Auswahl der wissenschaftlichen Literatur zum Thema „Financial and non-financial incentives“

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Zeitschriftenartikel zum Thema "Financial and non-financial incentives"

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Kafka, Kyriaki, Anna Maria Kanzola und Panagiotis E. Petrakis. „Cultural Perspectives of Financial and Non-Financial Incentives“. Journal of Business Accounting and Finance Perspectives 3, Nr. 1 (10.03.2021): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.35995/jbafp3010007.

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The present paper delineates an explanatory framework for the defining factors of incentives, both financial and nonfinancial, through the theory of human economic action and that of personality traits, which shape human goals and, ultimately, social identity. It is ascertained that three types of variables affect incentives: basic conditions (cultural change, etc.), basic values and needs (tradition, external values, etc.) and the dynamism of social identity, which includes the goals that are set. More specifically, the two basic variables that shape the incentives for human action and imbue dynamism in behavior relate to megalothymia—i.e., the need for acknowledgement of a person’s integrity along with the predisposition to be thought superior to others as well as the aspiration to a certain level of quality in life.
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Lee, Thomas H. „Financial versus Non-Financial Incentives for Improving Patient Experience“. Journal of Patient Experience 2, Nr. 1 (Mai 2015): 4–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/237437431500200102.

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Silver, Stephen E. „Financial Incentives“. Annals of Internal Medicine 113, Nr. 10 (15.11.1990): 808. http://dx.doi.org/10.7326/0003-4819-113-10-808.

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Willett, R. „Financial incentives“. British Dental Journal 200, Nr. 11 (Juni 2006): 599–600. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/sj.bdj.4813689.

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Main, David. „Financial incentives“. In Practice 36, Nr. 5 (Mai 2014): 262–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/inp.g2826.

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Gold, Marsha. „Financial incentives“. Journal of General Internal Medicine 14, S1 (Januar 1999): S6—S12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1046/j.1525-1497.1999.00260.x.

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Singh, Harcharanjit, Rossilah Jamil, Mas Bambang Baroto, Maizaitulaidawati Hussin, Yu Boyi und Sukmindar Singh. „Impact of Financial and Non-Financial Incentives on Employee Performance“. Advanced Science Letters 23, Nr. 1 (01.01.2017): 146–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1166/asl.2017.7181.

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Sukanta, I. Wayan, Anik Yuesti und Putu Kepramareni. „The Influence of Financial Incentives and Non Financial Incentives to Job Performance: Motivation of Work as A Variable of Modernation in Employee Cooperation of Save Loans (Ksp) Mitra Sari Dana Denpasar Oleh“. International Journal of Contemporary Research and Review 9, Nr. 07 (19.07.2018): 20886–900. http://dx.doi.org/10.15520/ijcrr/2018/9/07/552.

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The purpose of this study is to analyze the influence of financial incentives on job motivation, the influence of non-financial incentives on job motivation, the influence of financial incentives on job performance, the influence of non-financial incentives on job performance, and the influence of work motivation on job performance in the Cooperative Savings and Loans (KSP) Mitra Sari Dana Denpasar. This research is a quantitative research using primary data obtained from the questionnaire and measured by using Likert scale. The population of this research is employees at Savings and Loans Cooperative (KSP) Mitra Sari Dana Denpasar. The method of selecting the sample of this study using purposive sampling. The sample of this research is all employees who work Cooperative Savings and Loans (KSP) Mitra Sari Dana Denpasar as much as 32 people. Data analysis technique used in this research is Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) based on Partial Least Square (PLS) using SmartPLS 3.0 program.The result of the research shows that (1) financial incentive has positive and significant effect to job motivation, (2) non financial incentive has positive and significant effect to job motivation, (3) financial incentive has positive and significant effect to job performance, (5) the influence of mediation of job motivation variable on indirect influence of financial incentive to job performance is partial, and (7) influence of mediation job motivation variable on the indirect effect of non-financial incentives on job performance is partial
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Scott, Anthony, und Luke B. Connelly. „Financial incentives and the health workforce“. Australian Health Review 35, Nr. 3 (2011): 273. http://dx.doi.org/10.1071/ah10904.

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Changes to the remuneration of medical practitioners are currently being considered in Australia. In this paper, we provide a discussion of financial incentives in healthcare markets and their effects on health professionals’ behaviour. After defining incentives, the paper focuses on the design of incentive schemes for the health workforce. It discusses several issues that should be considered when designing incentives, illustrated with some Australian examples. What are the objectives of the incentive scheme? What types of incentives can be used and under what circumstances? What is the empirical evidence around the effects of incentive schemes? What unintended consequences might exist? The paper concludes with a set of principles around which incentives can be designed. These principles might be used to inform the current debate about revisions to the incentives that are faced by medical practitioners in Australia.
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Safavi, Kaveh. „Aligning Financial Incentives“. Journal of Healthcare Management 51, Nr. 3 (Mai 2006): 146–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/00115514-200605000-00003.

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Dissertationen zum Thema "Financial and non-financial incentives"

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Farbmacher, Helmut. „Financial incentives and behavior“. Diss., lmu, 2012. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-146559.

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Van, Alfen Tyson D. „ESSAYS ON FINANCIAL INCENTIVES“. UKnowledge, 2019. https://uknowledge.uky.edu/finance_etds/9.

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In my first chapter, I use a novel dataset of customer reviews from Amazon.com to study the impact of managerial myopia on product market reputation. Using exogenous variation due to the timing of CEO equity vesting events, I show that short-term incentive shocks predict declines in reputation. A changing product market lineup and a deterioration of existing products are two mechanisms through which reputation is affected. The effect is larger when the CEO has other short-term concerns and when the firm has a low reputation in the product market. However, higher advertising expenses mitigate the negative reputational effect among consumers. Using an alternative empirical methodology, I find that higher short-term ownership in the firm is also associated with declining product market reputation, while higher long-term ownership is associated with increasing reputation. My second chapter uses a different setting to examine the consequences of personal wealth incentives. We test whether household wealth shocks affect professional misconduct by financial advisors. We use a panel of advisors' home addresses and examine within-advisor variation relative to other advisors who work at the same firm and live in the same ZIP code. We show that advisors increase misconduct following declines in their homes' values. The increased misconduct is due, in part, to willful actions, such as churning. We show that advisors' housing returns explain misconduct targeting out-of-state customers, breaking the link between customer and advisor housing shocks. Further, the results are stronger for advisors with lower career risk from committing misconduct.
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Hall, Jonathan. „Digitalization of Facility Management : Financial Incentives“. Thesis, KTH, Fastigheter och byggande, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-236766.

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The digital reality is within this current moment debated and something that affects people. Upcoming years in real estate in general, it will be crucial of developments within the industry concerning digital solutions. The processes, business and approaches that have affected an industry for a very long time are changing in its foundations. Owning a property or managing an object in the coming years in an increasingly digitized world will bring new types of demands on organizations that intend to participate in the development. For a long time, digitization has existed as a concept seeming exciting and interesting. Smart devices have taken a larger part of time through telephones, televisions and likewise. Banking processes have evolved through phones and other digital tools to provide new variations of banking services. Airports have developed digital check-in services, which mean that you are actually virtually on the plane before you arrive at the airport. The development of these banking and tourism services changes the market and companies have been able to take part of the market by providing new solutions.  In development and innovation, there is a term used repeatedly, the idea of a “disruptive innovation”. More explicitly, a new innovation that destroys the previously functioning market. As a concrete example, the previously well-functioning camera - today largely exchanged for the digital camera. Or the previously mentioned development of banks and flight processes. It has previously been functioning markets, however, these new processes and innovations have eliminated earlier working solutions by performing better.   The study investigates possibilities closer if there are potential "disruptive innovations" in facility management and digital key control. The thesis has been focusing on the consequences of digital keys by using a model to analyse the impact on work in a future process. The physical key is one of the most ancient innovations that have been refined and developed over the centuries. With the new digital reality, it may be possible to find a new process that create better functions.
Kommande år i fastighetsförvaltning i allmänhet kommer det att vara avgörande för utvecklingen inom industrin med digitala lösningar. De processer, affärer och tillvägagångssätt som har påverkat en bransch under en mycket lång tid är på väg att förändras i grunden. Äga en fastighet eller förvalta ett objekt de närmaste åren i en alltmer digitaliserad värld kommer att medföra nya typer av krav på organisationer som avser att delta i utvecklingen och vara aktuell på marknaden. Under lång tid har digitalisering funnits som ett koncept som synes spännande och intressant. Smarta enheter har tagit en större del av tiden via telefoner, tv-apparater och liknande. Bankprocesser har utvecklats genom telefoner och andra digitala verktyg för att ge nya variationer av banktjänster. Flygplatser har utvecklat digitala incheckningstjänster, vilket innebär att du faktiskt är på planet innan du kommer till flygplatsen. Utvecklingen av dessa bank- och turismtjänster förändrar marknaden och företagen har kunnat ta del av marknaden genom att erbjuda nya lösningar. Inom utveckling och innovation finns det ett begrepp vilket används återkommande, en idé om en ”disruptive innovation”. Mer explicit, att en ny innovation förstör den tidigare fungerande marknaden, där det konkreta exemplet är den tidigare väl fungerande kameran vilken idag i stor omfattning är utbytt till den digitala kameran. Eller den tidigare nämnda utvecklingen av bank och flygprocesser. Det har tidigare varit fungerande marknader, dock har nya processer och innovationer slagit ut tidigare fungerande lösningar.  I det här arbetet har möjligheterna undersökts närmre ifall det går att finna potentiella ”disruptive innovations” inom fastighetsförvaltning. Den fysiska nyckeln är en utav de mest antika innovationerna som genom årtusenden och århundranden har förfinats och utvecklats. Med den nya digitala verkligheten kan det vara möjligt att finna en ny process vilken fungerar på ett bättre sätt.
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Liu, Chung-shu. „Objectives and incentives in financial markets“. Diss., Virginia Tech, 1994. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/40155.

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This dissertation is a collection of papers investigating objectives and incentives in financial markets. The first essay (Chapter 2) deals with the endogenous determination of credit history, credit-worthiness, loans and efforts by borrowers over time. A financial market with adverse selection and moral hazard is analyzed. Facing the adverse selection, lenders are not able to offer separate contracts to different types of borrowers. However, knowing borrowers' credit histories, lenders are able to assign different credit worthiness to borrowers that have different credit histories, and offer different contracts to different groups. It is shown that if borrowers' credit rating is too low, they make low effort to repay their debts. As a borrower acquires a good credit history and has his credit-rating upgraded above a certain point, it becomes worthwhile for him to choose high effort. A low quality borrower may make high effort in early periods in order to build up a good credit history and obtain better terms in the future contracts then shift back to the low effort even though his project continues to succeed when he approaches the end of his life.
Ph. D.
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Chen, Li. „Financial analysts' underreaction and reputation-building incentives“. Thesis, University of Auckland, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/2292/19643.

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This thesis examines the role of reputation in financial analysts' underreaction in earnings forecasts. Prior research suggests that the reputation effect mitigates short-term economic incentives that lead to overly optimistic forecasts, and hence, increases forecast accuracy (i.e., an aspect of high quality forecasts). In contrast, I hypothesise that certain factors affecting analyst reputation lead to analysts' underreaction. Specifically, when faced with uncertainty, analysts employ underreaction as a mechanism to improve consistency between their forecast revisions and subsequent news (i.e., another aspect of high quality forecasts), so as to protect themselves from incurring a higher reputation cost of inaccuracy for inconsistent versus consistent consecutive forecast revisions and forecast errors (i.e., asymmetric reputation cost). In my first research question, I examine the asymmetric reputation cost theory that predicts underreaction increasing with uncertainty and asymmetric reputation cost. I contextualise my study in business cycles where both factors change. I predict and find that uncertainty is greater during recessions than expansions whereas asymmetric reputation cost is greater during expansions than recessions (i.e., reputation concerns are greater during expansions). Further, I find that analysts' underreaction is greater during expansions than recessions. The implication is that the asymmetric reputation cost, rather than the uncertainty, drives analysts' underreaction. In my second research question, I investigate the differential underreaction to good news versus bad news in relation to short-term economic incentives and the reputation-building incentives simultaneously. If analysts put more emphasis on short-term gains, they will underreact more to bad news than good news, particularly during recessions where the short-term economic incentives are heightened. On the contrary, if analysts are more concerned with their reputations, they will underreact less (more) to bad news than good news during recessions (expansions), because bad (good) news is more likely to follow in bad (good) times and, accordingly, they can incorporate the current bad (good) news with greater confidence. My findings are consistent with the reputation-building incentive theory, but inconsistent with the short-term incentive theory. Robustness tests and further research considering industry/firm specific information provide consistent results. Overall, the thesis suggests that analysts underreact to information due to their reputation concerns.
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Papanicolas, Irene. „The new NHS : financial incentives for quality?“ Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2011. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/144/.

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In April 2002, five years after the Blair government’s proposals to create a ‘New NHS [National Health Service]’, the government outlined the key priorities that would mark the NHS reform. The main reforms involved patient choice supported by a system of ‘Payment by Results’ (PbR) under which hospitals would be funded on the activity they undertook. PbR is a case based payment system, a type of system increasingly being adopted as the main form of provider payment across industrialised countries. The literature on this type of payment system and experiences from other countries identifies many di!erent behavioural incentives that can have both positive and negative impacts on quality of care. This thesis investigates the quality implications observed so far in England, for seven conditions which represent a spectrum of important clinical areas that are admitted through both emergency and elective admissions. In order to identify changes in quality, this thesis first considers how to construct an appropriate measure of quality. The first part of the thesis utilizes two di!erent methodological techniques used for quality measurement; a latent variable approach and a technique put forward by McClellan and Staiger (1999) using Vector Autoregressions. The results from these techniques indicate that quality measurement approaches di!er markedly with regards to how much measurement and systematic error they are able to filter out of raw outcome data. Finally, the new indicators created by these techniques are used to evaluate the quality impact the introduction of PbR as the main form of hospital payment has had in England. The analysis indicates that since the policy’s implementation, there have been di!erential quality e!ects on the di!erent conditions. However, for the most part this indicates an improvement in mortality outcomes, and a reduction in the variation of outcomes across hospitals. As found, the interpretation of readmissions has to be approached with caution as more severe patients being kept alive through quality improving measures on mortality create more mixed signals for the readmission indicators. In two conditions we find changes in activity that are indicative of e"ciency gains, in the form of better coding and adoption of new technology, both as a result of differences in reimbursement categories.
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Ohinata, Asako. „Financial incentives and the timing of birth“. Thesis, University of Warwick, 2011. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/49108/.

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This thesis studies how financial incentives affect women's fertility timing decisions. Each chapter investigates this question by looking at a policy that exogenously increased fertility related financial incentives. The timing impacts of these policies are estimated using a discrete-time proportional hazard model with unobserved heterogeneity. In the first chapter, the impact of the 1999 UK Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) on the timing of birth is studied. This paper employs the 1991-2003 waves of the British Household Panel Survey and identifies the policy impact of WFTC by observing the change in the timing of birth using a difference in differences estimator. The main finding of this paper suggests little evidence of changes in the timing of all birth parity apart from first birth. Such a finding is likely to be explained by the policy design of WFTC that increased not only the fertility but also the labour supply incentives simultaneously. Moreover, a further analysis highlights the importance of other policies, which also in uenced women's labour supply during the period of study. The second chapter, on the other hand, studies the impact of the 1977-2001 US infertility health insurance mandates, which regulated the insurance companies to cover for infertility treatment cost. Although the majority of the past literature has studied impacts on older women who are likely to seek treatment, this paper proposes that the mandates may have had a wider impact on the US population. Specifically, it may have given an option for younger women to delay birth since these policies reduced the opportunity cost of having a child in the future. The chapter employs the 1980-2001 Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Results suggest a significant delay of 1-2 years in the time of first birth among highly educated white women.
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Zheng, Lingling. „Incentives and imperfect learning in financial markets“. Thesis, Imperial College London, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10044/1/23928.

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This thesis aims to explore the impacts of investors' imperfect learning behavior on asset prices and the economic consequences of misaligned incentives of financial intermediaries in a world with asymmetric information.
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Chew, Tong-Gunn. „Incentives for voluntary disclosures of derivative financial instruments by financial institutions in Singapore“. Monash University, Dept. of Accounting and Finance, 2004. http://arrow.monash.edu.au/hdl/1959.1/5301.

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Melence, Gatsinda. „Factors that influence intention to stay amongst health workers in Kabaya, Rwanda“. Thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/11394/4526.

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Magister Public Health - MPH
Background: Adequate human resources for health play a crucial role in improving access to services and quality of care. Human resources for health are often inequitably distributed between rural and urban areas within countries. In Rwanda, almost 88% of physicians and 58% of nurses in the country work in urban areas, despite the fact that 82% of the population lives in rural areas. Kabaya is located in a remote rural area in Ngororero District; its health facilities consist of one hospital and four health centers. Living and working conditions are poor for health workers. This results in constant migration out of health workers, which has negative impacts on service delivery and quality of care provided to the population. Aim and Objectives: This study aimed to assess factors that influence the intention to stay in Kabaya amongst health workers currently in Kabaya's health facilities. The specific objectives were to analyze the associations between the following factors and intention to stay among health workers in Kabaya: socio-demographic and job characteristics; working and living conditions; and financial and non-financial incentives. Study design: An analytical, cross-sectional survey of all health workers from five facilities in Kabaya was conducted. Methods: A self-administered questionnaire, adapted from one used in a study in Uganda (Hagopian, Zuyderduin, Kyobutungi & Yunkella, 2006), was used to collect data. Data were entered in Epi- Info 3.4 and analyzed using SPSS 16.0. Descriptive analyses and inferential statistics (Chisquare,Fisher‟s Exact) were done to test for associations with the main outcome, intention to stay. Results Out of 155 employees working in Kabaya‟s health facilities, 111 (72%) accepted to participate in the study. Of the 111 respondents, 34 (31%) indicated they intended to stay working in Kabaya indefinitely. Intention to stay (bivariate analysis) was associated with:  employment category (p=0.001) and age (p<0.001);  rural background - born in Kabaya (p<0.001); and born (p=0.001), grew up (p=0.001) and studied in a rural area (p<0.001); good quality supervision - encouraging employee development (p=0.029), caring for the employee as a person (p=0.011), and competent and committed facility managers(p=0.039);  presence of workplace friends (p<0.001);  conducive work and living environments - manageable workloads (p<0.001); good infrastructure (p<0.001); access to safe and clean water at work (p<0.001); adequate housing at home (p<0.001); having time to take lunch at work (p=0.001); access to adequate transportation to work (p=0.004); adequate shopping and entertainment(p=0.001);  adequate incentives - sufficient salary (p<0.001); recognition for doing a good work(p<0.001); and adequate training (p<0.001). The small study sample precluded multi-variate analyses and it was therefore not possible to control for potential confounders such as age, sex and profession in the analysis of workplace factors. Conclusions: Intention to stay in Kabaya appears to be influenced by a complex set of factors that include: individual (age, profession, rural background), workplace, human, social, career and salaryrelated factors. Promoting retention in Kabaya‟s health facilities requires multi-faceted interventions, without which the majority of the employees are likely to continue to migrate away from the area.
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Bücher zum Thema "Financial and non-financial incentives"

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Matin, Khan Abdul. Financial incentives to industry. Islamabad: Sustainable Development Policy Institute, 2001.

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Roots, Paul. Financial incentives for employees. London: BSP Professional Books, 1989.

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Chakravorti, Sujit. Managerial incentives and financial contagion. [Washington, D.C.]: International Monetary Fund, Policy Development and Review Dept., 2004.

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Cohen, Alma. Do financial incentives affect fertility? Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007.

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Richardson, J. R. J. Financial incentives & entrepreneurial medicine: Problems & solutions. Kensington, N.S.W., Australia: School of Health Administration, University of New South Wales, 1987.

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Eden, Dov. Financial and nonfinancial motivation. Tel Aviv, Israel: Tel Aviv University, Faculty of Management, Leon Recanati Graduate School of Business Administration, 1990.

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S, Walker John. A financial-agency analysis of privatization: Managerial incentives and financial contracting. Bethlehem, PA: Lehigh University Press, 1997.

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Gruber, Jonathan. Physician financial incentives and cesarean section delivery. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1994.

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Bhattacharya, Sudipto. Proprietary information, financial intermediation and research incentives. London: London School of Economics, Financial Markets Group, 1994.

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Parnell, Philip. Attitudes towards financial incentives for green buildings. [U.K.]: Drivers Jonas, 1999.

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Buchteile zum Thema "Financial and non-financial incentives"

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Verster, Joris C., Thomas M. Tzschentke, Kieran O’Malley, Francis C. Colpaert, Bart Ellenbroek, Bart Ellenbroek, R. Hamish McAllister-Williams et al. „Financial Incentives“. In Encyclopedia of Psychopharmacology, 533. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-68706-1_3274.

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Struewer, Bjoern, Rory Tews und Christina Moehrle. „Social Impact Incentives (SIINC)“. In Sustainable Financial Innovations, 133–48. First Edition. | Boca Raton, FL : Taylor & Francis, [2018]: CRC Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1201/9781315156194-7.

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Gaillard-Ladinska, Elīna, Mariëlle Non und Bas Straathof. „More R&D with tax incentives? *“. In International Financial Markets, 316–35. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2019. | Series: Routledge advances in applied financial econometrics ; volume 1: Routledge, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315162775-11.

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Jacobs, Michael. „Financial Incentives: The British Experience“. In Markets, the State and the Environment, 113–28. London: Macmillan Education UK, 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-14022-0_6.

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“Johnny” Ngan, Tsuen-Wan, Roger Dingledine und Dan S. Wallach. „Building Incentives into Tor“. In Financial Cryptography and Data Security, 238–56. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14577-3_19.

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Finnegan, Stephen. „Incentives to investment“. In New Financial Strategies for Sustainable Buildings, 42–59. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2018. |: Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315563725-3.

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Thompson, Steve. „Agency costs, incentives and management buyouts“. In Perspectives on Financial Control, 145–66. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1992. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-3053-8_7.

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Margolin, N. Boris, und Brian N. Levine. „Informant: Detecting Sybils Using Incentives“. In Financial Cryptography and Data Security, 192–207. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77366-5_18.

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Cruciani, Caterina. „Financial Advisory: Normative Developments and Incentives“. In Investor Decision-Making and the Role of the Financial Advisor, 93–126. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68234-1_4.

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Godbole, Nina S., und John P. Lamb. „Green Healthcare Economics: The Financial Incentives“. In Making Healthcare Green, 119–25. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-79069-5_9.

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Konferenzberichte zum Thema "Financial and non-financial incentives"

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Shuid, Siti Hawa, und Rohaya Md Noor. „Effectiveness of financial incentives on SMEs' financial performance in Malaysia“. In 2012 IEEE Colloquium on Humanities, Science and Engineering (CHUSER). IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/chuser.2012.6504394.

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Zhang, Jian, Alta Knizley und Heejin Cho. „An Evaluation of Financial Incentive Policies for Solar Photovoltaic Systems in the U.S.“ In ASME 2017 11th International Conference on Energy Sustainability collocated with the ASME 2017 Power Conference Joint With ICOPE-17, the ASME 2017 15th International Conference on Fuel Cell Science, Engineering and Technology, and the ASME 2017 Nuclear Forum. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/es2017-3693.

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This paper analyzes some of the existing incentives for solar photovoltaic (PV) energy generation in the U.S. to investigate how effectively those existing incentive policies can promote PV adaptions in the U.S. market. Two common building types (i.e., hospitals and large hotels) located in five different U.S. states, each having their own incentives, are selected and analyzed for the PV incentive policies. The payback period of the PV system is chosen as an indicator to analyze and critique the effectiveness of each incentive by comparing the payback periods before and after taking the incentive into consideration. In this way, the existing incentive policies implemented by utility companies in each state are analyzed and critiqued. Finally, a parametric analysis is conducted to determine the influence of the variation in key parameters, such as PV system capacity and PV capital cost, on the performance of PV system. The results show how the existing incentives can be effectively used to promote the PV systems in the U.S. and how variations of the parameters can impact the payback period of the PV systems. Through the evaluation of the existing incentive policies and the parametric study, this paper demonstrates that the type and level of incentives should be carefully determined in policy-making processes to effectively promote the PV systems.
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Mason, Winter, und Duncan J. Watts. „Financial incentives and the "performance of crowds"“. In the ACM SIGKDD Workshop. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1600150.1600175.

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Terzian, G. A., J. M. Enright und J. P. Brashear. „Financial Incentives for Marginal Oil and Gas Production“. In SPE Hydrocarbon Economics and Evaluation Symposium. Society of Petroleum Engineers, 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.2118/30045-ms.

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Inaba, Tatsuya. „Used Product Acquisition Control by Financial Incentives in Remanufacturing“. In 2019 IEEE International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management (IEEM). IEEE, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ieem44572.2019.8978641.

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„Financial Incentives for Sustainable Property - A 10 Year Perspective“. In 2005 European Real Estate Society conference in association with the International Real Estate Society: ERES Conference 2005. ERES, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.15396/eres2005_308.

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Schuldenzucker, Steffen, und Sven Seuken. „Portfolio Compression in Financial Networks: Incentives and Systemic Risk“. In EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3391403.3399538.

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Schaefer, John. „Comparing Carbon Fees with Existing Financial Incentives for Solar Electricity“. In American Solar Energy Society National Solar Conference 2016. Freiburg, Germany: International Solar Energy Society, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.18086/solar.2016.01.21.

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Jaffe, Caroline, Cristina Mata und Sepandar Kamvar. „Motivating urban cycling through a blockchain-based financial incentives system“. In UbiComp '17: The 2017 ACM International Joint Conference on Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3123024.3123141.

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Melikov, Y. I., und A. Y. Glinskaya. „WAYS TO IMPROVE THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF PERSONAL SUBSIDIARY FARMS“. In STATE AND DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS OF AGRIBUSINESS Volume 2. DSTU-Print, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.23947/interagro.2020.2.660-664.

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The issues of functioning of personal subsidiary farms, the existing problems that hinder their development and increase their financial and economic efficiency are considered. The advantages and disadvantages of PSF as the most popular category of agricultural producers are shown. Based on the survey of twenty-five private farms in the Rostov region and Krasnodar territory, the ways to improve financial and economic efficiency based on financial and credit incentives for their development are identified.
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Berichte der Organisationen zum Thema "Financial and non-financial incentives"

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Cohen, Alma, Rajeev Dehejia und Dmitri Romanov. Do Financial Incentives Affect Fertility? Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, Dezember 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w13700.

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Gruber, Jonathan, und Maria Owings. Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, November 1994. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w4933.

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García-Gómez, Pilar, Sergi Jiménez-Martín und Judit Vall Castelló. Financial Incentives, Health and Retirement in Spain. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, Februar 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w19913.

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Barro, Jason, und Nancy Beaulieu. Selection and Improvement: Physician Responses to Financial Incentives. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, Oktober 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w10017.

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Lee, Chanyoung. Improving Cost Effectiveness of Financial Incentives in Managing TDM. Tampa, FL: University of South Florida, Oktober 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/cutr-nctr-rr-2012-01.

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Ho, Kate, und Ariel Pakes. Hospital Choices, Hospital Prices and Financial Incentives to Physicians. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w19333.

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Fryer, Roland. Financial Incentives and Student Achievement: Evidence from Randomized Trials. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w15898.

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Cadena, Ximena, und Antoinette Schoar. Remembering to Pay? Reminders vs. Financial Incentives for Loan Payments. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, Mai 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w17020.

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Bakhtiar, M. Mehrab, Raymond Guiteras, James Levinsohn und Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak. Social and Financial Incentives for Overcoming a Collective Action Problem. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, September 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w29294.

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Albagli, Elias, Christian Hellwig und Aleh Tsyvinski. Imperfect Financial Markets and Shareholder Incentives in Partial and General Equilibrium. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, Mai 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w23419.

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