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1
Mahmoodi, Korosh. „Emergence of Cooperation and Homeodynamics as a Result of Self Organized Temporal Criticality: From Biology to Physics“. Thesis, University of North Texas, 2018. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1248467/.
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This dissertation is an attempt at establishing a bridge between biology and physics leading naturally from the field of phase transitions in physics to the cooperative nature of living systems. We show that this aim can be realized by supplementing the current field of evolutionary game theory with a new form of self-organized temporal criticality. In the case of ordinary criticality, the units of a system choosing either cooperation or defection under the influence of the choices done by their nearest neighbors, undergo a significant change of behavior when the intensity of social influence has a critical value. At criticality, the behavior of the individual units is correlated with that of all other units, in addition to the behavior of the nearest neighbors. The spontaneous transition to criticality of this work is realized as follows: the units change their behavior (defection or cooperation) under the social influence of their nearest neighbors and update the intensity of their social influence spontaneously by the feedback they get from the payoffs of the game (environment). If units, which are selfish, get higher benefit with respect to their previous play, they increase their interest to interact with other units and vice versa. Doing this, the behavior of single units and the whole system spontaneously evolve towards criticality, thereby realizing a global behavior favoring cooperation. In the case when the interacting units are oscillators with their own periodicity, homeodynamics concerns, the individual payoff is the synchronization with the nearest neighbors (i.e., lowering the energy of the system), the spontaneous transition to criticality generates fluctuations characterized by the joint action of periodicity and crucial events of the same kind as those revealed by the current analysis of the dynamics of the brain. This result is expected to explain the efficiency of enzyme catalyzers, on the basis of a new non-equilibrium statistical physics. We argue that the results obtained apply to sociological and psychological systems as well as to elementary biological systems.
2
Angus, Simon Douglas Economics Australian School of Business UNSW. „Economic networks: communication, cooperation & complexity“. Awarded by:University of New South Wales. Economics, 2007. http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/27005.
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This thesis is concerned with the analysis of economic network formation. There are three novel sections to this thesis (Chapters 5, 6 and 8). In the first, the non-cooperative communication network formation model of Bala and Goyal (2000) (BG) is re-assessed under conditions of no inertia. It is found that the Strict Nash circle (or wheel) structure is still the equilibrium outcome for n = 3 under no inertia. However, a counter-example for n = 4 shows that with no inertia infinite cycles are possible, and hence the system does not converge. In fact, cycles are found to quickly dominate outcomes for n > 4 and further numerical simulations of conditions approximating no inertia (probability of updating > 0.8 to 1) indicate that cycles account for a dramatic slowing of convergence times. These results, together with the experimental evidence of Falk and Kosfeld (2003) (FK) motivate the second contribution of this thesis. A novel artificial agent model is constructed that allows for a vast strategy space (including the Best Response) and permits agents to learn from each other as was indicated by the FK results. After calibration, this model replicates many of the FK experimental results and finds that an externality exploiting ratio of benefits and costs (rather than the difference) combined with a simple altruism score is a good proxy for the human objective function. Furthermore, the inequity aversion results of FK are found to arise as an emergent property of the system. The third novel section of this thesis turns to the nature of network formation in a trust-based context. A modified Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma (IPD) model is developed which enables agents to play an additional and costly network forming action. Initially, canonical analytical results are obtained despite this modification under uniform (non-local) interactions. However, as agent network decisions are 'turned on' persistent cooperation is observed. Furthermore, in contrast to the vast majority of non-local, or static network models in the literature, it is found that a-periodic, complex dynamics result for the system in the long-run. Subsequent analysis of this regime indicates that the network dynamics have fingerprints of self-organized criticality (SOC). Whilst evidence for SOC is found in many physical systems, such dynamics have been seldom, if ever, reported in the strategic interaction literature.
3
Moritz, Ruby Louisa Viktoria. „Cooperation in self-organized heterogeneous swarms“. Doctoral thesis, Universitätsbibliothek Leipzig, 2015. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-161633.
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Cooperation in self-organized heterogeneous swarms is a phenomenon from nature with many applications in autonomous robots. I specifically analyzed the problem of auto-regulated team formation in multi-agent systems and several strategies to learn socially how to make multi-objective decisions. To this end I proposed new multi-objective ranking relations and analyzed their properties theoretically and within multi-objective metaheuristics. The results showed that simple decision mechanism suffice to build effective teams of heterogeneous agents and that diversity in groups is not a problem but can increase the efficiency of multi-agent systems.
4
Durmaz, Huseyin. „International police cooperation as a response to transnational organized crime in Europe: Improvements in extradition“. Thesis, University of North Texas, 2005. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc4883/.
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International criminality has been a challenging phenomenon for national police forces for years. States have developed international police cooperation relations and extradition instruments in order to fight international criminal activity. This treatise explores the reasons for the rise in transnational organized crime activities in Europe and presents an in-depth explanation concerning the emergence, mandates, and structures of multilateral police collaboration systems such as Interpol, Trevi, Schengen, and Europol. Since the extradition has become an inseparable part of international policing, this study examines the improvements in extradition procedure and emphasizes the importance of extradition. Finally this study compares traditional (European Convention on Extradition of 1957) and new (European Arrest Warrant) extradition systems.
5
Hannan, Joseph. „Formative Evaluation of a Family Cooperation Board Game“. UKnowledge, 2017. http://uknowledge.uky.edu/hes_etds/50.
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A lack of credible evidence demonstrating the effectiveness of play therapy and the use of therapeutic board game in play therapy exists (Phillips, 2010; Matorin, 1996). Parent involvement is a key variable in the effectiveness of play therapy (Kottman, Stother, and Deniger, 2001). Formative research was used in this study to evaluate of The Super Family Board Game™ (SFBG) in order to develop an effective therapeutic board game aimed at enhancing family cooperation and cohesion. As the first formative evaluation of a therapeutic board game, this study provides future research implications for developing and testing therapeutic board games.
6
Berger, Ulrich. „Simple scaling of cooperation in donor-recipient games“. Elsevier, 2009. http://epub.wu.ac.at/5590/1/2009_BioSys.pdf.
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We present a simple argument which proves a general version of the scaling phenomenon recently observed in donor-recipient games by Tanimoto [Tanimoto, J., 2009. A simple scaling of the effectiveness of supporting mutual cooperation in donor-recipient games by various reciprocity mechanisms. BioSystems 96, 29-34].
7
Ji, Zhu. „Game theoretical framework for cooperation in autonomous wireless networks“. College Park, Md. : University of Maryland, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/1903/6728.
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Thesis (Ph. D.) -- University of Maryland, College Park, 2007.Thesis research directed by: Electrical Engineering. Title from t.p. of PDF. Includes bibliographical references. Published by UMI Dissertation Services, Ann Arbor, Mich. Also available in paper.
8
Cesario, Loryn Nicolle 1984. „Coalition Building and Cooperation Between Organized Labor and Immgrant Day Laborers in Portland, OR“. Thesis, University of Oregon, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/1794/11490.
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xi, 87 p. : col. mapThis project explores the factors contributing to and hindering coalition building and cooperation between immigrant day laborers and the building trade unions in Portland, Oregon. The research is based on interviews with local labor and worker center leaders and an examination of public records and media discourse. It draws from a theoretical framework informed by Stuart Hall, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe and their work on identity politics in new social movements. The research concludes that the lack of full success in this case was the result of a conflicting message that conveyed to workers that they shared a similar identity, while at the same time that they labored in separate industries. As a result, no shared identity was ever established and organized labor continued to view immigrant workers as outsiders.
Committee in charge: Daniel HoSang, Chairperson; Joseph Lowndes, Member; Daniel Tichenor, Member
9
Galli, Filippo. „Market expansion and the co-opetition of criminal organizations in Italy“. Master's thesis, NSBE - UNL, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10362/11760.
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A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and EconomicsA mafia modernization process will be addressed. That is the process by which the expansion growth into new territories coincided with a shift of objectives and interests of the mafia itself, which turned from being "traditional" to "entrepreneurial." Beside that we will examine the strategies adopted by the criminal organizations in order to successfully face the legal market and maintain at the same time a deep control over their home-regions.
10
Kamhoua, Charles A. K. „Modeling Security and Cooperation in Wireless Networks Using Game Theory“. FIU Digital Commons, 2011. http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/436.
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This research involves the design, development, and theoretical demonstration of models resulting in integrated misbehavior resolution protocols for ad hoc networked devices. Game theory was used to analyze strategic interaction among independent devices with conflicting interests. Packet forwarding at the routing layer of autonomous ad hoc networks was investigated. Unlike existing reputation based or payment schemes, this model is based on repeated interactions. To enforce cooperation, a community enforcement mechanism was used, whereby selfish nodes that drop packets were punished not only by the victim, but also by all nodes in the network. Then, a stochastic packet forwarding game strategy was introduced. Our solution relaxed the uniform traffic demand that was pervasive in other works. To address the concerns of imperfect private monitoring in resource aware ad hoc networks, a belief-free equilibrium scheme was developed that reduces the impact of noise in cooperation. This scheme also eliminated the need to infer the private history of other nodes. Moreover, it simplified the computation of an optimal strategy. The belief-free approach reduced the node overhead and was easily tractable. Hence it made the system operation feasible. Motivated by the versatile nature of evolutionary game theory, the assumption of a rational node is relaxed, leading to the development of a framework for mitigating routing selfishness and misbehavior in Multi hop networks. This is accomplished by setting nodes to play a fixed strategy rather than independently choosing a rational strategy. A range of simulations was carried out that showed improved cooperation between selfish nodes when compared to older results. Cooperation among ad hoc nodes can also protect a network from malicious attacks. In the absence of a central trusted entity, many security mechanisms and privacy protections require cooperation among ad hoc nodes to protect a network from malicious attacks. Therefore, using game theory and evolutionary game theory, a mathematical framework has been developed that explores trust mechanisms to achieve security in the network. This framework is one of the first steps towards the synthesis of an integrated solution that demonstrates that security solely depends on the initial trust level that nodes have for each other.
11
Dai, Zhiyu. „Coalitional game approach for cooperation strategy in cognitive radio networks“. Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/49947.
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Cognitive radio networks (CRNs) provide an effective solution to address the increasing
demand for spectrum resources. The cooperation among secondary users (SUs) improves
the sensing performance and spectrum efficiency. In this thesis, we study a traffic-demand
based cooperative spectrum sensing and access strategy in a CRN with multiple SUs
and multiple primary users (PUs). In the proposed strategy, each SU makes its own
cooperation decision according to its traffic demand. When the SU has a high traffic
demand, it selectively chooses channels to sense and access. When it has no data to
transmit, it can choose not to perform sensing and save energy for future transmission.
In the first part of the thesis, we study the traffic demand-based cooperation strategy
in CRNs, in which each SU senses at most one channel during a time slot. We formulate
this problem as a non-transferable utility (NTU) coalition formation game, in which each
SU receives a coalition value that takes into account the expected throughput and energy
efficiency. In order to obtain the final coalition structure, we propose a sequential coalition
formation (SCF) algorithm. Simulation results show that our proposed algorithm
achieves a higher throughput and energy efficiency than a previously proposed coalition
formation algorithm in [1].
In the second part of this thesis, we extend the cooperation strategy problem in CRNs
by enabling each SU to sense multiple channels during the sensing stage. We formulate the
problem as an NTU overlapping coalitional game. We propose an overlapping coalition
formation (OCF) algorithm to obtain a stable coalition structure. The proposed OCF
algorithm is proved to converge after a finite number of iterations. We also modify the
SCF algorithm proposed in the first part of this thesis to address the problem in the
new system model. The modified SCF algorithm requires a lower number of iterations
and involves less information exchange among SUs. Moreover, an adaptive transmission
power control scheme is proposed for SUs to further improve their energy efficiency.
Simulation results show that our proposed algorithms achieve a higher throughput than
the disjoint coalition formation (DCF) algorithm.Applied Science, Faculty of
Electrical and Computer Engineering, Department of
Graduate
12
Pervaiz, Haris. „Enhancing cooperation in wireless networks using different concepts of game theory“. Thesis, Queen Mary, University of London, 2012. http://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/handle/123456789/2529.
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Optimizing radio resource within a network and across cooperating heterogeneous networks is the focus of this thesis. Cooperation in a multi-network environment is tackled by investigating network selection mechanisms. These play an important role in ensuring quality of service for users in a multi-network environment. Churning of mobile users from one service provider to another is already common when people change contracts and in a heterogeneous communication environment, where mobile users have freedom to choose the best wireless service-real time selection is expected to become common feature. This real time selection impacts both the technical and the economic aspects of wireless network operations. Next generation wireless networks will enable a dynamic environment whereby the nodes of the same or even different network operator can interact and cooperate to improve their performance. Cooperation has emerged as a novel communication paradigm that can yield tremendous performance gains from the physical layer all the way up to the application layer. Game theory and in particular coalitional game theory is a highly suited mathematical tool for modelling cooperation between wireless networks and is investigated in this thesis. In this thesis, the churning behaviour of wireless service users is modelled by using evolutionary game theory in the context of WLAN access points and WiMAX networks. This approach illustrates how to improve the user perceived QoS in heterogeneous networks using a two-layered optimization. The top layer views the problem of prediction of the network that would be chosen by a user where the criteria are offered bit rate, price, mobility support and reputation. At the second level, conditional on the strategies chosen by the users, the network provider hypothetically, reconfigures the network, subject to the network constraints of bandwidth and acceptable SNR and optimizes the network coverage to support users who would otherwise not be serviced adequately. This forms an iterative cycle until a solution that optimizes the user satisfaction subject to the adjustments that the network provider can make to mitigate the binding constraints, is found and applied to the real network. The evolutionary equilibrium, which is used to 3 compute the average number of users choosing each wireless service, is taken as the solution. This thesis also proposes a fair and practical cooperation framework in which the base stations belonging to the same network provider cooperate, to serve each other‘s customers. How this cooperation can potentially increase their aggregate payoffs through efficient utilization of resources is shown for the case of dynamic frequency allocation. This cooperation framework needs to intelligently determine the cooperating partner and provide a rational basis for sharing aggregate payoff between the cooperative partners for the stability of the coalition. The optimum cooperation strategy, which involves the allocations of the channels to mobile customers, can be obtained as solutions of linear programming optimizations.
13
Lopez, Carlos Ramiro. „An Exploration of Cooperation during an Asymmetric Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game“. Thesis, University of North Texas, 2020. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1707264/.
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Researchers investigated how the contingent delivery of a cultural consequence on target culturants in an asymmetric iterated prisoner's dilemma game (IPDG) affected players' choices. The asymmetric IPDG creates an analogue to income disparities created by wage gaps and other cultural practices that create wealth inequalities between different members of the population and allows researchers to explore how these inequalities affect cooperation between players. Six undergraduate students divided into three dyads participated in an ABABCDCD reversal design. An asymmetric IPDG was arranged in Condition A and C such that one player received a greater number of points regardless of the second participants' selections - analogue to contingencies that produce income inequalities from wage gaps. In Condition B and D, a metacontingency was arranged such that delivery of a cultural consequence (CC; bonus points equally distributed among the dyad) was contingent on the oscillating production of target aggregate products (AP) across two consecutive cycles. When participants' coordinated responding and contacted the target AP→ CC relation, the wage gap was reduced. However, individual contingencies are in direct competition for the "wealthier" player, reducing the probability of cooperative responding. Results showed the CC selected certain oscillations between target APs resulting in a decrease of a point disparity between the players while also establishing equal points between the players during certain conditions.
14
Li, Qing. „Game Theoretic and Analytical Approaches to International Cooperation and Investment Problems“. Thesis, Virginia Tech, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/32406.
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International cooperation and foreign investment issues are two important components of an international economy. The various aspects of research related to such international cooperation and foreign investment decisions are fraught with various complex factors. In this thesis, we consider two specific issues in the arena of international technological cooperation and foreign investments, by using established Operations Research techniques of game theory and multiple criteria decision making.
We first analyze regional technological cooperation mechanisms using classical game theory. A concept of regional technological cooperation is developed based on a cooperative game theoretic model, in which a plan of payoff distributions induces an agreement that is acceptable to each participant. Under certain conditions, the underlying game is shown to be convex, and hence to have a nonempty core with the Shapley value allocations belonging to the core. A compensation scheme is devised based on the Shapley value allocations, whereby participants who enjoy a greater payoff with respect to the technological cooperation compensate the participants who receive a relatively lesser payoff via cooperation. In this manner, regional technological cooperation can bring overall benefits to all the involved players in the game. Some insightful examples are provided to illustrate the methodological concept.
Next, we discuss a model for analyzing foreign direct investment opportunities and for evaluating related projects based on the International Investment Attracting Force Theory and the technology of fuzzy evaluation. This model is applied to assess the industrial investment projects that were proposed in the â â 95 Chinaâ s Tumen River Area International Investment and Business Forumâ funded by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization. Accordingly, the projects are classified into groups based on their potential to attract foreign investors. Furthermore, we simulate the actual forming process whereby projects are sequenced and selected for funding by foreign investors based on a sequential update of their effect on the local economy. The results provide a scientific basis for formulating related decisions and policy recommendations regarding the various proposed projects.Master of Science
15
Miller, Andrew Cesare. „The information game : police-citizen cooperation in communities with criminal groups“. Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2020. https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/128634.
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Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science, May, 2020Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 312-339).
Criminal groups -- gangs, mafias, and drug cartels, among others --
likely cause more deaths than interstate war, insurgency, and terrorism combined. This violence and the lack of accountability for perpetrators present a major challenge to states' central mandates of providing public safety and administering justice. States fall short of their mandates, in part because they struggle to gain cooperation from citizens. This study is about what I call The Information Game: the competition between the police, which want citizens to come forward with information about violence, and criminal groups, which want citizens to stay silent. I present cycle of silence theory, which posits that collective misperceptions prevent communities from reaching their full potential of police-citizen cooperation. Akin to terrorism, fear generated by criminal group violence makes retaliation appear to be more likely than it is.
The violence has the underappreciated but potent second order effect of pushing citizens who are willing to cooperate to hide their disposition from others. Cooperation thus appears to citizens to be less of a norm than it is. I also take new methodological approaches -- namely, fielding the first large-scale virtual reality experiment --
to test realistically and ethically strategies aimed at promoting cooperation. The results show that providing access to anonymous tip lines, creating awareness of community cooperation norms, and in some circumstances, exposing citizens to police officers of the same ethnicity increase citizen information-sharing with the police. Employing a multi-method research design, this study draws on original surveys in Baltimore, Maryland (N=650) and Lagos, Nigeria (N=1,025) as well as proprietary survey data of criminal justice experts (N=2,700) and citizens (N=109,000) in 113 countries provided by the World Justice Project. I pair the quantitative analysis with first-hand observation as well as interviews with more than 150 citizens, state authorities, and criminal group affiliates.
by Andrew Cesare Miller.
Ph. D.
Ph.D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science
16
Sasaki, Tatsuya, und Isamu Okada. „Cheating is evolutionarily assimilated with cooperation in the continuous snowdrift game“. Elsevier Ireland Ltd, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biosystems.2015.04.002.
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It is well known that in contrast to the Prisoner's Dilemma, the snowdrift game can lead to a stable coexistence of cooperators and cheaters. Recent theoretical evidence on the snowdrift game suggests that gradual evolution for individuals choosing to contribute in continuous degrees can result in the social diversification to a 100% contribution and 0% contribution through so-called evolutionary branching. Until now, however, game-theoretical studies have shed little light on the evolutionary dynamics and consequences of the loss of diversity in strategy. Here, we analyze continuous snowdrift games with quadratic payoff functions in dimorphic populations. Subsequently, conditions are clarified under which gradual evolution can lead a population consisting of those with 100% contribution and those with 0% contribution to merge into one species with an intermediate contribution level. The key finding is that the continuous snowdrift game is more likely to lead to assimilation of different cooperation levels rather than maintenance of diversity. Importantly, this implies that allowing the gradual evolution of cooperative behavior can facilitate social inequity aversion in joint ventures that otherwise could cause conflicts that are based on commonly accepted notions of fairness. (authors' abstract)
17
Ghachem, Montasser. „Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory“. Doctoral thesis, Stockholms universitet, Nationalekonomiska institutionen, 2016. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-132433.
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Evolutionary game theory tries to explain the emergence of stable behaviors observed in human and animal societies. Prominent examples of such behaviors are cooperative and conformist behaviors. In the first part of the thesis, we develop a model of indirect reciprocity with institutional screening to study how institutions may promote cooperative behavior. We show that cooperation can emerge if screening institutions are sufficiently reliable at identifying cooperators. The second part presents a large-population learning model in which individuals update their beliefs through time. In the model, only one individual updates his beliefs each period. We show that a population, playing a game with two strategies, eventually learns to play a Nash equilibrium. We focus on coordination games and prove that a unique behavior arises both when players use myopic and perturbed best replies. The third part studies the payoff calculation in an evolutionary setting. By introducing mutual consent as a requirement for game play, we provide a more realistic alternative way to compute payoffs.At the time of the doctoral defense, the following papers were unpublished and had a status as follows: Paper 2: Manuscript. Paper 3: Manuscript.
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ALMEIDA, ANA LETICIA CANEGAL DE. „GETTING IN TO THE FIELD: THE ORGANIZED PICK UP SOCCER GAME AT THE ATERRO DO FLAMENGO“. PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2012. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=21156@1.
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PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIROCOORDENAÇÃO DE APERFEIÇOAMENTO DO PESSOAL DE ENSINO SUPERIOR
PROGRAMA DE SUPORTE À PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO DE INSTS. DE ENSINO
O presente trabalho trata das peladas jogadas no Aterro do Flamengo, parque público na cidade do Rio de Janeiro, a partir do trabalho de campo realizado com o Ellite Futebol Clube. Desde a inauguração, em 1965, criou-se uma identificação entre o Aterro e os peladeiros, já que com o crescimento da cidade, havia menos terrenos ou áreas livres para a prática amadora do futebol. As quadras do Parque também tinham o objetivo de suprir essa necessidade. Fundado em 1998, o Ellite é formado por amigos de colégio que vêem nas peladas jogadas todas as quartas-feiras uma forma de manter a amizade. É uma das diversas equipes que fazem dos campos do Aterro a sua casa. Jogam, segundo eles, uma pelada organizada, o que de certa forma contraria o imaginário de improviso e espontaneidade desta prática. As peladas aqui estudadas, a partir do exemplo do Ellite, têm características particulares, que nos fazem perceber como o espaço urbano público é rico em contraste, diversidade e conflitos.
This work is about the pick up soccer games played at the Aterro do Flamengo, a public park at Rio de Janeiro, from fieldwork with Ellite Futebol Clube. Since its inauguration in 1965, it has been created an identification between the Aterro and the pick up soccer game players, especially because with the growth of the city there were less land or open spaces for the practice of the amateur soccer. The courts from the park had also the purpose to meet this need. Founded in 1998, Ellite is formed by college friends who see in the pick up games played all Wednesdays a way to keep the friendship. It is one of several teams that make the fields of the Aterro like their home and make that a space of sociability. They play, according to them, an organized pick up game, which somehow contradicts the imagination of improvisation and spontaneity of this practice. The pick up soccer games studied here, from the example of Ellite, have particular characteristics that make us realize how urban public space is rich in contrast, diversity and conflict.
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Geoffroy, Félix. „Explaining fine-grained properties of human cooperation : Insights from evolutionary game theory“. Thesis, Montpellier, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018MONTG071/document.
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L'existence, dans de nombreuses espèces, de comportements coopératifs entre individus non-apparentés constitue un paradoxe apparent pour la théorie de l'évolution. L'explication la plus acceptée est que les comportements coopératifs peuvent être « incités » par un mécanisme qui récompense les coopérateurs et punit les tricheurs. On parle alors de « coopération conditionnelle ». La majorité des travaux en théorie des jeux évolutionnaires cherchent seulement à expliquer comment des comportements coopératifs en général peuvent exister à un équilibre évolutionnaire. Dans cette thèse, nous cherchons au contraire à montrer que la théorie des jeux évolutionnaires peut aussi permettre de comprendre certaines des propriétés fines des comportements coopératifs qu'on observe dans le vivant, en particulier dans le cas de l'espèce humaine. Tout d'abord, nous posons la question de l'origine de la coopération conditionnelle. Comment la coopération conditionnelle peut-elle évoluer à partir d'une situation initiale dans laquelle personne ne coopère ? A l'aide de méthodes empruntées à l'apprentissage automatique, nous montrons que la coopération conditionnelle peut évoluer en tant que sous-produit d'une adaptation à des interactions dans lesquelles les intérêts des participants sont alignés. Nous montrons également que ce processus évolutif ne peut aboutir qu'à deux résultats opposés. Soit toutes les opportunités de coopération sont « trouvées » par l'évolution, ce qui correspond à la prévalence des comportements coopératifs chez l'Homme, soit un nombre très réduit d'opportunités de coopération sont « trouvées », ce qui correspond aux comportements coopératifs non humains. Nous proposons également une variante de ce modèle qui permet d'expliquer pourquoi de nombreux mutualismes sont des formes exagérées de cas d'interactions basées sur des intérêts communs. Dans un second temps, nous nous concentrons sur un mécanisme particulier de coopération conditionnelle : le choix du partenaire. Nous utilisons des simulations individu-centrées, et nous montrons que si l'on peut choisir librement ses partenaires dans la coopération, alors le seul niveau d'effort investi dans la coopération qui est évolutivement stable est celui qui maximise l'efficacité sociale de la coopération. Puis, nous développons des modèles analytiques, importés de la théorie économique des appariements. Nous montrons que la seule distribution des bénéfices générés par la coopération qui est évolutivement stable ne dépend pas des rapports de force et est proportionnelle à la contribution de chacun des participants. Ainsi, la théorie du choix du partenaire explique deux propriétés fines des comportements coopératifs chez l'Homme : nos préférences pour les formes de coopération les plus socialement efficaces et notre sens de l'équité. Enfin, nous montrons que la théorie des signaux coûteux, appliquée à la coopération, peut expliquer plusieurs propriétés de la réputation morale, puis nous concluons en discutant de futures directions de rechercheThe existence of cooperation among non-kin in many species constitutes an apparent paradox for evolutionary biologists. The most commonly accepted explanation is that cooperation can be enforced by mechanisms that reward cooperators or punish cheaters. Most of the theoretical works in evolutionary game theory, however, aim only at explaining how some cooperation can exist at an evolutionary equilibrium, thanks to these enforcement mechanisms. Here, we aim at showing, instead, that evolutionary game theory can also explain the fine-grained properties of the cooperation that takes place in the living world, especially in the case of the human species. First, we address the question of the origin of enforced cooperation: How can enforced cooperation evolve from an initially non-cooperative state? Using tools from the field of machine learning, we show that enforced cooperation can evolve as a by-product of adaptation to interactions with shared interests. We also show that this process has only two possible evolutionary outcomes. Either all cooperative opportunities are enforced, which corresponds to the human cooperative syndrome, or only a very few number are, which corresponds to non-human cooperation. We also propose a variation of this model to explain why many mutualisms are exaggerated forms of cooperation with shared interests. In a second approach, we focus on one specific enforcement mechanism called partner choice. Using agent-based simulations, we show that, when individuals can freely choose their cooperative partners, the only level of effort invested into cooperation that is evolutionarily stable is the one that maximizes the social efficiency of cooperation. We then build analytical models of partner choice imported from economic matching theory. We show that the only evolutionarily stable distribution of the benefits of cooperation is both independent of bargaining power and proportional to each participant's relative contribution. Thus, partner choice explains two fine-grained properties of human cooperation, namely our preferences for the most socially efficient forms of cooperation and our concerns for fair distributions. Finally, we show that costly signalling models of cooperation can explain several properties of moral reputation, and we conclude by discussing directions for future research
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Simões, Patrício Manuel Vieira. „Cooperation in rats playing an interated Prisoner's dilemma game : influence of a game matrix formed with qualitatively distinct payoffs“. Master's thesis, Instituto Superior de Psicologia Aplicada, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.12/955.
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Dissertação de Mestrado em EtologiaO Dilema do Prisioneiro Reiterado (repetido) (DPR) é o paradigma centra! no estudo da cooperação de animais não-humanos. Este jogo formaliza os requerimentos descritos por Trivers (1971) para que a cooperação surja e se mantenha por reciprocidade. Neste jogo dois jogadores podem escolher numa jogada entre cooperar ou não cooperar: A cooperação mútua fornece a ambos os jogadores um reforço R (Reward), enquanto a não cooperação mútua fornece um reforço P (Punishment). Se um dos jogadores cooperar e o seu adversário não o fizer, o primeiro recebe um reforço S (Sucker) e o último recebe T (Temptation). Os reforços deste jogo terão que seguir as inequações T>R>P>S e 2R>T+S. O dilema deste jogo surge do facto de independentemente do que o adversário fizer, a escolha de um jogador que produz um maior reforço é não cooperar (T>R e P>S). No entanto ambos os jogadores receberiam um reforço maior se ambos cooperassem. Ser reiterado significa que existem um número não especificado de jogadas em que o resultado de uma determinada jogada poderá ser influenciado pelo resultado das anteriores. Axelrod e Hamilton (1981) mostraram que a cooperação poderá tornar-se sustentada num jogo DPR e que a estratégia Tit-For-Tat (TFT), em particular, é uma solução robusta para este problema. A estratégia TFT comanda um jogador a cooperar no encontro inicial e em encontros posteriores a copiar a decisão anterior do adversário. Apesar do grande sucesso ao nível da investigação teórica, existem poucos dados empíricos que suportem a reciprocidade (e por consequência o DPR) como a explicação principal para a cooperação nos animais. De facto, e ao nível de estudos laboratoriais, animais sujeitos a uma matriz de jogo conforme ao DPR mostraram valores diminutos de cooperação. O insucesso em manter a cooperação através de um paradigma DPR experimentalmente controlado, levou os investigadores a questionar que mecanismos poderão prevenir a emergência da cooperação nestes moldes. Uma abordagem alternativa utilizada foi experimentalmente controlar um dos jogadores num jogo do DPR, sendo na maior parte dos casos usada a estratégia TFT. Estes estudos mostraram que os animais sob o paradigma DPR dão prioridade às consequências de curto prazo, enquanto desvalorizam o resultado de jogadas futuras. Para mais, as contingências de reforço, quer locais, quer passadas (como por exemplo, a magnitude de reforço entre os resultados T, R, P e S) podem modificar a probabilidade de cooperação do animal. Partindo do princípio que jogar o DPR pode ser considerado uma tarefa de condicionamento operante, Stephens e Clements (1998) desenvolveram um modelo teórico que explora a relação entre os processos de aprendizagem e os equilíbrios teóricos do jogo utilizando matrizes de jogo com reforços positivos (recompensas), reforços negativos (castigos) ou ambos. A grande maioria dos estudos laboratoriais no DPR utiliza uma matriz de reforços positivos (na prática unidades de comida ou de dinheiro, se em humanos). No entanto este modelo apresenta um cenário interessante que deriva da aplicação de uma matriz de jogo em que os reforços S e P sejam: i) universalmente e sem ambiguidade considerados castigos e ii) qualitativamente distintos dos reforços T e R. Usando este tipo de matriz heterogénea, o modelo de Stephens e Clements prevê que os jogadores exibam elevados níveis de cooperação (entre os 60% e os 100%, dependendo da taxa de aprendizagem). Segundo o nosso conhecimento, tal matriz nunca foi aplicada em estudos de cooperação em animais não-humanos. Uma abordagem exclusivamente económica do DPR parece insuficiente para explicar a divergência entre predições teóricas e dados empíricos, visto que a estrutura clássica deste jogo não captura a sofisticação cognitiva que parece estar envolvida na cooperação por reciprocidade. Em concreto, os animais deverão ter capacidade de reconhecer o seu adversário como um indivíduo, compensar a diminuição do valor de reforço futuros e ter capacidade de memória suficiente para cumprir obrigações recíprocas de modo a que a cooperação por reciprocidade se mantenha. Para além dos obstáculos cognitivos, também as interacções sociais em si mesmas poderão limitar ou estimular a cooperação visto que a simples presença de um conspecífico poderá ter um valor de reforço não nulo. Deste modo, os reforços que os experimentadores tencionam dar numa experiência podem ser totalmente discordantes dos experienciados pelos animais. Esta dissertação pretende examinar as escolhas de ratazanas quando sujeitas a um jogo do DPR utilizando uma matriz de jogo constituída por reforços positivos (T- 4 pepitas de chocolate e R- 1 pepita de chocolate) e reforços negativos (P- 1 beliscão na cauda e S- 3 beliscões na cauda). Os animais jogaram contra um conspecífico programado para responder segundo uma estratégia TFT ou uma estratégia aleatória. As tendências cooperativas e as estratégias globais dos animais foram analisadas e os possíveis constrangimentos cognitivos e sociais que possam explicar as observações foram discutidos. Os resultados mostraram que quando as decisões são reciprocadas (oponente TFT), as ratazanas mostram níveis de cooperação sustentada de aproximadamente 60% por sessão, significativamente maior que os 12% de cooperação observada em ratazanas que jogaram contra uma estratégia aleatória. O sujeitos que jogaram contra um oponente TFT parecem ter adoptado uma estratégia de jogo sub-óptima, mostrando níveis altos de cooperação sustentada e de não cooperação sustentada e alta probabilidade de "perdão". Ratazanas que jogaram contra uma estratégia aleatória pareceram mostrar uma estratégia de jogo a tender para o óptimo. Observou-se que a presença e posição de um conspecífico influenciou as decisões das ratazanas quando estas envolviam dois reforços positivos de diferente valor. Esta influência social foi nula quando a decisão envolvia dois reforços negativos. Este reforço externo proveniente da componente social dos animais poderá modificar o valor da matriz de jogo recebida pelos animais num contexto de DPR. Foi observada uma preferência por parte das ratazanas em entrar nos compartimentos imediatamente adjacentes ao conspecífico quando os reforços entregues eram positivos.Esta influência externa poderá modificar as tendências cooperativas e as estratégias de jogo das ratazanas sujeitas a um jogo DPR. Estes animais mostraram-se sensíveis a contingências de reforço passadas e cooperaram significativamente menos contra uma estratégia TFT (cerca de 26%) quando previamente submetidas a uma estratégia aleatória. Este estudo demonstra que animais não-humanos podem apresentar altos níveis de cooperação sustentada num contexto DPR cuja matriz de jogo seja constituída por reforços positivos e negativos. No entanto, quer os níveis de cooperação observados, quer as estratégias adoptadas pelas ratazanas contra um oponente conspecífico são influenciados por efeitos sociais e de contingências de reforço passadas. Tal implica que uma perspectiva exclusivamente económica é insuficiente para explicar comportamentos cooperativos em animais. Não obstante, o DPR representa ainda uma ferramenta válida para o estudo da cooperação se se considerar os efeitos sociais e históricos próprios das interacções cooperativas entre os animais.
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van, Asch Edward. „Exploring the effectiveness of international cooperation to combat transnational organized wildlife crime : lessons learned from initiatives in Asia“. Thesis, University of Sheffield, 2017. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/19161/.
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The thesis aims to explore the effectiveness of international cooperation to combat transnational organized wildlife crime by analysing some lessons learned from two specific initiatives in Asia: the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ Wildlife Enforcement Network (ASEAN-WEN) and the Border Liaison Office (BLO) Mechanism. However, both exploring and measuring effectiveness are part of a difficult puzzle. To fit all the pieces of the puzzle together, the research explores the international framework within which the illegal wildlife trade is combated as well as the role of the various actors involved. The illegal wildlife trade is then examined as a transnational organized crime. This is followed by an analysis of the emergence of new structures or initiatives developed to facilitate cooperation and coordination to combat the illegal wildlife trade in Asia, and Southeast Asia in particular. The research provides a process evaluation of the initiatives on the illegal wildlife trade and cross-border cooperation and is grounded on findings which are constructed around themes identified based on available literature and perceptions of participants involved in the initiatives. The thesis provides an in-depth analysis of two existing efforts in Asia and attempts to measure their effectiveness as organisations, though it is not possible to undertake an outcome evaluation. It also identifies ways to strengthen both the effectiveness of efforts and the way one could analyse or measure their effectiveness. This includes exploring the challenges of cooperation and the various actors involved; considerations on wildlife crime as a serious transnational crime and combating it through platforms for cooperation, and; exploring and measuring the effectiveness of the different initiatives in a process evaluation. Given the pervasive role of corruption, some reflections on this important matter are included. The thesis concludes with some thoughts for future research and engagement for the broader research community as well as practitioners or organizations involved in similar efforts to combat transnational organized wildlife crime.
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Moritz, Ruby Louisa Viktoria [Verfasser], Martin [Akademischer Betreuer] Middendorf, Martin [Gutachter] Middendorf und Sanaz [Gutachter] Mostaghim. „Cooperation in self-organized heterogeneous swarms / Ruby Louisa Viktoria Moritz ; Gutachter: Martin Middendorf, Sanaz Mostaghim ; Betreuer: Martin Middendorf“. Leipzig : Universitätsbibliothek Leipzig, 2015. http://d-nb.info/1239423993/34.
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Motro, Daphna, Tamar Kugler und Terry Connolly. „Back to the basics: how feelings of anger affect cooperation“. EMERALD GROUP PUBLISHING LTD, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/621521.
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Purpose - The authors propose that angry individuals are much more likely to consider the emotional state of their partner than are neutral individuals. They then apply a lay theory dictating that anger decreases cooperation and react accordingly by lowering their own level of cooperation. Design/methodology/approach - The authors report four experiments involving different samples, manipulations, payment schemes and interfaces. The methodological approach was to capitalize on the positives of experimental research (e.g. establishing causality) while also trying to conceptually replicate the findings in different settings. Findings - The authors found evidence for a lay theory (i.e. expectation) that anger decreases cooperation, but that actual cooperation was lowest when angry individuals were paired with other angry individuals, supporting the hypotheses. Research limitations/implications - Anger can spill over from unrelated contexts to affect cooperation, and incidental anger by itself is not enough to decrease cooperation. However, the findings are limited to anger and cannot necessarily be used to understand the effects of other emotions. Practical implications - Before entering into a context that requires cooperation, such as a negotiation, be wary of the emotional state of both yourself and of your partner. This paper suggests that only if both parties are angry, then the likelihood of cooperation is low. Originality/value - To the best of the authors' knowledge, they are the first researchers to address the question of how incidental anger affects single-round cooperation. By going back to the basics, the authors believe that the findings fill a gap in existing research and offer a building block for future research on anger and cooperation.
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Hanley, James E. „The role of non-cooperative games in the evolution of cooperation /“. view abstract or download file of text, 2000. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/uoregon/fullcit?p9986740.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2000.Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 115-123). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.
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Srivastava, Vivek. „Behavior-based Incentives for Node Cooperation in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks“. Diss., Virginia Tech, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/29172.
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A Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) adopts a decentralized communication architecture which relies on cooperation among nodes at each layer of the protocol stack. Its reliance on cooperation for success and survival makes the ad hoc network particularly sensitive to variations in node behavior. Specifically, for functions such as routing, nodes which are limited in their resources may be unwilling to cooperate in forwarding for other nodes. Such selfish behavior leads to degradation in the performance of the network and possibly, in the extreme case, a complete cessation of operations. Consequently it is important to devise solutions to encourage resource-constrained nodes to cooperate.
Incentive schemes have been proposed to induce selfish nodes to cooperate. Though many of the proposed schemes in the literature are payment-based, nodes can be incentivized to cooperate by adopting policies which are non-monetary in nature, but rather are based on the threat of retaliation for non-cooperating nodes. These policies, for which there is little formal analysis in the existing literature on node cooperation, are based on observed node behavior. We refer to them as behavior-based incentives. In this work, we analyze the effectiveness of behavior-based incentives in inducing nodes to cooperate.
To determine whether an incentive scheme is effective in fostering cooperation we develop a game-theoretic model. Adopting a repeated game model, we show that nodes may agree to cooperate in sharing their resources and forward packets, even if they perceive a cost in doing so. This happens as the nodes recognize that refusing to cooperate will result in similar behavior by others, which ultimately would compromise the viability of the network as a whole.
A major shortcoming in the analysis done in past works is the lack of consideration of practical constraints imposed by an ad hoc environment. One such example is the assumption that a node, when making decisions about whether to cooperate, has perfect knowledge of every other node's actions. In a distributed setting this is impractical. In our work, we analyze behavior-based incentives by incorporating such practical considerations as imperfect monitoring into our game-theoretic models. In modeling the problem as a game of imperfect public monitoring (nodes observe a common public signal that reflects the actions of other nodes in the network) we show that, under the assumption of first order stochastic dominance of the public signal, the grim trigger strategy leads to an equilibrium for nodes to cooperate.
Even though a trigger-based strategy like grim-trigger is effective in deterring selfish behavior it is too harsh in its implementation. In addition, the availability of a common public signal in a distributed setting is rather limited. We, therefore, consider nodes that individually monitor the behavior of other nodes in the network and keep this information private. Note that this independent monitoring of behavior is error prone as a result of slow switching between transmit and promiscuous modes of operation, collisions and congestion due to the wireless medium, or incorrect feedback from peers. We propose a probability-based strategy that induces nodes to cooperate under such a setting. We analyze the strategy using repeated games with imperfect private monitoring and show it to be robust to errors in monitoring others" actions. Nodes achieve a near-optimal payoff at equilibrium when adopting this strategy.
This work also characterizes the effects of a behavior-based incentive, applied to induce cooperation, on topology control in ad hoc networks. Our work is among the first to consider selfish behavior in the context of topology control. We create topologies based on a holistic view of energy consumption " energy consumed in forwarding packets as well as in maintaining links. Our main results from this work are to show that: (a) a simple forwarding policy induces nodes to cooperate and leads to reliable paths in the generated topology, (b) the resulting topologies are well-connected, energy-efficient and exhibit characteristics similar to those in small-world networks.Ph. D.
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Volk, Stefan. „The evolution of trust and cooperation in diverse groups : a game experimental approach“. kostenfrei, 2009. http://www.biblio.unisg.ch/www/edis.nsf/wwwDisplayIdentifier/3579.
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Tarrant, Carolyn Clare. „Continuity, trust and cooperation : a game theory perspective on the GP-patient interaction“. Thesis, University of Leicester, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/2381/847.
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There is evidence that personal continuity is associated with positive processes and outcomes, although much of the previous work has lacked a theoretical framework. This thesis aims to explore, and develop a model of, the relationship between continuity, trust and cooperation in primary care, based on existing principles from game theory. Hypotheses generated from a game theory perspective were tested through a questionnaire survey of 279 patients. A secondary qualitative analysis of two data sets – interviews with patients and GPs – was also carried out to explore experiences of trust and cooperation in primary care. The survey findings indicated that a history of positive interactions between a patient and a GP, and expectation of future interactions, were associated with higher trust, as was interpersonal care. Trust was found to be weakly associated with self-reported adherence to treatment. The analysis of patient interviews found that patients described relatively high levels of initial trust. Repeated interactions allowed initial trust in the GP to be validated, and allowed the patient to build their own reputation as cooperative. Over time, experience of consulting the same GP could lead to a reduction of uncertainty, and a move to a more stable, affective basis for trust. This was associated with increased willingness to disclose information, and to accept treatment or advice. Analysis of GP interviews explored GP views of patient trust, and identified mechanisms inherent in repeated interactions that could promote quality of care. The findings from the qualitative and quantitative work are drawn together in order to develop a model of trust and cooperation in primary care, informed by game theory principles. This thesis highlights the reciprocal and interdependent nature of the health professional-patient relationship, and the value of repeated interactions in promoting mutual trust and cooperation. The implications of this for policy are discussed.
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Irmischer, Drew M. „Game theory and the warrior diplomat interagency cooperation in stability and reconstruction operations“. Thesis, Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5079.
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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimitedThe U.S. has become increasingly involved with failed and failing states since the end of the Cold War in the 1990s. Further, failed and failing states are forecast to remain a national security issue well into the future. United States involvement with failed and failing states has primarily focused around reconstruction and stability operations, and crisis management efforts. Previous reconstruction and stability efforts have been wrought with inefficiency and agency stovepipes. The United States believes a whole government approach is the solution to effective reconstruction and stability operations. While most agree, interagency cooperation is imperative to the whole government approach, interagency cooperation is difficult to achieve in practice. The United States State Department has been placed in charge of reconstruction and stability operations but has limited resources available. The Department of Defense is the only agency with the resources available. The Department of State and Department of Defense resources, organizational structure, and capabilities are compared. Reconstruction and stabilization efforts of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq are examined. An analysis utilizing Game Theory is performed to determine key mechanisms increasing interagency collaboration during reconstruction and stability operations.
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Suzuki, Toshihiro. „A Game Theoretic Approach to Multi-Agent Cooperation with Application to Economic Systems“. Thesis, KTH, Optimeringslära och systemteori, 2014. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-144104.
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Consensus problem with multi-agent systems has interested researchers in various areas. Its difficulties tend to appear when available information of each agent is limited for achieving consensus. Besides, it is not always the case that agents can catch the whole states of the others; an output is often the only possible measurement for each agent in applications. The idea of graph Laplacian is then of help to address such a troublesome situation. While every single agent obviously makes decision to achieve an individual goal of minimizing its own cost functional, all agents as a team can obtain even more improvement by cooperation in some cases, which leads to cooperative game theoretic approach. The main goal of this master thesis is to accomplish a combination of optimal control theory and cooperative game theory in order to solve the output consensus problem with limited network connectivity. Along with this combination, bargaining problems are considered out of necessity.
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Morford, Zachary H. „The Effects of Fines on Cooperation in a Four-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma Game“. Thesis, University of North Texas, 2011. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc84257/.
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Cooperation is an important area of investigation for behavior analysis. The prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) provides a useful scenario for studying cooperation in a behavior analytic paradigm. The PDG can be coupled with the concept of the metacontingency to investigate how various contingency arrangements support and promote cooperation in a group. Players in this experiment participated in a PDG and, in some conditions, were given the ability to fine other players but could not talk. The goal of this experiment was to investigate how players’ ability to fine one another affected the players’ patterns of cooperation, and whether fining itself was affected by the addition of a shared group consequence. The data show that participants cooperated in some conditions, but the fines did not seem to affect players’ rates of cooperation.
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Saral, Ali Seyhun. „Three Essays on Cooperation and Reciprocity“. Doctoral thesis, Università degli studi di Trento, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/11572/242869.
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This dissertation aims to contribute to the literature of cooperation and social preferences. We use experimental and computational methods to understand the role and extent of reciprocity on cooperation.
The first paper is a methodological contribution to the large literature on conditional preferences of cooperation. Cooperation generated by this type of preferences is notoriously unstable, as individuals reduce their contributions to the public good in reaction to other subjects' free-riding. This has led to the widely-shared conclusion that cooperation observed in experiments (and its collapse) is mostly driven by imperfect reciprocity. In this study, we explore the possibility that reciprocally cooperative preferences may themselves be unstable. We do so by observing the evolution of subjects' preferences in an anonymously repeated social dilemma. Our unsettling result is that, in the course of the experiment, a significant fraction of reciprocally cooperative subjects become egoistic, while the reverse is rarely observed. The non-selfish preferences that appear to be more stable are those most easily attributed to confusion. We are thus driven to the conclusion that egoism is more resistant to exposure to social dilemmas than reciprocity.
The second paper the evolutionary success of conditional preferences by using simulations. We use an agent-based model in which agents play a variation of the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game. We estimate the likelihood of cooperation levels as well as the likelihood of the existence of conditional types for different continuation probabilities. We show that an all-or-none type of conditional cooperation strategy together with the perfect conditional cooperation strategy are most likely to emerge when the continuation probability is sufficiently high. Our most surprising finding is related to the so-called hump-shaped strategy, a conditional type that is commonly observed in experiments. Our simulations show that those types are likely to thrive for intermediate levels of the continuation probability due to their relative advantage when probability of interaction is not enough to sustain a full-cooperation, but instead merely sustains mid-level cooperation.
The third paper aims to understand the underlying reciprocal motives in altruistic behavior. We argue that the altruism that is revealed in dictator games can be explained by what we call presumptive reciprocity. Subjects may display non-selfish preferences because they presume that the other subjects would have revealed similar, non-selfish preferences if the roles had been reversed. This kind of intuitive reasoning, although partially captured by indirect reciprocity, is overlooked in the literature on social preferences, especially when it comes to explaining the behavior that appears to be purely altruistic. The experimental evidence we provide shows that people's choices reveal mostly presumptive reciprocity, while purely altruistic preferences play a much smaller role.
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Brooks, Robert E. „Creating a coordinated game plan improving teamwork between law enforcement and the California National Guard“. Thesis, Monterey, Calif. : Naval Postgraduate School, 2007. http://bosun.nps.edu/uhtbin/hyperion.exe/07Mar%5FBrooks.pdf.
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Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Homeland Defense and Security))--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2007.Thesis Advisor(s): Stanley Supinski. "March 2007." Includes bibliographical references (p. 79-81). Also available in print.
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Dalhammar, Karl, und Erik Cederström. „Game changer? : Sveriges och Storbritanniens bilaterala försvarssamarbete efter Brexit“. Thesis, Högskolan i Halmstad, Akademin för ekonomi, teknik och naturvetenskap, 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hh:diva-42383.
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We have in our thesis focused on the bilateral defence and security cooperation between Sweden and Great Britain and investigated if Brexit have led to any consequenses on the cooperation between the two countries. We have also investigated possible consequenses on the bilateral cooperation in regards to Great Britain’s global ambitions. The defence cooperation is viewed from a Swedish perspective. Great Britain is a major security actor with global ambitions. Although, the EU has been a platform for cooperation in different political fields, including defence and security. With Great Britain leaving the EU, Sweden and Great Britain will lose this common platform. This change needs to be considered, especially due to the fact that Sweden has declared the ambition to deepen the defence and security cooperation with Great Britain. In this qualitative study we have turned to experts within the defence and security field with knowledge on the bilateral cooperation between Sweden and Great Britain. We have concluded that the bilateral defence and security cooperation have not been negatively influenced due to the British decision to leave the EU, nor it’s global ambition Global Britain. Although, Great Britain have announced it’s global ambitions after Brexit, we have concluded both that they have an interest in Sweden's vicinity and also that the cooperation have instead deepened during the last couple of years. We can also conclude that there are conditions in favour of a continued and deepened defence cooperation between Sweden and Great Britain. This thesis is written from a Swedish perspective. One of our recommendations for future research is recommending to explore the bilateral Swedish British defence cooperation from a British perspective. Finally, we have concluded that Brexit and Global Britain are not the ”Game Changer” as the title of the thesis imply. This was an assumption we made in the beginning of the work. But as the empirical studies have shown, this is not the case.Vi har i denna uppsats fokuserat på det bilaterala försvarssamarbetet mellan Sverige och Storbritannien och hur Brexit eventuellt påverkar samarbetet. Vidare har vi undersökt om Storbritanniens globala ambitioner påverkar det bilaterala försvarssamarbetet. Vi har belyst försvarssamarbetet ur ett svenskt perspektiv. Storbritannien är en stor säkerhetspolitisk aktör med globala ambitioner och där EU har varit en naturlig plattform för samarbete inom flertalet olika politiska områden inklusive försvars- och säkerhetspolitik. Med Storbritanniens utträde ur EU så mister Sverige och Storbritannien denna gemensamma plattform för samarbete och denna förändring måste hanteras, speciellt då Sverige deklarerar att man vill fördjupa samarbetet med Storbritannien inom försvars-området. I denna kvalitativa intervjustudie har vi vänt oss till sakkunniga inom det försvars- och säkerhetspolitiska området vilka har god kunskap om det bilaterala samarbetet mellan Sverige och Storbritannien. Vi kan konstatera att det bilaterala försvars- och säkerhetssamarbetet inte har fått några negativa konsekvenser kopplat till Storbritanniens utträde ur EU eller dess globala ambition Global Britain. Trots att Storbritannien har aviserat globala ambitioner efter Brexit kan vi dels konstatera dess intresse att verka i Sveriges närområde samt också att vårt bilaterala samarbete snarare har fördjupats de senaste åren. Vi har även kunnat konstatera att det finns goda förutsättningar för ett fortsatt och fördjupat försvarssamarbete mellan Sverige och Storbritannien. Denna uppsats är skriven ur ett svenskt perspektiv. En av våra rekommendationer för framtida forskning föreslår att även utreda försvarssamarbetet ur ett brittiskt perspektiv. Avslutningsvis har vi konstaterat att Brexit och Global Britain inte är någon större ”Game changer” för det bilaterala försvarssamarbetet mellan Sverige och Storbritannien som uppsatsens titel implicerar. Detta var ett antagande vi gjorde när arbetet inleddes, men som utifrån vår empiri inte visat sig stämma.
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Guang, August. „Switching Between Cooperation and Competition in Social Selection“. Scholarship @ Claremont, 2012. https://scholarship.claremont.edu/hmc_theses/40.
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Roughgarden et al. (2006) proposed a theory called social selection as a behavioral game theoretic model for sexual reproduction that incorporates both competition and cooperation in 2006. Players oscillate between playing competitively to maximize their individual fitness, leading to a Nash Competitive Equilibrium, and playing cooperatively to maximize a team fitness function, leading to a Nash Bargaining Solution. Roughgarden et al. (2006) gives rates of change for both the competitive state and the cooperative state, but does not explain her rates or how to switch between the states in sufficient detail.
We test and rederive the rates, critiquing an assumption that the derivation of such a rate must make, as well as create a probabilistic model that switches between the two states. We test our model on the reproductive behaviors of Symphodus tinca, the peacock wrasse. The results follow the trajectory of the reproductive strategies for the wrasse throughout the breeding system, suggesting that cooperation could be a mechanism through which wrasse change their reproductive behaviors. However, the inputs to the model need to be analyzed more critically. Future work could include deriving rates for competitive play and cooperative play that do not rely on assumptions of being able to quantify strategy allocation proportion and refining the model and drawing generalized conclusions about it.
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Wang, Wenjing. „MITIGATING MISBEHAVIOR IN WIRELESS NETWORKS: A GAME THEORETIC APPROACH“. Doctoral diss., Orlando, Fla. : University of Central Florida, 2010. http://purl.fcla.edu/fcla/etd/CFE0003080.
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Tudge, Simon James. „Game theoretic treatments of social niche construction : how do the conditions for cooperation evolve?“ Thesis, University of Southampton, 2016. https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/410310/.
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The presence of cooperation has long puzzled evolutionary biologists; the resolution to this puzzle is often attributed to population structure. While the effects of population structure on cooperation are understood, less is known regarding how population structure is itself subject to evolution. The research program of Social Niche Construction (SNC) explores these issues. This thesis presents three related papers that further our understanding of SNC and addresses a number of issues within the research program. Firstly, I demonstrate that diploid organisms under the presence of meiotic drive represents an example of SNC; where assortative mating plays the role of the social niche modifier. I thus argue that assortative mating may be an adaptation that overcomes meiotic drive. Secondly, I present a formal argument for why a gene that causes individuals to assort cannot invade a population of freely-mixed defectors at equilibrium. I present a potential solution to this problem; namely, that if individuals engage in multiple simultaneous cooperative dilemmas, then there may be a continued selection pressure for increased assortment. Lastly, I present a model for the evolution of a cooperative division of labour. Previous gametheoretic definitions assume cooperation to be a single behaviour. I argue that this is too narrow, as often the benefits of cooperation come about through the interaction of differing types. To address this issue I define a class of games; which I call Division of Labour (DOL) games, that have the property that fitness is maximised by a mixture of different types. I show that DOL games are not resolved by a positive assortment on phenotype; instead mean fitness is maximised by positive assortment on a genotype that can exhibit phenotypic plasticity; i.e. express multiple phenotypes conditionally upon social environment. Together these models broaden and deepen our understanding of how population structure evolves and how SNC transforms social dilemmas and modifies social outcomes.
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Furlong, Ellen Elizabeth. „Number Cognition and Cooperation“. Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University, 2008. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1216999104.
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Řípová, Eva. „Game Of Life: Economics Of The Contraception Market“. Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2009. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-150282.
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This thesis deals with the contraception market in the context of decision making about children, trying to outline the consequences of this market for the economy as a whole. The first section introduces the market and defines the key role of the market for the women making the decision. The second part introduces the agents in the market with their incentives and motivations. The third part moves into closer detail paying attention mainly to choice problems and uncertainty problems. The forth part focuses on game theoretical framework and various strategies from which the players are choosing. The fifth part presents a range of models for situations in the market derived from "games" on the prisoner's dilemma principle. These games result in the hypotheses involving consequences of particular behaviour in the market. The sixth part tests the hypotheses from the previous chapter, using evidence from selected countries including Czech Republic, United Kingdom, United States, and China. The conclusion specifies future development that is uncertain but based on the current facts.
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Arfvén, Gustav. „Europol & the Creation of the European Counter Terrorism Centre“. Thesis, Försvarshögskolan, 2017. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva-6990.
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While the limited number of scholars in the field of EU intelligence cooperation tend to have a rather state-centric view and focus on the normative (trust) or the functional (efficieny) dimension of intelligence cooperation, this study contributes to the field by focusing solely on the institutional structure of Europol. The purpose of this study is to examine why the Europol established the European Counter Terrorism Centre and why it is not addressing the interconnectedness between terrorism and organized crime. In order to address these questions, the theoretical framework of historical institutionalism has been applied and the notion of path dependency plays a vital role. The study rests on a qualitative single case study design and the disciplined configurative-model is used to fulfill the research objective. The researcher traces the process in a historically chronological order and uses pre-existing materials in order to uncover explanatory findings. The study concludes that the theoretical framework of historical institutionalism and the notion of path dependency can explain the research problem and the research questions. The findings prove that Europol is a highly reactive institution in terms of its counter-terrorism arrangements and that historical perceptions play a significant role and inevitable leads the institution onto a path dependent track.
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Crosby, Garth Valentine. „Trust Based Security Mechanisms for Wireless Sensor Networks“. FIU Digital Commons, 2007. http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/61.
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Wireless sensor networks are emerging as effective tools in the gathering and dissemination of data. They can be applied in many fields including health, environmental monitoring, home automation and the military. Like all other computing systems it is necessary to include security features, so that security sensitive data traversing the network is protected. However, traditional security techniques cannot be applied to wireless sensor networks. This is due to the constraints of battery power, memory, and the computational capacities of the miniature wireless sensor nodes. Therefore, to address this need, it becomes necessary to develop new lightweight security protocols. This dissertation focuses on designing a suite of lightweight trust-based security mechanisms and a cooperation enforcement protocol for wireless sensor networks. This dissertation presents a trust-based cluster head election mechanism used to elect new cluster heads. This solution prevents a major security breach against the routing protocol, namely, the election of malicious or compromised cluster heads. This dissertation also describes a location-aware, trust-based, compromise node detection, and isolation mechanism. Both of these mechanisms rely on the ability of a node to monitor its neighbors. Using neighbor monitoring techniques, the nodes are able to determine their neighbors’ reputation and trust level through probabilistic modeling. The mechanisms were designed to mitigate internal attacks within wireless sensor networks. The feasibility of the approach is demonstrated through extensive simulations. The dissertation also addresses non-cooperation problems in multi-user wireless sensor networks. A scalable lightweight enforcement algorithm using evolutionary game theory is also designed. The effectiveness of this cooperation enforcement algorithm is validated through mathematical analysis and simulation. This research has advanced the knowledge of wireless sensor network security and cooperation by developing new techniques based on mathematical models. By doing this, we have enabled others to build on our work towards the creation of highly trusted wireless sensor networks. This would facilitate its full utilization in many fields ranging from civilian to military applications.
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Komali, Ramakant S. „Game-Theoretic Analysis of Topology Control“. Diss., Virginia Tech, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/28358.
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Ad hoc networks are emerging as a cost-effective, yet, powerful tool for communication.
These systems, where networks can emerge and converge on-the-fly, are guided by the
forward-looking goals of providing ubiquitous connectivity and constant access to information.
Due to power and bandwidth constraints, the vulnerability of the wireless medium, and
the multi-hop nature of ad hoc networks, these networks are becoming increasingly complex
dynamic systems. Besides, modern radios are empowered to be reconfigurable, which harbors
the temptation to exploit the system. To understand the implications of these issues, some
of which pose significant challenges to efficient network design, we study topology control
using game theory.
We develop a game-theoretic framework of topology control that broadly captures the radio
parameters, one or more of which can be tuned under the purview of topology control. In
this dissertation, we consider two parameters, viz. transmit power and channel, and study
the impact of controlling these on the emergent topologies.
We first examine the impact of node selfishness on the network connectivity and energy
efficiency under two levels of selfishness: (a) nodes cooperate and forward packets for one
another, but selfishly minimize transmit power levels and; (b) nodes selectively forward
packets and selfishly control transmit powers. In the former case, we characterize all the
Nash Equilibria of the game and evaluate the energy efficiency of the induced topologies.
We develop a better-response-based dynamic that guarantees convergence to the minimal
maximum power topology. We extend our analysis to dynamic networks where nodes have
limited knowledge about network connectivity, and examine the tradeoff between network
performance and the cost of obtaining knowledge. Due to the high cost of maintaining
knowledge in networks that are dynamic, mobility actually helps in information-constrained
networks. In the latter case, nodes selfishly adapt their transmit powers to minimize their
energy consumption, taking into account partial packet forwarding in the network. This
work quantifies the energy efficiency gains obtained by cooperation and corroborates the
need for incentivizing nodes to forward packets in decentralized, energy-limited networks.
We then examine the impact of selfish behavior on spectral efficiency and interference minimization
in multi-channel systems. We develop a distributed channel assignment algorithm
to minimize the spectral footprint of a network while establishing an interference-free connected
network. In spite of selfish channel selections, the network spectrum utilization is
shown to be within 12% of the minimum on average. We then extend the analysis to dynamic
networks where nodes have incomplete network state knowledge, and quantify the price of
ignorance. Under the limitations on the number of available channels and radio interfaces, we
analyze the channel assignment game with respect to interference minimization and network
connectivity goals. By quantifying the interference in multi-channel networks, we illuminate
the interference reduction that can be achieved by utilizing orthogonal channels and by distributing
interference over multiple channels. In spite of the non-cooperative behavior of
nodes, we observe that the selfish channel selection algorithm achieves load balancing.
Distributing the network control to autonomous agents leaves open the possibility that nodes
can act selfishly and the overall system is compromised. We advance the need for considering
selfish behavior from the outset, during protocol design. To overcome the effects of
selfishness, we show that the performance of a non-cooperative network can be enhanced by
appropriately incentivizing selfish nodes.Ph. D.
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Lai, Lifeng. „Multiuser wireless networks the user cooperation perspective“. Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University, 2007. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1186425130.
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Larson, Jennifer Mary. „The Good, the Bad and the Cunning: How Networks Make or Break Cooperation“. Thesis, Harvard University, 2012. http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:10171.
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Groups often find themselves in a position to self-govern: sometimes a formal governing apparatus is weak or nonexistent; sometimes the legal system is underdeveloped, heavily back-logged or inapplicable; and sometimes groups simply have a preference for informal processes. In such cases, contrary to the Hobbesian vision of a self-help nightmare, groups often fare remarkably well both cooperating internally and coexisting with other groups. Diffuse punishment institutions induce cooperation well in tight-knit groups: the theory is well-understood and empirical examples abound. In many realistic settings, though, groups are imperfectly tight-knit, especially when populations are large or sparse or when communications technology is poor (even Facebook networks with very low-cost links are incomplete). Here I relate cooperation to a group's exact structure of communication to identify the role that networks play in making or breaking cooperation. By generalizing the game-theoretic model in Fearon and Laitin (1996), I present a model flexible enough to account for the various ways that a group may be imperfectly tight-knit.Government
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Ito, Koichi. „Influence of the structure of interaction among individuals on the evolution of cooperation“. 京都大学 (Kyoto University), 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/2433/200486.
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Kersting, Jan [Verfasser]. „Stability of cooperation in the international climate negotiations - An analysis using cooperative game theory / Jan Kersting“. Karlsruhe : KIT Scientific Publishing, 2017. http://www.ksp.kit.edu.
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Motlagh, Mahsa [Verfasser]. „Prospects of Cooperation in the Eastern Nile Basin : The case of Experimental Game Application / Mahsa Motlagh“. Bonn : Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Bonn, 2018. http://d-nb.info/1173898530/34.
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Toyasaki, Fuminori, Fichtinger Emel Arikan, Lena Silbermayr und Sigala Ioanna Falagara. „Disaster relief inventory management: horizontal cooperation between humanitarian organizations“. Wiley, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/poms.12661.
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Cooperation among humanitarian organizations has attracted increasing attention to enhance effectiveness and efficiency of relief supply chains. Our research focuses on horizontal cooperation in inventory management which is currently implemented in the United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot (UNHRD) network. The present work follows a two-step research approach, which involves collection of empirical data and quantitative modeling to examine and overcome the coordination challenges of the network. Our interviews with members of the network identified several managerial issues for sustainable cooperative inventory management that the UNHRD network pursues. Using a newsvendor model in the context of non-cooperative game theory, our research has explored member humanitarian organizations' incentive of joining the network, a coordination mechanism which achieves system optimality, and impacts of members' decisions about stock rationing. Our results indicate that behaviors of member HOs do not necessarily align with the UNHRD's expectation. Our results suggest that for system optimality, a system coordinator should carefully assess the circumstances, including demand coefficient and stock rationing. Our research also proposes a policy priority for the first-best system optimal inventory management.
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Han, The Anh. „Intention recognition, commitment and their roles in the evolution of cooperation“. Doctoral thesis, Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10362/8784.
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Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Doutor em
InformáticaThe goal of this thesis is twofold. First, intention recognition is studied from an Arti cial Intelligence (AI) modeling perspective. We present a novel and e cient intention recognition method that possesses several important features: (i) The method is context-dependent and incremental, enabled by incrementally constructing a three-layer Bayesian network model as more actions are observed, and in a context-dependent manner, relying on a logic programming knowledge base concerning the context; (ii) The Bayesian network is composed from a knowledge base of readily speci ed and readily maintained Bayesian network fragments with simple structures, enabling an e cient acquisition of the corresponding knowledge base (either from domain experts or else automatically from a plan corpus); and, (iii) The method addresses the issue of intention change and abandonment, and can appropriately resolve the issue of multiple intentions recognition. Several aspects of the method are evaluated experimentally, achieving some de nite success. Furthermore, on top of the intention recognition method, a novel framework for intention-based decision making is provided, illustrating several ways in which an ability to recognize intentions of others can enhance a decision making process. A second subgoal of the thesis concerns that, whereas intention recognition has been extensively studied in small scale interactive settings, there is a major shortage of modeling research with respect to large scale social contexts, namely evolutionary roles and aspects of intention recognition. Employing our intention recognition method and the tools of evolutionary game theory, this thesis explicitly addresses the roles played by intention recognition in the nal outcome of cooperation in large populations of self-regarding individuals. By equipping individuals with the capacity for assessing intentions of others in the course of social dilemmas, we show how intention recognition is selected by natural selection, opening a window of opportunity for cooperation to thrive, even in hard cooperation prone games like the Prisoner's Dilemma. In addition, there are cases where it is di cult, if not impossible, to recognize the intentions of another agent. In such cases, the strategy of proposing commitment, or of intention manifestation, can help to impose or clarify the intentions of others. Again using the tools of evolutionary game theory, we show that a simple form of commitment can lead to the emergence of cooperation; furthermore, the combination of commitment with intention recognition leads to a strategy better than either one by itself. How the thesis should be read? We recommend that the thesis be read sequentially, chapter by chapter [1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8]. However, for those more interested in intention recognition from the AI modeling perspective, i.e. the rst subgoal of the thesis, Chapters 6 and 7 can be omitted and Chapters 4 and 5 are optional [1-2-3-(4)-(5)-8]. In addition, for those more keen on the problem of the evolution of cooperation, i.e. the second subgoal of thesis, Chapter 3 and even Chapter 2, can be omitted [1-(2)-4-5-6-7-8].
Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia - PhD grant (ref. SFRH/BD/62373/2009)
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Yan, Chang. „A computational game-theoretic study of reputation“. Thesis, University of Oxford, 2014. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:e6acb250-efb8-410b-86dd-9e3e85b427b6.
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As societies become increasingly connected thanks to advancing technologies and the Internet in particular, individuals and organizations (i.e. agents hereafter) engage in innumerable interaction and face constantly the possibilities thereof. Such unprecedented connectivity offers opportunities through which social and economic benefits are realised and disseminated. Nonetheless, risky and damaging interaction abound. To promote beneficial relationships and to deter adverse outcomes, agents adopt different means and resources. This thesis focuses on reputation as a crucial mechanism for promoting positive interaction, and examines the topic from game-theoretic perspective using computational methods. First, we investigate the design of reputation systems by incorporating economic incentives into algorithm design. Focusing on ubiquitous user-generated ratings on the Internet, we propose a truthful reputation mechanism that not only enforces honest reporting from individual raters but also takes into account their personal preferences. The mechanism is constructed using a blend of Bayesian Truth Serum and SimRank algorithms, both specifically adapted for our use case of online ratings. We show that the resulting mechanism is Bayesian incentive compatible and is computable in polynomial time. In addition, the mechanism is shown to be resistant to common manipulations on the Internet such as uniform fake ratings and targeted collusions. Lastly, we discuss detailed considerations for implementing the mechanism in practice. Second, we investigate experimentally the relative importance of reputational and social knowledge in sustaining cooperation in dynamic networks. In our experiments, U.S-based subjects play a repeated game where, in each round, an endogenous network is formed among a group of 13 players and each player chooses a cooperative or non-cooperative action that applies to all her connections. We vary the availability of reputational and social knowledge to subjects in 4 treatments. At the aggregate level, we find that reputational knowledge is of first-order importance for supporting cooperation, while social knowledge plays a complementary role only when reputational knowledge is available. Further community-level analysis reveals that reputational knowledge leads to the emergence of highly cooperative hubs, and a dense and cluster network, while social knowledge enhances cooperation by forming a large, dense and clustered community of cooperators who exclude outsiders through link removals and link refusals. At the individual level, reputational knowledge proves essential for the emergence of network structural characteristics that are associated with cooperative actions. In contrast, in treatments without reputational information, none of the network metrics is predicative of subjects' choices of action. Furthermore, we present UbiquityLab, a pioneering online platform for conducting real-time interactive experiments for game-theoretic studies. UbiquityLab supports both synchronous and asynchronous game models, and allows for complex and customisable interaction between subjects. It offers both back-end and front-end infrastructure with a modularised design to enable rapid development and streamlined operation. For in- stance, in synchronous mode, all per-stage and inter-stage logic are fully encapsulated by a thin server-side module, while a suite of client-side components eases the creation of game interface. The platform features a robust messaging protocol, such that player connection and game states are restored automatically upon networking errors and dropped out subjects are seamlessly substituted by customisable program players. Online experiments enjoy clear advantages over lab equivalents as they benefit from low operation cost, efficient execution, large and diverse subject pools, etc. UbiquityLab aims to promote online experiments as an emerging research methodology in experimental economics by bringing its benefits to other researchers.
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Ren, L. (Lei). „An experimental study on the effects of cooperation and competition in the game-based mobile language learning“. Master's thesis, University of Oulu, 2019. http://jultika.oulu.fi/Record/nbnfioulu-201904121459.
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Abstract. As gamification gains popularity, it is a trend to implement gamified social features in the mobile language learning field based on Social Interdependence Theory (SIT), because the social interaction can positively affect learners. However, a detailed examination of how gamified cooperation and competition affect language learning process and outcome remains an open subject.
The current study was conducted among university students in China (N=75), and those students were randomly assigned either gamified cooperation or gamified competition setting. All students were asked to complete a daily task: learning 20 English words for 14 days with an app named Baicizhan. The study used a quantitative methodology and the data, related to task completion, learning achievement, social relatedness and intrinsic motivation, were collected to compare the difference.
In current study, firstly it confirmed that the cooperation outperformed competition in terms of promoting social relatedness; secondly, it identified that competition outperformed cooperation in terms of learning achievement; thirdly, it revealed that there was no significant difference in terms of task completion and intrinsic motivation between two settings. In a short, our study demonstrates that constructive competition can be as effective as cooperation in terms of motivating learners to put efforts and invoking intrinsic motivation; moreover, constructive competition was even more effective than cooperation in promoting learning achievement. Therefore, the constructive competition should be encouraged and taken into consideration when applying the gamified social features to learning activities.