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1
Edge, Peter W. „The European Court of Human Rights and Religious Rights“. International and Comparative Law Quarterly 47, Nr. 3 (Juli 1998): 680–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020589300062230.
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Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides:1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
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Tann, Boravin. „The Implications of the NGO Law on the Right to Freedom of Association of Human Rights Defenders in Cambodia“. Journal of Southeast Asian Human Rights 4, Nr. 1 (27.06.2020): 200. http://dx.doi.org/10.19184/jseahr.v4i1.13397.
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The right to freedom of association is of particular importance for human rights defenders. Freedom of association is an indispensable agent for human rights change that permits human rights defenders to maintain their civic space and pursue their mission in promoting and protecting rights and fundamental freedoms in a democratic society. In the current legal and political climate, human rights defenders face increasing challenges in the exercise of their freedom of association and other nexus rights vis-à-vis fulfilling their mission to advocate for other peoples’ rights. The Law on Associations and Non-Government Organizations, also known as LANGO, marks a significant turning point for the de jure and de facto exercise of the freedom of association, in particular for the most vocal and active human rights defenders and human rights organizations in Cambodia. This article first explores core elements, limitations and state obligations concerning the right to freedom of association provided by the international human rights treaties that Cambodia has ratified. It further examines key provisions of LANGO regarding the right to freedom of association of human rights defenders. It highlights that LANGO presents a critical challenge to the freedom of association due to its fundamental flaws, ambiguities and inconsistencies concerning its provisions on establishment, operation and suspension or dissolution of associations. This article concludes that LANGO offers extensive regulatory guidelines for all associations and NGOs in Cambodia; yet it also trigger concerns not due to the details, but the lack thereof which could undermine the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of association and other universally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cambodia as a whole.
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Spigelman, James. „THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM: FREEDOM FROM FEAR“. International and Comparative Law Quarterly 59, Nr. 3 (Juli 2010): 543–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020589310000229.
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AbstractFreedom from fear, expressly recognized in the foundational human rights treaties, has been forgotten in human rights discourse. Fear can have profound behavioural impacts. Without recognition of the importance of freedom from fear, the fulfilment of many human rights is compromised, particularly physical security. Politico-legal thought, from Montesquieu and Blackstone, has long identified the significance of security of the person and the tension between liberty and security. Comparative exploration of contemporary case law reveals disparate approaches to the recognition of security of the person as an individual right which the State is obliged to protect. Increasing the salience of security of the person and the dimension of freedom from fear in human rights decision making raises the difficult issue of balancing conflicting rights.
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Perry, Michael J. „FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE AS RELIGIOUS AND MORAL FREEDOM“. Journal of Law and Religion 29, Nr. 1 (03.01.2014): 124–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/jlr.2013.1.
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AbstractIn another essay being published contemporaneously with this one, I have explained that as the concept “human right” is understood both in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in all the various international human rights treaties that have followed in the Universal Declaration's wake, a right is a human right if the rationale for establishing and protecting the right—for example, as a treaty-based right—is, in part, that conduct that violates the right violates the imperative, articulated in Article 1 of the Universal Declaration, to “act towards all human beings in a spirit of brotherhood.” Each of the human rights articulated in the Universal Declaration and/or in one or more international human rights treaties—for example, the right, articulated in Article 5 of the Universal Declaration and elsewhere, not to be subjected to “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”—is a specification of what, in conjunction with other considerations, the imperative—which functions in the morality of human rights as the normative ground of human rights—is thought to forbid (or to require). A particular specification is controversial if and to the extent the supporting claim—a claim to the effect that the “act towards all human beings in a spirit of brotherhood” imperative forbids (or requires)X—is controversial. My aim in this essay is to elaborate and defend a particular specification: the right, internationally recognized as a human right, to freedom of conscience—to freedom, that is, to live one's life in accord with the deliverances of one's conscience.
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Spencer, J. R. „English Criminal Procedure and the Human Rights Act 1998“. Israel Law Review 33, Nr. 3 (1999): 664–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021223700016101.
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The European Convention on Human Rights is one of the manifestations of the Council of Europe, an organisation of European states founded in 1949 with the aim of strengthening the common democratic heritage. It is an international treaty which binds the contracting States to respect the list of human rights and freedoms it proclaims. An enforcement mechanism exists in the form of the European Court of Human Rights (in this paper called ‘the Strasbourg court’).In brief, these rights and freedoms are the right to life (art. 2); freedom from torture or inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment (art. 3); freedom from slavery or forced labour (art. 4); the right to liberty (art. 5); the right to a fair trial (art. 6); freedom from retrospective criminal laws (art. 7); the right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence (art. 8); freedom of thought, conscience and religion (art. 9); freedom of expression (art. 10); freedom of peaceful assembly (art. 11); and the right to marry and found a family (art. 12). Over the years, this initial list of rights has been expanded by a series of additional Protocols — not all of which have been ratified by all the Member States. The First Protocol, which Britain has ratified, guarantees the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions, education, and free elections.
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Chandrachud, D. Y. „Constitutional and Administrative Law in India*“. International Journal of Legal Information 36, Nr. 2 (2008): 332–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0731126500003097.
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The Indian constitution contains in Part III, a Chapter on fundamental rights. The fundamental rights cover a broad spectrum, including•the right to life and personal liberty;•the right to equality and equal protection;•freedom of conscience;•the right to profess, practice and propagate religion;•freedom of association and assembly,•free movement within the territory of India, and•freedom to practice a profession, trade or business.The fundamental rights are not absolute because the freedoms that are recognized by Article 19 are subject to reasonable restrictions in a variety of contexts.
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Mikołajczyk, Zbigniew, und Jarosław Struniawski. „Freedom of Assembly and Safety“. Internal Security 9, Nr. 2 (09.07.2018): 105–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0012.1706.
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The article refers to freedom and human rights as universal and global principles covering all aspects of human life. Human rights are those freedoms, means of protection and services respected precisely as rights, which all people should be able to demand from the society in which they live, in accordance with today's freedoms. On the other hand, as rights they solely occur among individuals and authorities. None of the authority can take them away. They can not be waived or renounced. In Poland, guarantees of respect for human rights - to which all people are entitled and citizen's rights - to which only Polish citizens are entitled are included in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. According to it, the inherent and inalienable human dignity is a source of freedom and human and citizen's rights. One of the fundamental human right is the freedom of assembly. The possibility of using the freedom of assembly must be dictated by the need to ensure the protection of national security or public order, protection of health, public morals and rights and freedom of other people. Due to the subject matter discussed, the study focused on peaceful assemblies, which organization is guaranteed by law, on the other hand no illegal forms of protest were described - the blockades and occupation of buildings, transport routes, or prohibited strike forms. The main task of ensuring security during assemblies rests with the Police, whose fundamental duty is to facilitate the conduct of assemblies. It is important to find a balance between maintaining order and exercising the right of assembly.
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Lægaard, Sune. „Territorial Rights, Political Association, and Immigration“. Journal of Moral Philosophy 10, Nr. 5 (2013): 645–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/17455243-4681011.
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Liberals conceive of territorial rights as dependent on the legitimacy of the state, which is in turn understood in terms of the state’s protection of individual rights and freedoms. Such justifications of territorial rights have difficulties in addressing the right to control immigration, which is therefore in need of additional justification. The paper considers Christopher Heath Wellman’s liberal proposal for justifying the right to control immigration, which understands the right as derivative of a general right to freedom of association held collectively by the people of the state. The paper argues that state legitimacy and freedom of political association fail to connect in the way required to justify a right to control immigration. Wellman’s argument conflates the state as an institution and the people as a political collective and elides the difference between territorial jurisdiction and associational freedom.
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Prasetyani, Rurin Sisilia, und Shally Saniyya Novina. „The Interpretation of Freedom of Religion and Believe: How Do University Understand This to Society?“ Indonesian Journal of International Clinical Legal Education 2, Nr. 1 (31.03.2020): 15–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.15294/ijicle.v2i1.37325.
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This paper is based on the condition of freedom of religion and belief and people's understanding of the meaning of freedom of religion and belief which is still wrong and ambiguous. In fact, as dignified beings, humans have a number of basic rights that must be protected, such as the right to life, the right to political rights, the right to assemble, as well as the right to religion and belief. Human rights values teach that these basic human rights are protected and respected. Human rights teach the principle of equality and human freedom so that there can be no discrimination, exploitation and violence against humans in any form and also there should not be any restrictions and restrictions on basic human freedoms, including the right to freedom of religion. The Indonesian nation is a pluralistic nation. There are various kinds of ethnicity, race, religion, and ethnicity that cause diversity in Indonesia. Although the majority of Indonesian people are followers of Islam, however, in Indonesia there are also several other official religions recognized by the government, namely, Catholic Christians, Protestant Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, and Confucians. Therefore, every person has the right to freedom of religion or belief, that means no one may be subject to coercion that would interfere with his freedom to adhere to or embrace a religion or belief of his own choice.
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Horubski, Krzysztof. „Wolność prowadzenia działalności gospodarczej w świetle art. 16 Karty praw podstawowych — wybrane problemy“. Przegląd Prawa i Administracji 114 (10.08.2018): 499–510. http://dx.doi.org/10.19195/0137-1134.114.32.
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FREEDOM TO CONDUCT A BUSINESS IN THE LIGHT OF ARTICLE 16 OF THE CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION — SELECTED ISSUESThe article deals with the signifi cance and legal character of the provision of Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. This article provides for the freedom to conduct a business. Therefore, the article presents a standpoint regarding the qualifi cations of the right to conduct business within the framework of the division of provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into principles and fundamental rights rights or freedoms. In the article’s considerations, the right to conduct business activity under art. 16 of the Charter is recognized as a fundamental right. The article also draws attention to the signifi cant deficiencies in the protection of economic freedom in EU law, in particular when it concerns the introduction of restrictions on this freedom in EU derivative law. Finally, comments are also made regarding the basic aspects of the subjective and objective scope of the right to conduct business.
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Bazyar, Ahmad, Alireza Nasseri und Mohammad Taher Babari. „Study of the Concepts Related to the Boundaries of Freedom Expression“. Journal of Politics and Law 10, Nr. 2 (20.02.2017): 21. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v10n2p21.
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The right of freedom of expression can be named as one of the most important rights and freedoms that have been emphasized on by all the international documents of human rights. Despite the fact that the aforementioned right is a universal right, most of the experts believe that it cannot be absolute and in order to be able to support the public and private rights, it must be restricted to some extent. Now the question is that the restrictions on the freedom of expression are needed to be implemented in what frameworks and based on what principles? In reply to that question we can say that ethics, national security, public order and preservation the rights and reputations of others are the key principles of restrictions on freedom of expression.
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Hirschmann, Nancy J. „Disability rights, social rights, and freedom“. Journal of International Political Theory 12, Nr. 1 (08.11.2015): 42–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1755088215613627.
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Akiyama, Hajime. „COVID-19 measures and human rights guaranteed by the Japanese Constitution“. F1000Research 10 (14.09.2021): 230. http://dx.doi.org/10.12688/f1000research.50861.2.
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Since March 2020, the Act on Special Measures for Pandemic Influenza and New Infectious Diseases Preparedness and Response has been a significant statute in dealing with COVID-19 in Japan. The Act mandates requests, instructions and orders for business suspension and shortened business hours, as well as stay-at-home requests. These measures limit freedom of movement and establishment, guaranteed rights under the Japanese Constitution. This article poses the following research question: “Does the Japanese Constitution allow measures against COVID-19 such as requests, instructions and orders for business suspension and shortened business hours, and stay-at-home requests?” It also asks: “Are measures with penalties allowed by the Constitution?” given the fact that the penalties were introduced in February 2021. This paper introduces constitutional concepts that guarantee or limit individual freedom. Concepts that guarantee individual freedoms include freedom of establishment and movement. These freedoms derive from the constitutional values of freedom to choose one’s occupation and choose and change one’s residence (Art. 22) and the right to own or hold property (Art. 29). Concepts that limit individual freedom include the right to life (Art. 13), welfare rights and public health (Art. 25), and public welfare (Art. 13). Individual freedom that threatens right to life, welfare rights and public health, and public welfare may not be guaranteed. This paper argues that the Constitution allows the measures against COVID-19 limiting freedom of establishment and movement from the perspectives of the right to life, welfare rights, public health, and public welfare, and the government is responsible for reducing the risk to life from COVID-19. It also argues that the Constitution permits measures with penalties, while proportionality needs to be considered.
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Sambor, Mykola. „Proceedings on administrative lawsuits to remove obstacles and prohibit interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly: current issues of legal regulation“. Slovo of the National School of Judges of Ukraine, Nr. 4(29) (11.02.2020): 31–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.37566/2707-6849-2019-4(29)-3.
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The right to freedom of peaceful assembly, among others, is characterized by the fact that, in addition to the communicative function caused by human socialization, it is the guarantor of the exercise of other rights and freedoms from unjustified interference in the private legal sphere of the subjects of public administration. Given the procedural guarantees outlined above, ensuring the exercise of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly is crucial not only for the right, but also for the legal order in the country. The analysis of administrative procedural guarantees, in the form of the respective rights of the subject of exercise of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and the rights and duties of representatives of the subjects of public administration, gives grounds for the conclusion that the legislator puts the representatives of public administration in a condition where the latter have priority conditions vis-à-vis defendants - subjects of the exercise of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly. As a result, the procedural issues and guarantees for removing obstacles and prohibiting interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly in the norms of the Code of Administrative Judiciary of Ukraine are completely vague. In addition, a number of concepts that impede the exercise of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly are an alternative both to criminal liability and to judicial action. Even an appeal against a decision of a court of first instance in cases of administrative actions for the removal of obstacles and prohibition of interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly is recognized as an appeal against the decision of the administrative court to establish restrictions on the exercise of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly. We are convinced that the norms of the Code of Administrative Judiciary of Ukraine require qualitative changes regarding the creation of guarantees for the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly from unwarranted and unlawful interference by public administration entities based on the fundamental principles of the rule of law, respect for human rights and freedoms. Keywords: right to freedom of peaceful assembly, removal of restrictions, procedural guarantees.
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Coval, S., J. C. Smith† und Simon Coval‡. „The Foundations of Property and Property Law“. Cambridge Law Journal 45, Nr. 3 (November 1986): 457–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008197300118458.
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Explicit rights and freedoms such as those of thought, assembly, life, liberty and security of person occur in constitutional charters because they are activities and states which are necessary for any successful action. It is through the protection of its necessary conditions that freedom of action is itself protected. Moreover, without the inference that freedom of action is the basic value being protected we cannot justify the above rights and freedoms. If we accept this hypothesis about the justificatory structure of constitutions it provides us with a test of the completeness of the list of explicit rights and freedoms. We argue that no charter could justifiably include the usual explicit rights and freedoms and not include the right of the individual to property since the latter is no less a condition of free action than are the former.
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Bevz, Svitlana. „Confidential Information and the Right to Freedom of Speech“. International Journal of Criminology and Sociology 10 (30.04.2021): 648–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.6000/1929-4409.2021.10.75.
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The article is devoted to the problem of ensuring balance in the realization of two fundamental human rights and freedoms in a democratic society – the right to freedom of speech and privacy. It has been concluded that the rights to freedom of speech and privacy are recognized as fundamental human rights that do not conflict with each other but are intangible, inherent in every person. The right to freedom of journalism is a continuation of the right to freedom of speech and information and consists in the collection, storage, and dissemination of socially important information through the mass media. The usage of the rights in question, including in the mass media actions, may not be grounds for restricting or violating the right of everyone to privacy, the confidentiality of correspondence, correspondence, telephone conversations, and entails criminal liability in cases provided by law. In the public interest, the law provides grounds for exempting a journalist from criminal liability for disclosing confidential information, in particular in the case of disclosure of information of public interest or has already been published in other media, or concerns officials of public authorities.
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Akiyama, Hajime. „COVID-19 measures and the Japanese Constitution“. F1000Research 10 (23.03.2021): 230. http://dx.doi.org/10.12688/f1000research.50861.1.
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Since March 2020, the Act on Special Measures for Pandemic Influenza and New Infectious Diseases Preparedness and Response has been a significant statute in dealing with COVID-19 in Japan. The Act mandates requests and orders for business suspension and shortened business hours, as well as stay-at-home requests. Although there have been no penalties as of January 2021, these requests and orders limit freedom of movement and establishment, guaranteed rights under the Japanese Constitution. This article poses the following research question: “Does the Japanese Constitution allow measures against COVID-19 such as requests and orders for business suspension and shortened business hours, and stay-at-home requests?” It also asks: “Are measures with penalties allowed by the Constitution?” This paper introduces constitutional concepts that guarantee or limit individual freedom. Concepts that guarantee individual freedoms include freedom of establishment and movement. These freedoms derive from the constitutional values of freedom to choose one’s occupation and choose and change one’s residence (Art. 22) and the right to own or hold property (Art. 29). Concepts that limit individual freedom include the right to life (Art. 13), welfare rights and public health (Art. 25), and public welfare (Art. 13). Individual freedom that threatens right to life, welfare rights and public health, and public welfare may not be guaranteed. This paper argues that since measures against COVID-19 are considered public welfare, the Constitution allows the limiting of freedom of establishment and movement. Furthermore, from the perspectives of the right to life, welfare rights, and public health, the government is responsible for reducing the risk to life from COVID-19. It also argues that the Constitution permits measures with penalties, while proportionality needs to be considered.
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Shah, Hemant. „Freedom, Obligations, and Rights“. Social Philosophy Today 9 (1993): 79–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/socphiltoday1993913.
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Pandey, S. L. „Freedom, Rights and Dharma“. Social Philosophy Today 9 (1993): 43–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/socphiltoday199396.
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Gaus, Gerald F. „Property, Rights, and Freedom“. Social Philosophy and Policy 11, Nr. 2 (1994): 209–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500004490.
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William Perm summarized the Magna Carta thus: “First, It asserts Englishmen to be free; that's Liberty. Secondly, they that have free-holds, that's Property.” Since at least the seventeenth century, liberals have not only understood liberty and property to be fundamental, but to be somehow intimately related or interwoven. Here, however, consensus ends; liberals present an array of competing accounts of the relation between liberty and property. Many, for instance, defend an essentially instrumental view, typically seeing private property as justified because it is necessary to maintain or protect other, more basic, liberty rights. Important to our constitutional tradition has been the idea that “[t]he right to property is the guardian of every other right, and to deprive a people of this, is in fact to deprive them of their liberty.” Along similar lines, it has been argued that only an economic system based on private property disperses power and resources, ensuring that private people in civil society have the resources to oppose the state and give effect to basic liberties. Alternatively, it is sometimes claimed that only those with property develop the independent characters that are necessary to preserve a regime of liberty. But not only have liberals insisted that, property is a means of preserving liberty, they have often conceived of it as an embodiment of liberty, or as a type of liberty, or indeed as identical to liberty. This latter view is popular among contemporary libertarians or classical liberals. Jan Narveson, for instance, bluntly asserts that “Liberty is Property,” while John Gray insists that “[t]he connection between property and the basic liberties is constitutive and not just instrumental.”
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Corner, John. „Freedom, Rights and Regulations“. Media, Culture & Society 26, Nr. 6 (November 2004): 893–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0163443704047033.
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Owen, Ursula. „Whose rights, whose freedom?“ Index on Censorship 23, Nr. 1-2 (Mai 1994): 4–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03064229408535632.
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Golder, Ben. „Foucault, Rights and Freedom“. International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique 26, Nr. 1 (11.02.2012): 5–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11196-012-9259-8.
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Mijović, Ljiljana. „Internet and freedom of expression in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights“. Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta, Novi Sad 54, Nr. 3 (2020): 1023–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/zrpfns54-24432.
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Internet as a means of communication, whatever the type of information it might be used for, falls within the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, as guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. As established in the European Court's case law, freedom of expression constitutes one of the essentials of a democratic society, therefore limitations on that freedom foreseen in Article 10 § 2 of the Convention are to be interpreted strictly. In order to ensure effective protection of one's freedom of expression on the Internet, States bear a positive obligation to create an appropriate regulatory framework, balancing the right to freedom of expression on one and the limitations prescribed in Article 10 § 2, on the other hand. Special attention in doing so is to be paid to the risk of harm posed by content and communications on the Internet to the exercise and enjoyment of other human rights and freedoms guaranteed by the European Convention, particularly the right to respect for private life. While it is the fact that the electronic network, serving billions of users worldwide, will never be subject to the same regulations and control, because of the national authorities' margin of appreciation, the European Court established commonly applicable general principles regarding the Internet as a media of exercising right to freedom of expression.
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Carter, D. M. „Republicanism, Rights and Democratic Athens“. Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought 30, Nr. 1 (2013): 73–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/20512996-90000518.
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In a recent article Paul Cartledge and Matt Edge argue that the modern republican tradition offers a useful framework for understanding the Athenian concept of freedom, and that within this framework the Athenians protected their freedoms without reference to a concept of rights. This paper agrees with both of these conclusions but identifies and corrects three assumptions behind Cartledge and Edge’s argument: that the only purpose of rights is to protect individual freedoms against the state; that rights have no place at all in the republican tradition; and that the ancient Greeks did not understand rights. In fact the Athenians did have an understanding of rights but they did not use rights to protect freedoms. The reason for this is that the protected freedom is a very modern and particularly sophisticated application of the concept of rights.
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Никитина, Елена, und Elena Nikitina. „Freedom of Conscience: Theory and Practice of Limitations of Rights in the Russian Federation“. Journal of Russian Law 1, Nr. 12 (14.11.2013): 65–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.12737/1549.
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In article some problems of formation of the complete theory of human rights in Russia, in particular the concept of restriction of the rights are considered; the main reasons influencing on realization of institute of constitutional human and civil rights and freedoms are revealed; various cases of illegal restriction of the human rights by the example of the right to freedom of worship and religion are considered.
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Newman, Dwight. „Freedom of Thought in Canada: The History of a Forgetting and the Potential of a Remembering“. European Journal of Comparative Law and Governance 8, Nr. 2-3 (27.04.2021): 226–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22134514-bja10017.
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Abstract Canada has a constitutional freedom of thought clause that has received almost no attention. This article considers reasons behind this phenomenon and the future potential of the clause. Unlike many constitutional rights and freedoms in Canada, constitutionalised freedom of thought did not have precedents in prior Canadian human rights instruments. Rather, its precedents are in international human rights instruments, with Canadian drafters choosing to adopt this freedom into Canada’s 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms. For a complex set of reasons, almost no Canadian case law has developed on freedom of thought. This article explains that phenomenon in terms of path dependence and problematic features of Canadian jurisprudence and scholarship. It argues that some recent cases offer new hope for development of freedom of thought jurisprudence. It argues that comparative constitutional conversations and emerging contemporary challenges may be significant in the development of Canada’s constitutional freedom of thought guarantee.
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Robbers, Gerhard. „Church Autonomy in the European Court of Human Rights—Recent Developments in Germany“. Journal of Law and Religion 26, Nr. 1 (2010): 281–320. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0748081400000989.
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The European Court of Human Rights is currently considering several German cases on the autonomy of religious organizations or churches within secular German labor law and resulting conflict resolution issues that arise within religious communities. In the past, the European Court of Human Rights has consistently underlined the importance of church autonomy, relying on the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Article 9 guarantees of freedom of thought, conscience and religion:Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.Implementing these provisions in the context of religious autonomy, the Court has critically noted:[T]he autonomous existence of religious communities is indispensable for pluralism in a democratic society and is, thus, an issue at the very heart of the protection which Article 9 affords.… The right [of religious communities] to an autonomous existence is at the very heart of the guarantees in Article 9.
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Sobczak, Jacek. „Wolność wypowiedzi a zjawisko manipulacji przekazem prasowym“. Przegląd Politologiczny, Nr. 3 (02.11.2018): 17–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/pp.2012.17.3.2.
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The legal concept of human liberties and rights, including freedom of speech, is secondary to philosophical assumptions. Certainty of where the border between authority and freedom lies leaves the issue of the actual range of freedom unresolved. There is no, and there can be no absolute freedom, and the borders of every freedom are defined by legal regulations. This raises the question of whether a democratic state, a state of law, can make regulations in the realm of human rights and freedoms. In international relations, human rights are the foundation of all humanitarian law. There can be no violation of human rights in democratic states. The Constitution of Poland prioritizes human freedoms and rights in the constitutional hierarchy. Freedom of speech is placed particularly high in the hierarchy of liberties encompassed by human rights. Freedom of speech is guarded not only by Constitutional regulations but also detailed laws, which simultaneously establish the limits of the freedom of speech. These limits are also set by ethical norms. Journalists attempt to get around the legal limits that establish the framework of freedom and the barriers posed by codes of ethics, by means of manipulation of press releases. Manipulating society, journalists become a tool of authorities that are frequently not elected, not sovereign and are in fact acting on behalf of entities that remain anonymous and whose goals are undisclosed.
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Kutuzova, Natalia. „Religious freedom as a universal value“. Religious Freedom, Nr. 22-23 (10.12.2019): 18–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.32420/rs.2019.22-23.1658.
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The article substantiates the universal value of religious freedom, based on the fundamental human right to freedom of religion and belief. Referring to the relevant international documents, the author reveals the content of the concept of "religious freedom" and concludes that there are two basic values at the heart of human rights: human dignity and equality. Only a systematic approach to freedom of religion in the human rights complex gives them universal value.
There are two components to freedom of religion (belief): freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; the right to profess one's religion or belief. Religious freedom has both a universal and a private dimension.
Being secular in nature, freedom of religion is especially evident in modern societies, which secularity and inclusivity empowers people to decide for themselves about their religiosity.
The article deals with the restrictions that exist for religious freedom. Often the right to practice one's religion comes into conflict with different rights of other people. The protection of these rights must come from the principles of non-discrimination, neutrality and impartiality, respect for the right to religion, pluralism and tolerance, institutional and personal autonomy, lack of a hierarchy of human rights.
The article argues that religious freedom is a universal value and right in the human rights complex.
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Mlynarska-Sobaczewska, Anna. „Utopian Concept, Mixed Structure, Digital Extent and New Claims“. International Human Rights Law Review 6, Nr. 2 (07.12.2017): 176–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22131035-00602004.
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The right to artistic culture, as a set of rights and freedoms associated with participation in artistic culture, can be regarded as a kind of umbrella term, consisting of an array of rights and freedoms related to the freedom to create and share one’s own works, the right to experience the works of others, setting the boundaries in horizontal relations between artists, and the freedom of access and creation on the basis of available works. The right to culture in European states with state patronage systems means also fulfilling a number of positive obligations, particularly connected to the fair financing of artistic life and universally assured access to it. This right is not by nature homogeneous and cannot be categorised only as a social right, while some components of it are already established and protected in civil rights systems of protection. Finding the elements of this right in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case-law and domestic legal measures delivers the evidence on its complex nature and allows the pointing out of some paradoxes in its development. It also considers the justiciability to the right to culture.
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Buron, Denis. „Liberté d'expression et diffamation de collectivités : quand le droit à l'égalité s'exprime“. Les Cahiers de droit 29, Nr. 2 (12.04.2005): 491–534. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/042891ar.
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Class defamation, for reasons of race, ethnic origin, religion or sex, is in the middle of a confrontation between many rights and liberties : On the one hand, freedom of expression, often considered the most fundamental of them all ; On the other, equality rights, freedom of opinion and the right to security of the person. This conflict may be viewed as a test for freedom of expression, hoping that truth will finally prevail, as well as a challenge for other liberties to be recognized. A choice has to be made : Should we protect expression, or should we protect collectivities from some expression ? The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, it is submitted, has already indicated the right direction : Sections 27 and 28, multiculturalism and sex equality, do in fact exclude class defamation from the protected freedom of expression. That which is currently the law of class defamation, as a consequence, will remain. But this might be an unfortunate blessing, since class defamation is virtually non-existent in Canadian law.
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Wyndham, Jessica M. „Freedom and Engineering for All“. Mechanical Engineering 134, Nr. 09 (01.09.2012): 32–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/1.2012-sep-1.
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This article discusses benefits and challenges in engaging engineers in connecting engineering and human rights. Engineers have a vital role to play in giving visibility to human rights, particularly in matters relevant to their field or discipline. Academic instruction in ethics is increasingly viewed as integral to a rigorous educational program in science or engineering. The Science and Human Rights Coalition of the American Association for the Advancement of Science is one network of professional societies that recognize a role for scientists and engineers in human rights. An important way in which engineers can protect and promote human rights is by ensuring that the products they develop benefit people in need. Engineers have human rights that need to be respected in order for the engineering enterprise to flourish and the benefits of engineering to be broadly enjoyed. Engineers have opportunities to contribute to human rights compliance when designing and implementing projects, and to contribute to the realization of the right to benefit from scientific progress and its applications.
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Small, Andrew. „From conflict to consensus: Reconciling the right to freedom of religion and LGBT rights“. Alternative Law Journal 43, Nr. 3 (16.08.2018): 221–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1037969x18768902.
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This Brief considers the tension between the right to freedom of religion and LGBT rights in the context of the landmark ‘wedding cake case’ decided by the US Supreme Court in June 2018 and the Australian Marriage Amendment (Definition and Religious Freedoms) Act 2017. The author proposes a proportionality approach for balancing claims between LGBT rights and freedom of religion, drawing on international norms, case law and the work of progressive religious leaders and academics. The author further suggests that the practical utility of this approach could be bolstered through diverse cross-cultural dialogues between members of LGBT groups and religious groups, with the aim of developing an ‘overlapping consensus’ on core human rights norms.
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Colnago, Cláudio de Oliveira Santos, und Bethany Shiner. „A Distinct Right to Freedom of Thought in South America“. European Journal of Comparative Law and Governance 8, Nr. 2-3 (22.06.2021): 245–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22134514-bja10023.
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Abstract The right to freedom of thought is guaranteed by Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights, yet current jurisprudence interprets the right as a mere dimension of freedom of expression, also protected by Article 13. Contemporary neurotechnology research presents the possibility for human thoughts to be tracked, recorded, analysed and predicted. This applies pressure upon the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ current understanding of the right to freedom of thought. Firstly, this paper will examine how Article 13 has been interpreted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights at different stages of its jurisprudence. Secondly, by considering both technological advances and the other rights guaranteed by the Convention, this paper argues for an evolution in the interpretation of Article 13 whereby the right to freedom of thought is understood as a distinct right, separate from freedom of expression. Finally, this paper proposes that the positive duty to secure Convention rights requires States to enact preventative legislation and regulations. Existing bioethics principles should be drawn upon to inform human rights-compliant laws and regulations that require the architectural design of technologies to limit the potential to infringe upon freedom of thought.
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Slutskiy, Pavel. „Freedom of Expression, Social Media Censorship, and Property Rights“. Tripodos, Nr. 48 (02.12.2020): 53–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.51698/tripodos.2020.48p53-68.
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Sustainable Development Goal 16 stresses the importance of access to information. It is clearly emphasised in target 16.10 —“to ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements”. With social media becoming the default communication platforms, the questions of the extent to which their content moderating models are conducive to the implementation of public access to information and fundamental freedoms are becoming increasingly important. Facebook, Instagram, Tumblr as well as Twitter and other social media platforms have been recently criticised for censorship of user-generated content. This article looks at the controversy surrounding these policies from the property rights perspective —focusing on the role which property rights play in securing the freedom of expression. By recognising the owners’ right to control the legitimately owned property, I conclude that social media are not engaged in “censorship” —they merely exercise property rights. There is a difference between a private platform refusing to carry someone’s ideas on their property and a government prohibiting from speaking on a legitimately owned property.
Keywords: SDG 16.10, freedom of expression, censorship, social media, property rights.
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Slutskiy, Pavel. „Freedom of Expression, Social Media Censorship, and Property Rights“. Tripodos, Nr. 48 (02.12.2020): 53–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.51698/tripodos.2020.48p53-67.
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Sustainable Development Goal 16 stresses the importance of access to information. It is clearly emphasised in target 16.10 —“to ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements”. With social media becoming the default communication platforms, the questions of the extent to which their content moderating models are conducive to the implementation of public access to information and fundamental freedoms are becoming increasingly important. Facebook, Instagram, Tumblr as well as Twitter and other social media platforms have been recently criticised for censorship of user-generated content. This article looks at the controversy surrounding these policies from the property rights perspective —focusing on the role which property rights play in securing the freedom of expression. By recognising the owners’ right to control the legitimately owned property, I conclude that social media are not engaged in “censorship” —they merely exercise property rights. There is a difference between a private platform refusing to carry someone’s ideas on their property and a government prohibiting from speaking on a legitimately owned property.
Keywords: SDG 16.10, freedom of expression, censorship, social media, property rights.
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Andrássy, György. „Freedom of Language: A Universal Human Right to Be Recognised“. International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 19, Nr. 2 (2012): 195–232. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157181112x639087.
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Human rights as legal rights originate from human rights as pre-existing moral rights; however, as pre-existing human rights are unwritten and invisible, it is uncertain whether all of these rights have been recognised and defined properly. This article advances the thought that if there are any human rights at all and if the civil and political rights recognised and defined by the United Nations represent these pre-existing human rights, then there must be at least one more such right, the right of all to freedom of language and, therefore, the United Nations ought to recognise and define this right too.
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Bezborodov, Yu S. „LEGAL-THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE UNIVERSAL AND REGIONAL DIMENSION: THE EDGE OF REASON“. Bulletin of Udmurt University. Series Economics and Law 31, Nr. 4 (12.08.2021): 721–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.35634/2412-9593-2021-31-4-721-728.
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In the theory of law, freedom of speech, which has a long history of formation, continuing even now - with the crystallization of this freedom by international institutions, remains the most important and necessary element of the functioning of civil society and the building of the rule of law. In the legal plane, being initially enshrined at the international level - universal and regional - this freedom faces serious obstacles to its realization and protection at the national level, where it collides with other rights and freedoms, including freedom of religion, as well as with the interests of society and the state which are often difficult to establish. One of the fundamental issues related to the realization of freedom of speech is the question of the absoluteness and limitations of this freedom. Restrictions on freedom of speech, established normatively and developed by practice at the universal and European regional international legal level, are associated with considerations of morality, social interests and values, necessity and security. These approaches developed at different levels of regulation are mutually consistent and complement each other, building a paradigm that is much needed by general international law in a uniform understanding of human rights and freedoms. Despite the established restrictions, in practice, contradictions and misunderstandings continue to arise related to the implementation of freedom of speech at the national level. This work attempts to correlate freedom of speech with restrictions on this freedom by states bound by security interests, morality and ethics. The article proposes an effective way to solve the problem of limiting freedom of speech and delimiting it from other freedoms: increasing the responsibility of states for violating human rights and freedoms by changing its form, and strengthening the jurisdiction of already existing international bodies for the protection of human rights, especially conventions.
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Hill, Mark. „Freedom of Expression: Defining the Limits for Broadcasters“. Ecclesiastical Law Journal 7, Nr. 35 (Juli 2004): 466–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0956618x00005652.
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On 10 July 2003, the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg delivered a significant judgment concerning the qualified nature of the right of freedom of expression enunciated in Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The previous May saw the House of Lords deliver a judgment on a similar matter. The former related to the resurrection; the latter was about video footage of unborn fœtuses. Each is illuminating and may prove of wider application.
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Jabłoński, Mariusz. „Ograniczenie konstytucyjnych wolności i praw osobistych w czasie trwania stanów nadzwyczajnych“. Przegląd Prawa i Administracji 106 (13.12.2016): 173–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.19195/0137-1134.106.16.
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LIMITATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS AND PERSONAL RIGHTS DURING EXTRAORDINARY MEASURESThe fundamental issue raised in this elaboration comes down to an attempt at identifying the character and content of constitutional guarantees of freedom and individual rights during extraordinary measures martial law, state of emergency and natural disaster. Three essentials in immanent connection are raised in this respect: constitutional conception of freedom and personal rights, principles and values legalizing the limitations in constitutional guarantees of freedom and individual rights and particular constitutional guarantees excluding the ability of constricting some specific liberties and rights during extraordinary measures. The intention of this analysis is to establish whether the existing solutions at the level of RP Constitution arrangements indeed ensure the system not being edited in terms of the particular category of freedom and individual rights in Polish legal order.
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Swaine, Lucas. „Freedom of Thought as a Basic Liberty“. Political Theory 46, Nr. 3 (09.11.2016): 405–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0090591716676293.
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Freedom of thought has been lauded in political theory and celebrated in human rights discourse. But what kind of freedom is it? I propose that freedom of thought deserves status as a basic liberty, given the significance of thought to human life, the fundamental importance of freedom of thought in establishing and sustaining crucial rights and freedoms, and the value of being able to develop and experience one’s thoughts without undue influence from others.
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Maino, Charles. „People, News and Government“. Pacific Journalism Review : Te Koakoa 2, Nr. 1 (01.11.1995): 84–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.24135/pjr.v2i1.543.
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Like all rights and freedoms, freedom of the press sometimes gets a rough handling by various authorities and governments throughout the world. In the Pacific, the right must be preserved for the interests of the people.
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Grcic, Joseph. „Academic Freedom and Employee Rights“. Social Philosophy Today 4 (1990): 247–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/socphiltoday1990470.
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Olson, Laura R., und Peter S. Wenz. „Abortion Rights as Religious Freedom“. Review of Religious Research 35, Nr. 1 (September 1993): 80. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3511070.
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Steiner, Hillel. „Impartiality, Freedom and Natural Rights“. Political Studies 44, Nr. 2 (Juni 1996): 311–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00330.x.
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Poses, Roy M. „Academic Freedom and Individual Rights“. Academic Medicine 76, Nr. 11 (November 2001): 1081. http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/00001888-200111000-00001.
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Goldstein, Rose, und Ellen B. Zweibel. „Academic Freedom and Individual Rights“. Academic Medicine 76, Nr. 11 (November 2001): 1081–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/00001888-200111000-00002.
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Joyce, Daniel. „Internet Freedom and Human Rights“. European Journal of International Law 26, Nr. 2 (Mai 2015): 493–514. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chv021.
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Kivelson, Valerie. „Muscovite “Citizenship”: Rights without Freedom“. Journal of Modern History 74, Nr. 3 (September 2002): 465–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/345109.
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