Malaysia from 2013 to 2015. The results of Ordinary Least Square (OLS) find that foreign ownership has a positive and significant influence on dividend policy while state ownership has a negative and significant influence on dividend policy. Furthermore, it also finds that Government Linked Investment Companies (GLICs) ownership has insignificant influence on dividend policy. This study provides evidence to policymakers of government through their GLICs and state in selecting and deciding their dividend policies. Furthermore, it also provides evidence to shareholders and managers that companies with foreign ownership pay higher dividends while companies with state ownership pay lower dividends. This study is the first study that contributes to the finance and corporate governance literature at examining the relationship between GLICs as whole and foreign ownerships with dividend policy in Malaysia.

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Alroqy, Faisal Ayid, und Khaled Salmen Aljaaid. „Family, Governmental, Domestic Corporations and Board of Directors and Audit Committee Effectiveness in GCC**“. Journal of Corporate Governance, Insurance, and Risk Management 3, Nr. 3 (30.12.2016): 89–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.56578/jcgirm030307.

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This study aims at investigating the association between ownership structure (government ownership, family ownership and domestic corporate ownership) and the interaction of board of directors effectiveness and audit committee effectiveness by GCC listed companies. The study utilizes a cross-sectional analysis of 492 firm-year observations during the 2006- 2010 period. A pooled OLS regression analysis is used to estimate the associations proposed in the hypotheses. The study finds that government and domestic corporate ownerships are positively related to the effectiveness of board of directors and audit committee. However, such association could not be reported by the family ownership. The results of this study suggest that government-owned and domestic corporate-owned companies are characterized to have good corporate governance practices in terms of board of directors and audit committee as internal control and monitoring mechanisms. Further, the results of this study contribute to the existing theory and empirical evidence of how the effectiveness of board of directors and audit committee is related to monitoring and controlling ownership type. This study offers policy-makers additional evidence to be used for setting up and/or enacting regulations in GCC.

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Putri, Pavita Bayu, und Arief Yulianto. „Government Ownership and Dividend Payment Policy“. Management Analysis Journal 9, Nr. 2 (18.06.2020): 179–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.15294/maj.v9i2.37344.

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The purpose of this study to examine and analyze differences in the average policy of dividend payments with government ownership in companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in period 2008-2017. Previous research still shows differences in research results or inconsistent results between one study and another. The results showed that the average dividend payment policy carried out by the government was higher than companies that did not have government ownership. This is considered as government ownership, so the amount of dividends distributed will increase. Based on the results of this study it can be concluded that government ownership provides an average higher dividend payment policy than non-government ownership. Suggestions for company management, in making dividend payment policies, the company should always consider the interests of the company’s owners. Investors should pay attention to factors outside the economy in investing. For further researchers, it can be used as an additional reference and research can be done one by one sector.

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Kalasin, Kiattichai, Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra und Ravi Ramamurti. „Government ownership and foreign direct investment“. Academy of Management Proceedings 2016, Nr. 1 (Januar 2016): 15230. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2016.15230abstract.

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Wolnicki, M. „Self-government and Ownership in Poland“. Telos 1989, Nr. 80 (01.07.1989): 63–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.3817/0689080063.

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Afonso, António, und Jorge Silva. „Determinants of nonresident government debt ownership“. Applied Economics Letters 24, Nr. 2 (06.04.2016): 107–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2016.1167818.

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15

Boubakri, Narjess, Sadok El Ghoul, Omrane Guedhami und William L. Megginson. „The market value of government ownership“. Journal of Corporate Finance 50 (Juni 2018): 44–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.12.026.

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16

Liu, Kerry. „Government Ownership in Listed Firms Around the World“. Studies in Business and Economics 13, Nr. 2 (01.08.2018): 131–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/sbe-2018-0025.

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AbstractBased on the first of its kind large-scale research on worldwide government ownership from 47 countries, the results show that government owners like to be the largest blockholders; if government is the largest blockholder, the size of its ownership is also quite big. Government ownership is mostly distributed in banks, infrastructure and public utility companies, and strategic manufacturing companies. While there are various theoretical arguments on the size and industry distribution of government ownership, this study provides first-ever empirical evidence. In sum, this paper contributes significantly and originally to our understanding on government ownership, and lay out further directions for future research on the complicated corporate governance issues of government ownership.

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Makhdalena, Makhdalena. „PENGARUH OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE DAN CORPORATE PERFORMANCE TERHADAP FIRM VALUE“. EKUITAS (Jurnal Ekonomi dan Keuangan) 20, Nr. 3 (02.02.2017): 388. http://dx.doi.org/10.24034/j25485024.y2016.v20.i3.2075.

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Research on the ownership structure (foreign ownership, government ownership and public ownership), corporate performance and firm value has been carried out by researchers, but the results have not been consistent. Thus researchers interested in studying the structure of the ownership (foreign ownership, government ownership and public ownership), corporate performance and firm value. The purpose of this study was to examine and analyze the effect of ownership structure (foreign ownership, government ownership and public ownership) and corporate performance to firm value. The population of this research is the company listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange that have complete data on foreign ownership, government ownership, public ownership, corporate performance and firm value for six consecutive years (2008-2013). Data type of variable of this research is secondary data obtained with techniques derived from ICMD documentation. Data analysis in this research is using regression. The results showed that foreign ownership, government ownership and public ownership had no effect on firm value and corporate performance positive effect on firm value.

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Pan, Yigang, Lefa Teng, Atipol Bhanich Supapol, Xiongwen Lu, Dan Huang und Zhennan Wang. „Firms’ FDI ownership: The influence of government ownership and legislative connections“. Journal of International Business Studies 45, Nr. 8 (05.06.2014): 1029–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/jibs.2014.27.

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19

Agha, Mahmoud, und Baban Eulaiwi. „The alignment effects of CEO stock incentives in the presence of government ownership: International evidence from Gulf Cooperation Council countries“. Australian Journal of Management 45, Nr. 2 (30.12.2019): 195–222. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0312896219893730.

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This article investigates whether government ownership in publicly listed firms of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries affects the behaviour of CEOs who are granted stock incentives, that is, an ownership stake in these firms. The results suggest that government ownership may create an environment that could be abused by these managers. In particular, we find that when government ownership reaches a certain threshold, the alignment effect of CEO stock incentives is reversed such that borrowing increases; capital expenditure decreases; selling, general and administrative (SGA) expenses increase; and firm performance decreases with the level of CEO stock incentives. Our results could have implications for investors and policymakers in GCC countries, and other developing markets, where governments usually have substantial equity stakes in some publicly listed firms. JEL Classification: G32, G34, G35, G38

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Basri, Hasan. „Assessing determinants of dividend policy of the government-owned companies in Indonesia“. International Journal of Law and Management 61, Nr. 5/6 (31.10.2019): 530–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijlma-09-2017-0215.

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Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the influences of financial leverage, profitability, the growth of assets and institutional ownerships on the dividend payout of the Indonesian Government-owned companies. Design/methodology/approach Annual data from the period 2007 to 2013 of the 15 listed government-owned companies on the main board in the Indonesian Stock Exchange were analyzed using the multiple regressions. Findings Except for the growth of assets that has an insignificant effect on the dividend policy, the financial leverage and institutional ownerships were documented to have negative and significant influences on the dividend policy, while the profitability has a positive and significant effect on the dividend policy. These findings imply that the profitability, financial leverage and institutional ownership should be considered as the important factors by the Indonesian Government-owned companies in determining their dividend policy. Originality/value Originality in this paper is to establish a model of leverage, profitability, asset growth and institutional ownership of dividend payments of Indonesian Government-owned companies with a panel regression approach.

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Ting, Irene Wei Kiong, Hooi Hooi Lean, Qian Long Kweh und Noor Azlinna Azizan. „Managerial overconfidence, government intervention and corporate financing decision“. International Journal of Managerial Finance 12, Nr. 1 (01.02.2016): 4–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijmf-04-2014-0041.

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of managerial overconfidence on corporate financing decision and the moderating effect of government ownership on the relationship between managerial overconfidence and corporate financing decision. Design/methodology/approach – Pooled OLS, fixed effect models (FEM), and Tobit regressions are employed to examine the relationship between managerial overconfidence, government ownership and corporate financing decision of publicly listed companies in Malaysia for the period of 2002-2011. Findings – The authors conclude that: first, CEO overconfidence is significantly and negatively related to corporate financing decision; second, a higher degree of managerial overconfidence would result in lower leverage in GLCs, whereas the effect does not significantly exist in NGLCs; third, a larger ownership of government in a firm will reduce the negative effect of managerial overconfidence on corporate financing decision; fourth, the moderating effect of government ownership on the association between managerial overconfidence and corporate financing decision in GLCs is more effective than NGLCs; and fifth, government intervention plays its role as moderating effect on the relationship between managerial overconfidence and corporate financing decision in firms with lower ownership concentration but not in firms with high ownership concentration (more or equal than 50 percent). Practical implications – The finding implies that the moderating effect of government ownership on the association between managerial overconfidence and corporate financing decision in GLCs is more effective than NGLCs. Originality/value – The authors make the first attempt to test the moderating effect of government ownership on the relationship between ownership concentration and corporate financing decision.

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Pradeep Kumar, B., und R. Ramya. „Ownership Pattern of Public Debt in India: A Study“. Shanlax International Journal of Economics 8, Nr. 3 (01.06.2020): 16–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.34293/economics.v8i3.2428.

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To bridge the inevitable gap between the expenditure and revenue of governments, public debt has been resorted to increasingly by the government all over the world. In India, too, public debt has been reckoned as a device though which governments attempt to garner enough resources for both developmental and non-developmental activities. The present paper looks into the change and pattern in the ownership of public debt in India in recent years. In recent times, there has been a slight decline in the State government securities issued in India. Provident Funds have become dominant and permanent owners of state government securities in Indi, especially in recent times. Commercial banks in India are the main owners of GOI dated securities. Half of the T-Bills have been held by the Commercial Banks in the country. Mutual Funds also have been buying the Treasury Bills on a large scale. Provident Funds (PFs) do not seem to be interested in engaging in Treasury Bills operations in the country.

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Zhang, Yi, und Xi Li. „Ownership Structure and Corporate Diversification“. Business and Politics 8, Nr. 1 (April 2006): 1–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1469-3569.1144.

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This paper examines the motivation and impact of corporate diversification in Chinese listed firms. We find that in local government owned-firms there is a non-linear relationship between the level of firm diversification and state ownership. As state ownership increases from zero, the level of diversification decreases. After state ownership reaches a certain level, the level of diversification increases as state ownership increases. There is no evidence that ownership is related to corporate diversification in non-state-owned firms or central government-owned firms. We also document that diversification is negatively related to firm performance in local government-owned firms. However, there is no evidence that diversification is negatively related to the firm performance in non-state-owned firms or central government-owned firms. Our findings suggest that agency problems are responsible for local government owned-firms taking value-reducing diversification strategies.

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Alkhataybeh, Ahmad, Safaa Adnan AlSmadi, Mohammad Ziad Shakhatreh und Mohammad A. Khataybeh. „Government Ownership and Corporate Cash Holdings: Empirical Evidence from the Amman Stock Exchange“. Sustainability 14, Nr. 18 (06.09.2022): 11168. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su141811168.

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While the effect of ownership structure on the level of cash holdings has been widely examined, that of government ownership has been understudied. Using a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation on the panel data of 107 Jordanian firms listed on the Amman Stock Exchange, this research adds to the limited literature on the relationship between government ownership and the level of corporate cash holdings. Consistent with agency theory, the findings reveal that firms with government ownership hold higher levels of cash and that such ownership creates agency problems. Other types of ownership, namely individual, foreign, and block holders, were found to be insignificant. The results provide an important implication for policy makers in Jordan: in order to reduce agency problems associated with government ownership, the government should revise its ownership policy and ensure it specifies clear purposes and expectations of business ownership and how it intends to exercise its rights as owner.

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Suchard, Jo-Ann, Mark Humphery-Jenner und Xiaping Cao. „Government ownership and Venture Capital in China“. Journal of Banking & Finance 129 (August 2021): 106164. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2021.106164.

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Besley, T., und M. Ghatak. „Government Versus Private Ownership of Public Goods“. Quarterly Journal of Economics 116, Nr. 4 (01.11.2001): 1343–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/003355301753265598.

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André, Stéfanie, und Caroline Dewilde. „Home ownership and support for government redistribution“. Comparative European Politics 14, Nr. 3 (30.06.2014): 319–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/cep.2014.31.

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Rydqvist, Kristian, Joshua Spizman und Ilya Strebulaev. „Government policy and ownership of equity securities“. Journal of Financial Economics 111, Nr. 1 (Januar 2014): 70–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.09.001.

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Borisova, Ginka, und Pradeep K. Yadav. „Government ownership, informed trading, and private information“. Journal of Corporate Finance 33 (August 2015): 196–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.07.001.

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Fibriani, Cut Dara, Islahuddin Islahuddin und Zuraida Zuraida. „The Effect of Government Ownership, Foreign Ownership, Managerial Ownership, Institutional Ownership on Financial Performance With Corporate Governance as Moderate in Soe Companies“. Journal of World Science 1, Nr. 9 (23.09.2022): 756–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.36418/jws.v1i9.93.

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Introduction: This study examines the effect of government ownership, foreign ownership, managerial ownership, and institutional ownership on Financial Performance with Corporate Governance as moderating BUMN companies Post Privatization in 2015-2019. In this study, the data used is panel data. Panel data is a combination of time series and cross-section. Methods: The data analysis method used is multiple linear regression using the SPSS Version 26 application, in accordance with the research objectives, the type of research used in this study is hypothesis testing research. This research is causal. Results: The results show that Government Ownership, Foreign Ownership, Managerial Ownership, and Institutional Ownership affect Financial Performance. Conclusion: The size of the board of commissioners has no impact on financial performance. The size of the board of commissioners moderates the predictor of the effect of government ownership on economic performance because the size of the board of commissioners has no impact on financial performance (p?0.05). The size of the Board of Commissioners moderates the predictor of the influence of Foreign Ownership on Financial Performance because the size of the board of commissioners does not affect financial performance. The size of the board of commissioners moderates the effect of managerial ownership on economic performance because the size of the board of commissioners has no impact on financial performance, and the size of the board of commissioners moderates the effect of institutional ownership on economic performance because the size of the board of commissioners has no impact on financial performance (p>0.05).

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Fibriani, Cut Dara, Islahuddin Islahuddin und Zuraida Zuraida. „The Effect of Government Ownership, Foreign Ownership, Managerial Ownership, Institutional Ownership on Financial Performance With Corporate Governance as Moderate in Soe Companies“. Journal of World Science 1, Nr. 9 (23.09.2022): 756–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.58344/jws.v1i9.93.

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Introduction: This study examines the effect of government ownership, foreign ownership, managerial ownership, and institutional ownership on Financial Performance with Corporate Governance as moderating BUMN companies Post Privatization in 2015-2019. In this study, the data used is panel data. Panel data is a combination of time series and cross-section. Methods: The data analysis method used is multiple linear regression using the SPSS Version 26 application, in accordance with the research objectives, the type of research used in this study is hypothesis testing research. This research is causal. Results: The results show that Government Ownership, Foreign Ownership, Managerial Ownership, and Institutional Ownership affect Financial Performance. Conclusion: The size of the board of commissioners has no impact on financial performance. The size of the board of commissioners moderates the predictor of the effect of government ownership on economic performance because the size of the board of commissioners has no impact on financial performance (p?0.05). The size of the Board of Commissioners moderates the predictor of the influence of Foreign Ownership on Financial Performance because the size of the board of commissioners does not affect financial performance. The size of the board of commissioners moderates the effect of managerial ownership on economic performance because the size of the board of commissioners has no impact on financial performance, and the size of the board of commissioners moderates the effect of institutional ownership on economic performance because the size of the board of commissioners has no impact on financial performance (p>0.05).

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Debora, Frina, Icha Jesika Manalu, Muhajir Muhajir, Pasquale Roy Bagaskara, Rodia Musdalifah Tiofan und Samuel Febrian. „PROBLEM OF LAND OWNERSHIP CERTIFICATES AS LEGAL PROOF OF OWNERSHIP“. Problematika Hukum 8, Nr. 2 (19.03.2024): 74. http://dx.doi.org/10.33021/ph.v8i2.5193.

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<p>Agrarian is the natural resource that humans need most, as a place to live and develop land resources. This development aims to achieve shared prosperity. maintain collective order and guarantee every community's rights in every region. So it is necessary to regulate in law a policy that determines land ownership according to the rights of each individual. Because if it is not regulated it will cause problems in social life. Because of this, the government passed legislation regulating the significance of land ownership as attested to by a Certificate of Ownership or Letter of Ownership (SHM). The government hopes that with SHM, every person who owns land or buildings (certain objects) can have their ownership rights guaranteed in compliance with relevant laws and regulations. Thus, if there is a struggle for property rights, it can be proven by the existence of SHM. Based on Law No. 5 of 1960 and Government Regulation No. 24 of 1997 emphasizes the crucial role of land ownership certificates as legal proof of ownership. This contributes to legal certainty, protection, and justice in the context of land ownership and transactions.</p><p>Keywords: Problematic, Freehold Title, Land, Evidence, Ownership, Legal.</p>

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Fauzi, Hasan, und Sami R. M. Musallam. „Corporate ownership and company performance: a study of Malaysian listed companies“. Social Responsibility Journal 11, Nr. 3 (03.08.2015): 439–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/srj-05-2014-0064.

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Purpose – This study aims to examine the effects of corporate ownership (government-linked investment companies, GLICs), linearity of GLICs, board ownership and linearity of board ownership on company performance. Design/methodology/approach – Using panel data from companies that are listed on the Malaysian Stock Exchange during the period of 2000 to 2009, this study uses weighted least square models. Findings – The results show that GLICs ownership is positively and significantly related to company performance, while board ownership is negatively and significantly related to company performance. These findings suggest that GLICs ownership improves company performance, while board ownership destroys company performance. The results also show that while GLICs ownership has an inverted U-shaped relationship with company performance, board ownership has a U-shaped relationship with company performance. Research limitations/implications – The theoretical implication of this study is that agency problem decreases in companies with low and high levels of board ownership concentration, while it increases in companies with middle level of board ownership concentration. Furthermore, agency cost decreases in companies with a certain level of GLICs ownership concentration as the government’s New Economic Model (NEM) expects. However, agency cost increases in companies after a certain level of GLICs ownership concentration. Practical implications – In practical perspectives, this study provides evidence to policy makers that the government’s proposal to reduce GLICs’ investments in Malaysia and diversify them aboard as mentioned in NEM is supported because the decrease in GLICs stakes in certain level may increase company performance. On the other hand, if the policy of the government is to increase GLICs stakes, the company performance may decrease after a certain level of ownership concentration. This study also provides evidence that investors can invest in companies with low and high board ownership concentration. Furthermore, the NEM policy gives investors an opportunity to invest in the companies with GLICs. Reducing GLICs stakes in the Malaysian market and putting them in the international markets, as mentioned in the Malaysian Government’s NEM policy, will create more opportunities for international investors to invest their fund in the Malaysian market. Thus, the emerging markets exist. In addition, the NEM policy also encourages institutional ownerships like domestic and foreign to increase their stakes instead of GLICs in the Malaysian market. Originality/value – So far, most of the previous studies on GLICs and board ownerships in the Malaysian setting focused on the relationship of the ownership structure with company performance. However, no study has been done to examine the linearity effects of GLICs and board ownerships on company performance. The study is very important to perform to provide the policy makers and investors with clear guidance before their decisions.

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Setiawan, Doddy, Bandi Bandi, Lian Kee Phua und Irwan Trinugroho. „Ownership structure and dividend policy in Indonesia“. Journal of Asia Business Studies 10, Nr. 3 (01.08.2016): 230–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jabs-05-2015-0053.

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Purpose This research aims to examine the effect of ownership structure on dividend policy using the Indonesian context. The most common ownership structure is concentrated in the hand of family owners except in the UK and USA (La Porta et al., 1998, 2000). Family owners hold more than half of the companies in Indonesia (Carney & Child, 2013; Claessens et al., 2000). Family firms play an important role in Indonesia. Another important characteristic that emerges is the rise of government- and foreign-controlled firms in Indonesia. Thus, this research also divides ownership concentration into family firms, government-controlled and foreign-controlled firms. Design/methodology/approach Samples of this research consist of dividend announcements during 2006-2012 in Indonesian Stock Exchange. This research excluded financial data because these have characteristics that are different non-financial sectors’ characteristics. The final sample of this research consists of a 710 firm-year observation. Findings The result of this research shows that ownerships have a positive effect on dividend payout. This research divides the sample into family-controlled firms, government-controlled firms (GOEs) and foreign-controlled firms. This research shows that government- and foreign-controlled firms have a positive impact on dividend payout. However, family firms have a negative effect on the dividend payout. Family firms pay lower dividends because they prefer to control it themselves. Family firms earn benefit from those resources, but at the expense of minority shareholders. Thus, family firms engage in expropriation to minority shareholders. Research limitations/implications This study focuses on ownership structure of Indonesian listed firm. This study does not analyze the impact of other corporate governance mechanism such as board structure on dividend decisions. The owner of the companies (family, government and foreign firm) has an opportunity to put their member as part of board members. However, this study does not analyze the impact of board structure on dividend decisions. Originality/value This study provides evidence that ownership concentration positively affects dividend payout. However, there is a different effect of ownership structure (family-controlled firms, GOEs and foreign-controlled firm). Government- and foreign-controlled have a positive effect; however, family-controlled firm have a negative effect on dividend payout. Therefore, this study provides evidence of the importance of ownership structure on dividend decision.

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Margaretha, Farah. „EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE TO DIVIDEND POLICY IN COMPANIES IN INDONESIA“. Business and Entrepreneurial Review 13, Nr. 2 (11.05.2017): 199. http://dx.doi.org/10.25105/ber.v13i2.1849.

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The purpose of this study is to analyze the effect of ownership structure on dividend payout policy in companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange. In this study, there are 4 kinds of ownership structures that will be discussed, namely private ownership structure, government ownership structure, foreign ownerships structure and family ownership structure. Dividend payout policy uses DividndPayout Ratio (DPR) indicator Population of this study is all the companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) 009-2011. Total samples in this study are 85 companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange determined by purposive sampling. Based on the study results, from the four ownership structures, only the private ownership structure influence Parliament. The implication for investors in doing this research, the investor can choose the private ownership structure of companies. for financial managers, this study provides information specifically on private companies that one way the companies reduce the agency problem could use dividend payout policy

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Yudhistira Dwica, Anandya, und Prasetyo Andrian Budi. „THE INFLUENCE OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE ON AUDIT FEE“. Jurnal RAK (Riset Akuntansi Keuangan) 4, Nr. 2 (30.10.2019): 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.31002/rak.v4i2.1950.

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The aim of the research was to analyze the effect of managerial ownership, foreign ownership, government ownership, ownership concentration, and percentage of shares of multiple large shareholders on audit fees. The independent variables were managerial ownership, foreign ownership, government ownership, ownership concentration, and percentage of shares of multiple large shareholders; while, the independent variable was audit fees. All non-financial companies listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2013-2015 were sampled. Proportionate stratified random sampling was applied to 207 sampled companies verified using slovin formula and multiple regression analysis to test the hypothesis of the research. This research found that the managerial ownership and the percentage of multiple large shareholders were negatively affected audit fees. Moreover, government ownership positively and significantly influenced audit fee; while, foreign ownership and ownership concentration had no significant effect on audit fee.

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Munandari, Dhealelia, und Putu Ayu Indira Savitri Suryana. „STRUKTUR KEPEMILIKAN DAN FINANCIAL DISTRESS: STUDI PADA PERUSAHAAN MAKANAN DAN MINUMAN YANG TERDAFTAR DI BURSA EFEK INDONESIA“. Jurnal REKSA: Rekayasa Keuangan, Syariah dan Audit 8, Nr. 1 (03.04.2021): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.12928/j.reksa.v8i1.3395.

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The purpose of this study was to determine the effect of institutional ownership, insider ownership, government ownership and foreign ownership on the likelihood of companies experiencing financial distress. The sample used is 20 food and beverages companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the 2017 - 2019 period. The research method used is using logistic regression analysis. Foreign ownership has a significant influence on the likelihood of financial distress. Meanwhile, institutional ownership, insider ownership and government ownership do not have a significant effect on the likelihood of financial distress in this study.This study aims to determine the effect of institutional ownership, insiderownership, government ownership and foreign ownership on the likelihoodof companies experiencing financial distress. The sample used is 20 foodand beverages companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the2017 - 2019 period. The research method used is using logistic regressionanalysis. Foreign ownership has a significant influence on the likelihood offinancial distress. Meanwhile, institutional ownership, insider ownership andgovernment ownership do not have a significant effect on the likelihood offinancial distress in this study.

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AlAli, Musaed Sulaiman, und Tariq Saeed. „Government Ownership Effect on Staffing Level and Financial Performance“. International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies (2147-4486) 9, Nr. 3 (24.08.2020): 99–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.20525/ijfbs.v9i3.836.

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It has always been believed that government ownership would lead to bad financial performance and overstaffing in any organization. This study aims to examine the effect of government ownership on staffing level and the financial performance of Kuwaiti bank over the period 2010-2018. Using the financial data of ten banks listed at Kuwait stock exchange (KSE), results shows that there was s statistically significant direct relation between government ownership and overstaffing and statistically significant inverse relation between government ownership and the financial performance of banks measured by return on assets (ROA). On the other hand results show that there was no relation between overstaffing and the financial performance of Kuwaiti banks.

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Jakobsen, Tor G., und Ola Listhaug. „Issue ownership, unemployment and support for government intervention“. Work, Employment and Society 26, Nr. 3 (Juni 2012): 396–411. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0950017012438574.

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In this article an examination is made of the association between unemployment and public demand for government intervention in the economy. The main hypothesis is drawn from the theory of issue ownership: public opinion is likely to shift to the left in times of high unemployment combined with a leftist government. Research on issue ownership has typically focused on case studies of particular countries. We extend the discussion to a much larger setting. Relying on data from the International Social Survey Programme from 23 OECD countries in the time period 1985–2007 we find a combined effect of issue ownership and agenda setting. An increase in unemployment leads the public to hold more leftist economic opinions when the government belongs to the left. However, ownership of an issue cannot be guaranteed to last if a party fails to deliver outcomes that are promised and expected from its historical legacy.

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Rahmawati, Isna Putri. „The Effect of Ownership Structure on Tax Aggressiveness in Manufacturing Companies in Indonesia“. JRAK: Jurnal Riset Akuntansi dan Komputerisasi Akuntansi 13, Nr. 1 (28.02.2022): 36–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.33558/jrak.v12i2.3212.

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This study aims to determine the effect of corporate ownership structure consisting of concentrated ownership, government ownership, institutional ownership, and foreign ownership on tax aggressiveness. The total sample used in this study is 200 taken from manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2018 to 2019. The results found that concentrated and foreign ownership had a negative effect on tax aggressiveness, while institutional ownership had a positive effect on tax aggressiveness. Meanwhile, government ownership has no significant effect on tax aggressiveness.

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Muharam, Harjum, und Galuh Kusuma Putri. „The effect of ownership structure on leverage with credit rating as a moderating variable“. Diponegoro International Journal of Business 3, Nr. 2 (31.12.2020): 80–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.14710/dijb.3.2.2020.80-87.

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This paper aims to examine the effect of ownership structure on leverage with credit rating as a moderating variable. The ownership structure used in this study is government ownership and managerial ownership. Leverage is measured using a debt to assets ratio (DAR). Credit rating uses ratings issued by PEFINDO.The sample used in this study was companies rated by PEFINDO and listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2015-2017. The number of samples used were 53 companies determined using a purposive sampling method. The analysis using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression analysis indicated that government ownership does not affect leverage, and the credit rating does not moderate the relationship between government ownership and leverage. Managerial ownership has a negative effect on leverage, and the credit rating moderates the relationship between managerial ownership and leverage

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Paskelian, Ohannes George, und Stephen Bell. „Corporate governance and firm valuation – the case of China“. Corporate Ownership and Control 7, Nr. 2 (2009): 21–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv7i2p2.

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We examine the determinants and implications of Chinese corporate cash holdings in the 1993- 2006 period. Agency theories assert that firms with a large controlling shareholder have relatively large cash holdings because of the greater ability of the controlling shareholder to extract private benefits from the cash holdings. Our findings show a very strong inverse relationship between cash holdings and firm valuation in high government ownership firms. Also, we find that in firms with high government ownership, dividend payouts are highly valued. We conclude that Chinese investors see government ownership as a factor that reduces firm value. They prefer relatively higher dividends from firms having high government ownership. Conversely, investors assign much higher value to firms with relatively low government ownership and they tend to be neutral about the dividends payouts of such firms. Also, investors value highly the presence of foreign investors in Chinese firms and tend to be neutral about dividend payouts of firms with high foreign ownership concentration.

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ZHENG, Yu. „China's State-owned Enterprise Mixed Ownership Reform“. East Asian Policy 06, Nr. 04 (Oktober 2014): 39–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1793930514000348.

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The new state-owned enterprise (SOE) mixed ownership reform have some distinct features that were not addressed in previous reforms. While some central SOEs and local governments have unveiled their own plans to diversify ownership structure, the success of the reform hinges on how the government resolves two credibility problems: one is to restore credibility to the reform commitment and the other is to convince private investors that their interests will be sufficiently protected.

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Maga, Anastasia, Elizaveta Baranova und Zhargal Tumunbayarova. „Value Relevance of Government Ownership of Equity (Evidence from Russian Listed Companies)“. Higher School of Economics Economic Journal 23, Nr. 2 (2019): 314–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.17323/1813-8691-2019-23-2-314-330.

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Miletkov, Mihail K. „A Cure Rather than a Disease: Government Ownership and Minority Shareholder Protection“. Multinational Finance Journal 18, Nr. 1/2 (01.06.2014): 1–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.17578/18-1/2-1.

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Kalderimis, Daniel. „Pure Ideology: the "Ownership Split" of Power Companies in the 1998 Electricity Reforms“. Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 31, Nr. 2 (01.05.2000): 255. http://dx.doi.org/10.26686/vuwlr.v31i2.5957.

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In April 1998 the New Zealand Government announced a reform package for the electricity industry. This package was designed to create the competition promised since deregulation first began in 1987. The 1998 reforms had two main aspects: first, the split of the Electricity Corporation of New Zealand (ECNZ), New Zealand's dominant state-owned enterprise (SOE) generator, into three competitive units; second, a rule business (the ownership split) that local power companies could not own both a lines business (the local distribution wires) and a generation or retail.The ownership split caused a revolution in the industry. Effectively, small community-owned companies were forced to sell their retail and generation businesses to larger companies or to the State, in the form of the ECNZ "babies". The Government believed that the ownership split would facilitate retail competition and deliver lower domestic power prices. This article asks whether the Government was right – whether the ownership split was necessary, or able, to reduce domestic power prices. It concludes that the ownership split was a staggering mistake. The Government's reasoning was based on inconclusive evidence, inadequate research, and contained major logical flaws. The Government rejected unanimous policy advice warning against the split. Since the split, average domestic power prices have risen by almost four per cent. A major factor is the demise of community-owned supply companies which had offered unique advantages to consumers.The root of this disaster was ideological bias. The Government did not understand the electricity industry but treated it as an abstract economic construct. This article documents the way in which ideology led the Government to wreak havoc on an industry in order to cure problems which did not exist.

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SEEBERG, HENRIK BECH. „What can a government do? Government issue ownership and real-world problems“. European Journal of Political Research 56, Nr. 2 (19.10.2016): 346–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12175.

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Uddin, Md Hamid. „Government ownership in stock exchange listed corporate firms: An empirical study of the United Arab Emirates“. Corporate Ownership and Control 12, Nr. 4 (2015): 38–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv12i4p3.

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Government ownership in stock exchange listed corporate firms can be found in many countries, but it is widespread in some countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, China, Turkey, India, Jordan, and United Arab Emirates (UAE), as documented by different researchers. It is found that the government ownership generally has a negative effect on the corporate performance of all countries but the UAE. In this country, the corporate firms that have a government shareholding record superior financial results comparing to that of other firms. In this regard, researchers assumed that a causal relationship between the government shareholding and corporate performance may exist due to the agency problems or government supports of firms. However, they did not examine the underlying reasons why government wants to retain a corporate ownership, and factors affecting the government shareholding. This study fills this gap by investigating these issues in the context of UAE, where the government holds ownership in 48% of all exchange listed firms. The study finds that government shareholding in firms evolves through economic transition of a country, and the probability of government share retention in firms depends on their strategic importance, ability to earn profit, and valuations in financial market. Additionally, it is found that the strategic importance and market valuation of firms play main role in determining the probability of government taking control of firms by holding a majority ownership, whilst the firms’ ability to earn profit affects the decision of government to relinquish control of firms to the private management by retaining a minority ownership.

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Amirnejad, Saeed, Ali Reza Elahi und Hossein Akbari Yazdi. „A comparative study to identify a suitable model of ownership for Iran football pro league clubs“. International Journal of Applied Exercise Physiology 7, Nr. 1 (22.01.2018): 30–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.22631/ijaep.v7i1.255.

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Today the government ownership of the professional football clubs is absolutely illogical view point. Most of sports clubs are conducted by private sector using different models of ownership all over the world. In Iran, government credits benefit was main reason that the professional sport was firstly developed by government firms and organizations. Therefore, the sports team ownership is without the professionalization standards. The present comparative study was to examine the different football club ownership structures of the top leagues and the current condition of Iran football pro league ownership and then present a suitable ownership structure of Iran football clubs to leave behind the government club ownership. Among the initial 120 scientific texts, the thirty two cases including papers, books and reports were found relevant to this study. We studied the ownership prominence and several football club models of ownership focused on stock listing model of ownership, private investor model of ownership, supporter trust model of ownership and Japan partnership model of ownership; theoretical concepts, empirical studies, main findings, strengths and weaknesses were covered in analysis procedure. According to various models of ownership in leagues and the models’ productivity in football clubs, each model of ownership considering national environmental, economic, social conditions has strengths and weaknesses. So, we cannot present a definite model of ownership for Iran football pro league clubs due to different micro-environments of Iran clubs. We need a big planning to provide a supporter-investor mixed model of ownership to Iranian clubs. Considering strengths and weaknesses in the models of ownership as well as the micro and macro environment of Iran football clubs, German model and Japan partnership model are offered as suitable ones to probable new model of ownership in Iran pro league clubs. Consequently, more studies are required to find a suitable model of ownership based on environmental conditions in Iran.

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Meilani, Astian Yosi, Siti Nur Azizah, Hadi Pramono und Bima Cinintya Pratama. „The Effect Of Ownership Structure On The Performance Of Intellectual Capital“. Jurnal Akademi Akuntansi 4, Nr. 2 (30.11.2021): 229–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.22219/jaa.v4i2.17897.

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This study aims to show empirical evidence of the effect of managerial ownership, institutional ownership, foreign ownership and government ownership on intellectual capital performance as the dependent variable. This study relates the influence between these variables by expanding the concept and understanding of Resource-Based Theory, Agency Theory and Stakeholder Theory. The sample in this study is the mining sector companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2016-2019 using purposive sampling technique, namely selecting samples with certain criteria to get more valid results. The data analysis technique used is the classical assumption test, then the results are analyzed using multiple regression analysis to prove the influence between variables by utilizing an accurate SPSS application. The results of this study indicate that institutional ownership and foreign ownership have a positive effect on intellectual capital performance in mining companies, while managerial ownership and government ownership do not show any effect on intellectual capital performance in mining companies in Indonesia. This research contributes to the theory and practice of companies in the conduct of business. However, this study has not been able to prove the influence of managerial and government ownership on intellectual capital performance, so that further research can consider other corporate sectors whose managerial and government ownership is quite dominant.

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