Auswahl der wissenschaftlichen Literatur zum Thema „Formation de coalition“
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Zeitschriftenartikel zum Thema "Formation de coalition"
Rahwan, Talal, Tomasz Michalak, Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Jacek Sroka, Michael Wooldridge und Nicholas Jennings. „Constrained Coalition Formation“. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 25, Nr. 1 (04.08.2011): 719–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v25i1.7888.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleDutta, Bhaskar, und Hannu Vartiainen. „Coalition formation and history dependence“. Theoretical Economics 15, Nr. 1 (2020): 159–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/te2947.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleGOLDER, SONA NADENICHEK. „Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation in Parliamentary Democracies“. British Journal of Political Science 36, Nr. 2 (09.03.2006): 193–212. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123406000123.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleCURRARINI, SERGIO, und MARCO A. MARINI. „COALITION FORMATION IN GAMES WITHOUT SYNERGIES“. International Game Theory Review 08, Nr. 01 (März 2006): 111–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198906000813.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleSinghal, Shiksha, und Veeraruna Kavitha. „Coalition Formation Resource Sharing Games in Networks“. ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review 49, Nr. 3 (22.03.2022): 57–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3529113.3529132.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleOWEN, GUILLERMO. „ENDOGENOUS FORMATION OF COALITIONS“. International Game Theory Review 10, Nr. 04 (Dezember 2008): 461–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198908002047.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleBEJAN, CAMELIA, und JUAN CAMILO GÓMEZ. „USING THE ASPIRATION CORE TO PREDICT COALITION FORMATION“. International Game Theory Review 14, Nr. 01 (März 2012): 1250004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198912500041.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleShi, Yuanyuan, Gang Zhu, Siyu Lin, Jianwen Ding und Shengfeng Xu. „Coalitional Game Theory for Cooperative Interference Management in Femtocell Networks“. Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2015 (2015): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/767649.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleMARTIN, LANNY W., und RANDOLPH T. STEVENSON. „The Conditional Impact of Incumbency on Government Formation“. American Political Science Review 104, Nr. 3 (August 2010): 503–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055410000213.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleKong, XiangLong, XiangRong Tong und YingJie Wang. „Min- k -Cut Coalition Structure Generation on Trust-Utility Relationship Graph“. Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing 2021 (14.04.2021): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/8834879.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleDissertationen zum Thema "Formation de coalition"
Winschel, Evguenia. „Essays on coalition formation“. [S.l. : s.n.], 2007. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-20457.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleHojnacki, Marie Elizabeth. „Coalition formation among organized interests /“. The Ohio State University, 1994. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1487856906261803.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleBarton, Levi L. „Agent-Organized Network Coalition Formation“. DigitalCommons@USU, 2008. https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/etd/206.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleBäck, Hanna. „Explaining coalitions evidence and lessons from studying coalition formation in Swedish local government /“. Uppsala : Uppsala Universitet, 2003. http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/53332399.html.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleDeJong, Paul. „COALITION FORMATION IN MULTI-AGENT UAV SYSTEMS“. Master's thesis, University of Central Florida, 2005. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETD/id/2712.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleM.S.Cp.E.
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Engineering and Computer Science
Computer Engineering
Khan, Majid Ali. „Coalition formation and teamwork in embodied agents“. Doctoral diss., University of Central Florida, 2007. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETD/id/2711.
Der volle Inhalt der QuellePh.D.
School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Engineering and Computer Science
Computer Engineering PhD
Pycia, Marek. „Essays on economic design and coalition formation“. Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/34513.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleIncludes bibliographical references.
This thesis consists of three essays on economic design and coalition formation. The first chapter studies the stability of many-to-one matching, such as matching between students and colleges or interns and hospitals. Complementarities and peer effects are inherent in many such matching situations. The chapter provides the first sufficient condition for stability that may be used to study matching with complementarities and peer effects. The condition offered is shown to be also necessary for stability in some matching problems. The second chapter provides a sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the core in coalition formation such as the formation of clubs, partnerships, firms, business alliances, and jurisdictions voting on public goods. The condition is formulated for settings in which agents first form coalitions and then each coalition realizes a payoff profile from the set of available alternatives via a mechanism. In particular, there exists a core coalition structure if the payoffs are determined in the Tullock rent-seeking game or Nash bargaining. The core might be empty if the payoffs are determined by the Kalai-Smorodinsky or Shapley bargaining solutions.
(cont.) The chapter also determines the class of linear sharing rules and regular Pareto-optimal mechanisms for which there are core coalition structures. The third chapter studies the multidimensional screening problem of a profit-maximizing monopolistic seller of goods with multiple indivisible attributes. The buyer's utility is buyer's private information and is linear in the probabilities of obtaining the attributes. The chapter solves the seller's problem for an arbitrary number of attributes when there are two types of buyers, adding a new simple example to the few known examples of solved multidimensional screening problems. When there is a continuum of buyer types, the chapter shows that generically the seller wants to sell goods with some of the attributes partly damaged, stochastic, or leased on restrictive terms. The often-studied simple bundling strategies are shown to be generically suboptimal.
by Marek Pycia.
Ph.D.
Karos, Dominik [Verfasser]. „Power, Control, and Coalition Formation / Dominik Karos“. Aachen : Shaker, 2013. http://d-nb.info/1050344871/34.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleDang, Viet Dung. „Coalition formation and operation in virtual organisations“. Thesis, University of Southampton, 2004. https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/260239/.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleLee, Daesik. „Essays on coalition formation under asymmetric information“. Diss., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1988. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/53567.
Der volle Inhalt der QuellePh. D.
Bücher zum Thema "Formation de coalition"
Bolduc, Nathalie. Les facteurs influençant la formation des coalitions. Québec: Université Laval, Laboratoire d'études politiques et administratives, 1992.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenMurnighan, John Keith. Organizational coalition formation: Process, consequences and dominant coalitions. [Urbana, Ill.]: College of Commerce and Business Administration, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1985.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenAd M.A. van Deemen. Coalition formation and social choice. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenGreenberg, Joseph. Coalition formation with eligibility. Toronto, Ont: Department of Economics, York University, 1989.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenHoller, Manfred J., und Guillermo Owen, Hrsg. Power Indices and Coalition Formation. Boston, MA: Springer US, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-6221-1.
Der volle Inhalt der Quellevan Deemen, M. A. Coalition Formation and Social Choice. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-2578-0.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleAcemoglu, Daron. Coalition formation in political games. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenAcemoglu, Daron. Coalition formation in political games. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2006.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenAcemoglu, Daron. Coalition formation in non-democracies. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2009.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenEvans, Robert A. Value, consistency and random coalition formation. Cambridge: University of Cambridge, Department of AppliedEconomics, 1992.
Den vollen Inhalt der Quelle findenBuchteile zum Thema "Formation de coalition"
Bernhard, Laurent, und Hanspeter Kriesi. „Coalition Formation“. In Political Communication in Direct Democratic Campaigns, 54–68. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230343214_4.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleBernhard, Laurent. „Coalition Formation“. In Campaign Strategy in Direct Democracy, 102–23. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137011343_5.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleBimonte, Giovanna. „Restricted Coalition Formation“. In New Economic Windows, 137–46. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05185-7_8.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleChalkiadakis, Georgios, Edith Elkind, Evangelos Markakis und Nicholas R. Jennings. „Overlapping Coalition Formation“. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 307–21. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_37.
Der volle Inhalt der Quellevan Deemen, M. A. „Coalition Preferences“. In Coalition Formation and Social Choice, 149–86. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-2578-0_6.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleTakahashi, Shingo, Kyoichi Kijima und Ryo Sato. „Coalition Formation by Organizations“. In Applied General Systems Research on Organizations, 115–30. Tokyo: Springer Japan, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-53949-0_6.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleRapoport, Anatol. „Theories of Coalition Formation“. In Decision Theory and Decision Behaviour, 369–81. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7840-0_20.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleFiaschi, Davide, und Pier Mario Pacini. „Growth and Coalition Formation“. In Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, 171–88. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/3-540-27296-8_12.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleŞtefuriuc, Irina. „Coalition Formation — The Process“. In Government Formation in Multi-Level Settings, 100–132. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137300744_7.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleRapoport, Anatol. „Theories of Coalition Formation“. In Decision Theory and Decision Behaviour, 383–93. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230377769_20.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleKonferenzberichte zum Thema "Formation de coalition"
Mamakos, Michail, und Georgios Chalkiadakis. „Probability Bounds for Overlapping Coalition Formation“. In Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2017/47.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleKerkmann, Anna Maria, und Jörg Rothe. „Altruism in Coalition Formation Games“. In Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Seventeenth Pacific Rim International Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-PRICAI-20}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2020/49.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleTaguelmimt, Redha, Samir Aknine, Djamila Boukredera, Narayan Changder und Tuomas Sandholm. „Optimal Anytime Coalition Structure Generation Utilizing Compact Solution Space Representation“. In Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-23}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2023/35.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleBistaffa, Filippo, und Alessandro Farinelli. „A COP Model for Graph-Constrained Coalition Formation (Extended Abstract)“. In Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-18}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/783.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleBoongasame, Laor. „Preference coalition formation algorithm for buyer coalition“. In 2012 International Joint Conference on Computer Science and Software Engineering (JCSSE). IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/jcsse.2012.6261956.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleJi, Xi, Quan Liu, Wenjun Xu und Duzhong Zhang. „Complexity Optimization for Cooperative Sensing Using Coalition Games“. In ASME 2014 International Manufacturing Science and Engineering Conference collocated with the JSME 2014 International Conference on Materials and Processing and the 42nd North American Manufacturing Research Conference. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/msec2014-4078.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleChalkiadakis, Georgios, Evangelos Markakis und Craig Boutilier. „Coalition formation under uncertainty“. In the 6th international joint conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1329125.1329203.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleSujit, P. B., J. M. George und R. W. Beard. „Multiple UAV coalition formation“. In 2008 American Control Conference (ACC '08). IEEE, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/acc.2008.4586788.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleShuling Di. „Strategy of agent coalition formation based on outstanding coalition“. In 2010 2nd International Conference on Computer Engineering and Technology. IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iccet.2010.5485666.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleBlankenburg, Bastian, Rajdeep K. Dash, Sarvapali D. Ramchurn, Matthias Klusch und Nicholas R. Jennings. „Trusted kernel-based coalition formation“. In the fourth international joint conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1082473.1082623.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleBerichte der Organisationen zum Thema "Formation de coalition"
Battaglini, Marco. Coalition Formation in Legislative Bargaining. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, März 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w25664.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleAcemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov und Konstantin Sonin. Coalition Formation in Political Games. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, Dezember 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w12749.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleBurger, Nicholas, und Charles Kolstad. Voluntary Public Goods Provision, Coalition Formation, and Uncertainty. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, November 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w15543.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleOrtiz, Charles L., Regis Vincent, Eric Hsu, Bruno Dutertre und Barbara Grosz. Incremental Negotiation and Coalition Formation for Resource-Bounded Agents. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, Januar 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada421724.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleIrwin, Douglas. Antebellum Tariff Politics: Coalition Formation and Shifting Regional Interests. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w12161.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleSoh, Leen-Kiat. A Negotiation-Based Coalition Formation Model for Agents with Incomplete Information and Time Constraints. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, Januar 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada461997.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleSchuster, Christian. Strategies to Professionalize the Civil Service: Lessons from the Dominican Republic. Inter-American Development Bank, September 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0010594.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleDannenberg, Astrid, Andreas Lange und Bodo Sturm. On the Formation of Coalitions to Provide Public Goods - Experimental Evidence from the Lab. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, Mai 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w15967.
Der volle Inhalt der QuelleBonvecchi, Alejandro. The Political Economy of Fiscal Reform in Latin America: The Case of Argentina. Inter-American Development Bank, Mai 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0010935.
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