Thematische Bibliographien / First Coalition, War of the (1792-1797) fast

Auswahl der wissenschaftlichen Literatur zum Thema „First Coalition, War of the (1792-1797) fast“

Autor: Grafiati

Veröffentlicht am 25. Juli 2024

Zuletzt aktualisiert am 26. Juli 2024

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Dissertationen zum Thema "First Coalition, War of the (1792-1797) fast"

Hayworth, Jordan R. „Conquering the Natural Frontier: French Expansion to the Rhine River During the War of the First Coalition, 1792-1797“. Thesis, University of North Texas, 2015. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc822845/.

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After conquering Belgium and the Rhineland in 1794, the French Army of the Sambre and Meuse faced severe logistical, disciplinary, and morale problems that signaled the erosion of its capabilities. The army’s degeneration resulted from a revolution in French foreign policy designed to conquer the natural frontiers, a policy often falsely portrayed as a diplomatic tradition of the French monarchy. In fact, the natural frontiers policy – expansion to the Rhine, the Pyrenees, and the Alps – emerged only after the start of the War of the First Coalition in 1792. Moreover, the pursuit of natural frontiers caused more controversy than previously understood. No less a figure than Lazare Carnot – the Organizer of Victory – viewed French expansion to the Rhine as impractical and likely to perpetuate war. While the war of conquest provided the French state with the resources to survive, it entailed numerous unforeseen consequences. Most notably, the Revolutionary armies became isolated from the nation and displayed more loyalty to their commanders than to the civilian authorities. In 1797, the Sambre and Meuse Army became a political tool of General Lazare Hoche, who sought control over the Rhineland by supporting the creation of a Cisrhenan Republic. Ultimately, troops from Hoche’s army removed Carnot from the French Directory in the coup d’état of 18 fructidor, a crucial benchmark in the militarization of French politics two years before Napoleon Bonaparte’s seizure of power. Accordingly, the conquest of the Rhine frontier contributed to the erosion of democratic governance in Revolutionary France.

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Jarrett, Nathaniel W. „Collective Security and Coalition: British Grand Strategy, 1783-1797“. Thesis, University of North Texas, 2017. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc984129/.

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On 1 February 1793, the National Convention of Revolutionary France declared war on Great Britain and the Netherlands, expanding the list of France's enemies in the War of the First Coalition. Although British Prime Minister William Pitt the Younger had predicted fifteen years of peace one year earlier, the French declaration of war initiated nearly a quarter century of war between Britain and France with only a brief respite during the Peace of Amiens. Britain entered the war amid both a nadir in British diplomacy and internal political divisions over the direction of British foreign policy. After becoming prime minister in 1783 in the aftermath of the War of American Independence, Pitt pursued financial and naval reform to recover British strength and cautious interventionism to end Britain's diplomatic isolation in Europe. He hoped to create a collective security system based on the principles of the territorial status quo, trade agreements, neutral rights, and resolution of diplomatic disputes through mediation - armed mediation if necessary. While his domestic measures largely met with success, Pitt's foreign policy suffered from a paucity of like-minded allies, contradictions between traditional hostility to France and emergent opposition to Russian expansion, Britain's limited ability to project power on the continent, and the even more limited will of Parliament to support such interventionism. Nevertheless, Pitt's collective security goal continued to shape British strategy in the War of the First Coalition, and the same challenges continued to plague the British war effort. This led to failure in the war and left the British fighting on alone after the Treaty of Campo Formio secured peace between France and its last continental foe, Austria, on 18 October 1797.

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Baker, William C. „Capital Ships, Commerce, and Coalition: British Strategy in the Mediterranean Theater, 1793“. Thesis, University of North Texas, 2014. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc699881/.

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In 1793, Great Britain embarked on a war against Revolutionary France to reestablish a balance of power in Europe. Traditional assessments among historians consider British war planning at the ministerial level during the First Coalition to be incompetent and haphazard. This work reassesses decision making of the leading strategists in the British Cabinet in the development of a theater in the Mediterranean by examining political, diplomatic, and military influences. William Pitt the Younger and his controlling ministers pursued a conservative strategy in the Mediterranean, reliant on Allies in the region to contain French armies and ideas inside the Alps and the Pyrenees. Dependent on British naval power, the Cabinet sought to weaken the French war effort by targeting trade in the region. Throughout the first half of 1793, the British government remained fixed on this conservative, traditional approach to France. However, with the fall of Toulon in August of 1793, decisions made by Admiral Samuel Hood in command of forces in the Mediterranean radicalized British policy towards the Revolution while undermining the construct of the Coalition. The inconsistencies in strategic thought political decisions created stagnation, wasting the opportunities gained by the Counter-revolutionary movements in southern France. As a result, reinvigorated French forces defeated Allied forces in detail in the fall of 1793.

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Bücher zum Thema "First Coalition, War of the (1792-1797) fast"

European armies of the French Revolution, 1789-1802. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2015.

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Kuehn, John T. Napoleonic warfare: The operational art of the great campaigns. Santa Barbara, California: Praeger, an imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2015.

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Napoleon. La Campagna d'Italia, 1796-1797. Roma: Vecchiarelli, 1997.

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Ilari, Virgilio. La guerra delle Alpi: 1792-1796. Roma: Ufficio storico dello Stato maggiore dell'Esercito, 2000.

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Elena, Lucchesi Ragni, Stradiotti Renata, Zani Carlo und Gianfranceschi Vettori Ida, Hrsg. Napoleone Bonaparte: Brescia e la Repubblica Cisalpina, 1797-1799. Milano: Skira, 1997.

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Periboni, Giulio Alessio De. Giornale della venuta dei francesi, 1797. Trieste: Istituto giuliano di storia, cultura e documentazione, 1997.

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Pescasio, Luigi. Mantova assediata, 1796-1797. Suzzara: Edizioni Bottazzi, 1989.

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Pescasio, Luigi. Mantova assediata, 1796-1797. Suzzara: Edizioni Bottazzi, 1989.

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Agnoli, Francesco Mario. Le Pasque veronesi: Quando Verona insorse contro Napoleone : 17-25 aprile 1797. Rimini: Il cerchio, 1998.

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Foramitti, Paolo. Volete la guerra, ebbene l'avrete: 1797 : Bonaparte in Veneto e Friuli. Pordenone: Biblioteca dell'immagine, 1997.

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Buchteile zum Thema "First Coalition, War of the (1792-1797) fast"

Schroeder, Paul w. „The First Coalition, 1792-1797“. In The Transformation Of European Politics 1763 –1848, 100–176. Oxford University PressOxford, 1994. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198221197.003.0003.

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Abstract One might expect that the outbreak of war would at least restore France’s importance in international politics.1 Ultimately this happened with a vengeance, but not for a while; both France and the war against France continued for some time to be international sideshows. One reason for this, as will be seen, was that at first, despite the radical Revolution, France’s foreign policy continued along traditional lines. A more important reason was that none of the members of the first coalition fought mainly to overthrow the Revolution, and some were loath to fight at all. Their main reaction to the discovery that it would be more difficult than expected to defeat France and restore order was not to fight harder, but to attempt to end the war, coexist with Revolutionary France, and pursue other goals-which some found possible, others not. The problem is not to explain how the War of the First Coalition started, which is fairly easy, but why it persisted and proved difficult or impossible to end. The basic answer is that the same kind of traditional politics that got both sides into war also kept them from ending it.

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